Civil

Law

MUST READ CASES (CIVIL LAW)

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)

If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the said date,
subject to the requirement of publication. The clause unless otherwise provided refers
to the date of effectivity and not the to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted.

LA BUAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS, G.R. No. 127882,

January 27, 2004

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a
ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the fundamental, paramount
and supreme law of the nation," is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process
clause, which, so Taada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into
Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section
1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines," finds suppletory application. It is
significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on
August 3, 1987.

Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988

The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because lawyers in the
active practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published in advanced reports and the SCRA.

Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000

The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity of the New
Civil Code. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested
rights.

Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985

The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of its enactment since the courts application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985

Civil Law

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad,

RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)

Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the defamatory words
on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected his business as well as because other people have come
to know of said defamatory words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the
petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to Dionela.

Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)

Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to article 21 of the new civil
code not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind
it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000

A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade but was later
on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor
who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being
his employer.

SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting
the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014
Civil Law

The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader than that
covered by intellectual property laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair
competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."

Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961

It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the abortion of appellees wife,
without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act,
that cannot be to severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her
husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal
basis.

Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil
code.

Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127

Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of marriage license
is enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage contract
of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA 446

Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a non-resident

invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication
are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage

Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day because their cohabitation is not exclusive. The Court ruled that the
cohabitation contemplated under said provisions must be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract and characterized by exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved
at anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that is unbroken.

Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958

Civil Law

The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from the marriage
license. Even if there is failure on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the
necessary affidavit, such irregularity will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is
not being required of the parties.

Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780.

October 16, 2013

A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is NOT
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that
the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said
Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA 637

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989

Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse having

obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint. The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and
by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
Civil Law

Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001

Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in the

Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005

Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)

The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of psychological

incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)

In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their marriage on
May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties of sexual cooperation for the procreation of children is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517

In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many military
officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced
to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage.
Civil Law

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No. 171577,

February 12, 2014

Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.

Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16

Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much
less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not
examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other
peoples recollection and opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did
not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic,
much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the
marriage.

Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)

If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological

incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.

VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this

case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272

Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of PI is a valid defense
for the crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.
Civil Law

Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order NO.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.

Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured
another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.

Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646

Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is
to be presumed dead starting October 1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in
the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.

Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code

CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061, 08 OCTOBER

2014

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic
fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of
the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties
have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Civil Law

Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321

Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal separation case
amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of non- appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for
the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco

lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion
is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.

Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the
name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption.

BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No. 172017 / G.R.
No. 171904 August 7, 2013

The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during
marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in
the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Moreover, when the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is
no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication
that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse. Moreover, the presumption
may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There
must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting it.

Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63

Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject
property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration
of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides
that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses
redeeming the property.

Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570

The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in
case the property is sold by the owner- spouse.
Civil Law

Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687 SCRA 414

Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal
indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against
the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article
have been covered." No prior liquidation of those assets is required.

MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246

Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of
Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties
until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1

Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The
Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in
this case. The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public
policy.

Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the
Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.

JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370, September 23,
2013

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this
case. Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a
similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity,
we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both
the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.

Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221
Civil Law

Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological
incapacity of the spouses. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses.

Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of
the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license

San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code

SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN

G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014

As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the applicable provision
governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent. In Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of
a land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the
husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled that the view that the disposal by
the wife of their conjugal property without the husbands consent is voidable is
supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the
husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required are annullable
at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on
September 22, 1986, one month after or specifically on November 25, 1986, Leonardo
died. Aurora as one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos
estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it
deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights.

Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666

Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not
just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it
stands. Thus,
Civil Law

applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject
land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence
20 years back

Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.

There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the

Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home
as contemplated by law

Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40

The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from
raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.

Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code.

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT

G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015

As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement
for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the
Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360

A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so

are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has
been paid and the amount thereof.

Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 585

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.

DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

Civil Law

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.

GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014

An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has expressly
recognized their filiation. However, the child is under no compulsion to use his fathers
surname. When Antonio recognized Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the
two children had the right to use the surname of Antonio. However, they were under no
compulsion or mandate to use the same. The law uses the word may, which dictates
that it is merely permissive.

Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523

In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249 SCRA 447

Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal impediment to
marry each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to
know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be
legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born,
there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran.

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,

A.K.A. MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO AND JAYROSE M. CASTRO vs JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough
to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588
SCRA 98
Civil Law

The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless
there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required.

Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357

A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite pendency of appeal.

De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176

Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child and the putative
father, made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation
and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent, however,
paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence.

Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296

It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely
on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not
be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case,
the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose
custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need,
therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative.

St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473

The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident.

Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA 253

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation,
or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter.

FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN

D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO
BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)
Civil Law

The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being
the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her
husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To
say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right
and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of

man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse
exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third
persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the
duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that
persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No. 175540, 14

April 2014

There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate

notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that
remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of
the deceased.

PROPERTY

Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009

International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said
services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The
construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its
coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication services and
business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law.

Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324

In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as Real Estate Mortgage
and Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate Mortgage if indeed their intention is
to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said
contract a separate LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken
together, evince the conclusion that the parties intention is to treat these units of
machinery as chattels.

Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982

Civil Law

SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station
building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the
gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within
the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982

While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree
of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco
for its operations.

Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514

Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation and cannot be
acquired by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the Land
Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents title.

Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to
public policy.

German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)

The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession, and not when possession has already been lost.

Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P-- 07-- 2399, Jun. 18, 2008

When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the
thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested
with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the
obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his
superior or his officemates that he found something.

Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land
on which he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and
that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.

Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005)

Civil Law

The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the
protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt
reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has
not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the
property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the
things possessed.

BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014

The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property with the
townhouses and other buildings and improvements that may be thereon without
indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to
demolish what has been built on the property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors;
or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of the land. As such, the Sanchezes must
choose from among these options within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision.
Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case
shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair market value
of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988.

Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995

Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless,
we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-
ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the
improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.

Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)

Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the
subject land is part of the public domain.

Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)

The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by
another person through prescription.

Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)

There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their ownership, as it is
subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident,
without need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the
private ownership of the owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be
considered as a trespasser.

Bahais v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012

Civil Law

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable requisites in an
action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an
action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal
or equitable title to or interest in the lots. The petitioners status as possessor and owner
of the lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the
Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the
petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the lots.

Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003

Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others, hence,
the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute.

Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008

Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did
not join, even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an
action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a co- heir who did
not join the earlier case should not be barred by prior judgment.

Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No. 179011. April 15,
2013

In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of
them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co- owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit
is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y.

GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No.
182314,
November 13, 2013

Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an
action for legal redemption, to the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not
the co-owner of a land subject of a compromise agreement cannot claim that he was
defrauded when the parties in the compromise agreement entered into the same. As a
third party to the agreement, he is not indispensable for the agreement to materialize.

Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006

Civil Law

One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary, is not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith.

Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical
occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired
not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action
of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right, possession can be acquired by juridical acts.

EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R. No.

194336, March 11, 2013

Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time
that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to
have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.

Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008

As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide
ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer
will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.

Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their
waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early
instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the
owner of private property creates an
Civil Law

artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding
any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive
nuisance."

Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011

The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons
and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 166330,
September 11, 2013

Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become
nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life
and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be
substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise
must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when
noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is
of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person
of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If
the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree,
and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and
conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a
nuisance.

Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000

The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate
instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in
the separate acceptance.

Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011

When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime; but
when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor
meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of
said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to
dispose of them freely.

Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998

Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the
condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the
condition within a reasonable period. Only then - when the non-fulfillment of the
resolutory condition was brought to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the
donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of
the deed of donation.
Civil Law

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.

Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011

While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not
preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein.
Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be
conclusive evidence of the subject properties' locations if both the stated and described
locations point to the same area.

Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012

Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as
such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims
of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some
grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had
been let into private ownership through the States imprimatur, such land is presumed to
belong to the State.

SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L. OPINION, G.R.

No. 176043. January 15, 2014

Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Since the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the certificate title in their name,
or at the very least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in the name of
Dulos Realty, have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their
claim.

LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen J.)

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the difference
between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to
registration of title on the basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the
registration of his property on the basis of prescription. Registration under the first mode
is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while
under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code.
Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the
30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
Civil Law

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461

Aliens mat not acquire private or public agricultural lands.

Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 113472, Dec. 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341.

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or only
to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public domain.

Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465

A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme, 146 SCRA 509

The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right
to own it is acquired and not the time to register ownership.

Tan vs. Republic April 16, 2012

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.
It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and
an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI

G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

Spouses Vallido v. Spouses Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173. April 15, 2013

It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go

beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are
circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or
inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants
thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued
Civil Law

piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants. The
burden of proving good faith lies with the second buyer (petitioners herein) which is not
discharged by simply invoking the ordinary presumption of good faith. After an
assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, this Court holds that the petitioners
are NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to discharge their burden of proof.

SPOUSE PERALTA v. ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014

The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the
exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the
registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the
qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This
means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent
holder for value and that includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered,
and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.

Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172

Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.

Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444

Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner private persons or entities.

Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012

There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription
against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first
established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA

YBAEZ
G.R. No. 161380, 21 April 2014 FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin J.)

Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid only between
the parties thereto, third parties would also be affected by the registered deed or
instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it was further registered in
accordance with Section 194, i.e., the deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the
day book and the register book for unregistered lands in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the realty was located.
Civil Law

The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or
instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of a third party with a better
right. This exception is provided in Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the
effect that the registration shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right; and in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect
that any recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION

In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, G.R. L-16749, January
31, 1963

Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition should be governed
by Philippine Law, when the national law of the testator refers back to the Philippine
Law. Edward is domiciled in the Philippines hence, Philippine court must apply its own
laws which makes natural children legally acknowledge as forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA 755

A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with
duties to take effect after his death."

Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524

The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA which
is the national law of the decedent. It is settled that as regards to the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the wills as provided for by article 16 and 1039 of the New Civil Code,
the national law of the decedent must apply.

Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483

The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative referred in the will should include
those who are born after the testators death. To construe it as referring to the nearest
male relative at any time after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply
and create uncertainty as to the disposition of the estate.

De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972

There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her share immediately after such
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is
ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

Bonilla vs Leon Barcena, G.R. L-41715, June 18, 1976

Civil Law

The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before the
judicial declaration of their being declared as heirs. When Fortunata died, her claim or
right to the parcel of land in litigation in civil case number 856 was not extinguished by
her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.

Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171

The properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract.

The heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of death of the decedent. In
this case, the purported waiver of hereditary rights cannot be considered effective.

Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R.NO. 174489, April, 11, 2012

It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the
attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not
necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or
was not duly executed in the manner required by law."

Echavez vs. Dozen Cons., G.R.NO. 192916, Oct. 11, 2010

An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the
absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can
be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

Lopez v. Lopez, G.R.NO. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation
or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages.

Azuela v. CA, 487 SCRA 119

The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other
hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring
to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself.

Lee v. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is
his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure
that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
Civil Law

Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix but in its concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix
and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil
Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are
properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making
them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be
read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the
witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator's) other senses.

Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 348

This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of
fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege.

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior
and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement
take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of
the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator.
On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not
the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the
draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already
acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even
prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for
the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.

Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258

The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament
was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment
itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of
the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should
be completed without interruption. 37
Civil Law

Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so
that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of
the will.

Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781

The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by

respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured
or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which
would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual
requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will.

Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209

The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that
it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8
pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394

The issue in this case whether the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his
commission satisfies the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? Outside the
place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a
notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and
effect.

Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569

While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, error in the number of
pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the
subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of
some of the pages. 38

Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16

The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.

Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333

Civil Law

The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is
mandatory."

Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on

the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.

Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237

To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature.

Roxas vs. De Jesus, 134 SCRA 245

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of
fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB.,61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Labrador vs. CA, 184 SCRA 170

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator.

Seangio v. Reyes, 508 SCRA 172

Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn
by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator.

Palaganas v. Palaganas, 2011 640 SCRA 538

A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court.

Vda.De Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722

Civil Law

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since
the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate.

Casiano vs CA 158 SCRA 451

Revocation under this condition to be effective must have complied with the two
requirements: the overt act as mentioned under the law; the intent to revoke on the part
of the testator. The document or paper burned by one of the witnesses was not
satisfactorily established to be the will at all, much less the will of Adriana.

Adriana Maloto vs. CA, 158 SCRA 451

For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of
Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence.

Gago vs. Mamuyac NO. L-26317, 49 Phil 902

Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent
evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found
after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other
person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.

