The ability to vote in free elections is a defining feature of liberal democracies.

However, as the

outcome of an election is both non-excludable and non-rival, citizens are able to benefit from it by

free-riding instead voting. This essay will argue that when individuals abstain from voting, this

reduces the equity, legitimacy and efficacy of the government and leads to a less informed and less

cohesive society.

What are Public Goods?

A public good has two defining properties it must be non-excludable and non-rival. A non-rival

good is one for which a persons usage does not impede on the utility others can derive from using

the good. Non-excludability refers to the fact that no one can be denied access to a good regardless

of whether they contribute to its provision. (Olson, 1965) Because the outcome of an election affects

all members within a given polity irrespective of their political participation and the benefits derived

are not subject to rivalry, it satisfies the criteria of a public good. (Key, 1955)

What is free-riding?

The term free-riding refers to the phenomena whereby an individual is able to benefit from a public

good without contributing to its provision. (Andreoni, 1988) For the public good of electoral

outcomes, a free-rider is one who benefits from government services but chooses not vote. In a

collective action scenario such as voting, a particular actor may free ride if the expected utility from

free-riding is at least as large as the utility derived from participating. (Cornes & Sandler, 1996)

Furthermore, free-riding behaviour is more likely to occur in larger groups. As group size increases,

the individual costs of obtaining a good exceed the small fraction of the total benefit a person in a

large group would receive. (Olson, 1965) In other words, an individuals willingness to participate in

collective action is inversely related to the size of the group. (Oliver & Marwell, 1988)
Why do people abstain from voting (free-ride)?

One reason people abstain from voting is because, in a large election, the probability that each

individual vote will change the electoral outcome is extremely small. This idea is elucidated in the

collective action function for an individual. According to this model, the expected benefit of voting is

equal to the benefit from having your preferred candidate win the election (B), multiplied by the

probability of your vote being decisive (P), minus the costs of voting (C). Because (P) is exceedingly

small in a large polity, so is the individual benefit (B). (Blais, 2000) As such, small opportunity costs

such as waiting in queues or travelling to a polling station can deter people from voting and

encourage them to free-ride. (Downs, 1957)

What are the implications of this?

1. Government is less representative

When people free-ride by not voting, the elected government is less representative of the

population as a whole. In a system of non-compulsory voting, political participation is concentrated

among the wealthier and more educated demographics of society.(Lijphart, 1997) This is because

the costs of being informed on public policy and the voting process itself are relatively lower for

highly educated and wealthy citizens. (Filer, et al., 1993) As a result, the outcome of an election may

not be an accurate representation of all citizens preferences when people abstain from voting. In

turn, this leads to negative consequences concerning the provision of public goods which is

discussed in Section 5.

However, some political scientists dispute the link between higher voter turnouts and more

representative government in the case of compulsory voting. Even though all citizens are required to

submit a ballot, not all citizens are necessarily making rational and informed political decisions based

on their preferences. (Jakee & Sun, 2006) Furthermore, the institutional constraints inhibiting the

formation of smaller parties in a two-party political system means that voters who make informed
political choices may not have their views accurately represented in the electoral outcome. (Teorell,

2006) As such, the outcome of an election can only be representative of the population when all

people participate as willing and interested actors with a plurality of political choices.

2. Reduced legitimacy of government

Voter participation is especially important as it increases the legitimacy of government. Through

taking part in the political process by voting, individuals are more likely to accept the policy

outcomes of the elected government regardless of whether it accords with their own preferences

(Almond & Verba, 1963). By promoting popular acquiescence to governmental decisions in this way,

participation fosters the notion of legitimate rule. (Verba, 1996) To this end, core democratic values

such as justice are promoted by encouraging citizens to vote. (Olsen, 1982) Thus, when individuals

choose to free-ride in elections, this diminishes the legitimacy of the elected government.

On the contrary, it can be argued that abstaining from voting actually increases the legitimacy of the

government as it shows that citizens are satisfied with current policy outcomes. (Hardin, 1998)

Famously, Bill Clinton was elected to the White House in 1996 with the support of less than 25% of

the voting age population ((FEC), 2003). Even though this regime was accepted as legitimate, in the

longer term, the sense of legitimacy engendered by voting does encourage further political

participation and promotes democratic stability. (Pateman, 1970)

3. Individual disenfranchisement

Voting can also have an empowering effect on an individual by making them feel valued and

included in the political process. According to Kaufman, citizen participation through voting

contributes to the development of human powers of thought, feeling and action. (Kaufman, 1960)

As such, voting in elections make individuals feel more positive towards the government and the

norms and values it embodies. (Finkel, 1987) Conversely, in choosing not to vote, people are
disenfranchised from the political process and may feel alienated from society. (Weitz-Shapiro,

2008)

However, many scholars contest whether individuals derive a personal benefit from voting. Under

the collective action function outlined earlier, because the probability that your vote will be decisive

in the electoral outcome is so small, the overall benefits of participating are insignificant. (Downs,

1957) As such, individuals may be no worse-off by free-riding in elections.

