Divorce

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Doctrine: For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this
Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59

xxx

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether
to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.1wphi 1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the
following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a
civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition
of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy
and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would
be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the
party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in
the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the
RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is
lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the
RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together
with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition
was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this
also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from
the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a
legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is
a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry
as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil
status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a
void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose
the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

 (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and
a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this
Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if
the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to
the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court
states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited
review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under
the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may
be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
"[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage
to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband
nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.
The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that
the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity
of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor
to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce
decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice
to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether
to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in
the Philippines.1wphi 1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

Doctrine: Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the

national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December
14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22,
1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.

Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of
the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been
denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they
impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of
its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same
holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property.

Xxx

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious
result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between
Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from
the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally
pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer

be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot,
for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph

2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
 a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further
the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they
wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

xxx

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de

San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen7 born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave

birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of
Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court
issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the
couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the
legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over
Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No.
406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during
their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance
of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of
nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to
withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of

Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that
she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on
the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch
256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente
lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay
a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of
PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and
moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting

on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another

marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against
each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints
against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's

motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's
application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
 Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of
the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO
HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of
the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment
invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a
mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above

August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30,

2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of

the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be
ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of
an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the

aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20,
2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved
for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002

are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari,
docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated

March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set
aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.
The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to
state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss
on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a
complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the
light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her
marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been
dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she
personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored
Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a

Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was
dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also
doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was
still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship,

having professed to have that nationality status and having made
representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such
as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c)
when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but
later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-
378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle,
Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from
denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above

Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as

grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the
proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the
RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA

decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN
ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.
 II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING

ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO

CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD
ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING

THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No.
155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a

divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or
at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in

G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to
dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first,
whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22,
1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so,
what are its consequent legal effects?
 The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied
for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and
remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting
American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and
may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed,

asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly:
(1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the
birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration

(Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine
Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show
that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be
over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on
June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by
Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC

9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY

BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto
and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
 Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5,
1953

Sex: female Civil

Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on

face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as

per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995,
and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in
his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel

purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts
and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose
B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the
1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8,
2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and
(3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11,
1995after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per
OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could
have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the
Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8,
2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems
to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he
was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino

citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of
Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III,
Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide
immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens."
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for
Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition

as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall

automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of
its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval
by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the
Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No
Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of
Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine

passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of
Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual
sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to
said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a
Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate
No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law
Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate
shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only
on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the
eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June
13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino

citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca
did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a
Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil
Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could
not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal
of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it
was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month
after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce
decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said
divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as
annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October
11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be
appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship
being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition,
also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment.
What were attached consisted of the following material documents:
Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through
her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May
2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient
basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which
we will expound later.
 Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and
406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still
to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before,
during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern
her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as
an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which
pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly

submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of
age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN
ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR.
ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed
before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila,
duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national

laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December
14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22,
1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.

Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of
the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been
denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they
impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of
its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact
or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same
holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do
so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure),
to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a

judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the

judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is

presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the

foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured
the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a
certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the
foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic
court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a
Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For
as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the
parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious
result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween
Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from
the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally
pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer

be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot,
for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
 Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph

2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further
the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they
wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97
and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca
and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which

they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990
issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila
registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca
M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by

the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No.
406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement
entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and
directed to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the

Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the
divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property
was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that

Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause
of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of

the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of
cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in
the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before

the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof,
with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a
cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant
must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim
has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is
no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of
Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The
records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any
rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982,
reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now
be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had
been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil
action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of
Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and
Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned
shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve

into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to
support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support
hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094
by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is

hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for
review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution
of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

Doctrine: In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who
own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from
the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in
the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition
for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond
of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."