Seangio v. Reyes, 2006 508 SCRA 172

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the
Civil Code.

Molo vs. Molo NO. L- 2538, 90 Phil 37

The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will
in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional.

Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509

Civil Law

The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof; if the
ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In case of
holographic will if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud
this way.

Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator. But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102

Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the appellant is not required to
produce more than one witness. Even if the genuiness of the holographic will were
contested, article 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having
denied the probate.

Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333

We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is contested, the law requires that
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. A visual
examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator.

Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can
be interposed as res judicata with respect to private respondents complaint.

Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33

It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the
testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should hearing the
two cases.

Nepomuceno vs CA, 139 SCRA 206

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. Where practically
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before
it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

Aznar vs. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590

Civil Law

To constitute preterition, the omission must be total and complete, such that nothing
must be given to the compulsory heir.

Acain vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 100

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy
are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

Seangio v. Reyes G.R.NO. 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 172

The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

Legitime and Simulated Contracts; Spousal Marital Estrangement

Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, 354 SCRA 112

Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property.

Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444

Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir,
mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO,
SR., G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013

Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant. The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor
predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He
may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the
Civil Law

survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.

Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the
alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was
still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the
former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property
subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

Gonzales vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 479

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil.
186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217

Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact, it was Rafael who
inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not
be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate
of Rafael.

Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704

The word degree means generation and the present code has obviously followed this
interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted. The code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be
related to and one generation from the first heir.

Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491

In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an obligation upon the first heir to

preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him,
upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event.

Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69

The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouses parents. There is no

provision in the civil code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-
law.
Civil Law

Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555

In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate in the

inheritance with the surviving nieces and nephews because the existence of the latter
excluded the more distant relatives. In the collateral line, the right of representation
does not go beyond the children of brothers and sisters.

Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567

Since, Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
was the legitimate child of Tomas, himself was a legitimate child, appellant Tomas has
no cause of action to recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his daughter,
Juanita as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate.

Santillon vs Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563

If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse since they shall equally,
one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse.
Although the law refers to children or descendants, the rule in the statutory construction
that the plural can be understood to include the singular.

Bacayo vs Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986

A decedents uncle and aunt may not succeed intestate so long as nephews and nieces
of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. In this case, the
nephews and nieces were not inheriting by right of representation because they only do
so if they concur with the brothers and sisters of the decedent.

Bagunu vs. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the
right of representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of representation may
only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such
children survive with their uncles or aunts.

Sayson vs. CA, 205 SCRA 321

The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

Corpus vs. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567

In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by

their
natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and
Civil Law

sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.

Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142

Petitioners argument that the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate
relatives of a decedent does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably
demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was
actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy,
educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents
husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.

Diaz vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 645

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record
shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and
the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Diaz vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 427

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood
to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one.

Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA, 284 SCRA 511

A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant,

ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood
relative is immaterial.

Delos Santos vs Ferraris-Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986

Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring
with the brothers or sisters of the deceased which is provided in article 975 when
children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive with their uncles and
aunts but if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 162826, October 14, 2013

Degaos claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract with
them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. The
incompatibility
Civil Law

in novation must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as
its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely
modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT

G.R. No. 163654, 08 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)

The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card
membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the
parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be
present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or
bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes gross
negligence.

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. AND FIL-ESTATE NETWORK, INC., v. SPOUSES

CONRADO AND MARIA VICTORIA RONQUILLO, , G.R. NO.185798. January 13,
2014
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis cannot be said to be unforeseeable and beyond the
control of a business corporation, especially a corporation engaged in real estate
enterprise. Such corporation is considered a master in projections of commodities and
currency movements and business risks. It has the ability to foresee such situation.
Thus, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is not an instance of caso fortuito.

ANSAY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, G.R. NO. L-13667, April 29, 1960

Appellants filed against appellees in the CFI a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas
bonus, contending that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural, "Civil
obligations are a right of action to compel their performance, while Natural obligations,
not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of
action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof".

SALEN vs. BALCE, G.R. NO. L-14414, April 27, 1960

Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante arising
from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil liability which the law imposes
upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
punish them in moderation" .
SALUDAGA vs. FEU, G.R. NO. 179337 April 30, 2008
Civil Law

Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent FEU filed a case for damages
against it after he was shot by one of the security guards on duty at the school
premises. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is a
established contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties
are bound to comply with but which FEU failed to perform when it did not provide a safe
and secure environment to its students.

NAPOCOR vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124378, March 8, 2005

The negligence of NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in its
dams has been satisfactorily and extensively established. In crimes and quasi-delicts,
the defendant shall be liable for all damages, which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of and it is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.

GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, G.R.

NO. 147839, June 8, 2006
Petitioners argument is that it is not liable for the unpaid accounts because the fire is a
fortuitous event. If the obligation is generic in the sense that the object thereof is
designated merely by its class or genus without any particular designation or physical
segregation from all others of the same class, the loss or destruction of anything of the
same kind even without the debtors fault and before he has incurred in delay will not
have the effect of extinguishing the obligation, based on the principle that the genus of a
thing can never perish, (Genus nunquan perit) and an obligation to pay money is
generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific property of the
debtor.

TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988

Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner
undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram but which
petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation
by paying the required charges. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.

MANUEL vs. CA, G.R. NO. 95469 July 25, 1991

Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accipiendi. The failure of the
owners to collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses, since
consignation under such circumstances, is necessary, and by this we mean one that is
effected in full compliance with the specific requirements of the law therefor.

UNLAD RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DRAGON, G.R. NO.

149338, July 28, 2008

Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation under the
Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents failure to increase the capital
stock of the corporation to an amount that will accommodate their undertaking, it had
become impossible for them to perform
Civil Law

their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of the other party to perform
the obligation renders the other party to demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for
the rescission of the contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G.R. NO. 178610
November 17, 2010

Respondents executed undated promissory notes. They were not able to pay the
monthly amortizations of their respective loans, which were suppose to be paid through
salary deduction, to the petitioner because of their dismissal. Loans secured by their
future retirement benefits to which they are no longer entitled are reduced to unsecured
and pure civil obligations and the absence of a period within which to pay the obligation,
the fulfillment of which is demandable at once.

JAVIER vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48194 March 15, 1990

When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth and effectivity can take
place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled,
and if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the
conditional obligation had never existed.

PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926

Appellant contends that a condition precedent having been imposed in the donation and
the same not having been complied with, the donation never became effective. The
characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected
while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with, consequently,
when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when
the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent but a
condition subsequent.

ALILEO A. MAGLASANG v. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No.

188986, March 20, 2013

The court ruled that the power to rescind the obligations of the injured party is implied in
reciprocal obligations, such as in this case. On this score, the CA correctly applied
Article 1191, which provides thus: the power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent
upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of
the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing
the fixing of a period.

EDS MANUFACTURING, INC. v. HEALTHCHECK INTERNATIONAL INC. G.R. No.

162802, October 9, 2013
Civil Law

The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat
the very object of the parties in making the agreement. It must be pointed that in the
absence of a stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and extra judicially rescind a
contract. A judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take place.

Even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to automatic
rescission. Under Article 1191of the Civil Code, the right to resolve reciprocal
obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with what
is incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked judicially. Consequently, even if
the right to rescind is made available to the injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto
erased by the failure of the other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The
party entitled to rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The right
cannot be exercised solely on a partys own judgment that the other committed a breach
of the obligation. The operative act which produces the resolution of the contract is the
decree of the court and not the mere act of the vendor.

UP vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28602, September 29,

In the first place, UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in the "Acknowledgment of
Debt and Proposed Manner of Payments" that, upon default by the debtor ALUMCO, the
creditor (UP) has "the right and the power to consider, the Logging Agreement dated as
rescinded without the necessity of any judicial suit."

The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded, and
act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds at its own risk, for it is only
the final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle
whether the action taken was or was not correct in law.

AYSON-SIMON vs. ADAMOS, G.R. NO. L-39378, August 28, 1984

Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation in
reciprocal ones are alternative remedies, and plaintiff having chosen fulfillment in the
Civil Case, she cannot now seek rescission; and (2) that even if plaintiff could seek
rescission the action to rescind the obligation has prescribed. The rule that the injured
party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and cannot
have both, applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment, if the fulfillment has
become impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured party to seek rescission even
after he has chosen fulfillment.

OSMEA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007

The Letter-Agreement, the SPA, the SSC resolutions assailed in this recourse, and the
Invitation to Bid sent out to implement said resolutions, all have a common subject: the
Shares the 187.84 Million EPCIB common shares, which, as a necessary
consequence of the BDO- EPCIB merger which saw EPCIB being absorbed by the
surviving BDO, have been transferred to BDO and converted into BDO common shares
under the exchange ratio set forth in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of Merger. As thus
converted, the subject Shares are no longer equity security issuances of the
Civil Law

now defunct EPCIB, but those of BDO-EPCI, which, needless to stress, is a totally
separate and distinct entity from what used to be EPCIB.

Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to give a determinate thing is
extinguished if the object is lost without the fault of the debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of
the Civil Code, a thing is considered lost when it perishes or disappears in such a way
that it cannot be recovered.

ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R. NO. L-22558 May 31, 1967
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side streets on the
sides of the land which were sold to the PSE due to the presence of squatters,
questions the decision of the lower court ordering him to comply with his obligation
within 2 years from the finality of the decision. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the
Civil Code involves a two-step process, the Court must first determine that "the
obligation does not fix a period", or from the nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, because courts can not fix a period merely because
in its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the complaint not having sought that the
court should set a period, but must set the time that the parties are shown to have
intended.

RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28, 1984

Respondent filed a modification of the order of the lower court in a collection case
praying for the "execution of the decision in its entirety against all defendants, jointly and
severally." In the absence of a finding of facts that the defendants made themselves
individually liable for the debt incurred they are each liable only for one-fourth of said
amount, the obligation being described as "individually and jointly".

SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825, October 11, 2012

Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00 was not made to the
creditors themselves, but rather, it was allegedly made to a certain Losloso who was the
authorized agent of petitioners. Respondents obligation consists of payment of a sum
of money, and in general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation,
must be made to the proper person, thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself
or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment.
Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be
treated as though actual authority had been given for its receipt. If payment is made to
one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work as a discharge.

TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993

Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and their
acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option of the
creditor.

SPS. NAMAEL AND LOURDES BONROSTRO v. SPS. JUAN AND CONSTACIA

LUNA, G.R. No. 172346. July 24, 2013
Civil Law

Tender of payment "is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay
an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the
debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall
have been made with the proper court." Consignation is the deposit of the proper
amount with a judicial authority in accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the
tender of payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct
payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.

Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect. To have the effect of payment
and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the
companion acts of tender of payment and consignation.

Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin v. Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171298. April 15, 2013

Consignation is necessarily judicial. Article 1258 of the Civil Code specifically provides
that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing or things due at the disposal of
judicial authority. The said provision clearly precludes consignation in venues other than
the courts.

DALTON vs. FG.R. and DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. NO. 172577 January 19, 2011

The withdrawal by the creditor of the amounts consigned was subject to the express
reservation of assailing the validity of the consignation. In such case, the creditor is not
deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. When the amount
consigned does not cover the entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his
right to the balance.

FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988

Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been extinguished by legal compensation
and claims that the government owed him when a portion of his land was expropriated,
hence, his tax obligation had been set-off by operation of law.

The general rule based on grounds of public policy is well-settled that no set-off
admissible against demands for taxes levied for general or local governmental purposes
because taxes are not in the nature of contracts between the party and party but grow
out of duty to, and are the positive acts of the government to the making and enforcing
of which, the personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required.

CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., G.R. NO.
147950. December 11, 2003
There was no change in the object of the prior obligations in the restructuring
agreement since it merely provided for a new schedule of payments and additional
security giving Delta authority to take over the management and operations of CBLI in
case CBLI fails to pay installments equivalent to 60 days. With respect to obligations to
pay a sum of money, this Court has consistently applied the well-settled rule that the
obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, changes
only the terms of payment, and adds other obligations not incompatible with the old
ones, or where the new contract merely supplements the old one.
Civil Law

SPOUSES TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, G.R. 167874. January

15, 2010

A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for
the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent.

PALATTAO vs. CA, G.R. NO. 131726, May 7, 2002

Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellees letter-offer of a parcel of land but

appellee made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered amounts within two
years in quarterly amortizations. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance
must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer, for a qualified acceptance
constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer and such acceptance is
not sufficient to generate consent.

GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-

67742 October 29, 1987

The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be considered as a
valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of sale of a parcel of land registerd
under the Torrens System. The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that
contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present, except when the law so requires
requiring a contract to be in some form for validity or enforceability.

SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972

Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is
not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it, and pending notice of its
withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell
which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.

TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28, 2007

Respondent contends that the inclusion of the two-year non-involvement clause in

petitioners contract of employment was reasonable and needed since her job gave her
access to the companys confidential marketing strategies. A non-involvement clause is
not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable
limitations as to time, trade, and place.

CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30, 2013

Disregarding the stipulations in the contract allowing additional compensation for
easement fee, the CA ruled that Cabahug's attempt to collect further sums by way of
additional easement fee and,or just compensation is violative of said contract. It is
settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are bound by its
stipulations which, when couched in clear and
Civil Law

plain language, should be applied according to their literal tenor and the courts cannot
supply material stipulations, which contradict the intent of the parties.

SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771 December 17,
1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the
parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality,
hence, a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent
exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties, is void.

DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 118248 April
5, 2000
Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and the deceased, hence, heirs
are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the
rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2)
stipulation or (3) provision of law.

PRUDENTIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ABASOLO, G.R. NO.

186738,
September 27, 2010

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, and if a contract
should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, the contracting parties must
have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon the third person.

FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September 30, 1977

To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent of the
stipulating parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient that the third person may be
incidentally benefited by the stipulation.

ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES

G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5, 2010
A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for being
subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.

URETA vs. URETA, G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011

Lacking in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and

enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the
reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to
divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a
sham. Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for
taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands.

LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984
Civil Law

Unquestionably, the parties herein operated under an arrangement, commonly known

as the "kabit system", whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such
franchise for a fee, and the petitioner prays that private respondents be declared liable
to petitioner for whatever amount the latter has paid. It is a fundamental principle of in
pari delicto that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will
leave them both where it finds them.

CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR.

G.R. No. 187240, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An accepted
exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy. In this
jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as that principle of the law which holds that
no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good. The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized
public policy of the State.

CORONEL vs. CONSTANTINO, G.R. NO. 121069, February 7, 2003

Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that
through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have
ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother. Ratification means
that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized
act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him ,
hence, an alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on
their part.

YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27, 1981

Respondent judge assumed that as long as the requirements of perfection of a contract

are present in a contract which involves payment in installments, the Statute of Frauds
would no longer apply as long as the total price or consideration is mentioned in some
note or memorandum and there is no need of any indication of the manner in which
such total price is to be paid. In any sale of real property on installments, the Statute of
Frauds read together with the perfection requirements of Article 1475 of the Civil Code
must be understood and applied in the sense that the idea of payment on installments
must be in the requisite of a note or memorandum therein contemplated.

ORDUA vs. FUENTEBELLA, G.R. NO. 176841, June 29, 2010

Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the purchase price
payable on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared to have been a recipient of
some partial payments but after his death, his son questions the verbal sale contract
between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita, and alleged that the contract is unenforceable for
non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides
that a contract for the sale of real property or of an interest therein shall be
unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and
subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal contract of sale, however, has
been
Civil Law

partially executed through the partial payments made by one party duly received by the
vendor, as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute.

AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104234 June 30,
1995

Petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the ground of
unsatisfied judgment against respondents and It likewise moved to declare the sale to a
third party of a parcel of land in the name of the private respondent as one in fraud of
creditors which was granted by the lower court. Rescissible contracts, not being void,
they remain legally effective until set aside in a rescissory action and may convey title,
and an action for rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary proceeding
through a motion, but in an independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial.

LAW ON SALES

PEALOSA vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 133749, August 23,

2001

Respondent insist that the second deed is a complete nullity because a) the
consideration stated in the deed was not paid; b)seller was not present when the deed
was notarized; c) seller did not surrender a copy of the title; d)real estate taxes were not
paid. The elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds;
(2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent which are
present in the second Deed of Sale hence there is already a perfected contract of sale.

FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. SECURITRON SECURITY SERVICES,

INC.
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015

Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no obligation to
make payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money
to petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under Art. 1482 of the
Civil Code, there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of
earnest money. Where the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no
contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Earnest
money applies to a perfected sale.

MOLDEX RAELTY INC. v. FLORA A. SABERON, G.R. No. 176289. April 8, 2013
The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision developer to
register the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds does not
result to the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer.
The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting. The intrinsic validity of the contract to
sell is not affected by the developers violation of Section 5 of PD 957.Nevertheless, the
respondent in this case is entitled to 50% refund under the Maceda Law.

SPOUSES DELFIN O. TUMIBAY AND AURORA T. TUMIBA-DECEASED ET AL. v.

SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 171692, June 3, 2013
Civil Law

In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid
the price in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property prior
to the full payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the seller is entitled to
rescission because the breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very
object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell. In the case at bar, the court
finds that respondent Rowenas act of transferring the title to the subject land in her
name, without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-payment of
the full price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the contract to
sell.

HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES vs SOCCO-BELTRAN, G.R. 176474 November 27, 2008

It was unmistakably stated in the Contract to Sell and made clear to both parties thereto
that the vendor was not yet the owner of the subject property and was merely expecting
to inherit the same. The law specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership
of the property at the time of delivery hence, there was no valid sale from which
ownership of the subject property could have been transferred.

DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG et al., G.R. NO. 159578, February 18, 2009

Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if the
action is based on an implied or a constructive trust. However, since respondents'
action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the fraud.
Respondent's action for reconveyance was not even subject to prescription, since the
deed of sale that was executed in favor of petitioners was null and void because the
seller was not the owner of the land, nor has the authority when she sold it to
petitioners, hence, being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to attack anytime
because an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.

NOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116635 July 24, 1997
Petitioners contend that they could repurchase the property that they "sold" to private
respondents when they allowed the respondent to redeem the properties for them from
DBP but DBP certified that the mortgagors' right of redemption was not exercised within
the period. Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that "where goods are sold by a
person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had,
unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's
authority to sell.", hence, petitioners "sold" nothing, it follows that they can also
"repurchase" nothing.

DAROY vs. ATTY. ABECIA, A.C. NO. 3046, October 26, 1998

The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land, acquired by a
client to satisfy a judgment in his favor to his counsel as long as the property was not
the subject of the litigation.

ARCENIO vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M. NO. MTJ-89-270 July 5, 1993

Civil Law

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE PAGOROGON, A.M.

NO. MTJ-92-637 July 5, 1993

The respondent judge engaged the services of a mechanic to tow the jeep in custodia
legis and to place the jeep in good running condition, spending in the process her own
money and also registered the same in her brother's name. The act of respondent judge
is not unlike the prohibited acquisition by purchase described in Article 1491 of the New
Civil code and is in fact, even worse when she did not acquire the said vehicle from it's
owner but instead whimsically spent for its repairs and automatically appropriated the
jeep for her own use and benefit.

VALENCIA vs. ATTY. CABANTING, A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991
Paulino alleged that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his
house and while the petition for certiorari was pending the trial court issued an order of
execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and
executory". While it is true that Atty. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding, and a thing is said to be in
litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.

FABILLO vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-

68838 March 11, 1991

After the court declared with finality that the petitioners are the lawful owners, they
refused to comply when the respondent lawyer proceeded to implement the contract of
services between him and the petitioners by taking possession and exercising rights of
ownership over 40% of said properties which are the subject of litigation. A contract
between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said
prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is
not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been
rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.

MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. NO. 2430 August 30, 1990

Complainant alleges that for over a period of 20 years, respondent counsel allowed
lease contracts to be executed between his client and a partnership of which
respondent is one of the partners, covering parcels of land of the estate, but respondent
claims that he is only acting as an agent. Even if the respondent signed merely as an
agent, the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or
lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part.

BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. GONZALES, A.M. NO. 1625 February 12, 1990

The Solicitor General found that respondent counsel transferred to himself one-half of
the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were
involved. Persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from
purchasing the property mentioned therein because of the existing fiduciary relationship
with such property and rights, as well as with the client.
Civil Law

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF

GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA, B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004

Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he
acquired his clients property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned
to him by the client in payment of his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case. The prohibition
extends to sales in legal redemption and such prohibition is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.

PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HEIRS OF RUFINA MORALES, G.R. NO. 170115,

FEBRUARY 19, 2008

The City of Cebu was no longer the owner of the lot when it ceded the same to
petitioner under the compromise agreement and at that time, the city merely retained
rights as an unpaid seller but had effectively transferred ownership of the lot to Morales.
A successor-in-interest could only acquire rights that its predecessor had over the lo
which include the right to seek rescission or fulfillment of the terms of the contract and
the right to damages in either case.

HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO vs. SANTOS, G.R. NO. L-46892 September 30,
1981

By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, appellants declared themselves to be owners of
one-half (1,2) interest thereof and contend that the deed of assignment of one-half (1,2)
interest thereof executed by said Custodio in their favor is strictly personal between
them. Notwithstanding the lack of any title to the said lot by appellants at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale in favor of appellee, the said sale may be valid as there
can be a sale of an expected thing.

JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48194 March 15, 1990
The efficacy of a deed of assignment is subject to the condition that the application of
private respondent for an additional area for forest concession be approved by the
Bureau of Forestry which was not obtained. The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or
expectancy is deemed subject to the condition that the thing will come into existence,
which did not happen, hence the agreement executed never became effective or
enforceable.

DEL PRADO vs SPOUSES CABALLERO, G.R. NO. 148225, March 3,2010 7

The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of
4,000 sq m, more or less, but when the OCT was issued, the area was declared to be
14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq m. Petititiomer, however, claims that
respondents are, therefore, duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries
stated, without any corresponding increase in the price. Article 1542 is not hard and fast
and admits of an exception and the use of more or less or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency, and clearly, the discrepancy of
10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity.
Civil Law

SEMIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 76031 March 2, 1994

Private respondent sold Lot 4221 to his nephew by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" which incorporated both the area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the former
transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters stated in their document of sale but the
entire area circumscribed within its boundaries.

If besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of

real estate, its area or number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be
bound to deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the
area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall
suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number,
unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to
deliver what has been stipulated.

DANGUILAN vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-69970 November 28, 1988

Respondent admits that she did not take physical possession of property but argues
that symbolic delivery was effected through the notarized deed of sale. The thing is
considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the
vendee," and in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is
necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold at the
moment of the sale, but if there is no impediment to prevent the thing sold passing into
the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through
the execution of a public instrument is sufficient.

CHUA vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003

Petitioner insists that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price but
withheld payment because he required that the property be registered first in his name
before he would turn over the check to the private respondent. 8

The obligation of the seller is to transfer to the buyer ownership of the thing sold, but in
the sale of a real property, the seller is not obligated to transfer in the name of the buyer
a new certificate of title, but rather to transfer ownership of the real property, because as
between the seller and buyer, ownership is transferred not by the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of the buyer but by the execution of the instrument of sale
in a public document.

VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83851.
March 3, 1993.
The seller gave access to the buyer to enter his premises, manifesting no objection
thereto but even sending people to start digging up the scrap iron. The seller has placed
the goods in the control and possession of the vendee and such action or real delivery
(traditio) transfered ownership.

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-31189

March 31, 1987
Civil Law

Respondent discovered that a parcel of land she owns is being used by Petitioner,
Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery for 29 years and when the Mayor replied that
Petitioner bought the land from her grandmother, she asked to be shown the papers
concerning the sale but petitioner refused to show the same. Where there is no express
provision that title shall not pass until payment of the price, and the thing sold has been
delivered, title passes from the moment the thing sold is placed in the possession and
control of the buyer.

DE LEON vs. ONG, G.R. NO. 170405, February 2, 2010

Petitioner sold three parcels of land to respondent which were mortgaged to a bank,
hence petitioner and respondent executed a notarized deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage, but petitioner some time thereafter paid the mortgage and sold
the properties to another person. Settled is the rule that the seller is obliged to transfer
title over the properties and deliver the same to the buyer, and as a rule, the execution
of a notarized deed of sale is equivalent to the delivery of a thing sold.

PUROMINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEAL, G.R. NO. 91228. March 22, 1993.