While the individual benefits of voting may be small, greater participation can promote active

citizenship and contribute to a more educated society. When people choose to vote, they

necessarily hold informed opinions on contemporary issues. On the contrary, when people abstain

from voting, they often do not hold opinions on policy issues and are less likely to be active citizens

in a democracy. (Highton & Wolfinger, 2001) In this way, low rates of political participation results in

a disjointed and uninformed polity. Furthermore, when a society is less informed of political

processes and policy decisions, this reduces the accountability of government to the populous.

(Krishna & Morgan, 2012)

4. Increased likelihood of protests

When people abstain from voting and hence do not view the elected government as being

legitimate, they are more likely to engage in protests, resulting in civic disharmony. Protests are an

effective tool for people who want to challenge the political establishment and have their views

heard. (Dalton, 2002) Since voting allows citizens to voice their opinions on political processes,

protest is a more likely outcome for those who do not participate in elections. In particular, empirical

evidence suggests that the rise of newer forms of social protest such as environmental activism is

negatively related to rates of voter participation. (Norris, 2002)

However, some scholars argue that likelihood of protests forming is positively related to political

participation. This is because the people who vote in elections are more likely to be those who are
interested in politics and hold informed opinions on a range of issues. (Schussman & Soule, 2005)

Accordingly, voting and protest are complementary forms of political expression as opposed to being

alternative forms of collective action. (Dalton, 2002)

Even if lower voter turnouts actually lead to fewer protests, there is a need to distinguish between

the types of protests that occur. With high rates of political participation, protest movements are

likely to be well-structured, coordinated and relatively peaceful as people in these contexts still

accept the elected government as legitimate. (Eisinger, 1973) In contrast, because low levels of

political participation reduce the legitimacy of government, protests in this situation are more likely

to cause greater civic disruption as citizens feel excluded and disenfranchised from the political

process. (Pollock, 1983)

5. Reduced provision of public goods and efficacy of government

Since voting provides a mechanism through which the government is informed of what public goods

are demanded by its citizens, decreased political participation can lead to decreased provision of

public goods. Under this conception of voting, the democratic responsiveness (of elected officials)

depends on citizens participation. (Verba, 1996) As such, when people choose to free-ride, the

government becomes less responsive and hence provides less public goods. In this way, while voice

and action are usually seen as alternative methods of exerting influence, in terms of voting, exit

(not voting) seems to be an ineffective action. (Hirschman, 1970)

In response, some argue that because most voters demand similar public goods, increased voter

participation would have little impact on the range and quantity of public goods provided. (Highton

& Wolfinger, 2001) However, this argument ignores the substantial class bias that exists in political

participation in favour of the upper classes who have different preferences and opinions to the rest

of society. (Hill & Leighley, 1992)

This class bias in political participation leads to detrimental outcomes for government policy

concerning the provision of public goods. Because people on lower incomes tend to be more reliant

on government welfare services, high voter participation is important to ensure the sufficient

provision of social welfare programs (Ingraham & Schneider, 1984). This is evident in the United

States where a highly class-biased, low voter turnout rate has made it easier for politicians to reduce

government services to the poor. (Lijphart, 2001) Furthermore, Piven and Cloward argue that this

unrepresentative electorate in the United States is what allowed for the dismantling of state

welfare in the 1980s. (Piven & Cloward, 1989) Hence, poor rates of political participation can

contribute to increased societal inequality by influencing the provision of public goods. (Dye, 1969)

Finally, when individuals free-ride, some of the campaigning in the lead-up to the election is diverted

away from policy discourse towards convincing people to vote. As such, this inefficient use of

campaign funds resulting from the free-rider problem reduces the efficacy of the elected

government. (Mackerras & McAllister, 1999)

Conclusion:

In a situation of non-compulsory voting, the outcome of an election is a public good for which

individuals can choose to free-ride by not participating. However, this decision to free-ride leads to

numerous negative consequences regarding the legitimacy of the government and its ability to

efficiently provide public goods. Furthermore, individuals who choose not to vote are less likely to be

active citizens engaged in political processes, creating the potential for civic discord in the form of

protests. As such, it is in the interest of governments and society to encourage citizens to participate

in elections and not free-ride.

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