This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were
not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on

certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when
 she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that
there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different
matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988
in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA)
where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely:
Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San
Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085 1,693,125.00
Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property)

Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. located at 400,000.00

Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora

A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at 490,000.00

Maria Aurora, Aurora

175,000.00
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at Sabang
Baler, Aurora

3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, 750,000.00

Aurora

USA

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City, California

$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)

Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00

Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by Davids parents. The parties herein secured a
loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be
foreclosed, the couple paid a total of 1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In
December 2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell
the Sampaloc property for 2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003,
David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia
claimed that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of
Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the 1.1Million
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2)
that David shall return and pay to Leticia 750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the
amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce
and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines.5 David was able to collect 1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
property, leaving an unpaid balance of 410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California
court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couples properties
in the USA.7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before
the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids
failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to
administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and
desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal
properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of50,000.00
and 100,000.00 litigation expenses.8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered
on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded
that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated
and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties be charged
against the conjugal partnership.9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and

marital infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties properties in favor of
the petitioner and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A.
and the same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras

and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latters
property rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the

2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of
the 1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including
interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand litigation expenses of the parties were
chargeable against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and
presumptive legitimes.10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared

DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only,
with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree
issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, United States of
America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the
name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
 3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children
with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes
and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their
share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the
respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner

Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome
and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the said properties. Their share in the income from these properties, if any,
shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of
each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent
David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to
their income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall
take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her
custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be
increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his financial capacity
can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of 410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc

property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay 5,000.00 to respondent
David A. Noveras and 405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent
may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a
local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names,
withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their representative duly
authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made
withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the
passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of
this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of
Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the parties shall be
shouldered by them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their
legal and personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are
divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court
of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties marriage
had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as
one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the
legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of
conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement
before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then,
the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since
the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the
instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation
of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and
her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and
infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying
for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to
the payment of the childrens presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89
of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the
Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision by directing the equal
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the
common childrens presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each
pay their children the amount of 520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the

assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in
Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph

2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually
within the first half of January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount of520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as
their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the
receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora,
under a joint account in the latters names. The payment/deposit shall be made
within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin
the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana

(sic) the amount of 1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry
of Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times
Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment
was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David
argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US
properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own
properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for
judicial separation ofconjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond
of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were
not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on

certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is
no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different
matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the
celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification
isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and
136 of the Family Code.18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on
paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the
court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with
his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements
has abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment
against the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial
separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to
necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family
Code. The trial court ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a
valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left
the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima
facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to
his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at
his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there
after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit
her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter
of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of
their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for
the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not
tackled in the trial courts decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living
separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.20Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June
2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe
Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

 (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to
138. (Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute
community regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall
apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its
net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles
43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious,
we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect
to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the
spouses in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of
their childrens presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
1wphi1

absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have
come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of
the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election
expenses in the amount of 300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the
Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his
personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of 120,000.00
or in the respective amounts of 1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children
and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net
assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering
the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of
520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

Doctrine:

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least
sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and
care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification
of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate

son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or
 (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses.12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner
and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he
must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2)
he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee
is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed
without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude
P. Lim.

The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June
1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to
have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that
they were the childrens parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the
clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban
brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits
of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent.8 Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial
court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly
with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the
Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not
fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the
law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only
for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner,
who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of
the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since,
at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they
have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least
sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and
care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification
of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
 (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate

son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses.12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner
and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he
must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2)
he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee
is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
 Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children
have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons
of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed
and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind.
To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means
of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that
will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love,
care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to
affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and
it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot
sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly
filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

Doctrine:
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength
in petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those
of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

xxx

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented
by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
to petitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties
are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has
already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed
the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00
more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established
a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states
that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive,
refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen
(14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the
victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in
the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since
the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in
regard to a parents duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot
be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis
child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to
give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists
against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with
the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme
Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition
with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was
one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only
questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule
41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is
taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and
the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore,
dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time,
effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and
economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy
of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless,
we do not fully agree with petitioners contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented
by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
to petitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article
1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties
are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has
already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent
does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners allegation that under the second page
of the aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to support his child is specifically
stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of
America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not
find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to

support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
(Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
topetitioners son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or
her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength
in petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those
of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support
his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that
there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal
liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners
child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth
and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to
the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further
proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131680 September 14, 2000

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, RICHARD J. GORDON, FERDINAND M.

