The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John J. Mearsheimer University of ChicagoStrategies for Survival itn nro tyme a as he [er a ae eran aie den Spee pee cece weed rela epee heceesy acremaee eno yf cig owe tae os wen sms iyo cate ob ret pea cme rican, penne ae ee ee cae cee Sinn dca ipo he i cat ere ee smepely atc gee fa eh ree Seal cece meron ae re ice cote. Bical ws ical to achieve, however esse sre mers ae Bikey Lo gh eft Hey sub thas rm other seat powers, Another rater for suining power han Ma whereby a sate wes to weaken ts sal by provoking lang and cosy war between them. But thi scheme ao dil make work A more Promising variant of she suatgy 6 blot, in which sae measures ensure tat any wari whith an aera vole is pro tract an dey Belong ant bck ys are the pric strategies ha ret pores se wo prevent aggresiors rm upeting the alice of power! With ba cng heatene sates seriously committees to cntaning thet Atngerous opponent other woes they ate ling to shower the bar sen of detertng oF igi eed be, he ageesor. With buck passing they ty to get another reat power to check the agree while they ‘remain onthe sidelines. Theaened sates way pees buckpasing 0 eancing manly because the bukser avoids the cont of iting the ogesso inthe event of wa "The strategies of pps and honing ae NX patclry use {ul or dealing with agresior. Both cl for conceding power to a Hral sate, whic a preserion for serious trouble in an anarchic system. With tandwazoning the threatened sate sbondons hope of preventing ‘he agressor ftom siing power a ts expense snd instead ois forces with its dangerous So 0 get Ist some small portion of the spots rar Appeasement 2 more ambos sraepy. THe apes aims to molly the behavior ofthe arse by conceding it power. he hope ‘hat this gesture wil mak the aggressor fe more secre this dap ing or eliminating is mote fr aggresion. although appesenent and ‘andragoning are infective ad dangerous stele, becae they allow the balance of power to hit aginst the treatm sae wil di ‘us some speci creunsances where Ht may make sense for sate to concede power to snother sate nis commonplace inthe international retin eratite age hat {rancing and bandwogoning ace the key akerntve tei avalale io ‘hestened reat powers and that ret powers svaraly op o balance splot dangerous aversares I dsgree. Bandwagon, a emphasized, mor productive option in eelit wor or ahh the banda:ing state may achieve more absolute power. the dangerous aswesor ums more The actual choice in 8 elt work between Dal td Pucks, and thcatened sates prefer buck psig (0 balancing enever possible inal cate my theory 10 the well-known ral argument that intaono he successol practices fal great powers san important Consequence of security competion. While I acknowledge the Base ina correc, Tare that nao tends to be defined a0 narrony Focusing on copyeatting defensive but nat llensive behavior. Moreowe treat powers a care abut novation, whi often means finding clever troy toga power athe expense of al states. Although a varity Thae satel ae considered i this chap. che pimary fcas 1 00 fivees war the msi state for gaining addonal Increment of omer, wheres tlancng and ek passing are the main sates for Procrving the Balance of omer, An explanation of how threatened Fines choo Between blancing ad bck-pssing Tad out in Chapter {and an explanation for when sates are Ikely 10 choose Wari: put loch in Chapter. Amerie crate wr snaximize thet share of worl power more needs 0 be std about what tha etavoeeotts This section wil therefore examine the diferent gals that nates prsue and the states they employ in their nt for more Regional Hegemony Great powers concentrate on achieving four bse obectves, Fist they sovk rela! hegemony. Atnouph state would maximize secur Hit ‘dominated the enite wor global hegemony not ele. exept in he nly event hat hat ste achieves nla superiority overs as {Gee belo) The key iting facto, dscused in the preceding caplet isthe atuty of projecting power acs lage tees of water. wich makes impose for any great pert conquer and dominate regtons| Separated rm by oceans Regional hegerons cea pack a powetal ‘ntary punch, but lunching amphibious ass across oceans gas teritory conte and defended by another ret power would be asl lal underaking. Not surpsnghy, the United Stats, whic ste ony ‘esonal heemon n modern history, has never soul considered con ‘quering either Europe oe Northeast Asa. A great power cou il con ‘quer neighboring exon tat col reach by lap butt would il fll larshoet of achieving loa hegemony. ‘Not ony do gent powers aim o dominate their own exon. they aso sive to prevent vals ia ther areas re te Negemony. Regional Fegemns fear tata per competitor might opadize thelr Negemony bse the balance a ower thei ackyard Ths. regional ge mons peer that there he wo oF more great powers In the other Key etios ofthe word became thou neighbors ae key to spend most of ‘hel time comping wih ach othe, easing them few opportu to ‘eaten dstan egemon How eginalhegemons prevent other grea power rom dominating far-off regions depends onthe bslnce of power in those areas. power i sebwed ater evenly among the major sate, 50 that tere is no poten hegemion among them, the distant hegemon can sale say out ‘of any confi in those reins, Besuse no satel powerful enough to tongue ll ofthe ober. But even ia poentlhegeton comes om the scene in aneter repo, the distant egemon’ fst preference woud Be to sand ase and allow the loa great powers to check the treat. hiss ‘quineseal ekepssing a ply, and asics below, sates peer th buck pas than to balance when fc with 3 dangerous opponent. I te local great powers cannot contain the thea, however, the ditant hegemon would move in and balance aginst Although ts man goal ‘would be cntalnmen, the dant heemnon woul ao lok fr oppo es to undermine the tne and reestablish ough balance of power in the region, so that fi could tur ome. In eience, regional hegemons ‘ac avotore tances nother areas of tbe wot though hey ple tote the nee fs sor‘ne might wonder why state hat soo asides awa eon would care whether there was another regonal hegemon, expec if the two Cormpetitrs were seared by an ocean. Alter all would be almost Impossible for eter regal egemon 1 ke acess the water atthe father For example, even i Nai Germany had won World War in urope, Adal Hier could not have launched an amphibious asaul ‘acros the Ala Ocean sins the Unk Sates. Nor could China, it Someday Becomes an Asan egemon, strike actos the Pace Ocean to