Petitioner argues that the sales contract does not include the contract of carriage which
is a different contract entered into by the carrier with the cargo owners.
As worded, the sales contract is comprehensive enough to include claims for damages
arising from carriage and delivery of the goods. As a general rule, the seller has the
obligation to transmit the goods to the buyer, and concomitant thereto, the contracting of
a carrier to deliver the same. Art. 1523 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1523. Where in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller in authorized or required
to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the
buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of
the goods to the buyer, except in the cases provided for in article 1503, first, second
and third paragraphs, or unless a contrary intent appear.
"Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must take such contract with the
carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the
goods and the other circumstances of the case. If the seller omit so to do, and the
goods are lost or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the
delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself,, or may hold the seller responsible in
damages."
xxx xxx xxx
The disputed sales contact provides for conditions relative to the delivery of goods, such
as date of shipment, demurrage, weight as determined by the bill of lading at load port.

BOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 125088, April 14, 2004
Petitioner sold the subject property to respondents as evidenced by a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale, but contends that the respondents have no right to material possession
of the property since the respondents have not paid the property in full. Unless there is
a stipulation to the contrary, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
contract.
Civil Law

SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

126376.
November 20, 2003

Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in
the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father and assuming that there is consideration,
the same is grossly inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale. If there is a meeting
of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid and gross
inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except if there is a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other contract.

HO, JR. vs TENG GUI, G.R. NO. 130115, July 16, 2008
RTC considered that although the sales of the properties on the lot were simulated, it
can be assumed that the intention of Ho in such transaction was to give and donate
such properties to the respondent. The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on
the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil Code to conclude that the simulated sales
were a valid donation to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on
a mere assumption when the law requires positive proof, which the respondent was
unable to show.

HYATT ELEVATORS vs. CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS, G.R. NO. 173881 December 1,

2010
As revealed by the records, it was only Hyatt who determined the price, without the
acceptance or conformity of CHBCAI. The fixing of the price can never be left to the
decision of one of the contracting parties, but a price fixed by one of the contracting
parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.

CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119255, April 9, 2003

On the agreed date, Chua refused to pay the balance of the purchase price as required
by the contract to sell, the signed Deeds of Sale, and imposes another condition. The
vendee is bound to accept delivery and to pay the price of the thing sold at the time and
place stipulated in the contract.

FULE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 112212, March 2, 1998

While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of the consideration was still
payable to petitioner, its nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate
the contract or bar the transfer of ownership and possession of the things exchanged
considering the fact that their contract is silent as to when it becomes due and
demandable.
Neither may such failure to pay the balance of the purchase price result in the payment
of interest thereon. Article 1589 of the Civil Code prescribes the payment of interest by
the vendee "for the period between the delivery of the thing and the payment of the
price" in the following cases:
(1) Should it have been so stipulated;
(2) Should the thing sold and delivered produce fruits or income;
(3) Should he be in default, from the time of judicial or extrajudicial demand for the
payment of the price.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES ALFONSO, G.R. NO. 131074,
March 27, 2000
Civil Law

Respondents aver that they are entitled to cancel the obligation altogether in view of
petitioner's failure to pay the purchase price when the same became due, while
Petitioner claims that the respondent failed to comply with their contractual obligations
hence it was entitled to withhold payment of the purchase price. Should the vendee be
disturbed in the possession or ownership of the thing acquired, he may suspend the
payment of the price until the vendor has cause the disturbance or danger to cease.
This is not, however, the only justified cause for retention or withholding the payment of
the agreed price, but also, if the vendor fails to perform any essential obligation of the
contract.

MANUEL UY & SONS, INC. v. VALBUECO, INCORPORATED, G.R. No.

179594.
September 11, 2013

Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil Code are applicable to contracts of sale, while R.A.
No. 6552 applies to contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty
Installment Buyer Act, applies to the subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda
Law) recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial,
residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an
installment by the buyer, which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.

SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI FAMILY

BANK, INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO
G.R. No. 160107, 22 October 2014, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The protection of Republic Act No. 6552 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act) does
not cover a loan extended by the employer to enable its employee to finance the
purchase of a house and lot. The law protects only a buyer acquiring the property by
installment, not a borrower whose rights are governed by the terms of the loan from the
employer.

SPOUSES MICHELLE M. NOYNAY AND NOEL S. NOYNAY vs. CITIHOMES

BUILDER AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014

In Pagtalunan v. Manzano, the Court stressed the importance of complying with the
provisions of the Maceda Law as to the cancellation of contracts to sell involving realty
installment schemes. There it was held that the cancellation of the contract by the seller
must be in accordance with Section 3 (b) of the Maceda Law, which requires the
notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the full payment of the cash
surrender value of the payments made on the property. The actual cancellation of the
contract takes place after thirty (30) days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full
payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.

SKUNAC CORPORATION AND ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ vs. ROBERTO S.

SYLIANTENG AND CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG
G.R. No. 205879, 23 April 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Civil Law

The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are: (a) The two (or more
sales) transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions
must pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds
over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting
interests; and (d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller.

Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not by just one but two vendors.

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR v. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, G.R. No.

181359 August 5, 2013

Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.
Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyers good or bad faith is relevant only where
the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies
on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith
for value. Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case
is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of
transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any
registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.

INDUSTRIAL TEXTILE MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

vs. LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 66140, January 21, 1993 21

Respondent alleges that it cannot be held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags which were
not used for packing cement as originally intended invoking it's right of return. Article
1502 of the Civil Code, has no application at all to this case, since the provision in the
Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was
taken, clearly requires an express written agreement to make a sales contract either a
"sale or return" or a "sale on approval", which is absent in this case.
Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing that an
invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and purporting to embody a sale
without condition or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the purchaser
desired to incorporate a stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have
done so at the time the contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept
part and reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the
parties in the "on approval" situation.

LO vs. KJS ECO-FORMWORK SYSTEM PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 149420 October 8,
2003

The vendor in good faith shall be responsible for the existence and legality of the credit
at the time of the sale, unless it should have been sold as doubtful; but not for the
solvency of the debtor, unless it has been so expressly stipulated or unless the
insolvency was prior to the sale and of common knowledge.

ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
Civil Law

The seller, in declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the
Deed of Absolute Sale, is giving an implied warranty of title which prescribes six months
after the delivery of the vehicle.

PNB vs MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 173454,
October 6, 2008
MEGA PRIME REALTY AND HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. PNB, G.R. NO. 173456,
October 6, 2008

In a contract of sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is an implied warranty

on the part of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the time when the
ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall have a peaceful possession of the thing
and it shall be free from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or encumbrance not
declared or known to the buyer.

ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177874, September 29, 2008
The seller, in pledging that he will defend the same from all claims or any claim
whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the government of the Republic
of the Philippines, is giving a warranty against eviction. A breach of this warranty
requires the concurrence of these four requisites:(1) The purchaser has been deprived
of the whole or part of the thing sold; (2) This eviction is by a final judgment; (3) The
basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and (4) The
vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the
instance of the vendee.

DE YSASI vs. ARCEO, G.R. NO. 136586, November 22, 2001

Petitioner admitted that he inspected the premises three or four times before signing the
lease contract and during his inspection, he noticed the rotten plywood on the ceiling
which in his opinion was caused by leaking water or "anay" (termites), yet he decided to
go through with the lease agreement. The lessor is responsible for warranty against
hidden defects, but he is not answerable for patent defects or those which are visible.

ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

52267, January 24, 1996

The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written contract - and
not a suit to enforce warranties against hidden defects. The remedy against violations of
the warranty against hidden defects is either to withdraw from the contract (redhibitory
action) or to demand a proportionate reduction of the price (accion quanti minoris), with
damages in either case.

DINO vs COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 113564, June 20, 2001 23

Respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products to petitioners on September 28,
1988 and the action to recover the purchase price of the goods petitioners returned to
the respondent was filed on July 24, 1989, more than nine months from the date of last
delivery. Actions arising from breach of warranty against hidden defects shall be barred
after six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
Civil Law

LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA, G.R. NO. 137552, June 16, 2000

A MOA has this stipulation "....SELLER-LESSOR hereby agrees to sell unto BUYER-
LESSEE the property described within six (6) months from the execution date hereof, or
upon issuance by the Court of a new owner's certificate of title and the execution of
extrajudicial partition with sale of the estate of Francisco Laforteza, whichever is
earlier;...". Petitioner contends that since the condition was not met, they no longer had
an obligation to proceed with the sale of the house and lot. The petitioners fail to
distinguish between a condition imposed upon the perfection of the contract and a
condition imposed on the performance of an obligation, failure to comply with the first
condition results in the failure of a contract, while the failure to comply with the second
condition only gives the other party the option either to refuse to proceed with the sale
or to waive the condition.

INTEGRATED PACKAGING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 115117,

June 8, 2000
There is no dispute that the agreement provides for the delivery of printing paper on
different dates and a separate price has been agreed upon for each delivery. When
there is a contract of sale of goods to be delivered by stated installments, which are to
be separately paid for, and the seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or
more installments, it depends in each case on the terms of the contract and the
circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is so material as to justify the
injured party in refusing to proceed further and suing for damages for breach of the
entire contract, or whether the breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for
compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as broken.

VISAYAN SAWMILL COMPANY, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. NO. 83851. March 3, 1993.

The petitioner agreed to deliver the scrap iron only upon payment of the purchase price
by means of an irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit, which the respondent
failed to obtain, thus, there was no actual sale. Where the goods have not been
delivered to the buyer, and the buyer has repudiated the contract of sale, or has
manifested his inability to perform his obligations, thereunder, or has committed a
breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract of sale by giving notice of his
election to do to the buyer.

DIAMANTE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-51824 February 7, 1992
A right to repurchase was granted subsequently in an instrument different from the
original document of sale which caused the cancellation of the permit or lease by the
Secretary of Fisheries. An agreement to repurchase becomes a promise to sell when
made after the sale, because when the sale is made without such an agreement, the
purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely, and if he afterwards grants the vendor the
right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered into by the purchaser, as absolute
owner already of the object.

VASQUEZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 83759 July 12, 1991
Respondents sold the lot to the petitioners under a Deed of Sale, On the same day and
along with the execution of the Deed of Sale, a separate instrument, denominated as
Right to Repurchase was executed by the parties, Later, petitioners resisted the action
for redemption. The transaction
Civil Law

between the petitioners and private respondents was not a sale with right to repurchase,
the second instrument is just an option to buy since it is not embodied in the same
document of sale but in a separate document, and since such option is not supported by
a consideration distinct from the price, said deed for right to repurchase is not binding
upon them.

BAUTISTA vs UNANGST, G.R. NO. 173002, July 4, 2008

Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the vendor remains in possession, as a
lessee or otherwise, the contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage
because in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the legal title to the property is
immediately transferred to the vendee, subject to the vendors right to redeem and
retention by the vendor of the possession of the property is inconsistent with the
vendees acquisition of the right of ownership under a true sale.

ABILLA vs. ANG GOBONSENG, JR., G.R. NO. 146651, January 17, 2002
The legal question to be resolved is "May the vendors in a sale judicially declared as a
pacto de retro exercise the right of repurchase under Article 1606, third paragraph, of
the Civil Code, after they have taken the position that the same was an equitable
mortgage?" No, where the proofs established that there could be no honest doubt as to
the parties intention, that the transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de
retro, the vendor a retro is not entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article
1606.

AGAN vs. HEIRS OF SPS. NUEVA, G.R. NO. 155018, December 11, 2003
The lower court's dispositive position states: "However, the vendors can still exercise
the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision
pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil Code." Article 1606 grants the
vendor a retro thirty (30) days from the time final judgment was rendered, not from the
defendants receipt of the judgment, "final judgment must be construed to mean one
that has become final and executory.

Spouses CRUZ vs. LEIS et al., G.R. NO. 125233, March 9, 2000 26

The lower court rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of
Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the
ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property. A judicial
order is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to
prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is being made,
however, notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the
consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer
of ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of
registering the consolidated title.

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs. SPS. VELOSO, G.R. NO. 141974, August 9,
2004
The respondents offer to redeem the foreclosed properties and the subsequent
consignation in court were made within the period of redemption, but the amount
consigned did not include the interest and was also way below the amount paid by the
highest bidder-purchaser of the properties during the auction sale. The redemption price
should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court because
only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being
Civil Law
made in good faith.
Civil Law

LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

104114 December 4, 1995
Petitioner questions the ruling of the Court of Appeals which concluded that a prior
tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of the action
for legal redemption. To avail of the right of redemption what is essential is to make an
offer to redeem within the prescribed period. There is actually no prescribed form for an
offer to redeem to be properly effected. It can either be through a formal tender with
consignation, or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the
redemption price within the prescribed period.

VILLANUEVA vs. HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, G.R. NO. L-33158, October 17,
1985

It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed redemption
because it considered the vendee, Vallangca, a co-heir, being married to Concepcion
Villanueva. The term "third person" or "stranger in Art. 1620 refers to all persons who
are not heirs in succession, either by will or the law or any one who is not a co-owner.