ARISTORENAS, MANUEL W. QUIJANO and RAYMOND P. VENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF TAIWAN, UIG INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SUBIC BAY GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB,
Inc., respondents.5

Doctrine: (a) Respondents Capacity to Sue

Petitioners contend that UIG does not have the capacity to sue because it is a foreign non-
resident corporation not licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do
business in the Philippines. They contend that the capacity to sue is conferred by law and
not by the parties.

As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot file suits in the
Philippines. Section 133 of the Corporation Code specifically provides:

"Sec. 133. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or
its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but such corporation
may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws."

A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For
this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the
Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the
jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the SEC and appoint an agent for
service of process.15 Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.

It should be stressed, however, that the licensing requirement was "never intended to favor
domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms and then
repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to do business in this
country."16 After contracting with a foreign corporation, a domestic firm is estopped from
denying the formers capacity to sue. Hence, in Merril Lynch Futures v. CA,17 the Court ruled:

"The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to
deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations; "one who
has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its
existence and capacity. The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a
foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly
in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract x x x."

This doctrine was initiated as early as 1924 in Asia Banking Corporation v. Standard
Products18 and reiterated in Georg Grotjahn GMBH v. Isnani19 and Communication Materials
and Design v. CA.20 In Antam Consolidated v. CA,21the Court also rejected a similar argument
and noted that "it is a common ploy of defaulting local companies which are sued by
unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke lack of
capacity to sue."

In this case, SBMA is estopped from questioning the capacity to sue of UIG. In entering into
the LDA with UIG, SBMA effectively recognized its personality and capacity to institute the
suit before the trial court.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A stipulation authorizing a party to extrajudicially rescind a contract and to recover

possession of the property in case of contractual breach is lawful. But when a valid objection
is raised, a judicial determination of the issue is still necessary before a takeover may be
allowed. In the present case, however, respondents do not deny that there was such a
breach of the Agreement; they merely argue that the stipulation allowing a rescission and a
recovery of possession is void. Hence, the other party may validly enforce such stipulation.

The Case

Before us is a Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 3, 1997
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 45501. The decretal portion of the
CA Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of
merit, and certiorari DENIED. The Orders of the respondent court both dated 03 October
1997 hereby STAND."3

The first Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City (Branch 73),5 which was
affirmed by the appellate court, granted herein respondents application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction in this wise:6

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants, their agents, officers and employees,
and all persons acting in their behalf are directed to restore peacefully to the plaintiffs all
possession of the golf course, clubhouse, offices and other appurtenances subject of the
Lease and Development Agreement between UIG Taiwan and the SBMA; and the said
defendants, and their agents, officers [and] employees to refrain [from] obstructing or
meddling in the operation and management thereof or x x x otherwise committing acts
inimical to the interest of plaintiffs in the management or operation of the same, until the
parties may be heard on the merits of the case.
"The Injunction bond is fixed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in cash or surety bond
provided by a surety company of reputable solvency."

The second RTC Order, also dated October 3, 1997, disposed of petitioners Motion to
Dismiss as follows:7

"WHEREFORE, and the foregoing p[re]mises considered, Defendants Amended and

Consolidated Motion To Dismiss is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

"The Motion to Dismiss filed by Richard J. Gordon is [g]ranted insofar as the suit against him
is concerned in his private or personal capacity. He shall, however, remain as defendant in
his official capacity."

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:8

"On 25 May 1995, a Lease and Development Agreement was executed by respondent UIG
and petitioner SBMA under which respondent UIG shall lease from petitioner SBMA the
Binictican Golf Course and appurtenant facilities thereto to be transformed into a world class
18-hole golf course, golf club/resort, commercial tourism and residential center. The contract
in pertinent part contains pre-termination clauses, which provide:

Section 22. Default

(a) The following acts and omissions shall constitute default by Tenant (each an Event of
Default):

xxx xxx xxx

(ii) Tenant or any of its Subsidiaries shall commit a material breach or violation of any of the
conditions, covenants or agreements herein made by Tenant or such Subsidiary (other than
those described in Sections 22.2 [a] [l] and such violation or failure shall continue for thirty
(30) days after notice from the Landlord, or, at Landlords sole discretion, sixty (60) days if
such violations or failure is reasonably susceptible of cure during such 60 day period and
Tenant or such Subsidiary begins and diligently pursues to completion such cure within thirty
(30) days of the initial notice from Landlord;

