Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Labor Rel Case 1
Labor Rel Case 1
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA (OWNED AND OPERATED BY GRAND PLAZA HOTEL
CORPORATION)Petitioner,
vs.
PINAG-ISANG GALING AT LAKAS NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HERITAGE MANILA (PIGLAS-
HERITAGE),Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a companys objections to the registration of its rank and file union for non-
compliance with the requirements of its registration.
Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila (petitioner
company) formed the "Heritage Hotel Employees Union" (the HHE union). The Department of Labor
and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of registration1 to
this union.
Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for certification election2 that petitioner company
opposed. The company alleged that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be an independent
union, when it was, in truth, a local chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant
and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN). The company claimed that the HHE union intentionally omitted
disclosure of its affiliation with NUWHRAIN because the companys supervisors union was already
affiliated with it.3 Thus, the company also filed a petition for the cancellation of the HHE unions
registration certificate.4
Meanwhile, the Med-Arbiter granted the HHE unions petition for certification election.5 Petitioner
company appealed the decision to the Secretary of Labor but the latter denied the appeal.6 The
Secretary also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, prompting the company to file a
petition for certiorari7 with the Court of Appeals.
On October 12, 2001 the Court of Appeals issued a writ of injunction against the holding of the HHE
unions certification election, effective until the petition for cancellation of that unions registration
shall have been resolved with finality.8 The decision of the Court of Appeals became final when the
HHE union withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this Court.9
On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees of petitioner company held a meeting and
formed another union, the respondent Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa
Heritage Manila (the PIGLAS union). This union applied for registration with the DOLE-NCR10 and
got its registration certificate on February 9, 2004. Two months later, the members of the first union,
the HHE union, adopted a resolution for its dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for
cancellation of its union registration.11
On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a petition for certification election12 that
petitioner company also opposed, alleging that the new unions officers and members were also
those who comprised the old union. According to the company, the employees involved formed the
PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of Appeals injunction against the holding of the certification
election sought by the former union. Despite the companys opposition, however, the Med-Arbiter
granted the petition for certification election.13
On December 6, 2004 petitioner company filed a petition to cancel the union registration of
respondent PIGLAS union.14 The company claimed that the documents submitted with the unions
application for registration bore the following false information:
(a) The List of Members showed that the PIGLAS union had 100 union members;15
(b) The Organizational Minutes said that 90 employees attended the meeting on December
10, 2003;16
(c) The Attendance Sheet of the meeting of December 10, 2003 bore the signature of 127
members who ratified the unions Constitution and By-Laws;17 and
(d) The Signature Sheet bore 128 signatures of those who attended that meeting.18
Petitioner company alleged that the misrepresentation was evidenced by the discrepancy in the
number of union members appearing in the application and the list as well as in the number of
signatories to the attendance and signature sheets. The minutes reported that only 90 employees
attended the meeting. The company further alleged that 33 members of respondent PIGLAS union
were members of the defunct HHE union. This, according to the company, violated the policy against
dual unionism and showed that the new union was merely an alter ego of the old.
On February 22, 2005 the DOLE-NCR denied the companys petition to cancel respondent PIGLAS
unions registration for the reason that the discrepancies in the number of members stated in the
applications supporting documents were not material and did not constitute misrepresentation. As
for the charge of dual unionism, the same is not a ground for canceling registration. It merely
exposed a union member to a possible charge of disloyalty, an internal matter. Here, the members
of the former union simply exercised their right to self-organization and to the freedom of association
when they subsequently joined the PIGLAS union.19
On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relation (BLR) affirmed the ruling of the DOLE-NCR. It reasoned
that respondent PIGLAS unions organization meeting lasted for 12 hours. It was possible for the
number of attendees to have increased from 90 to 128 as the meeting progressed. Besides, with a
total of 250 employees in the bargaining unit, the union needed only 50 members to comply with the
20 percent membership requirement. Thus, the union could not be accused of misrepresentation
since it did not pad its membership to secure registration.
