CHAPTER VIZ

CONCLUSION.
 C O N C L U S I O N
P=P======="P=P==1=

I n t h e p r e s e n t t h e s i s , attempt has been made to study the

*-.".
Buddhists and t h e ~rnt%saphilosophy a s presented by J a y a n t a
Bhatta i n his ~ y i Q a m a ~ j a r I~n. the p l a n of o u r work we proposed
..
t o c r i t i c a l l y examine t h e depth and t h e completeness of t h e
Prima-facie arguments o f t h e opponents namely, t h e
..
B h a t ta s
and t h e Buddhists, which a r e quoted and r e f u t e d by J a y a n t a
Bhatta . We a l s o proposed t o bring out t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f
..
Jayanta Bhatta t o I n d i a n Logic i n p a r t i c u l a r , and Indian
..
Philosophy i n General. .We may now summarize and p r e s e n t o u r
findings i n t h e f o r n o f observations i n conclusion .
So f a r as J a y a n t a ' s Treatment of t h e Buddhists and tie

P I ~ Z ~ SphilosoghyG i s concerned, it may be observsd t h a t NyZya-

maEjarx can very well be t r e a t e d a s a source book f o r t ! ~ estudy
o f t h e s e systems. J a y a n t a ' s method of p r e s e n t i n g h i s h y p o t h e s i s
i s a p e c u l i a r one. He i n t r o d u c e s t h e view o f h i s oaponents,
l i k e , ~ ~ r v a m i m 5 i s a k aands 3uddhists, a n a l y s e s t h e i r m e r i t s and
cemerits and u l t i m a t e l y p u t s forward h i s own theory or supports
the e x i s t i n g NyZya t e n e t by t h e method of e l i m i n a t i o n o r a s s i -
m i l a t i o n of t h e r i v a l hypotheses . The prima-facie arguments a r e
complete comprehensive. It is also notable feature that,
Jayanta's completeness and accuracy o f p r e s e n t i n g the prima - facie
view along with t h e arguments o f t h e o p ~ o n e n t sl i k e , t h e Buddhists
and t h e ~mg6saka . scan be seen i n m y a case . To mention a
very few, while r e f u t i n g t h e Buddhist n o t i o n of abhsva, h e n o t
only p r e s e n t s t h e i r view b u t a l s o g i v e s i n d e t a i l t h e eleven -
fold d i v i s i o n s a s proposed by t h e Buddhists .
I t i s a l s o be observed t h a t J a y a n t a ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e

rival theories is remarkably impressive, and h i s account o ft h e

auddhist terms kalpanspodha and abhariinta i s very c l e a r and
-.

exhaustive, and h i s r e f u t a t i o n s of Buddhist view a l s o superup.

It i s a l s o understood t h a t he i s p e r f e c t l y honest i n p r e s e n t i n g
the views of t h e ~ T r n ~ i s a k a sa,s noted.
I t may be observed h e r e t h a t , J a y a n t a ' s aim i s n o t confined

simply t o aprove o r r e f u s e t h e ~irn%j,saka'so r Buddhists' defini-

t i o n s but he t r i e d t o p r e s e n t a conprehensive view of them
which may be of u n i f y i n g nature i n s p i t e of a l l t h e d i v e r s i t i e s
i n various aspects.
Jayanta i s never g a r t i a l i n h i s view. 5ven h e quotes the

view of . . a s a u t h o r i t y when he f i n d s it l o g i c a l . For example,

ahatta
I
while he r e f u t e s tile Buddhist view of Sabda, he quotes Kumarila's
1__

view.
I n t h e same c o n t e x t he again quotes Kumarila t h a t t h e know

ledge produced by a word, reveals an o b j e c t , the reason t h a t the

sentence has been a s s e r t e d by a trustworthy person o i n t S o u t so
the consequence t h a t t h e knowledge, produced by such a sentence
is true. Thus, t h e consequence i s d i f f e r e n t . f r o m t h e o b j e c t of
the verbal knowledge.
 I t i s a l s o observed t h a t while Jayanta is refuting the
guddhists view on n o t i o n of . - t o Kumiirila, to
pramgna, h e r e f e r s
serve a c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of c o n s t i t u t e s p e r c e p t i b i l i t y t h a t a
sound i s a n o b j e c t of a u d i t o r y p e r c e p t i o n , i s never d i r e c t l y
grasped. When one h e a r s a sound, h i s c o g n i t i o n assumes the
form t h a t 'it i s sound b u t not t h a t it i s an o b j e c t o f h e a r i n g t .
~ u it i s i n d i r e c t l y known through t h e j o i n t method o f agreement
and d i f f e r e n c e . A deaf man cannot h e a r a sound, A man who has

