‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES coe RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES SECTION 1. . Institution of criminal actions — Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows: (a) For offenses where a preliminary investiga- tion is required pursuant to section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary in- vestigation. (b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters, The institution of the criminal action shall inter- rupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws. (la) Source.—This is a substantial restatement of Section 1, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court, as amended in 1985 with amendment. The proviso excluding the offenses subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases was omitted, hence, the present rule now covers all offenses except those that may be provided in the charter of cities and other spe- cial laws. Modes of instituting criminal action —Under the old rules, a criminal action or prosecution may be instituted in the courts in either of two ways. First, it may be com- menced by any person presenting to a court a complaint. anSee, DURE Crmmnal, PROC Rule 110 A i the acti which begins ion i ig the procsee no other furthe, Such complaint we has been presented, a fe Where such cn amt of the prosecutor i ‘Second ae ding on the P complaint a: B CD a pro 4 a the prosecutor by filing with Petion may be commence i that case, such information is the court an 1 utes the action and prosecution pro- which insti : . Narv Soe it as the People’s pleading (oo 2 renee Phil. 410, 41D. The present procedur' consideration is pasically thi e outlined in the section under ‘e same, except that where a pre- liminary investigation is required pursuant to Section l(a), Rule 112, the criminal action must be. instituted by first fil- ing the corresponding complaint with the proper officer for purposes of preliminary investigation. The section referred to further provides that except where the accused is under ar- rest, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of the complaint or information for an of- fense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least “four (4) ven two (2) months and one (1) day, without regard to the ine. if ne presen however, falls under the jurisdiction a pal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial ourt, and the 1 7 years, two (2) rey for the offense is less than four (4) a id one (1) d ; instituted thi and © ay, the action may be with said ee complaint or information filed directly Sceont in Manila me aoe enone of the public prosecutor, as always t chartered citi jon office of the * be commenced by a co ‘ies where the acti ‘ i cutor, w erwise. So if the case; nless their charters provided oth- ity, said o ly with the Municipal , ‘ourt should refer the cas¢ r . refer RA 207), PrOPer action (Salcedo vs. Nobles aeRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 2 Meaning of “proper officer.”—The term “proper offi- cer” in Section 1(a) refer to officers authorized to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation, namely, the provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants, national and regional state prosecutors, and other officers as may be authorized by law. Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdiction. Interruption of the prescriptive period.—The last paragraph abandoned the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in People vs. Olarte, 119 SCRA 494, and adopted the ruling in the subsequent case of Francisco vs. Court of Ap- peals, 122 SCRA 483, to the effect that the filing of a crimi- nal action either by complaint or information for preliminary investigation or trial on the merit, interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged unless provided in special laws. Basis of a successful prosecution.—A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: identification of the author of the crime and the ~ actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to:convincingly prove the offender’s identity. The constitu- tional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties. (People us. Tumambing, 644 SCRA 482) «SEC. 2. The complaint or information.—The com- Plaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons @ay appear to be responsible for the offense involved. Ke0 CRIMINeS©" ~ Rule} i ction 1, Rule 110, 1964 ‘ Set : i 2 Repo a 35 without modification. a ed in ‘ . sation —A formal accusation acc’ 7: « e “al conditio dent to a valid nian y a is an essential ora no inal proceedings ft pa a a criminal offense, vated until 2 formal charge + penly made be brought or insti'e “at or information (See 41 Am. against the accuse vaation of the type ee 1-2). A formal acc of U y cee cannot be waived, and in its absence there is nothing for the court to act upon and the court acquires no jurisdiction (Harris vs. State, 46 Del. 111, 82 A2d 387). Accusation must be in writing —The demonstrable fallibility of human memory requires, in matters as serious as an imputation of a criminal offense, a more or less fixed memorial from which the parties concerned can take their bearing without much disagreement. A written accusation, besides being more compatible with the right of the accused = be informed of the nature and. cause of the accusation inst him, serves also th i F him to prepare his defense ea a yesh ee a fixed record. The court. i intelligently based upon rt, too, is enabled to appreciate fully the evidence and nes i submissioi i rs 2 accusation before hit ns of the parties vis-a-vis the i - im. As t] Fy litera scripta manet (The g fhe maxim goes, vox emissa volat; Men Poken word flies; the written letter Soure Rules of Court, aS notized to Eee suffering : Sreopk creof i © the criminal pro ‘heory has be, i of the hilippine Teduired to be in the : » Whose peace in lega! especti Pective then She ealby,$ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Bec. $ which it is to be commenced, whether by complaint or infor- mation, the criminal action must be in the name of the Peo- ple of the Philippines, not in the name of the political unit within which the crime was committed (City of Manila vs. Rizal, 27 Phil. 50; Ngo Yao Tit vs. Sheriff of Manila, 27 Phil. 378) or of the offended party (See People vs. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120). Moreover, the rationale behind the rule is “to pre- vent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private per- sons” (Chua-Burce vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 1). How- ever, a criminal action instituted in the name of the offended party or of a particular city, although erroneous, may not be quashed for the defect is merely one of form (People vs. San- tiago, supra; City of Manila vs. Rizal, supra) and may there- fore be cured at any stage of the trial (Ngo Yao Tit vs. Sheriff of Manila, supra). But in a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of ing to lack of jurisdiction or on other juris- he rules state that the petition may be aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved e and the private offended party or the complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case, so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on * jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not ’ pring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines, do vs, Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA & discretion amount: dictional grounds, tl filed by the person parties are the Stat .+-but in his name (Bernar« «- 68), a Accusation must be against all persons responsible “for the offense —The complaint or information must be filed against all persons who appear to be responsible for the é offense. The mandatory tenor of the section is demanded by a sound public policy, which would deprive prosecuting officers of the use of their discretion, in order that they may notEDURE 110 CRIMINAL PROC Rule s or favorites (Guiao vs. Fi. ired quantum is i of the require’ ‘ ete ae oie ha no alternative but to file inst. all persons inculpated thereby, the information against. eee a thereby to ign he fiscal chose Thus, W here formation all persons who autre responsible eee aie it becomes proper and necessary !0r —— for a tent court to require him to comply therewith (Guiao vs. Figueroa, supra). . As already stated, the complaint or information must be filed against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense or whom the fiscal believes to be guilty (U.S. vs. Abanzado, et al., 37 Phil. 658; U.S. vs. Fineza, 39 Phil. 948; Guiao vs. Figueroa, supra). However, in the matter of deter- mining whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a reason- able belief that a person has committed an offense, discretion lies in the prosecuting officer (Guiao vs. Figueroa, supra; Aaa ela eat AnO, od Phil. 435). Stated otherwise, it is compulsion to file a ’ i ou nature of his office, is under no is not convinced particular criminal information where he ed that he has evidence to su . pport the allega: tions thereof (Albert: One, 59 Phi ma ve. De la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406; People vs. ople vs. i e: shield or favor friends, protes' ute a pe ' him for consid be established by tl reer ose guilt may not, vidence submitted to arrassing for the = 30 SCRA 10). In- Prosecuti »» because in hie” 2 Case scuting attorney Sary evidence to oe opinion he a Sie eee " ‘i S © @ conviction a have the neces ; ecause he is not be emb; e com to do so, Ses to pro:Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 2° convinced of the merits of the case (Alberto us. De la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406). The reason for this rule is not difficult to see. The discretion given to the fiscal of not prosecuting where he is not convinced that the evidence gathered or presented would warrant the filing of an action in court is deemed nec- essary if we are to prevent the courts from being flooded with cases of doubtful merit or unduly compel the fiscal to work against his conviction. Although a prosecuting officer under the power vested upon him by law not only has the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of his office, he is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or malicious prose- cution (Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 392, 396). It goes with- out saying that if for any reason the fiscal failed to include the names of one or more criminals in the information, such persons are not relieved of penal liability; nor shall the ac- cused who have been charged with the offense be permitted to escape punishment merely because it develops in the course of the trial that there were other guilty participants in the crime (People us. Catli, 6 SCRA 642). On this score it has been ruled that unlike in civil cases where indispensable parties are required to be impleaded in ‘ order to allow for complete relief once the case is adjudicated, the determination of criminal liability is individual to each of the defendants. Even if the criminal court fails to acquire ' jurisdiction over one or some participants to a crime, it still is able to try those accused over whom it acquired jurisdic- tion, the criminal court will still be able to ascertain the in- dividual liability of those accused whom it could try, and hand down penalties based on the degree of their participa- tion in the crime. The absence of one or some of the accused may bear impact on the available evidence for the prosecu- ATRule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See tion or defense, but it does not deprive the trial court to ag, cordingly try the case based on the evidence that it is acty. ally available (Gabionza vs. Court of Appeals, 565 SCRA 38), Filing of information discretionary on the Prose. cutor—The determination of whether or not an information should be lodged with the court lies within the exclusive realm of the prosecutor (Ogburn vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 483). From these considerations, a corollary rule emerges; Since the fiscal is entitled to use his judgment and a meas. ure of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence pre- sented to him, it is clear that the exercise of such judgment and discretion may not be controlled by mandamus (Gonza- les vs. Serrano, 25 SCRA 64). For, where the law demands that all persons who appear responsible for an offense shall be charged in the information, it also implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence exist are not to be in- cluded in the charge; and the determination of whether ot not there is, as against any person, sufficient evidence of guilt to warrant his prosecution necessarily involves the exercise of discretion by the prosecuting officer (Maddela vs. aii pe nea 488; People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA oat not lie to aes i arr eader on a ped mandanus vl quasi-judicial nee te ae cape Rs fag e 97 Fill 481)Dinino gal Rehabicien Ace Corolle 91 Phil, 608; Llant is abilitation Finance Corporatio” 31, 1966). Prosecutiy vs. Dimaporo, G.R. No. L-21905, MareRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES a prosecuting officer to determine whether the evidence: at hand is sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that a per- son has committed an offense, this power or prerogative is not, however, altogether absolute. It is subject to judicial review in proper cases, as where from the evidence submit- ted and gathered by the prosecuting officer a person appear- ing responsible for the commission of an offense is not in- cluded in the information (De Castro, Jr. vs. Castafieda, 1 SCRA 1131). In other words, although it is a matter of dis- cretion on the part of the prosecuting attorney to determine which persons “appear” responsible for the commission of a crime, yet the moment he finds one to be so liable, it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prose- cute him for the same. The provision then ceases to be merely discretionary; it becomes mandatory (Matute vs. Ab- >, bas, 6 C.A. Rep. 629). So where the fiscal abuses his discre- = tion by refusing to include a person as a co-accused despite =» sufficient evidence against the latter, mandamus will lie ==. against him as his act amounts to a deliberate refusal to “< perform a duty enjoined by law (Gonzales vs. Court of First «= Instance, 63 Phil. 846; Guiao vs. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018; De Castro, Jr. vs. Castafieda, supra; Bernabe vs. Bolinas, 18 SCRA 812; Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367). Parenthetically, every person accused of a crime “has a positive interest in the inclusion of all his co- : conspirators, a right to demand that all of them be accorded qual treatment and be made to suffer the penalties imposed - by law. Without deciding the question as to whether or not “+ any private citizen may demand compliance by the fiscal “>. With the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 106 of the 1964 Rules of Court requiring him to file the information “against all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense,” the upreme Court nonetheless held that the other accused have an interest in the inclusion of their companions in the com- mission of the crime, because they are jointly and severally 49Je 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See. Rule liable with them for indemnities that may be imposed upon able them for the offense they may have committed together 1 (Guiao us. Figueroa supra). Criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined; excep. tions Eminent authorities are agreed that, being vested with public interest, writs of injunction or prohibition to restrain a criminal prosecution are generally not available (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103; Arkoncel vs. CFI of Basilan City, 6 SCRA 361). Public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prose- cuted for the protection of society (Nicomedes vs. Chief of Constabulary, 110 Phil. 52; Grinen vs. Consolacion, 115 Phil. 697; Asutilla vs. PNB, 141 SCRA 41; Romero vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 170 SCRA 408). Furthermore, the accused has an adequate remedy at law by establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did not commit the act charged, or that the statute, on which the prosecution is based, is void, and, in case of conviction, by taking an appeal (George 0: P Sct 101 Phil. 886; Arkoncel vs. CFI of Basilan City, An injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution (Peopl: 7 Ps 2 - more reason way es: Mencias, 124 Phil. 1436, 1440). With injuncti . Sma the preliminary inve ction not lie when the case is still #Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES — stop a purported enforcement of the criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice, (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, (c) to avoid multiplicity of suits, (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights, and (e) where the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was declared void (Hernandez vs. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, citing cases; Ramos vs. Torres, 25 SCRA 557; People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748; Dimayuga vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; University of the Philippines vs. City Fiscal of Quezon City, 2 SCRA 980). In Guingona, Jr. vs. City Fiscal of Manila (1837 SCRA 597), the petition for prohibition and injunction of the pre- liminary investigation of Guingona, Jr. and. his co- = respondent was granted on the ground that the complaint for estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign exchange, is civil in nature. However, in a motion for reconsideration, the peti- tion was dismissed and the City Fiscal of Manila was di- rected to finish the preliminary investigation it appearing “. that he has jurisdiction over the case and that the filing of « the injunction and prohibition case is premature. The case ~ does not fall within any of the exceptions where prohibition lies to stop the preliminary investigation (Guingona, Jr. vs. City Fiscal of Manila, 137 SCRA 597). ©: Lately, however, the Supreme Court in the case of Do- mondon vs. