G.R. No.

107916 February 20, 1997

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA

MODAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF
BUNAWAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Facts:

On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan
del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the
Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along
the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers
Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." 2

In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio
C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On
September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution
and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that
there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government
center." 3

Issue:

The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate
private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD:

The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It
is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national
legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. 16 For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there
must be just compensation. 17

Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:

(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal

ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred
 upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such
ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part,
entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal
authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the
ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part.
The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is

an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond
the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a
similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's
pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant early jurisprudence,
are applicable to the case at bar.

The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon
the council or president making the same." Absolutely no other ground
is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the
provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the
fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the
legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits,
it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or president.
Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. 20

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove

Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and
could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners'
property.

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be
observed. 22 The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy
of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose
of the taking, 23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be
genuine and of a public character. 24 Government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.

After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary
support for petitioners' allegations. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the
case of "Percival Moday." et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No.
26712) are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE
and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili,
Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and
EFREN SAN JOAQUIN,respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor
General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands
of petitioners for use as a housing project.

Issue:

Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is

subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the
implementator of the agrarian reform program.

HELD:
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and
institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units
must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion
of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department
of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same
being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b)
orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the
Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order
of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO
SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG,
LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO,
LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within
the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) 3 a
Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8,
1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property
for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain,
therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The
fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for
eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not with this Court."4
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of this
Court:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or
expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?9
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
1 In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for
the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it.1avvphi1 This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may
expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The government
does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a
question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim
that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to
"appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public
necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner,
vs.
V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize
an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body.
The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local
law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of
the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res
judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same
property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.
Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the
Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels
of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area
of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the
complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing
project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant
to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an
offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept. 10
On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim, 13alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to
state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause
of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:
 1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same
force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation
case of a valid cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not
applicable when public interest is primarily involved. 21
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides. "If the
LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of
the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other
public entities and public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs
the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted. 27
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution"
and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of
all the Sanggunian members.33
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only
a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly
misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said
rule which merely seeks to implement it. 37 It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the
law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere
oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof,
also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of
the LGU act pursuant to an ordinance.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites
for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final
judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests,
subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds
application in generally all cases and proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State
or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as
an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be
absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of
eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property
which the State might need for public use." 46
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's proper
exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109173 July 5, 1996

CITY OF CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION), HON. JUDGE
RODOLFO BELLAFLOR and MERLITA CARDENO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, R., J.:p

Facts :

Private respondent Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of
2,019 square meters located at Sitio Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 116692. On February 25, 1992, the petitioner, City of
Cebu, filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent with Branch II
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City seeking to expropriate the said parcel
of land. The complaint was initiated pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance
No. 1418, dated February 17, 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City
authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose of
providing a socialized housing project for the landless and low-income city
residents. 3
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground of lack
of cause of action. She asseverated that the allegations contained in paragraph VII
of the complaint, to wit:
That repeated negotiations had been made with the defendant to have
the aforementioned property purchased by the plaintiff through
negotiated sale without resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations
failed. 4
do not show compliance with one of the conditions precedent to the exercise
of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit as enunciated in
Section 19 of R.A. 7160 5 which provides in part that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain . . .
; Provided however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not accepted . . . . [Emphasis provided.]

Issue: Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action.

Held: Yes it does.

An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition for review on certiorari which has
essentially become a battle of semantics being waged before this Court. While
petitioner reiterates that paragraph VII of the complaint sufficiently states compliance
with the requirement of "a valid and definite offer", private respondent insists that the
term "negotiations" is too broad to be equated with the said requirement. 12
The same liberality should be applied in the instant case where an examination of
petitioner's "Comment and Opposition" to private respondent's Motion to Dismiss
leaves no room for doubt that petitioner had indeed made "a valid and definite offer"
to private respondent as required by law.
The foregoing should now put to rest the long drawn argument over the alleged
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. There is no longer any room for
doubt that as alleged in the complaint, and as admitted by private respondent, the
petitioner had in fact complied with the condition precedent of "a valid and definite
offer" set forth in Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160.
And as a fitting finale to this controversy, the principle enunciated in both
the Tan and Marcopper cases is here reiterated:
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their
aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules
had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party,
said rigid application cannot be countenanced. 26
The aforequoted doctrine finds compelling application in the case at bench. For as
correctly averred by petitioner, nothing else was accomplished by the dismissal of
the complaint for eminent domain but a considerable delay in the proceedings. The
dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner from filing another eminent domain
case and from correcting its alleged error by the mere expedient of changing
paragraph VII thereof. Indeed, precious time has been wasted while the salutary
objectives of Ordinance No. 1418 of the City of Cebu have been put on hold by a
quarrel over technical matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered remanded to the RTC which shall
proceed to the hearing and final determination thereof.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170432 March 24, 2008

AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA P. FRANCIA, and HEIRS OF BENJAMIN P.
FRANCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
On February 6, 2003, respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a
complaint for expropriation1 against petitioners Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia P.
Francia and Benjamin P. Francia2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 16. Respondent needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle property at
the junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and
the MacArthur Highway.3 It planned to use it to establish a common public terminal
for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.
In their answer,4 petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was
raw land. It was in fact developed5 and there were plans for further development. For
this reason, respondents offer price of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square meter)
was too low.

