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San Beda College of Law: Cases in Constitutional Law I
San Beda College of Law: Cases in Constitutional Law I
Mendiola, Manila
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]
1
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
Francisco vs. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003]
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles
of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And
so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 38
in this wise:
2
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through
Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other
aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
3
of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the
Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25,
1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the
same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987,
absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to
replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence,
the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation
on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and
effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on
March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this
period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the
Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise,
they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided
for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g.
extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of the
first Congress, etc.
4
The Power to Amend the Constitution is not included in the General Legislative
Power
It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
constitutional provisions on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification
on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to
consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words,
the subject- matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.
Moreover, the amendments proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted
for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R.B.H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3)
resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote
separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the
same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof,
anything that would negate the contested of different Congresses to approve the
contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different
sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any
plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said
resolutions on the same day.
5
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to
propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention,
instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for
ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be
conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not
its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit Members of
Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and
participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.
Whether or nothing should be done is a political question, not subject to review by
the courts of justice.
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the
Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election Some members of
the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any
"election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such importance, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may
reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of
the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not
insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to
affect the selection of elective officials.
6
Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity
of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of
vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has
been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
7
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori
not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people
Imbong vs. Ferrer, COMELEC [G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970]
8
Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the
required three-fourths vote.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by
the President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a
legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as
Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.
9
propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign
to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to
the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one . . . is no argument
against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." There is here the adoption
of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a
constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. We are not
disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also
advantageous in practice.
2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the
Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution
making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as
the whole of it, if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and
harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and
reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties,
ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations
of the people, on the other. It is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of
any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other
parts.
10
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the
purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in
its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they
can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it
before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as
a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part
of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its
parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already
from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant
qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage,
there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if
a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he
feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in
the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not,
because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can
he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to
approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the
right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in
other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a
voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of
the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish
and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter
not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of
the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of
hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people
are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject
the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for
the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the
election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In
brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice
Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper
submission".
11
Santiago vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND DOES NOT COVER INITIATIVE ON
THE CONSTITUTION. - First, Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."' . . . Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the
three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must
submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the
Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Section 5 paragraph (c) requires, among other things, a statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approve or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. . . . The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle, II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws. . . . The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No.
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on
this substantive matter are fatal and. cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of [the] Act."
12
as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
13
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and
misleading" which renders the initiative void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that
the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires
that the people must sign the "petition . . . as signatories."
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that
an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people . . . in a petition" meaning
that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people
under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members
of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they
have signed the petition.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision,
then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision
of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described
the fundamental difference in this manner:
14
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
15
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment
is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that
may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates
a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to
determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for
instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to
a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda [G.R. No. L-13250, Oct 29,
1971]
16
the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the
constituent functions as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine
Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education,
public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.
The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of
these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare
those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a
government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations
owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic
life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a
private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a
private corporations under the Corporation Law.
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that
they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take
for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the
purpose of "adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of
copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products", a function which
our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however,
it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any
other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government. As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that the Government
happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation"
17
(National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587). "By
becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government divested
itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the
corporation. . . . Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an
agency or instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as
an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do
not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law.
Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law
and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption
clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
"In its more general sense the phrase 'municipal corporation' may
include both towns and counties, and other public corporations created
by government for political purposes. In its more common and limited
signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and cities.
Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661."
(McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. CIR [G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975]
18
to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere
else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice." Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks
incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the
laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into
the governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science, the first
edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the then Professor, later
American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was
categorized by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what
was demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the
very bonds of society." The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or
optional.
It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly
commanded the authoritative position which at one time it held in the United
States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board, could affirm:
"The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government
activity." The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach.
As noted in Edu v. Ericta: "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to
our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with
the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up
to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." Nor did
the opinion in Edu stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in
1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional
Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear
when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted
the 'vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions' and the 'almost
unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to
compete with existing business' as 'reflections of the fascination exerted by [the
then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: 'My answer is that
this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but
social and economic. . . . If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations
of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the
interest and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have
come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those
safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national
aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries
which a constitutional provision automatically imposes."
19
aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a
compassionate society" be attained.
Gov. of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad [G.R. No. 9959, December
13, 1916]
DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE - In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 How., 369, 384), Mr.
Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States,
supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3
Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that
there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the sale of the estates of
infants, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot
act for themselves, said:
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power to institute the
action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the
people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action
could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in
overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the
Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved
the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Young & C. C., 417):
20
"Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who
hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the public that the crown should
be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the
public generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no
individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to
allow it." (2 Kent's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 665; 1
Daniell's Chancery Practice, sec. 13; Perry on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be
damages by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donor or the
cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is
not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the
accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the
contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They
parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting
of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died,
leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or
actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course
that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to against assume control
of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground
upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true
ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public
property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was
intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and
became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the
Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the
Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy,
as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and
Christian benevolences in like instances in the future.
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh [G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945]
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among them
Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised
Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944, and the interpretation of
the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow
vs. Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary
consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people
to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection
and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits
and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws,
that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the
punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the
21
occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by
the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.],
632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was,
does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague
Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued
by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts
would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing
as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory,
and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist
the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in
penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or
occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.
We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of
General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean
judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not
deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be
construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in
sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say
that the term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative
and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According
to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meaning, its meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d
ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or
construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of
said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations
with which the world "processes" is associated.
As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect
private rights or persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes,
are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no
crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the
restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is
nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be
caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the
law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and
after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored.
As there are vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of
such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or
abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because
such reversal would deprive them of their properties without due process of law.
22
should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of
such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines
being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be
exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty." Then came
this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted
that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power
plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in
the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it
has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state
then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence." The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there
is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not in appearance. The words
employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are
still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory."
23
times'; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that,
as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and
subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing
as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests
24
nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure,
either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to
do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules
of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory,
who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which
have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in
conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended
or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity
and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not
demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force,
threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist
and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
25
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
INSTANCES OF SUITS AGAINST THE STATE. - Some instances when a suit against
the State is proper are:
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not
pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party
defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred,
their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority.
Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and
military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as
there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign
state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has
given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them
from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this
case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on
the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs
to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its
agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position
in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another."
THE STATE IMMUNITY IS NOT WAIVED ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT THE
PRESIDENT CREATED A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT, OR BY THE
PRESIDENTS ACT OF JOINING A RALLY OF THE COMPLAINANTS. In effect,
whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.
Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not
the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the
State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory.
This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding body.
26
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done
or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from
suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not
mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow
the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the
government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's
speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the
rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any
liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter written was in fact a reply to
a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the
case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such request,
he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism in effect
a direct attack against him that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic
form of supervision."
As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval
Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of
employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced.
Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in
nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department
of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the
department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about
it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the
scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will
have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will require that government to
27
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our
adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land.
par in parem non habet imperium (meaning, an equal has no authority over an
equal)
ACTS COMMITTED BY OFFICIALS OUTSIDE THEIR AUTHORITY WILL NOT GIVE RISE
TO THE CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. Ordinarily the officer or employee
committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious
act." 49 Am. Jur. 289. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office,
exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the
plea that he is a public agent." 43 Am. Jur. 86.
United States vs. Guinto [G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]
CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. - The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part
of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also
intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international
community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state
28
is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other
states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No.
3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government
enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the
will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver
of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only
where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
29
Ruiz, where the transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the
wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental
function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the
accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if
he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and,
hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.
Veterans Manpower & Protective Services, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 91359,
September 25, 1992]
30
WAIVER OF STATE IS CONSTRUED STRICTISSIMI JURIS. - Waiver of the State's
immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred,
but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence,
from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.
We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State
to be sued:
"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into
by the PC Chief in relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in
nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.
This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of America vs.
Ruiz where the Hon. Supreme Court held:
The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the
inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that
public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government" (Siren vs. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129,
as cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic vs. Purisima (78
SCRA 470, 473) rationalized:
31
Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands [G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]
SPECIAL LAW WAIVING STATE IMMUNITY. - Act No. 2457, effective February 3,
1915, reads:
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it
cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff
or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the
terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to
fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two
questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order
32
that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due
solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is
legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if
it exists.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16,
1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the
substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
33
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself
of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level
of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.
34
The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit
except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in
principle or precedent. On the contrary
"The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right
to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail
itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain
limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might
have against the state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E.,
pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L.ed. 899)'" 51
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State
exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis.
Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken
in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity
from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the
owner.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has
proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not
an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties.
The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental
agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against
the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no
such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the
existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the
complaint should have been dismissed.
35
established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the
immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris.
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.