normal power of h e a r i n g h e a r s sound. Hsnce soun6 i s h 2 r d l y

the e a r s o f a man. It is a c a s e of i n f e r e n c e .
F u r t h e r , while d i s c u s s i n $ about t h e
-.- in the
t\r'rm ' s e s e v a t '
theory of anumana J a y a n t a r e f e r s KumZrila j u s t t o s t a t e t h a t t h e
subject of i n f e r e n c e i s both t h e consequence and t h e reason . It
bec3mes t h e consequsnce whzn it i s q u a l i f i e d by something which
0
h:)s n o t been establish?d. I t a l s o a c t s a s t h e reason when
it i s
q u a l i f i e d by something which h a s been experienced and determined before.

Jayanta was n w e r found t o be dogmatic o r orthodox

..
Bhatta
and a b l i n d f o l l o w e r of h i s predecessors . Therefore he tries
t o ? r e s e n ta l l p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and l e a v e s t h e readers
o r t'ne s c h o l a r s t o decide f o r themselves without imposing h i s
own p r e f e r e n c e .
For example: While recording t h e v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s on

the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f p r a t y a k s a of Cautama, he
 remarks: s o many view have been presented h e r e and t h e competent
l e a r n e r s should make t h e i r own choice t h a t i s which a p p e a l t o
t h e i r minds.

I n s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t h e i s a t r u e s t u d e n t and f o l l o w e r

of Gautama and VEitsyayanats t r e n d , he n e v e r f a i l s t o make h i s

own p o i n to r d i f f e r from t h e views of Vatsyiiyana by making
a d d i t i o n so r s u g g e s t i o n . For example: '~Jhilecommenting on
- he remarks: t h e example given by Vatsyayana is not proper.
anumiina
F u r t h e r i n t i e c a s e of - -.- he adds: t o make t h e
~ a b d apramgna
d e f i n i t i o n o f Gautzma p e r f e c t , Yne words ~ ; % a , a r t h a ,Vyava-
-
-_I

sayamaka and avyapsdesyarn, a r e t o be b o r r o ~ e dfrom t h e preceed -

ing s u t r a .
We p r e s e n t h e r e a few important d o c t r i n a l i n t r o d u c t i o n s

innovated f o r t h e f i r s t t i m ? by Jayanta .
1. Jayanta defines -.- a s c o l l e c t i o n of consciousa s w e l l
pramsna
as unconscious o b j e c t s which r e s u l t s i n producing suchaQpre -
hension o f kno~nilable o b j e c t s a s i s d i f f e r e n t from doubt and
illusion.
2. Jayanta c a t e g o r i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e etymological s e n s e o f

t h e term .- n o t convey t h e o r i g i n a l meaning and he

p r a t y a k s a does
differentiates .- a s -.- and .-
between p r a t y a k s a pramgna pratyaksa as
pramiti by supplying an a d d i t i o n a l to t h e Gautama's
word ' y-a.t a h '

-Nyaya sutrarn .
 3, The t e c h n i c a l
-
terms used by Gaut,\ma i n h i s sztra r e c e i v e d

t h e a t t e n s i o n of almost a l l l o g i c i a n s , b u t it i s J a y a n t a ..
Bhatta
who has recorded a s many a s s i x a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e

t e r n , avyapadesya . #
4. On t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f he remarks. To make t h e
sabda
#
-

d e f i n i t i o n o f sabda s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t one h a s t o borrow t h e words,

-- vyavaszyatmaka and avyapade;a from t h e s i i t r a which
jgiina, a r t h a ,
contains the definition of perception, therefore hissu5gestion
of t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e s e words i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of verbal
knowledge on t h e saine-grounds on wfiich t h e s e have Seen incorpo -
rated i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f perception is really great.
5. I t may be observed t h a ? Jayanta Bhatta's r\M was t h e f i r s t
t o b r i n g forward t h i t h e o r y of t a t p a r y a being a d i s t i n c t -.-
vritti
5. Though he has accepted t h e twofold c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f