As for the issue of dual unionism, it has become moot and academic, said the BLR, because of the
dissolution of the old union and the cancellation of its certificate of registration.20
Petitioner company filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,21 assailing the order of the
BLR. But the latter court dismissed the petition, not being accompanied by material documents and
portions of the record.22 The company filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching parts of the record
that were deemed indispensable but the court denied it for lack of merit.23 Hence, the company filed
this petition for review under Rule 45.
Issues Presented
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari before it
for failure of petitioner company to attach certain material portions of the record;
2. Whether or not the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union
registration; and
First. While the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the companys petition initially for failure to
attach material portions of the record, the court should have bended back a little when petitioner
company subsequently attached those missing materials to its motion for reconsideration. As a
general rule, petitions for certiorari that lack copies of essential pleadings and portions of the record
may be dismissed but this rule has not been regarded as absolute. The omission may be cured.24
The Court of Appeals has three courses of action when the annexes to the petition are insufficient. It
may dismiss the petition,25 require the submission of the relevant documents, or order the filing of an
amended petition with the required pleadings or documents. A petition lacking in essential pleadings
or portions of the record may still be given due course, or reinstated if earlier dismissed, upon
subsequent submission of the necessary documents or to serve the higher interest of justice.26
Second. Since a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals for a determination of the substantive
issues will only result in more delays and since these issues have been amply argued by the
opposing sides in the various pleadings and documents they submitted to this Court, the case may
now be resolved on the merits.
Did respondent PIGLAS union commit fraud and misrepresentation in its application for union
registration? We agree with the DOLE-NCR and the BLR that it did not. Except for the evident
discrepancies as to the number of union members involved as these appeared on the documents
that supported the unions application for registration, petitioner company has no other evidence of
the alleged misrepresentation. But those discrepancies alone cannot be taken as an indication that
respondent misrepresented the information contained in these documents.
The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its
registration is a serious charge and deserves close scrutiny. It is serious because once such charge
is proved, the labor union acquires none of the rights accorded to registered organizations.
Consequently, charges of this nature should be clearly established by evidence and the surrounding
circumstances.27
Here, the discrepancies in the number of union members or employees stated in the various
supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union submitted to labor authorities can be
explained. While it appears in the minutes of the December 10, 2003 organizational meeting that
only 90 employees responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be assumed that such
number could not grow to 128 as reflected on the signature sheet for attendance. The meeting
lasted 12 hours from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. There is no evidence that the meeting hall was locked
up to exclude late attendees.1 a vv p h i 1
There is also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the fact that only 127 members ratified
the unions constitution and by-laws when 128 signed the attendance sheet. It cannot be assumed
that all those who attended approved of the constitution and by-laws. Any member had the right to
hold out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply ignore the process.
At any rate, the Labor Code28 and its implementing rules29 do not require that the number of
members appearing on the documents in question should completely dovetail. For as long as the
documents and signatures are shown to be genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws
democratically ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration requirements.
Petitioner company claims that respondent PIGLAS union was required to submit the names
of all its members comprising at least 20 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list
it submitted named only 100 members notwithstanding that the signature and attendance sheets
reflected a membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission, said the company, amounted to
material misrepresentation that warranted the cancellation of the unions registration.
But, as the labor authorities held, this discrepancy is immaterial. A comparison of the documents
shows that, except for six members, the names found in the subject list are also in the attendance
and signature sheets. Notably, the bargaining unit that respondent PIGLAS union sought to
represent consisted of 250 employees. Only 20 percent of this number or 50 employees were
required to unionize. Here, the union more than complied with such requirement.
Labor laws are liberally construed in favor of labor especially if doing so would affirm its
constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization.30 Here, the PIGLAS unions supporting
documents reveal the unmistakable yearning of petitioner companys rank and file employees to
organize. This yearning should not be frustrated by inconsequential technicalities.