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 150060. August 19,
2003

Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants to an
adjoining owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it can be shown that the
buyer or grantee does not own any other rural land.

G.R. NO. 134117. February 9, 2000

SEN PO EK MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MARTINEZ
Petitioner invokes its right of first refusal against private respondents, when Teodora
sold the property that petitioner has been leasing. Article 1622 of the New Civil Code
only deals with small urban lands that are bought for speculation where only adjoining
lot owners can exercise the right of pre-emption or redemption. It does not apply to a
lessee trying to buy the land that it was leasing, especially when such right was never
stipulated in any of the several lease contracts.

CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 162421, August 31, 2007
Petitioners may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses, but they must
do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In
requiring written notice, Art. 1623 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of (a) the sale and (b) the date of such notice, as the date thereof becomes the
reckoning point of the 30-day period of redemption.

SPOUSES SI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 122047, October 12, 2000
Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written
notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the
sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty
days. But where the co- owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or
afterwards, a written notice of a
Civil Law

fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
unnecessary.

FRANCISCO vs. BOISER, G.R. NO. 137677, May 31, 2000

Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come
from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. Since the vendor of
an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners who under
the law must be notified of the sale, and is in the best position to confirm whether
consent to the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership
thereof to the vendee has been given.

LEDONIO vs. CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 149040, July 4,

2007

An assignment of credit has been defined as an agreement by virtue of which the owner
of a credit (known as the assignor), by a legal cause - such as sale, dation in payment
or exchange or donation - and without need of the debtor's consent, transfers that credit
and its accessory rights to another (known as the assignee), who acquires the power to
enforce it, to the same extent as the assignor could have enforced it against the debtor.

TEOCO, JR.,vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, G.R. NO. 162333,
December 23, 2008

Would the exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem the properties in
question be precluded by the fact that the assignment of right of redemption was not
contained in a public document? NO, the phrase "effect as against third person" in
Article 1625 of the Civil Code is interpreted as to be damage or prejudice to such third
person, hence if the third person would not be prejudiced then the assignment of right to
redeem may not be in a public instrument.

HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA,

JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, vs. MARIO A.
BATONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL, JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR
BATONGBACAL AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL
G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014

An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in some formality, or form or

words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of
the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing
impossible or contrary to law. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise,
two requisites must concur: (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
sale; and (2) the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.

CEBALLOS vs. Intestate Estate of the Late EMIGDIO MERCADO, G.R. NO. 155856,
May 28, 2004 30
Civil Law

Petitioner argues that Mercados delay in registering the Deed of Absolute Sale and
transferring the land title shows that the real agreement was an equitable mortgage.
Delay in transferring title is not one of the instances enumerated by law in which an
equitable mortgage can be presumed.

DEHEZA-INAMARGA vs ALANO, G.R. NO. 171321, December 18, 2008

The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute
sale, and in case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase
shall be construed as an equitable mortgage in consonance with the rule that the law
favors the least transmission of property rights.

EUGENIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 109404, January 22, 1996
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment
of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into
prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree"?
P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23
thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making
further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project
according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.

PNB vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 104528, January 18, 1996

A buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale cannot disposses prior purchasers on

installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they
previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer on the theory
that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not
applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to
the enactment of P.D. 957.
Moreover, the SC held that, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges
petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered
by private respondents. Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for
the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot
or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments
to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the
particular lot or unit being paid for.

HULST vs. PR BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO. 156364, September 25, 2008
Petitioner contends that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent involved
a condominium unit and did not violate the Constitutional proscription against ownership
of land by aliens. The law expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and
shares in condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total and
outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation, since under this
set up, the ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself.
CARDINAL BUILDING OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. ASSET RECOVERY AND
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 149696, July 14, 2006

Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, provides:
Civil Law

Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly
registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the
time the assessment is made. The amount of any such assessment plus any other
charges thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees) and penalties, as
such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien
upon the condominium assessed when the management body causes a notice of
assessment to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where
such condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such
assessment and such other charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of
restrictions, a description of the condominium unit against which the same has been
assessed, and the name of the registered owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by
an authorized representative of the management body or as otherwise provided in the
declaration of restrictions. Upon payment of said assessment and charges or other
satisfaction thereof, the management body shall cause to be registered a release of the
lien.

Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration of
said notice of assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration
of restrictions may provide for the subordination thereof to any other liens and
encumbrances. Such liens may be enforced in the same manner provided for by law for
the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise
provided for in the declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to
bid at foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption as in
cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages.

Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Manila in order that the amount of such assessment could be
considered a lien upon Marual's two condominium units. Clearly, pursuant to the above
provisions, petitioner's claim can not be considered superior to that of respondent. As
mentioned earlier, the deed of sale wherein Marual conveyed to respondent his two
condominium units, was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

CHATEAU DE BAIE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES MORENO, G.R.

NO. 186271, February 23, 2011

The petition sought to prohibit the scheduled extrajudicial sale for lack of a special
power to sell from the registered owner. Under RA 4726 (the Condominium Act), when a
unit owner fails to pay the association dues, the condominium corporation can enforce a
lien on the condominium unit by selling the unit in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and
a special authority from the condominium owner before a condominium corporation can
initiate a foreclosure proceeding is not needed.

Pagurayan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO. 154577, July 23, 2008

A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by

which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another who
undertakes to pay the rent.
Being a consensual contract, it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the
minds on the thing and the cause and consideration which are to constitute the contract.
Without the agreement
Civil Law

of both parties, no contract of lease can be said to have been created or established.
Nobody can force an owner to lease out his property if he is not willing.

CA-AG.R.O-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO.

90027, March 3, 1993

We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the safety
deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil
Code. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643
because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not
given to the joint renters the petitioner and the Pugaos.

PARTNERSHIP, AGENCY AND TRUST

LIM TONG LIM vs. PHILIPPINE FISHING GEAR INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. NO.
136448, November 3, 1999

A partnership may be deemed to exist among parties who agree to borrow money to
pursue a business and to divide the profits or losses that may arise therefrom, even if it
is shown that they have not contributed any capital of their own to a "common fund."
Their contribution may be in the form of credit or industry, not necessarily cash or fixed
assets.

ROSARIO U. YULO vs. YANG CHIAO SENG, G.R. NO. L-12541, August 28, 1959

The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind
themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund; (2) intention
on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. (Art. 1767, Civil
Code.).

HEIRS OF TAN ENG KEE vs .COURT OF APPEALS and BENGUET LUMBER

COMPANY, G.R. NO. 126881; October 3, 2000
In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:

(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other
are not partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether
such co- owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the
property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not
the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property which
the returns are derived;
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if
such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installment or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the
business;
Civil Law

(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by
installments or otherwise.

ALFREDO N. AGUILA, JR vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE

ABROGAR, G.R. NO. 127347, November 25, 1999

Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code, a partnership has a juridical personality separate
and distinct from that of each of the partners. The partners cannot be held liable for the
obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different
juridical personality is being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes, hence it is
the partnership, not its officers or agents, which should be impleaded in any litigation
involving property registered in its name, violation of this rule will result in the dismissal
of the complaint.

Villareal vs. Ramirez, G.R. NO. 144214. July 14, 2003

Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the shares
of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In
other words, it can only pay out what it has in its coffers, which consists of all its assets.
However, before the partners can be paid their shares, the creditors of the partnership
must first be compensated. After all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the
partnership assets becomes available for the payment of the partners shares.

Angeles vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. NO. 142612, July 29, 2005

The Angeles spouses position that there is no partnership because of the lack of a
public instrument indicating the same and a lack of registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) holds no water for the following reasons: first, the
Angeles spouses contributed money to the partnership and not immovable property;
and second, mere failure to register the contract of partnership with the SEC does not
invalidate a contract that has the essential requisites of a partnership. The purpose of
registration of the contract of partnership is to give notice to third parties. Failure to
register the contract of partnership does not affect the liability of the partnership and of
the partners to third persons. Neither does such failure to register affect the
partnerships juridical personality. A partnership may exist even if the partners do not
use the words partner or partnership.

Ortega vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109248, July 3, 1995

The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the very
foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued existence is, in turn,
dependent on the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each partner's capability
to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution provided by the law itself. Verily,
any one of the partners may, at his sole pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the partnership
at will. He must, however, act in good faith, not that the attendance of bad faith can
prevent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for damages.
Among partners, mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows
them to have the power, although not necessarily the right, to dissolve the
Civil Law

partnership. An unjustified dissolution by the partner can subject him to a possible

action for damages.

Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. NO. 114398, October 24, 1997

Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa and advances the theory that the
intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of partnership, wherein Rosales
(private complainant for Estafa) would contribute the funds while she would buy and sell
the cigarettes, and later divide the profits between them But even assuming that a
contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between the parties, SC ruled
that when money or property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose
(such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later misappropriated it, such partner
is guilty of estafa.

Moran, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-59956, October 31, 1984

The rule is, when a partner who has undertaken to contribute a sum of money fails to do
so, he becomes a debtor of the partnership for whatever he may have promised to
contribute (Art. 1786, Civil Code) and for interests and damages from the time he should
have complied with his obligation (Art. 1788, Civil Code). Thus in Uy v. Puzon (79 SCRA
598), which interpreted Art. 2200 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, we allowed a total
of P200,000.00 compensatory damages in favor of the appellee because the appellant
therein was remiss in his obligations as a partner and as prime contractor of the
construction projects in question.

Tai Tong Chuache & Co. vs. Insurance Commission, G.R. NO. L-55397 February 29,
1988

Petitioner being a partnership may sue and be sued in its name or by its duly authorized
representative. Thus, Chua as the managing partner of the partnership may execute all
acts of administration including the right to sue debtors of the partnership in case of
their failure to pay their obligations when it became due and demandable.

Catalan vs. Gatchalian, G.R. NO. L-11648, April 22, 1959

Catalan and Gatchalian as partners mortgaged two lots together with the improvements
thereon to secure a credit. Catalan redeemed the property and he contends that title
should be cancelled and a new one must be issued in his name. Under Article 1807 of
the NCC every partner becomes a trustee for his co-partner with regard to any benefits
or profits derived from his act as a partner. Consequently, when Catalan redeemed the
properties in question, he became a trustee and held the same in trust for his co partner
Gatchalian, subject to his right to demand from the latter his contribution to the amount
of redemption.

Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad Santos, G.R. NO. L-31684 June 28, 1973

Respondent industrial partner has the right to demand for a formal accounting and to
receive her share in the net profit that may result from such an accounting.
Civil Law

ISLAND SALES, INC. vs. UNITED PIONEERS GENERAL CONSTRUCTION

COMPANY, G.R. NO. L-22493, July 31, 1975

Defendant company, a general partnership purchased from the plaintiff a motor vehicle
on an installment basis with the condition that failure to pay any of said installments as
they fall due would render the whole unpaid balance immediately due and demandable.
Having failed to receive the installment, the plaintiff sued the defendant company for the
unpaid balance with Benjamin C. Daco, Daniel A. Guizona, Noel C. Sim, Romulo B.
Lumauig, and Augusto Palisoc were included as co-defendants in their capacity as
general partners of the defendant company. In this case, there were five (5) general
partners when the promissory note in question was executed for and in behalf of the
partnership. Since the liability of the partners is pro rata, the liability of the appellant
Benjamin C. Daco shall be limited to only one-fifth of the obligations of the defendant
company. The fact that the complaint against the defendant Romulo B. Lumauig was
dismissed, upon motion of the plaintiff, does not unmake the said Lumauig as a general
partner in the defendant company. In so moving to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff
merely condoned Lumauig's individual liability to the plaintiff.

ELMO MUASQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-39780, November 11, 1985

There is a general presumption that each individual partner is an authorized agent for
the firm and that he has authority to bind the firm in carrying on the partnership
transactions. The presumption is sufficient to permit third persons to hold the firm liable
on transactions entered into by one of members of the firm acting apparently in its
behalf and within the scope of his authority.

ANTONIO C. GOQUIOLAY, ET AL. vs. WASHINGTON Z. SYCIP, ET AL, G.R. NO. L-

11840, December 10, 1963

Where the partnership business is to deal in merchandise and goods, i.e., movable
property, the sale of its real property (immovables) is not within the ordinary powers of a
partner, because it is not in line with the normal business of the firm. But where the
express and avowed purpose of the partnership is to buy and sell real estate (as in the
present case), the immovables thus acquired by the firm from part of its stock-in-trade,
and the sale thereof is in pursuance of partnership purposes, hence within the ordinary
powers of the partner.