Issue:
Whether or not prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was
necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession

Held:
Section 19 of Republic Act 71609 provides:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated; Before a local government unit
may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1)
file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court
and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value
based on its current tax declaration.11 The law does not make the determination of a
public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA (represented by Gloria Ardona) ANASTACIO C.
CABILAO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO CABILAO (represented by Jose Cabilao)
MODESTA CABILAO, HEIRS OF ROMAN CABUENAS (represented by Alberto
Cabuenas), AGRIPINO GABISAY and PRUDENCIA MABINI, ANTONIO
LABRADOR and LUCIA GABISAY, GERONIMO MABINI and MARCELINA
SABAL, INOCENCIO MABINI and ARSENIA REYES, PATRICIO MABINI and
GREGORIA BORRES, ANICETO GADAPAN and MAXIMA GABISAY,
BARTOLOME MAGNO and CALINECA E. MAGNO, ALBERTO CABUENAS,
NARCISO CABUENAS and VICTORIA CABUENAS, EUTIQUIOSENO, HEIRS OF
ESPERIDION CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas), MAXIMINA
NAVARO, SULPICIO NAVARO, EDUARDO NAVARO, MARTINIANO ROMA (in
representation of Arcadio Mabini, deceased), MARTIN SENO, FAUSTO ARDA,
MAXIMA CABILAO, ESTRELLA SENO, EDUVEGIS S. CABILAO, ROSARIO
CABILAO, MINORS DANILO, SOCORRO, JOSEFINA and MARITES, all
surnamed Cabilao, JUAN BORRES (represented by Francisca Borres), RAMON
JABADAN, JESUS ALIPAR and LEONILA KABAHAR, ANTONIO LABRADOR,
HEIRS OF NICASIO GABISAY (represented by Arsenio Gabisay), PACIFICO
LABRADOR, DEMETRIO LABRADOR and FRUCTOSA TABURA, VENANCIO
DEL MAR, MARINO DEL MAR, HEIRS OF TEODORA ARCILLO (represented by
Brigida Arcillo) DIONISIA GABUNADA, HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA
FRANCISCO (represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), HEIRS OF
VICTORIA C. CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas) HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO GABUNADA (represented by Claudio Gabunada), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch I,
COURT OF FIRST instance OF CEBU, and the PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, respondents.
George M. Baladjay, Mario G. dela Victoria, Olegario Sarmiento, Jr., and Democrito
Barcenas for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Judge.
F.A. Sugue & Elino B. Lingas for Philippine Tourism Authoirity

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu
and in the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist
zones.

Facts:

The petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu and
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and implementing the writs of
possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the
petitioners: Civil Cases Nos. R-19562, R-19684, R-20701, and R-21608 of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu (Branch 1).
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land
situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority
"to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private
land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5,
paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined
geographic areas with potential tourism value.
The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation in that the taking is
allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public
use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private
property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that
limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant;
and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the
expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National
Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the
issuance of writs of possession.

Issue:
The issues raised by the petitioners revolve around the proposition that the actions
to expropriate their properties are constitutionally infirm because nowhere in the
Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private property for
the promotion of tourism.

Held: Petitioner is wrong.

In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court emphasized
that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to
the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive
forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form
of restraint on the sovereign power.
The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because
private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as
restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even
less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private
businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the least bit the
public character of expropriations for roads and streets.
The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of the government in raising their
second argument. According to them, assuming that PTA has the right to
expropriate, the properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the
purposes intended since they are within the coverage of "operation land transfer"
under the land reform program.
The Petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area being developed is
indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents
and certificates of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of
more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the land reform
program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and unproductive
land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly
survive.
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since the
necessity for the taking has not been previously established, the issuance of the
orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as well as
the corresponding writs of possession was premature.
Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533,
the government, its agency or instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation
proceedings is authorized to take immediate possession, control and disposition of
the property and the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the
pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine National
Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated.
The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already
Identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is,
therefore, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSE D for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125218 January 23, 1998