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If an event of default shall have occurred and be continuing, Landlord may, in its sole
discretion;

(i) Terminate this Lease thirty (30) days after the expiration of any period granted hereunder
to cure any Event of Default and retain all rent and other amounts previously paid by tenant
and its Subsidiaries. Thereafter, Landlord may immediately reenter, renovate or relet all or
part of the Property to others, and cancel all rights and privileges granted to Tenant and its
Subsidiaries without any restriction on recovery by Landlord for rents, fees and damages
owned by Tenant and its Subsidiaries.
"On 4 February 1997, Petitioner SBMA sent a letter to private respondent UIG calling its
attention to its alleged several contractual violations in view of private respondent UIGs
failure to deliver its various contractual obligations, primarily its failure to complete the
rehabilitation of the Golf Course in time for the APEC Leaders Summit, and to pay
accumulated lease rentals and utilities, and to post the required performance bond.
Respondent UIG, in its letter of 7 February 1997, interposed as an excuse the alleged default
of its main contractor FF Cruz, resulting in their filing of suit against the latter, and committed
itself to comply with its obligations within a few days. Private respondent UIG, however,
failed to comply with its undertakings. On 7 March 1997, petitioner SBMA sent a letter to
private respondent UIG declaring the latter in default of its contractual obligations to SBMA
under Section 22.1 of the Lease and Development Agreement and required it to show cause
why petitioner SBMA should not pre-terminate the agreement. Private respondents paid the
rental arrearages but the other obligations remained unsatisfied.

"On 8 September 1997, a letter of pre-termination was served by petitioner SBMA requiring
private respondent UIG to vacate the premises. On 12 September 1997, petitioner served
the formal notice of closure of Subic Bay Golf Course and took over possession of the
subject premises. On even date, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
SBMA for Injunction and Damages with prayer for a writ of temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction. On 3 October 1997, respondent court issued the two assailed
orders subject of the petition."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals upheld the capacity to sue of Respondent Universal International
Group of Taiwan (UIG) because petitioners, having entered into a Lease Development
Agreement (LDA) with it, were estopped from questioning its standing. It also held that
Respondents UIG International Development Corporation (UIGDC) and Subic Bay Golf and
Country Club, Inc., (SBGCCI) were real parties in interest because they had made
substantial investments in the venture and had been in possession of the property when
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) rescinded the LDA.

Likewise, it debunked petitioners submission that Section 21 of RA 72279 was "a blanket
proscription against the issuance of any and all injunctive relief[s] against SBMA." It said that
"those actions which are removed from the stated objectives of the corporate entity x x x
cannot be placed beyond the pale of prohibitory writs."10

While it conceded that the law allowed extrajudicial rescission of a contract, it ruled that "no
rationalization was possible" for the extrajudicial taking of possession. It reasoned that "no
one may take the law into his own hands. To hold otherwise would be productive of nothing
but mischief and chaos."

It also rejected petitioners reliance on Consing v. Jamandre,11 in which the Supreme Court
allowed a contractual stipulation giving the lessor the right to take possession of the leased
property without need of court order. It explained that Consing was a "judicial aberration, not
common but not unknown in the body of our jurisprudence, which lays down a ruling contrary
to the teaching of the greater mass of cases."12

Furthermore, it held that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not dispose of
the main issue. Concluding, it observed that "we cannot and should not send the message to
foreigners who do business here that we are a group of jingoists who cannot look beyond our
narrow interests and must look at every stranger with a wary eye and treat them with uneven
hands."

Disagreeing with the above judgment, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court.13

The Issues

In its Memorandum, Petitioner SBMA submits the following issues for our consideration:14

I.

"Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in ruling that petitioners
action of extra-judicially recovering the possession of the subject premises is supposedly
illegal [as it] runs counter to the established law and [the] applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court on the matter.

II.

"Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in ruling that:

(a) The trial court ha[d] jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the case
despite the fact that the suit filed by private respondents is essentially
an ejectment case, and

(b) The trial court ha[d] authority to issue the questioned injunctive relief despite the
express prohibition under Section 21 of R.A. 7227

III.

"Whether or not respondent court committed a reversible error in ruling that private
respondents ha[d] the capacity to sue and possess material interest to institute an action
against petitioners.

IV.

"Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error by sanctioning departure
by the trial court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by failing to
make any ruling on the essential elements of injunctive relief consisting of: (1) a
clear and unmistakable right and (2) irreparable damage on the part of the private
respondents.

V.

"Whether or not respondent court committed a reversible error in departing from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by sanctioning the illegal procedure
of taking possession of the subject premises from petitioner SBMA and transferring it into the
hands of the private respondents, although the rights of the latter ha[d] not yet been clearly
established.

VI.
"Whether or not respondent court committed a reversible error by departing from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by sustaining the grant of injunctive relief
which effectively prejudged the merits of the main case.

VII.

"Whether or not respondent court committed a reversible error by departing from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by sustaining the grant of injunctive relief
in favor of the private respondents although the latter [we]re clearly not entitled thereto as
they came before the courts with unclean hands.

VIII.

"Whether or not in the event of a no reversible error judgment on the questioned decision of
the respondent court, this Honorable Division of the Supreme Court might modify or
even reverse the doctrines and principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in several
leading cases, in violation of Section 4, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

IX.

"Whether or not in the event of a no reversible error judgment, this Honorable Division of
the Supreme Court might unwittingly cause great loss or irreparable damage to the
government because such a ruling tend[ed] to send a wrong signal that Philippine Courts
[would] reward rather than punish foreign investors who miserably failed to comply with their
contractual commitments to develop vital government assets."

Distilling the above-quoted assignment of errors, we find two main issues before us: (a)
whether the denial of petitioners Motion to Dismiss was correct, and (b) whether the
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction was proper.

Under the first issue, the Court shall resolve (1) whether Respondent UIG has the capacity to
sue, (2) whether Respondents UIGDC and SBGCCI are real parties in interest, and (3)
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the suit.

Under the second issue, the Court shall determine these questions: (1) whether the Writ of
Injunction against SBMA issued by the trial court contravenes Section 21 of RA 7227; (2)
whether respondents have established their entitlement to the Writ; and (3) whether SBMAs
rescission of the LDA and takeover of the property are allowed by law.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious. The CA correctly affirmed the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss, but erred in sustaining the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction.

First Issue:

Denial of the Motion to Dismiss

In its amended Motion to Dismiss filed before the RTC, petitioners contended that UIG had
no capacity to sue, and that UIGDC and SBGCCI had no material interest in the present
case. Both the appellate and the trial courts rejected these contentions. Reiterating the
arguments before us, petitioners add that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the
case.

(a) Respondents Capacity to Sue

Petitioners contend that UIG does not have the capacity to sue because it is a foreign non-
resident corporation not licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do
business in the Philippines. They contend that the capacity to sue is conferred by law and
not by the parties.

As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot file suits in the
Philippines. Section 133 of the Corporation Code specifically provides:

"Sec. 133. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or
its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but such corporation
may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws."

A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For
this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the
Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the
jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the SEC and appoint an agent for
service of process.15 Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.

It should be stressed, however, that the licensing requirement was "never intended to favor
domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms and then
repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to do business in this
country."16 After contracting with a foreign corporation, a domestic firm is estopped from
denying the formers capacity to sue. Hence, in Merril Lynch Futures v. CA,17 the Court ruled:

"The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to
deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations; "one who
has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its
existence and capacity. The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a
foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly
in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract x x x."

This doctrine was initiated as early as 1924 in Asia Banking Corporation v. Standard
Products18 and reiterated in Georg Grotjahn GMBH v. Isnani19 and Communication Materials
and Design v. CA.20 In Antam Consolidated v. CA,21the Court also rejected a similar argument
and noted that "it is a common ploy of defaulting local companies which are sued by
unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke lack of
capacity to sue."

In this case, SBMA is estopped from questioning the capacity to sue of UIG. In entering into
the LDA with UIG, SBMA effectively recognized its personality and capacity to institute the
suit before the trial court.

(b) Material Interest of

SBGCCI and UIGDC
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, defines a real party in interest in this manner:

"Sec. 2. Parties in Interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest."22

SBMA contends that UIGDC is not a real party in interest because it was not privy to the LDA
between UIG and SBMA. It further alleges that it did not approve the assignment to UIGDC
of UIGs rights thereunder. In like manner, SBGCCI had no interest in the LDA because it
only derived its rights from the Development Agreement it had entered into with UIGDC.

