You are on page 1of 23
WARFARE Countering A2/AD Strategies Sam J. TANGREDI Good Chapter 2 Developing the Modern Concept of Anti-Access Victory itis ten recalled, has a thousand fathers (o mothers, but defer aliways appears an orphan, So iis with moder ideas that tum popula fy 2013 i as come repeated wisdom tha nt accessor ant-acesare del (AZJAD i the form of conventional warfare th United States woud most kel face regional confit: In fact, overcoming antes and area denial challenges wat iene 36 fone of he ten “primary missions ofthe U.S, armed ores in Janay 2012 strategic guidance signed by President Barack Obama hinsl “The document aotes tht to credibly deter potential adversities ard to preven them fom achiving thi objectives, tbe United Sats muse maimain it ably eo project pow in fresdom to eperat ar challenge the document ao provides 3 directive concerning resource alostion| inne tet fate defense budgets "According the US itary wil ines a requited vo enue is ably to operate effectively in ant access and avea denial (A2/AD) eniroamenss."" Tiss rt esd se eel er lly modern Defining Anti-Access and Atea Denial Previously we have noted that the Deparment of Defense has estab linked “nearly oficial” definition for ant accer and area deni Thee should be considered nly thar Because chey have ye to appear in Joint Publcston 1-02 the Department of Defense Dictionary of Miltary and Associated Terms (8 November 2010, a¢ amended though 1 Aust 2011) Alo where the terms appear in the DOD's Joint Operational Access Concept OAC), the authors ad the caveat “a ed in this pee" The authors ao por our tha the document i “a warihcing concep” implying hart necessary avoids much dis- s~"* cussion of the plea and diplomatic efforts that maketh atiacess, "3 approach a viable component of sand ate ‘Aiacess x defined in the dacument a8 “those ations and cap Ines, sally nga, dese to prevent an opposing fore From tntering an operational are.*" The erence to “longa” is most likely driven by capabilies being developed by such potential ant acess powers a the People’s Republic of Chia (PRC), which include nish alc mises (ASBMS). Bu with chat exception this dfn tion correlates with tar espoused in his book, Historical examples ind ‘tethat“lngange” isan exact term, and “aly ngage” sultant the US. goverment since the 195, Along wth ons, ‘wth anamberoffeerl agencies, RAND hase, long term contracts with both the Ai Force and Army (as separate programs} ro provide research and analsisin operation, personnel polices, force structure, and servic trate. Its wo majo publicly available reports eerene- ing antiaccess strategies were both undertaken by RAND's Project Air Fors, ‘The int, publshed in 2002 and completed before the invasion of teagan assesment ofthe ably ofthe U.S. A Force ro carey out analy halt mision—quickly orerditng and defeating « mechanic invasion by lagi forces in Saud Arabia or elewhere Tiled Measuring Interdicion Capabilities inthe Presence of AntiAccss Stteies: Exploratory Anais to Inform Adapie Strategy forthe Persian Gull it provides aeypology of potential actions and couneractons reat 0 ant-aces strategies, which i defines strategies “that would impede American us of regional bases and otherwise hinder ficient operations Inthe ron.” “The sud pareiculary emphasis the threat of WMDs and decep- tion a8 Key elements ofant-aces, bu t alto one ofthe few that ‘oventy acknowledges the impact of geographic factors, probably because its ana is specially focused ona deser environment. notes that “these clement [enemy scheme of manewer, WMDs, deception] of an ant-aces satay are under the control ff the ant-aces fore), while ‘others are more intrinsically related tothe particular theater’ tera oF to chance." RAND’ second majoe antiaccess study published in 2007, tack les what most defense analysts view asthe most fomiable anaes sffor, that ofthe People's Republic of China Tied Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Amtaccess Soatepes and Their Implications forthe United Stats, the aly examines broad categories ofan accs techniques and weaponry, swell x dts specications the People Liberation Army cold take. The dy ie soured fom profesional ‘wt by PLA ofcers and associated academics, making an effective case that the PLA currently views potential hostlies with the United States though anantvaces lens ln is ow documents, the PLA eal its antiaccess strategy Shachouion, or “Assassin's Mace" flkore tefeence oa club use by a hero, notably playing by his ow ele, 0 ‘overcome a more poweral enemy" The RAND authors maintain that “Chinese sates appear to understand the success against the U.S. miliary depend on Chinas abity to avoid aie cononaton with US. forces ina eadtionalforce-on-forebate."* Surrssing the attractiveness ofthe anise approach i view that factors inladed within what has eater been described 3 the Fendarental clement of anthacett could iia an advantage in Iightechoolgy weaponry Ia the word ofthe study, “undelyng the Chinese approach toward a potential conflict wih the United Sass the conviction tha even an adversary with superior weapons, ech ‘ogy and equipment wil be unable maintain sbsoae superior in all resfecs: Military confit doesnot ocur in a vacuum. Rates, takes place within a specie geographic and pola context that wil ine tably provide the PLA with opportnites 0 oft the Unie Sate! sdrantage in echo.” one ads this conviction ro a prspecive thatthe PRC isa “ising power” whereas America i “in deling,” there coud be a tendency by PLA planners o assume an even greater degre ofthe effectiveness of| their an-access tools than hey ght waerae fa hosieconfomation occurred, Ths rng powerdsclning power perspective has cts con siderable concer arnong the PRC’ neighbors whose the United States 2 providing blanc inthe gion. tis easonable osssume that RAND has ako conducted conser ale