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 292 and De Jesus vs. landiganbayan, 536 SCRA 394, reiterated its previous rul- ing in Broca vs. Enrile, 192 SCRA 83, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 201, the recognized exceptions of the general rule that criminal Prosecution cannot be enjoined in the following cases: :¢._ a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional Tights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., 19 SCRA = 95); 51Rule 110 dministration of he orderly a : of b. When necessary fe altiplicity of actions (Dj. justice or to avoid OPP 43 Phil. 304: Hernandez vs, mayuga, et al. Vs. Fernan om et al., 104 SCRA 607); supra; Fortun vs Labang, aa Aa here is a prejudicial question which is subju- When there 18 7 dice (De Leon vs. Mabanaé, 70 Phil. 202); ; ; d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62); an ion i der an invalid law, ordi- e. Where the prosecution 1S un C : nance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389); f, When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (San- galang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140); g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez us. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616); h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prose- cution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25. 1960); i. Where the charges are manifest]. i ly false and moti- ee the lust for vengance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 LJ. pee an anos vs, Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. °30720-R, SCRA 577}; 5 Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, 128 J. When there is cle: accused and a motion to : arly no prima facie case against the nied (Salonga vs, Pajio, 5 quash on that ground has been de- a et al., 134 SCRA 438); fad = = » To prevent thi e thi ers. (Ocampo, IV ys, Ombuane’ unlawful arrest of peti- Juridical one n, 225 SCRA 725.) cusation, tionRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Bee 8 tice and procedure in criminal actions whereby a corporation, as such, may be proceeded against criminally and brought jnto court (West Coast Life Insurance Co. vs. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401). If the accused is a corporation, no criminal action can lie against it (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303). If the cor- poration violates the law, the officer, through whom the cor- poration acts, answers criminally for his acts (People vs. Campos [CA], 40 O.G. Sup. 12, 7). SEC. 3. Complaint defined—Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. (3) Source.—Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court,:as amended in 1985, without amendment. The changes are basically stylistic in that un- necessary words and phrases in the previous rule are de- leted. Persons authorized to file complaint.—Under the above Section, only three sets of persons may file a criminal complaint, namely: (1) the offended party, (2) a peace officer, - and (3) a public officer charged with the enforcement of the = Jaw violated. Outside of those enumerated, no other person ‘may file a complaint (See Albano vs. Arranz, 15 SCRA 518). Consequently, a fiscal has no authority to file a complaint {Albano vs. Arranz, supra). Nor a person who has not been, might bé injured by the commission of the act denounced a crime, has authority to commence a criminal action (U.S. vs. Malabon, 1 Phil. 731). -}° Offended party, defined.—Justice Feria, in a concur- ing opinion, defined the “offended party” as the person against whom or against whose property the crime was 53See, le 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ; Rule i varra U: ti committe meron system, where the prosecution of q pobut resentative of the goy. public offense is aes 4 ioe a individual citizen canny nae ee that purpose, our rules of criminal Proce. postin vesely recognize the right of the party injured by the somission of an offense to file a complaint aa inn of. fender. It is necessary to maintain the private via one of the injured party himself, in consequence ot e om inued operation of the Penal Code, for two reasons: first, ecause, on principle, the declaration of the criminal liability carries with it the declaration of the resulting civil obligation; and, second, because there are crimes which can not be prose- cuted other than at the formal instance of the person injured (U.S. vs. Malabon, supra). The offended party is the person who is entitled to civil indemnity in the civil action arising out of the criminal act for which the accused is charged (See People vs. Obusan, 75 0.G. 8114), and this includes, for example, the widow of a murdered husband (Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Vda. de Mercado, 29 SCRA 116) and the sister of the deceased victim (Pobre us. Court of Appeals, 463 SCRA 51 : criminal complaint is 0). The right, however, to file a § personal to the offended party, a right that oa upon his death and is intransmiesible to bis 's (Guevarra vs, Del Rosario, 29 SCRA 615) Peace officers “« authori 7 / term “peace officers” = the sedan” file complaint.—The 46 SCRA 7 ts ur - ement agen vestigation (RA Rouge > Criminal Investigation © the Philippine National Bation Group, President i "Ants u identia: s. Del Rosario, 77 Phil. 615, 621) °4 Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Bese Crime Commission, etc. (See People vs. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 427; People vs. Perez, 75 Phil. 20). Examples of public officers charged with the en- forcement of the law violated.—The typical examples of public officers charged with the enforcement of the law vio- lated are internal revenue agents with respect to violations of the National Internal Revenue Code, customs agents with respect to violations of the Tariff and Customs Code and authorized agents of the National Pollution Council, with respect to violations of the Anti-Pollution Law. Complaint may be filed with the court or the of- fice of the fiscal.—In Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 78 Phil. 827, the Supreme Court held that “it is not correct to say that a complaint, as defined in Section 2, Rule 10 (now Section 3, Rule 110), must be filed with a court of justice, because said section, which provides that a ‘complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the government or governmental institution in charge of the -. enforcement or execution of the law violated’ does not require that it be filed with a court of justice.” Unlike an informa- tion, a complaint need not necessarily be filed with the court d may therefore be laid before the City Fiscal for investi- gation (See People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565). In the case of People vs. Santos, 101 Phil. 789, a “salay- Say” executed by an offended party in a prosecution for rape before the Provincial Fiscal, although narrative of how the : crime was committed, “is not the complaint contemplated in and required by Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the Rules of Court ‘éctions 2, 4 and 5 of the 1964 Rules of Court) and Article fet of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint contemplated ty the law and the rules is necessarily that one filed in court. The ‘salaysay’ was filed with the fiscal and not with the RRthe criminal proceeding” (See also Hep. court; it did not ces SCRA 607). There appears good reasy nandez vs- nder the new procedure; & ae may by to believe hee the fiscal’s office or wt uurt, excep, i filed either ei ther chartered cities. By express Provision in Manila and © he offense is cognizable by the Regional of the rule, pene aes must be instituted by, filing the com. in Trial Court, ae ropriate officer for preliminary investiga. plaint with the eaten nt it is clearly inferable that it neeq on iT ee ‘he court, since the term “appropriate off. not be filed with ‘ nd special prosecutors, inter alia. Simi. cer” includes fire i izable by the Municipal Trial larly, if the offense is cogniza’ z rt and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the filing of a com- oe t directly with the court or with the fiscal is expressly 2 thorized. In the light of this development in our remedial processes, it is thus believed that the rigidly technical dis- tinction between a complaint filed with the fiscal and one directly filed with the court as enunciated in U.S. vs. Santos, supra, has since lost precedential force. Lack of oath, not a fatal defect.—It is laid down in an eminent case-authority that a complaint presented by 4 private person when not sworn to by him, is not necessarily void. The want of an oath is a mere defect of form which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the mer its. Such being the case, sud it is not permissible to set aside # Judgment for such a defect (U.S. vs, Bibal, 4 Phil. 369). promiine of complaint does not require mediation of nated person with wo SWom complaint, charging a desis 7 With the commission of a crime, is presented !° 4 court, it is the dut; 3 denounced, either citing the cou sting abtaenay 0 a vene and di secuting attorney to inter the Tape of aoe Prosecution, or else eee to bit investigation as hee So that he may hold such prelimin © might see fit. The court is without #” t Be‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES ceee thority to dismiss the complaint because it is not presented through the mediation of the prosecuting attorney. Such a proceeding would make it impossible to prosecute crimes upon complaints (Trinidad vs. Jarabe, 3 Phil. 518). Complaint, when required.—A sworn written com- plaint is required if the offense is one which cannot be prose- cuted de oficio, or is private in nature, or where it pertains to those cases which need to be endorsed by specific public offi- . cers (Hernandez vs. Albano, 2 SCRA 607; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241). The crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and which by express provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are required to be brought at the in- stance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party, are with specificity enumerated in Title XI, Book Two of the Revised Penal Code; namely, adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, or acts of lasciviousness (Manglia vs. Lanti, 30 SCRA 81), as well as defamation consisting in the imputation of any of the above crimes (Article 360, par. 4, Revised Penal Code). With respect to the other class of cases, the Supreme Court has this to say: “The vesting of authority in an admin- - istrative body to determine when to institute a criminal ac- "tion for a violation of the law entrusted to it for administra- ‘ion or enforcement, to the exclusion of the regular prosecu- ‘in service of the government, is not new in this jurisdiction. ~-Itis recognized in Yao Lit vs. Geraldez, et al., 106 Phil. 545, Which upheld the exclusive authority of the Commission on “© orlmmigration to investigate and impose administrative fines pon violation of the provisions of RA No. 751, for the reason that said official ‘has better facilities than the prosecuting éfficials to carry out the provisions of said Act, the former fficial being the keeper of records pertaining to aliens.’ The ame principle has been recognized with respect to the - Prosecution of violations of the Anti-Dummy Law (Republic 57Rule 110 CRIMINAL Pkovsvce~ we, 30). In holding that the City Fiscal of Manila i y to prosecute such violations independently it was said: «where the city fiscal or the provincial fiscal who has the power or right to prosecute violations of all laws and ordinances allowed to prosecute vio- lations of the ‘Anti-Dummy Law, there would be no order, concert, cooperation, and coordination be- the government. The tween the said agencies of function of coordination, which is entrusted to the Anti-Dummy Board is evident from all the above- quoted provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There can be no coordination as envisioned in the law unless the Anti-Dummy Board be given the power to direct and control the city fiscal in the prosecu- ‘Anti-Dummy Law (Zo- tion of the violations of the bel vs. Concepcion, 5 SCRA 428).” (Mead vs. Argel, 115 SCRA 256). Parenthetically, in cases of violations of the Anti- Pollution Law (Republic Act No. 3931), a public prosecutor may file an information therefor only after the National We teshend Air Pollution Control Commission has determine Pee a supposed act of the offender has caused pollution eters a ° an information for violation of said Jaw prior BY ate eae Es premature and concomitantly, the charged therein (Meta De diget wet ee iT Act No. 11: no authorit the Anti-Dummy Board, SEC. 4. . an eerie ep omaeat ory defined.—An informatio? is offense, Sateen charging a person with # the court. (4a) y the prosecutor and filed withRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 4° Source.—Reproduction of Section 4, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, except that the word “fiscal” is substituted by the word “prosecutor,” pursuant to Executive Order No, 292, of November 24, 1988. Complaint and information, distinguished.—While poth the complaint and information are written accusations of the commission of a criminal offense, they are nonetheless to be differentiated in that (a) the complaint may be signed by the offended party, any peace officer or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated, while the information is always signed by the fiscal or an authorized prosecuting officer; (b) the complaint is: sworn to by the per- son signing it, whereas the information need not be under oath the reason therefor being principally that the prose- cuting officer filing it is charged with the special duty in * yegard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office (U.S. vs. Dacquel, 37 Phil. 16); and (c) a complaint may be filed either with the fiscal’s office or the court, while an information is always filed with the court = (Section 1, Rule 110, supra; People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA “= 565; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 78 Phil. 827). However, where the accused underwent preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 1(d) of Presidential Decree No: 911, the certifica- “tion to that effect must be under oath. _. Persons authorized to file information.—Aside from the city or provincial prosecutor and their assistants, duly ppointed special prosecutors can sign and file informations “(Eo Chay vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635). A lawyer appointed by = the Secretary of Justice, pursuant to Section 1696 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, to assist the city ‘ fiscal is authorized to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions (People vs. Henderson II, 105 Phil. = 859), even in the absence of the fiscal (Sec. of Justice vs. Ma- 59Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See, 5 lanoc, ae vs. Perez, 49 SCRA 508). e clarificatory resolution of the Supreme Court in the ae George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965. 70, promulgated on March 20, 2001 it was held that in goy- ernment service-related cases the prosecution of cases cogni- zable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular courts, the law recognize a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Om- budsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of said cases. SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.— All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direc- tion and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecutor Office or the Regional State Prose cutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the crimi- nal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even iD the absence of a public aaa prosecutor, unless the author ity is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. . ee of adultery and concubinage shall not uted except upon a complaint filed by th® offended spouse. Th: criminal penueell ak offended party cannot institut? i : without includi alty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any oe the oa 20 SCRA 638; Cf. People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717;’ "S Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 4* fended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, if the of- fender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated be- fore she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or guardian, ‘unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the of- fended party, who is a minor, fails to file the com- plaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents, or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised succes- sively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding paragraph. No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party. (5a) The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provisions thereof. (n) Source.—The first paragraph is an amendment intro- duced by Administrative Order No. 02-2-07 of the Supreme Court effective May 1, 2002. All the rest of the section were 61Rule 110 f Court, he 1964 Rules © » ag Je 110 of the | deleting rape b Section 5, Ru ification of de: pe be. tae in 1085 with the mea on September 30, 1997, amen 3 apP: ¢ person, hence, a public i 835: Republic Act A ains cause acifies rape as 2 cna which was added by the Re. crime, except the last paragt’ of December 1, 2000. minal Procedure ised Rules of Criminal : : vise ution of criminal cases, direction and con Bee ening statement of this section lays down the trol.