We are not persuaded. The CA made a factual finding that UIGDC and SBGCCI were in
possession of the property when SBMA took over. Moreover, it also found that they had
already made substantial investments in the project. We find no reason at this time to justify
a different conclusion. In view of these circumstances, we agree with the CA that UIGDC and
SBGCCI stand to be benefitted or injured by the present suit and should be deemed real
parties in interest.23

SBMAs contention -- that it had not approved UIGs assignment of rights to UIGDC -- is not
necessarily bereft of merit, however. SBMA should raise this issue, not now but in
appropriate proceedings before the trial court.

(c) Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

Petitioners also argue that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, which was allegedly an
ejectment suit cognizable by municipal trial courts. They add that the Complaint demanded
that respondents be restored to the possession of the subject leased premises.

We disagree. A close scrutiny of the amended Complaint reveals that it sought to enjoin
petitioners from rescinding the contract and taking over the property. While possession was
a necessary consequence of the suit, it was merely incidental. The main issue was whether
SBMA could rescind the Agreement. Because it was a dispute that was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, it was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.24

Second Issue:

Issuance of the Writ of Injunction

(a) Present Writ of Injunction Not Barred by RA 7227

Petitioners contend that the RTC was barred from issuing a writ of injunction in this case,
pursuant to Section 21 of RA 7227 which provides as follows:

"Sec. 21. Injunction and Restraining Order. -- The implementation of the projects for the
conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations is urgent and
necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines."25

We are not persuaded. We agree with the CA that the present provision is not a blanket
prohibition of the issuance of an injunctive relief against any SBMA action. Section 21 of RA
7227 prohibits only such court orders which restrain the "implementation of the projects for
the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations."

The Writ issued in this case did not restrain or enjoin the implementation of any of SBMAs
conversion projects. In fact, it allowed UIG to proceed with the development of the golf
course pursuant to the LDA. It merely restrained SBMA from taking over the golf course.
Clearly, the assailed RTC Order did not seek to delay or hamper the conversion of the
former naval base into civilian uses.

Moreover, the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued in connection with a dispute
pertaining to the correct interpretation of the LDA. To divest the trial court of that authority is
to give SBMA unhampered discretion to disregard its contractual obligations under the guise
of implementing its projects. Indeed, Section 21 of RA 7227 should not bar judicial scrutiny of
irregularities allegedly committed by SBMA.26

(b) Right of Respondents to Injunctive Relief

A writ of mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act27 and is granted
only upon a showing of the following requisites:

"1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;

2. The right of a complainant is clear and unmistakable.

3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage."28

Because it commands the performance of an act, a mandatory injunction does not preserve
the status quo29 and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction.
Accordingly, the issuance of the former is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt and
dispute. Necessarily, the applicant has the burden of showing that it is entitled to the writ.

In this case, the first assailed RTC Order dated October 3, 1997 was effectively a preliminary
mandatory injunction because it "directed [herein petitioners] to restore peacefully to the
[herein respondents] possession of the golf course, clubhouse, offices and other
appurtenances subject of the Lease and Development Agreement between UIG Taiwan and
the SBMA." In addition, it was also a prohibitive injunction because it restrained petitioners
from obstructing or meddling in the operation and management of the disputed property.

The records, however, do not show that herein respondents were indubitably entitled to a
mandatory writ. Under the LDA, we find no proof of a "clear and unmistakable right" on their
part to continue the operation and the development of the golf course. Indeed, the RTC
based its assailed Order mainly on the ground that SBMAs takeover was "not legally
justifiable." Thus, it ruled in this wise:30

"From all the foregoing, the Court is of the considered view that the forcible take over [by] the
[petitioners] of the golf course and its appurtenances is not legally justifiable. Based on the
evidence adduced during the hearing, the [respondents] have established a clear right to
continue the operation and management of the golf course, and x x x continued withholding
of the premises by the [petitioners] will result to irreparable damages to [respondents]."
Furthermore, the CA did not make any categorical ruling that respondents established a
"clear and unmistakable right" to the Writ. Like the RTC, it emphasized that there was "no
rationalization" for SBMAs extrajudicial takeover of the disputed property. In other words,
both the CA and the trial court effectively ruled that respondents are entitled to the Writ of
Mandatory Injunction because SBMAs action was not in accordance with law.