Gautama and Vztsyayana, h a s added two more sub v a r i e t i e s o f

abhava namely, -. acd sa?ngrthya?shZva.
ap ekszbhava
On t h e b a s i s of what has a l r e a d y been discussed we now

r e s e n t h e r e Jayanta 's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o I n d i a n Logic . .iis t h e o r y

o f knowledge c o n s i s t s o f a s y s t e m a t i c s e t of answsrs t o a s y s t e -
matic s e t of questions. Knowledge i s a quality, it is neither
an a c t i v i t y nor a r e l a t i o n . Jayanta r e f e r s t o " ~ u d d h i "and
"upalabdhitt as d e f i n i t i v e synonyms of j z ~ n a . It i s observed t h a t

according t o Jayanta prrmii i s t h a t "knowledge o f o b j e c t s which

i s f r e e from doubt and i l l u s i o n , and he i s q u i t e aware o f all
the f a c t o r s of knowltadge such a s - -.- prameya and
prama, pramana,
prami ti .
 He d e f i n e s pramana a s a c o l l p c t i o n o f conscious as w e l l a s
L----. -
unconscious o b j e c t s which r e s u l t s i n producing such apprehen-
sion of knowable o b j e c t s as i s d i f f e r e n t from doubt and i l l u s i o n .

-f or c e fu ll y
He s u p p o r t s t h e v i a b i l i t y o f only f o u r s o u r c e s
of v a l i d knowledge and r e f u t e s o t h e r s w i t h convincing arguments.
He opposes t h e Buddhist i d e a o f pramgnavyavasthZ, and s u c c e s s -
.
, - fully endorses t h e NyZya view i.e., pr;?mZna samplava.
- _._
I t has been also been observed t h a t , Jayanta has b r o u g h t
o u t a new c h a r a c t e r i : , t i c , '9i30dha~odhasvabh5va" n the definition
of p r a m h a . No o t h e r iiaiygyika h a s s t a t e d so c l e a r l y a s J a y a n t a
-0-

t h a i , conscious as well a s unconscious o b j e c t s from t h e c o l l e c t i o n

o f c o n d i t i o n s of a mear .; o f knowledge. Thougn he r e j e c t s doubt
as a form o f v a l i d 'knowledge, y e t it i s h e who has pro?erly
evaluated t h e r o l e o f doubt a s a beginning p o i n t o f Philosophy,
We have a l r e a d y noted t h a t J a y a n t a p r e s e n t s t h e ooponents

view, l i k e p~rvamim;iisakas, and Buddhists i n d e t a i l and in a

f a i t h f u l manner. He i n t r o d u c e d t h e Umbeka's view o f pramsna i . e .,
-*-
t h e terms d r s h a . and lfavisamvCdalfexclude doubt and error
.-
L.

r e s p e c t i v e l y , from v a l i d knowledge. He a l s o has i n t r o d u c e d t h e

3uddhists view of p r a m h a and number o fpramzna, i . e . a c c o r d i n g
.
--- - . -
t3 Buddhists a v a l i d means of knowledge i s t h a t which i s n o t
contradicted and which l e a d s t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e o b j e c t

revealed by t h e apprehension, and they a c c e p t o n l y two pramana,

. -
i . e . , p e r c e p t i o n and i n f e r e n c e .
I t may be noted that Jayanta's argument over ~ r r n ~ r f i s a k aiss ,

though t h e succession o f c o g n i t i o n i s n o t t h e knowledge of t h e

new o b j e c t , y e t it i s v a l i d knowledge and his assertain is that

.. of the -.-
the Bhattas definition pramzna i s t o o narrow.
On t h e Buddhists view, he pointed that their definition of

pramha i ~ b s o l u t e l yu n r e a l i s t i c ; s i n c e , it is t o o narrow to
cover a l l c a s e s of v a l i d knowledge.
On J a y a n t a ' s t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n it may be observed t h a t