United States vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985]
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84
Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the
United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to
recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had
expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been
vacated.
The Holy See vs. Rosario [G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994]
36
or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state
where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where
the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court
requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled
to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit,
he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only
the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a
"suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit
of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088
[1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-
employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the
Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval
Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus
curiae.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office,
to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the
Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of
37
course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings
on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a
private cause.
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in
the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued
without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such
a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the
state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways
v. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action `only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.
Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, speaks to that effect. Justice
Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule, which has never
38
been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue
of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be
to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing
officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason
which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
forbids it."
Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993]
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may
not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the
private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
39
claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Thus, in Carabao, Inc.,
vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, we ruled:
When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily
consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives
its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor, this Court, in
nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has
explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan [G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981]
40
GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION HAS A SEPARATE
PERSONALITY INDEPENDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND THUS, THE QUESTION OF
SUABILITY MAY BE DETERMINED FROM ITS CHARTER. - It is not necessary to write
an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental
function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is
sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
(R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d].) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it
has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government.
(See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963,
8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in
any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can
include a tort claim such as the one instituted by petitioners.
Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass. [G.R. No. L-15751,
January 28, 1961]
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of
Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev.
Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may
be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending
upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional
work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request,
as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government
work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the
Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1665, id.). As
shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works
consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and
for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the
Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is
41
embossed, and on the bank checks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the
reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of
private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1
percent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau
does not include profit, because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the
Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it
executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such
work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the
employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions.
Mobil Phils. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service [G.R. No. L-23139,
December 17, 1966]
Mun. of San Fernando vs. Firme [G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]
42
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable." (United States of America v. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660).
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-
29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes
important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez [G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984]
Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt
from execution. Besides, there must be, pursuant to Section 2(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration," a
corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the
case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an
ordinance to this effect. Furthermore, the procedure outlined by Section 15, Rule 39
of the New Rules of Court has not been followed.
43
June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-
537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of
petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no
legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may
avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of
the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of
municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo,
supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil.
247 (1960)].
City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde [G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003]
Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City Government, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, Br. X,
et al., where petitioners challenged the trial court's order garnishing its funds in
payment of the contract price for the construction of the City Hall, we ruled that,
while government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from execution or
garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for
the payment of the City's obligations
Section 1
44
Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is
all the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S.
vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the
same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus,
and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was
whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to
be established in the Philippine Islands.
One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for
women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of
Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to
regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of
habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who
was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure
to comply with the order of the court.
These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not
chattles, but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens.
Section 2
45
Agustin vs. Edu [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]
The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is
reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas
clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which
was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices; . . ." It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in
the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." The
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
46
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive
agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not
appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming
that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter
into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his
veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and
a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to
the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its
Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up and that of the United States.
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting
State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1
of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force
of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the
Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the
Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only
to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Phil. Constitution).
At any rate, the Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice
their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring
to practice in the Philippines.
47
Section 4
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the
compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war
does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from
that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army.
This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its
duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson
vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without
violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against
his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson
(253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due
process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office
or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by
reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different,
inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the
defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more
effective, in case of need.
Section 6
48
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the
Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare,
and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies
of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution
and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
(sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec.
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code)
sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec.
928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law
allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against
religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state
(see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that:
In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct
from each other. "Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to God what is God's." We
have, however, observed as early as 1928 that:
49
allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical
nature. 4 (italics ours)
In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that
in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which
the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. Thus,
Section 10
50
This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant
farmers "of private agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estates or not" shall be
deemed "owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if
not irrigated and there (3) hectares if irrigated."
SOCIAL JUSTICE IS NOT EQUALITY, BUT PROTECTION. - Lastly, to quote from the
opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in
this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually poor and
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the
law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these
cases is not equality but protection."
Section 11
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually
evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. It
became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece
of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." 84
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo
libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus
writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants'
rights derived from the agrarian reform process.
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed
been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to
security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
51
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the
extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v.
CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to
be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right
to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to
which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property...
pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In
a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things
which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament,
and lawful desires of the individual."123
52
Section 12
Virtouso vs. Municipal Judge [G.R. No. L-47841, March 21, 1978]
THE STATE SAFEGUARDS THE RIGHTS OF THE YOUTH. - This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which
is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes
the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical,
intellectual, and social well-being."
Section 16
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA [G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994]
"The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature."
53
"to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration
of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its
power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and
desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.
Section 19
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan,
practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-
absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but
to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:
Section 21
Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. vs. Sec. of DAR [G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989]
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the
subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these
measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are
less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned,
54
that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's
rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do
not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the
contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own
mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all
means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron
shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but
also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of
inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the
farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a
more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his
insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."
Section 25
55
"ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to
its constituency.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two
senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall
be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy
. . . Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of
the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree
of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is,
as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government).
Section 26
An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the
provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26,
Article II had read, The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and
prohibit public dynasties. Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.
56
successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word broaden to the
phrase ensure equal access, and the substitution of the word office to service.
He explained his proposal in this wise:
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
The approval of the Davide amendment indicates the design of the framers to
cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may
be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
Nuisance Candidates and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give
due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
Section 28
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
AGENCIES CAN ONLY REGULATE THE MANNER OF INSPECTION, BUT MAY NOT
PROHIBIT ACCESS. - It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court
that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access
to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on
the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the
Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the
manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records
relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds
may promulgate are confined to:
57
. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that
damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of
other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido
vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that
the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to
refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the
authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of,
public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies
may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted
by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate
relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss
of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons
entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to
58
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern.
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board
in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote
of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the
individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the
member concerned.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
59
IN DEFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, JUDICIAL
OFFICERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE APPOINTED TO POSITIONS PERFORMING
NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. - Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution).
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on
Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for
which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
60
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises
the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
61
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . .
the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their
eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the
success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible
of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized
would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of
protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out
hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
62
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
63
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private
respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a
new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under
the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite"
(Paredes, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing
facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and
Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192) relied upon by the respondents this is not an
action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly
or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said
House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6)
Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither
of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139;
Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be
exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has
aptly put it:
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain
powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine
whether the powers thus possessed have been validly exercised. In
performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers
of a coordinate branch of the government, since the determination of
the validity of an act is not the same thing as the performance of the
act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves
the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely
seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by
anything done or attempted by either an executive official or the
legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244,
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied.)
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the
Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress And, since judicial power
includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two
Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why
the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the
Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of
the so- called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the
defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible
with the fundamental law.
64
Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of
vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has
been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori
not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court on prior constitutional cases underline
the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the
amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, the
contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor, "is a
political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as
justiciable in nature. Subsequently, in the Ratification Cases involving the issue of
whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, "announcing the
Ratification by the Filipino people of the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the
affirmative stand of the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the
question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, "(T)hus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory
of the respondents therein that the question-whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection
of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We
unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical unanimity.
We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaeda, insofar as it adhered to the
former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the
same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission
on Elections, the political-question thereby adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito."
65
13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the
Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion
continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the
same as those given in support of the political question theory advanced in said
habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court
and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As
consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of
the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual
reiteration."
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia
that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could
resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not
the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice
in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the
manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The
Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination . . . of the
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and
hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature.
It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
66
conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or
statutory rights . . . .' (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also
the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the
parties herein."
DELEGATION OF POWER
67
political question, and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon
with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more
conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. Doubtless, also, legislative power
may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of
the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and
tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution
provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine
whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the
President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon
the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the
Constitution itself.
For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take
effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the
legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to
administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the
rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on
delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at
variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the
presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof
in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some
cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that it is insufficient; and in
still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the
provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether
or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards
are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the
Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
68
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain
language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA [G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988]
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers
of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are
rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.
69
the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which,
in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment
practices."
70
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." The
standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by
an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad
and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of
the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education"
and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that
these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General [G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965]
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the
fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
". . . may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require."
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require" qualifies, not the clauses preceding the one just
quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred.
This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was
originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided, that "whenever in the
judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by
executive order", effect the changes enumerated therein (as well as in said Section
68), including the change of the seat of the government "to such place . . . as the
public interest requires". The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748
71
which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said
section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to
be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require",
in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs.
William (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld "public welfare" and "public interest", respectively, as sufficient standards
for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid
down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in
relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do
not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law construed in the
Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and
regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other
hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under
Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative
securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact.
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government."(Emphasis
supplied)
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are
the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
relevant part:
72
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the
rates of duty indicated in the Section under this section except as
otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the
maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem.