On this point, we disagree with the trial and the appellate courts. As we will now show, there
is legal basis for petitioners rescission of the contract and takeover of the property without
any court order.

(c) Legality of SBMAs Rescission of the LDA and Takeover of the Property

Because of UIGs failure to comply with several of its contractual undertakings, SBMA
rescinded the LDA and took over the possession, the operation and the management of the
property without any judicial imprimatur. In doing so, it relied on the provisions of the LDA,
which we quoted earlier.

The Court of Appeals held that the extrajudicial rescission of the LDA was lawful, but that the
extrajudicial takeover of the property was not. It relied on Nera v. Vacante,31 in which the
Supreme Court held:

"x x x. A stipulation entitling one party to take possession of the land and building if the other
party violates the contract does not ex proprio vigore confer upon the former the right to take
possession thereof if objected to without judicial intervention and determination."

It also cited Zulueta v. Mariano,32 which reiterated the above-quoted ruling. That case was
purportedly applicable because it involved a similar contractual stipulation, which reads as
follows:

"12. That upon failure of the BUYER to fulfill any of the conditions herein stipulated, BUYER
automatically and irrevocably authorizes OWNER to recover extra-judicially, physical
possession of the land, building and other improvements which are subject of this contract,
and to take possession also extra-judicially whatever personal properties may be found
within the aforesaid premises from the date of said failure to answer for whatever unfulfilled
monetary obligations BUYER may have with OWNER; and this contract shall be considered
as without force and effect also from said date; x x x."

Because Zulueta was a subsequent Decision, it supposedly overturned the "diametrically

opposed" earlier ruling in Consing v. Jamandre,33 in which the Supreme Court upheld a
contractual stipulation authorizing the sub-lessor to take possession of the leased premises
in case of contractual breach. As earlier noted, the CA also ruled that Consing was a "judicial
aberration."

We disagree. At the outset, it should be underscored that these cases are not "diametrically
opposed" to each other. In fact, they coexist. It should be noted also that the CA erred in
holding that Zulueta, being a later case, overturned Consing. The CA logic is flawed,
because after the promulgation of Zulueta, Consing was reiterated in 1991 in Viray v. IAC.34

Moreover, Zulueta and Nera recognized the validity and the effectivity of a contractual
provision authorizing the extrajudicial rescission of a contract and the concomitant recovery
of possession. Like Nera, Zulueta merely added the qualification that the stipulation "has
legal effect x x x where the other party does not oppose it. Where it is objected to, a judicial
determination of the issues is still necessary." Significantly, they did not categorically rule
that such stipulation was void.

In fact, the stipulation is lawful. In Consing, the Court held that "this kind of contractual
stipulation is not illegal, there being nothing in the law proscribing such kind of
agreement."35 Affirming this ruling, the Court in Viray v. IAC36reiterated that the stipulation
"was in the nature of a resolutory condition, for upon the exercise by the sub-lessor of his
right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is deemed terminated."

UP v. De los Angeles37 is instructive on this point. Pursuant to a stipulation similar to that in

the present case, the University of the Philippines (UP) rescinded its Logging Agreement
with ALUMCO and subsequently appointed another concessionaire to take over the logging
operation. Hence, the issue was "whether [P]etitioner UP can treat its contract with ALUMCO
rescinded, and may disregard the same before any judicial pronouncement to that effect."
Ruling in favor of UP, the Court held that a party could enforce such stipulation:

"[T]he party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded, and act
accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk. For it is only the
final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the
action taken was or was not correct in law. But the law definitely does not require that the
contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before
taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the others
breach will have to passively sit and watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of
the suit until the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he
should exercise due diligence to minimize its own damages." (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court also noted that the rescission was "provisional" and "subject to scrutiny and
review by the proper court." It further noted that "if the other party denies that rescission is
justified, it is free to resort to judicial action in its own behalf, and bring the matter to court." It
observed that the "practical effect of the stipulation [was] to transfer to the defaulter the
initiative of instituting suit, instead of the rescinder."