—The op 1 actions either commenced by le that all crimina ae re by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal (U.S. vs. Cruz, 20 Phil. 363). The right of the offended party to institute the criminal prosecution for the commission of a public offense ceases upon the filing of the complaint in court, the fiscal taking charge of the prosecution of the suit in the name of the Peo- ple until the termination thereof (Gonzales us. CFI of Bula- can, 62 Phil. 846, 855; Salcedo vs. Liwag, 9 SCRA 609). It is the duty of the public prosecutor to take an active and direct part in the trial of a case. He is charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by the commission of a crime and oe the prosecution of the public action as if he himself ere the aggrieved party (U.S. vs. Mamintud, 6 Phil. 37). The reason therefi or rests upon the id. i imi offense is an outra ea that, since a criminal natural th a case but that justice Peculiar and very definité © two-fold aim of which # Sen; TV: IW, Se, the se ant of the la th >‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES =" that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty then to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic- tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556; Tan, Jr. vs. Gal- * lardo, supra). Thus, it was stressed that there is an absolute > necessity for the prosecuting attorneys to lay before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the = court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the inno- > cent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution’s prime duty to the court; to the accused, and to the state (People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453; Tan, Jr. vs. Gallardo, supra). From the gem of this doctrine developed the notion that the fiscal, as a quasi-judicial officer, determines whether a prima facie case exists or not (Zulueta vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944) or may move for the dismissal of the case already filed in court for insufficiency of evidence (Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914; People vs. Pervez, 110 Phil, 214) and that if he must have control of the prosecution of the criminal case, he must have the ultimate power to decide, as between conflicting testimonies, which should be believed (Talusan vs. Ofiana, 45 SCRA 467; People us. Lig- gayu, 91 Phil. 863) or which witnesses'to present (People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237; People vs. Nabunat, 182 SCRA 52). Subject only to the right against self-incrimination, the de- termination of the witnesses to be presented is addressed to the discretion of the prosecution (People vs. Carifio, 216 SCRA 893). 6310 CriminaL PROCEDURE any Rule 1 ulsion to file the corresponq_ ] is under no comp’ a 5 fee ae based upon 2 complaint, where a is not ing informé t the evidence gathered or presented would convinced tha +. It is true that this Fe jon in cour ling of an action 1 » 5 . ; eee the exercise of discretion to a wide latj. au 5 sn ayf. mission of abuses, yet it hile it may invite the com! inde eo Be recognized that necessity demands that prose. must al n that authority if we are to i fficers should be give: i ee courts from being flooded with cases of doubtful merit or unduly compel the fiscals to work against their con- victions. It may be stated in this connection, that although prosecuting officers under the power vested upon them by law not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecut- ing persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office, they are likewise bound by their oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or malicious prosecution. Accordingly, it would amount to a serious dereliction of duty if a fiscal would prosecute a person whom he does not believe to have committed the offense he was charged with by an alleged eel Pe Vaomiens oe available is not, in his 5 nt the his (Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 309) of the accused eee eu ny for the view that even the court can es fore wit the control of the fiscal over the action. For ae 2 ¢ven permissible for a court to compel the aay al nena a’proceeding, originally initiated by him sian er i he finds the evidence relied upon by 626), Lveetaes ae conviction (People vs. Mall, 68 Phil. urt has no power or authority to direct within a particular period for not i itis 64110 Rule PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 4 officer's prerogative and control of criminal actions Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, supra). (Asst. Motion to dismiss case in court.—Settled is the rule that where the information has already been filed in court, the court steps in and takes control of the case until the same is finally disposed of, so that the fiscal has no more control over it. Hence, a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal should be properly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (Hoey vs. Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, 130 SCRA 239; Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191; Crystal vs. Sandi- ganbayan, 170 SCRA 822). In one case it was held that where the court refuses to grant the fiscal’s motion to dismiss involving a case where the Secretary of Justice ordered the fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case, the fiscal should continue to appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of evi- dence to the private prosecutor (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462). In further elaboration, the Supreme Court held in a subsequent case that “if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dis- * missal of the case and when denied, refuse to prosecute the _same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the ‘criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial Seourt. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for “the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evi- dence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his supervision and control (U.S. us. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 42; U.S. vs, Gallego, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other rosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty ind present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the €urt decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evi- dénce adduced by both parties (Sta. Rosa Mining Co. vs. 65Se Rule 110 CrimINAL PROCEDURE oe pala, 153 SCRA 367; See also Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171° Zabala, f SCRA 39). Consequently, ited that the institu the sound discretion © al proposition, it may be pos. tion of a criminal action depends upon f the fiscal. He may or ate apelin the : z ‘ r may not follow that pre. complaint ot information, fe sording to whether the ev ae in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. By reason thereof, a prosecuting officer, save in those exceptional cases already noted (See pages 34-35, ante), cannot be compelled by man- damus to file a criminal information or a case where he is convinced that he does not have the necessary evidence (Bagatua vs. Revilla, supra; Alberto vs. De la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406; Abella vs. Golez, 181 SCRA 12; Bautista vs. City Fiscal of Dagupan City, 131 SCRA 132) or be controlled by a writ of prohibition to restrain a criminal prosecution (Arkoncel vs. CFI of Basilan, 66 SCRA 361). But once the case is already filed in court, the same can no longer be withdrawn or dis- missed without the tribunal’s approval (Crespo vs. Mogul, supra). : , as a gener An ee ncaa however, that the court decides to dismiss eee : ewe of the Prosecution, it should make an peoe valuation or assessment of its merit and not to és ly on the said motion as this will be an abdication of w settled (Velasquez v. Un 388; Balgos, Sr. v. Sandi 287; i 7; Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 1915le 110 Rul PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec.4 * Almazar v. Cenzon, 161 SCRA 545; Dungog v. f peals, 159 SCRA 145; Peralta v. Court of First pees ree Union, Branch I, 157 SCRA 476; Sta. Rosa Mining Compan; v. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367; Marquez v. Alejo, 154 SCRA 302, and Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462). In the case of Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that: . “The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution “ of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. é Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a rein- : vestigation of the case, at such stage, the permis- sion of the Court must be secured. After such rein- vestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appro- priate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualifi- cation is that the action of the Court must not im- pair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the Peoplé to due process of law. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion 67eny it and require that the motion oF deny for the proper de- ‘e merits pro he case.” may grant the trial on thi termination of t XXX Xxx The said doctrine was reiterated in Dumlao, Jr. vs. Pon. ferrada, 508 SCRA 426. re tel, stice should, as ing the case, the Secretary Of ul ould, far Sear refrain from entertaining a petition for pao or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the com- plaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. (Crespo vs. Mogul, supra). A fortiori he should avoid another review or appeal after the court has already dis- missed the case (Marcelo us. CA, supra). In the case of Marcelo, et al. vs. C.A., et al., (G.R. No. 106695, August 4, 1994), the Supreme Court held that it is not proper for the Secretary of Justice to review the case already dismissed by the court and order its refiling for then the ultimate consequence is the unmitigated reprobation and reversal of the order of the court dismissing the case. os an od eee case, however, of Roberts, Jr., et al: there eae No. 113930, March 5, 1996, it was held that ment of Ju cieaay Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the Depart of a petition for non taking cognizance of an appeal, by WaY as practicable, ee It merely advised the DOJ to “as fat or appeal from the an from entertaining a petition for review information hae poe of the fiscal, when the complaint not have intended ot vies n filed in court.” Crespo “cou! Tepealing the last © without doing violence to, Rules of Court which res Ph of Section 4, Rule 112 of th? gnizes the authority of the Sect”Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 4* tary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.” This was reiterated in the case of Dimatulac vs. Villore, 297 SCRA 679 and in Community Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.), Inc. vs. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34, where it was held that the Secretary of Justice, who has the power of su- pervision and control over prosecuting officers, is the ulti- mate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be believed. 4 When prosecution may be controlled by a person 2 other than the public prosecutor.—For practical reasons, + in case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in ; the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor = may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to * . the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecu- tor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Because of said authority, it is submitted that there is no need for the prosecutor to give his written conformity in any pleading that the private prosecutor may file in connection with said case, unless the written authority of the prosecutor * so requires it. The written authority must be clear on this “matter especially when it covers plea bargaining, amend- Ynent of the information or the dismissal of the case. * The aforesaid rule as introduced by Administrative --Order No. 02-2-07-SC does not qualify the level of courts _ where the heavy work schedule of public prosecutors or lack : public prosecutors may occur. Consequently, all levels of ial courts are covered. Exclusive right of the Solicitor General to handle criminal cases in the Court of Appeals and the Su- # 69See. 5 Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ion.—Ma: Court; exception. 2 Rinile it is the public prosecutor who represents the People in i it is only the Solicitor ‘imi: es before the trial courts, i ¢ 0 seen that js authorized to bring and defend actions in shalt f the People or Republic of the Philippines once the Sea he Supreme Court or Court of Ap- i ht before t! r 0 Seapine Nano, 205 SCRA 155). As reiterated in Sa- . Romaquin, (429 SCRA 41) and further reiterated in Gengahas vs. Court of Appeals, 565 SCRA 373 “in appeals before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c) on automatic appeal; or (d) in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines.” Service of copy of the petition on the Peo- ple of the Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor would be inefficacious and shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. However, in all cases elevated to the Supreme Court by way of petition for review against decisions or final orders of the Sandiganba- yan, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, through its Special Prosecutor, which shall represent the People of the Philip- pines pursuant to the second sentence, third to the last paragraph of Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 8249. fe Pereenaon of the aggrieved party.—The right of paar See to intervene in the prosecution of the Sani enanee Pee a settled principle in this jurisdiction. The himself is nece Private penal action by the injured party tion of the penal eon in consequence of the continued opera- ciple, the declaration’ for two reasons: first, because, in prin- the declaration of the wens & timinal liability carries with it because there are SiEeea oul obligation; and, second; mot be prosecuted other aA rkworthy is the fact that © —Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 4* than at the formal instance of the person injured (U.S. vs. Malabon, 1 Phil. 731; Gonzales vs. CFI of Bulacan, 63 Phil. 846). Note, however, that the intervention of the offended party in criminal prosecutions is predicated on his right to enforce the civil liability borne out of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused (Roa us. De la Cruz, 108 Phil. 7; People vs. Orais, 65 Phil. 744). Thus, in deportation cases, a private party may not intervene, even if he can establish damages due to him arising from the depor- “tation charge against the alien (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, = GR. 81798, Dec. 29, 1989). The offended party may intervene in the criminal pro- ceeding personally or by counsel, except when the accused enters a plea of guilty before the commencement of the trial (Section 3, Rule 110, infra, Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 81798, Dec. 29, 1989) or where said offended party waives his right to the civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the criminal action, in which cases he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution (People vs. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; People vs. Capistrano, 90 Phil. 832). The right to intervene may be exercised by the offended party as a matter of right, not merely as a matter of - tolerance. In this respect, the Jaw makes no distinction be- tween cases that are public in nature and those that can be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. In either _, case, the law gives the offended party the right to intervene, ==; personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of that right only when he waives the civil action or reserves his right to insti- = tute one (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197; Cf. Florendo vs. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679). It goes without saying that the injured party may intervene in the prosecution if he seeks Seah ve 71Sec. 5 10 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 1 i i ffense is one claim or if the offense : f he files late produce civil liability, the @ pov ay pronouncement with respect to it e supra). damages, but i of those which d court cannot mal (People vs. Orais, The intervention of tl while authorized is, however, he offended party or his counsel subject to the provision of Sec. tion 5, Rule 110, supra, that all criminal actions whether ON Oy » i by information shall be prose- ee eee ol tcl of the fiscal. The prose- ted under the direction an the aan of a criminal case is the responsibility of the govern- lways be under his control. This ment prosecutor and must a 2 0 h is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination of witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses, even if they are the complainants, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for the dismissal or revival. Their only function is to testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government Prosecutor, or one acting under his authority and by no one ee eases a G.R. 74989, Nov. 6, 1989). As a necessary corollary to this principle, the aggrieved party is prevented oe to ae fiscal as to the conduct of the case (Peo- " yu, 97 Phil. 865; People vs. Natoza, 53 O.G. 8099; Zulueta vs. Nicolas, 10: i . g » 103 P. . exercise of his power to direct an i eanand that, in the cutions, the fiscal may move for th reng, 60 Phil, 89: cy of evidence (Peopl. i a- dismissal of a £2 People vs. Liggayu, supra) ee a ple 2s, Velez, 73 Phil. 1096 he offended party (Peo- b aid down that { Onnection, the rule has n order of dismissal ty may not appeal from fiscal, a Seal, for to permit h: red upon motion of the ‘uch a case would be tan- ). In this ¢ he offended par by the court ent 1m to do so in sRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Seo tamount to giving said party as much right to the direction and control of a criminal proceeding as that of the fiscal (Gonzales vs. CFI of Bulacan, 63. Phil. 846; People vs. Lig- gayu, supra; People vs. Velez, supra). As the Supreme Court held recently, that if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be under- taken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philip- pines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused (People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 152). As stated further in Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa, 452 SCRA 736, “the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquit- tal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.” Right of the offended party to file special civil ac- tion independently of the State.—An offended party in a criminal case has sufficient personality to file a special civil action for certiorari, in proper cases, even without the im- . primatur of the State. Thus, it was held that as the offended party in the pending criminal case before the trial judge, it © cannot be gainsaid that the former has sufficient interest and personality as a person aggrieved by the judge’s ruling 4 on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action (Peo- ble vs. Placer, G.R. No. 89732, July 20, 1989 [Minute Resolu- ~ tion]). Settled is the rule that “in a special civil action for = éertiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court “2 wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave _3® Abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on “ other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the ag- 73CRIMINAL PROCEDURE eae Rule 110 the private offended party ° ; Gh oe has EA interest in aye or ences ne he may file such special civil action joning the decision or action of the respondent court on nds. In so doing, the complainant should g the action in the name of the People of the Philip- jnes. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said nant. (Perez us- Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 327 SCRA 588 quoting De La Rosa vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499).” The said doctrine was reiterated in Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345; Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Padilla, 567 SCRA 438). Prosecutor may turn over conduct of trial to pri- vate counsel.—An offended party, as already stated, may intervene in the criminal proceeding, especially in cases of offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party (Herrero vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 489). In those cases where private intervention is authorized, such an in- tervention may be made through an attorney, who, if allowed by the fiscal, may prosecute the action (Diel vs. Martinez, 76 Phil. 275). Indeed, there is nothing in the rules of practice and precede in criminal cases which denies the right of the ses , in the exercise of sound discretion, to turn over the ctive conduct of the trial to a competent assistant or to 4 Paes prosecutor, with the understanding, of course. that - isn not thereby relieve himself of the responsibility for : et eee at every stage of the proceedings to the end, nd to intervene at any time h fF i laderas, 32 Phil. 442). For while it ie t fit (U.S. vs. Despaby eae ae Serie ae ae it is true that prosecution of not exclusively by fiscals pee function) can be performe* vate attorneys in cases whe: republic omhicezs nat vera prosecutors (Diel vs. AEs eaey are allowed as private ing objectionable in the aa 6 Phil. 275). There is notb- of allowing private prosecU” grieved parties complaii 74| s Rule 11 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES od tors to take over the active conduct of criminal cases pro- vided always that the fiscal retains control of the prosecution and assumes full responsibility therefor (U.S. vs. Despabi- laderas, supra). A private prosecutor entrusted by the fiscal with the au- thority to handle the conduct of the proceeding may cross- examine the witnesses for the defense (People vs. Hernandez, 69 Phil. 672), and present evidence for the prosecution. How- ever, the private counsel is not entitled to be served with copies of the pleadings in the case as a matter of right (Pan- gan vs. Pasicolan, 103 Phil. 1143). In such a case, as the private prosecutor and the fiscal represent a common cause and party, with the fiscal having direction and control of the prosecution, a notice of the Court to the fiscal is notice to the private prosecutor (Sese vs. Montesa, 87 Phil. 245). Further, the private counsel’s interest is subordinate to that of the State and he may not therefore take a stand inconsistent therewith (Tan, Jr. vs. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306). Neither may the private prosecutor appeal from an order dismissing the case on motion of the fiscal (People vs. Liggayu, supra) nor may he continue to take part in the proceedings after the death of the offended party, the theory being that the latter - is the principal and the private prosecutor is but his agent ~ (People vs. Florendo, 77 Phil. 16). In the same manner, any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to :, dismiss the original case even if without objections of the ac- * cused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his : own view on the matter (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191). Parenthetically, in an estafa case where the accused. “ was acquitted on the ground that his liability is merely civil in nature, it was held that the offended party cannot appeal * from the decision of acquittal with respect to the civil aspect - of the case. Her remedy is “to institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi- 75CRIMINAL PROCEDURE an Rule 110 tract or any other ie delict or one 7. but certainly not ae from He source of Sr petitioner (accused) oe ise! ly been se offense of w! le vs. ‘Amistad, 1 SCRA ee ae rome at ‘ the uP she that the offended party nouncement srs appeal from the decision of the eoneitae Mean nd of prescription and other 73 Phil. 679), should be m law, con i the grow issing the case on similar cases (FI Yorendo vs. Maceda, d from this latter ruling. differentiate Hl Presence of the public prosecutor during the pro- ings no longer required.—It seems that with the Seas of the first paragraph of Section 5, that be- cause of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or lack of public prosecutors, the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor, subject to the approval of the court, may authorize the private prosecutor to prosecute, the doctrine of requiring the presence of the public prosecutor may no longer be applicable. Otherwise stated, the heavy work schedule or the lack of public prosecutors prevents the presence of the public prosecutor during the trial, hence, the authority given to the private prosecutor to prosecute. More- over it ican be said that the written authority to the private prosecutor to prosecute will not be given by the public prose- cutor if the private prosecutor i handle the prosecution. ae P iti BI lier oneness Fee private crimes, generally.—In eat » iv was intimated that there are certain criminal actions whi ee ich the law requires to be instituted by ty. the Revised Penal Ga,, xPYe8S Provisions of Article 360 of cuted de ofici ©, these crimes which cannot be prose a the criminal action be Pon complaint expressly file Titl Party, aj Fi x © XI, Book Two, of ee Specificity enumerated i? vised Pena] Code, that is, adul-10 Rule 1 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 4 tery, concubinage, seduction, abduction or Civil ness (Mangila vs. Lantin, 30 SCRA 81), as ST 2 Se defamation which consist in the imputation of these so-called private crimes (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code). This legal requirement was imposed out of consideration for the ag- grieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in si- Jence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial (Samilin vs. CFI of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304; People vs. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11). The legal prescription that private crimes may be prose- cuted only at the instance of, and upon express complaint by the offended party is mandatory and failure to comply therewith deprives the court of jurisdiction to try the action (People vs. Palabao, 95 Phil. 959; People vs. Manaba, 55 Phil. 665; People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372; People vs. Santos, 101 Phil. 798; People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565). Compliance with this is a jurisdictional requirement and not merely a formality (People vs. Sunpongco, 163 SCRA 222). In this ion, it is important to note that by its own avowal, the Supreme Court has invariably exacted strict compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of a complaint being filed by the offended party.’ In the case of People vs. Palabao, su- pra, the Supreme Court considered as insufficient an infor- mation filed by the fiscal, wherein the offended party signed at the bottom thereof and above the signature of the prose- cuting officer, even though the information certified that the fiscal was charging defendant with the crime of seduction “at connecti ' * See, however, Valdeperias vs. People (16 SCRA 871), where it was : held that the complaint required in ‘Article 344, Revised Penal Code, is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of _ the power to prosecute the guilty parties, and that said article does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. To the same effect is the ruling in Peo- ple vs. Bugtong, 169 SCRA 797 and People vs. Santiago Tafiada, 166 SCRA 360. 17110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Sees Rule arty.” In the case of People ys ° the instance of he a ae Court motu propio die Martine, 78 Pr failure of the aggrieved party to file the missed the CP Coe the offense of oral defamation, although prope’ eae raised the question on appeal, thereby ca Ses necessity of strict compliance with the legal requirement even at the cost of nullifying all the proceedings already had in the lower court. So, | also, it was held that mere narration of how a private crime was committed al- though subscribed and sworn to by the aggrieved party is not sufficient basis for filing the jnformation because it was not the compliance contemplated in Article 344, Revised Penal Code (People vs. Santos, 101 Phil. 798, 803). However, in a case of relative recency, the Supreme Court held that the affidavit-complaint submitted by the complainant in which he not only narrated the facts and circumstances constitut- ing the crime of adultery but also explicitly and categorically charged the respondents with said offense, is sufficient com- pliance with the legal requirement (People vs. Tlarde, 125 SCRA 11). This latter case was distinguished from People vs. peecelee ras in that in Santos “the salaysay executed by , plainant was not considered the complaint contem- as by Article bia of the Revised Penal Code because it mere narration of how the crime of rape was commit- ” A ted gun ee whereas tn Hard he affidavit compli s and circumstances of the offense but iw atk ead ety an categorically charged the respondent by the fiseal “co; oreover, in Santos, the information file 4 signed fiscal mmenced with the statement the under accuses Engracio Santos with the crime of rap&oO Rule 11! PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 4 forth (Cf. People vs. Ibariez, supra). Finally the Suprem Court held that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the case even if the complaint was filed by a minor and a mental retardate for such defect was cured when complainant’s brother’s testimony shows the consent and willingness of the family of complainant to have the private offense of rape publicly tried (People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 114). In any event, the filing with the proper court of a sworn complaint charging a private crime is sufficient to initiate criminal prosecution. Since the filing of a complaint for any of the offenses enumerated in Article 344 of the Revised Pe- nal Code, except rape by the person or persons enumerated therein, is jurisdictional, the filing thereof is sufficient to initiate a valid prosecution, and no information need be filed any longer by the prosecutor. Also, where the offended party originally filed a formal sworn complaint for a private offense with the Municipal Trial Court which conducted the prelimi- nary investigation thereon, an information filed by the fiscal based upon said complaint sufficiently vests in the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction to try the action (See U.S. vs. Garcia, 27 Phil. 254; People vs. Bugtong, 169 SCRA 797; People vs. Somera, 170 SCRA 428; People vs. Ramirez, 186 SCRA 702). And the complaint of the offended party in a rape case need not be introduced in evidence as the basis of information filed by the fiscal (People vs. Rondina, 149 SCRA 128). Note, however, that where, in a prosecution for adultery upon the complaint by the husband, the municipal judge, after a pre- liminary investigation dismisses the complaint for lack of reasonable cause to sustain the charges, the case is definitely terminated and can only be reopened upon a new complaint by the offended party (Quilatan vs. Caruncho, 21 Phil. 399). Lastly, the death of the offended spouse after the formal : filing of the complaint in the fiscal’s office does not abate the proceedings (People vs. Ilarde, supra). 79Rule 110 vate crime complexed with q ° . a pri : prosecution ie complex crimes, where one of the com, public offense.—/” rivate crime and the other a Public ponent offenses 6 ay initiate the proceedings de ae (Peo. offense, the ©.G., Supp. 11, 238, cited in People ys, ple vs. Oreullo, 46 BaD. reason therefor is that since one of Buama, 95 Phil. 435). ‘sa public erime, the latter should the component oneness teing always paramount to private prevail, public saa Criminal Procedure, quoted with ap. interest ae tri Yu, 1 SCRA 199). Thus, during the time prota Ea ea ti ime, if the offense committed is that rape was a private crime, 1 thi Fa r ; robbery with rape, rape with homicide or kidnapping with rape, the prosecution thereof need not be commenced at the instance of and at the express complaint by the offended party (See People vs. Yu, supra; People vs. Martinez, 43 O.G. 132; People vs. Orcullo, supra; People vs. Buama, supra; Peo- ple vs. Jamoralin, G.R. No. L-2257, February 19, 1951). Prosecution of adultery and concubinage.—The rule provides that the crime of adultery or concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the of- fended party. Furthermore, the offended spouse cannot insti- tute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders (Article 344, Re-$ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES coe : secure the conviction of the wife; for, to secure this end, it ; would only be necessary for the husband to omit from his complaint an allegation that the paramour knew of the exis- tence of his marriage with the woman, or to insert an allega- tion that the paramour did not know of the existence of the .. marriage, in order to relieve him from liability of conviction and punishment. It is not for the husband to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the paramour of the crime of adultery; that question must be left to the court (U.S. vs. Asuncion, 22 Phil. 358). It is noteworthy, however, that while the law provides that the complaint must be presented in a criminal action for adultery (a) by the offended spouse and (b) against both of the alleged culprits, there is no provision of law that they shall be tried jointly. The mere fact then that the law re- quires the offended husband to institute the criminal action against both of the alleged guilty parties does not necessarily prevent either of them from obtaining a separate trial, nor prohibit the court from dismissing the complaint as to one or the other (U.S. vs. Topifio and Guzman, 33 Phil. 90; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289, 292). When the complaint was filed by the offended spouse = against both of the guilty parties, the proceedings then ~ passed to the prosecuting officer who may move for a dis- missal of the complaint as to one if he is satisfied that he cannot establish guilty knowledge, on the part of the man for example, of the fact that the woman was married, but such dismissal would not in itself require the court to acquit the woman (U.S. vs. Gallegos, supra, citing U.S. vs. Asuncion, 22 ~ Phil. 358; U.S. vs. De la Torre and Gregorio, 25 Phil. 36). In * sum, separate trials may be had: (a) when either of the par- ties requests it; (b) when the government is satisfied that the man did not know the woman was married; (c) when one of the parties had died before the trial; and (d) when, for exam- 81Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See. § m i d the jurisdiction of the f the parties has escape oe coves eat been arrested (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Gallegos, supra; People vs. Oplado, 12 SCRA 147). The second paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “the offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty par. ties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.” As the term pardon” unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, “consent” must have been intended, agreeably with its ordi- nary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances, as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. Thus, prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense (People us. Schneckenburger, 73 Phil. 413). In this connection, it needs to be observed that the of fense of bigamy and that of concubinage are two distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes the crime of bigamy; on the other hand, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman eng eaae his wife characterizes the crime of concubinage- STS SA PETES against civil status, which may be fense against ee instance of the State; the second, an of- instance of a Sea a re amay be prosecuted polypatiie supra). Bigamy then ie Deon People vs. Schneckenburger, adultery and concubin, y ne means similar to the crimes of quires that the culprites if ee peeglaw, specifically re- cuted or included in the informatine ave Should be prose- ‘Ormation. In the crime of bigamy, 82Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 4° both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties, depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his pre- vious marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as co-accused. Bigamy is a public offense and is a crime against status, while adultery and concubinage are private offenses and are crimes against chastity. In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the of- fended party will bar the prosecution of the case, which is not so in bigamy (People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr., 64 SCRA 518). Prosecution of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness.—By express provision of the law, the of- fenses of seduction, abduction, or act of lasciviousness, shall * not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the of- * fended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by © the above named persons, as the case may be (3rd para- graph, Article 344, Revised Penal Code). This requirement is - mandatory; non-compliance therewith precludes the court «from acquiring jurisdiction over the case (See People vs. Palabo, 95 Phil. 959; People vs. Santos, 101 Phil. 540; Tolen- tino vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 97; People vs. Aranda, 106 Phil. -1108); and a judgment rendered in a proceeding held in vio- -lation of this requirement is void ab initio (People vs. Ma- raba, 58 Phil. 665). A prosecution initiated by the fiscal or by = & peace officer, or by the offended party who failed to swear to. a complaint is a nullity (People vs. Trinidad, 58 Phil. 163; P eople vs. Manaba, supra; People vs. Aranda, supra; People - 0s. Santos, supra). Furthermore, if the original complaint is to be amended, the amended complaint must likewise be » Subscribed and sworn to by the offended party (See People vs. _Cerena, 106 Phil. 570; People vs. Oso, 60 Phil. 271), except when the amendment merely refers to the manner by which8. