KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY DAVID BLOOR g & a § a 3 = d 3 3 14946 ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL London, Henley and BostonUs U 2 1H400 div, Bess [sss First published in 1976 by Rowledge & Kogan Paul Ltd 30 Store Street, London WCLE 7DD, Broadway House, Newtown Road, Healey-on-Thames, (Oxon RGO TEN and 9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02108, USA Manuscript typed by A. Merrick Printed and bound in Great Britain by Unwin Brothers Limited, The Gresham Pross, Old Woking, Surrey A member of the Staples Printing Group © mavid Bloor 1976 No part of this book may be reproduced tn any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation of briet passages in criticism ISBN 7300 8977 7 BI11267 1076160001 4( 10044 For Max Bloor42 IH 400 BESS CONTENTS vit PREFACE, ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ‘THE STRONG PROGRAMME. IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE ‘The strong programme ‘The autonomy of knowledge ‘The argument from empiricism ‘The argument from self-refutation ‘The argument from future knowledge SENSE-EXPERIENCE, MATERIALISM AND TRUTH. ‘The reliability of sense experience Experience and belief Materialism and sociological explanation ‘Truth, correspondence and convention SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO THE STRONG PROGRAMME ‘A Durkheimean approach to selence Soclety and knowledge KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY: A CASE STUDY ‘The Popper-Kubn debate Enlightenment versus romantic ideologies ‘The historical location of the ideologies ‘The link between epistemological and idcological debates Another variable: knowledge under threat ‘The lesson to be learned A NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO MATHEMATICS ‘The standard experience of mathematics ‘4.8, Mill's theory of mathematics Frege's criticisms of Mill Frege's definition of objectivity accepted but what satisfies this definition? Mill's theory modified by sociological factors Summary and conclusion 10 13 15 20 21 26 29 32 40 44 48 48 st or 70 “4 7” 1 82 85 a7 92vill Contents, 6 CAN THERE BE AN ALTERNATIVE MATHEMATICS? What would an alternative mathematics look like? leone’ a number? Pythagorean and Platonic number The metaphysics of root two Infinitesimals Conclusion 1 NEGOTIATION IN LOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL ‘THOUGHT Tord Mansfeld's advice Paradoxes of the infinite Azande logic and Western solence The negotiation of a proof in mathematics 8 CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE STAND? BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX 95 95 98 105 108 ut ne ut us 121 123 120 aa 5 151 PREFACE In this book 1 discuss a number of problems which are vivid and immediate tous, although they sound abstract when formulated generelly. They concern knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. Iam interested in what idea we form of these things whea we reflect on them ~ for somehow we do manage to picture them to ourselves and these pictures can be powerful and influential. They are part of our self-awareness as ‘members of « selentifie culture. Indeed for those who are scientists these ideas are an even more intimate part of life, though in some way they touch us all. approach the problem from a very simple starting-point. Tf we want fan account of tho nature of scientific knowledge, surely, we can do no better than to adopt the scientific method itself. Science is a social phenomenon so we should turn to the sociologist of knowledge. The peculiar thing is that this immediately gencrates opposition from both sociologists and philosophers. ‘They appear to have a ready-made con- ception of knowledge which precludes this simple course of action, claiming that itis foredoomed. Something odd and interesting is clearly going on. Some nerve has been touched. ‘This is what the book ts about. ‘The path of the argument, which may be judged fromi the contents page, traverses what may variously be described as the philosophy of science, the philosophy of the social sciences and the soctology of knowledge. There {is no denying It: the hook is a hybrid. T suspect that it is intrinsic to the subject under discussion that it should despoil academic boundaries. For ‘these boundaries contrive to keep some things well hidden.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Tam anxious to express my gratitude to a number of people who kindly read drafts and parts of the book while it was in preparation. These are Barry Barnes, Celia Bloor, David Edge, Donald MacKenzie, Martin Rudwick and Steven Shepin.' In all eases Ihave greatly benefited from their comments and criticisms. My helpful eritios have not alwaye agreed with what I have sald and go I must stress that they are in no way responsible for the final outcome. Porhaps Iwould have been wise to make more extensive alterations in the light of their comments than I sometimes did. A It fs only right that I single out of this list one of my colleagues at the Setence Studies Unit, Barry Barnes. This is in order to express the very special debt that 1 owe to his thinking and work. This is too Pervasive to be conveyed in footnotes, but is nevertheless keenly felt. Similarly, rather than make repeated references to his book ‘Scientific Knowledge and Soctological Theory’ (1974) I hope that a general acknowledgment will suffice. Certainly, anyone interested in the stand- point to be developed in the