(Emphasis supplied)
73
of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized representatives
shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs
import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally filed in
the Commission on Audit.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of
which this Court may take judicial notice that the Bureau of Customs which
administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional
generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that
generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the government The
Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates
are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and
for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name
given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax
assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." The
levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect
of protecting local industries where such local industries actually exist and are
producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs
duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs
duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy
objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense
of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds have either or both the
generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their
moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular
instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil
consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on
imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some
"protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the effective price of
imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be
gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition
of such increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our
constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff
74
and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the
authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that
authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local
industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of
that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the
sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a
confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in
Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after
all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important
a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the
protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even
removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and
shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local
manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may
not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative
delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and
abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated
powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . ."
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671.
Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be
in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the
express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of
it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was
no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about
the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed
to make a provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the
termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point
in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the
law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by
the legislature.
75
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the
duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering
his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called
the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of
the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very
President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid
unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon
the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.
They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant
should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph
of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a
special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942." (Italics ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring
of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the
inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability
could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an
abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and
continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions
could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete
disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we
are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must
start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated,
the period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations,
with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not
the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability
of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body.
Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No.
671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the
emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from
holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.
Section 3 provides:
76
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the
rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein
granted."
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of
Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The
section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had
been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned
in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the convening
of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what reason could there be for its
failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the
form of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as
unimportant, as the initial one.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the
regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain
stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express
provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos.
600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to
be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the
minds of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse
not later than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic
repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the
consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not
this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily
foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the
President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to
issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning
heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of
Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
77
determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, in
palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must
be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent
upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby
become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution
of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To
contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead
to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its
powers by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third
vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent
of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept
the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation
in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted
only during the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually
involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That
emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the
actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is
confirmed by the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to
open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a
resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their
loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the
President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution
may be delegated to him in time of war." 3 When President Quezon said "in time of
war", he undoubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.
78
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1
Section 5
79
COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province of Leyte.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for
each legislative district.
80
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city
to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each
province point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was,
in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.1
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative
district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that
case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by
a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of
only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and
the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the
Constitutional phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, to wit:
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither
1[27]
312 Phil. 259 (1995).
81
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran
through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of at least two
hundred fifty thousand may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI,
proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AREA. Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark
was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among
provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was
used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila
should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population
had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was
not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the
point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province
to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have
been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among,
several determinants.
2[39]
G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309-310 .
82
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the
formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth
has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the
first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in
the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the
text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000]
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
"qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives,
as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the
number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
83
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least
two -percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
"first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since
the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is
equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total
of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is
equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
84
No. of votes of
concerned party
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Total no. of votes
for party list system
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
THE 20% ALLOCATION IS ONLY THE CEILING AND DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILLED
UP. The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list."
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result
in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our
task now, as should have been the Comelec's, is not to find fault in the wisdom of
the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within
the context of the actual election process.
85
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-
judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the
proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the house of
Representatives, as the following shows:
86
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
87
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one guaranteed seat each.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats"
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Votes
Garnered
over Guaranteed Additional (B) plus Applying
Total Seat Seats (C), in the
Votes
Rank Party Votes for (First (Second whole three
Garnered
Party Round) Round) integers seat cap
List, in (B) (C) (D) (E)
%
(A)
BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
88
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
COOP-
9 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
Total 17 55
89
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147589, June
26, 2001]
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:
90
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010]
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
91
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941,
the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which
parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House
of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into
office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules,
the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees.
92
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which
already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector.
For Palparan, Bantays personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own
person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action
against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
"members" of that House are:
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members
x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitutions
point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not
their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through
that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress
by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties
to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the
House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote
93
for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing
the Constitution, states:
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent."
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine
the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that
nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring
nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the
party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that
the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become
its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that
goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has
the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of
party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not
raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed
out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
94
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Section 6
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
MODE OF LOSING DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. First, a minor follows the domicile of his
parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when
she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
95
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for
a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of
a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between
the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence.
ARTICLE 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family.
But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This
part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in
the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence,"
referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband
96
may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept
of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention
of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband
and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference
could for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband a
single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to
any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further
explains:
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other place.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives this Court held that the
term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not
97
only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The
Court there held:
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest
purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with
the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing
98
wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation,
which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or
who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would,
therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to
whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the
area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of
his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
99
Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July
30, 1991]
Section 7
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of
a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office.
As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is
allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in
the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex
rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which
shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it
preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in
the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of
which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect
of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never
intended such absurdity.
Section 11
100
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as
a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."
101
suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the
motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding
the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has
the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of
the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair
of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does
not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters,
not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,3[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to
the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession
would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
their license and the law invest in them.4[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust
in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers
who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly
administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or,
3
4
102
worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the
case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in
Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang5[17] who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It
is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional
hall.6[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution.7[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance. 8[20] The lady senator clearly violated the
rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Section 13
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad
interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in
5
6
7
8
103
accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled
him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of public interest, being one
of the means employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes, which
is the administration of justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice
in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes,
the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without detriment
to the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he
now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he
should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should
have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the
laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the
final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The
petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by
implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after
taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily
accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from
questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of
which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least
he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission
were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.
Section 14
The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances, there had been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before any administrative body" which is a
circumvention of the prohibition under Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, held that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the Securities
and Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said constitutional
prohibition.
104
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had
been filed on May 25, 1979 before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel
for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners.
Realizing perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene"
on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted
that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he
appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero
therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there
has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body"
and in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the prohibition contained in Section
11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. That which the Constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or implied prohibited. (Am. Digest,
2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P1046.)
Section 16
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. [G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring
to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words
of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal
does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority", much less the "minority," in
the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
105
minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth regular session, when Sen.
Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was
reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where
even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. History would also
show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political
party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority"
normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority". Majority
may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the "dominant
minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition
of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to
select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
106
In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of
the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
that body being amendable at any time by that majority. And at any session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy
arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all
concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose
of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
107
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the state Senate
is given the power to expel a member, the courts will not review its action or revise
even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 200, p.
902.) [Italics Ours.]
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford
vs. French. 7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate
of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic language:
108
committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to
direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise
of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions,
which it is expressly forbidden to do."
We have underscored in the above quotation these lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion,
they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the
case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides
that each
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17
109
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When
the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the
Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19 that unless an infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any
part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs,
it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed
by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 118364, August 8, 1995] 252
SCRA 541
110
unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one
purpose, it must be taken for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must
rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to
many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling
matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same
point the court, in the State ex rel. Heron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in
1886, said:
In the case from which this last quotation is taken the court cited numerous
decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein
laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the
rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover
the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those
of the Federal Government and the various states we do not hesitate to follow the
courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17931, February 28,
1963]
THE TERMS OF THE ENROLLED BILL ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS ON THE
TENOR THEREOF. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and,
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But,
said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors, Inc. vs.
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 27, 1960].
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961 ). If there
has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
111
the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11,
1993]
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid)
case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
Section 17
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162].
The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as `intended to be complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature' [Id. at
112
175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized
by Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete' [Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon
the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81
Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission
[Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA
140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, 'judicial review
of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is
(thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing
Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse."
Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized
would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of
113
protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out
hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE ON ALL
CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATION OF THE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. Petitioner's reliance on
Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in
unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed
before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should
be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the COMELEC
"shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional,
provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973
Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no
provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving
Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is
concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily
apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution
vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction
of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to
election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those
involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including
the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making
power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This
is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
[63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in
no uncertain terms:
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absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177;
emphasis supplied.]
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973
Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted
either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the
Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and non-
partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the
1987 Constitutions].
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this
wise:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the
power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as " full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as
full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA
140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the
powers of the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in
an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the
Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was
only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the
Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that
the jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature was
115
vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of
elections for all elective national and local officials.
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral
Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the separation of powers
of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too evident
to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's
purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and
accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters
and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1),
(3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to these
areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully
applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same
cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide
election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution.
Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art.
XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate
jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials
[Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and
the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. LLpr
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of
the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is
founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly,
on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal [G.R. No. L-83767, October 27, 1988]
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
116
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman."
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this
proposition when it held that said provision ". . . is a clear expression of an intent
that all (such) contests . . . shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the
Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is
that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the
same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme
Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators
to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1
an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all 24 Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit
in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate
will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
117
on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to
party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group.
As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from
the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
118
have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the
minutes of their respective proceedings.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order
enjoining "the proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate
without first acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and
urgent petition dated May 22, 1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered
requiring the Comelec to re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13
provinces therein enumerated (Petition, p. 9) including Metro Manila, scan the
ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said
scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner.