conquer the American homeland ‘Nevertheless hegemons seated by an ean can stil these ‘one her by Helin pet he Balance of power n each ther bck yan. Specialy, # tego ego might someday face @ local ha Teng from an upstart stat, which wou! sorely have tong scenes lly with he distant hegemon to roe isl rom ack bythe neighbor ing gemon. Atte same tine, he dixant hegemon might have ressons of som for oot with upstart ae, Remember tat hee ae ‘many possible reasons why ats night lem to ake advantage of each ter In such eases water’ stopping power woul have lil tet on the ‘sian hegemon’s ower projection cyl, ecase it woul nt ave to nc an amphibious attack aces the ea, but cul Instead anspor troop and supple across the Water 1 the tien Lenory ots ayn the val hegemon’s backed. Frying 100 a easier to accomplish than invading aval test power fromthe ea, albough the asta hepe ‘mon would il eed 0 be able to move recy across the acean ‘ollusate tis ng onder the flowing hyde example. Germany had won Wort War In Europe and Mesco’s economy and opuaton fa grow apd during the 19505, Mescoprbebly woukd have sought an allonce wih Germany. and might have even invited Germany 0 stion troops in Mexico. The best way forthe United Sater to have precded senaio of thls kind would have bee wo ensure hat ‘ts power advantage over Mevicorernined lng, and that Gernany. ot sy othe sal great power, was bogged dawn in a elon sci com etton, sh pory poring to mde fn the Western Hemisphere. ‘Of couse Mt Germany ha een hegron in Europe it would have had ‘he same incetives to do whatever was pose en the Und States ominance ofthe Western Hemisphere, which & why Germany’ woul Ive been likly t Join ores with Mexico against the Une States in the fst place. Real-world evidence shows the portance of gaining Beyemeny in lone own region wile making sure tat rivals im dstan regions ae Inge down in Seeusty compenion. France for example, put 00s Lnsed states. But the US. mary was inn poston to challenge the French deployment, because i as invlved in a major war with the Confeersy, Soon ater winning the war the Unie Sates ore France to remove it ops fom Meso Shonly thereat near 1866, Austra ttreatened 1 send ts ove Woops wo Mesic. Tha threat never mate lad however, because Ausra became invalved i sess cs th rusia that ed 08 major war been hem in the sumer of 1866 Auhough evry great poser would ike wo be a eon hegeron, few a ket reach hat pinnacle. As mentioned already th United Sates ‘ste only great power that has dominated its regon In modem hor. ‘There ae two seatons why regan germans tend to be ante specie. Few stteshave the necessary endowments to make aren at hegemony: To quail sa potent hegemon,astate must be considerably wealthier than ‘socal ra and mst poses the ges army i the ein. During the past two centuries only a handful of stats have met those rer: "Napoleonic France. Wielmine Geman; Naz Geman the Soviet Union has the wherewithal 1 ea poten egemon, the eer great powers in the sytem wl sek to preven tr actually becoming 4 regonal ege- ron, None of the Esropean great posters mentioned above or earl, as abet defeat al fis rivals and gin regional hegemony. Second zea powers alm wo maximize the amount ofthe wots wealth ‘hat they coir Sites care abou relive wealth. because economic ‘might the foundavon of mitary might. tn pret terms this means har great pomers place high premium on having & powertl anddynamic economy, not onl ecane enhances the general wellie, but lho because ita reliable way to ain a mltary advantage over ras tained are “two sso these on” Te el sition for any 'w expesence sharp economic growth whi sivas economies grow arcathekly great powers are lkly 10 view expecially west states or aes moving in that dteton, a5 eious threats egaes of Can rater easly be tanslaed nto mulary mht. A case i poi 6 ‘ithelmine Germany inthe ae nineteenth and cart twentieth centres ‘omy as reason enough to sare Europe’ other peat powers lous ‘German behavior sometimes ced those far Silla fats ex day ‘undergoing rapid modernization. Convery are power are key 0 ‘wor les bout tates that are moving down te pecking order of wealthy me Sovlet Union In part hecause Russa docs not contol nest 35 much ‘of the won’ eal she Soviet Union di in its hela, Rusa cannot ‘eu ws powesil wn ary as did its Sorc redeem. Chin's ero ‘omy hits he skids and does not recover, feats about China wl subside ‘he wealth-gnerating areas of the wold Inthe moder er, those areas are sual populate by the leading industrial sats, ahough they might te occured by lese-eeloped sates that poses cell portant 7 ‘miter. Great poms sometimes atemp 10 dominate those regions ‘herslve. but a the very kas they try bere that none fal under the onto of val gest power Ares tht conan ie nic wea 24e oes concent ret powers?” ‘During the Cold War, for example, American sates focused thelr atrenton on three replons outside ofthe Wesera Hemisphere: arog Nartetst Ai, and the Persian Gull The United States was determined thatthe Soviet Union not dominate anf hove aes, Defending Western Europe was Ameri’ number ane state ory because ia wealthy reson that wan dest threatened by the Soviet ary. Soviet conta of the European continent would have sharply shied the balance af power saint the United States. Northeast Asa was satel Important ese pan isamong the words wealthiest states. and it faced a Soviet vet abel Test serous threat than the one confronting Western urope. The United States cared about the Persian Gulf manly because of cil which fuels the economies of Ai and Europe. Consequently, the American miliary ws dese gly oat in these thee reso the ‘wold The Unite States pd les tention o Ac the rest of he Mile ax, Soutess Asa andthe South Asan subcontinent, becuse here Was i potent power in those reson Precminent Land Power ‘Tai, great powers alm o dominate the balance of land power, becuse tat is the est way to maize dee sare of ary might, race ths means that sates ull power armies well ai and naval ores 1 suppor those ground fres. But great powers donot pen all of hee etensefnds on land power As discussed below, they devote conser table resources to acquiring miear weapons: somites they abo buy independent sea power and sate agpwer But because land power ‘the daminan form of iary power states apie wo ave the most form date army nthe region ofthe worl Fourth, great powers sek nuleat supesiorty aver thet val nan Mel lwo a sine would Rave the wor only clear arsenal which would ve he capa to devastate ts vals