present book will find ite discussions of first rate importance. Nevertheless, although our two books share a number of important premises they develop quite different themes and press the argument into quite different areas. Tam grateful to the Hutchinson Publishing Group Ltd for permission touse a diagram from p. 13 of Z.P. Dienes's 'The Power of Mathematics’ (2964). {must also record my appreciation to the historians of seteace whose scholarship I have pillaged to provide myself with examples and Illustrations. Frequently I must be using thelr work in a manner of which they would not approve.Chapter 1 THE STRONG PROGRAMME IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE Can the soctology of knowledge investigate and explain the very content and nature of selentific knowledge? Many soclologists believe that it cannot. They say that knowledge as such, as distinet from the ciroum~ lances surrounding its production, ts beyond their grasp. They voluntarily Limit the seope of their own enquiries, I shall argue that this {sa betrayal of their disciplinary standpoint. All knowledge, whether it be in the empirictl aciences or even in mathematies, should be treated, 2 material for investigation. Such limitations ao Ao exist Tor Ue soc ISAT Consist Ib Banding over material to alled selences like peyehology or in depending on the researches of specialists {nother disciplines. ‘There are no lumitations which ie in the absolute or transcendent charactor of selentifie knowledge itself, or in the special nature of rationality, validity, truth or objectivity. 1 might be expected that the natural tendency of a discipline such as the sociology of knowledge would be to expand and generalise itself: moving from studies of primitive cosmologies to that of our ovn culture. This is precisely the stop that sociologists have been reluctant to take, “Again, the sociology of kaawlodge might well have pressed more strongly into the ‘area currently occupied by philosophers, who have been allowed to take ‘upon themselves the task of dafining the nature of knowledge. In fact sociologists have been only too eager to limit thelr concern with science to its institutional framework and extern Rictors FelAUNg 10NS fale ot “rovetror-drreetiet THIS leaves untouched the nature of the knowledge thar oFGated (GE Ben-David (1971), DeGré (2967), Merton (1968) and Stark (1958)). What is the couse for this hesitation and pessimism? 1s i the enormaus Intellectual and practioal difficulties whch would attend such « programme? Certainly these must not be underestimated. 4 measure of their extont can be gained from the effort that has been expended on the more limited alms, But these are not the reasons that are in fact dvanced, Is the soctologist at Joss for theories and methads with Which to handle scientific knowledge? Surely not. His own éiselpline 12 Chupter 1 rovides him with exemplary studies of the knowledge of other cultures which could be used as models and sources of inspiration. Durkheim's classic study "The Elementary Forins of the Religious Life' shows how @ sociologist can penetrate to the very depths of a form of knowledge. What is more Durkheim dropped a number of hints as to how his findings might relate to the study of scientific knowledge, The hints have fallen on deaf ‘The cause of the hesitation to bring selence within the seope of a thorough-going sociological scrutiny is lack of nerve and will. It is believed to be a foredoomed enterprise. Of course, the failure of nerve has deeper roots than this purely psychological characterisation suggests, ‘and these will be investigated later. Whatever the cause of the malady, ts symptoms take the form of a prior! and philosophicel argumentation. By these means sociologists express thelr conviction that science is a special case, and that contradictions and absurdities would befall them if they ignored this fret. Naturally philosophers are only too eager to ‘encournge this act of self-abnogation (e.g. Lakatos (1971), Popper (1968)), Itwill be the purpose of this ook to combat these arguments and inhibitions. For this reason the discussions which follow will sometimes, ‘though not always, have to be methodological rather than substantive. But hopefully they will be positive in their effect. ‘Thetr aim is to put weapors in the hands of those engaged in constructive work to help them attack eritics, doubters and sceptics, 1 shall first spell out what F eall the strong programme in the soctolegy of knowledge. This will provide the framework within which Getailed objections will then be considered. Since a priort arguments are alvays embedded in background assumptions and attitudes it will be nocessiry to bring these to the surface for examination as well. This will be the second major topte and it is here that substantial sociological hypotheses about our concoption of selence will begin to emerge. The third ajor topic will concern what is perhaps the most difficult of all the Sbstacles to the sociology of knowledge, namely mathematics and logic. 