It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of
"manifest error's in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the
Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots
contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error"
in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There
being none, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which,
under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that "(t)he Senate and the House
of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The word "sole" underscores the
exclusivity of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their
respective Members (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199
SCRA 692 [1991]; Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA
391 [1988]; Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). It is therefore
crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is
the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a
member of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial
candidates have been proclaimed.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that a recount before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal where he would be forced to shell out the expenses imposes not only a
property requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a
price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will.
The argument, however, is beside the point. The law is very clear on the matter
and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence,
engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter the Omnibus
Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases like
the one at bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The proper
recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial
measures.
Section 18
119
LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be
rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority
and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the
House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which
is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the
majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its
lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the
House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of
the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17
congressmen or congresswomen.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the
petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival,
respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the
Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by
their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of
their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.
On the claim of Senator Taada that under the ruling in the case of Senator
Lorenzo Taada, and the case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be
elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the
physical impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must
be rounded up into one senator, (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his
party is entitled to be represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c) having
been elected senator, rounding up into one full senator his fractional membership is
120
consistent with the provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be in full
accord, with the principle of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked as a precedent
in support of incumbent Senator Taada's claim to a membership in the present
Commission on Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24 elected
senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
while Senator Lorenzo Taada, who belonged to the Citizens' Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of the Commission on
Appointments because he alone represented the minority party. Had there been
another senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of
who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition party would have arisen.
In the case of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the
opposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of proportional
representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the opposition was entitled to one
full member (not a fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally
nominated and elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the present
case, if there were a political party other than the present four political parties is
the Senate. and We follow Senator Taada's claim that he is entitled to full
membership as lone representative of his party, We would have the anomaly of
having 13 senators, where the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the
Commission on Appointments.
121
1) In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly
elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot
constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence
of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives
in order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if not fully
constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution.
Among these are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Election, Commission on Audit. They perform their functions so long as there is the
required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on
Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten
(10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.
Section 21
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991]
122
As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel
a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee
or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment
requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain
the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or
39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212, because, firstly, Senator
Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the
herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to conduct its
investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already
been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of
its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of
petitioners' respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the
respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before
the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's
judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of
123
its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan
can not be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt
vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
In another case
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right
against self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely
silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by
other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable
Court of Appeals, et al. thus
124
"We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case
is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand
and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination
only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will
incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not."
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may
not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in
aid of legislation and, If pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government,
ordained by the Constitution.
But no person can punish for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless
his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to
inquire. (Killbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)
Since, as we noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative
field than either the congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it
is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It
would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can
be bounded. It is necessary for us to do so in this case. Suffice it to say it must be
coextensive with the range of the legislative power.
125
may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the
subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may
be pounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation.
In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and
not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature
established therein the Batasang Pambansa and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno, a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already
recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch
may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled,
is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper
subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are
126
one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction
involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being
related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the
transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch,
it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to
executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive
operations.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself
might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power
of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one
possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to
indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that
matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given
such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of
inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in
aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or House's duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without
duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit
filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch.
Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at
present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might
be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members
of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending
on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these
abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions
to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive
privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being
mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a
127
discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by
U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is
of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
objectives. Another variety is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a
generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.
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That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however,
necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is
not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural
setting.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in
the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive
privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials.
Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch,
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this
power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of
powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker
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Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice.
THE PRESIDENT MAY VALIDLY PREVENT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM
ATTENDING CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.
Preliminarily, we must discuss the effect of E.O. 464 and the Court's ruling in
Senate on the present petition. Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in
any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for
violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate
Committee, an order that stands independent of the executive order. Distinctions
are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed "generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege," as among those public
officials required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 "to secure prior consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress." The Court in Senate declared
both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void, and the impression may have been left
following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from
requiring military personnel from attending congressional hearings without having
first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong.
During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency
of this petition as well as the issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was
rendered with the comfort that the nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear
no impact on the present petition since petitioners herein were not called to task for
violating the executive order. Moreover, the Court was then cognizant that Senate
and this case would ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues. Relevantly, Senate
purposely did not touch upon or rule on the faculty of the President, under the
aegis of the commander-in-chief powers to require military officials from securing
prior consent before appearing before Congress. The pertinent factors in
considering that question are markedly outside of those which did become relevant
in adjudicating the issues raised in Senate. It is in this petition that those factors
come into play.
Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was
ordered confined under "house arrest" by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen.
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Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he
may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period
of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:
Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military
way of life circumscribes several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part
and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot abide by these limitations
normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other fields;
and in fact many of those discharged from the service are inspired in their later
careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of military life.
Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character,
for the military mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally
conscripted into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those who do make
the choice to be a soldier, significant concessions to personal freedoms are
expected. After all, if need be, the men and women of the armed forces may be
commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal inclinations.
Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of
the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the
President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President's prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on
the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in
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matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions,
yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief
and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
President's ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the
officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is
the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislature's functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President's power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to conduct legislative inquiries.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by
which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries
even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief
Executive's prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to
the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify
before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative
and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is
only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode
of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not
enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies
and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the
Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of
government.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it
constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it
means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more
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evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry
is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle
of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea, Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion
barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for
damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
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Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying
with orders of this Court.
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of
the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public
official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the
benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or
forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the
Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents
conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of
judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all
citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally
ordained separation of governmental powers.
Section 22
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Pambansa one of the most competent inputs that we can put
in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet
ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it
is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez
bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the
appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the
Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the
provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original
draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation.
This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one
reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting
it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
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Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will
consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application
of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners' alone. From the above-
quoted exchange, Commissioner Maambong's committee the Committee on Style
shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress.
Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman
of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed
as representing that of his Committee.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform
more fully to a system of separation of powers. 88 To that extent, the question
hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question
period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to
appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered
powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the
absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress' right to
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executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more
imperative. As Schwartz observes:
Section 24
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the
revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that
the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the
conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to
note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in
respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the
treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House
overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing
137
here with the legislative power, which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate
and a House of Representatives." The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not
the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive
power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of
the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such non-legislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has
never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can
be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the
Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7,
1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the
time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to
amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been
filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was
only a substitute of those earlier bills.
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SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading,
from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the House bill.
Section 25
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated
money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said
paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling
to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The
incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any
provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject
expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that
subject.
We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of
the act. Thus, in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is
"a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject."
The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.
139
policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve
officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
REALLIGNMENT OF BUDGET MAY ONLY BE DONE WHEN THERE ARE SAVINGS FROM
THE APPROPRIATIONS OF A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT AND THE SAME IS TO BE
DONE TO AUGMENT OTHER ITEMS IN THEIR OWN APPROPRIATIONS. Paragraph 1
of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting
to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null
and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: . . ." and money belonging to no one
in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for
misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of
the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money
from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public
purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to
another [Sec. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among
others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public
funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon
the President, ". . . Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment
of unfounded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures,
diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel
system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of
development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5 The contention
of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted
pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall
flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from
one branch of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. I, Eight
Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
140
the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative.
Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come
before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount
law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the
courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce
the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature
has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at
liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every
private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when
the judges assume to act and to render judgments or decrees without
jurisdiction. 'In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges
have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people,
which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law.' [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61;
People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169,
1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825]" (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of
its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But
where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X,
Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutional and which power
this Court has exercised in many instances.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-
92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article VI of the
Constitution. Said section provides:
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to augment items in an
141
appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of
Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994,
which provides:
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones
authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the
members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position
to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these
two officials will have to see to it that:
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items
of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
Section 26
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
142
that general subject." (Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73
Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly
illustrated and explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the
question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land
Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its
provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court
held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title,
and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this
provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title, is
not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory.
It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this
constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164 5 ; See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil.
676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the
title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and
is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first,
the prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second,
the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not
embrace more than one subject.
Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987]
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the
DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
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The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its
title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE
to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and
5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in
its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express
all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the
DECREE.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]
THE SUBJECT OF THE LAW NOT THE EFFECT THEREOF IS REQUIRED TO BE STATED
IN THE TITLE. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It
has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable
but would actually render legislation impossible. As has been correctly explained:
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal
of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a
new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new
statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be
difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."
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The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect
and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law,
which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if
the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed
that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in
the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe
the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
"unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval)
would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise
of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill
which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only
the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved
would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may
well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing
copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy
enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special
election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is
required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency
session.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the
House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been
certified by the President as urgent.
145
three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on
separate days, also.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who
favor any one of unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act, (b) to avoid
surprises or even fruad upon the legislature , and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of
legislation. 1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have
been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of
the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005]
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in
these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two
houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in
each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for
its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to
proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to
absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived
of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI,
Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by
the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to
disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of
Congress is prohibited.