In the present case, it is clear that the subject stipulation is allowed by law. Moreover, a party
is free to enforce it by rescinding the contract and recovering possession of the property
even without court intervention. Where it is objected to, however, a judicial determination of
the issue is still necessary.38 Force or bloodshed cannot be justified in the enforcement of the
stipulation. Where the lessees offer physical resistance, the lessors may apply for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, to which they have a clear and unmistakable right. Indeed,
courts are the final arbiters.

Thus, contrary to the ruling of the CA and the RTC, there is a rationalization and a legal
justification for the stipulation authorizing SBMA to rescind the contract and to take over the
property.

No Valid Objection on the Part of Respondents

As earlier observed, there were several violations39 of the LDA, which were duly reported by
SBMA to UIG. Respondents, however, did not deny or controvert them. Effectively, therefore,
they offered no valid or sufficient objection to SBMAs exercise of its stipulated right to
extrajudicially rescind the LDA and take over the property in case of material breach.
First, the Amended Complaint merely argued that the takeover was "grounded upon a void
provision of the agreement."40 It did not controvert the grounds for SBMAs exercise of its
rights under the subject stipulation. Indeed, glaring was respondents failure to deny the
alleged violations of the LDA.

Second, Respondent UIG was given several opportunities by SBMA to explain the alleged
violations. Instead of controverting them, UIG instead indicated its willingness to comply with
all its undertakings. Hence, in its February 4, 1997 letter,41 SBMA called its attention to
several instances showing contractual breach. In response, UIGs counsel did not deny the
violations and instead apologized for the delay.42

Finding the response and the explanation unsatisfactory, SBMA, in a letter dated March 7,
1997, declared UIG in default and required it to explain why the LDA should not be
terminated. UIG did not submit any written explanation. Instead, its counsel called the SBMA
chief operating officer43 to inform him of its "commitment to undertake anew the remedial
measures regarding the matter."44

In its letter dated September 8, 1997, SBMA directed UIG to vacate the premises and to
settle its outstanding accounts. Finally, on September 12, 1997, SBMA served UIG a Notice
of Closure.45 It should be underscored that during all these exchanges, UIG did not controvert
its alleged noncompliance with the LDA.

Third, in the hearing for the application for a writ of mandatory injunction, respondents
presented two witnesses: Orlando de la Masa, operations manager of SBGCCI; and Danilo
Alabado, comptroller of UIGDC. De la Masa testified on the alleged forcible takeover by
SBMA, while Alabado testified that respondents had invested $12 million in the rehabilitation
of the golf course. Respondents, however, did not deny the violations of their undertaking,
which were explained by Atty. Raymond P. Ventura.46

Most significant, neither the CA nor the RTC made any finding that there was no breach on
the part of UIG. Likewise, they did not even make any observation that respondents had
1wphi1

controverted SBMAs claim.

Clearly, respondents stand was not a valid or sufficient objection to SBMAs exercise of its
right. Indeed, sustaining their claim would unduly diminish the force of such lawful stipulation
and allow parties to disregard it at will without any valid reason. In this case, respondents
miserably failed to give any semblance of objection to the merits of SBMAs allegations.
Moreover, we find no adequate showing of resistance to SBMAs implementation of the
subject stipulation.

Under the circumstances, SBMA showed that it had a right not only to rescind the contract,
but also to take over the property. On the other hand, respondents have not shown any
"clear and unmistakable right" to restrain SBMA from enforcing the contractual stipulation.
Indeed, they have offered no objection to SBMAs allegations of contractual breach. Without
prejudging their right to offer controverting evidence during the trial on the merits, the Court
holds that they failed to do so in their application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Epilogue

The Court of Appeals expressed its apprehension that a ruling against UIG would send a
message to foreign investors that we "are a group of jingoists." We do not share that view.
Jingoism is not an issue here. Far from it. In partially reversing the CA, this Court is merely
performing its mandate to do justice and to apply the law to the facts of the case. It is merely
affirming the message that in this country, the rule of law prevails; and contracts freely
entered into, whether by foreign or by local investors, must be complied with. Indeed, rule of
law and faithfulness in the performance of contracts are cherished values everywhere.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSEDand SET ASIDE insofar as it affirmed the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued by the trial court. The said Writ is hereby LIFTED and the case REMANDED to the
RTC for trial on the merits. In the meantime, respondents shall, upon finality of this Decision,
yield the possession, the operation and the management of the subject property to SBMA.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.