TAYAG v.

LACSON

FACTS: Respondents Angelica Tiotuyco Vda. de Lacson, and her children were the registered owners of
three parcels of land located in Mabalacat, Pampanga, registered in the Register of Deeds of San
Fernando, Pampanga. The properties, which were tenanted agricultural lands, were administered by
Renato Espinosa for the owner.

On March 17, 1996, a group of original farmers/tillers individually executed in favor of the petitioner
separate Deeds of Assignment in which the assignees assigned to the petitioner their respective rights as
tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled by them for and in consideration of P50.00 per
square meter. The said amount was made payable "when the legal impediments to the sale of the property
to the petitioner no longer existed." The petitioner was also granted the exclusive right to buy the property
if and when the respondents, with the concurrence of the defendants-tenants, agreed to sell the property.
In the interim, the petitioner gave varied sums of money to the tenants as partial payments, and the latter
issued receipts for the said amounts.

The petitioner called a meeting of the defendants-tenants to work out the implementation of the terms of
their separate agreements but the defendants-tenants instead wrote the petitioner stating that they were
not attending the meeting and gave notice of their collective decision to sell all their rights and interests,
as tenants/lessees, over the landholding to the respondents (the landowners/ the Lacsons).

1. Is the petitioner entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents? (Meaning,
can the court, ante litem, stop the farmers from selling their rights to the Lacsons)

ANS: A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo
of things ante litem and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the
case can be heard. While generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court taking cognizance of the case, it should be granted only when the court is fully
satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. For the court to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction, the petitioner was burdened to establish the following: (1) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent
act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.

We have reviewed the pleadings of the parties and found that, as contended by the respondents, the
petitioner failed to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in denying the respondents comment/motion as well as their motion for reconsideration.

a) The trial court cannot enjoin the respondents from selling, disposing of and encumbering their property.
As the registered owners of the property, the respondents have the right to enjoy and dispose of their
property without any other limitations than those established by law, in accordance with Article 428 of the
Civil Code. The right to dispose of the property is the power of the owner to sell, encumber, transfer, and
even destroy the property. Ownership also includes the right to recover the possession of the property
from any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such property, by the appropriate action for
restitution, with the fruits, and for indemnification for damages but it is limited by those set forth by law,
such as the agrarian reform laws.

b) The respondents are not parties or privies to the deeds of assignment issued by the farmers. There is no
evidence that the respondents agreed, expressly or impliedly, to the said deeds or to the terms and
conditions set forth therein. The matter of the period for the petitioner to pay the balance of the said
amount to each of the defendants-tenants is an issue between them, the parties to the deed.

c) Under the Deeds of Assignment, the obligation of the petitioner to pay to each of the defendants-
tenants the balance of the purchase price was conditioned on the occurrence of the following events: (a)
the respondents agree to sell their property to the petitioner; (b) the legal impediments to the sale of the
landholding to the petitioner no longer exist; and, (c) the petitioner decides to buy the property. When he
testified, the petitioner admitted that the legal impediments referred to in the deeds were (a) the
respondents refusal to sell their property; and, (b) the lack of approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform:

2. WON the deeds of assignment executed by the defendants-tenants are perfected option
contracts. NO.

ANS: An option is a contract is a condition offered or contract by which the owner stipulates with another
that the latter shall have the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or in
compliance with certain terms and conditions, or which gives to the owner of the property the right to sell
or demand a sale. It imposes no binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside from the
consideration for the offer. Until accepted, it is not, properly speaking, treated as a contract. An option
contract is a separate and distinct contract from which the parties may enter into upon the conjunction of
the option.

In this case, the defendants-tenants-subtenants, under the deeds of assignment, granted to the petitioner
not only an option but the exclusive right to buy the landholding. But the grantors were merely the
defendants-tenants, and not the respondents, the registered owners of the property. Not being the
registered owners of the property, the defendants-tenants could not legally grant to the petitioner the
option, much less the "exclusive right" to buy the property.

3. WON the respondents can be impleaded as parties-defendants because allegedly, they induced
or are inducing the defendants-tenants to violate the deeds of assignment (art 1314 of Civil Code).
NO.

ANS: For the said law to apply, the pleader is burdened to prove the following: (1) the existence of a
valid contract; (2) knowledge by the third person of the existence of the contract; and (3) interference by
the third person in the contractual relation without legal justification. Where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather
than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is
financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or
malicious intermeddler.
CRUZ v. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Adoracion Cruz is the mother of her co-petitioners s well as Arnel Cruz, who was one
of the defendants in Civil Case. Petitioners filed said case against Arnel Cruz and herein private
respondents Summit Financing Corporation ("Summit"), the deputy sheriff and ex-officio sheriff of Rizal,
and the Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal.

Petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Rizal. Yet the property
was registered only in the name of Arnel Cruz. According to petitioners, the property was among the
properties they and Arnel Cruz inherited upon the death of Delfin Cruz, husband of Adoracion Cruz. The
petitioners and Arnel Cruz executed a Deed of Partial Partition, distributing to each of them their shares
consisting of several lots previously held by them in common. Among them is the subject of this case.
Subsequently, the same parties to the Deed of Partial Partition agreed in writing to share equally in the
proceeds of the sale of the properties although they had been subdivided and individually titled in the
names of the former co-owners pursuant to the Deed of Partial Partition. This arrangement was embodied
in a Memorandum of Agreement.

Petitioner Thelma Cruz then discovered that one of the TCTs had been cancelled and another was issued
in the name of Summit. Upon further investigation, petitioners learned that a Real Estate Mortgage was
constituted on the disputed property to secure the loan obtained by Arnel Cruz thru Nelson Tamayo,
husband of petitioner Nerissa Cruz Tamayo (via a SPA) from respondent Summit. Since the loan had
remained outstanding on maturity, Summit instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and at the
foreclosure sale it was declared the highest bidder.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the mortgage was valid since the petitioners, claiming to be co-owners of property
with Arnel Cruz, did not consent to it. YES, mortgage was valid.

RATIO: Resolution of the issue in turn depends on the determination of whether the mortgaged property
was the exclusive property of Arnel Cruz when it was mortgaged. If answered in the affirmative, then
there was nothing to prevent him from exercising ownership over the said property. Co-ownership is
terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial partition of the properties owned in common. Partition, in
general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.

From a reading of the Deed of Partial Partition, no other meaning can be gathered other than that
petitioners and Arnel Cruz had put an end to the co-ownership. In the aforesaid deed, the shares of
petitioners and Arnel Cruz's in the mass of co-owned properties were concretely determined and
distributed to each of them. In particular, to Arnel Cruz was assigned the disputed property. As the
absolute owner thereof then, Arnel Cruz had the right to enjoy and dispose of the property, as well as the
right to constitute a real estate mortgage over the same without securing the consent of petitioners.

The parties only bound themselves to share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties. The agreement
does not direct reconveyance of the properties to reinstate the common ownership of the parties. To insist
that the parties also intended to re-establish co-ownership after the properties had been partitioned is to
read beyond the clear import of the agreement and to render nugatory the effects of partition, which is not
the obvious or implied intent of the parties. It must be noted that subsequent to the execution of the Deed
of Partition and Memorandum of Agreement, the properties were titled individually in the names of the
co-owners to which they were respectively adjudicated, to the exclusion of the other co-owners.

PANGANIBAN V. OAMIL

FACTS: Julita Oamil, herein respondent, filed a complaint for specific performance with damages
praying that Partenio Rombaua (Partenio) be ordered to execute a final deed of sale over the parcel of
land which was the subject of a prior "Agreement to Sell" executed by and between them. The property
is located at #11 21st St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, and is Partenios conjugal share in a parcel of
commercial land (the subject property) acquired by Partenio and his deceased first wife Juliana during
their marriage.

There are two portions of the subject property in contention: one consisting of 204.5 square meters facing
21st Street (the 21st St. portion), and another consisting of 204.5 square meters facing Canda Street (the
Canda St. portion). Petitioners and their father Partenio are acknowledged co-owners of the subject
property to the following extent: one-half to Partenio as his conjugal share, and one-sixth each of the
remaining half to petitioners and Partenio as the surviving heirs of Juliana.

In the meantime, a Motion for leave of court to file a Complaint in Intervention was filed by Sotero Gan
(Gan), who claims to be the actual and rightful owner of Partenios conjugal share. Gan claims to have
purchased Partenios conjugal share in the property, and in return, the latter executed a deed of waiver and
quitclaim of his possessory rights. Gan likewise claims that the tax declaration covering the portion of the
property had been transferred in his name.

1. WON petitioners can intervene in the proceedings to protect their rights as co-owners of the
subject property. YES, THEY CAN.

RATIO: Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of
the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is
an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. Before partition in a co-
ownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common property.
The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this undivided interest, except as to purely personal
rights. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the
partition of the property. Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of a division or partition of
property owned in common, assignees of one or more of the co-owners may take part in the division of
the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot
impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made
notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or
assignor to maintain its validity.

As Partenios successor-in-interest to the property, respondent could not acquire any superior right in the
property than what Partenio is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition. In a contract of sale
of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor
had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. It must be noted
that the court in Special Civil Action specifically awarded the Canda St. portion to Partenio. This should
put an end to the co-ownership between Partenio and the respondents, and the award made to each co-
owner of specific portions of the property as their share in the co-ownership should be respected.
Hence, although Partenio was free to sell or transfer his undivided interest to the respondent, the effect of
such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals did not specify which portion of the property the 21 st St.
portion or the Canda St. portion should be deeded to respondent as buyer of Partenios conjugal
share. By disregarding the final and executory judgment in Special Civil Action, they certainly ignored
the principle of conclusiveness of judgments. Hence, petitioners can now intervene to protect their rights
as co-owners.