Section 27
VETO POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power
of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a
general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the
line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto
less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given
the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not
146
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and
first came into being in the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August
1916. This was followed by the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar
provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto power was made
more expansive by the inclusion of this sentence:
The 1935 Constitution further broadened the President's veto power to include the
veto of item or items of revenue and tariff bills.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and
compact form, thus:
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto
any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object."
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI,
Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official
concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a
provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a
disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120,
124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312)
declared "that an 'item' of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in
itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill."
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein
and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in
the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
147
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate
to the entire bill.
Petitioners' further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the
President partakes of the nature of legislative powers it should be strictly
construed, is negative by the following dictum in Bengzon, supra, reading:
148
Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature.
In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions
must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto
power over general appropriation bills.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices
which privilege was extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by
Republic Act No. 3595.
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which
repealed Republic Acts 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of
pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was surreptitiously restored
through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of
Justices and Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the
repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and
budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions is the
1992 General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier
1990 veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P. D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P. D. No. 644
was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be
effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced from 1957 to
1975, so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were
never taken away validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also
produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed
certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing
Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1797
never achieved that purpose because it was not properly published. It never
became a law.
149
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION. In Gonzales, we made it clear that the
omission of that sentence of Section 16 (2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987
Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power of the
President to veto a "provision."
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein"
and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows
that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in
its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the
category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions
which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more
appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as
Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for
and regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for
that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
Section 28
150
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas vs. Tan [G.R. No. L-
81311, June 30, 1988]
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is
uniform. The Court, in City of Baguio vs. De Leon, said:
"To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another
case decided two years later, (Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300)
is that the statute or ordinance in question 'applies equally to all
persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.' This Court
is on record as accepting the view in a leading American case
(Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495) that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.' (Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153)."
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold
to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from
its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine
products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.
Province of Abra vs. Hernando [G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981]
THE USE OF THE PROPERTY AND NOT THE OWNERSHIP IS THE CONTROLLING
FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE EXEMPTION. Respondent Judge would not
have erred so grievously had he merely compared the provisions of the present
Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of
"lands, buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under the
1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present
Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries"
and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they
should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious
151
or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should
not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions
would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There
must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and
improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation.
According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero: "From 1906, in
Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting
Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that
exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns
on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed
strictissimi juris." In Manila Electric Company v. Vera, a 1975 decision, such
principle was reiterated, reference being made to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 15 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine
Acetylene Co. & CTA; 16 and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
Section 29
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960]
152
"The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar
millers, planters and producers for a special purpose that of
'financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its
components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign
market.' The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys
pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even
though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v. American
Surety Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p.
718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected
are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the
statute, 'administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the
purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance if any, is to be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the
essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec.
29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). 17
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes,
they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the
OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as
a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and
review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.
Section 30
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]
Diaz vs. CA [G.R. No. 109698, December 5, 1994]
Section 32
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 125416, September
26, 1996]
153
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the
registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making
authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction
of the Commission on Elections.
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is
begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-
making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes
of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex
than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or
"No" in the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as
"powers" or "legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms
them, or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred
to in this Decision.]
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the
counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act
submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed
legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several
autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be
exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to
the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an
initiative".
It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition."
Section 1
Section 4
THE COMELEC CANNOT MAKE UNOFFICIAL COUNT FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise
of an "unofficial" tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election
returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the
154
election of President and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution
provides in part:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.
As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed
to Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent
COMELEC could not and should not conduct any "quick count" of the votes cast for
the positions of President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2, 2004
addressed to Chairman Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position
emphasizing that "any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said
positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-
President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but
would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."
Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436 confirms the constitutional
undertaking of Congress as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President. Section 24 thereof provides:
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and
totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official
canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is,
with more reason, prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes.
155
The COMELEC realized its folly and the merits of the objection of the Senate
President on the constitutionality of the resolution that it decided not to conduct an
"unofficial" quick count of the results of the elections for President and Vice-
President. Commissioner Sadain so declared during the hearing:
JUSTICE PUNO:
The word you are saying that within 36 hours after election,
more or less, you will be able to tell the people on the basis of your
quick count, who won the election, is that it?
COMM. SADAIN:
Well, it's not exactly like that, Your Honor. Because the fact of
winning the election would really depend on the canvassed results, but
probably, it would already give a certain degree of comfort to certain
politicians to people rather, as to who are leading in the elections, as
far as Senator down are concerned, but not to President and Vice-
President.
JUSTICE PUNO:
So as far as the Senatorial candidates involved are concerned,
but you don't give this assurance with respect to the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections which are more important?
COMM. SADAIN:
In deference to the request of the Senate President and the
House Speaker, Your Honor. According to them, they will be the ones
canvassing and proclaiming the winner, so it is their view that we will
be pre-empting their canvassing work and the proclamation of the
winners and we gave in to their request.
xxx xxx xxx
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. SADAIN:
These was relayed to us Your Honor and their objection or
request rather was for us to refrain from consolidating and publishing
the results for presidential and vice-presidential candidates which we
have already granted Your Honors. So, there is going to be no
consolidation and no publication of the . . .
COMM. SADAIN:
Reason behind being that it is actually Congress that canvass
that the official canvass for this and proclaims the winner.
Section 13
156
DISQUALIFICATION OF THE OFFICIAL FAMILY OF THE PRESIDENT. Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not . . . during (their)
tenure, . . . directly or indirectly . . . participate in any business." The constitutional
ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36,
subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private business . . . without the permission required by
Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
any officer or employee in the civil service.
On the suspension of the petitioner from office, Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) provides:
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22,
1991]
THE PRESIDENT AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY CANNOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OTHER
OFFICE IN THE GOVERNMENT EXCEPT IN THOSE INSTANCES ALLOWED BY THE
CONSITUTION AND IN THOSE PROVIDED BY LAW IN AN EX OFFICIO CAPACITY
WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AND REQUIRED BY THE PRIMARY
FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION. Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the
second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President
and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz
after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be
stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise
157
more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation
that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2)
of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the
Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the
President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the
other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure.
Section 15
158
for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned
induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new
President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to
fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to
deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.
Normally, when the President makes appointments with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he makes
ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be
prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for
such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments
that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the
appointment and where the names are to be submitted by his successor, who may
not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in
extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350
appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which
was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the
contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim
appointments.
Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this
Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative
Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.
Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an
appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the
appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments
(three hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in
a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justify revocation and if any circumstances justify
revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.
Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to
revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is
doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation,
considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other
happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which
form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be
argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline,
whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public
service. Needless to say, there are instances of the public service. Needless to say,
there are instances wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and
righteousness should be taken into account.
159
9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the
courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of
Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect
only once every six years.
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of
the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after
the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos
P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a
"caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President." Said the Court:
160
President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing
President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were
shown to have been well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments those
made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their
making but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided is much
narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making of
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly
restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Section 16
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition
by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us,
the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of
the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
161
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of
the Cabinet.
Indeed, even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be
validly exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter,
as an extension or "projection" of the personality of the President, made irreversible
the petitioner's title to the position in question. The petitioner's conclusion that
Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is based only on
half the doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel stated that doctrine clearly in
the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, where he described the
relationship of the President of the Philippines and the members of the Cabinet as
follows:
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business," which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor
of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also happened in the case at
bar.
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
162
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of
constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if
not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third
and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad
Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the
officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
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appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. It provides:
The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional
Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom,
exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission
on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The
evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter
of appointments to public office, between the President and Congress (the latter
acting through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of
the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent
that the Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to
make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the
Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in
the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for
her by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained.
164
the Commission on Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act,
which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of
office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably
and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for
a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14
January 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no
vacancy in said office to this day.
To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding oneself that day is night just because
the drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive
questions of constitutional law raised by petitioner, the records clearly show that
petitioner came to this Court in timely manner and has not shown any indication of
abandoning her petition.
165
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS ARE VALID ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR AFTER THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF
CONGRESS. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as
authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as
appointing authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII,
appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no
confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the constitutional
provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner's
appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering
that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments
having acted on petitioner's appointment, said appointment/nomination had
become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the
Commission."
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was
deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the
Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all
presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
166
"3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureau, officers of the Army from the rank of the
colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or
commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . ."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily
exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person to fill an
office constitutes the essence of his appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds
that an "[a]pointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise
of discretion." In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court we held:
167
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of
issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the
appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the
pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such
power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to
pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress
can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a
presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A.