Third. The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS unions members were also members of the old
rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new unions registration. The
right of any person to join an organization also includes the right to leave that organization and join
another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to exist and its certificate of registration had
already been cancelled. Thus, petitioners arguments on this point may also be now regarded as
moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in BLR-A-26-3-05 dated May 26, 2006.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL G.R. No. 162355
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR CORONA,
AND EMPLOYMENT and CHICO-NAZARIO,*and
STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
CORPORATION WORKERS
ASSOCIATION (CLUP LOCAL
CHAPTER), Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 14, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Facts
In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-
SLECCWAs petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The
prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and
SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for direct
certification. SMSLEC is entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges, and obligations of
an exclusive bargaining representative from the time of the recording of the
voluntary recognition. Moreover, the duly registered CBA bars the filing of the
petition for direct certification.
CLUP-SLECCWA filed a Memorandum of Appeal of the Med-Arbiters Order before the Secretary.
SO DECIDED.[5]
SLECC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Secretary denied for lack
of merit in a Resolution dated 27 March 2003. SLECC then filed a petition for
certiorari before the appellate court.
The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary and quoted extensively from
the Secretarys decision. The appellate court agreed with the Secretarys finding that
the workers sought to be represented by CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers
Union included the same workers in the bargaining unit represented by
SMSLEC. SMSLEC was not the only legitimate labor organization operating in the
subject bargaining unit at the time of SMSLECs voluntary recognition on 20 July
2001. Thus, SMSLECs voluntary recognition was void and could not bar CLUP-
SLECCWAs petition for certification election.
The Issue
SLECC raised only one issue in its petition. SLECC asserted that the appellate court
commited a reversible error when it affirmed the Secretarys finding that SLECCs
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor organization
was in existence in the bargaining unit.
The petition has no merit. We see no reason to overturn the rulings of the Secretary and
of the appellate court.
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment.Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional
Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate
indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. [6] Any
applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of
the certificate of registration.[7]
Bargaining Unit
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but
related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining
unit in San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma,[8]where we stated that:
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Unions initial problem was that they
constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining
unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-
registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of
SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union
was a legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-
SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article
239 of the Labor Code.[10] THUS, CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS
UNION, HAVING BEEN VALIDLY ISSUED A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION,
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING ACQUIRED JURIDICAL PERSONALITY
WHICH MAY NOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. THE PROPER PROCEDURE
FOR SLECC IS TO FILE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF
REGISTRATION[11]OF CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION
AND NOT TO IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
PROCEEDINGS WITH SMSLEC.
We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-
SLECCWAs petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election, the
employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters
decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to
bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us.[13]
THIRD DIVISION
CARPIO,* J.,
VELASCO, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
-versus- ABAD, and
SERENO,**JJ.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The issues in the present case, relating to the inclusion of employees in supervisor
levels 3 and 4 and the exempt employees in the proposed bargaining unit, thereby
allowing their participation in the certification election; the application of the
community or mutuality of interests test; and the determination of the employees
who belong to the category of confidential employees, are not novel.
In G.R. No. 110399, entitled San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and
Exempt Union v. Laguesma,[1] the Court held that even if they handle confidential
data regarding technical and internal business operations, supervisory employees 3
and 4 and the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) are
not to be considered confidential employees, because the same do not pertain to labor
relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances. Consequently, they
were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the three
different plants of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in
Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having community or mutuality of interests,
constitute a single bargaining unit. They perform work of the same nature, receive
the same wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in
concerted activities. It was immaterial that the three plants have different locations
as they did not impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.[2]
Pursuant to the Court's decision in G.R. No. 110399, the Department of Labor and
Employment National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) conducted pre-election
conferences.[3] However, there was a discrepancy in the list of eligible voters, i.e.,
petitioner submitted a list of 23 employees for the San Fernando plant and 33 for the
Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and 82, respectively.[4]
On September 30, 1998, a certification election was conducted and it yielded the
following results,[6] thus:
Cabuyao San Fernando Total
Plant Plant
Yes 23 23 46
No 0 0 0
Spoiled 2 0 2
Segregated 41 35 76
Total Votes
Cast 66 58 124
On the date of the election, September 30, 1998, petitioner filed the Omnibus
Objections and Challenge to Voters,[7] questioning the eligibility to vote by some of
its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong to the bargaining
unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of employer-
employee relationship with petitioner. Specifically, it argued that certain employees
should not be allowed to vote as they are: (1) confidential employees; (2) employees
assigned to the live chicken operations, which are not covered by the bargaining unit;
(3) employees whose job grade is level 4, but are performing managerial work and
scheduled to be promoted; (4) employees who belong to the Barrio Ugong plant; (5)
non-SMFI employees; and (6) employees who are members of other unions.
