Romero vs. CAGR. No.

188921, April 18, 2012

Facts:
On 1974, when Judge Romero died his wife, Aurora was appointed as legal guardian. During the
pendency of Settlement Proceedings of the estate of their deceased father, Leo and David
Romero filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title
against their mother Aurora C. Romero and brother Vittorio C. Romero alleging that their
brother Vittorio through fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the
several properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. The
RTC dismissed the complaint. Likewise, the RTC denied their MR, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to recover the title or
possession of lands until such lands have actually been assigned. The court ruled that plaintiffs
must first cause the termination of settlement proceedings to its logical conclusion before their
case could be entertained by the Court. Leo and David filed Petition for Certiorari before the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions issued by the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
The CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a
probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite
the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero
may prosper.

Ruling :
NO. S e c t i o n 3 , R u l e 8 7 b a r s p e t i t i o n e r s f r o m f i l i n g t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n .
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or administrator is appointed
and assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done
to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the
court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts
has expired.
 Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresas College
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Writ of Habeas Data
FACTS: January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos
and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
childrens right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014, MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE
MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA, PETITIONER, VS. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, RESPONDENT.
Raquel filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
against Ma. Hazelina, to compel her to produce before the court her biological daughter, minor
Criselda, and to return to her the custody of the child. In her petition, she indicated three
addresses of Ma. Hazelina: her residence at Novaliches, Quezon City; one in Kamias, Quezon
City, and her office at the Office of the Ombudsman. The writ was issued but service thereof
was unsuccessful, although the sheriff left copies of the writ. Ma. Hazelina did not attend the
hearing. In the meantime, Ma. Hazelina filed a petition for guardianship over Criselda, which
Raquel opposed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus case. The QC RTC dismissed the
case, hence Raquel filed a case for kidnapping against Ma. Hazelina before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. Upon request of Raquel, the Caloocan RTC issued an alias writ of
habeas corpus, which was served on Ma. Hazelina during the preliminary investigation before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City of the kidnapping case. By way of special
appearance, Ma. Hazelina moved for quashal of the writ, arguing that she was not personally
served summons thus the Caloocan RTC had no jurisdiction over her. The Caloocan RTC denied
her omnibus motion, citing that as the habeas corpus petition is an extra-ordinary remedy,
service of the writ is comparable to service of summons; the same need not be served at her
address but anywhere she may be found as log as the same was served upon her by an
authorised person, in this case the sheriff.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, her appeal was again denied. According to the CA,
jurisdiction was properly laid in the petition. Likewise, appellate court ruled that service of
summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as the
Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. According to
the CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding. Thus, Ma. Hazelina
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing in the main that the Caloocan RTC had no jurisdiction
in the habeas corpus case, and the writ issued by the Caloocan RTC cannot be enforced in
Quezon City.
The Supreme Court:
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. As
provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge
of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family
Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no
Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial
region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate
court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.
(emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or
pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper
RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which contains the enumeration of
judicial regions in the country,states:
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. There are hereby created thirteen Regional Trial
Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan
and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig,
Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.(emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is
proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region,
as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since
Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the
former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioners insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain
reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody
of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition. The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found.(emphasis added)
Lastly, as regards petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to
state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it
under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of
habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in
that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

G.R. No. 197174, September 10, 2014, FRANCLER P. ONDE, PETITIONER, VS. THE OFFICE OF
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIAS CITY, RESPONDENT
Francler filed a petition for correction of entries in his Certificate of Live Birth, under Rule 108,
to correct the following entries: 1) on the Entry pertaining to the Date and Place of Marriage of
Parents, from December 23, 1983, Bicol to Not Married; 2) First Name Of Mother, from
Tely to Matilde; and, 3) First Name, from Franc Ler to Francler).
His petition, however, only impleaded the Office of the Civil Registrar of Las Pinas as sole
respondent. The Regional Trial Court dismissed his petition, noting that the first correction (the
date and place of marriage of parents) are substantial corrections, while the other corrections
maybe made before the City Civil Registry under Republic Act 9048. Francler moved to
reconsider, but the RTC denied it, hence he filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 to assail the ruling of the RTC.

The Supreme Court:

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the RTCs ruling on this point.[4] Indeed,
under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can
be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without
need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical
or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect
of said law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No.
9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can
avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mothers first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to
not married is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the civil register
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceedings.
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of
entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he
sought on his and his mothers first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the
circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries
before the RTC be reinstated since the same petition includes the correction he sought on his
and his mothers first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTCs dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can
avail of the administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mothers first name. He can
also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial
correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City:
x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of
Court] provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x
xxxx
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage
between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance
with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements
are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must
implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the
dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the
procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108
adversary. In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations,
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new
petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the
substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

[G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.]

THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.

FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado,
Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks
of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment
of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering
that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25
in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of
jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and
30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3
supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir
Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued
on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.

Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory.
The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for
Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the
inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine
Teresita on the inventory.

The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the
administratrix's motion for approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the
inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S.
Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an account of her administration
of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.

Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the
order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty,

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square
meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January
10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.
 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March
14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate
Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and
ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are
all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory
of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three

months. Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In
the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or
more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless
of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of
the executor or the administrator, and in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of
the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of
what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA
cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which
properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse
of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy
ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of
discretion." As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must
be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and
the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is
that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.

The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she)
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the
inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the

inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, RESPONDENT.

Merlinda wants to marry her boyfriend of five years, so she secured a Certificate of No
Marriage from the NSO. To her dismay, she discovered that she was married to Korean national
Ye Son Sune on June 24, 2002 at the MTCC of Cebu. Thus she filed a petition for cancellation of
entries in the marriage certificate especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. In support
of her petition, she presented herself and Eufrocina, an employee of the MTCC. Merlina
testified that she could not have entered into a valid marriage with Yo because at the time of
the solemnisation of the marriage, she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor. She
did not know her supposed husband, but knew the witnesses named therein because she
worked in a pension house. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny, who
owned a travel agency, when she gave her personal circumstances to him when she applied for
a passport. Eufrocina attested that the marriage was indeed celebrated inside their office at the
MTCC, but claimed that the wife who appeared was definitely not Merlinda. A document
examiner also appeared and testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged.

The Regional Trial Court granted Merlindas petition. The Office of the Solicitor General
moved to reconsider the order, but the same was denied by the RTC, hence, the OSG elevated
the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law. According to the OSG, the grant of the
petition by the OSG is tantamount to a declaration of nullity of marriage of Merlinda, which
should be done in an adversarial proceeding, not a Rule 108 petition. The petition filed by
Merlinda was therefore an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, in the guise of a Rule
108 petition.The Supreme Court:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the
Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it
also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it
states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long
as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary
proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported
husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she
was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent
tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son
Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents.
It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied
with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn
authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More
importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court
where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate
was different from respondents signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature
in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established
that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria
Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only evidence of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court
where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent;
the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted
and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as
set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate
of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014, EDELINA T. ANDO, PETITIONER, VS.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT
Edelina, formerly married to Yuchiro, was divorced by the latter in accordance with Japanese
law. In her belief that the divorce decree which was annotated before the Civil Registry of
Manila entitled her to marry another, she married Masatomi Ando, another Japanese national.
After her marriage, she applied for a Philippine passport before the Department of Foreign
Affairs using her new married name, Edelina Ando; however, she was advised that until such
time that a valid court decision was issued recognising her marriage to Masatomi Ando, her
request for a new passport under the name shall be denied. Hence, Edelina filed a special civil
action for Declaratory Relief, impleading the DFA, praying that her marriage with Masatomi
Ando be recognised as valid, declare her as entitled to a new passport; and the DFA be
compelled to issue a new passport under the name Edelina Ando.
The RTC dismissed the case, ruling that though Yuchiro, her first husband, divorced Edelina, the
latter should first file a petition for recognition of her divorce decree, hence she is not entitled
to declaratory relief; besides, she has another remedy which she can avail, that is, by filing a
petition for judicial recognition of her marriage, which the RTC cannot grant as it is not a family
court. On motion for reconsideration filed by Edelina, the court reconsidered its decisions and
granted her prayer that it be assigned to a family court. When the case was assigned to the
family court, the latter still dismissed the petition ruling that admittedly, the marriage sought to
be declared valid by Edelina was her second marriage which is bigamous since her divorce with
Yuchiro had not yet been recognised by a Philippine court. Further, Edelinas allegation of Sec. 2
(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration
under Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable only in case of re-marriage. More importantly,
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a
marriage valid.
Her motion for reconsideration denied, Edelina went directly to the Supreme Court on pure
question of law, assailing the dismissal of her action for declaratory relief. According to her,
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it is only the husband or wife who is authorised to file an
annulment of marriage; the State is not allowed to file a direct attack on a marriage, much less
entitled to a collateral attack on her marriage with Masatomi, as the RTC did in her case. Even
assuming that a court judgment is necessary for her re-marriage, the same is a mere irregularity
in the issuance of the marriage license which does not affect the validity of her marriage to
Ando. In its comment, the DFA thru the Office of the Solicitor General averred that Edelina
should have first filed an appeal with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the denial of her
passport application, thus she failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Supreme Court:
First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly
filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFAs refusal to
issue a passport to her under her second husbands name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25
February 1997, the following are the additional documentary requirements before a married
woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made in
accordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband
pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certified true
copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be
required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar
conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her
annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the
annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post
which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shariah Court or the
OCRG.
d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must
present the original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the
Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shariah Court, in which case the applicant may
choose to continue to use her husbands surname or resume the use of her maiden surname.
From the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under
her married name, all she needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified
true copy of her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance
in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over
the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular
mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport
under her second husbands name. Should her application for a passport be denied, the
remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in
due course.
xxx
Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the
denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239.
Petitioners argument that her application cannot be said to have been either denied,
cancelled or restricted by [the DFA], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal,
as instead she was merely told that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The
law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.
xxx
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid,
petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven and like any other fact.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of
petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on
record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the
divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce
can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and
the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