it i s m a i d y based u2on t h e e x p o s i t i o n of Gautama's -

sutra
dealing with t h e n a t u - e o f perception . Jayants, however h i n t s
a t c e r t a i n p o i n t s which a r e b a s i c a l l y h i s own i n n o v a t i o n s . It
may b e obsarved that, Jayanta categorically statesthat the
stynological s e n s e of t h e .+ n o t convey t h e
term pratyaksa does
o r i g i n a l meaning, and he d e f f 2 r e n t i a t e s between .- a s
pratyaksa
. - .- a s p r a m i t i by supplying an a d d i t i o n a l
prarnana and p r a t y a k s a
word "yatah" t o t h e Gautama's aphorism.
-.
Wnile i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e aphorism of Gautama, Jayanta has
r ~ c o r d e da s many as six alternative explanations of t h e t e r n

avyapadesya .
It may be noted t h a t Jayanta enjoys the credit of bringing

to light a good number o f view of t h e l o n g f o r g o t t e n logicians.

 I t must b e noted t h a t J a y a n t a ' s most s t r i k i n g c o n t r i -
b u t i o n t o t h e t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t o b e found i n h i s e x p o s i -

tion of the determinate cognition, (Savikalpa pratyaksa) Jayanta's

.- -
are only related to
m-

o b s e r v a t i o n on t h e Yogaja p r a t y a k s a i n h i s NPI
his assessment of the ~ i r n Z f i s 5v i e w on the via
bility o f the yogic
assertainment of dharma, and who do not accept the yogaja pratyay
a
whereas t h e Naiyayikas m a i n t a i n t h o Yogaja .-
pratyaksa is the third
kind o f p e r c e p t i o n , a n d i t b e l o n g s t o Yogins o n l y .
It is also noteworthy that, Jayanta has introduced the

-.
s r a t i b h a pramana
-
.
i e.
F o r e s i g h t p e r c e p t i o n which r e v e a l s a

f u t u r e ob jP C t .
J a y a n t a has 3 l a y ~ da rema- k a b l e ' r o l e i n t h e dev3lopment

of t:le t n e ~ r yo f anumzna s o f a r a s o f t h e o l d s c h o o l i s c o n c e r n e ? .
Though h e d i d n o t m m t i o n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f anumana a c c o r d i n g t o
- e x p l a i n e d t h e a s c e r t a i n t o f vy - ti, according to
>4imSfisakas, h e
t - ex . I t i s a l s o worthy t o n o t i c e t h a t J a y a n t a h a s d i s c - u s s e d
e l a b o r a t e l y t h e t h e o r y of anumzna according to the Buddhists,
- is one o f c o n d i t i o n s o f i n f e r e n c e . The 3 u d d h i s t s
i . 2 .Xiyama
maintain there characteristic features of inference namely,
spaksa, v i p a k s a and t h e p a k s a . J a y a n t ad i d n o t m e n t i o n a n y
-- . _ -.-
..
c r i t i c i s ma g a i n s t t h e anumana, and v y Z p t i , s i n c e
ShZtta theory of
the latter .. i n f l u e n c e d by t h e N a i y a y i k ~ i s , Xowever he was
BhZttas
vehamently c r i t i c i s e d t h e l>ra%hSk.?ras view.
iJhile he refutes t h e B u d d h i s t s v i e w o f anumana, he points
- -
 out t h a t , i n t h e c a s e of i d e n t i t y , t h e probans and t h e probandm
cannot be refuted a s ' t h e i n d i c a t o r t and ' t h e i n d i c a t e d t , and h e ,
s a r c a s t i c a l l y remarks that ifthe 'probandsband the 'pmbandmf

are i d e n t i c a l , anmiha should be p o s s i b l e i n both the ways, i . e .

each being i d e n t i c a l with o t h e r . He a l s o r e f u t e d the Buddhists
view of t h e t h r e e f o l d - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c : f e a t u r e s of hetu. which i s
dead a g a i n s t of t h e Naiyayikas f i v e f o l d c h a r a c t e r i g t i c f e a t u r e s .