classed analysis fr the DOD on anti accesses. (CSBA and A2/AD ven more effect in popularizing the at-access concep has en the _work ofthe Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an innit that combines the features of think tank and defense consul tay, CSBA hasbeen headed since the 19 by Andsew J Keepineich Je, prominent Ofc of Net Assessment alumnus and, a previously roted, a NDP membee. CSBAs papers and briefing have influenced Democratic nd Republican administration alike, ait ithe research centr most associated wit the concep, having prepared the most pab> less concerning the an-access threat wo US, NATO, and ater lied interes, With long carers oldie schol Krepinevich has a public ep- ‘uation tha began with the publication in 1988 of hs bok The Army and Vietnam, in which he argues that Senior Army and cian Jeaders reve understood what kind of war hey were Fighting in Southeast Asa Deni he Modem Cont of ates 1 ind that no amount of esoures coud have made shir approach sc «cessful The Book nughtanenon becuse of the sources uned—noe the ‘op-ed opinions of eres, but tbe Army's ow deste! documents and interviews with combaans. A eantemporary of Captain Cur, Colne Krepinevich served in Net Assessment inthe early 1990s where he was lead analyst of he RMA and one who brought that and the ‘erm defense transformation into ple prominenc, He would do ke wis othe term ant-accesaren denial, which he shortened for conve rience to AZAD. CCSBA issued its fist pul papers on an-access ates in 2002. (Onc, on the vunerabilyof overseas ai bassin an ant acces environ: ‘ment was contracted from Chrisopher |. Bowe, then a senior analyst 1 the Northrop Geum Analysis Cester and former RAND analyst and member ofthe seectary ofthe Ait Foxe’ staf. From his postion 22 wed agen, Bowie is able point to both the operational and politcal vulnerability of forward land ac bassin way acknowledged by US. Air Fore leaders: On the poialvalnerabliy, his concer s tuncertainy: “The aide of ost countries regarding aces in fture iscsi ful o pred, ring signin uncertainties regarding the basing and employment of combo ara. The United Sates can bing ‘xormous pressure to bear ona host county to accept US forest sees, 35 has bee Sen in numerous criss, cannot be paranted Aung he operational an-aces challenges, he makes theese for rater Air Frc investment logerange arr, ging that recent hudges were skewed! more towarl short-range fighters than in pret ‘ows Air Force badge plang He conclude: “This report suggest tht ‘ove the long run, the combined uncertainties aed by politcal factory, legis and emerging mitary threat mean thatthe combat power of the Lnd-hased ght fore may be signal constrained in suppor ing US power projection operations in an an-accestevronment, To hg, the Defense Department shoul adj ts current combat air «raft modernization plans, which foes primary on the action of Fehr aircraft 1o increase spending on sates less reliant upon for wear bases." Ina subse posh agains Deparment ofthe Navy claims that naa forces can conduct extensive forward operations without dependence ‘on overseas bases, Bow introduce he bse vue into a oint 50 cher ‘ontexs “The isis ised in thi rls ave broader erates mpi ‘tions for he US military ara whole Reliance om large, xed fies Jn the tester of operations mach mre than an Ai Force issue." The second CSBA seport issued in 2002 defends, in pat, the Department of the Navy’ clim to operational independence ofits forward deployed forer rom basing, whl arguing tha the Navy and ‘Marine Coops ned to come fl atcpansin she defense transforma ‘on, Ween by retired Marne colonel and subsequent anderecetary of the Navy Robert O. Work, The Challenge of Marte Transformation Is Bigger Better is an overall aseament of then current Navy-Marie Corp force strocture rather than a study of antiaccess per se But ‘Work, paps influenced by she Nays description ofits decentralized ‘mode of operations as nerwork centric warfare, introduces the idea of anti-access networks to deseribe a potential adversary’ overall stem ‘of sensors, elestonic measures and coumtermiessres, ad fee and Alefensive weaponry that old be sed to support an aac eae. ‘Ancracrese network i obviously Worl’ prefered method of scribing the ant-aces challenge to US. forces; he wis the nm 93 times in is 169-page sepore Its ndeed an effective way to shit away from possible fixations on particular ant-access weapon systems—PRC anishp lic misses, for example—towand an understanding that if an an-accesssraegy iso beefetve, an em inerdependent ne ‘work of systems and actions ar egured 1 work together sicostlly Bur this lo means that anteaccs sates are vlherable wo Useup tion ifthe elements ofthe nerwork become issgerepated. Countering antaccesstratgies thereby consis of antacks against an organic whol in onder to break par the component so thatthe canbe destoyed in ex or bypassed—in oer words o break the wall. In 2008 CSBA released a conuthored report asessng individual service pln and programs in tenn of thir ceiver ina at cco and area-deial environment. Till Meeting the Ant-Access and ‘Aves Deal Challenge, i was hee thatthe acroayen IAD was fest ‘sed extensive Par ofthe logic Behind this ay he inability to clearly and effectively distinguish Beowcenan-aces and area denial despie ‘whatever nuanced definitions could be used. The tactics and wexpon systems appropriate o countering ant-acces strategies appear o be the me appropriate for countering area-deil defenses. Acton taken by Deviate Mabe Compo Accent the defender sem to vary ony in ems ofthe anges of the weapons involved But another sian pat ofthe lg wa the des Be able oases Anny programe agin a-access pe ape, See Assi graphic poston cy mans emma of he ‘matime domain in toi oof are ses inthe ace of exon anisacess never iif o poste a rok forthe Acmy the

You might also like