7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible,
i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts
in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose
whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element
of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer
during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the
appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso
limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim
appointment is permanent in character. In Summers vs. Ozaeta, 25 decided on
October 25, 1948, we held that:
168
". . . . an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of
paragraph (4), Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that the 'President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.' It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim
appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an 'acting' appointment which is merely
temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued."
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cites Black's Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean
"in the meantime" or "for the time being." Hence, petitioner argues that an ad
interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character. This argument is not
new and was answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 27 where we explained that:
". . . . From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should
experience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent
had been extended several 'ad interim' appointments which petitioner
mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature.
Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word 'ad interim' which
creates such belief. The term is defined by Black to mean "in the
meantime" or "for the time being". Thus, an officer ad interim is one
appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office
during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent
(Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not
the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Dr. Esteban's appointments, the term is not descriptive of
the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to
denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is,
done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the
Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter
with the power of appointment, is unable to act. . . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)
169
Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed
by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment
that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the
text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine
jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an ad interim
appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, 28
where the Court stated:
Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]
Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact
that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we
have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil
Service merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.
170
It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the
approval of another officer or body, like the Commission on Appointments under
1935 Constitution. Appointments made by the President of the Philippines had to
be confirmed by that body and could not be issued or were invalidated without such
confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was then
considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such
confirmation.
"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning where
the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or where an
adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or
contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction
may arise when the consequence of a literal interpretation of the
language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable, or mischievous result, or
one at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole; and the
real meaning of the statute is to be ascertained and declared, even
though it seems to conflict with the words of the statute." (82 CJS
589-590; Emphasis supplied.)
Section 17
171
procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of
control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Villena vs. Secretary of Interior [G.R. No. 46570, April 21, 1939]
172
him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his
secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for
the acts of administration of the entire executive Department before his own
conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the
language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are
the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if
there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the
system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution
by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction.
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pao [G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes
upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control
simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of
his department secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an
undue delegation of power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain
any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the
Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to
act personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must
exercise in person.10 Not as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive
may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person. 11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The
President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit
which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that
"under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf
and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify,
or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue.12
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3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to
the other department heads, no higher than anyone of them. From this, plaintiff
carves the argument that one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter
ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another
department secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that
where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the
President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is
to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," 13 that remains the act of the
Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. 14 No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
City of Iligan vs. Director of Lands [G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988]
Such power of the President is recognized under Section 69 aforecited of the Public
Land Act as it provides:
From the foregoing provision it is clear that the President of the Philippines may
execute contracts in favor of any province, municipality or other branch or
subdivision of the government who shall need any portion of the land of the public
domain open to concession for educational, charitable or other similar purposes, in
the form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form.
ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines (also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect
when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January
1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the
Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) "assisted by a
Cabinet" composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and
accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads
of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
174
the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the heads of such departments, performed in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter
into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as
he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid
agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party
thereto.
Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez [G.R. No. 85439, January 13, 1992]
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to
the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2)
require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of
violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon
budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.
POWER OF CONTROL APPLIES ONLY TO THE ACT AND NOT TO THE ACTOR. The
extent of the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all
officers and employees in the executive department was interpreted by this Court in
the case of Hebron vs. Reyes 104 Phil., 175 to mean "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter", to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to
remove an officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the
actor or agent himself of the act.
National Marketing Corp. vs. Arca [G.R. No. L-25743, September 30, 1969]
175
not applicable and that what should apply is Section 13(d) of Republic Act No.
1345, (NAMARCO Charter) which vests in the General Manager the power and/or
duty, with the approval of the Board of Directors, to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline for cause any subordinate employee of the NAMARCO. They contend that
in reversing the order of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive
from the service, and in ordering his reinstatement, the President of the Philippines
arrogated unto himself a power not authorized either by the Constitution or by law,
hence his actuations were legally ineffective and certainly could not be a basis for
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
We hold that the President of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse the
decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his
position in the NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement falls within the
constitutional power of the President over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Under our governmental setup, corporations owned or controlled by the
government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus
or offices, which are administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office
of Economic Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of
an Executive Department" and who "shall be responsible to the President of the
Philippines under whose control his functions . . . shall be exercised." (Executive
Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950; section 1, issued under the Reorganization
Act of 1950).
Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does
not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case
of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
176
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
Section 18
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the
Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop
177
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The
Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime
where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of
security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of
the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of
authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose
spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may
still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of
the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features.
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-
martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.' (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents; 2d Edition, p.
49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It
must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to
aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." (Footnote
No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.).
Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 [G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987]
". . . Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses
under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process.
178
"Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a
military government and even on the premise that martial law
continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which
are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open
and have been regularly functioning. . . .
"And in Toth v. Quarles, the U.S. Supreme Court further stressed that
'the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial
law.'
"The late Justice Black . . . added that '(A) Court-Martial is not yet an
independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the over-all mechanism by which military discipline
is preserved,' and that ex servicemen should be given 'the benefits of
a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians . . . Free countries
of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest
jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline
among troops in active service.' "
Quiloa vs. General Court Martial [G.R. No. 96607, March 4, 1992]
179
Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts: Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned,
to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended
by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial:
Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not
yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."
CALLING OUT POWER. The above provision grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter
two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely,
an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such
power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
"[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The
only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution
vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and
foremost, with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The executive
power shall be vested in the President. . . ." As if by exposition, Section 17 of the
same Article provides: "He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The
provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when
taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of
office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with
the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of
government or the integrity of the State.
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly
pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential
180
issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to
constitutional rights."
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may
resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra,
majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion,
as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'" In other words, a person may be subjected to
a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has
declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest
are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While
the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional
limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners
here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis.
Section 19
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President
181
has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power
was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.
The pertinent provision reads:
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even
before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her
appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it
may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal
and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.
EFFECTS OF PARDON. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one
not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive
consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based
on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however,
that the offender is a `new man', and `as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense;' is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A
person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he
may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard
him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it
places no restraints upon him following his conviction."
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
182
where the requirement is '"final conviction," as was mandated in the original
provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final
judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.
THE GRANT OF PARDON WHILE THE APPEAL IS PENDING DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A
WITHDRAWAL OF THE APPEAL. It must, nevertheless, be noted that the
constitutional provision quoted is that of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which
authorized the exercise of the pardoning power at anytime, either before or after
conviction. Also, in Monsanto vs. Factoran, this Court stated that the acceptance of
a pardon amounts to an abandonment of an appeal, rendering the conviction final;
thus:
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency
could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency
could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional
pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court.
It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former
limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is
our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon
was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would
still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to
have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
This statement should not be taken as a guiding rule for it is nothing but an obiter
dictum. Moreover, the pardon involved therein was extended on 17 December 1984
or under the regime of Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, which allowed the grant of pardon either before or after conviction.
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers
demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and
kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction
by final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without
the knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one whom he, in
good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied
that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power which did no require conviction, the President had unimpeded
power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the
1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at
any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either
case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration
of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the
183
jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented
by the Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a
presidential folly. Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision
consisting in the imposition of "conviction by final judgment" requirement can
change the rule. The new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to
finality.
Garcia vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993]
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it
affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not
been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because
he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the
trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he
was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the
offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant.
Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement
by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission.
184
and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal
from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is
afforded to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is
no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle
him to back wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of
any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public
office, but is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the
Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of
control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter." In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive
exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of
petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the
petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be
sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in
their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against
the officials of this government agency.
In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the
service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice
and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School
Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.
However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971
to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto this Court said he is not entitled to
automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government
service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had
been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is
afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.
In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made
continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate
when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate
retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere
classroom teacher.
185
Llamas vs. Orbos [G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991]
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason
can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, . . ., the President may commute
or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and
employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may
impose in the interest of the service."
"I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers
from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society
we extend probation to them while in this case, they have already
been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy
to them is through this executive clemency extended to them by the
President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be
prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious killers
in our society. . . ."
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his
cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of
Presidents and refrained from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers.
(II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-525)
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the
President's executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage,
except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty,
parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation
of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged
guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively
should likewise be extended the same benefit.
186
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to
pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from
punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to
mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not
bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases.
It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some
charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to
them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the
public. (p. 34, Comment of public respondent)
We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
Section 21
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading [G.R. No. L-14279, October 31,
1961]
187
"International agreements involving political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the
form of executive agreements.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole
188
representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. 13 In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered
into by the executive.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By
requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the
President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance
necessary in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.
We disagree.
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making
process in this wise:
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty,
the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not
indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the
treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance
with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to
sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
189
representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting
states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an
opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to
their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject
to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other
than that which negotiated them.