Having i n t r o d u c i n g and r e f u t i n g t h e view of t h e ~irngrisakas

and t h e Buddhists, J a y a n t a records t h e t h i s he
Gautamafs g. On
observed t h a t t h e n a t u r e of anumzna remains unexplained i n t h e
s u t r a and it simply i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e i n f e r e n c e 'de?ends on
/
perception' admits of t h r e e kinds i . e . and
purvavat, s e s a v a t ,

V a t ~ y i i y ~ ~nitar o d u c e s t h e sarnbandhani rdesa / of liriga and

lirigin i n t h e sphere o f anumsna. Uddyotakqra presented various
ex?lanations of t h e word trividham . J a y a n t a has g i v e n h i s own
explanation o f t h e terms, piirvavat, .- and ...-
sesavat, ~Gn~nyatodrsta
i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ways. I t i s observed t h a t Jayanta admits t h e
terms -- and .. .- a s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d , b u t he a l s o
kesavat sZmZnyatodrsta
contends t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e involved i n each case i s d i E f e r e n t ,
the examples might be s i m i l a r .
Jayanta i n t e r p r e t s t h e word "pGrvavattl in the tripartite

d i v i s i o n of i n f e r e n c e i . e . t a k i n g "vat" i n "pGrvavatit e t c . ,
-
-
a s t h e remainder o f t h e s u f f i x ' ' v a t i " and holding t h a t it i s
the u n i v e r s a l concomitance between the reason and , t h e reason
and t h e consequence which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
of one by another . Therefore whenever one d i s c o v e r s t h e u n i v e r s a l
r e l a t i o n of concomitance h o l d i n g between t h e reason and t h e conse-
quence on t h e b a s i s of o u r p r e v i o u s p e r c e p t i o n of t h e same homo-
geneous reason, w i t h t h e same homogeneous consequence, the
inference operates.
/
Jayanta i n t e r p r e t s ways:
"Sesavat" i n t w s
- .-
I------

-
I t i s merely a v e r b a l statement t h a t a cause i s i n f e r r e d
from i t s e f f e c t , b u t i n r e a l i t y t h e up-country which h a s neavy
shower of r a i n , which i s i n f e r r e d from t h e abnormal s w e l l i n g of
t h e r i v e r , o r a p a r t i c u l a r country may be t h e s u b j e c t of i n f e r e n c e ,

instead of t h e r i v e r h o l d i n g t h t t h i s c o u n t r y i s i n c o n t a c t with
another country which has heavy-shower because it h a s r i v e r s
with swollen stream.

-
" vat "
a s t h e remainder of t h e s u f f i x
-
" v a t i " propounding
t h a t t h e conclusion i n t h i s i n f e r e n c e i s a r r i v e d a t through
the method of elinination,
Commenting on t h e V ~ t s y a y a n a t si n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e term

... remarks: The . ..-

sgmanyatodrsta Jayanta example f o r sZm%yodrsta
given by Vatsyayana i s n o t sound i . e . "sun has motion" because,
rcaching d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s due t o motion a c t u a l l y i l l u s t r a t e s t h e
inference of cause from i t s e f f x t , it is rather an example of
According t o Jayanta t h e meaning of
"sEmCnyotodrstaf' ...-
 i s t h a twhen w e i n f e r t h e consequence from t h e r e a s o n which is
n e i t h e r a c a u s e n o r an e f f e c t .
Thea l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s term g i v e n by

Jayanta i s t h a t , h e n we i n f e r t h e i m p e r c e p t i a l o b j e c t on the

b a s i s of concomitance between t h eu n i v e r s a l o f the antecedent

and t h e u n i v e r s a l of t h e consequent, t h a t i s c a l l e d sgmanya-
... anumana; f o r i n s t a n c e , we i n f e r t h e e x i s t e n c e s of the
todrsta
organ o f h e a r i n g from t h a t o f a u d i t o r y p e r c e p t i o n .
Thougn t h e Naiyzyikas , t h e ;\l?miihsakas and t h e Advai t a

Vedzntins have accepted upamana a s a d i s t i n c t s o u r c e o f v a l i d

knowledge. S t i l l t h e r e a r e d i v e r g e n t views among them, with
regard t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n and p r o c e s s . Jayanta brings out the
l a i n c o n f l i c t between t h e N?mii6sakas and t h e Naiyzyikas t o the
forefront, I t i s mainly h i s account o f upamzna which d e c i d e s
once f o r a l l t h e demarcation l i n e s between t h e NyEya and tile

f l i m a ' 6 ~view~ o f upamzna .