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ce. § Rule 110 s committed (People vs. Bangalao, 94 Phi), as Pastores, 40 SCRA 498). it is rather evident that the right to of seduction, abduction ang tt be reposed in the offended and guardian, at one and the offense W' 354; People vs. From another view, institute proceedings in case} acts of lasciviousness, ore bate s, gran > ¢ aa erent er without occasioning grave difficulties in the administration of justice resulting from the attempts of some of these persons to institute criminal proceedings contrary to the wish and desire of the others. Hence, although these persons are mentioned disjunctively in Article | 344 of the Revised Penal Code, (except rape which is a crime against person, hence a public offense under RA No. 8353 approved on Sept. 30, 1997) the Rules expressly provide that the of- fended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to insti- tute the prosecution for these offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompe- tent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her para Perea a em party who is a minor fails guardian file the same. it is further prog aor rf of the parents, grandparents and gu: va palihatsibe right is exclusive of all other Persons a ite be poane the) action ceed if ther therein with tion. i ‘ion. Th : a institute the ac- parent © filed by the offended 4, Rule 116, aa ibarents, or guardian, in * Supra; U.S. vs. De la Santa 1 , ‘at orde; Phil. 29)," SeetionPreferential right to institute the action is conceded to the offended party herself, even if she is still a minor, unless she is otherwise incompetent or incapable of doing so for reasons other than her minority (U.S. vs. Bautista, 40 Phil. * 735; U.S. vs. Garibon, 25 Phil. 171). Hence, if the offended woman is of legal age and not otherwise incapacitated, only she can file the complaint (Benga-Oras vs. Evangelista, 51 O.G. 5165). However, if the offended woman is a minor, or is otherwise incapacitated, and she refuses or fails to file the requisite complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian, in that order may file the complaint (People vs. Bongalao, 94 Phil. 354; People vs. Pastores, 40 SCRA 499). Regarding the parents, since the father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate chil- dren who are not emancipated, neither one enjoys preferen- tial right to file the action in behalf of their daughter. Thus, a complaint filed by the mother is sufficient compliance with the law and confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case (People vs. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498, 508; People vs. De la Cruz, 56 SCRA 84; People vs. Mariano, 124 SCRA 802). Par- enthetically, if there should arise a disagreement between the parents as to the proper action they should take relative to the outrage committed on their daughter, it is submitted that the decision of the father should prevail, in view of Arti- cle 311, Civil Code, which reads in part: “The father and mother exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated. In case of disagreement, “the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial _ order to the contrary x x x.” Finally, if the offended party dies or becomes incapaci- tated before she was able to file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents, or gu ardian, the State shall initiate the action in her behalf, pursuant to the doc- trine of parens patriae. 85CRIMINAL PROCEVONS ves Rule 110 jon cases.—No criminal ion of defamation . Fs ac. Prose oa eon which consists in the imputation of ay, tion for de ina ge, seduction, abduction, or acts of lascivious, tery, concubl 2 pt at the instance of and upon com. prought except Pe ness a aa Sreeiod party (Last paragraph, Section 5, Rule plain es People vs. Martinez, 76 Phil. 599; People vs. San. ‘1. 111). Hence, in a case where the accused circy. ee EB By spread gossips, rumors OT stories to the effect that the offended party, a married woman, WS the paramour of another man, the Supreme Court held that the charges im. port adultery, and, therefore, the complaint of the offended party is essential (People vs. Gonzales, 105 Phil. 45; Fernan- dez vs. Lantin, 74 SCRA 338). However, where alleged de- famatory utterance consists in the imputation upon the of- fended party of the crime of prostitution, which is a public crime that can be prosecuted de oficio, the information filed by the fiscal is deemed sufficient (People vs. Hong Din Chu, 33 SCRA 199), for to call a married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her adulteress, a violator of her mari- tal vows; it is to charge her of having committed an offense against public proorelds oigmcrel degeneracy far exceeding (People vs Hong Din Chu uence of adulterous relations SCRA 611), Still for another reason erie eee adultes a x reason, assuming arguendo that ry which is a private crime, and tituti ich i public crime, are both imputed te Pree eT which sa © complainant, criminal ac- tic ; cae pede car anata without er complaint bets est, so requires (People vs. Pa’ paramount \to)nruazeliae us. Hong Din Chu, supra)” + SCRA 199, cited in People n . Prosecuted de oficio, ape anit which cannot b® rule that criminal actio? 86; L i Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 6° must be commenced either by complaint or information must give way; the criminal case must have to be brought solely “at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.” The converse proposition, however, cannot be true. Reasonable construction will not permit a deduction which would constrict criminal prosecution—of defamation which can be prosecuted de oficio—by means of information (Balite vs. People, 18 SCRA 280). SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.— A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the of- fended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information. (6a) Source.—Reproduction of Section 6, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, except the words “ap- proximate time” were modified to “approximate date.” Purpose of the rule.—The evident purpose of the rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accu- sation against him. Also, as stated in the case of U.S. vs. Enriquez (1 Phil. 179), one other purpose of an information is to notify the defendant of the criminal acts imputed to him so that he can duly prepare his defense. Hence, the informa- tion or complaint must be complete (People vs. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252; People vs. Capinlac, 64 Phil. 442), the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, 87CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Seg Rule 110 ily in the terms of the statute defining the of° not necessarily h form as is sufficient to enable a person of fense, but in such *" g to know what offense is intended tg din; 5 oan ane aable the court to pronounce judgment be charged, ‘apinlac, Supra; People vs. Rodrigo, 16 SCRA a Beas eon should thus state the facts and the i ‘tuting the crime charged in such a wa; ae ea or See i nderstanding may easily conned eased be informed of what it is about. To be sure, legal logodaedaly is not necessary. Courts have since come to rec. ognize that much of the tautology and prolixity which char- acterize indictments could be safely disregarded without any infringement of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and it is the policy of modern courts to disregard mere technical objec- tions and to require only that an indictment shall fully state the essential elements of the offense charged. It has been said that an indictment which is otherwise sufficient is not defeated by the fact that it is inartfully drawn or awkwardly worded, contains surplusage, and is disorderly in the ar- rangement of its allegations (41 Am. Jur. 917). Test of sufficiency of complai i i : fs plaint or information— The rule is that if the complaint or information clearly and succinctly sets out: First. the designation of the , the names of the accused; second, plained of as constituti crime charged; third, the acts com- lan; onstituting the crime, in ordinary and concis¢ Me guage, and in such form as to ney ry erstanding to ain pronounce 'g to know what is intended and the court to jud, i fense was comaitees according to right; fourth, that the of within the Jurisdiction of the court; an! fifth, the name i of sompliance with the ies Party, the same is sufficient ; cription (U.S. vs, Legaspi, 14 -S. vs. Legaspi, Phil. 38; rise, S80 Paraiso vs. Ue th Phil. 799; People vs of Quezon, 206 SCRA 187) ae‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 6 Too, there is authority for the proposition that the suffi- ciency of an indictment is measured by two criteria: (1) whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defen- dant of what he must be prepared to meet; and (2) in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the records show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction (Russel us. U.S., 369 U.S. 749, 8 L. Ed. 2d 242). Number of acts charged, not counts, controlling. — A person accused of an offense is not considered as having been charged by the number of counts or paragraphs into which the acts charged may have been grouped in the infor- mation, but by the specific criminal acts, even if two or more of them are contained in one paragraph or in one count. © While it is convenient that each count or paragraph should = contain only one offense or one specific act for the sake of clearness, this does not justify the inference or claim that all _ of the acts charged under one count or paragraph should be considered as only one act or offense, and proof of all the acts | |. tneluded therein is necessary to prove the charge (People vs. : Rasay, 92 Phil. 708). Defects in the complaint or information.—Formerly, it was held that in criminal cases, any defect in the accusa- fats tion other than that of lack of jurisdiction over the subject s Matter may be cured by good and sufficient evidence, intro- --duced by the prosecution and admitted by the trial court, Without objection on the part of the defense, and the accused ~ May be legally convicted of the crime or offense intended to e charged and so established by evidence. Of course, it is to e expected that the defense will object to any question ich is not based upon the allegations made in the com- “> Dlaint or information, but this does not preclude the possibil- | -< tty that immaterial evidence might be admitted although not % 89CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See g Rule 110 tions, due to inadvertence on the rted by such allegatio ne | Santos, 76 Phil. i suppo le us. art of the defense (ee? been adopted to the effect that a But, lately, the ie in the information cannot be cured by substantial ee dea jeopardize the accused’s right to be evidence ine 7 ue nature of the offense he is being chargeq informed of tee a of Appeals, 108 Phil. 938). So where there pa ee a the information that the accused knew eae or at the time of the assault that eee Was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in author- ity, but only of homicide even though the evidence of the prosecution, without any objection on the part of the accused, shows that the accused knew at the time of the killing that the victim was an agent of a person in authority. To quote the Supreme Court: “Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the accused, cannot likewise cure the aforestated defect in the information as to validly convict the accused thereof; because to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him” (People us. Regala, 113 SCRA 613). Similarly, in a case of relative re i ilarly, cency, it was held that the conviction of an accused on the finding that he raped the eiiths nature and cause of accusation ; . Pailano, 169 SCRA 649). An accused ea ame under a mode of commission Bugtong, 169 SCRA 797). Tt gree yjmermation (People vs >. It goes without Saying that juris-Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 7 dictional defects cannot be waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, not excluding appeal (Garcia vs. Director of Prisons, 38 Phil. 413). Ambiguity of accusation.—Where there is ambiguity in the complaint or information, such an ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused (People us. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 562). SEC. 7. Name of the accused.—The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known. If his name cannot be ascer- tained, he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown. If the true name of the accused is thereafter dis- closed by him or appears in some other manner to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the com- plaint or information and record. (7a) Source.—Substantially reproduced from Section 7, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, with amendment only in style. Reason for the rule.—As the rule provides, the com- plaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known, or if his name cannot be discovered he must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown. The manifest intent of the provision is to make a specific identification of the person to whom the commission of an offense is being imputed. On the one hand, the rule precludes the possibility of having a wrong person apprehended and brought to trial while in the meantime the real culprit goes scot-free. On the other, it affords the accused the opportunity to prepare his defense 910 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE =< Rule 11 : i ause his companions in the Crim, * fully and eae cemsation, if their names were Te tore ae judgment has been rendered, to be able to in. ee Te =a nary in a subsequent prosecution foy the ee a if any there be. For these reasons, the allegation of eer ee ncaa peur MT limited to the caption, it must also be repeated in the body of the information, Where a co-respondent was not included as a Principal} in the crime charged as co-accused, the accused should file g motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal and failure to do so will estopped him from assailing his non-inclusion (Vij. Jarin vs. People, 656 SCRA 500). An error in name is not reversible.—An error, how- ever, in the name of the accused is not reversible as long as his identity is sufficiently established (People us. Ramos, 85 Phil. 638). This defect is curable at any stage of the proceed- ings (U.S. us. Bayson, 27 Phil. 447) as insertion of the real name of accused is merely a matt Padica, 221 SCRA 362). If the accust a mistake in his name ag set forth in Complaint or informatio. i 1 c 7 against minors.—In ac- cordance with Section 4(e) RA 9344 known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare A y i accused of, or adjudged der Philippine law; i, flict With the je ae they mated eee respondent accused or any other a shall not be referred a8Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 9° SEC. 8. Designation of the offense-—The com- plaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a) Source.—Taken from Section 8, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, with amendments. The impor- tant amendment in this Section is the requirement of speci- fying the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Reason for the rule.—The seriousness of a criminal prosecution requires a clear specification of the offense charged, consistently with the right of the accused to be in- formed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges against him and thus avoid all and any possible surprise which might be detrimental to his rights and inter- ests. Ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or information; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the neces- sary specification, which is but an amendment in mere mat- ters of form (People vs. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744). For as held . in another case, this is essential to avoid surprise on the part of the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly (People vs. Purisima, 85 SCRA 542). Designation of offense, not mandatory.—The re- quirement that the complaint or information should set forth the designation of the offense by the statute is by no means 93Sec. 8 Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE i of the Supreme Court is . aaenpe ie as the facts are alleged i anner as to enable a person of common ani oO a Know what is intended, and the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A comes is suffi- cient if it describes the offense in the language 0! e statute, if the statute contains all of essential elements constituting the particular offense. It is not necessary; however, to follow the language of the statute in the complaint. The complaint will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by the law. A complaint charging the crime will be sustained if the offense charged is alleged with such particularity as to apprise the accused with reasonable certainty of the offense with which he js charged (U.S. vs. Go Chamco, 23 Phil. 641, citing cases). As consequence, a mistake in the caption of an indict- ment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the charging part that is the gist of the accusation. It is almost a universal rule that the caption of a pleading is not control- ling but the determinant is what is embodied therein (People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264; People vs. Olivera, 67 Phil. 427; Cf. Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184; People vs. Maravilla, 165 SCRA 392; Licyayo vs. People, 547 SCRA 598). The erroneous classification of an act described in de- tain “ omen does not prevent the accused from being aaa fark on ler a different classification from that entered (US. ve ae ean it affect the sentence that may be ae ia bi . us. Galleda, 15 Phil. 121). Hence, the conclu- 3 ‘as been advanced that the failure to make a designa- tion of the offense must be disregarded fae a mere defect in the form, not t air eae eons See ee oe ae efendant (U.S. vs. Li-Dao, 2 Phil. 458). To repeat, it i i i Pe wabons bas peor the designation of the offense in the ation that is controlling (People v- imperative. S that the accusation 1s good so a4s Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Seco) Samillano, 56 SCRA 573); the facts alleged therein and not its title determine the nature of the crime (People vs. Mag- dowa, 73 Phil. 512). The real nature of the crime charged in an information or complaint is determined, not by its title nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the accusation (People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702; People vs. Elesterio, 173 SCRA 243). So, an erroneous specification of the provision of law applicable does not vitiate the information if it clearly mentions the crime charged and recites the facts constituting it (People vs. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252). Indeed, there is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be con- victed, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be mentioned in the information. The Rules of Court do not require that it should mention the particular penal provi- sions penalizing the offense (People vs. Silo, 99 Phil. 216; People vs. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664). In this connection, it may be mentioned that the desig- nation of the offense made by the prosecutor is a mere con- clusion of law on his part and is, therefore, not controlling. The fact that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the prosecutor in the preamble thereof. It is not necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective prepara- tion of his defense, that he be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged (U.S. vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 656; U.S. vs. Lin San, 17 Phil. 273; Cf. People vs. Arlegui, 128 SCRA 556). SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common un- 95E Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDUR! ule ense is being charged as derstanding 1 ed oreravating yee ee ie Saar to pronounced judgment. (9a) ne Reproduction of Section 9, Rule 110, 1964 i apr pier Sere in 1985 with some ee = including allegations of qualifying and aggravating cir- cumstances. ‘i i ee jtution guarantees that in all i ees ee shall be informed of the rare and cause of the accusation against him (Article Iv, Section 1, 20). To give substance to this constitutional guar- antee, the rules require that the acts or omissions com- plained of as constituting an offense must be stated in ordi- nary and concise language so as to enable a person of com- mon understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged; and to enable the court to pronounce the proper judgment (Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456). The right signifies that the accused should be given the necessary data as to why he is being proceeded against. He should not be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution (People vs. Mencias, 46 SCRA 89). This must be so because in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, and it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the ch: i der to avoid any possible surprise that charges in order may | us. Zulueta, 89 Phil, 752). The seer ead to injustice (People i in purpose of the require- ment then is to enable the accused to suitably eae his quired.—The complaint oF ition suffici an ordinary and concise lan-Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 8 pe charged, and (2) to enable the court to pronounce ‘proper judgment, as earlier stated (People vs. Bandojo, 63 Phil. 1053; Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, supra). It is not necessary, however, to follow the language of the statute in the com. plaint or information. What is important is that the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particulars as to apprise the accused with reasonable certainty of the offense charged. In other words, the crime must be stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law. (Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, supra; U.S. vs. Gatmaitan, 4 Phil. 265; U.S. vs. Go Chamco, 23 Phil. 241). While the rule states that the “acts or omissions com- plained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordi- nary and concise language,” a complaint or information is not defective simply because it contains irrelevant or eviden- tiary matters or is made more specific by the introduction of details and particulars (See Caparos vs. Gonzales, 7 SCRA 182). Neither is an accusation legally objectionable even though its language is not clear and simple and that it is * repetitious, so long as in essence it clearly charges the of- fense (People vs. Talos-Perez, 98 Phil. 764). Every element must be alleged.—It is fundamental hich the offense is composed must be -: that every element of w! alleged in the complaint or information (Balitaan vs. CFI of Batangas, 115 SCRA 729; People vs. Salcedo, 4 Phil. 234), for if the facts alleged do not constitute an offense within the terms and meaning of the law upon which the accusation is based, or if the facts alleged may all be true and yet consti- tute no offense, the indictment is insufficient (41 Am. Jur. 5 919-920). a as distinguished from the facts es- Matters of evidence, sential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. forth with par- All that is required is that the charge be set 97See. 9 URE CRIMINAL ProceD Rule 110 e the exact offense which ted and will enable him nit ve commit (People vs. Argois, 131 i ed to a weepare nis defense ticularit! the accus' to intelligen SCRA 24)- : 5 are necessary to be stated mstance: ry Wee facts and Oy reference to the definitions and the must be detern specific crimes. Reasonable certainty in the essentials of the sp asonable os rat th ffices. Ho tis statement of " a matter of evidence as distinguished from to say W to be stated in order to render the informa- ae ae certain to identify the offense (Balitaan vs. CFI of Batangas, supra). For that purpose, it is necessary to juxtapose the facts alleged in the complaint or information with the law or statute defining the offense charged. In a prosecution for theft, the allegations that the de- fendant stole the checks described in the tabulated state- ment set out in the information, and the sum of P178.08 in cash “which amount in all to the sum of B3,041.56 pesos” were deemed sufficient averments of the value of the stolen property; and that it is so clear and explicit as to leave no toom for doubt in the mind of any person of even rudimen- tary intelligence that it means to charge the defendant with the theft of the sum of m i . checks A of money therein mentioned and of the therein described, the total val i hi erein indicated, the 1 ee cee ing the amount for whi h Frpaecr ence conareta check be ted statement ws. it was drawn as set out in the a ee eer a 20 iA) though it failed to peoeee for theft was held effective a! in ayes ofa detailed cae list of the property stole? ther the pres caly alleged in i the robbery, the value © in nature Petites nor jud e information, vitiates 2% eople vs, Ville, Sment, not being jurisdictio?® as, 55 Phil. 567). So, too im * e crime SURule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See.9 * prosecution for perjury, the complaint was sustained, it ap- pearing that it contained allegations setting out the sub- stance of the controversy upon which the false oath was taken, a specification of the court or office by whom the oath was administered, a statement that such court or officer had authority to administer such oath and that the oath was false (U.S. vs. Go Chamco, supra). In a prosecution for bri- gandage, the complaint which alleged: “that the defendant during the period after the 12th day of November, 1962, conspired with more than three persons and formed a band of ladrones in the mountains of Buhi, Camarines with the ob- ject of stealing carabaos and other personal property by means of force and violence, and went out on the highways and roamed over the country armed with deadly weapons, for the purpose of stealing cara- baos and other personal property x x x” was held to be good, it reciting all the ingredients of the of- fense charged (U.S. vs. Salcedo, 4 Phil. 234). cian In People vs. Cosare, supra, a complaint designated as “acts of lasciviousness” in the caption but which recited the elements of “qualified trespass to dwelling” in the text _ thereof, was ruled sufficient to sustain a conviction for the “latter charge. So, also, where the designation given the of- fense was “assault upon agent of a person in authority” but the body of the complaint specifically described the offended “party as a municipal president—a person in authority—it was ruled that the accused may be convicted of “assault upon _@ person in authority” (U.S. vs. Gumban, 39 Phil. 76). The Tulings in both cases were based upon the principle that the failure to inform the accused of the technical name of the $rime he stands charged of is not violative of his constitu- ional rights (Izon us. People, 107 SCRA 118). 99See. 9 Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ul to be in a body © Fs ts of offense ) y Allegations or eee another angle, it was held —Vi of informers vape where the allegation of the qualifying that in a rae victim and the fact that the circumsta ve re pe ee jn the opening paragraph or accused 16 nee tion, said allegations cannot be con- Preamble the oto rcarnstances as they are prejudicial to Seen Tee to be informed of tne eee of the accusation against him and, consequently, the ea bars conviction of the case of rape in its qualified form wl Lich is punishable with death. Said allegations must be made in the “cause of the accusation” for “x x x the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or the preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been committed x x x, but from the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information (People vs. Madraga, 344 SCRA 628). This ruling was reiterated in the case of People vs. Palarca, 382 SCRA 741. Allegations in complex crimes.—It is rather axio- matic that in a prosecution for a complex crime, all the es- zene pecans of the constituent offenses must be set out in the complaint or i i aoe or aint or information (See U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy, For criminal i * . , complaint or in: nto charge the commission of a com permatio ga0, 16 SCRA 879), 0 ommit the other (People vs. Ala- that, in order to determi » it is well worth noting complex crime, we shoula whether two offenses constitute 4 i With their definitin got find out whether, in accor- » Stunent of the other, such = a » One of them is an essential ¥sical injuries which caus refines aspera kone Pocomanmapiemep tere amran | tr mses irene |Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. the death of the victim, or of stealing of personal property without the consent of the owner through force or violence, for in such cases, there would be only one single offense of homicide in the first case and robbery in the second case. But, we should take into consideration the facts alleged in a complaint or information and determine whether one of the two separate and different offenses charged therein was committed as a necessary means to commit the other offense; otherwise, the complaint or information charges two crimes or offenses independent from one another (Parulan vs. Ro- das, 78 Phil. 855). Defect in complaint or information.—It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be; an accused person cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or is necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is * charged before he is put on trial and to convict him of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or infor- * mation on which he is charged would be an unauthorized denial of that right (Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456). Obviously, then, where the information does not state all the _ essential facts and ingredients that would with sufficient ’= definiteness and clarity fully apprise the accused of the na- » ture and cause of the accusation against him, the accusation 4 cannot stand (See Sugay vs. Pamaran, 41 SCRA 260). i Hence, the absence of an allegation of lewd designs in a » complaint for acts of lasciviousness converts the act into another crime, which is unjust vexation (People vs. Gilo, 10 .« SCRA 753). Also, where the information for libel sets out -* Seven pages of published statements alleging in effect that ~ they are collectively and singly libelous, whereas upon their +% face, a quarter part thereof is not libelous the accusation was held to be fatally defective, because it leaves the court to 101See. g URE ' 110 CRIMINAL PROCED! Rule ages to i its way through all aoa us, in violation of the rule as to what statements ibel, the offensive expressions that in any batim. Where an article is lengthy and must be set out verba Tibelous with much that is-not, the ae singled out and the prosecution d eee one vs. Burgos, 59 Phil. 375). a SEs ba =a eduction, failure to allege virginity on the part of tion ffended party, is fatal (People 8. oe Reber! 7 Zoe 44; Cf, People vs. Velasquez, 12 SCRA 847; Bebento vs. Zosa, 120 SCRA 334; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473). Also, where the information did not allege that the person struck by the municipal mayor was under his charge as a prisoner, the prosecution for maltreatment of prisoners under Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be sustained (People us. Punzalan, 52 0.G. 7608). So, too, it is essential to aver that the accused had knowledge of, or knew, in a prosecution for assault upon a person in authority or his agent, the official position of the latter at the time the attack was made (People us. CFI of Quezon, 68 SCRA 302; People vs. Regala, 118 SCRA 613). grope libelous ma’ Negative allegations and negativing exceptions.— foo ane well-settled that where a statute eens an of mae er exception in the enacting clause of the the offense th 3S So incorporated with the language defining at the ingredients of the offense cannot be a¢- Palestorara se if the exception is omitted, the upon the statvts ding require that an indictment founde cused is not within ae allege enough to show that the a Statute defining the FA exception; but if the language of the exception that the ie fense is so entirely separate from thé © accurately and cle ‘sredients constituting the offense mY t if rh a 0 the exception, the ane defined without any such reference er may safely omit such refereD” 1092 arrive at a surmise *zl eee aerate ee ee es Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 9 _: as the matter contained in the exception is a matter of de- fense and must be shown by the accused (U.S. us. Cook, 84 Rep. 168 B, cited in U.S. vs. Chan Toco, 12 Phil. 262). Thus, if the statute exempts certain persons, or classes of persons, from liability, the complaint should show that the person charged does not belong to the class (U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245). Likewise, if a negative fact inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications required by law (U.S. us. Tria, 17 Phil. 303), or the act of practicing medicine without previously obtaining the proper certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners (People vs. Quebral, 86 Phil. 564), or the act of possessing a firearm without a license therefor (People us. Pajinado, 31 SCRA 812), such negative averment must. be made in the complaint or information. Note, however, that, as a rule, an exception in a penal statute by which certain particulars are withdrawn from or excepted out of the operation of the enacting clause thereof, defining a crime concerning a class or species, constitutes no part of the definition of such crime, whether placed close to or remote from the enacting clause. Thus, it was held that in an information for prescribing opium unnecessarily for a patient, it is not necessary to negative the exception in favor + fa person using opium under prescription of a duly licensed . and practicing physician, the matter contained in the execu- tion being a matter of defense which must be alleged and “* proved by the accused if he relies upon it (U.S. vs. Chan . Toco, supra). “ Defendant cannot be convicted of an offense raver than that alleged.—Well-settled is the rule that a “person cannot be convicted of an offense of which he has = Bot been informed (People vs. Austria, 94 Phil. 897) or for a crime higher than that alleged in the information (People vs. Simon, 10 SCRA 280), no matter how conclusive and con- 103Sec, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE a Rule 110 may be (Matilde vs. Jabson, : ilt Y be he offense proved is more evidence of vineing the when t supra). AS a cons “narged, 25 when the offense there ical injuries and the offense serious than Sane a charged is Jess serious P. y' the accused may be con. i ‘i hysica! proved i ey Ea not of the latter (U.S. vs. De Guz. pics Phil 91), In the same manner, it would be error for ne es to find the defendant guilty of robbery with homi- ne ee facts describing the of- ide wl the information sets out aaa without any allegation of robbery (People vs. ‘Amdam, 103 Phil. 1129). Allegation of aggravating and qualifying circum. stances.—Pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of this Rule, not only the essential ingredients of the crime charged must be set out in the complaint or information but also the attending qualifying and aggravating circumstances as well, otherwise, the same cannot be properly appreciated (People vs. Gano, 353 SCRA 126). But these provisions were given retroactive effect as they favored the accused (People vs. Elona, 388 Pay ear the old doctrine, a qualifying circum- t alleged may be considered as an aggravating circumstance if proved. In the case of murder, if there is nO qualifying circumstance alleged, like ti hi ; becomes homicide and t sh ip eeuecocuely 1Lben the coe reachery if proved can be considered onl; 5 Sevating cinco TNE circumstance. Also, any 28° now. Under Sections 8 oa uae may also proved. But not alleged in the info, of this Rule, they must be both i ad Proved during the trial for the Dadi . Perr therwise, they cannot be consid- edulla, 642 SCRA 439, pores 862 SCRA 202); People 0 _ However, j ple us. Rebucan, 654 SCRA 726)-: ‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 9 case is concerned they may be considered to determine ex- emplary damages in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code and prevailing jurisprudence. (People vs. Agudez, 498 SCRA 692). , It has been ruled, on this score that in case of allegation of aggravating circumstance of habitual delinquency, it should not be generally averred. The information should specify the requisite data regarding: 1) the commission of the ‘) erimes; 2) the last conviction or release; 3) the other previous * conviction or release of the accused. An allegation in the “* information to the effect that the accused “is a habitual de- » linquent he already having been convicted three (3) times of the crime of theft by virtue of a final judgment by a compe- = tent court, the date of the last conviction being December 30, = 1935,” is so general and insufficient to sustain a conviction for habitual delinquency upon a plea of guilty (People us. Ochina, 63 Phil. 528). Noteworthy is the decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Nava, 333 SCRA 749, wherein the complaint initi- ated by the complainant sufficiently established her age of fourteen (14) years as well as the fact that the accused is her father, but the indictment or information in which the ac- “-eused was arraigned failed to reiterate the same. Accused was only made liable for simple rape. Likewise, the allegation of the aggravating circum- “stance is a very important amendment in view of the present practice in the trial courts wherein the investigating prose- cutor who filed the information, oftentimes, is not the one rosecuting the same. Hence, right from the start the latter is not fully aware of the gravity of the offense charged. The tequirement in the rule that the aggravating circumstance = be alleged in the information will enable the trial prosecutor _* to know at once the aggravating circumstance and be pre- Pared to prove it. 105See. 19 10 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 1 i 391, rei | , Aquino, 386 SCRA Arete However, 10 People a an 388 SORA 991, seit. Cae amendments to the Rules on held that a eel qualifying circumstances need not be eee ate descriptive words such as qualifying” oy ee to properly apply an offense as long as the ee circumstances are specified in the information, SEC. 10. Place of. commission of the offense.—The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be un- derstood from its allegations that the offense was f its essential ingredients oc. committed or some 0 ial ingrec curred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was com- mitted constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification. (10a) ated in People Source.—Substantially reproduced from Section 10, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court as amended in 1985 with no substantial amendment except in style. Reason for the rule.—The necessity and sufficiency of pellcention in an information of the aie of commission of the srpnarriae be considered in the light of the fact that ae ec on commonly serves the dual purpose of in- tion against him, pa e a fees eet the accuse aioe ed and 0 fixing jurisdiction and venue (State ; SW 2d 336). In connection with the latter pur; ies pose, the requi mission of the Crome e pas that the place of the com- information has for it b ould be alleged in the complaint or court is generally ]j § basis the fact that the jurisdiction of 4 it may not area nee to a well-defined ee i ict a offense alle Jurisdiction of rritory, sO ited territo, ged to have been comme eens charged with an TY (People vs. itted outside of that lim- M ercado, 65 Phil, 605). The rule inRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Bech 10 criminal actions is that the place where the offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (Alfelor, Sr. vs. Intia, 70 SCRA 480; Lopez us, City Judge, 16 SCRA 616; U.S. vs. Pag- dayunan, 5 Phil. 265). From there proceeds the corollary that what determines the jurisdiction and competence of the court js that which is alleged in the complaint or information and that questions relating thereto have to be resolved by the averments in the accusation (People vs. San Antonio, 14 SCRA 63). Hence, when a criminal complaint is presented in the municipal court where the offense was committed, as alleged in the complaint, the question of jurisdiction in the light of such allegation must be passed upon and decided in the first instance by the municipal court itself in the criminal case before it (Mediante vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832). It goes without saying that if the evidence offered show that the crime was committed outside the territorial boundaries of. the court, contrary to what the complaint or information asserts, then the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the case and the complaint or information must be dismissed (People vs. Galano, 75 SCRA 193). Allegation of specific place, not required.—Under the rule it is not required, save in certain instances, that the complaint or information state with particularity the place where the crime was committed. So long as it appears from the allegations that the offense was committed, or some of the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place, within the jurisdiction of the court, the requirement is al- ready satisfied. Courts may take judicial notice of political or geographical subdivisions within its territory (People vs. Prado, 58 Phil. 637; People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 637) so that if the crime was committed in the territory embraced within the court’s jurisdiction, the judgment would be valid even if 107CRIMINAY * 1 that point. AS a matter of fact, ne sco mann i a arto he particula conviction ? en if it Jess the Pa rense charée not committed at the place a). that the crime ei d the place of actual com. diction of the court (People vs, Ma. : ific place need be averred— isscoea ae shen Pd a exceptions may be To the po rale itself implies, if the place of the commis. eee the offense constitutes an essential element of the ical robbery in an inhabited house, public building or place of worship (Article 299, Revised Penal Code); de- structive arson (Article 320, ibid.); trespass to dwelling (Arti- cle 280, ibid.)—the place must be pleaded with specificity. Likewise, the exact place must be alleged where the offense charged is the doing of an unlicensed act and the exact loca- tion is essential to individuate the offense (Arrington us. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 96, 12 SE 224). An example of this is the carrying of a deadly weapon within the 30-meter radius of a polling place or a violation of a zoning ordinance. SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense—it is the precise dere nate in the complaint or ‘information see ate the offense was committed ex¢eP offense’ may be all rial ingredient of the offense- date as near as ‘ leged to have been committed © a mission. (11a) Possible to the actual date of its c™ Sources, -—Substant; ae 110, 1964 he reproduced from Section i endment only in style Court, as amended in 1985,Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 11 * Averment of time of commission, general rule.— While it is true that the complaint or information must al- lege the time at which the offense was committed, it is not necessary that it be set out with exact precision. It suffices that the allegation approximates or be as near the actual date when the offense was committed. But, although the rule states that the precise time need not be pleaded, by no means should it be read as authorizing the total omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing (U.S. vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421). And, of course, the act should be alleged as having been committed at some time before the filing of the complaint or information (U.S. vs. De Castro, 2 Phil. 616). Illustrative cases.—There is good authority to the ef- fect that if the crime, for example, was committed on June 10, 1984, it is sufficient to allege that the same was commit- ted “on or about June 10, 1984” or “on June 10, 1984 or thereabout.” The reason advanced is that the word “about” is avery comprehensive term which, when used with regard to time, may cover a considerable extent thereof. Thus, where -. an information alleges that the crime was committed “on or about January 20, 1950,” evidence may be received to show “S| that the offense was committed about the 5th or 6th of ‘ March of the same year (People vs. Jacobo, [CA], 51 O.G. 3498, citing U.S. vs. Cardona, 1 Phil. 381). Also, where the time difference is only 2 months and 5 days, it was held that the disparity allows approximation as to the date of commis- sion of the offense (People vs. Borromeo, 123 SCRA 253). ‘However, an allegation that the accused committed rape “between October, 1910 and August, 1912” was held in- effective because it did not afford the accused the informa- tion required by law and thereby prejudiced his defense (U.S. vs. Dichao, supra). The same result was reached in a case where the variance in dates was so great—5 years—as to 109S 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ee. 19 Rule : ission of one and the sam, mation 1n the commis : le us. Reyes, 108 SCRA 23). When time is a material in. tion to the rule. y Lae ae offense charged, it becomes mandatory to a aie same with precision or particularity. Thus, a com. eee en information for infanticide (Article 255, Revised Pe Code) which the law characterized as the killing of a child less than three days old, the time of the killing is a material element. Similarly, accusations for violation of the then Blue Sunday Law, election laws and the laws on gam- bling must state with particularity the precise date when the act was committed. An information which charges without specifying that such dates were days on which the acts com- plained of were unlawful under the statute, is invalid for uncertainty, except as to which the court can take judicial notice that they were dates on which the acts constituted the offense charged (State vs. Van Ness, 109 Vt. 392, 199 A 759). By way of recapitulation, it may be stated that where time is of the essence of the offense, it must be correctly al- leged and must be proved as laid; but where time is not of the essence or gist of the offense, the precise time at which the offense is charged to have been committed is not material (41 Am. Jur. 2d 953). In the latter case, the proof need not correspond to the allegation; the evidence is admissible and Seen, if it shows that the crime was committed at any rans anne period of the statute of limitations and be- e time stated in the complaint or indictment and beft eve ot efore the action is commenced (U.S. vs. Smith, 3 Phil. defy approxi offense (Peop SEC. 12. Na: plaint or informer ct (he offended party—The com name of the Seer must state the name and sur een te parson against whom or against whos nse was committed, or any appella- 1inRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 12 tion or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. (a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to properly iden- tify the offense charged. (b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. (c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or designa- tion by which it is known or by which it may be iden- tified, without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a) Source.—Reproduction of Section 12, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, with change only in style or certain phraseology but not in substance. General rule.—The general rule is that the name of the offended party should be alleged in the complaint or in- formation. Like the name of an accused, the offended party must be designated by name, nickname, any other appella- tion or by fictitious name if there is no better way of identi- fying him. This is necessary to make the complaint or infor- mation sufficient. Likewise, if there is indemnity to be awarded, the court will find no difficulty to whom to make the award. However, an erroneous allegation as. to the name of the person ‘injured shall be deemed immaterial when the offense can still be ascertained despite such error (Mendoza , 111Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See. 19 ye, Almeda-Lopez, 64 Phil. 820; U.S. vs. Kyner, 1 Phil. 519; ° Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680). nded party, when indispensable, the injured party is necessary as a mat. ter of essential description of the crime charged, the com. plaint must invest such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is unknown (Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th Ed., Sections 111, 112), In crimes against property, it is elementary that ownership must be alleged as a matter essential to the description of the offense (U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil. 830). For, to permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an entirely dif- ferent person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and, in addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal (U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy, supra). Additionally, if a man may be con- victed of robbing one person when he is charged with robbing another, the complaint instead of being a means of informing him of the particular offense with which he is charged would rather serve as a means of concealing it (U.S. vs. Lahoyla- hoy, supra). Name of offe Where the name of Tn case of offense against property, if the name of the of ae party js unknown, the property, subject matter of the properly ‘dentin i described with such particularity as t? Rule 110, ay we Particular offense charged (Section 11, robbery, embezzlement, one because “to constitute larceny: malicious Sree obtaining money by false pretenses, must be that Bo on the Property obtained or damaged must name the oe and indictments for such offenses the offense” (Clarh’s Chimin x It is also necessary to identify inal Procedure, Pp. 227, cited in US. SaatRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 12° vs. Lahoylahoy, supra). It ought to be noted, however, that the rule is that the complaint or information is good if it al- leges ownership of the stolen property to be in the legal pos- sessor (U.S. vs. Gumarang, 27 Phil. 1). In theft or robbery, the offended parties may be mere possessors, not necessarily the owners of things stolen or taken (People vs. Juban, [CA], 44 O.G. 962, cited in Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, p. 1508). The reason therefor has been succinctly stated thus: “The actual condition of the legal title is imma- terial to the thief; so far as he is concerned, one may be taken as the owner who was in peaceable possession of it, and whose possession was unlaw- fully disturbed by the taking. The possessor of the goods from whom the thief took them may therefore properly be described as owner in the indictment. The possession must be actual; right of possession alone will not suffice, nor a general direction and control, not amounting to a legal possession. The goods need not be in the actual manual possession of the person described as owner at the moment of taking; it is enough that he was legally the posses- sor. Upon this principle the property or goods sto- len may be laid in a bailee from whom they were taken, as for instance, in a common carrier, inn- keeper, a pledgee, a receiver, a hirer or borrower, a cestui que trust, one in possession under a contract for purchase, a washerwoman who has the goods to wash, or a coach-maker who has a coach to repair, or a lien or, manufacturer, who is performing work on the materials of another, a cashier of a bank, or a constable who has attached or taken the goods in execution” (People vs. Gumarang, supra, cited in Aquino, R.C., op. cit., supra). 113CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See. 1g Rule 110 from the fact that the name of the injureg in case of necessity, be alleged as unknown ; person a paferred that the naming of such person whey ie ance (Wharton, Criminal Pleading and ice, supra). ission of the name of the party ag. Pi Cece eras to be permissible only when his name ig etn and, even then, the rule requires that the articles stolen must be particularly described. In defamation cases, the identity of the person against whom the traducive words were directed is also a materia] element. Hence, in a case of slander where there has been a misidentification of the offended party, the Supreme Court ruled that the complaint was properly dismissed (People vs, Uba, et al., 99 Phil. 134). However, in rape cases or in cases involving violence against women and their children the court shall withhold the real nea of the victim and shall use fictitious initials to represent her. Additionally, Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims- survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise with their identities, as well those or their im- pagans es of family or household members, shall not ee closed (People vs. Cabalquinto, 502 SCRA 419, citing es eee Women and their Children, Se Role XI, Section €9, cohernine (nementing Act No. Te Against Women , otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Nazareno, 551 SCRA 16,” Children”; reiterated in People ¥* SEC. 13, re Duplicity of the offense.—A complaint or information must char, when the law prescribes only one offense, ex¢e?’ ous offenses, (18a) Single punishment for varRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 13° Source.—Reproduction of Section 13, Rule 110, 1964 Rules of Court as amended in 1985 without change except in style and phraseology but not in substance. oe Duplicitous informations.—Duplicity in criminal pleading is the joinder of two or more distinct and separate offenses in the same count of an indictment or information (41 Am. Jur. 2d, 1011), A complaint or information is duplici- tous if it charges two or more different offenses. Consistently with the right of the accused to be in- formed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him <, Gection 14(2), Article IV, 1987 Constitution), the general rule has been laid down that a complaint or information must charge but one offense (Section 13, Rule 110, ante). The pre- scription is designed to give the defendant in a criminal ac- tion the necessary knowledge of the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare his defense. The State should not ~ heap upon the defendant two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense (People vs. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234). . Thus, it was held that the law against charging more than ne offense in an information is fundamental, and where “more than one crime is charged in an information to which a demurrer is properly filed on that ground, the court should ‘Sustain the plea and a failure to do so is reversible error (People vs. Garcia, 46 Phil. 363). In the recent case of Manuel é Pafio, 172 SCRA 225, the Supreme Court observed with arked disapproval: “The information imputed to the ac- used two different offenses, to wit, writing allegedly libelous letter and causing the publication of the allegedly libelous == ews report. This is not allowed under Rule 110, Section -(18), of the Rules of Court, providing that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in ose cases in which existing laws prescribe a single pun- ishment for various offenses. If libelous, the letter and the 115CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See Rule 110 d separate offenses that shoul have itute' , y mation.” parate info: he view has been expressed F a ern eee by an information and = outs pes to singleness or plurality of crimes charge) pee be resolved against the writer thereof, especially mus consideration is taken of the duty of the proseeu, tion, by constitutional mandate, of informing the ac. cused of the cause and nature of the accusation against him (Dissent of Perfecto, J. in Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI, 79 Phil. 165). Test of duplicity——Whether two offenses are charged in an information, or otherwise, must not be made to depend upon the evidence presented at the trial but upon the facts alleged in the information (Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI, supra). Note, however, that misnaming an offense by denominating one crime and setting out facts showing it to be another does not render a count bad for duplicity (People vs. Cuddihi, 54 Cal. 53). Prohibition against duplicity may be waived— When the information charges more than one offense, the a¢- Baul $0 Pha ake a seasonable objection thereto (U.S. 2%. vs. Patio, 172 SCRA Cone 2% Pelicher, 60 Phil. 771; Manuel can be had by virt 225); and, if he does so, no conviction 56 O.G. 3546). C uosolisaid information (People vs. Santos accused with the aver acy » if the information charges thé object to the multi Seren of several crimes and he fails plicity of the charges made in said jnfor- news report const been charged in se! ecord (P, » August 31 eople vs. Guzman, cused does not ee 1958). In other words, when an a “pon the ground of duplicity and 60%Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 18 to trial under an indictment charging more than one offense, he is deemed to have waived the defect and he can not be heard to complain on appeal against that defect (Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI, supra; cf. Manuel vs. Pafo, supra). Exceptions to the “duplicity rule.”—By the express terms of Section 13, Rule 110, a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for vari- ous offenses. The following have been considered as falling under the exception and, therefore, the rule on duplicity does “=. not apply: (1) Complex crimes.—Under the law, there exists a complex crime when (a) a single act constitutes two or more =. grave or less grave felonies, or (b) an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (Article 48, Revised Penal Code). Ilustrative of the first kind, otherwise known as de- lito compuesto or compound crime, is the case when one shot. from a gun resulted in the death of two or more persons, or the case when one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter’s body and wounded another, or the case where a person planted a bomb in an airplane and the bomb ex- © ploded, destroying the plane and killing 13 persons (People 20s. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). Examples of the other kind of complex crime—called delito complejo or complex crime ‘proper—are falsification of a residence certificate to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas, 60 Phil. 241); seduction by theans of usurpation of official function (U.S. vs. Hernandez, 9 Phil. 109); and kidnapping with murder (Parulan vs. Ro- :.das, 78 Phil. 855). Note, however, that if one of the offenses is a light felony (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; Corpus vs. éPaje, 28 SCRA 1662; People vs. Baras, 22 SCRA 1383), or where one of the offenses is punished by a special law (U.S. % vs. Araneta, 48 Phil. 650) there is no complex crime. 117Rule 110 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE See. 13 ial complex crimes.—These are a class of com. plex ore Si aly given definite momencaeur ad pen. alties, typical example of which are robbery as romicide (Article 294, par. 1, Revised Penal Code); robbery with rape (Article 294, par. 2, id.); attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide (Article 297, id.), and death as a consequence of arson (Article 326-A, id.). (3) Continuous crime or delito continuado.—A continu- ous crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts aris- ing from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being a unity of purpose and of right violated, commits di- verse acts, each of which although of a delictual character merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual acts is called a delito continuado (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308; People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The notion or concept ofa continuous crime has its origin in the judicial fiction favor- able to the law transgressors and in many a case against the interest of the society. For it to exist there should be plural- ity of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more piotstions of the same penal provisions are united in one and ie same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (People vs. Zapata, 88 Phil. 68%: pected supra; Gamboa vs. C.A., supra). Juris- aS eet peers the defendant took 13 cows at the e same place where he found them gra? ing, he performed but Phil, 322). The act of talking to renee coe ato i i ing two roosters, i to the t i | , in response eats pee a the criminal purpose on one occasio®, committed for the © crime of theft. There is no series of act 'e accomplishment of different purposes, but‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See. 13 only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes each having an independent existence of its own, because there are not two different distinct appropria- tions, nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 446; People vs. Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 575; Cf. Gamboa vs. CA, supra). An information plainly charging the accused with smok- ing opium and with possession of smoking paraphernalia incident to the act of smoking, is not duplicitous for, obvi- ously, the act of smoking necessarily involved possession of the opium pipe and opium as part thereof, since it could not be carried out otherwise. All the acts alleged in the informa- tion are therefore descriptive of one and the same offense (Say Guat vs. Barrios, [CA], 43 O.G. 1664, citing U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil. 484). Where a statute enunciates a series of acts, any of which separately or altogether may constitute an offense, all of such acts may bé charged in a single count for the reason that notwithstanding that each act by itself may constitute the offense, all of them together do no more (Pyle vs. Boles, 148 W. Va. 465, 185 SE 2d. 292). So, if the defendant who was not a duly licensed physician, gave medical assistance and treatment to a certain person and advertised himself and offered services as a physician by means of cards, letter- heads and advertisement in the newspapers, the latter being a means to commit the former, and’ both violations are pun- ishable with the same penalty, the information cannot be challenged as duplicitous (People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536). The rule, however, is different if the accused is charged for violation of two different sections of the same law, each vio- lation having a distinct penalty such that the accused may be penalized for both offenses at the same time, in which 119Rule 110 i a eer annot be properly joined in ong case the eee s Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234). Likewise eee performed by the accused each of which constj. nies : separate offense, two informations should have tg i filed. For example, if with treachery the accused fired five shots at five different victims, as @ result of which four of them died, while the other sustained serious wounds, four separate crimes of murder and a frustrated murder were committed which are chargeable in five separate informa. tions (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 749). (4) Crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes.—It is well settled that where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes speci- fied, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one of fense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness (Jurado vs. Suy Yan, 38 eee a us. Tolentino, 5 Phil. 682; Ko Bu Lin vs. ppeals, 118 SCRA 573). Similarly, where an infor- ration charges = defendant with a specific crime set forth counts, each i a vests offense, it may be allow of which may constitute a distin? : ay ed without violating the prohibition ce eee offenses. The aera in the informa facts ures ins ae 4s considered a bill of particulars ° crime charged a Ean of guilt of the accused of t ba tionable (People vs. Yap, 22 Sone soup ently, is not objee , 4), in. » if aoeRule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES See, 14 having committed the offense charged therein were included jn the information merely to describe and narrate the differ- ent and specific acts the sum total of which constitutes a crime, the validity of the information cannot be assailed on the ground that it charges more than one offense, because those different acts or offenses may serve merely as a basis for prosecution of one single offense (People vs. Camerino, 108 Phil. 79). For example, in a case of frustrated homicide, the information may properly allege physical injuries, be- cause physical injuries constitute an essential element of or are embraced in the graver crime of frustrated homicide (People vs. Pacubas, 64 Phil. 614). The same is true if the common crimes of arson, robbery and physical injuries are alleged in the information charging the commission of rebel- . lion, since these crimes are absorbed in the latter offense (People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515; People vs. Santos, 104 Phil. 551). Splitting a case, not allowed.—A defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based upon the same act by splitting the same into various charges, all ema- nating from the same law violated, when the prosecution : mbody them in a single information « (People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518, March 30, 1964; People us. Silva, 4 SCRA 95). From the viewpoint both of trial practice and justice, it is doubtful whether the prosecution could split the action against the defendant by filing against him sev- n would work €fal informations. Such splitting of the actiot “unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in > general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before ifferent courts (People vs. Cano, 17 SCRA 237). < SEC. 14, Amendment or substitution—A com- Plaint or information may be amended, in form or in could easily and well e 121Pp RE Seo, lel CRIMINAL ROCED C14 Rule 110 t any time bef, . ave of court, a ‘Ore substance, without is plea. After the plea and during S the ee ental amendment may only be made with we trig court and when it can be done without caus. eave 0 ing prejudice to the rights of the accused. amendment before plea, which r, any : ae the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or informa. tion, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n) If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper of- fense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in dou- ble jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a) Source—Paragraphs 1 and 3 are substantially the same as Section 14, Rule 110 A > , 1964 as amended in 1985. Para, aph Dis ne Rules of Court, ea al . made within the trial, a formal amend ausin, 1th leave of court and when it c4” 8 Prejudice to the rights of the aceule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec, 14 sed. The second part allows any amendment also before jea which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or exclude any accused from the complaint or information put can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reason in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties specially the of- fended party. And the last part provides that if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been committed in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the origi- nal complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, infra, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy (Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 107 Phil. 843). The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance in the trial. Nature of an amended information.—An amended . information is not a new information because it does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one. The amended information super- sedes the original information (U.S. vs. Macalintal, 7 Phil. 448; People vs. Taruc, et al., 5 SCRA 132), but relates back to i. the date at which the original information was filed (Quinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil. 801). This distinction is important in de- termining whether or not the crime charged has already . Prescribed. . : Amendments before plea.—The first paragraph of the section under consideration authorizes the amendment of the complaint or information, whether in substance or in form, without prior leave of the court at any time before the defendant pleads. As a necessary consequence, the rule lodges in the prosecuting officer the discretionary power to cu 123, Criminal PROCEDURE Sec, 14 Rule 11 ut in the accusation both in mat F stance (See Conde vs. Judge of F;, ters of form ee Fiscal of Tayabas, 45 Phil. ie be Instance a : RA 489; Catuira vs. Court of Ap. ple vs. peescRA 136). But where the amendment before Jea, whether jn form or in substance, downgrades the na. os dr the offense charged in or exclude any accused from the complaint or information, it can be ie only upon mo. tion by the prosecutor, with notice to the o ‘ended party and with leave of court. So, where the charge is murder and the prosecution would like to amend it to homicide; or when the information charges conspiracy of two or more persons and the prosecution would like to exclude any of the accused, the prosecution, unlike before, cannot do it motu proprio. It must ask the permission of the court. It must file a motion to that effect with notice to the offended party. The purpose of this qualification is to protect the offended party by preventing the prosecuting officer from exercising oppressively its un- limited discretion to amend, as previously stated. Most often the offended party to its consternation and prejudice will just learn that the offense was downgraded or one of the accused was deleted from the information. change the averments set 0 In short, where the charge to be amended is a greater re to a lesser one, or where any of the original accused eps cceluded, the following requisites must concur: ama aa a eee effect shall be filed by the prosecution stating ie 3 wt y there will be a downgrading of the nature of (2) the ee or the exclusion of any of the accus 7 tion; and (3) at arty must be furnished a copy of said 0 court and copies ep must be favorably resolved by ee ties, especially the as all be furnished to all pa” Formal tance, if solely fer {iubstantial amendments.—Of impo © reason that only amendments in for 194; ‘ Rule 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Sec. 14 may be introduced after arraignment, is the distinction be- tween form and substance. Black defines substance as the material or essential part of a thing; and form, as the an- tithesis thereof. In pleadings, indictments, affidavits and conveyances, @ matter of form (as distinguished from a mat- ter of substance) is all that relates to the mode, form or style of expressing the facts involved, the choice or arrangement of words, and other such particulars, without affecting the sub- stantial validity or sufficiency of the instrument or without going to the merits (Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed.). Ap- plied to the present discussion, the substantial matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and the determination of the jurisdiction of the court (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38). All others are merely matters of form. In the case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, 207 SCRA 134, cited in Villaflor vs. Vivar, 349 SCRA 194, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations that relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment that does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations that do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case s0 as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense to be assumed; and (4) an amendment that does not adversely affect any substantial right of the ac- cused, such as the right to invoke prescription. Amendment after plea.—After arraignment, a com- plaint or information may be amended only with respect to form and with leave of court; no substantial amendment of the information may be permitted (People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752), The reason for this is not difficult to see. Once the defendant enters his plea, the battle lines are drawn, and the defendant is now expected to muster all his defenses within » 125