without er of etalon. Tat Inge military advantage would take that mclearmed sate slob hgemon. in which case my previous dscns of regional hegemony ‘wptld be lcevan. Alo the tlance of nd power weld be of moeImporance in world dominated by 2 velar hegemon. It Aca. however to achieve nd maintain mea sera, Because val ses Wil oo great lengths wo develop a mdea etalstory force ofthe ow. ‘As emphasued in Chapter 4 eat powers re iy 0 find thems ‘operating in 8 word of ilar powers with the assed capacy to esroy thelr enemies—2 word of ma Some scholar. expecially detensive reali, argue that makes no sease for nuclear armed sates in 8 MAD word to purse Mla super ‘ony parla hey shoul not bull counteronce weapons. ‘hose that could eke the ote sides mica ncnal—and they should ot ud detensive systems that could sha dwn the avers ncn Ing ucla warhends because the extence oa MAD word is that no sate an be asured hai has destroyed als vas nica weapons. and ‘has would remain vulnerable 10 nukae devastation. Ie makes nore sense so the agument goes. or eah tate oe vaerabl 19 the other sides nacear weapons wo reasons underpin the asrtion that Mice armed sates shoul not pusue nuclear sypesony- MAD i power fore for sabi, ok makes no ses o undermine it Furthermore tis slmost impossible 1 gain meaning milary advantage by bling ‘ounterforce weapons and defenses. No mater how sophisticated hove systems might eI almost impossible wo fight and win a nlear wt, ecase nua weapons ae so detract bh sles wile anni Iota he conf, Thus makes ile eset thinkin es of pining mary advange tthe nucle eve Great ower, however ae nly tobe content with singin & MAD word an thy are ky 1 Sate for ways to ain superoty over thee nylesrarmed opponents. Although there fo queon tht MAD makes ‘war among theses omer et Hey ate elt be mone secure ‘chs mock superory, Specially, «great power operating under MAD sul has ret poe iva that t mus wory about and il sala ew nucearaack which atonh uniy sl ose. A great poner ‘har gains nuclear superinyon the oer hand ea heron ad eho no majo Hea 16 fear Mos portant. woul ot face the tet of | Degemons. Tis og does no deny that meaningful mca supe ruclear advange because ofthe great bene promises, In particu states wil blll of coumtererce capably and pus hard to develop ‘sur, reat powers pursue four main gos 1) 6 be the only eon ngemon onthe globe, 2} 1 enol sae a percentage of he wos ‘wells posite, 3) w dominate the balance of land power thei revlon. and 4 to have nicer superior. Let us now move fom geal to seeps starting with dhe seateis that tts employ to incase thei war increase thee share of world power. Not onl does ic inolve death and ‘wemteth century 1 argue that conquest des no pay and that wars therefore afte enterprise. The most famous work making his pots yeas before he sar of World War [Tis base heme fa ental to the wings of many contemporary students of iteraioal polis. The dam ha war a sing propaston takes fur basi foes. Some {chapter 2 where {noted that the past. aes that nated war wo roughly 60 percent of the tne. Others mainan that nudear weapons ‘ofthe danger of mutual aniston, 1 eat wth ise n Chap srguing that nuclear weapons make wea-power wa les ily, but theyruceat age has behaved asi war with another jor pomer has been ‘he other two perspectives assume that was are Wwinzable, but Mat sucessful conquest leads 1 yeticvitores. The two fous respective fon the costs and on the benefis of wae. These concepts are actly inked since tates contemplating agpesion invariably weigh is expec cont and benefits ‘The ents argument, which attracted oo stenon inthe 19605, thar conquest does not pay bec2use I leads fo the ceaion of empes {andthe pie of maining an erpice eventually becomes so great that ‘economic growth at ome is sharply slowed In fect. Nigh levels of etense spending undermine a sates reat economie poston over ‘ime, ulmatey eroding Hs postion i the balance of power. go, great powers would Be bette lf ceating wealth rather than conauerng fr ‘According 10 the Denes agument, military vciory doesnot Poy because conquerors cant expt mor indus economies fr gan spec those that re ult round information tees. The rot ofthe conqueror’ prolen hat nations makes i ard to subdue nd manipulate the people in defeated sates. The vitor may ry ees sion. but ts Hel o baci n the face of massive popu resistance Moreover, repeession not fease fm the information age Becine -nowledge-ased economies depen on opennes Yo function scot ‘Thus the conqueror cracks down, It wl elev Kl he goo hat Jays the goden gs doesnot crack doen, however, sbverve Mea reat side the detested sate making rebelon Hy. There Is no question that great powers sometimes cantante stances in whi the Ukely costs of congues are high an the expected ene ae sal In those aes. K makes no Sense sat a Wa, But the eneral ci tat conquest almost alwys bankrupts the agreor and provides no tangle benefits doesnot standup to close sting ‘There re many example oats expanding a the sword and yet ot damaging thet economls in tbe process. The United States during he ist half of the nineteenth century and FrssaHerween 1862 and 1870 are Steatepes or Survival 109 obvious ese in pont: aggression pald handsome economic aliens for ‘both ates Morcover ie scholar evlence pert the i that igh evel of defense spending necesariy hut a great powers economy" The ‘Unie staes, for example has spent enormous suns of money on defense Kingdom ha! 3 huge empire and is economy evenly is compe tive ed, but lew econo blame is economic decline an high eves of tkfense pening Ina, the United Kiger hsercaly spent conse Ahly less money on defense than ai ts reat power vals." Probsbiy the ‘ase that best supports dhe aim hat lege mitary budgets rain a states coy he demise ofthe Soviet Unio i the ne 1980s. Bat scholars have reached consensus on what asd the ove economy tcl an sere is god reason to think that it was due to pofound suc problems in te economy not military senting. Regarding she bene argument. conquerors an expt a vanquished stots economy for gui, even i the information age, Wealth can be ‘extracted roan cup ate by levying axe, contesting indus ‘output or even contsaing india plans eer Liberman showsin his seminal work on shissubjet tha contrary to the views of Angel and oth- ‘modernization nt only makes dtl seis wealthy and there fore lucrative targets, but It also makes coercion and repression ier—not harder—lor the conqueror” He nates, for example, that ‘khough Infomation tetnologes have a “subversive potenti” they shave an “Crean” dimension, which facitates repression impor tant ways. “Coercive and repreive conquerors” he args cin make eteated moder societies pay a large share oftheir economic surplus in Daring Word War I for example, Germany was able, “rough finan lal tonsfers alone... 