J. TIOSEJO INVESTMENT CORP. vs. Ang, G.R. NO. 174149, September 8, 2010

Petitioner cannot avoid liability by claiming that it was not in any way privy to the
Contracts to Sell executed by PPGI and respondents. As correctly argued by the
respondent, a joint venture is considered in this jurisdiction as a form of partnership and
is, accordingly, governed by the law of partnerships and under Article 1824 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, all partners are solidarily liable with the partnership for
everything chargeable to the partnership, including loss or injury caused to a third
person or penalties incurred due to any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-
partners.
Civil Law

PRIMELINK PROPERTIES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LAZATIN-

MAGAT, et.al, G.R. NO. 167379, June 27, 2006

On dissolution, the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed. Winding up means the administration of the assets of
the partnership for the purpose of terminating the business and discharging the
obligations of the partnership.

MARJORIE TOCAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 127405, October 4, 2000

An unjustified dissolution by a partner can subject him to action for damages because
by the mutual agency that arises in a partnership, the doctrine of delectus personae
allows the partners to have the power, although not necessarily the right to dissolve the
partnership.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. WILLIAM J. SUTER, G.R. NO. L-

25532, February 28, 1969

A limited partnership, named "William J. Suter 'Morcoin' Co., Ltd.," was formed on 30
September 1947 by herein respondent William J. Suter as the general partner, and Julia
Spirig and Gustav Carlson, as the limited partners. The thesis that the limited
partnership, William J. Suter "Morcoin" Co., Ltd., has been dissolved by operation of law
because of the marriage of the only general partner, William J. Suter to the originally
limited partner, Julia Spirig one year after the partnership was organized is not tenable.
The subsequent marriage of the partners does not operate to dissolve it, such marriage
not being one of the causes provided for that purpose either by the Spanish Civil Code
or the Code of Commerce. The appellant's view, that by the marriage of both partners
the company became a single proprietorship, is equally erroneous. The capital
contributions of partners William J. Suter and Julia Spirig were separately owned and
contributed by them before their marriage; and after they were joined in wedlock, such
contributions remained their respective separate property under the Spanish Civil Code.

Country Bankers Insurance Corp.. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18, 2012, G.R.
NO. 166044

In a contract of agency, a person, the agent, binds himself to represent another, the
principal, with the latters consent or authority. Thus, agency is based on
representation, where the agent acts for and in behalf of the principal on matters within
the scope of the authority conferred upon him. Such acts have the same legal effect as
if they were personally done by the principal. By this legal fiction of representation, the
actual or legal absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence.

SALLY YOSHIZAKI v. JOY TRAINING CENTER OF AURORA, INC., G.R. No.

174978. July 31, 2013

As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral. However, it must be written when
the law requires a specific form. Specifically, Article 1874 of the Civil Code provides that
the contract of
Civil Law

agency must be written for the validity of the sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein. Otherwise, the sale shall be void. A related provision, Article 1878 of the Civil
Code, states that special powers of attorney are necessary to convey real rights over
immovable properties. Further the special power of attorney mandated by law must be
one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of
the authorized act. Such power must be must express in clear and unmistakable
language. In the present case, the pieces of documentary evidence by Sally did not
convince the Court as to the existence of agency. Necessarily, the absence of a
contract of agency renders the contract of sale unenforceable. Joy Training effectively
did not enter into a valid contract of sale with the spouses Yoshizaki.

Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006

It bears stressing that in an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal

is extended through the facility of the agent. In so doing, the agent, by legal fiction,
becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him
do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which
must not, in any way, be compelled by law or by any court.

Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. Cuizon, G.R. NO. 167552, April 23, 2007

In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do

something in representation or on behalf of another with the latters consent. The
underlying principle of the contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the
services of others to do a great variety of things like selling, buying, manufacturing,
and transporting. Its purpose is to extend the personality of the principal or the party for
whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority to act. It is said that
the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the
principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal
effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. By this legal fiction, the actual
or real absence of the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence qui facit
per alium facit per se. The elements of the contract of agency are: (1) consent, express
or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a
juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not
for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.

Lintoja vs. Eternit Corp., G.R. NO. 144805, June 8, 2006

An agency may be expressed or implied from the act of the principal, from his silence or
lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that another person is
acting on his behalf without authority. Acceptance by the agent may be expressed, or
implied from his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction
according to the circumstances. Agency may be oral unless the law requires a specific
form. However, to create or convey real rights over immovable property, a special
power of attorney is necessary. Thus, when a sale of a piece of land or any portion
thereof is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing, otherwise, the
sale shall be void.

Naguiat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 118375, October 3, 2003

Civil Law

The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an agency by estoppels citing Article
1873 of the Civil Code. Apparently, it considered that at the very least, as a
consequence of the interaction between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt, Queao got the
impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to
correct Queaos impression. In that situation, the rule is clear. One who clothes
another with apparent authority as his agent, and holds him out to the public as such,
cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the
prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith, and in the
honest belief that he is what he appears to be. The Court of Appeals is correct in
invoking the said rule on agency by estoppel.

Siasat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. NO. L-67889, October 10, 1985

A general agent is one authorized to do all acts pertaining to a business of a certain kind
or at a particular place, or all acts pertaining to a business of a particular class or series.
He has usually authority either expressly conferred in general terms or in effect made
general by the usages, customs or nature of the business which he is authorized to
transact. An agent, therefore, who is empowered to transact all the business of his
principal of a particular kind or in a particular place, would, for this reason, be ordinarily
deemed a general agent. A special agent is one authorized to do some particular act or
to act upon some particular occasion, acts usually in accordance with specific
instructions or under limitations necessarily implied from the nature of the act to be done

Veloso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 102737, August 21, 1996

There was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since the
general power of attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the
power to sell the subject property. The special power of attorney can be included in the
general power when it is specified therein the act or transaction for which the special
power is required. Whether the instrument be denominated as general power of
attorney or special power of attorney, what matters is the extent of the power or
powers contemplated upon the agent or attorney in fact. If the power is couched in
general terms, then such power cannot go beyond acts of administration. However,
where the power to sell is specific, it not being merely implied, much less couched in
general terms, there cannot be any doubt that the attorney in fact may execute a valid
sale. An instrument may be captioned as special power of attorney but if the powers
granted are couched in general terms without mentioning any specific power to sell or
mortgage or to do other specific acts of strict dominion, then in that case only acts of
administration may be deemed conferred

Orbeta vs. Sendiong, G.R. NO. 155236, July 8, 2005

A special power of attorney simply refers to a clear mandate specifically authorizing the
performance of a specific power and of express acts subsumed therein, and there is a
specific authority given to Mae Sendiong to sign her name in behalf of Paul Sendiong in
contracts and agreements and to institute suits in behalf of her father. Neither would the
fact that the document is captioned General Power of Attorney militate against its
construction as granting specific powers to the agent pertaining to the petition for
annulment of judgment she instituted in behalf
Civil Law

of her father. As Justice Paras has noted, a general power of attorney may include a
special power if such special power is mentioned or referred to in the general power.

Country Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, June 18, 2012, G.R.
NO. 166044

Our law mandates an agent to act within the scope of his authority. The scope of an
agents authority is what appears in the written terms of the power of attorney granted
upon him. Under Article 1878(11) of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is
necessary to obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety.

Mercado vs. Allied Banking Corpporation, G.R. NO. 171460, July 24, 2007

Equally relevant is the rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and
pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified
therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney.
Where powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers
and duties are limited and are confined to those which are specified and defined, and all
other powers and duties are excluded. This is but in accord with the disinclination of
courts to enlarge the authority G.R.anted beyond the powers expressly given and those
which incidentally flow or derive therefrom as being usual and reasonably necessary
and proper for the performance of such express powers.

Angeles vs. Philippines National Railways, G.R. NO. 150128, August 31, 2006
A power of attorney is only but an instrument in writing by which a person, as principal,
appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain
specified acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of
attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been called a letter of
attorney. Its primary purpose is not to define the authority of the agent as between
himself and his principal but to evidence the authority of the agent to third parties with
whom the agent deals. Except as may be required by statute, a power of attorney is
valid although no notary public intervened in its execution.

SHOPPERS PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. EFREN P.

ROQUE, G.R. NO. 148775, January 13, 2004

Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power of attorney is necessary to
lease any real property to another person for more than one year. The lease of real
property for more than one year is considered not merely an act of administration but an
act of strict dominion or of ownership. A special power of attorney is thus necessary for
its execution through an agent.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF , G.R. NO. 117356, June 19, 2000

One factor which most clearly distinguishes agency from other legal concepts is control;
one person - the agent - agrees to act under the control or direction of another - the
principal. Indeed, the very word "agency" has come to connote control by the principal.
The control factor, more than any other, has caused the courts to put contracts between
principal and agent in a separate category.
Civil Law

Republic vs. Evangelista, G.R. NO. 156015, August 11, 2005

A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation

based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of
the agent to act depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the
power of the agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal.
Thus, generally, the agency may be revoked by the principal at will. However, an
exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it is coupled with interest,
i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency. The reason for its irrevocability is
because the agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It is not solely
the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons which are affected.
Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked at the sole
will of the principal.

Lim vs. Saban, G.R. NO. 163720, December 16, 2004

Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract
depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a
partner is appointed manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his
removal from the management is unjustifiable. Stated differently, an agency is deemed
as one coupled with an interest where it is established for the mutual benefit of the
principal and of the agent, or for the interest of the principal and of third persons, and it
cannot be revoked by the principal so long as the interest of the agent or of a third
person subsists. In an agency coupled with an interest, the agents interest must be in
the subject matter of the power conferred and not merely an interest in the exercise of
the power because it entitles him to compensation. When an agents interest is confined
to earning his agreed compensation, the agency is not one coupled with an interest,
since an agents interest in obtaining his compensation as such agent is an ordinary
incident of the agency relationship.

RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS vs.

FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-24332, January 31,
1978

By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent,
agency is extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or agent. Although a
revocation of a power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties
concerned, yet a revocation by operation of law, such as by death of the principal is, as
a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch as "by legal fiction the agent's exercise of
authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing will. With death, the
principal's will ceases or is the authority is extinguished.

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

BONEVIE vs CA, G.R. NO. L-49101 October 24, 1983

Petitioner assails the validity of the mortgage between Lozano and PBCOM arguing that
on the day the deed was executed there was yet no principal obligation to
secure as the loan of
Civil Law

P75,000.00 was not received by the Lozano spouses, so that in the absence of a
principal obligation, there is want of consideration in the accessory contract, which
consequently impairs its validity and fatally affects its very existence. A contract of loan
being a consensual contract, said contract of loan was perfected at the same time the
contract of mortgage was executed, and the promissory note is only an evidence of
indebtedness and does not indicate lack of consideration of the mortgage at the time of
its execution.

SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-24968, April 27, 1972

The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that there was a perfected
contract between the parties when the application of Saura, Inc. for a loan was
approved by resolution of the defendant, and the corresponding mortgage was
executed and registered and that the defendant was guilty of breach thereof.
An accepted promise to deliver something, by way of commodatum or simple loan is
binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be
perferted until the delivery of the object of the contract.

FRANCISCO HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-

48349,
December 29, 1986

Pursuant to a contract, the defendant-appellee paid to the plaintfff-appellant advance

rentals for the first eight years, subtracting therefrom the amount of the interest or
discount for the first eight years, Plaintiff-appellant insists that the lower court erred in
the computation of the interest collected out of the rentals paid for the first eight years;
that such interest was excessive and violative of the Usury Law.
The contract between the parties is one of lease and not of loan since the provision for
the payment of rentals in advance cannot be construed as a repayment of a loan
because there was no grant or forbearance of money as to constitute an indebtedness
on the part of the lessor, hence usury law will not apply.

PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. 75223, March 14, 1990

An escalation clause is a valid provision in the loan agreement provided that (1) the
increased rate imposed or charged does not exceed the ceiling fixed by law or the
Monetary Board; (2) the increase is made effective not earlier than the effectivity of the
law or regulation authorizing such an increase; and (3) the remaining maturities of the
loans are more than 730 days as of the effectivity of the law or regulation authorizing
such an increase.

ILEANA DR. MACALINAO vs BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. NO.

