MEETING OF THE CERCLE In view of the deteriorating world situation and tnereasing threats to the unity and effectiveness of the Weatern Alliance we believe that the circle should be called upon to play a more active political role than it has done in recent years. To this end, we are inviting a number of parliamentarians and industrialists to the forthcoming meeting, to be held at Kreuth near Munich from June 11th to 13th. The theme of the forthcoming meeting, te which you are cordially invited, will be "Soviet Threat to the Alliance". We expect the discussiens to cover such aspects as: - mounting Euro-American divergencies in the face of the threat of the soviet ss-20 misseles, the soviet "peace" campaign, arms control and the western respons: - Central America and the Caribbean Basin. - Southern Africa. - the Middle East. - the Falklands crisis. Participants are asked to arrive at Munich in the afternoon or early evening of June 11th. The discussions will begin on Saturday June 12th at 9.00 o'clock and are expected to end after lunch on Sunday 13th. soon as possible, to Franz Josef Bach, Be Aachene06, 1982 in Wildbad Kreuth The Right Hon. Julian Amery Esq. MP John Brown, MP —=( Mylan => fy imine faites) Sir John Bigge-Davison,MP Brian Crozier Nicholas Elliot Frank Steel [n= Col. Maclean Sir Peter Tennant Lord Cranborne,MP EG-Kommissar Dr. K.H. Narjes General a.D. F.J. Schulze Hans Graf Huyn, MaB Dr. Bruno Heck, 1. Vorsitzender der Konrad-Adenaver-Stiftung Dr. F.J. Bach, Botschafter a.D. Monique Garnier-Lancon Maire Adjoint de Paris ‘i William Francois Henri Renard, Ambassadeur Jues Pujo Admiral a.D, Robert Hanks ‘aul M. Weyrich _ Pat Ballestreri James Lucier Donald Jameson Miles Costick Margaret Carlisle Arnold M. Silver — Richard Mc aJune 1982 MEETING OF THE CERCLE (Notes for Memory) BRIAN CROZIER 1. The "Different Crisis" The current cri ‘of the Soviet empire is by no means the first, but it differs from Previous ones in important respects. It could even be the {inal crisis, leading to the collapse of the empire and even in time to the dissolution of the Soviet system, There is, however, no certainty about this, for we are faced with a paradox: on the one hand, the failure of the system is patents on the other hand, the pawer af the empire is at its height, The crisis unfortunately finds the West deeply divided. There is no consensus between the Reagan Administration and its European partners, either on the nature of the problem or on any action the Western Alliance should take. The same is true amongst the European members of NATO. The situation is thus a dramatic one, without prece- dent in contemporary history. By taking advantage of the absence of unity among, the Western powers, the Soviet regime could well gain the upper hand and win the unilateral war ("World War III") which it has been conducting against the “free world" since 1945. If, however, the West showed itself capable of united action under the leadership of President Reagan, the Leninist system would be the loser. The stakes are thus gigantic. Like it or not, we are in a race against time, the out- come of which will decide our survival, whether in victory or in defeat. Again, unlike previous crises, there is a known deadline. In December 1979, the NATO Ministerial Council, meeting in Brussels, decided to accept the new generation of Am= erican "theatre" nuclear missiles (Theatre Nuclear Forces, or TNF)—the Pershing Il and the Cruise missile — as the only possible response to the threat of the Soviet $5-20 missiles, with multiple warheads, already depleyed in European Russia and capable of destroying all NATO's installations in one surprise attack. If the decision of December 1979 is implemented, however, in the best of cases the new missiles cannot be delivered by the United States and deployed in Western Europe before the second half of 1983, Even before the meeting of December 1979, the Soviets had shown that they under- stood what was at stake and proposed to act. The vast propaganda and subversion apparatus, controlled by the International Department of the Seviet Communist Party(CPSU) wes eecbitinns ond urinnched in tes eunemn of 1979, The key rete ts payasiag the World Peace Council, and through itby inmumersble misidiary bodies in all thy Western countries, The cbjective is clear and simpler to make it peychologically wm thirkable and politically impossible to deploy the new American missiles, If tee “peace campaign succeeds, the Soviets will be the victors: ao Fintardised Europe will tera away trom America, or alternatively a disillusioned America will abandon