1 mablize an annual average of 30 percent of ‘rent national incomes, 42-44 percent of Dutch, Bean, and Norwegan prewar national income, and at les 25 percent Cech prewar nasonal Income 2 Germany alo extracted signe economic resources from the Soviet Union during World War IL The Soviets then returned the favor in the carly year ofthe Cold War by exphiting the East Germaneconomy for gain. Nevers occupant costco the cn quero, and there wll be case Where the cae of explaing another ‘state economy outweigh dhe hemes. Si conquest sometimes pays Dandiome evident Its lo posible for conquerors to gain power by conficating mater resources sich as oil and fondu, For example, any gret power tat conquers Sou Arabia would surly reap sigan econonie ben from contoing Sai ol. Tiss why the Unite Sates crete Rap Deployment Frc inthe lte 197 ested ha the Soviet Union might invade lan and cape the oisich area of Khuzestan, which would enhance Sove power! Moreover, ance in an the Soviets would be well sone theaten Soul Arabia and the sich aes, Daring eth world wars. Germany was bent on gaining acces to the wai and other Foods produced inthe Sole Union so that cou fed ts wn Fo le dheapy and easy The Geman also coveted Soviet ll and eer ‘But even if ane tos the notion that conquest pay economic dv ends there ae thee ater ways that a victors aggressor cn tthe balance of power in is favor The conqueror might employ some portion lof the vanglsed sate’ population in ts army or foc abo nts homeland, Napoleon's military machine, for example, made use of man ower aed in deste sates. Infact, wen France a the summer of 1812, roughly half ofthe mais invasion foree—shlch eal 674,00 soins not French." Naa Germany also employed soldiers from conquered states ints amy. For example, “ofthe thin ght SS divisions in existence 1945, none was compo ely of fstve Germans and nineteen conse lngely of lorign pesnne Moreover the Thi Rich use ford labor to is advantage. Indeed appears that there were probaly ax many a8 7.6 milion foregn van workers an prisoners of war employed In Germany by August 194, twhich was one-fourth ofthe ttl German wos fore = Furthermore anges sometines pays Beane the Wt as sa sally important rertor.nparcua sates an gain a butler ene tha helps prove them fom auack by another ste, oe that ca bee 10 launch an tack om aval sate For example, France gave serious cons craton to annexing the Rhineland beloe and ater Germany ws detest fi Word War L restate postion was certainly enhanced in| une 1967 wih she aquistion ofthe Sinal Penns tbe Gol Heights sd the West an fn the Sia-Day War. The Soviet Union went 1 War ‘pnt Plann he winter of 1939-20 to gain tera at would help the Rod Army thwart a Nil invasion The Wehrmacht. om the other hand, conquered prt of Poland in September 1939 and used I a5 2 launching ps for Jane 1941 fasion a he Soviet on. ‘aly, war ashi he Blane of power in the vcr’ avr by eis inating the vanguished state ftom the ranks of the gic power. Conquering sates can achieve this gal Ss illerent ways. They might, estoy deletes val by kllng most of people, thereby eliminating it stogeer rom the international system, Sates rarely purse this atc ‘option, bat evidence of his Kn of behavior ext 0 make tats think shout The Romans fr example annlated Carthage and there rea son 0 think that er panied to eliminate Poland and te Stet Union| ftom the map of Europe Spain destroyed both the Ait ae the [nc tries ia Cental and South Amerie. and during the Cold War oth superpowers worried that the cer would we it nuclear weapons 10 Tounch 9 “sen ist ke" hat woud obiterate wer. rel ten wer that he Ar states ever nf a dese eteaton Ia they ‘would impose a Canaan pee" ‘Acai conquering tates might annex he detested sate. Aust, Psi, and Russ for example pained Poland four ines inte pas Aree entries The victor might sla conser dnesing tnd neualitn. the eaten state, The Alles employe thie ategy agaist Germany afer ‘Word War and in the ey years ofthe Cok Wa. Stan ited wih the ses of cresting 2 nied fut italy weak Gennany The famous “Morgen Pan proposed that poster Gemany be deadustta ‘eed a tured no to largely atin ates, so hati 0 knger cul wild power miary forces” Fall coneuesing states might dive a eae great power Inco two oF more smal sas, which i what {Germany 1 the Soviet Union i the spring of 1918 wit he Treaty ofrest-Ltowsk, ads ako what the Unie Kingdom, the United Stes and ‘he Soviet Union elective to Germany ater Word War Blackmail ‘A sate can gain power at vals expense with pong to wary thea: ening 10 use mitary force oplnst ss epponent. Coercive teats and this blackmail works. deaiy preferable 10 war. Because black achieves its goals without bloody css. However. blackmal is unkly to rodace marked shifts in the balsnee of power mainly Benue treats lone are usualy no enough to compe great power to make signa ‘cess oa sv geet power Great power by detinton, have far ‘nidable mary strength relative to etch othe, and therefore they are ot ky t give it these without a fight Blackall more ky 20 ‘work agaist nor powers that have no grea-pomer ally, For example in the decade before World War. Geman attempted ‘0 mimiate is European vals on four acasions and succeeded onc." Germany inated diplomatic conionttons wth France athe United King over Moroceo in 1993 and again in 1911. Although Germany was lett more pert han eter te United Kingdom or France, and hplomate defeats both mes. In he other two aes, Germany ted to Mackall Rusia into making concessions inthe Balkans 191909, sta annexed Bois without ay prompting fom Gemany. When Rossa rested, Gemmany ised the threat of war to force Rusa 10 acept ‘Aust’ acon. Blackmail worked in this ese, becuse the Rsan ary ad oe recovered rom it shattering delet in the Reso-Japanese We 1904-5) and thus asin no postion to contont tbe mighty German my na wa The Germans ret innate the Rutan again inthe summer of 1914, bt by the the Rasan amy had recovered ra it leat a decade cater. The Russians stood hee ground, and the result ‘Among thee ater wel-known css of ack nly ene ad tent test on the balance of power The ist case as 2 out 1838 ‘etweenthe United Kinglom ad France over contol of Fasbods sue scaly emportnt