J a y a n t a b s g i n s h i s d i s c u s s i o n with the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e

views of ~ r g b h & a r a s , and observed t h a t , though i n

..
B h a t t a ~ ,and
.- f
the c a s e s and anupa-
of p r a t y a k s a , anumana, sabda, a r t h a p a t t i ,
labdhi t h e ~ i m ~ r n s a k haves defined t h e r e s u l t s , i n the case
- t'ney c h o o s ~t o d e f i n e t h e means. .-
of upamzna ( ~ r a r n ~ n a ) The.
i'Iim%isakas might have been cor,sious o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e between
- u p a m i t i , and observed t h a t i n t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s of
upamzna and
the pramanas t h e s u b j e c t i s sometimes t h e r e s u l t .
 I t i s noteworthy t h a t according t o t h e Naiyayikas upamha
serves a s an instrument of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , whereas a c c o r d i n g t o
the ~lrngmsakasit as an a i d t o make up d e f i c i e n c y of d e s c r i p t i v e
d e t a i l i n t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of one t h i n g - f o r a n o t h e r , s i n c e t h e y
include it i n one o r t h e o t h e r means o f knowledge.
Jayanta vehamently r e j e c t s t h e ~ i m i i i s a k a sview. He a s k s :

how does a citizen remember o n l y - t h e cow andn o t a h o r s e o r an

elephant s e e i n g ,s
gavaya . And f u r t h e r he s t a t e s t h a t , t h e

a nothing but a remembrance.

~ I m ~ 6 s a k aus~ r n i t ii s
A f t e r r e f u t i n g t h e ? l i m 5 n s ~view of upamana, J a y a n t a h a s

given t h e d e f i n i t i o n , according t o h i s predecessors and contempo-

r a r i e s , and he proves beyond t h a t upamgna i sa d i s t i n c t way of
a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n holdingbetween a name and the
object denoted by it .
According t o VGtsyZyana "upamZnafl i s t h e knowledge o f an

unknown o b j e c t by means of i t s resemSlance t o a known o b j e c t .

a u t he used t h e term, "sZmZnya1' i n t h e p l a c e of wsZdharmyal' and

whereas Gautama defines upamzna a s t h e means of knowledge and
s t a t e s nothing about t h e r e s u l t of uparnana, b u t Vgtsyiiyana
gives a c l e a r c u t e x p o s i t i o n of upamiti a s well .
According t o Uddyotakara, t h e compound "prasiddha sadhamya

a s "prasiddharn sZdharmyam" o r prasiddhena vZ szdharmyam yasya"

qualities gavaya i . e . , - -
the tern t h e r e l a t i o n of d e n o t a t i o n o f a
word and i t s meaning i s upamgna. He f u r t h e rs t a t e s t h s t the
 ~.lernentof "vaidhamya a s a b a s i s of upamsna i n a d d i t i o n t o
11sKdhamya" and 'ne j u s t i f i e s h i s t h e s i s by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t
the term
lfsa"dhamya,ni n t h e sctrai s - symbolic and i t compre-

bends vaidhamya a s well .

J a y a n t a s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e t h e o r y may be n o t i c e d i n h i s

remarks t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n given by a r e l i a b l e person p l a y s

only a second p a r t , s i n c e , the words h e l p only i n p o i n t i n g o u t
the e f f i c i e n c y of t h e p e r c e p t i o n of s i m i l a r i t y ; t'ne s t a t e m e n t
here i s not t h e immediatecause b u t o n l y a p o i n t e r t o a n o t h e r
cause i . e . , p e r c e p t i o n o f si:nil l r i t y .
I t may be observsd t h a t Jayanta does n o t op?ose t h e ~?mamsakas

f o r t h e sake of argument. Ii r a t h e r , g i v e s a f a i r e x p o s i t i o n of
their views. For, example, he t ? k e s Kum?rilass e x p o s i t i o n a s
the prima - facie vi-w of t h e Xim5rnsa system . He n e i t h e r l e a v e s
out nor 2dds any p i n t i ne x ? l a i n i n q t h e i r t e n e t .
. h d it may be a l s o n o t i c e d t h a t J a y a n t a supports Cautama

and Vztsyayana a g a i n s t t h e - gives due importance

XirnZmsakas and
t o t h e vi.?ws of h i s contemporaries . Thus it may be mentioned
t h a t , J a y a n t a ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f upamzna i s t h e sensuous perce7 -
af a resemblance which r e s u l t s i n t h e c o g n i t i o n of the