Europa, in = second phase, America would flind itself more and more isolated and thus whaterer the degree of rearmament achieved under the Reagan Administration — would find itself tm @ state of permanent strategic inferiority in relation to the USSR. Ii on the contrary, the campaign Lails, and the West reacts intelligently and mobilies its collective will, the Seviet system and empire would find themacives starved of Western credits and supplies — notably of grain and of the high technology hech enables the USSR to expand its already gigantic war machine — and would face defeat. ‘The collectivist economy has broken down, Central planning gave results in the pri Mary phase: steel, electricity, etc. It has shown itself incapable of providing for fhe needs of © conmmer society. Agriculture, which is permanently dackwarc, = levels of productivity or of feeding the population. Tha on Western imports, and transfers of high technology, al, the same remarks apply to the other centralised Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia t0 the extent than elsewhere, this is due to the tolerance ofScvance of any to be found in the West. In any case, the options used by the Soviets in World War 1, wit intimidation oF use, a "shooting war* is only ene ih military Power: in reserve foe the following methods are in constant us Psychological war; ‘diplomacy; agitation and propaganda: disinformation; the use of Solenlalsterogate forces (Cubans, East Germans, et}; spies and agents of influence; international front Organisations, In this context, the International Department of the ‘Central Committee of the CPSU, under Boris Ponom subversion; terrorism; jarev, is the direct successor to Lenin's Comintern, deciding the broad lines of international subversion, vo be eureuted ‘by the KGB and the GRU (military intelligence). 3. Weaknesses of the West In the face of this world-wide, life-and-death challenge the majoe Western. countries are in a seriously weakened state, in comparison with the 19503 and 1960s. America’s defeat in Vietnam, followed by the Watergate affair, produced widespread demoralisation and a general collapse of will, The CIA was virtually destroyed as an ‘9perational agency. In the United Kingdom, the counter-subversive arm of the Foreign Office, the Information Reasearch Department (IRD) was destroyed im a complex eperation in which the CIA traitor, Philip Agee, played a leading pact. The foreign intelligence and security services (MI¢ and MI5) were increasingly bureaucratised, In France, the Seme Bureaux for psychological war were disbanded by General de Gaulle in the wake of the Algerian war. The internal security service (DST) remained a re-named DGSE) was operationally active under the long-serving Alexantre de ‘Marenches, but underwent an upheaval as a result of the elections of May 1931. ln Brandt government, from 1969 onj the same is also true of the internal seasritythe inspirer of the revolution — that is, to the extent that, ideo. = Ideology is no longer o character of the Soviet (ed with the Soviet propaganda output and th ntinues to inspire terrorist and guerrilla groups i is that it logy is. ident State. Marxism-Leninism, however, co! a number of countries, The true significance of ideology, within the empl ime and the sole justification for the remains the sole source of legitimacy of the reg export of the original revolution. In other words, ideology "justifies" repression at home and imperialism abroad. In 1919, Lenin created the Comintern as a means of extending the Bolshevik system to “all countries of the world without exception®, It is in that sense that ideology remains important within the Sovict Union and empire. It has long ceased to inspire the pepulation, including the "intellectuals", and is probably accepted with due cynicism by the ruling party. It is, however, a State religion or counter-religion, and it is important to note that the objectives of the Comintern are incorporated into the "Brezhnev" Constitution of 1977 (see in particular Article 23). - The rejection of the ruling ideology by the populations of the empire (including those of the USSR) is nevertheless, from the Soviet standpoint, a worrying development. This rejection is visible everywhere, including the USSR, but it is in Poland that it has manifested itself most openly. The colonising power could not tolerate the existence of an independent source of workers' power. Hence the absolute necessity for repression. In the face of Western hostility, the Soviet leaders appear to have renounced direct in tervention — for fear of losing, for a limited