fort atthe headnatesof Aas Nile Rive. The United Kingdom warned France no ate to conquer any par ofthe Nie ecase would ehteaten Brith conto of Egypt andthe Suez Canal ‘When the Unite! King lea that France had set an expeinary force to Fashoda, i tld France to retove i ot face wat, Prance backed oa, bese knew the United Kinglom would win the ensuing Wa, and becuse France dl ot want to lk a fet with the United Korn ‘when twas more worried about dhe emerging German threat on i 38 fer bore, The second case f the frou Munich eis of 1938, when ier threatened war to compel the United Kingdom and France 0 Geamany to swallow up the Sudteland, which was athe time pa of Cascosbvaia The tld cae when the United Slats fred the Soviet. ‘Union to remove its bli ise rom Cuba nthe fl of 1962. Of hese ‘es, ly Munich had. ling eet on the alance of power it and Bleed stand bleed id satgy that sates might employ to serease thee reative power. This trate involves using 1 Fas © engage in a pr traced wa, that they bled ach ther white, while tbe baer remains ‘on the seine, its milly szength ita There was concen the nied States during the Cold Wer, for example, tht thir pry igh sucrepiouly rovoke a nucear war bewween the superpowers Alo ‘ne ofthe suerpomes ight have considered provoking i alto arta Tosng war in te Third Worl. For example, the Uned States could have encouraged the Sovet Union 0 get entrapped in coats Kk the oe in Aithaisan, But that was not American poly I fact. there are few ‘examples in mer history of states pursuing a al-ane-led sate The best cise of at and bleed {can i Russia ellos nthe Wake ofthe French Revelation (1789 0 ene Austra and Prussia ino staring {at with France 0 tat Rusia woud be fe 1 expand i power incentral Europe, Rusa leader Catherine the Geet tld her secretary in November 1791 1am rang ny brains inorder to push the courts of su ant to ot the involved neha Busines to have my handsfree. {have much unfinished busines, and is neceary for dem 1 be Kept sy ano of my wa." Aug Asa ad Praia dd go to war uinst France in 1792, Russ prompting had ite inuence 0 thelr Secon ode they had compen reasons of thei wa ae pking 2 fib wh France "Anoter case hat losly resembles a balanced statgy Invols| tnaeL in 1954, Fins Lavon, lel delente minster diet sao Sees 10 How up important American ned Bish tc the Erato cles of lexan and Clr, The alm wast uc tensions tec the Une Kingdom and pL which IC was hoped would consace the United Kingdom to abandon i pla to witha stoop rom bases nea the Suez Cana These force was aught ad the operation ted ‘he fandamental pbs wih a aitandled ratey 8 the Laven ii demonstrates, f that ical to kal states into staring var that they would oterwise not fight. There are hardly any god ways of aun rouble tween eter states without geting expo or tet ras usin in he age states, Morac, the sates Dein aed are ‘key to rene the danger of engaging ach other i 3 protracted war ‘he cheap states ae key 1 avo such ap, Fly there always the lange fo the tert one of heats beng baed might win quick and ecsievicory an end up aiing power rather than sn Bloodletting ‘lodleing is 2 moe promising varant of his satey. Hee the alm Iy conflict that saps their strength. There bing inthis version: he vals have gote wo war independent. and tbe Blot i manly con ‘cemed wih causing is vals to Des each ther white, while i ays ou fof the fing, As senate, Haery Tuma had this sey in mind in Sune 1941 when he fact 19 the Nasi evasion of the Soviet Union by ‘ering “If we see that Germanys winning we ought 1 lp Russa, 2nd 11 Russ wining we ought 0 hep Germany and tha way et shen Kil sseany 2 pose lai Lenin, to, had his sete n mind when he wok the Sov ‘Union out of World Wr I wie the ing between Germany and the Allies the United Kinglom, France, andthe United tats) continued in the west, “n conchuing separate peace now” he sl oa January 20 1918, “werd outs. ath pels groups iting each the. ‘We cn ake advantage of tel se which mas df fo them to reach an aprement a ur expense, and se that period when our hands fae fee to develop and strengthen the Sodas Revlon.” As John Wheeler Rene notes, “Few documents sate moe suc Lenin’ underaning of the valve of Rio in sttesmanship The Une Stites ako pure tis sategy agaist the Soviet Unis in ‘Alghaisan ding the 19805 reat powers no nly sek 10 gin power over tee vals dey so Fin to prevent thow foes fre gaining power at their expense Keeping potential agers at yf sometimes athe spl ask. Since eat posers maximize ther shar of wold power they invest heavy in ‘eens nd yal bul ormidable ign oes. That npresve mii ‘ary copay wna suet 0 deter sates om challenging the talance of power. Bu eccsonlly, highly aguesve ext powers hat re more fcuk to conan come on the scene spell powerful tates, ike ote egerons, vary fl no thi xtegoy T dal with these fsgueos, threstened great powers can choose Between mo Sas felancng and buck passing, Tey invariably preter back passing ahough soci hey have no ec but obalanc against she ret,‘Wi balancing «great power asumes dre respons for eevnting 2 ggreor from upeting the Ble of omer The inal gl so ‘eter the agsresor, but that all the balancing sate wl ght the ens Ing war, Theateed sates can tke tree measires to make blancng ‘wore Fin they can send ler slgals tthe agessr though diplomat Je channes and through the acon deste low) that ter are frmiy ‘commited to maining the balance of poe even it means glng 19 war The empha the Dlancers message son confrontation, not con lation. In tect the Balancer draws ine in the sand anc warns the gress not wo eos The United Site pursed this tye of ply with the Sovee Union throughout the Cold War: France and Russ dl the same with Germany before Word Wa st ‘second, ttwatened stats can work to ceste a defensive allance 0 help ‘then contain their danger opponent. This lon maneuver, which ‘soften called extemal balancing" is ied a polar word, case ‘ere ate no potential reat-poweralance partners, although ts pos Sle lly with minor posers Dung the Cold Wer or example, oth the Une Sates and he Soviet Union ad mo choce bt 1 lly with minor powers, because they were the only reat powers the syste. ‘Threatened sates place 2 high premium on tnding alliance partners because the ess ofchecklag an ggresioe ar shared in a allance—an ‘pedal mportan considers war breaks ot Further, ret Ing lies increases the amount of tepower conkoatig the appre, ‘wilh in tum increases the likelihood that deterrence wil work, ‘These benelis notwithstanding. externa