A. Executive Agreements.
B. Treaties.
190
Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the
Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the ratification by
the President. A certified true copy of the treaties, in such
numbers as may be required by the Senate, together with a
certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall
accompany the submission of the treaties to the Senate.
Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By
ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound
by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state's
representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the
responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure
that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the
head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be
pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to
ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal
obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be
based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons.
Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in
its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court
via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore,
cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the
signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
Section 1
NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER. The last point raised by appellees deserves first
consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the
category of the tribunal board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated
by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be
necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
191
"In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against
'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1,
Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in
the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a
special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the
following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific
controversy involving rights of persons or property and said
controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing
and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
192
citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial
power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal
rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone
who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial
power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a
matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.'
(34 C.J. 1183-1184.)
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does
not belong to the legislative or executive department.
"In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the
following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarcation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a
matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.' "
193
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the
rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised
neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task.
From the above-quoted portions of the decisions cited, it will be gleaned that before
a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed
With power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,
however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is
and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial
functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees
allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder,
and, in the performance of that committee's duties.
The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing
restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any
assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this
instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying
out "the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government
corporations and/or the assets thereof" (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation,
not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or
revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the
system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts
over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to
the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by
them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority
and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor
block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its
194
decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred
to it.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed
by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the
challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge
and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from
Annex Q of the private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject
project has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This
fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and
academic.
PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955]
"Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law" upon the complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S.
405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S.
316-325.)
"The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient." (United Public
Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)
"Bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and
vital controversy between litigants." (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, p. 1138.)
195
JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education
might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a
justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.)
197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and
positive relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the
issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for
the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1955, Law Ed.,
Vol. 99, p. 511.)
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will
run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue
in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority [G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993]
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental
requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he
has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and
exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties
of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot
be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants."
196
Joya vs. PCGG [G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993]
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is
premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and
that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the
relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of
judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff
must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right
of some third and unrelated party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the
rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
Bugnay Construction & Devt. Corp. vs. Laron [G.R. No. 79983, August 10, 1989]
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]
197
Section 3
We cannot overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary.
The Court has on various past occasions explained the significance of judicial
independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982], it ruled:
"A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration.
It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain
rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently . . . It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even
more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the
dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base
or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal
right." (At pp. 338-339).
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by
the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
198
is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of
the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence
and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their
objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant
of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief
Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular
item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld.
Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given
a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Section 4
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996]
Section 5
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presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts,
if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in
the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty
of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory
that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached
by the requipped majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
THE POWER TO CHANGE VENUE AND PLACE OF TRIAL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. As regards petitioner's motion to change the venue
and the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, we are constrained to
dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation
is a function of the Executive Department and not of the Judiciary. Petitioner
should therefore address their plea to the Department of Justice that has control
and supervision over the conduct of preliminary investigations.
Separate Opinion
It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right granted by law
upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross- examine the witnesses for the
prosecution in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a
substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a person is
not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the
latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of
his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is a
substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he
has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has
200
been committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be
released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public
accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the
corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always
entails.
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused
outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of
criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged
with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of
the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and
disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a
constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme
Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the
Constitution.
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several
cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not
been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it
follows that said section diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in
criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and
therefore is null and void.
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the
BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to
be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions
of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of
appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies
found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said
201
circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The
second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply
to appeal from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."
E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . .," strongly implying that there are other quasi-
judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been
expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of
the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions
and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of:
(1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-
judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by
statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among
the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91,
which is but implementary of said law.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying
his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12
of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after
receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent,
therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed
timely.
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REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRING
THE ELECTIVE OFFICERS TO SEEK AUTHORITY FIRST BEFORE EXERCISING A
PROFESSION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME
COURT. Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of
law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between
the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in
those instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and
doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members
"may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly
to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely
than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
Section 6
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by
a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service
is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to
the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted
to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
203
Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the
independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make
such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Raquiza vs. Castaeda, Jr. [A.M. No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is
sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The
general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
Section 7
Section 10
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased."
(Emphasis supplied).
204
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate
of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that
which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of
the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David
must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego
of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
Section 11
205
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to
do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to
avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
People vs. Gacott, Jr. [G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995]
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the
Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted,
entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter
alia:
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the
aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the
penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert
the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the
lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in
divisions of three, five or seven members.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court
promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
206
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a
majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution
of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a
division thereof rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute
the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos
thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with
situations like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and
circumspection.
Section 12
Section 13
Prudential Bank vs. Castro [A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988]
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the
conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and
deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an
opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the
Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is
obviously not required.
Section 14
Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992]
207
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by
a higher tribunal.
In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife
with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage."
Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the
other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of
words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its
ruling and, having done so, ends.
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It
has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was
dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground,
all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by
the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements
of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to
explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its
conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but
it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second
ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the
factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
208
us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing
the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an
extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional
provision requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v.
Santos, what is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear
why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor
is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the
requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this
respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of
words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by
what the Constitution directs." What must then be stressed is that under such a
provision as held in the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the
decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the
proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its
disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, the above
decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing
the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed
from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based.
Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions
have been held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if
the situation is subjected to a searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is
really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner. Had he
prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisional liberty. Under the
circumstances, as the facts of the case clearly demonstrate, with the plea for
habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly
would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely,
the leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their respective contentions
should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without
according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the
Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way,
foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we
deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application.
In that sense, a minute resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise
failing to abide by a constitutional command.
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Thursday that it meets en banc or around one thousand (1,000) cases a week. It is
only on Fridays and week-ends that the members of the Court work in their
separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session either
in Divisions or En Banc.
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated
by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof
to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular
case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their
cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never
participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions
of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was
explained in the case G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante,
et al.", where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said "[M]inute
resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the
members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its
judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be
known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions."
In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.
(May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision
must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as
referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the
constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review . . . shall be
refused due course . . . without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article
VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any
subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due
course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal
basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and attention
of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers do not have the time to
answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants questioning decisions and
resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the
Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court,
not its subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts.
Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of the
Court.
210
Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998]
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, it has
been stressed that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it;
and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the
Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal vs.
Commission on Audit, et al. that the constitutional mandate is applicable only in
cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due
course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the
Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny
due course to the petition and states that the questions raised "are factual or there
is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA [G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998]
"MEMORANDUM DECISION
This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of
Romero v. Court of Appeals, where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:
"We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-
assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to
affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the
soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency,
therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts
and conclusions of the court a spread in its decision, as integral part of
this Our decision." (Emphasis supplied)
211
and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of
eighteen (18) single spaced pages.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following
requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to
say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the
person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other
words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower
court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made
of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without
a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity
at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an
additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only
in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that
212
will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision
may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where
the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.
THE DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY MAKE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, BUT SHOULD
STATE THE FACTS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW. This is not what is
contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and distinct
statement of the facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing
one-paragraph statement constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at
by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis thereof. Indeed
the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is
traversed by the records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered
the sale to them. The court statement in the decision that a party has proven his
case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the
Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.
Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed
decision. It merely adopted the alleged findings of facts of the trial court. Although
it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in favor of respondent
Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance
with the mandate aforestated.
As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly
and distinctly the facts on which it is predicated. This Court has said again and
again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the
lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case,
the Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings of facts,
rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records for
further proceedings.
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 6
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1,
Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill
of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section
2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
213
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it
provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Section 7
It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seemingly
interminable debates on this matter that have been festering for quite some time
now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the COMELEC. The
indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and application of its
own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our people who remain
unrepresented to date in the House of Representatives despite the fact that the
congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.
Acena vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 90780, February 6, 1991]
214
requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost (Ozaeta v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83281, December 4, 1989).
Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal to
execute its final and executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended proceedings
have taken place in the Court of Appeals and certain issues have been expressly
raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issues appear to the Court to be important
215
enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead of simply being given
short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court of Appeals were
totally unnecessary because the Civil Service Commission actually had the power to
execute its final and executory Resolution.
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer [G.R. No. L-31455,
February 28, 1985]
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the
award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein
the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the
questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued
pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In
short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
"[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Civil Service Commission,
and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. We quote.
216
'SECTION 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.'
The Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable
and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment."
Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular
No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect
on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the
present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered y the Civil Service Law.
2. Cases Not Covered. These rules shall not apply to judgments and
final orders or resolutions issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
4. Period of Appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
Section 2
Trade Union of the Phils. and Allied Services vs. National Housing Corp. [G.R.
No. 49677, May 4, 1989]
217
however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the corresponding provision
whereof declares that "(t)he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters."
218
majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions.