relayion between t h e term and t i e o b j e c t denoted by it . And

almost t h e l a t t e r Baiyayi kas followed Jayanta i n t h e i r account

Jayanta has d i s c u s s e d in detail t h e problem
and t.:e natxre
 -
/
o f t h e v e r b a l testimony . He j u s t i f i e s t h e acceptance o f sabda
as a d i s t i n c t means of v a l i d knowl,.?dge and opines t h a t w i t h o u t
a'

t h e i n c l u s f on of t h e term "pta i n t h ed e f i ni t i o n , it w i l l
-
become t o o wide, s i n c e , I.n that c a s e it would apply t o a word
which does n o t produce t h e t r u e knowledge. S i m i l a r l y , f o r t h e
/
he r e f e r s t o t h e view t h a tt o declineate the nature
term upadesa
-
,'
o f sabda and t o make t h e d e f i n i t i o n s e l f s u f f i c i e n t and p e r f e c t
one h a s t o borrow t h e words ,
N-

jnana , a r t h s ,
vyavasayatmaka and
- -
-avyapadesya from t h e s u t r a which c o n t a i n s t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f
perception, t h e r e f o r eh i s s u g g e s t i o n of t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e s e
words i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f v e r b a l knowledge on t h 2 same grounds
on which t h e s e have been i n c o r p o r 2 t e d i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of
? ? r c q t i o n , i s worth n o t i n g .
/
Jaynnta's etinological meaning o f t h e
t e r n upsdesa i s 4

8130 s u ? e r u ? , and he n o t e s t h a t it i s a f a c t t h a t t o be aware

of an o b j e c t i s t o know it, s t i l l , t o be perceived, i n t e n d and
t o be denoted, a r e n o t synonymous with one a n o t h e r and i t is
/ /
t h e term which d e f f e r e n t i a t e s from t h e remaining
upadesa sabda
-I

means of knowledge.
Regarding the term - J 2 y a n t a quotes VZtsyayqna and
5pta
s t a t e s t h a t , t h e terms, c i k y a p a y i s a v i z . i n t e n t i o n t oi m p a r t
and upadesta v i z . t h e t e a c h e r , i n t h e Bhasya have s p e c i a l
.I
__I. -.-
s i g n i f i c a n s . The first term s i g n i f i e s t h a t , a wr:rson who
i s n o t p a r t i a l l y dispo::ed i s Zpta and t h e second t e r n s i g n i f i e s
t!-.at he should be e f f i c i e n t i n tile art of t e a c h i n ? , i . e . he $.no
does no t have any of t h e s e q u a l i f i c a t i o l i s cannot be a t e a c h e r .
His f u r t h e r s t a t e s : i f t h e term Kpta i s n o t i n c l u d e d t h e n t r a d i -
-
t i o n ( a i t i h y a ) would n o t be d i s t i n c t from v e r b a l testimony .
H i s arguments f o r proving " t h e r e l a t i o n between word and

i t s meaning i s conventional", a r e vital. The c r i t i c i s m o f the

Buddhists h y p o t h e s i s o f apoha, a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e words denote
r e a l o b j e c t s which a r e n o t mere n e g a t i o n of t h e i r o p p o s i t s , a r e
significant. xis views on PramanyavSda a r e a l e o o r i g i n a l , and
he i s very p e r f e c t i n p r e s e n t i n g ' s e l f v a l i d i t y ' pra'rnanya)
.
( svatah
of ~ i m a m s a k a s . He i s of t h e view t h a t t r u t h o r falsehood ap?lies
only t o a judgement and t i a t th,?re i s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n n a t u r e .
I t i s alss noteworthy th,3t, Jayanta nas discussed %e

8hSttas i n ti.:eir oljri view without any b i a s . . .Jaya;ita 'has also

..
i .F . ,
recorded - t h e Buddhists view. t h e v e r b a l knowledge i s
i n f e r e n t i a l , s i n c e it i s known t o be v a l i d i f it i s i n agreement
with t h e uadoubtable and unquestionably t r u e of a r e l i a b l e person .
3ut Jayznta r e f u t e dt h e i r view and s t a t - d t h a t , i t i s n o t fair
t o hold t h a t i f t h e v a l i d i t y of v e r b a l knowledge i s notestabli-
shed, t h e n such knowledge merely r e f e r s t o a n imaginary o b j e c t ,

s i n c e it i s u n i v e r s a l l y experienced t h a t words produce the

knowled~eo f objects.
J a y a n t s has g i v e n an e x h a u s t i v i ~t r e a t n e n t to t h e concept

and accountof ~ r t h a p : ~ t t i .
views i s p e r f e c t l v i m pa r t ia l , a n d h i s r e f u t a t i o n a l s oi s n o t
based on t h e twisin&:> o f f a c t s .