alancng has 3 downside: ie ten slow and inefcen. The dificules of making an alliance work smoothly are elected in the coment of the French peneal who sald at the end of Word War Since Ihave seen allancs at work, Thave kn something of my admiration for Napoleon who almost always fought withou ales against aliances}“ Putin together balancing cositions quick and making then function smoothly eon dik because ne to coordinate the lors of poaesive aes o member sates, even when theres wide agement on what ees ta be done. Thresened sites sully dnagre over how the burdens shouldbe dniuted among ‘lance meters, After al sats ae sll iterestd actors with owe Incentives to misiize the cos they pay 1 conta an aggressor This oblem compounded by the ct hat lance members have ample to buco pss aang themschves, assed low. Fall theres ely tobe ton among colon members ver which stat ads the lance ‘pesly when comes 1 formatting sate. "Tir hestend sates can lance aps an aggressor by mobiiing ational resoures of thee own, For example, lene pending might encased conscription ght be implemented. This action, which ‘commonly refered toa “nteal snd” sl-help Inthe purest Sense ofthe tem But there are usally snicnt Hits on how many ional resources a thestened state can muster aglns an ageesr, case great powers normaly already devote a lage percentage a heir resourees o defense. Hecate they seek 0 maximize thei share af word owe, ste ate efevely engaged in sternal Balancing all the Hime Nevers, whe asd with a parca aggresive adversary great, powers wl eliminate any slick in the sytem and search forever Ways to boost defense spending ‘There however, ne xceonal ccumsance in which a reat power wincrease deems pending o lp deter an aggressor. Ofshonetalancers tke the Unied Kingdom andthe Uae Sas end ro maintain relively smal itary fore when they are no needed to costa a penta hee non ina step important as. Us, they cn llr 1 havea small ty tease ther dst als tendo focus thelr atenon om ea (ther and becmse te upping power of water previes them wth abun- ant secuty. Therefore, when es necessary for an ofsore balancer to ‘heck «poten hegemon, i 6 Bkey 1 sharply expand the sie and Sarength of fighting forces, a the United States di i 1917, when i nerd World War and in 1940, the yar beloe ke entered World Wa uck-Passing| Buckepesing 4 hcstened gest powers mun altemadve to bales Ing A bck-paeratempes to get another sta wo bear the bundsetring or posblyighting an agresior wilt emalns on the ie tines. The bucks fly recognizes the esd! 0 feven the aggressor from increasing is share of world power bu looks for some other sate ‘hat threatened bythe apres 0 prlrm tha onerous task, Threatened states can take four measures to fate buck posing Fs they can seek good diplomatic reatons wih the agresor or a leas no do anything to provoke it nthe hope that wil eoncenrat ts tention on the intended “buc-eatcer” uring the Ute 1930s, for ‘example, oth France and the Soviet Union red ops the buck o each other he fac ofa daa threa fom Nasi Germany, Each eto have sod rltlons wih Mite shat he would im he gush atthe other. ‘Second, buck pases usualy ainan cool elations withthe intend x uckcatchet not jst Because this diplomatic dancing might help foster good relations with the aggresor, bu aio because the buck pas. does noe want to get dragged nto a war on the side of the buck ‘tcher The alm of the buckpaser tera eto avoid ving o ight the ageesor. Not surprisingly then, «hose undertone charecerieed relations bemween France and the Soviet Union in the Years before ‘World War ‘hind rea powers cn mobile adtional resourses of thee own make bc-psng Work might seem that the Buc-yasser shouldbe able to take a somewhat relaxed appa to deense spending ice the satay’ objective to get someone che 1 contain the aggressor Bat save lor the exceptional case ofthe ofsone balancer discussed that contusion woul! be wrong. Leaving aie he fc that states max ize relative power, bck passers veto othe goa! eon oak tor ‘opportunites to inresedlense pening. By bling up is own eens ‘a buckpaser makes iselfan imposing tare. his ig the agressor Incentive 10 foes is tenon on the intended buck-aehet. The lie hee simple: the more power these sate theless ly ei ‘hata aggressor wil ack it Of couse, the back-cather must sll have *e wees to comtaln the aggro ihout the buck ase’ help ‘Buk-pasers asp bul formidable miltary forces for poplars sons Ina wold where tno or mote tates ae attempting wo buck oss no steam ceri hat il oct the buck and have to std lone faint the aggressor. I & better to be prepared for that eventual ‘uring the 1930s for example, neither France nor the Soviet Union could be sure i would ot catch the buck and have to stand alone aginst Nan {Germany But even if state successes the buck there always ‘the posit tha the apgresor mig quickly and decsvely deat the Tnutenicher and then atack the buek-pusser, Thus, 2 sate might ‘improves defenses san surance policy case buck pasing fal. Four sometimes makes sense fara buck passer to allow or even lactate the growth in power of he tended bucket, That buen eae would then havea beter chance of containing the agressor sate, nich woul increase the buckepasters prospects of remaining on the Sidelines, Been 1864 and 170, for example, the United Kingdom and use stood by an allow Ono on Bismac’s Prasat conquer tee tory in the heart of rope and cea a unified German Reich that was considerably move powerful than ss Pasian predecessor. The United Kingdom reasoned that «united Germany would not oly deter Pench at of Europe, but # would also lve and Rus expansion no the ther anion away rm Aca and Asa where they might threaten the rsh empire. The Russians, an the other hand, hoped that 2 umked Germany would Keep Austria and France check, and that it would ao sie Polish national “The Allue of Buck-Passing ‘Buck psig and png tetera balancing ceaion obviously repre sn aggresoe Nevertheless, theres SEatcnmenng moe ol eng ‘Ton tenerey pe eed lnc sos Sinope ger hab using il rede cea power {nlemertng ce Dug they yu of Wo Wa oa pl Beis ptcmalcs eo inne he amen sng {roomie ese nt adit en lane pane‘oop 19 win the ina hates agaist Germany and vo dictate the tems ot peace. The United Kinglom would “win the peace” because it would ‘merge from the war ina substanily moe owe postion than eer the defeated Germans othe bole worn Feech and Ruslan. The United Kingdom’ ales quickly gured out what wa going on, omever, and force the Bish army to parpate fully in te afl tsk