1 will transpire that the problems of principle involved are not, in fact, ly techneal. I shal indicate how these subjects can be staied sociolozically, ‘THE STRONG PROGRAMME The sactologist ic concerned with knowledge, iuvluding sclentitic Knowl8ige, pUFOly as @aatural phenomenon. His definition of knowledge Will therefore be rather ditfereat Irom that of either the layman or the Philosopher. Instead of defining it as true belief, knowledge for the sociologist is whatever men take to be knowledge. It consists of those beliets which men confidently hold to and live by. In particular the sociologist will be concerned with beliefs which are taken for granted or 3 Chapter 1 institutfonalised, or invested with authority by groups of mea, Of course knowledge must be distinguished from mere belief. This ean be done by reserving the word "knowledge! forwhat is collectively endarsed, leqing {he individual and idiosyncratic to count as mere belief, ‘Men's ideas about the workings of the world have varied greatly. ‘This has been true within science just as much as in other areas of culture. Such variation forms the starting polat for the sociology of Iowledge and constitutes ite main problem. What are the causes of this variation, and how and why does it change? The soclology of lenawledige focuses on the distribution of belief and the varlaus hotors ‘which influence it. For example: how Ia Taiowlsdge Wanamittod; how Stable is it; what processes go into its creation and maintenance; how is it organised and categorised into dilferent disciplines or spheres? For the sociologist these topics call for investigation and explanation, ‘and he will try to characterise knowledge in a way whieh accords with this perspective. His ideas therefore wil! be in the same causal idiom fas any other scientist, His concern will be to locate the regularities and general principles or processes which appear to be at work within the field of his dala. His aim will be to bulld theories to explain these regularities. If these theories are to satisfy the requirement of maximum enorulity they will have to apply to both true and false beliefs, and as, far as possible the same type of explanation WHT have To epply in both ‘cases. Tho aim of physiology 16 to explain tho orguntem in health and ‘igease; the aim of mechanics {s to understand machines which work and rachines which Sail; bridges which stand a8 well as those which fall, Similarly the sociologist seeks theories which explain the beliefs which are in facTTouM, regardlees of haw the investigatcr evaluates them. Same typical probleme in this area which have already fielded {interesting findings may serve to illustrate this approach. First, there have been studies of the connections between the gross social structure ‘of groups and the general form of the cosmologica to which they have “Rictibad. Anthropologists have found the sootal correlates, and the possible causes of men having anthropomorphic and magical world-views 4 distinct from impersonal and naturalistic one (Douglas (1968 and 1970) Secon, there have been studles which have traced the connections between economic, technical and industrial developments and th of sclestiie theories; “For exile, The" rate “Imonis in water and steam technology’on the content of theories in thermo dynamics has been studied in great detail. ‘The causal link is beyond dispute (cuba (2958), Cardwell (1871)), Third, there is much evidence ‘hat features of culture which usually count as non-scteatitic greatly influence both the creation and the evalkation of selentific theories and findings. ‘Thus Eugenie concerns have been shown to underly and explain Francis Galton's ereation of the concent of the coetficient of correlation in statistics. Again the general political, social and ideological stand- point of the geneticist Bateson has been used to explain his role of ‘eeptic in the controversy over the gene theory of inheritence (Coleman4 Chapter 1 (1970), Cowan (1872)), Fourth, the importance that processes of train ing and socialisation have in the conduct of science 1 becoming In= ‘creasingly documentai. Patterns of continuity and diseontinuty, of ‘ecestlon und rejection, appear to be explicable by appeal to these processes, An interesting example of the way in which @ background fa tho requirements of a scientific discipline influences the assessmeat of a Blece of work is afforded by Lord Kelvin's criticisms of the theory of evolusion. Kelvin calculate the age of the sun by treating it aa an In ‘candescent body cooling down. He foand that it would have burnt itself out before evolution could have reached is currently observable state, ‘The world is not old enough to have allowed evolution to have Tun ts, course, 50 the theory of evolution must be wrong. ‘The asoumption of ological uniformity, with its promise of vast stretches of time, had been rudely pulled from beneath the biologist's feet. Kelvia's arguments caused dismay. Their authority was immense and in the 1860's they were uunansyerabies they followed with convincing rigour trom convincing physical premises. By the last decade of the century tho geologists had Phicked up courage to tell Kelvin that he must have made a mistake, ‘This newfound courage was not because of any dramatic new discoveries, indeed, there had been no real change in the evidence available. What had happened in the intorim was a general consolidation in goology an a discipline with a mounting quantity of detailed observation ofthe fossil record. It was this growth which caused a variation in the assessments of probability and plausibility: Kelvin simply must have left some vital but tuninorn factor out of consideration. It was only with the understanding of the sun's nuclear sources of energy that his physical argument could be fnultel. Geologists and biologists had no foreknowledge ofthis, they simply had not waited for an answer (Rudwick (1972), Burchfield (1975). ‘Tals ample also serves to make another point. it deals with social processes internal fo sclence, a0 there ts no question of sociological considerations being confined to the operation of external influences. Fanally, mention must be made of « fascinating and controversial study of the physicists of Welmar Germany, Forman (1971) uses thele academic addresses to show them taking up the dominant, anti-scientific "Lebersphilosophie’ surrounding them. He argues ‘that the movement #0 dispense with causality in physies which sprang up so suddenly and Dlossomed so lusuriantly i» Germany after 1918, was primarily an effort by German physiciats to adapt the content of their setence to the values of their intellectual environment’ (p.7), The boldness and interest of this claim derives from the central place of a-causality in modern quantum thoory. The approaches that have Just been sketched suggest thet the sootology of scletific knowledge should adhere to the following four tenets. In this vay it will embody the same values which are taken for granted in other scientific disciplines. These are 1 It would be causal, that is, concerned withthe conditions which bring about belief or states of knowledge, Naturally there will L game 5 Chapter 2 be other types of causes apart from social ones which will eo ‘operate in bringing about belief. 2 It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, Success or failure, Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 3 It would be, symmetrical in its style of explanation. types of case would explain, say, true and false bell 4 It would be reflexive... In principle its patterns of explanation would have to Be applicable to sociology itself. Like the require- ‘ment of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for eneral explanations. It is an obvious requiremeat of principle because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own theories. ‘These four tenets, of causality, Impartiality, symmetry and reflex— ivity define what will be called the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge. ‘They are by no means new, but represent an amalgam of the more optimistic and sctentistic strains to be found in Durkheim (1998), Mannheim (1936) ane Znaniecki (1965). In what follows J shall try to maintain the viability of these tenets against criticism and misunderstanding. What is at stake Is whether the strong programme can be pursued in x consistent and plausible way. Let us therefore turn to the main objections to the sociology of knowledge to draw out the full significance of the tenets and to see how the strong programme stands up to criticism. ‘The same ‘THE AUTONOMY OF KNOWLEDGE One important set of objections to the soctology of knowledge derives from the conviction that some beliefs do nct stand in need of any explanation, or do not stand in need of a causal explanation. ‘This feeling is particularly ‘strong when the beliefs in question are taken to be truo, rational, seientifie or objective. When men behave rationally or logically it 1s tempting to say that thotr actions are governed by the requirements of reasonableness or logic. ‘The explanation of why a man draws the conclusion he does from 8 set of premises may appear to reside in the principles of logical Inference themselves. Logic it may seem, constitutes a set of connect= ions between premises and conclusions and men's minds ean trace out these connections. As long as they are being reasooable then the connections themselves would seam to provide the best explanation tor the beliefs of the reasoner. Like an engine on rails, the rails them- selves dictate where it will go. It is as if'men can transcend the ‘dtrectionless push and pull of physical causality and barness it, or sub- ordinate it, to quite other principles and let these determine their thoughts, "If this is so then it is not the soctologist or the psychologist Dat the logician who will provide the most important part of the explanation of belief.5 Chapter 1 Of course, when men make mistakes in thelr reasoning then logic {teel! is no explanation, A lapse or deviation may be due to the inter~ feretce of a whole variety of factors. Perhaps the reasoning is too difficult for the limited intelligence of the reasoner, perhaps he Is in~ Attentive, oF 190 emotionally involved ia the subject under discussion. ‘As when a train goes off the ratls, a cause for the accident can surely be found. But we neither have, nor need, commissions of enquiry into why accidents do not happen. Arguments such as these have become a commonplace in eontemp- rary analytice! philosophy. ‘Thus in "The Concept of Mind’ (1919) Ryle says: 'Let the psychologist tell us why we are deceived; but we can tell carselves and him why we are not deceived’ (p.308). This approach ray be summed up by the claim that aothing makes people do things that, ae correct butsomething dood MaKS,-Ot-CAUEE, thet fo go wrong (el. “Tiamlyn (1969), Peters (1958). ‘The general structure of these explanations stands out clearly. They all divide behaviour or belief into two types: right and wrong, true or false, rational or irrational. They then invoke causes to explain the negative side of the division, Causes explain error, limitation and “Zeviaion. THe posfve side of the evaluative divide is quite different. Here logic, rationality and truth appear to be their on explanation. Here causes do not need to be invoked. Applied to the feld of intellectual activity these views have the