® Republic of the Philippines Sandiganbayan Quezon City SEVENTH DIVISION MINUTES of the proceedings held on February 2, 2017. Present: Hon. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO ~ — Chairperson Hon. MA. THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA ~ Associate Justice Hon. ZALDY V. TRESPESES Associate Justice The following resolution was adopted: Crim. Case No. SB-17-CRM-0001 to 0015 ~ People vs. JOSEFINA M. DELA CRUZ, etal This resolves the followin, 1. Accused Josefina M. dela Cruz's “MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION (Or Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, With Leave of Court, and with Prayer for Deferment of Arraignment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest)" dated January 10, 2017; and 2. The Prosecution’s “COMMENT/OPPOSITION (Re: Motion for Reinvestigation or Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, with Leave of Court, and with Prayer for Deferment of Arraignment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest dated 16 January 2017) filed by accused Ma, Josefina Mendoza dela Cruz” dated January 24, 2017. For resolution is accused Josefina dela Cruz’s Motion for Reinvestigation (or Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, with Leave of Court, and with Prayer for Deferment of Arraignment). In her Motion, she additionally prays to reverse and set aside the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated ‘August 18, 2015 and Order dated May 3, 2016, and to quash the Informations. Accused dela Cruz argues in her Motion that there is no cause of action against her, as this Court has no jurisdiction over this case, the GSIS having original and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Further, there is no probable cause against her because the failure to remit private complainant's loan amortizations to the GSIS was attributable to force majeure, the PPC having insufficient funds therefor due to financial woes. In its Comment, the Prosecution rejoins that the Informations sufficiently confer jurisdiction in this Court against accused dela Cruz, who is 1People. ostina Mt dela Cru, eta 2ipace (minal Case No, S-17-C2M.0001 to 0015. RESOLUTION indicted for an offense in relation to her office, and together with another accused with Salary Grade 28. As held by the Ombudsman, accused dela Cruz failed to substantiate her allegation that PPC lacked funds to remit loan amortization to the GSIS. She did not even present PPC’s trial balance to establish such financial incapacity to meet its obligations to the private complainant and the GSIS. Further, RA 8291 is a special law where good faith is not a defense. Accused dela Cruz’s Motion, though dubbed one for reinvestigation, is a mélange of pleas seeking disparate redresses. It discordantly seeks a reinvestigation and the reversal of the Ombudsman’s resolutions, a judicial determination of probable cause, and the quashal of the Informations. In one breath, accused dela Cruz hypothetically admits the allegations in the Informations and also contests them. Whether treated as a Motion for Reinvestigation, a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, or Motion to Quash, the instant motion must fail. There is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against accused dela Cruz. Accused dela Cruz cites Leviste v. Alameda, et al.' to urge this Court to review the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, maintaining that “any disposition of the case x x x rests in the sound discretion of the court”. This is misplaced as such discretion merely pertains to remedial measures to be taken once the Information has been filed. It does not grant this Court supremacy over the Ombudsman in the determination of probable cause. Precisely, in Leviste, the Supreme Court explained: There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial, The executive determination of probable cause is one made uring preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, ie., whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not, and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for piacing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Ifthe judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Paragraph (a), Section 5, / * GR. No. 182677, August 3, 2010People. Josefina M del Cur, Blpase ‘rmiral case Ne. 58-17-CRM-001 0015 RESOLUTION Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC. To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. (Boldface supplied; underscoring in the original) Hence, contrary to the submission of accused dela Cruz, this Court may not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause. While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor's finding? As the Supreme Court imparts in Joya v. Marquez’: xxx Probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably disereet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It bears remembering that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance. Thus, the standard used for the {issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him. (emphases supplied) Accused dela Cruz is charged with a violation of Section 52(g) of R.A. 8291, which provides: (g) The heads of the offices of the national government, its political subdivisions, branches, agencies and _instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the collection of premium contributions, loan amortization and other accounts. due the GSIS who shall fail, refuse or delay the payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time that the same shall have been due and demandable shall, ‘upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and a fine of not less 2 Mendoza v. People, etal, G.R. No. 197293, April 24, 2018 GR. No. 162416, January 31, 2006People. ostina M. dela Cru etal slpage Criminal Casa No. S-17-CRM.G001 to 0015 ResoLuTiON than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), and in addition, shall suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government. Based on the Records, this Court is convinced that there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against accused dela Cruz for violation of Section 52(g) of R.A. 8291. Indeed, the documents submitted would show that deductions were made from private complainant Santos Jose Pamatong’s salary from October 2011 up to December 2012 for his loan amortizations, which were not remitted to the GSIS within 30 days. It also appears that accused dela Cruz was head of the PPC during this period, being its Postmaster General. Accused dela Cruz’s insistence that the failure to remit loan payments to GSIS was due to circumstances beyond her control, as PPC suffered financial setbacks that rendered it unable to effect such remittances is a matter of defense that is best left for the Court to resolve after a full-blown trial on the merits.> Necessarily, this Court finds no reason to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation. This Court has jurisdiction over this case and accused dela Cruz. Speciously drawing on a mix of civil, administrative and criminal law concepts, accused dela Cruz claims that private complainant's purported violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies obtainable from the GSIS stripped the charges of a cause of action and this Court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in this wise: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before 1 party is allowed to seek the intervention of the cour, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum, (emphasis supplied)? “attachments to private complainant's Affidavit, Records, Vol. 1, pp. 21-36 5 Cf Co, etal. v. Republic etal, G.R. No. 168811, November 28, 2007. * Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008, tly,People. Josefina M dela Cr, ta Slrace (minal Case No, 58-17-0001 0015 RESOLUTION This is a criminal complaint charging an offense, and not a civil complaint based on a cause of action. Jurisdiction over criminal cases lies with the courts, and jurisdiction over these cases particularly lies with this Court. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not even come into play. Contrary, however, to the allegations of the Prosecution in its Comment, this Court’s jurisdiction over accused dela Cruz is provided not under Sec. 4(A)(5)’ of PD 1606, as amended, but under Sec. 4(A)(1)(g), in relation to Sec. 4(B), which provides: See. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, atthe time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act ‘No. 6758), specifically including: XXX (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;? B, Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. The Information plainly charges accused dela Cruz, the Postmaster General of Philippine Postal Corporation,'? a government-owned and controlled corporation, with the non-remittance of loan amortizations to the 7(5) all other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, ® Further amended by RA 10660, which “shall apply to cases arising from offenses committed after [its] effectivity” (Section 5) © Those tha fall within the original jurisdiction ofthe Sandiganbayan are: 1) officials ofthe executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (2) (a) to (g), regardless oftheir salary grades. (Duncano v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,G.R. No. 191894, uly 15, 2015) © Ra 7354, Ar, IV, Section 20. Executive Officers. - The [Philippine Postal] Corporation shall be managed by 1 Postmaster General who shall be assisted by as many Assistant Postmaster General as the Board ma deem necessary for postal efficiency. xxx TePeople, Josefinn Mela Cru, SIP ace imal Case No, SB.A7-CRMO00% to COIS RESOLUTION GSIS. Clearly, this case and accused dela Cruz fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. As explained in People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante:!! ‘A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter Il, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there g no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office. (emphases supplied) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused dela Cruz’s Motion for Reinvestigation (or Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, with Leave ‘of Court, and with Prayer for Deferment of Arraignment) is DENIED for lack of merit. Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused Josefina M. dela Cruz. SO ORDERED. Approved GESMUNDO, J., Chairperson GOMEZ-ESTOESTA, J. fs TRESPESES, J. 4 GR. No, 167304, August 25, 2009