of beeing ‘he German army whit. As always sate worry about relative power Brains atempt to free om is ales, along withthe history deserted in Chapters 7 and 8 gives eldence the power impulse 10 beuckpass among threatened sae, Indeed reat powers seem cary 10 prefer bck-pasing Yo boanding. Oe reason fo hi preference I that Duck passing usualy provides deense “om the heap” After al the sae ‘hat aches the buck pays the substantial css fighting the appre it eterrence tis and war breaks out OF cours, buck-pssers sometines spend considerable sums money on their wn mutary to faite bckpassing and to protect against the posibilty that buck posing mh a, Buclpassng can ao have an offensive dimension to. whi ean make it even more atacve Specialy he agaesor and the back ‘atcher become involved in long and coy wat the ance of powers likey to shit the uck-psser favor would then bein ago pos Yon to dominate the poswar world. The United Sate, for example fered Wold War I in December 1941 but i nt and ts amy France uni Jne 1944, tes than a yea Before the war ended. Thu the buen of weaing down the fumidable Wehrmacht fl trey om the shoulders ofthe Soviet Uni. hich ld sagering pce to reach ein Although the Unied Sats woud have preferred wo invade France before 1944 and was ths an inadvertent buck-passer. there m0 ‘questlon thatthe United States tenes rey fom delaying the Normandy inssion uate nthe war, when bth the Gem and he Sick armies were haere and worn Nov sumptsagly. Jose Stalin elieved thatthe Unled Kingman the United Sates were pupsely ling Germany and the Soviet Union to bed each ober white w thst ‘hose offshore balances could dominate postwar Europe. Strategies for Survival ‘Pasing the buck ako an atactveepion when a sate faces ore tha one dangerous vl but does not have he aitary might confront them all at once, Buck pasng might help reduce the numberof threat Foreample, he United Kingso faced hee menacing aversresin the 30+Germany ily td Japen—Dut it dna have the mary power to check thee of them at once. The United Kingdom attempted to ale: inte the problem by passing the burden of dealing with Germany 0 Insead on Rat sd pan. Buekpasing snot folroo statey, however. chie drawback that ine bukser might fal to check the aggressor leaving the buck pase in a precarious stateplc postion. For example, Fance could not Inde Nati Gemany slone and therefore the United Kingdom had to form a balancing clon with France against ter in March 1939. By then, however Hier console al of Crechoslovaia andi was 100 ae to contain the Thied Rech war broke out five months ne in September 1939, Dung that se pen he Soviet Unlon succesfully pase the Duck to France and the Unite Kingdom and then sat back expecting 10 watch Germany engage those two buck-atchers ina Tong ody wat. But the Wehrmacht overran France in six weeks uring the spring of too, leaving ler feet aick the Sovet Union wiibou having 10 worry mech about his Wester lank By buck jasing rather han engage ing Germany at he sate tie that France anid the United Kingdom di ‘he Soviets wound up fighting a much harder wa. Furthermore. in ess where the buck-pasr allows dhe tay ight ofthe buck-asher o inctesse, there the danger thatthe Dues night eventually become 0 pomefl tat threatens to pst te balance ff power, a+ happened with Germany alert was unified in 1870 ‘Bismark acta ork o uphold he lance forthe next wen Yeas Indeed, «united Germany served o keep Russa and France in check | the European cone, athe United Kingdom hoped t would, Bu he situation changed saskely after 1490, a5 Gemnany grew increasingly powerful and eventually aierpted to dominate Europe by force, Buck sing inthis ae was a best a mized sucns forthe United Kingdom find Rasa flectve inthe shot un, bu sos the ong rn.Athough these potenti problems are sey cise for concen, they itimstely do ite o diminish bucking’ appeal. Great powers do not ‘bucks hinklng ha led fae. On the contrary hey expect the seategy to suceed, Otherwine, they would eschew Buck pasing smd ye a Blancingcsliion with the other thestened ates nthe system, Bure saiticutopredit the fate interasonl pts, Who wou have guessed in 1870 hat Germany woul sine the mo power tate In Eurpe by the cart twentieth century and peeptat two ward Wats? Nor salaning 2 felproo!aemaive to bac-pasng. ded aang Is often inetent, an ste that lance together sometimes sulle cata stropie defeat. as happened tthe United Kingdom and France inthe TE should be apparent that backpasingsomtines lea o he same outcome a a tatand-led strategy. Specialy when buck pesing leads o war. the bl-per Ike the ber, improves relative power son by remaining onthe silines wile is mn rvs weae them selves down Furthermore, bth strategies cn alin he same way one ‘of he combatants wins a quick and dee victor, Neverteles thee fan important difleencetermeen the two tte buck psig is rn pully a deerence sate, with warlighing as the dau! opton nets bt and bleed purposely sims to provoke a wat S creme nan big ma ho hat threatened sats might employ agains a dangerous opponent Appeasement apd tundagoning, so the argent gs ares viable sheratves: But tht wrong, Both of thse states cl for conceding wer a ages, hich Vas lance power log and nceses the danger tome siate tha employs them. Grest power hat care abut ee survival shuld netier appease nr bendwagn wih hr avers Randwagoning happens when ate joins orcs with ae power ‘opponent conceding that ts formate new pare wil gin «dso tonite sate ofthe spol the congue ogee: The baton of owe. oter words, wl hl free again the bandwagoner an in the stonger state's for: Bandwagoning sa setey forthe Weak HS undesyingasumpuon& that Ia sate badly outgunned by iva i rakes mo sense to rest its demands, Because tat adversary Wil ake wha ants by force anna and nic onsite punsment i the proces The bandwagoners ust hope tht the woublemaker mer ful Thc famous dictum tha “the stg do what they ean and the weak ler what hey must” apres the ese bandwogoning This trey, which volts the asc con of ollensve eat states marimize rela power rately employed by grat powers wx they hve, by detnion, the wherewithal pat apa decent ight sprinter great powers, and because hey cenainly have the incentive to sand up and fi. Bandwagoning employed mally by minor pow tha and alone agains hose ret power Mey have no cice ‘butt grein 4 the enemy, because they ae weak and osted. Good cxamples of ndwagoning ae the desions by Bulgaria and Romar to lly with Nazt Germany in the ett sages of World Wa and then shit ‘heiallesance to the Soviet Union near the end ofthe wat ‘With appaseent threatened sate makes concessions 10 a8 ages sor tha hit the Balance of power inthe recipient’ avr. The appear wally agrees sumtender all or part ofthe terkory of thie ate powerful oe. The purpose ofthis allowance & behavior modicaton: 10 ‘alte aggestor ina more pc dren and possibly tar tino at fs qo poner The steaeny rests 0 the asumpton thatthe adversary’ ‘sguemive behaviors ingly the result of an aut sens of svat Vl ‘erabity. Therefore any steps ake to reduce hat inseesity il amp rand possibly eliminate, the undeying mote for war. Appeasement ‘complies tis nd, the argument goes, by allowing the appease 10 ‘dasa sg intentions an by shiing the mia alee the snpeaed state’ favor thus making tes wulerable and more secur. ultimately ess aneresive ‘Unlike the bandnagoner, who makes no eto 1 contain the gars, the appear remains commited to ech he heat But ke bandwaging. appesemen contradicts the dates offensive eealsm and therfore iiss fan and dangerous state. tunel to tanorm ‘dangerous foe int kinder gener opponent. much less a peace ving Sante. Indeed, appeasement Mely to whet, not shrink, an ages ses appetite for conquest. There ie dou that ia sate concedes 3 Sabsantl amount of power to an acuety neere tl that foe would resumaby fel beter abouts prospect fr survival. That reduced level tf fear woul, in tur, len tat sas incentive to sf the balance of ower ins for, But ha good ews only part the sty. na wo ter considerations trump tit peace-promotng lg. Intemational anarchy, as emphasired, cases tates 1 Took for opportniies to sin dana increments of power at each others expense. Because great powers ace programmed for lfens, an pease wate Hkly tse Pret any power enncession hy anoer state asa sign of weaknessa5 evi leace that the appeser is unling to defend the balance af power The npesed sate then Ike 0 coninve pushing for more concen ‘would be fol fora ste not to gain as much power as posible becuse «state's prospect for survival incense a acumulaes ado: 21 incemens of power. Furthermore, the appeased sate capbity 0 ln even more power would be enkanced—probaby sustantaly—by the additonal power tas rant by the appease. shoe. appease rent key to make a dangerous val more, noes, dangerous. Inte ate, however spect cumstances in which 2 great power might concede wre per wo anther sate Ye Nt act ontay #0 alanc-o owe lop. AS noted eer i sometines makes good Sense forabuckpaser tn allow the buckcatces to sin omer ft enances the bck catchers prospect containing the aggro by tse, Farhermore, ita grea power contents woo more aggressor a the same ine but has eer dhe source check ll of them nor anally which an pass the buck, he esieged sate proeliy should prize beeen is tet alow the lace wath he lesser treat sit avers oa 1 ee “op cures dsl withthe rma thea. With any lek; the secondary ‘ear wl venus become aval ofthe peinary thea ths making ase wo forge am alance wi he former agai the ter “Tis ogi explain par the United Kingdoms rapprochement with ‘the United States in the ety twentieth century." Atha me, te United Slats mas deaty the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere though the United Kingdom il ad sigan interes nthe region Thich sometimes serious sputes ith he Amen, However, it fkecided to abandon the regan and exablsh ood eaions withthe ‘nied Stats, in part becase the United Kingdom, all the way across he ‘Alani ean, as inno pono onont the United States ins own backyad, But the United Kingdom aso faced groveing thes in other otemlly far greater threat to the United Kingdom than was the ‘Une States an ocean away. This changing threat environment moth col the United Kingdom to make concessions the Americans so that it ould concentrate is resources against Germany. Eventual, Germany ftweatened the United States at well causing the Americans and the Bris o ight together as ales aint Germany in both world was Finally, conceding per to 8 dangerous adversary might make sense 2s short-term satey for buying tine 1 mobilize he rsoures needed dealing rom a shor-erm poston of weakness But must aso have super fo longs mobilaton capably. Few isancs of his kindof Beha lor can be foun ia the sora cord. The only case 1 know ofthe ‘Munich agreement of September 1938, In which the United Kingdom lowed the Suietenland (wich was an integral part of Czechoslovak) to te absorbed by Nazi Germany i pare because Besh policymakers believed tha she Balance of omer favored the Third Reich but that i it in avo ofthe United Kingdom and France over ime: fact the balance shies agains the Ales ater Muh: they probably would hove been beter off going 10 war agains Germany In 1938 over Crechosloskia ar than over Plann 19539here one nal mater regarding how sates ato gain and mata ower that mestsateaon. Kenneth Wall bas mae famous the esl rates of thee opponents States ate sale. e argues 10 conform 0 common international races” Inde they have no coke but todos they hope to survive in the pha tue a wold pol tes. “The dsejntpostionof ates rome ther sameness through the mains lear that they must check opponents who threten to disrupt fouming behavior and t works to preserve, not upset. the aknee of omer This saghlorard deensve elm For sre, theres powerful tendency for sates to imitate the sce: ful proces of her sates inthe stem. I ako makes sense o sent cigar ahgy tt sats wd wont nae gh tsk ‘ear why states need tobe soiled to balance against apres. The structure of he system alone shoul compe states to balance agains da But Walz overlooks wo closely read aspect of state behavior that ‘make itemational pois more effense-oented and more dangerous they a imitate sueesal aggression. For example, one reason that the United States sought wo reverse Saddam Huns conquest of Kamat dts inate more wars of conquest Funtbeamore, great powers not only tnlate each others sucess advantage over opponents by developing new weapons innovve mi much aout staple surprise. The ce of Nai Germany highlights his Poin, ier suely ermlated the sure paces of rival Borope saves bute ako pursued novel sae hat someties surprised his alvesares.Securty competion. nother word pushes tates deviate tro accepted practice sell 3 conform with Insummary. have explained how stats maize de share of wos owe, oouing on the spec gas they purse as wells the sates ‘hey employ to achieve tone goa Now, tm the histor record 0 deermine whether there s evidence tat great powers constantly sek tain advanage ove sivas