period, the economic fruits of "detente". Hence a new and sophisticated technique: indirect inervention by the Polish Army (created in the first place by Stalin, and whose first Commander-in-Chief was the Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky, a Soviet citizen of Polish origin). It should be recalled also that two Soviet armoured divisions are permanently stationed in Poland, and that the Polish armed forces are totally obedient to the Soviet Union in the framework of the Warsaw Pact under the command of the Soviet Marshal Kulikov. Decline of the International Communist Movement, Communist Europe has failed, and Moscow's authority is badly shaken, The French Communist Party (PCF), after a briet flirtation with "Eurocommunism™, has allied completely to the Soviet tine (paradoxically, since the PCF is the coalition partner of the French Socialist Party in the Mitterrand government, which has not been sparing in its criticism of the USSR, with special reference to Afghanistan and Poland). The tralian Communist Party (PCD, in contrast, has formally taken its distance fron Soviet doaination and now finds Well, = erent Nea It should always be remembered at these events are taking place against the-3 - Suspended the An SF the American programme fer the building ef an enhanced radiation warhead (misteadingly known as "the neutron bomb), With impu Hh impunity, therefore, Brezhnev and his associates pressed on with their world Programme: Under the shelter of SALT Il, they built and deployed the formidable SS-20 missiles, targeted on Western Eurape. ~ In April 1978 in Afghanistan, the KGB installed @ regime of its choice, At the end of the year, in the face of a general revolt, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, ~ _ In Tune, Soviet agents replaced the government of South Yemen, whose President was executed, Again, a government of Moscow's choice was installed, ~ Still in’ 1978, the Soviets airlifted 25,000 Cubans to Ethiopia, where their protege ‘Mengistu Haile Meriam had seized power in February. In Africa, they incited Khadaffi of Libya to occupy Chad, ~ In the near East, they extended their influence and military presence in Syria. ~ In Central America, their Cuban satellite provided the high command of the Sandinista Suerrillas in Nicaragua, resulting in the final offensive of July 1979. ~ Next, their attention was turned to El Salvador and Guatemala, where guerillas supplied from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba and East Germany, and powerfully supported by the international Communist propaganda regime, stepped up their voffensives against pro-Western governments, At the end of 1980, however, Jimmy Carter was ‘Swept out of power by Ronald Rea- gan. This was a change in depth. In common with Margaret Thatcher in Britain, the American President is a "visceral" anti-Communist from the time of his experience as President of the Actors Guild in Hollywood, Although seriously hampered by “Weft-overs" from the Carter (and Kissinger) eras, he appears to have a basic understanding of the necessary Strategy to halt the Soviet offensive. It must be Added, however, that the results to date have been relatively meagre, President Reagan's first year in office was dominated by domestic problems (including high ‘unemployment, budget deficits and excessively high interest rates). Nevertheless, he has launched a vast rearmament programme to enable the United States to catch up with the massive lead achieved by the USSR during the years of "detente" and the Carter presidency, He deferred the resumption of strategic arms talks with the Soviets, which were eventually relaunched in November 1981 with a significant change of names Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In the face of much hostile public epinion both nationally and internationally, he encouraged the government of EL Salvador to hold general elections at the end of March 1982, which resulted in an undeniable vote of confidence in the government despite intimidation from the rebel side, The President is, however,a eae has been rivalry between the the clash between Haig and sin the - e, there is obviously far from homogeneous. For example, Secretaries of State and Defense (Haig and Weinberger), seis nds, the Allen affair, and serious obstas t of the “left-overs", A Jeane Kirkpatrick over the F. formulation and execution of a new foreign policy on the par EI Salvador after the publication in February 1981 of the whole year was wasted he impressive State Department report on the supply ef arms to the rebels by t eral allies inside the United