175490, September 17, 2009

In its Complaint, respondent BPI originally imposed the interest and penalty charges at
the rate of 9.25% per month or 111% per annum which was declared as
unconscionable by the lower courts for being clearly excessive, and was thus reduced
to 2% per month or 24% per annum but which the CA modified increased them to 3%
per month or 36% per annum based on the Terms
Civil Law

and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, which governs
the transaction between petitioner Macalinao and respondent BPI.
The courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand, for stipulations
demanding interest excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant interest rates
are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.

ECE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. HAYDYN HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 212689, August 11, 2014

Since July 1, 2013, the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality of the
judgment until satisfaction has been brought back to six percent (6%). Section 1 of
Resolution No. 796 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas dated May
16, 2013 provides: "The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods
or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to
such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum." Thus, the rate of interest to
be imposed from finality of judgments is now back at six percent (6%), the rate provided
in Article 2209 of the Civil Code.

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC CHURCH vs. CA, G.R. L-80294-95, September 21,
1988
When respondents allowed the free use of the property they became bailors in
commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject
matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the
borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. Hence,
an adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription
because of the absence of just title.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BAGTAS, G.R. NO. L-17474, October 25, 1962

The appellant had been in possession of the bull even after the expiration of the
contract. He contends, however, that since the contract was commodatum the appellee
retained ownership or title to the bull. Hence, it should suffer its loss due to force
majeure.
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be considered a
compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of the
Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith,
because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And
even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of
the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum
. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:

(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .

(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a
stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event; xxx

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-46145 November 26, 1986

The disputed property is private land and this possession was interrupted only by the
occupation of the land by the U.S. Navy which eventually abandoned the premises. The
heirs of the late
Civil Law

Baloy, are now in actual possession, and this has been so since the abandonment by
the U.S. Navy. The occupancy of the U.S. Navy partakes of the character of a
commodatum, and one's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of
another's possession if such possession be under claim of ownership, not where the
possession is only intended to be transient, in which case the owner is not divested of
his title, although it cannot be exercised in the meantime.

HERRERA vs. PETROPHIL CORPORATION, G.R. NO. L-48349 December 29, 1986

The difference between a discount and a loan or forbearance is that the former does not
have to be repaid. The loan or forbearance is subject to repayment and is therefore
governed by the laws on usury.

BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971

In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the prestation of the debtor to pay the
principal debt, which is the cause of the contract is not illegal. The illegality lies only as
to the prestation to pay the stipulated interest. Hence, being separable, the latter only
should be deemed void, since it is the only one that is illegal.

INTEGRATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R.

NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989

OBM contends that it had agreed to pay interest only up to the dates of maturity of the
certificates of time deposit and that respondent Santos is not entitled to interest after the
maturity dates had expired, unless the contracts are renewed. When respondent
invested his money in time deposits with OBM they entered into a contract of simple
loan or mutuum, not a contract of deposit.

BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66826 August 19, 1988

The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received
by the bank for safekeeping. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person
receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of
returning the same, but if the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal
purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

BPI vs. CA, G.R. NO. 104612, May 10, 1994

Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really loans because they
earn interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a bank is one of creditor
and debtor, and the deposit under the questioned account was an ordinary bank
deposit; hence, it was payable on demand of the depositor.

SERRANO vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-30511, February
14, 1980
Civil Law

All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans
and are to be covered by the law on loans because it can use the same. Failure of he
respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and
not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the
deposit

COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. 130886.

January 29, 2004

Petitioners liability under the suretyship contract is different from its liability under the
law. There is no question that as a surety, petitioner should not be made to pay more
than its assumed obligation under the surety bonds. However, it is clear from the above-
cited jurisprudence that petitioners liability for the payment of interest is not by reason
of the suretyship agreement itself but because of the delay in the payment of its
obligation under the said agreement.

THE MANILA INSURANCE CO INC vs SPOUSES AMURAO, G.R. NO.

179628,
January 16, 2013

Petitioner imputes error on the part of the CA in treating petitioner as a solidary debtor
instead of a solidary guarantor and argues that while a surety is bound solidarily with
the obligor, this does not make the surety a solidary co-debtor. A suretys liability is joint
and several and although the contract of suretyship is secondary to the principal
contract, the suretys liability to the obligee is nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute.

THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC. vs. DE LOS ANGELES, G.R. NO. L-28030,
January 18, 1982

Imperial Insurance, Inc. bound itself solidarily with the principal, the deceased defendant
Reyes. In accordance with Article 2059, par. 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
excussion (previous exhaustion of the property of the debtor) shall not take place "if he
(the guarantor) has bound himself solidarily with the debtor," hence the petitioner cannot
escape liability on its counter- bonds.

MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC. vs. ALMEDA, G.R. NO. L-27249 July 31,
1970

There is no question that under the bonds posted in favor of the NAMARCO in this
case, the surety company assumed to make immediate payment to said firm of any due
and unsettled accounts of the debtor-principal, even without demand and notice of the
debtor's non-payment, the surety, in fact, agreeing that its liability to the creditor shall be
direct, without benefit of exhaustion of the debtor's properties, and to remain valid and
continuous until the guaranteed obligation is fully satisfied. In short, appellant secured to
the creditor not just the payment by the debtor-principal of his accounts, but the
payment itself of such accounts. Clearly, a contract of suretyship was thus created, the
appellant becoming the insurer, not merely of the debtor's solvency or ability to pay, but
of the debt itself. Under the Civil Code, with the debtor's insolvency having been
judicially recognized, herein appellant's resort to the courts to be released from the
undertaking thus assumed would have been appropriate.
Civil Law

RCBC vs. ARRO, G.R. NO. L-49401, July 30, 1982

The surety agreement which was earlier signed by Enrique and private respondent, is
an accessory obligation, it being dependent upon a principal one which, in this case is
the loan obtained by Daicor as evidenced by a promissory note. By the terms, it can be
clearly seen that the surety agreement was executed to guarantee future debts which
Daicor may incur with petitioner since a guaranty may also be given as security for
future debts, the amount of which is not yet known; there can be no claim against the
guarantor until the debt is liquidated.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAL-FOX LUMBER CO., INC., G.R. NO. L-
26473, February 29, 1972
On whether the surety's liability can exceed the amount of its bond, it is enough to
remark that while the guarantee was for the original amount of the debt of Gabino
Marquez, the amount of the judgment by the trial court in no way violates the rights of
the surety. If it (the guaranty) be simple or indefinite, it shall comprise not only the
principal obligation but also all its accessories, including judicial costs, provided with
respect to the latter, that the guarantor shall only be liable for those costs incurred after
he has been judicially required to pay.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710 October 3, 1985

The fact that when Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage, no
consideration was then in existence, as there was no debt yet because Island Savings
Bank had not made any release on the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage
void for lack of consideration. It is not necessary that any consideration should pass at
the time of the execution of the contract of real mortgage, it may either be a prior or
subsequent matter, but when the consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, the
mortgage can take effect only when the debt secured by it is created as a binding
contract to pay.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985

Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the
sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual
sum due.

INTEG.R.ATED REALTY CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R.

NO. L-60705, June 28, 1989
OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-60907 June 28, 1989

The facts and circumstances leading to the execution of the deed of assignment, has
satisfied the requirements of a contract of pledge (1) that it be constituted to secure the
fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) that the pledgor be the absolute owner of the
thing pledged; (3) that the persons constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their
property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.
The further requirement that the thing pledged be placed in the possession of the
creditor, or of a third person by common agreement was complied with by the execution
of the deed of assignment in favor of PNB.
Civil Law

YULIONGSIU vs. PNB, G.R. NO. L-19227, February 17, 1968 67

The defendant bank as pledgee was therefore entitled to the actual possession of the
vessels, and while it is true that plaintiff continued operating the vessels after the pledge
contract was entered into, his possession was expressly made "subject to the order of
the pledgee." On the other hand, there is an authority supporting the proposition that the
pledgee can temporarily entrust the physical possession of the chattels pledged to the
pledgor without invalidating the pledge. In such a case, the pledgor is regarded as
holding the pledged property merely as trustee for the pledgee.

MAKATI LEASING and FINANCE CORPORATION vs. WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS,

INC., G.R. NO. L-58469, May 16, 1983

A house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of

executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree
and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby. There is absolutely no reason
why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one
who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.

BUNDALIAN vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-55739, June 22, 1984

The contract also provides that "it is agreed that the vendor shall have the right to
possess, use, and build on, the property during the period of redemption." When the
vendee acknowledged the right of the vendor to retain possession of the property the
contract is one of loan guaranteed by mortgage, not a conditional sale or an option to
repurchase.

TIOSECO vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-66597, August 29, 1986

When the respondents chose to enforce their right of redemption thru a court action
they were well within their right as the action was filed within one year from the
registration of the foreclosure sale of the real estate. The law does not even require any
previous notice to the vendee, nor a meeting between him and the redemptioner, much
less a previous formal tender before any action is begun in court to enforce the right of
redemption.

PNB vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-60208, December 5, 1985

When the foreclosure proceedings are completed and the mortgaged property is sold to
the purchaser then all interest of the mortgagor are cut off from the property Prior to the
completion of the foreclosure, the mortgagor is liable for the interests on the mortgage.
However, after the foreclosure proceedings and the execution of the corresponding
certificate of sale of the property sold at public auction in favor of the successful bidder,
the redemptioner mortgagor would be bound to pay only for the amount of the purchase
price with interests thereon at the rate of one per centum per month in addition up to the
time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the
purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase and interest on such last named
amount at the same rate.
Civil Law

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985

Where the indebtedness actually owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the
sum named in the mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual
sum due.

RAMIREZ vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-38185, September 24, 1986

The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to
him by the debtor. The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owner but mere
holders placed in possession of the land by its owners, thus, their possession cannot
serve as a title for acquiring dominion.

OCAMPO vs. DOMALANTA, G.R. NO. L-21011, August 30, 1967

A proceeding for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is an action quasi in rem. It is based

on a personal claim sought to be enforced against a specific property of a person
named party defendant. And, its purpose is to have the property seized and sold by
court order to the end that the proceeds thereof be applied to the payment of plaintiff's
claim.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-45710, October 3, 1985

A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided among the
successors in interest of the debtor or creditor. Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has
paid a part of the debt can not ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or
mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied, neither can the creditor's heir
who have received his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to
the prejudice of other heirs who have not been paid.

PHILNICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE
G.R. No. 199420, August 27, 2014

The Pledge Agreement secures, for the benefit of PMO, the performance by PIC of its
obligations under both the ARDA and the Pledge Agreement itself. It is with the
execution of the Pledge Agreement that PIC turned over possession of its certificates of
shares of stock in PPC to PMO. As the RTC pertinently observed in its Order dated
June 19, 2003, there had already been a shift in the relations of PMO and PIC, from
mere seller and buyer, to creditor-pledgee and debtor-pledgor. Having enjoyed the
security and benefits of the Pledge Agreement, PMO cannot now insist on applying
Section 8.02 of the ARDA and conveniently and arbitrarily exclude and/or ignore the
Pledge Agreement so as to evade the prohibition against pactum commissorium.

More importantly, the Court, in determining the existence of pactum commissorium, had
focused more on the evident intention of the parties, rather than the formal or written
form. In A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, therein
petitioner similarly
Civil Law

denied the existence of pactum commissorium because the proscribed stipulation was
found in the promissory note and not in the mortgage deed.

680 HOME APPLIANCES, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014

The remedy provided under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 to the debtor becomes available
only after the purchaser acquires actual possession of the property. This is required
because until then the debtor, as the owner of the property, does not lose his right to
possess. However, upon the lapse of the redemption period without the debtor
exercising his right of redemption and the purchaser consolidates his title, it becomes
unnecessary to require the purchaser to assume actual possession thereof before the
debtor may contest it. Possession of the land becomes an absolute right of the
purchaser, as this is merely an incident of his ownership. The debtor contesting the
purchasers possession may no longer avail of the remedy under Section 8 of Act No.
3135, but should pursue a separate action e.g., action for recovery of ownership, for
annulment of mortgage and/or annulment of foreclosure.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Ylarde vs. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697

Teacher Edgardo Aquino, after bringing his pupils to an excavation site dug by them,
left them all by themselves, and one of the pupils fell into the pit. A teacher acted with
fault and gross negligence because a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils
would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO.
100727, March 18, 1992

Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association, a group of drivers, took over all
jeepneys of a transportation company, Lungsod Corporation, as well as the operation of
the service in the companys route without authority from the Public Service
Commission. The act was in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code [Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages] because the
constitutional right of the drivers to redress their grievances with the company should
not undermine public peace and order nor should it violate the legal rights of other
persons.
F.F. Cruz and Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 731

A fire that broke out in the furniture shop of the petitioner spread to an adjacent house
because of the shop owners failure to construct a firewall as required by a city
ordinance. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is applied by the Court in this case,
may be stated as follows: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
Civil Law

evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Dionisio, 148 SCRA 353

The driver of a dump truck parked it improperly at night near his residence and it was
bumped by the driver of a car, who suffered damages. The proximate cause of the
accident was the improper parking of the dump truck.

Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448

A fire broke out at a gasoline station while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck
into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle
of the hose was inserted, as a result of which several houses were burned. Under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor, the employees negligence was the proximate cause of the
fire which in the ordinary course of things does not happen.

Gabeto vs. Araneta, 42 Phil. 232

Araneta stopped a calesa with passengers aboard on the street and seized the rein of
the horses bridle, by reason of which the driver brought the carromata to the adjacent
curb and alighted to fix the bridle, and while the driver was engaged at the horses head,
the horse moved forward bringing down a police telephone box, and because of the
noise caused thereby, the horse was frightened and it ran away and one of the
passengers jumped and was killed. Araneta's act in stopping the horse was held as not
the proximate cause of the accident because the bridle was old, and the leather of which
it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.

Gregorio vs. Go, 102 Phil. 556

Go ordered his cargador, who had only a students permit to drive his truck, but a
policeman who boarded the truck took the wheel, and while driving the truck, it hit and
ran over a pedestrian. There was no direct and proximate casual connection between
the defendants negligence and the death because the proximate immediate and direct
cause of the death was the negligence of the policeman.

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353

Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the "immediate and proximate cause"
of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353

Petitioners sought the application of the doctrine of "last clear chance". The Supreme
Court said that the common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery
at all by a plaintiff
Civil Law

who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion
of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law
last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been
rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its
common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiff's or the defendant's
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily
an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of
terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of
time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are
the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity
of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The
petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved
from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to
act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril
precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a
man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or
omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in
society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners'
pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695

Respondent entrusted companys cash for deposit to his secretary who defrauded the
company by depositing the money, not to the companys account, but to her husband
who maintained similar account with the bank, made possible because the duplicate slip
was not compulsory required by the bank in accepting the deposits. Under the doctrine
of last clear chance, an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against
liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided,
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that the
respondent company was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus
providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the
petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last
clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their self- imposed validation procedure.

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384

Civil Law

The driver of a Pantranco bus encroached into the lane of an incoming jeepney and
failed to return the bus immediately to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney coming
from the opposite direction, resulting to the death of eight passengers of the jeep. The
doctrine of last clear chance does not take into operation here because it applies only in
a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff.

Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762

The passenger ship of William Lines, Inc. caught fire and sank while in the custody of
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works to which it was brought for annual repair. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies here because the fire that occurred and consumed
MV Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable
care and diligence had been exercised by Cebu Shipyard.

Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. [RCPI] vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA
657

Defamatory words were inserted in the telegram sent by respondent Timan, which were
not noticed and were included by the RCPI in the teleG.R.am when delivered. Since
negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of
RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts
or circumstances surrounding the injury.

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483

Custodio filed a case for damages because his tenants cancelled their contract of lease
due to adobe fences constructed by adjoining lot owners which restricted passage from
and to his apartment. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom as a wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan Chuan Leong, 42 SCRA 352

Although B&I Trading had knowledge of the simulated sale between Tan Chuan Leong
and his son and had entered into the contract of mortgage pursuant to a design to
defraud Leongs creditors, no damage or prejudice appears to have been suffered by
the petitioner thereby. Absent damage or prejudice, no right of action arises in favor of
the petitioner because wrongful violation of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a
cause of action unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damages.

Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 328

House of Mayfair, a foreign manufacturer of wall covering products, with which Yu has
had an exclusive distributorship aageement was duped into believing that the goods
ordered through the
Civil Law

FNF Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and
sold in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person
who induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby
entitling the other contracting party to relief therefrom.

Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 83122, October 19, 1990

Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6 Million from the
P4.4 Million insurance coverage of the Delta Motors he obtained for Philippine American
General Insurance (Philamgen) because the Philamgen terminated their agency
agreement after Valenzuela refused to share his commission with the company.
Philamgen was found to have acted with bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating
the agency under the principle that every person must in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 83

The driver was in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when its vehicle
got involved in an accident that killed three persons. For the driver to be found negligent
petitioner must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of
the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto because such negligence, consisting
in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

Mckee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517

A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck driver and a car driver Jose Koh,
which resulted in the death of Jose Koh and two others because the Koh avoided hitting
two boys who suddenly darted across the lane. Under the Emergency Rule, Koh was
not negligent because his entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to
avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril of death or injury to the two
boys. Under this rule, a person who, without fault or negligence on his part, is suddenly
placed in an emergency or unexpected danger and compelled to act instantly and
instinctively with no time for reflection and exercise of the required precaution, is not
guilty of negligence and, therefore, exempt from liability, if he did not make the wisest
choice of the available courses of conduct to avoid injury which a reasonably prudent
person would have made under normal circumstances.

Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil. 478

An overhead wire of Meralco conducting electricity parted and one of the charged ends
fell to the ground, and a nine (9) year old school child touched the wire and was
electrocuted. It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to
the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child
would feel to do something out of the
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ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the
age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.

Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 327

A young man by the name of Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through electrocution,
when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole owned by
Meralco. Meralco was negligent in so placing the pole and wires as to be within the
proximity of a place frequented by many persons, with the possibility of coming in
contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.

Bernardo vs. Legaspi, 29 Phil. 12

Two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it
appears from the evidence that the drivers were equally negligent and contributed
equally to the collision. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, neither can
recover from the other for the damages suffered.

Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 534

The ship captain of MT Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by PNOC, was playing mah-
jong when it collided off the Tablan Strait in Mindoro, with M,V Don Juan owned by
petitioner NENACO. The owner of the ship was found equally negligent with the ship
captain because of tolerating the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew
members while on board the ship and failing to keep the ship seaworthy.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94

The jeepney of the respondents fell into an open excavation when the jeep swerved
from the inside lane of the street, respondents being aware of the presence of said
excavation. The negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to
his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages.

Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584

At the time of her admission, patient Erlinda Ramos was neurologically sound but during
the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of a gall bladder
operation, she suffered irreparable damage to her brain and was diaganosed to be
suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage. The damage sustained by
Erlinda Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case
for the application of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice as it was found out that
brain damage does not normally occur in the process of gall bladder operations, and
does not happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.

Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334

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A piece of rubber glove was left in the abdomen of a patient after a caesarean section
operation. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies because aside from the caesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have
caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that
such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr.
Batiquin.

Roque vs. Gunigundo, 89 SCRA 178

Atty. Gunigundo was charged by his client Roque with G.R.oss negligence in not
seasonably filing their motion for reconsideration and in not perfecting an appeal from
the trial courts order of dismissal. Atty. Gunigundo's filing of motions for extension on
the last day and sending them by registered mail (thus giving the court insufficient time
to act before the extension sought had expired) and his omission to verify whether his
second motion for extension was granted are indicative of lack of competence, diligence
and fidelity in the dispatch of his clients business.

Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734

Adarne was declared in default for failure to appear in the hearing because his one of
his lawyers honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a
special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record
to handle his case after the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more
about it. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a
reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes to do.

Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47

Theness, a three-year old child, was killed after she was bitten by a dog while she was
playing with the child of Purita Vestil in the house of Vicente Miranda, the late father of
Purita. Spouses Vestils contention that they cannot be faulted as they are not the
owner of the house where the child was bitten cannot be accepted because under the
Article 2183 of the Civil Code the possessor of animal is liable even if the animal should
escape or be lost and so be removed from his control.

Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315

Amadora was shot dead by his classmate Daffon inside the school auditorium, when the
classes had formally ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410

Yu was inside his car when his driver bumped a carretela in front and at the same time
hit another car coming from the opposite direct. Under [Article 2184], if the causative
factor was the
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drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he
could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.

ANDAMO vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 74761November 6, 1990

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. All the elements of a
quasi- delict or culpa aquiliana are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

PONCE vs. LEGASPI, G.R. NO. 79184 May 6, 1992

The present case stemmed from the filing before the Supreme Court OF a complaint for
disbarment against respondent by petitioner which was dismissed. Respondent
thereafter filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner. The adverse result of an
action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment
of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
because one who exercises his rights does no injury, and if damage results from a
person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008

In the present case, MERALCO wilfully caused injury to Leoncio Ramoy by withholding
from him and his tenants the supply of electricity to which they were entitled under the
Service Contract. MERALCO's failure to exercise utmost care and diligence in the
performance of its obligation to its customer, is tantamount to bad faith hence is entitled
to moral damages.

MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. vs. PHOENIX

ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK,MCGEE & CO., INC., G.R. NO. 162467,
May 8, 2009

The Court ruled that Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required degree of
diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good
father of a family. There is no basis for the award of attorneys fees in favor of petitioner
since none of the circumstances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code exists
because the present case is clearly not an unfounded civil action against the plaintiff as
there is no showing that it was instituted for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.

AIR FRANCE vs.CARRASCOSO, G.R. NO. L-21438, September 28, 1966

Plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging
to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class
without his consent and against his will. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended
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with a public duty, and neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.

BAYANI vs. PANAY ELECTRIC CO., INC., G.R. NO. 139680, April 12, 2000
The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are:
(1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal;
(2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.

WASSMER vs VELEZ, G.R. NO. L-20089, December 26, 1964

Two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... ", then
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and never returned and was never heard from
again. This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry but unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid and per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of
the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code.

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. vs. ERNESTO V. SANTOS and

RIVERLAND, INC., G.R. NO. 153004, November 5, 2004

The demand letter sent to the petitioner on October 28, 1992, was in accordance with
an extra- judicial demand contemplated by law. When the debtor knows the amount and
period when he is to pay, interest as damages is generally allowed as a matter of right.

TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988

Petitioner and private respondent entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner
undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by teleG.R.am but which
petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by
paying the required charges. The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is
likewise justified and, therefore, sustained as a warning to all teleG.R.am companies to
observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 136202,

January 25, 2007

Upon the prompting of Templonuevo and with full knowledge of the brewing dispute
between Salazar and Templonuevo, petitioner debited the account held in the name of
the sole proprietorship of Salazar without even serving due notice upon her. The award
of exemplary damages is justified when the acts of the bank are attended by malice,
bad faith or gross negligence and the award of reasonable attorneys fees is proper
where exemplary damages are awarded because depositors are compelled to litigate to
protect their interest.
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VELASCO vs.MERALCO, G.R. NO. L-18390, August 6, 1971

It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation of MERALCO

and whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue
in this case and appellant asked that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory,
moral and other damages. Article 2203 clearly obligates the injured party to undertake
measures that will alleviate and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the
injury, and places upon him the burden of explaining why he could not do so.

BPI vs CA, G.R. NO. 136202, January 25, 2007

The bank froze and later unilaterally debited an amount from the account of A.A.
Salazar Construction and Engineering Services without informing her that it had already
done so, which caused plaintiff-appellee great damage and prejudice particularly when
she had already issued checks drawn against the said account and as can be expected,
the said checks bounced, thereby causing private respondent Salazar undue
embarrassment and inflicting damage to her standing in the business community.
A depositor has the right to recover reasonable moral damages even if the banks
negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, if the former suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation.

VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-
25499
February 18, 1970

The trial court and the Court of Appeals, both found that the accident and the death of
Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was
liable under its contract of carriage with the deceased but the only issue raised in this
appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents herein. The
determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has
therefore no fixed basis and much is left to the discretion of the court considering the
moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no
exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount
recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

PEOPLE vs. EBAROLA, G.R. NO. L-69666, January 23, 1992

Appellant had been convicted of homicide and the trial court awarded the amount of
P100,000.00 to the heirs of Manahan as indemnity for death. The indemnity for death
must be reduced to P50,000.00 conformably with prevailing jurisprudence on the matter
and aside from the ordinary indemnity for death appellant is obliged: (1) to compensate
the heirs for the latter's loss of earning capacity; (2) to give support in the form of
expenses for education to dependents of the deceased and (3) to pay the heirs for
moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by them.

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119398. July 2, 1999

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To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorneys fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must
prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence, but even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still
be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional
rights.

PLENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-56505, May 9, 1988

Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages and in
arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are
guided by our ruling that: There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has
been such loss.

AREOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 95641 September 22, 1994

Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must
be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind,
or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.