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 128077 January 23, 1998
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO MALIT, ANTONIO CAGUIAT, ALICIA
CABRERA, ARMANDO LACHICA, JACINTO CAGUIAT, GLORIA ANTONIO,
ELIZALDE NAVARRA, DOLORES FUENTES, SUSANA ROY, ANTONIO IBANEZ,
BENIGNO BASILIO, LUCERIA DEMATULAC, FLORENCIA GOMEZ, LAZARO
GOMEZ, JOSE GOMEZ VENANCIO MANALOTO, CRISTINO UMALI, DEMETRIA
GATUS, PRISCILLA MALONG, DOMINGO AGUILA, RAMON SAN AGUSTIN,
JULIAN FERRER, JR., FRANCISCO GALANG, FLORENTINO MALIWAT,
SEVERINA VILLAR, TRINIDAD NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, FORTUNATO AGUSTIN
CABRERA, GAUDENCIO INTAL, DANILO DAVID, ENRIQUE DAVID, VICENTE
DE GUZMAN, POLICARPIO LUMBA, BELEN PALMA, ELEN SOMVILLO,
LEONARDO MANICAD, OPRENG MICLAT, BENITA MATA, GREGORIO LOPEZ,
MARCELINA SAPNO, JESUS MERCADO and CALIXTO GOMEZ, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:
In resolving the instant petitions, the Court is tasked to strike a balance between the
contending interests when the state exercises its power of eminent domain. On one
side we have the owners of the property to be expropriated who must be duly
compensated for the loss of their property, while on the other is the State which must
take the property for public use.
Facts:
Petitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties
subject of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio
Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila, with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters and
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200 and 169202 of
the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 15) docketed as Civil Case No. 140817-CV against the
occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land (herein private respondents in G.
R. No. 128077) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment
of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on September 14, 1993 ordering
private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. 1
However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private
respondents filed on May 25, 1993, a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange
against petitioner Filstream which was docketed in Civil Case No. 93-66059 before
the RTC of Manila, Branch 43. It was at this stage that respondent City of Manila
came into the picture when the city government approved Ordinance No. 7813 3 on
November 5, 1993, authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by
negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land
registered under T.C.T. Nos. 169193, 169198, 169190, 169200, 169202 and 169192
of the Registry of Deeds of Manila which formed part of the properties of petitioner
then occupied by private respondents.
The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely a procedural and technical matter.
Petitioner takes exception to the resolutions of respondent CA dated March 18, 1996
and May 20, 1996 which ordered the dismissal of its Petition for Certiorari for non-
compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documents and papers and
for attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and unreadable. Petitioner
argues that respondent appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to
form rather than substance.
We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules
in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the
violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by
petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed
premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned
in favor of the City of Manila.
The judgment in the ejectment suit became final and executory after private
respondents failed to interpose any appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 25, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33714. Thus, petitioner has
every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already become final and
executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to
exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction.
Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In
the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must
be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right
of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for
public use.
Issue: Did the City of Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions when it
expropriated petitioner Filstream's properties?

Held: No.
We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would
indicate that respondent City of Manila complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A.
7279. Petitioner Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in
favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other
lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a
violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be
rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising
its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the
State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes
precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose
sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are
also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right
cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the
property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due
process requirements is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP NO. 36904 dated March 18, 1996 and May
20, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 128077, the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43101 dated January 28, 1997
and February 18, 1997 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137621 February 6, 2002

HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The facts:
On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an
ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28,2 which increased the stall rentals of the market
vendors in Hagonoy.
On December 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with the Secretary
of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was
unaware of the posting of the ordinance.
.
Nonetheless, we hold that the petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the
petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable
law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides:
"SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for the approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be
raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment
of the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without
the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Kautusan Blg. 28 is constitutional?

Held: Yes, constitutional.

The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure
should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity
of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed
ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28
took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December
1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996. Clearly,
the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this
point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their
legal remedies before competent courts is not a "mere technicality" that can be
easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local
Government Code are mandatory.10 Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure
adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals.
Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount
importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic
services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus,
it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a
considerable length of time.11 Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved
party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.
Petitioners bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to
the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence
On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the Local Government Code
provides:
"Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. Within ten (10)
days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax
ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive
days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, That in provinces, cities
and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same
may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places."
(emphasis supplied)
The records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioners negative allegation that
the subject ordinance was not posted as required by law. In contrast, the
respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment
of the assailed ordinance was complied with. Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1, 1996. Then Acting
Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7, 1996.
After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to the Municipal Treasurer on
the same day. On November 9, 1996, the Ordinance was approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period from
November 4 - 25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in front of the municipal
building, at the bulletin board of the Sta. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of
the Office of the Market Master in the public market.14 Posting was validly made in
lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the
municipality of Hagonoy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the
PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as
herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS
IMPERIAL, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No.
3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of
contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized
for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the
"Voice of the Philippines" project.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter
property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein
respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area.
On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained
unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the
plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. In
the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No.
22,2 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State
University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used
exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was
retained by the PIA.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a
public purpose.7 Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no
recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely
confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching
that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every
form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all
separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or
implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of
the property whenever the public interest so requires it.8
In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized - the first is public
employment or the actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or
benefit.12 The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued
utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of
the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents
question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property,
pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in
the 1969 expropriation proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the nature of utilization of the condemned property at present
which differs from the purpose originally intended is lawful?

Held: Yes, lawful.

The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely,
petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights
to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for
public use, which, decidedly, it is.
In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents
ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps
apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.21
In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests
accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred.27
.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the
Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04
January 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case
be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper
execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.