On October 21, 1998, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directing respondent
to submit proof showing that the employees in the submitted list are covered by the
original petition for certification election and belong to the bargaining unit it seeks
to represent and, likewise, directing petitioner to substantiate the allegations
contained in its Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters.[8]
In compliance thereto, respondent averred that (1) the bargaining unit contemplated
in the original petition is the Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation, now
known as San Miguel Foods, Inc.; (2) it covered the operations in Calamba, Laguna,
Cavite, and Batangas and its home base is either in Cabuyao, Laguna or San
Fernando, Pampanga; and (3) it submitted individual and separate declarations of
the employees whose votes were challenged in the election.[9]
Adding the results to the number of votes canvassed during the September 30, 1998
certification election, the final tally showed that: number of eligible voters 149;
number of valid votes cast 121; number of spoiled ballots - 3; total number of votes
cast 124, with 118 (i.e., 46 + 72 = 118 ) Yes votes and 3 No votes.[10]
The Med-Arbiter issued the Resolution[11] dated February 17, 1999 directing
the parties to appear before the Election Officer of the Labor Relations Division on
March 9, 1999, 10:00 a.m., for the opening of the segregated ballots. Thereafter, on
April 12, 1999, the segregated ballots were opened, showing that out of the 76
segregated
votes, 72 were cast for Yes and 3 for No, with one spoiled ballot.[12]
Based on the results, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order[13] dated April 13, 1999,
stating that since the Yes vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, respondent is
certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt
employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis.
On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution[14] dated July
30, 1999, in OS-A-2-70-91 (NCR-OD-M-9010-017), affirmed the Order dated April
13, 1999, with modification that George C. Matias, Alma Maria M. Lozano,
Joannabel T. Delos Reyes, and Marilyn G. Pajaron be excluded from the bargaining
unit which respondent seeks to represent. She opined that the challenged voters
should be excluded from the bargaining unit, because Matias and Lozano are
members of Magnolia Poultry Processing Plants Monthly Employees Union, while
Delos Reyes and Pajaron are employees of San Miguel Corporation, which is a
separate and distinct entity from petitioner.
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration[15] dated August 14, 1999 was
denied by the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary in the Order[16] dated August 27,
1999.
Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF THE
BARGAINING UNIT DEFINED BY THIS COURT'S RULING IN G.R. NO.
110399.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM
JURISPRUDENCE - SPECIFICALLY, THIS COURT'S DEFINITION OF A
CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE - WHEN IT RULED FOR THE INCLUSION OF
THE PAYROLL MASTER POSITION IN THE BARGAINING UNIT.
III.
WHETHER THIS PETITION IS A REHASH OR A RESURRECTION OF THE
ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. NO. 110399, AS ARGUED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
Thus, applying the ruling to the present case, the Court affirms the finding of
the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for
the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis[25] of Magnolia Poultry Products
Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged
in live chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working
conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions
do not affect or impede their commonality of interest. Although they seem separate
and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually
interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a
single bargaining unit.
Petitioner asserts that the CA erred in not excluding the position of Payroll
Master in the definition of a confidential employee and, thus, prays that the said
position and all other positions with access to salary and compensation data be
excluded from the bargaining unit.
