Independent Civil Actions

A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-Delicto) (Art 29 and Art 30, Civil Code)

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not the acquittal is due to that ground.

Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense,
and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute
the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the
civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex
delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are
suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished
when the court hearing the criminal action declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. [ see Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, G.R. Nos. 175256 and 179160, August 23, 2012]

An acquittal of the accused predicated on the conclusion 'that the guilt of the defendant has not been
satisfactorily established,' is equivalent to one on reasonable doubt and does not preclude a suit to
enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission under Article 29 of the new Civil Code. [see
Mendoza vs Alacala, G.R. No. L-14305, August 29, 1961]

If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the offended party or private
complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but
only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended
party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or
mandamus,if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party
has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [see Mobilia
Products, Inc. vs. Hajime Umezawa, G.R. No. 149357, March 4, 2005]

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When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal action,
whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior filing of a separate civil
action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor. The civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes
subsequent proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal. Consequently, if the state pursues an
appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the accused and private
complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action,the civil liability ex delicto that
is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private
complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the
doctrine of non-forum shopping. [see Garcia vs. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. G.R. No. 172505, October 1,
2014]

B. Civil Liability Not arising from a Criminal Offense (Art 31 in relation to Art 32, 33, 34, 2176, 2177
Civil Code)

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.

(1) Culpa Contractual

Art 31 of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a
criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract.

To illustrate, a passenger of a common carrier vehicle was injured while being transported to his
destination due to the reckless negligence of the driver in operating the vehicle. The injured passenger
will have cause to bring criminal charges against the driver for criminal negligence. In such event, civil
liability (ex-declicto) may also be recovered because every person who is criminally liable is also civilly
liable. (Art 100, Revised Penal Code)

This notwithstanding, the injured passenger may bring a separate and independent civil action for
damages against the common carrier, not on the basis of the criminal negligence of the driver, but on the
basis of breach of contractual liability of the common carrier due to its failure to carry safely the
passenger to their place of destination. The action for civil liability arising from contract (culpa contractual)
may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of, the criminal action
against the driver (culpa criminal). [see Bernaldes, Sr. vs Bohol Land Transportation, Inc. G.R. No.
L-18193, February 27, 1963]

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(2) Culpa Aquiliana (Quasi-delict)

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Art 31 of the Civil Code also refers to actions for damages based on tort or quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana)
under Article 2176.

Consequently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict may lie against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. Moreover, the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. [see Elcano vs Hill, G.R. No. L-24803,
May, 26, 1977]

(3) Violation of Constitutional Rights (Art 32)

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

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(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad
faith. [see Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999; Lim vs Ponce de
Leon, G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975]

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Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression, joint tortfeasors. [see Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2,
1999 in relation to Aberca vs Ver, G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988]

(4) Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art 33)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

As a rule, after a criminal action has been commenced, a civil action arising from the same offense shall
be suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. However, by way of
exception, Article 33 provides for instances where the injured party need not wait for the conclusion of
the criminal action in order to proceed with the civil action. Specifically, in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages may simultaneously and separately be filed by the injured
party which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and would only require a
preponderance of evidence.

When the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed
independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the court's
disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so
because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned,
that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action. [ see Salta vs De Veyra, G.R. No. L-37733 September 30,
1982]

The term "physical injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide. [Dyogi vs Yatco, G.R.
No. L-9623, January 22, 1957]. Consequently, even while a criminal case for homicide is still pending, a
separate civil action for damages (on the ground of physical injuries resulting in death) under Art 33 may
still be proceeded upon. Such civil action shall likewise not be subordinate to the outcome of the criminal
proceeding, such that even if the defendant is acquitted, the civil action may still prosper, since liability is
not based on civil liability ex delicto but based on a separate provision of law, i.e. Art 33 of the Civil Code.

In contrast, however, where the offense charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, there is
no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence,
homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the
acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal
act. [see Corpus vs Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969]

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An acquittal from a charge for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act would not be a bar to
civil action based on the same fraudulent acts for which the criminal action was filed.[ see Salta vs De
Veyra, G.R. No. L-37733 September 30, 1982]

Note: Article 33 speaks of a situation where an act which constitutes a crime gives rise to two modes of
recovering civil liability: (a) civil liability ex delicto under Art 100 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Art 29, Civil Code and (b) civil liability under Art 33 of the Civil Code, but only for those acts constituting
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Under the first mode, the action to recover civil liability is
suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is likewise
extinguished upon the acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. Under the second mode, the civil action need not await nor depend
on the outcome of the criminal action since it may proceed independently of the latter. However, under
Art 2177 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

(5) Failure or Refusal to Render Aid by a Peace Officer (Art 34)

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to
support such action.

C. No Need to Reserve Independent Civil Action

Section 3, Rule 111 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (as amended last
December 1, 2000) reads:

Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)

The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions
referred to in Articles 32, 33,34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and
independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
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The consequences of such revision and omission are:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act
or omission.

Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime
or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such remaining civil interest
therein. By the same token, the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal case
acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil liability ex delicto. [see
Neplum, Inc. vs Orbeso, G.R. No. 141986, July 11, 2002]

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