De Leon vs Esguerra 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA,J

Facts:

In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners as
Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B.
Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the
same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with the
other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the
respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov.
Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall
serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Issue:

Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:

The designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND
EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over
of petitioners position subject of this petition.

Ratio

The affectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987.
By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as
provided in Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners.

Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there
can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the
incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-
quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the \

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION

(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its
stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share
in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are
they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter
of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond
judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are
not truly political in nature.

Gonzales vs COMELEC GR No 28196 09 November 1967

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. On March 16, 1967, the
Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions, (1) increasing the number of
seats in the lower house from 120 to 180, (2) calling for a constitutional convention, and (3) allowing
members of the Congress to run as delegates to the constitutional convention without forfeiting their
seats. Congress passed a bill, which, approved by the President on 17 June 1967, became Republic Act No.
4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions
No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections on 14 November 1967.

Issue: Whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution
pursuant to Section 1 Article XV.

Decision: The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general
grant of legislative power to Congress. Pursuant to Section 1 Article XV, The Congress in joint session
assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification. The said resolutions are null and void because the Congress may not avail of both amending
and calling a convention at the same time and the election must be a special election not a general election
for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification.
Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar

Facts:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No.
6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates.

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November,
1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16,
1967 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the
existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications
as those required of members of the House of Representatives, 1 and that any other details relating to
the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent
with the provisions of this Resolution. 2

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality
of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner
Gonzales.
Issue:

Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;

Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

Decision:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

Ratio:

Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention
for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for
such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted
more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the
number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures
from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.

Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political
parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all
organizations.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Fernando I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on
political parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision
that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage
in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the
Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos
Constitution.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-34150

APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the
validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148
to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in
proposing amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised
was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of
the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the
interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call
of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of
such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision
rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic
system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified
by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that
the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity
of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any
rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard
for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity,
only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join

Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution 84
certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve
Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided
that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001,
after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte),
COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators.
Resolution 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years
and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan
(Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino
and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC
as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for
a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution
01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELEC
issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position
to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or
regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and
Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial
candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino
and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and
voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they
sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.

Held: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The
requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied
strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and Mojica assert a harm
classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure
by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and
Mojica alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition
because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was]
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose.
On the other hand, the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to
give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. The Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure. The Court accords the same treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their
capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the
issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.
Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections
[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections [GR L-44714]
En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2
filed separate opinions

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of
Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of
22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a
new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission
on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October
1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30
September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the
power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another
petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his
son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential
Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof
provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the
approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,
therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the
calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination
of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted
on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President
was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's
decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people
themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution
was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to
withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975,
the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was
eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention,
who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion
since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore,
when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body
is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction
is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The
distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies
only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR#
183591, October 14, 2008

Carpio-Morales, J:

Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of
Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties
and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality
merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?

Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever
remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal
force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant
Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer
present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite
and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable
controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion
only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public
interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power
of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or
addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must
be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional
law.

Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Facts:

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval

set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,

caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and

instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations.

On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been
untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of
those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of
peoples initiative. The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC
hence the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for Peoples Initiative to amend the constitution
specifically to lift term limits of elected officials.

Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

Decision:

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.

The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.

Ratio:

Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation
is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally
defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that
the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that . . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history
of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17
was entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception Therefrom,
Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances
or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body. Beyond doubt,
Senate Bill No. 17 did not include peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In
checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153

Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987
constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed
changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the
Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting
a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the
Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative
void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments
to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes
a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec
2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.