This argument must fail. Confidential employees are defined as those who (1)
assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.[26] The
two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered
a confidential employee - that is, the confidential relationship must exist between
the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of
employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management
policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished
by the confidential employee rule.[27]
Corollarily, although Article 245[30] of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility
to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees,
jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work
are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and,
hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential
records.[31] Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file
bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join
any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees, because
if allowed to be affiliated with a union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty
in view of evident conflict of interests and the union can also become company-
denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the union
membership.[32] Having access to confidential information, confidential employees
may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy
or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.[33]
In this regard, the CA correctly ruled that the positions of Human Resource
Assistant and Personnel Assistant belong to the category of confidential employees
and, hence, are excluded from the bargaining unit, considering their respective
positions and job descriptions. As Human Resource Assistant,[34] the scope of ones
work necessarily involves labor relations, recruitment and selection of employees,
access to employees' personal files and compensation package, and human resource
management. As regards a Personnel Assistant,[35] one's work includes the recording
of minutes for management during collective bargaining negotiations, assistance to
management during grievance meetings and administrative investigations, and
securing legal advice for labor issues from the petitioners team of lawyers, and
implementation of company programs.Therefore, in the discharge of their functions,
both gain access to vital labor relations information which outrightly disqualifies
them from union membership.
The proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature and,
therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.[36] Applying the
doctrine of res judicata, the issue in the
present case pertaining to the coverage of the employees who would constitute the
bargaining unit is now a foregone conclusion.
It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers;
hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. The general rule is that
an employer has no standing to question the process of certification election, since
this is the sole concern of the workers.[37] Law and policy demand that employers
take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative
of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management.
A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the
employees alone and to no other.[38] The only exception is where the employer itself
has to file the petition pursuant to Article 258[39] of the Labor Code because of a
request to bargain collectively.[40]
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court writes finis to the issues raised so
as to forestall future suits of similar nature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2000 and
Resolution dated November 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
55510, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions dated July 30, 1999 and
August 27, 1999 of the Secretary of Labor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
Promulgated:
CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, June 6, 2011
INC.,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Courts Decision
dated November 15, 2010.
This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law, because
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound
to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by
the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties
and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any
of the following recognized exceptions:
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court on
whether the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the former giving scant
consideration thereon, and the latter affording it more weight.
As found by the Secretary of Labor, the MOA came about as a result of the
constitution, at respondents behest, of the Labor-Management Council (LMC)
which, he reminded the parties, should not be used as an avenue for bargaining but
for the purpose of affording workers to participate in policy and decision-
making. Hence, the agreements embodied in the MOA were not the proper subject
of the LMC deliberation or procedure but of CBA negotiations and, therefore,
deserving little weight.
The appellate court, held, however, that the Secretary did not have the
authority to give an arbitral award higher than what was stated in the MOA. The
conflicting views drew the Court to re-evaluate the facts as borne by the records, an
exception to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with in an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45.
The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the minutes of
the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the rule on parol
evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence, should
not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW
v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. [8] teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor
cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling.
Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and
technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded
from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary
to, what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence because it
was validly entered into by the parties, the Court notes that even those who signed
it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the MOA can
be treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must thus be given a
liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a narrow and technical construction, with
due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which
it is intended.[9]
As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW
during the pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing its personality to
represent the Union, the same does not affect the Courts upholding of the authority
of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what was supposedly
agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to respondents assertion, the unavoidable issue
of disaffiliation bears no significant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of the
Courts Decision.
SECTION 2. Coverage. Other related labor relations disputes shall include any
conflict between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or group that is
not a labor organization or workers association. This includes: (1) cancellation of
registration of unions and workers associations; and (2) a petition for
interpleader.[10] (emphasis supplied)
Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW went against the will and wishes of its
principal (the member-employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the
MOA, is not for the Court, nor for respondent to determine, but for the Union and
FFW to resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the September 18, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72848 which found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) which ruled in favor of Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda (KML). Also
assailed is the September 14, 2005 Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On June 6, 2001, KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando,
Pampanga, a Petition for Certification Election[1] docketed as Case No. RO300-0106-RU-
001. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization of the rank and file employees
of Legend International Resorts Limited (LEGEND). KML claimed that it was issued its
Certificate of Registration No. RO300-0105-UR-002 by the DOLE on May 18, 2001.
LEGEND moved to dismiss[2] the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate labor
organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and supervisory
employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code.LEGEND also claimed that KML
committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain
employees attended its general membership meeting on April 5, 2001 when in reality some
of them were either at work; have already resigned as of March 2001; or were abroad.