CARAM VS SEGUI

Ma. Christina and Marcelino had an amorous relationship which made Ma. Christina pregnant.
She, however, did not disclose her pregnancy to Marcelino, as she intends to put up her child
for adoption by the Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation. When she gave birth to Baby Julian, it was the adoption agency who
shouldered her hospital expenses. Ma. Christina then voluntarily surrendered her child to the
DSWD by way of a Deed of a Voluntary Commitment. The DWSD, on November 27, 2009, issued
a certificate declaring Baby Julian as Legally Available for Adoption. A local matching
conference was held where Baby Julian was matched to spouses Vergel and Filomena.

Meantime, on November 26, 2009, Marcelino died of a heart attack. During the wake, Ma.
Christina narrated that she had a baby with Marcelino and that she gave up the baby for
adoption due to financial distress and embarrassment. Taken aback by the revelation,
Marcelinos family vowed to help Ma. Christina to recover and raise her baby. Thus, on May 5,
2010, Ma. Christina wrote the DWSD asking that the adoption proceedings be suspended and
that she intends to take her baby back and make her family whole again. Also, Marcelinos
brother, Noel sent a letter to the DSWD, informing them that a DNA testing is scheduled on July
16, 2010 at the UP. The DSWD replied to Noel that they are no longer in a position to stop the
adoption process as the procedures taken to make the baby legally available for adoption were
followed to the letter. Thus, if Ma. Christina wants to take custody of Baby Julian, she should
institute appropriate legal proceedings herself.

Thus, Ma. Christina filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo, alleging that DSWD and the
other respondents blackmailed her into surrendering custody of Baby Julian to the DSWD
utilising an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as
basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied
with.

After several hearings, the Regional Trial Court denied the writ of amparo, hence Ma. Christina
elevated the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law, the issue being whether or
not the writ of amparo is a proper remedy to recover parental custody of a minor child.
The Supreme Court:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this Court held:
[
T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of
amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof. As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico
enumerated the elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily
defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or
a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her enforced
separation from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an enforced disappearance
within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of
the DSWDs May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian
before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore,
no enforced disappearance as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
Petition denied.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015, NILO V. CHIPONGIAN, PETITIONER, VS.
VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS.

The Case:
Vicente was married to Isabel, Nilos sister. The spouses had no children. Thus, when Isabel
died in 1989, Vicente and Nilo executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement with respect to
Isabels estate, where Nilo waived his rights to the estate of Isabel in favour or Vicente. The
latter, in turn executed an affidavit on the same day affirming that the waiver did not extend to
the paraphernalia properties of Isabel. When Vicente died, his sister, Victoria, and a nephew,
Feodor, initiated proceedings to settle the estate of Vicente (SP-797). The RTC appointed
Feodor the administrator of the estate. Nilo intervened in the intestate proceedings, seeking
the partial revocation of the May 13, 1994 order to exclude the paraphernalia properties of
Isabel, citing the affidavit executed by Vicente. On June 8, 1994, he moved that the
paraphernalia properties of Isabel be excluded from Vicentes estate. Before the RTC could rule
on the motion, Nilo withdrew it, filing instead a complaint-in-intervention. The RTC admitted
the complaint-in-intervention. On August 21, 1998, the RTC dismissed the complaint-in-
intervention. It he lad that Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, provides for a limitation of 2 years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with either Section 1 or Section
2 of the same Rule, within which an heir or other person deprived of his lawful participation in
the estate may compel the settlement of the said estate in the Courts for the purpose of
satisfying such lawful participation. If he was indeed deprived of his lawful share or right in his
sisters estate, it comes as a surprise why it took him more than 12 years assert the purported
affidavit allegedly executed in his favor by Vicente O. Benitez. It noted that Nilo actively
participated in the settlement of estate of Isabel, and slept on his rights.