Finally, with respect to Gans intervention, Gan moved to intervene only in 1995, when the decision
became final and executory in February 1994. Certainly, intervention, being merely collateral or ancillary
to the principal action, may no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
Moreover, since Gan did not appeal the herein assailed decision of the appellate court, then the same, as
against him, has become final and executory.

BONGALON v. CA

FACTS: Pedro Bongalon, the late husband of petitioner Filipina Bongalon (petitioner), respondents
Cecilio Bongalon and Amparo Bongalon and four others are the children of the late Cirila Bonga and
Bernabe Bongalon. Cirila is one of the five children of Rosalia Buenaflor and Cornelio Bonga. The other
children of Rosalia and Cornelio are Trinidad Bonga Bobier, Jacoba Bonga Faustino, Emilio Bonga and
Benito Bonga. Jacoba had namely, Conchita Faustino Base, Catalina Faustino Conlo, and Leonardo
Faustino. Emilio also had three children, namely, Teodora Bonga Bien, Francisca Bonga Camba, and
Maxima Bonga Diaz. It appears that Jacoba and Emilio predeceased their children. [ANG DAMI NILA,
PASENSYA!]

Rosalia was the owner of Lot (LOT) in A. Berces St., Tabaco, Albay. Rosalia died intestate in 1940,
survived by her husband and five children. On 26 July 1943, Trinidad, Conchita, and Teodora executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Cirila a part of the LOT for P100. On the same day, Cirila, and
again Trinidad, Conchita, and Teodora, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Pedro Bongalon
a part of LOT also for P100. On 22 February 1971, Cirila executed another Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying LOT to Amparo for P4,500. Amparo subsequently declared LOT in her name for tax purposes
and paid the real estate taxes. Even before the execution of the Deed of Sale, Amparo and her family
were already occupying a 32-square meter portion of LOT where her house stands.

Meanwhile, Pedro Bongalon executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate declaring that Cirila is the
only heir of Rosalia and that he is, in turn, the only heir of Cirila. Based on this Extrajudicial Settlement,
Pedro Bongalon obtained Transfer Certificate of Title issued in his name. Pedro then sued respondents
for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Portion of Property and Damages. Pedro prayed that the RTC declare
his title free of any cloud and order respondents to vacate Lot and pay him damages and litigation
expenses.

1. WON Pedro owns the entire LOT. NO.

RATIO: There is no dispute that Lot was Rosalias paraphernal property. Thus, when Rosalia died
intestate, she passed on this piece of property to her surviving spouse Cornelio and their five children,
namely, Cirila, Trinidad, Jacoba, Emilio, and Benito. These heirs inherited Lot in co-ownership, at 1/6
undivided share each. After Cornelio died, his 1/6 undivided share passed to his surviving five children
per stirpes, thus increasing their undivided shares to 1/5 each. The 1/5 undivided share of Jacoba, who
apparently predeceased her children Conchita, Catalina, and Leonardo, passed to Jacobas children as co-
owners in equal shares. Likewise, the undivided 1/5 share of Emilio, who also apparently predeceased his
children Teodora, Francisca, and Maxima, passed to Emilios children as co-owners in equal shares.

Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita sold to Cirila a part of Lot. Since these co-owners could alienate their
undivided shares, they sold their undivided shares in Lot to Cirila. Similarly, on the same day, Cirila (and
again Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita), conveyed to Pedro a part of Lot. Thus, Cirila sold to Pedro her
original 1/5 share and the combined undivided shares of Trinidad, Teodora and Conchita she earlier
acquired. The participation of Trinidad, Teodora and Conchita, while superfluous (as they had earlier sold
their undivided shares to Cirila), is valid. In sum, Pedro Bongalons interest in Lot covers only the
undivided shares of Cirila, Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita.

Thus, Pedro Bongalon did not acquire ownership of the entire Lot B. As the other co-owners, namely, the
heirs of Benito Bongalon, and the other children of Jacoba (Catalina and Leonardo) and Emilio
(Francisca and Maxima) did not sign either, they remained co-owners of Lot. While each co-owner has
full ownership of his part and may alienate it, the alienation affects only the portion which pertains to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

2. WON On the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale Casts a Cloud on Pedro Bongalons Title

A cloud on title to real property or any interest therein is any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. The 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale purports to
show that Amparo was the owner of such property when in fact she was not. This document is void
because at the time of its execution, Cirila had no more interest to sell in Lot because she had sold all her
interest in that property to Pedro. Thus, Cirilas other children, including Amparo and Cecilio, cannot
claim any interest over Lot. Amparos subsequent declaration of Lot under her name for tax purposes (and
her payment of the real estate taxes in 1977 and 1978) did not change her status as a stranger to that
property.

There is no question that Pedro Bongalon falsely stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement that Cirila was the
only heir of Rosalia and that he, in turn, was the sole heir of Cirila. This is not a minor defect but in fact
renders the document void. Consequently, TCT, which the Register of Deeds of Albay issued based on the
Extrajudicial Settlement, must be cancelled. But this does not deprive Pedro or his heirs of the right to
maintain this action for quieting of title.