In its Comment,[3] KML argued that even if 41 of its members are indeed supervisory
employees and therefore excluded from its membership, the certification election could
still proceed because the required number of the total rank and file employees necessary
for certification purposes is still sustained. KML also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor
union could not be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings but only
through a separate and independent action for cancellation of union registration. Finally, as
to the alleged acts of misrepresentation, KML asserted that LEGEND failed to substantiate
its claim.
On September 20, 2001, the Med-Arbiter[4] rendered judgment[5] dismissing for lack of
merit the petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter found that indeed there were
several supervisory employees in KMLs membership.Since Article 245 of the Labor Code
expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining the union of rank and file
employees, the Med-Arbiter concluded that KML is not a legitimate labor
organization. KML was also found to have fraudulently procured its registration certificate
by misrepresenting that 70 employees were among those who attended its organizational
meeting on April 5, 2001 when in fact they were either at work or elsewhere.
On May 22, 2002, the Office of the Secretary of DOLE rendered its Decision[6] granting
KMLs appeal thereby reversing and setting aside the Med-Arbiters Decision. The Office
of the Secretary of DOLE held that KMLs legitimacy as a union could not be collaterally
attacked, citing Section 5,[7] Rule V of Department Order No. 9, series of 1997.
The Office of the Secretary of DOLE also opined that Article 245 of the Labor Code
merely provides for the prohibition on managerial employees to form or join a union and
the ineligibility of supervisors to join the union of the rank and file employees and vice
versa. It declared that any violation of the provision of Article 245 does not ipso
facto render the existence of the labor organization illegal. Moreover, it held that Section
11, paragraph II of Rule XI which provides for the grounds for dismissal of a petition for
certification election does not include mixed membership in one union.
The dispositive portion of the Office of the Secretary of DOLEs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the order of the Med-
Arbiter dated 20 September 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let the entire record of the case be remanded to the regional office
of origin for the immediate conduct of the certification election, subject to the
usual pre-election conference, among the rank and file employees of LEGEND
INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED with the following choices:
2. NO UNION.
Pursuant to Rule XI, Section II.1 of D.O. No. 9, the employer is hereby
directed to submit to the office of origin, within ten days from receipt of the
decision, the certified list of employees in the bargaining unit for the last three
(3) months prior to the issuance of this decision.
SO DECIDED.[8]
LEGEND filed its Motion for Reconsideration[9] reiterating its earlier arguments. It
also alleged that on August 24, 2001, it filed a Petition[10] for Cancellation of Union
Registration of KML docketed as Case No. RO300-0108-CP-001 which was granted[11] by
the DOLE Regional Office No. III of San Fernando, Pampanga in its Decision[12] dated
November 7, 2001.
In a Resolution[13] dated August 20, 2002, the Office of the Secretary of DOLE
denied LEGENDs motion for reconsideration. It opined that Section 11, paragraph II(a),
Rule XI of Department Order No. 9 requires a final order of cancellation before a petition
for certification election may be dismissed on the ground of lack of legal
personality. Besides, it noted that the November 7, 2001 Decision of DOLE Regional
Office No. III of San Fernando, Pampanga in Case No. RO300-0108-CP-001 was reversed
by the Bureau of Labor Relations in a Decision dated March 26, 2002.
Undeterred, LEGEND filed a Petition for Certiorari[14] with the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 72848. LEGEND alleged that the Office of the Secretary of DOLE
gravely abused its discretion in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Med-Arbiter
despite substantial and overwhelming evidence against KML.
For its part, KML alleged that the Decision dated March 26, 2002 of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in Case No. RO300-0108-CP-001 denying LEGENDs petition for
cancellation and upholding KMLs legitimacy as a labor organization has already become
final and executory, entry of judgment having been made on August 21, 2002.[15]
The Office of the Secretary of DOLE also filed its Comment[16] asserting that KMLs
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Finally, the Office of the Secretary of DOLE
stressed that LEGEND has no legal personality to participate in the certification election
proceedings.