Nilo filed a notice of appeal, but the RTC denied due course to the appeal. On motion for
reconsideration, the RTC admitted that Nilo timely filed his appeal, but nevertheless denied it
for non-perfection of the appeal due to his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.

Nilo then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the denial of his appeal for non-
perfection. But the CA dismissed it, affirming the RTC order that indeed he failed to pay the
correct docket fees on time. When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Nilo elevated
the case to the Supreme Court. He argues that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal for non-
payment of docket fees. The respondents oppose the petition because Nilo did not file a record
on appeal as mandated under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Nilo countered,
stating that his appeal was on the order of the RTC denying his complaint in intervention, which
is not the main case, the intestate case. Since the intervention was not an independent
proceedings but merely ancillary to the main action, the rule on multiple appeals does not
apply. The respondents argue otherwise.

The Issue:
Whether or not Nilos appeal should be given due course.

The Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings.1 If an intervention makes a third party a litigant
in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the main
case. Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings No. SP-797, his
complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering
any final disposition thereof subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings,
including Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.
Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. In the context of the final
judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in
special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the
remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter
in the case, to wit:

Rule 109. Appeals in Special Proceedings

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance
or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person,
or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of
a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

The dismissal of the petitioners intervention constituted a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his
deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1, supra, because it had the effect
of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph (e) of Section
1, supra, because it was a final determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably
with either or both paragraphs, which are boldly underscored above for easier reference, the
dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely
disposing of his intervention.

The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by notice of
appeal and record on appeal. This is pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

xxxx

Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an
appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will
require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party, to wit:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken
within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or fmal order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed, (n) (bold emphasis supplied)

For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal was 30
days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of the period of 30
days happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision
dismissing his intervention. However, the entire time from the filing of his Motion for
Reconsideration on October 2, 1998 until his receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on March 18, 1999 should be deducted from the reckoning of the period to
perfect his appeal. He filed the notice of appeal on March 19, 1999, and paid the appellate
court docket fees on March 31, 1999.2 Initially, the RTC denied due course to the notice of
appeal on the ground that it had been filed beyond the reglementary period; hence, the
petitioner filed hisMotion for Reconsideration against the order denying due course.3 On July
5, 1999, the RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the
notice of appeal, but still denied theMotion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had not
perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees. 4 Hence, he
filed a Motion to Set Aside Order, to which he appended the copies of the official receipts of the
payment of the appellate court docket fees.5 Nonetheless, on August 13, 1999, the RTC denied
the Motion to Set Aside Order, and a copy of the order of denial was received by his counsel on
August 27, 1999.6
In Lebin v. Mirasol,7 the Court has discussed the justification for requiring the record on appeal
in appeals in special proceedings, viz.:
The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional
right, but merely statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who
intends to appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else
the right of appeal may be lost or squandered.

As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special proceedings is
appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or final order determining and terminating a
particular part is usually appealable, because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the
proceeding, unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court. The ostensible reason for
requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multipart nature of nearly
all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally determined and terminated
independently of the other parts. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the
elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in
its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record on appeal
enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original records remain
with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review and
decide the appealed matter.

xxxx
The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 made feasible the
shortening of the period of appeal from the original 30 days to only 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order. Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as
the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the need for
the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved by
a judgment or final order issued in special proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal
and a record on appeal upon the adverse party within the period; in addition, the appealing
party shall pay within the period for taking an appeal to the clerk of court that rendered the
appealed judgment or final order the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by record on
appeal, or the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. 8
Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3
of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result,
the dismissal became final and immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself. The right
to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the
exercise of the right. As such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was
mandatory and jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time
rendered the judgment final and beyond review on appeal. Indeed, we have fittingly
pronounced in Lebin v. Mirasol:

In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional, because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules
of Court causes the judgment or final order to become final as to preclude the appellate court
from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order. The failure of the
petitioners and their counsel to file the record on appeal on time rendered the orders of the
RTC final and unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost the jurisdiction to review the
challenged orders, and the petitioners were precluded from assailing the orders. 9
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner lost his right to appeal through his failure to file the
record on appeal, and rendered the dismissal of his intervention final and immutable. With this
outcome, we no longer need to dwell on the denial of due course to his notice of appeal
because of the late payment of the appellate court docket fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October
30, 2002 subject to the foregoing clarification on the correct justification for the dismissal of the
appeal being upon the petitioners failure to perfect his appeal in accordance with Section 2(a)
and Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.