States, conscious or Communist powers. With their otherwise, the Soviets have had an extraordinary success in recent months in their "peace" campaign. In the United States and in other member-countries of the Alliance, the anomalies of the context of World War Ill, In the party democracy present a depressing picture US, to give one example, the absurd Clark Amendment of 1975 prevents any American action to aid the anti-Marxist guerrillas in Angola, and the Administration — after 18 months in office — has not been able to find a way of repealing it. In Britain, the Falklands crisis brought about a semblance of national unity which does not exist in the face of the much wider and graver threat from the Soviet Union, In France, last Year's elections brought the paradox of an anti- Communist President who included the Communist Party (PCF) in his government; and a strong anti-Soviet policy in defence and in Europe, along with a pro-Cuban policy for Central America. In the Federal Republic, Chancellor Schmidt, despite his reputation as an "Atlanticist", has been ‘en towards a policy of accommodation with the USSR by the pro-Soviet element in his own SPD party. The SPD Congress in Munich in April yielded a party commitment to a security partnership with the Soviet bloc — a contradiction of the purposes of NATO. ‘Against this background, the Soviet-supported "peace" movement in Western Europe made rapid headway in 1981 — especially in West Germany, Britain, Holland and Belgium. It is encouraging to note, however, that in all these countries, and in France as well, counter-movements or groups have been created, which weaken the impact of ‘the unilateralist organisations by calling for multilateral disarmament. Towards a Common Western Policy In the current state oe wistdcn eens it may not be practical politics to call for a comprehensive revision of NATO doctrine — although it is clearly obsolescent in the ‘Circumstances of 1982, It does not seem to me to be impossible, however, to aim at least at a common: Te ee niet sithn docs ta aa pmaiesc-- ra (iii) (iv) the case for “peaceful coexistence" (in the Western, not Communist definition of the term) is overwhelming. War in Europe is too horrible a prospect to contemplate, and a feral ban‘on Commercial relation: would amount almost to an act of war, Although commercial relations should, therefore, be maintained, certain’ conditions should be insisted upon on the Western side. The West is under no ob! iBation to do ete for the Soviet Union than the United States did for Britain when war broke out in 1939, and when the American arms 9 was replaced by “cash and carry". If the Soviet Union and its satellites want to buy Western goods, let them pay cash, The development of high technology in recent years has made the old Cocom list of embargoed strategic items ebsolete. There should be a total ban on the transfer of high technology, for twe simple and obvious reasons: such transfers relieve the ailing Soviet system of the drain implicit in developing such technologies for itself; and they ‘contribute directly to the Soviet war machine which threatens the West. There should also be a concerted Western policy — with Japanese participation — to cease giving credits to the Eastern bloc, especially on tecms which amount to an aid Programme. The sums allocated in the forms of credits would be far better employed in our own Western countries to reduce unemployment and stimulate economic development. According to the latest official figures published this month in Prague, the total level of Eastern bloc indebtedness to the West has now reached the stagger- ing total of US$80.7 billion for 198] — an increase of 11 per cent over the previous year. This figure breaks down as follows: Soviet Union: $19.5 billion (increase of 44 per cent over 1980). Poland: $24 billion (136 per cent up) Romania: $9.6 billion (5.5 per cent up). DDR; $11.3 million (17.7 per cent up). Czechoslovakia: $3.6 billion (2.9 per cent uph Hungary: $7.8 billion (5.8 per cent up). Bulgaria: ‘$2.3 billion (28.1 per cent down). NB These figures were presented to the participants in the latest Comecon meeting in Moscow. I believe that the Soviet is considerably higher in reality.Western banking system as well, The West German banks are already under severe ‘Strain in relation to credits made available to Poland in particular. If, then, it is really impossible for the Western Alliance to take positive measures to “roll back" the Soviet empire, the least we should do, in mere common sense, is to ‘stop building up the Soviet threat against ourselves, ect Ba ttt