What they really add up to is that the employees of the government
form their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages
because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum
where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic)
promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own
bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is
the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-
organization that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and
corruption and for exposing it.
De los Santos vs. Mallare [G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950]
POSITIONS EXEMPTED FROM THE MERIT SYSTEM. As has been seen, three
specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These
positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in
nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that
appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer
that makes them.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is
reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining.
A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of
its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference
to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him
by section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial
in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A
city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly
technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of
technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower
than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are
eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-
technical men possessing executive ability.
219
Salazar vs. Mathay [G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976]
220
fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a
clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not
be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist or a
scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No
technical man worthy of the name would be willing to accept work under such
conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that highly
technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked
at the humor of their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical
positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes- men, who must rely not on
their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to carry favor with the powerful.
The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil
Service on the basis of merit, would be thus negated.
Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]
Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA [G.R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995]
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE THE APPOINTMENT ITSELF. The
foregoing is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing
authority. Time and again, the Court has defined the parameters within which the
221
power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service
Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled that CSC has
the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have
the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to
change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the
eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it
must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC
is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in
the appointment process ceases. In the case at bench, CSC should have ended its
participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it
confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service
eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it
stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the
discretion vested solely upon the latter.
SSS Employees Association vs. CA [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MAY FORM UNIONS, BUT MAY NOT STRIKE. The 1987
Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself
fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service
Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that
"[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent
as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When
we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of
government employees, it does not mean that because they have the
right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done
222
because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go on
strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic
Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but they
are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice-
President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve
this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to
this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we
allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen
to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion
in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed
by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in
the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized
the right of employees of government corporations established under the
Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service
to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its
amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the
Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for
such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D.
No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
223
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to
do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
[At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6
is not at issue].
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act,
R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to
public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present
in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and
those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures,
whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any
dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies
224
under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the
dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for
appropriate action.
Section 7
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There
was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-
owned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes
of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were
designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
225
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government
was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. This condemnation
came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983
Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure
No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B
already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
226
he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The
deliberation in the Constitutional Commission is enlightening:
"MR. DAVIDE.
On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term"
with TENURE.
"MR. FOZ.
The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign
from his position.
"MR. DAVIDE.
Yes, we should allow that prerogative.
"MR. FOZ.
Resign from his position to accept an executive position.
"MR. DAVIDE.
Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say, incapacity, he
may leave the service, but if he is prohibited from being appointed within the
term for which he was elected, we may be depriving the government of the
needed expertise of an individual."
227
his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a
de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of
the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body,
or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election,
or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell
[N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).
Section 8
According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double
compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as members with
compensation in government examining boards like the bar examinations, or
department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government
corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not
observed. This undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had
to be coursed through different offices like the Department of Finance, the Civil
Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor General to the President for
approval. If the President approves the double compensation, well and good. The
appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning
could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will
have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was willing to
serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection. This is
another proof that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was
only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was that
plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be
taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different
offices which the appointment had to go through.
228
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be
removed at will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no
less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without
cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation
in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The
problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
229
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them
and not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But
while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista
case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
Section 2
Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180,
otherwise known as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947.
The present Constitution and extant election laws have further strengthened the
foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present COMELEC
has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had
"exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections." exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law"
and had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.
and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the
consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform
such other functions as may be provided by law," it was not expressly vested with
the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That
power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the
necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the
Commission to "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law."
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to
promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article
IX-C thereof reads as follows:
230
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."
(Emphasis supplied)
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is
thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the
Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881),
which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
231
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon
the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last
paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases remains
in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section
1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply
put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ
of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent
received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days from 1 July 1994 or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which
is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures
pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last
day for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private
respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the
trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of
the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial
court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion
was filed before the perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by
the trial court.
It appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent
filed his notice of appeal with the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for
immediate execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably filed within the five-
day reglementary period for filing an appeal since the decision of the RTC was
promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993.
The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial
court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion
for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting
an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing
party is of no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to
resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal
because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the records
232
to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at
the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and
was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party.
MR. REGALADO. Before that, on page 26, line 26, we should have a
transposition because decisions are always final, as
distinguished from interlocutory orders. So, it should read:
'However, decisions, final orders or rulings,' to distinguish them
from interlocutory orders, '. . . of the Commission on Elections
on municipal and barangay officials shall be final and
IMMEDIATELY executory.'
We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned
decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior
court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
233
"The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment
in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly
and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election
offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense
or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the
COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v.
Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is
no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial
Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's
preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the
ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:
234
People vs. Basilla [G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989]
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The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court
requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court
the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may
review its actions is certainly untenable.
We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to decide whether or not to appeal
the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution
expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has held:
Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election
Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in Court.
The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation
and prosecution of election offenses.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies.
They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the appeal of the
COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases
should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate
preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no
probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have
discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. If he disagreed
with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from
the cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts
and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no
probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the
manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as basis for denying due course to the
notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.
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Section 3
(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the
Clerk of Court concerned.
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set
the case for hearing." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the
abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently,
the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.
Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro [G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995]
This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and
rulings of COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the
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Constitution in its Art. IX, A, 7 means the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65. Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first
file a motion for reconsideration, it follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to
his present action.
Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only
question raised in his petition is a question of law. This is not correct. The questions
raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore,
not pure questions of law.
Art. IX, C, 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
Id. 3. The Commission on Elections may be sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Conformably to those provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a
party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, 7, "may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari."
Section 4
National Press Club vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992]
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press
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(Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with the Article IX (C)
(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited
period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the
special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a
democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the
electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall
have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are
accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free
speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important
and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society,
equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article
II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law."
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that
no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.
For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly
and convincingly proving that assertion.
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon
basic principles relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for
constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The essential question is whether or
not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether
such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations
so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328
dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority
by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January
1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application.
Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and
sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air
time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in
any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
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news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications,
and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs
are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment
upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for
office constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant
case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. In Sanidad, the Court
declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which
provided as follows:
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the
plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167
constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
". . . [N] either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2476 has no statutory
basis." (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied).
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section
11 (b). exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of
print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required
to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual
candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently
apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space"
on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions
materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations
effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at
least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the
benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out.
It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral
Commission 7 that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession
of the power or authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human
society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the
Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much
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the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is
commanded by statute to bur or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in
mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory
command. There is no indication, so far as the record here would show, that
Comelec would not in fact carry out its statutory duty in this connection, and if it
does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have
judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not
cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their
qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and
television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal
information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any
intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content
of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political
advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their
respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious
functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or ideas reporters,
broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV
screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section
11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political
advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space" in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4)
and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of
print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core
problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and
the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism
which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political
candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED TO GIVE AIR TIME TO THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FREE OF CHARGE. Petitioners' argument is without
merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance
with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires."
The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of
charge is not new. It goes back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388), which
provided:
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of prime time once a week which shall be known as "Comelec Time"
and which shall be used exclusively by the Commission to disseminate
vital election information. Said "Comelec Time" shall be considered as
part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the
Government for the dissemination of public information and education
under their respective franchises or permits.
This provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code
(P.D. No. 1296), which provided:
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was
brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but
even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed
of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that
broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are
responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can
constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public
affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations
may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. 12 Thus,
Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law School, in urging
reforms in regulations affecting the broadcast industry, writes:
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as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be
stilled:
"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's
power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is
perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is
balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment . .
. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of
the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . .
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due
process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation.
Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was
assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power
of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus
and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented
in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In
a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
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election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a
plebiscite.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to
be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 2
Orocio vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992]
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or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the
legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for
the questioned disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger
and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon
lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and
regulations.
Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela [G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992]
Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit [G.R. No. 103309, November 27, 1992]
Saligumba vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. L-61676, October 18, 1982]
DECISIONS OF THE COA THAT MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT ARE
LIMITED ONLY TO THOSE WHICH INVOLVE MONEY MATTERS. Our power to review
COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving
the discipline of its personnel.
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Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative
matters as mentioned above, We can not do so on factual issues; Our power to
review is limited to legal issues.
Section 3
Philippine Airlines vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 91890, June 9, 1995]
Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization [G.R. No. 112399, July 14, 1995]
Section 8
FOR THE THREE-TERM LIMIT TO APPLY, THE LOCAL OFFICIAL SHOULD BE ELECTED
TO THE OFFICE AND COMPLETES THE FULL TERMS. To recapitulate, the term limit
for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the
following cases or situations:
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he
is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next
election?
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions
for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely,
that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that
he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local
official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three
246
times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive
times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had
he served the full term because he only continued the service,
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but
also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the
situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand,
he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to
office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of
the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of
the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
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