On September 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[17] finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE. The appellate court
held that the issue on the legitimacy of KML as a labor organization has already been
settled with finality in Case No. RO300-0108-CP-001. The March 26, 2002 Decision of
the Bureau of Labor Relations upholding the legitimacy of KML as a labor organization
had long become final and executory for failure of LEGEND to appeal the same. Thus,
having already been settled that KML is a legitimate labor organization, the latter could
properly file a petition for certification election. There was nothing left for the Office of the
Secretary of DOLE to do but to order the holding of such certification election.
LEGEND filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] alleging, among others, that it has
appealed to the Court of Appeals the March 26, 2002 Decision in Case No. RO300-0108-
CP-001 denying its petition for cancellation and that it is still pending resolution.
On September 14, 2005, the appellate court denied LEGENDs motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone assignment of error, viz:
Petitioners Arguments
LEGEND submits that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that the March 26,
2002 Decision denying its Petition for Cancellation of KMLs registration has already
become final and executory. It asserts that it has seasonably filed a Petition
for Certiorari[21] before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72659 assailing said
Decision. In fact, on June 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the
March 26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations and reinstated the November
7, 2001 Decision of the DOLE Regional Office III ordering the cancellation of KMLs
registration.
Finally, LEGEND posits that the cancellation of KMLs certificate of registration should
retroact to the time of its issuance.[22] It thus claims that the petition for certification election
and all of KMLs activities should be nullified because it has no legal personality to file the
same, much less demand collective bargaining with LEGEND.[23]
LEGEND thus prays that the September 20, 2001 Decision of the Med-Arbiter dismissing
KMLs petition for certification election be reinstated.[24]
Respondents Arguments
In its Comment filed before this Court dated March 21, 2006, KML insists that the
Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations upholding its legitimacy as a labor organization
has already attained finality[25] hence there was no more hindrance to the holding of a
certification election. Moreover, it claims that the instant petition has become moot
because the certification election sought to be prevented had already been conducted.
Our Ruling
This is inaccurate. Records show that (in the cancellation of registration case)
LEGEND has timely filed on September 6, 2002 a petition for certiorari[26] before the
Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72659 assailing the March 26,
2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. In fact, KML received a copy of said
petition on September 10, 2002[27] and has filed its Comment thereto on December 2,
2002.[28] Thus, we find it quite interesting for KML to claim in its Comment (in the
certification petition case) before this Court dated March 21, 2006[29] that the Bureau of
Labor Relations Decision in the petition for cancellation case has already attained
finality. Even in its Memorandum[30] dated March 13, 2007 filed before us, KML is still
insisting that the Bureau of Labor Relations Decision has become final and executory.
Our perusal of the records shows that on June 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision[31] in CA-G.R. SP No. 72659 reversing the March 26, 2002 Decision
of the Bureau of Labor Relations and reinstating the November 7, 2001 Decision of the
Med-Arbiter which canceled the certificate of registration of KML.[32] On September 30,
2005, KMLs motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.[33] On November 25,
2005, KML filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari[34] before this Court which was
docketed as G.R. No. 169972. However, the same was denied in a Resolution[35] dated
February 13, 2006 for having been filed out of time. KML moved for reconsideration but
it was denied with finality in a Resolution[36] dated June 7, 2006. Thereafter, the said
Decision canceling the certificate of registration of KML as a labor organization became
final and executory and entry of judgment was made on July 18, 2006.[37]
This issue is not new or novel. In Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Labor,[38] we already ruled that:
In Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,[40] we also held that the pendency
of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective
bargaining.[41] Citing the Secretary of Labor, we held viz:
We agree with the ruling of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE that the legitimacy
of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification
election proceeding. This is in consonance with our ruling in Laguna Autoparts
Manufacturing Corporation v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment[49] that such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only
through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it.[50] We further
held therein that:
Hence, to raise the issue of the respondent unions legal personality is not
proper in this case. The pronouncement of the Labor Relations Division Chief,
that the respondent union acquired a legal personality x x x cannot be challenged
in a petition for certification election.
SO ORDERED.