He b e g i n s h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e

Bhatta i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f gabara ' s' - s t a t e m e n t , t h a t whenever a

..
f a c t known t o u s o r l e a r n t from a v e r b a l s o u r c e seems t o b e
a p p a r e n t l y a b s u r d and r e q u i r e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f some o t h e r
f a c t t o e x p l a i n it, i t i s c a l l e d This definition of
-a r t h a p a t t i .
a r t h a p : ? t t i i s h e l d by J a y a n t a a s t h e p r i m a - f a c i e view o f t h e

I t may be n o T i c e d t h a t J a y y n t a h a s n o t h i n g t o remark a g a i n s t
Sabara whereas he ,rut'llessly t a k e s his f o l l o ~ . r ~ ~tor st a s k . I t
is a fact that cTaya~tawas aware o f t h e d i v e r g e n t < n t e r r ; r e t a -
/
tions t>y Kum*Trila and P r a b h i h a r a .
O F S a 5 a r a t s ststennent

..
I t h a s a l r e a d y b e e s s t a t e d t h a t t h e 3 h a tt a s a c c e p t e d
a r t h a p a t t i a s a d i s t i n c t s o u r c e o f v a l i ? : knowledge, b u t J a y a n t a
r e j e c t s t h e i r t e n e t s t a t i n gt h a t it i s n o t d i f f e r e n t from
i n f e r e n c e . J a y a n t a f u r t h e rs t g t e s t h a ' . , even i f we a c c e p t it
f o r t h e s a k e of argument, it w i l l Ic.ad t o r e g r e s s u s and

i n f i ri turn .
J a y a n t a i s of t h e view t h a t Pm%hakara's standpoint that

t h e sequence o f t?!? gsmaka and t k e gaxya i.e., t h e i n w l i c a n s

and t h e i m p l i c a t e , i n i n f e r e n c e , is d i f f e r e n t from t h e s e q u e n c e

of - and garnya i n a r t h a p a t t i , i s n o t baser! unon soun?

t h e gamaka
judgement.
 I t i s a l s o noteworthy t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o J a y a n t at h e
; r u t a r t h ~ ~ a t tiis simply a b s u r d ; because . t h e meaning of t h e
c.

i m p l i c i t p a r t of a s e n t e n c e could be e a s i l y i n f e r r e d from t h e
m e a h n g of t h e e x i s t i n g p a r t ,
A s we can s e e J a y a n t a ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n r e s t s mainly i n t h e

fact that hehas p r e s e n t e d t h e problem i n a l l i t s d e t a i l s ,

from t h e p o i n t of view of h i s own system . It may b e observed
t h a t J a y a n t a ' s e x p o s i t i o n o f a r t h a p a t t i i s remarkable, because

it s e t s a t r e s t t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r t h e various sid
e - i s s u e s of
t h e problem and t r i e s t o prove t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of the NyZya
p o s i t i o n o v e r t h a t of t h e bl?rn~rns&.
It is a f a c t tha; t h e o n t o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n o f J a y a n t a t s

views on abhava wsre a l r e a d y t h e r e b e f o r e him s t i l l it i s

J a y a n t a who h a s t h e c r e i i t o f dg.finin;r aSh5va for t h e f i r s t
time from t h e e ~ i s t e a o l o g i c a lp o i n t of view. He h a s also the
c r e d i t of s t 3 t i n g t h a t it i s n o t devoid o f all causal efficiency
b u t i s c a p z b l e of producing c o n s c i o u s n e s s . J a y a n t a 3 h a.t ta h a s .
discussed elaborately the
..
B h a t ta s ,
PraTbhakaras, and t h e 3 u d d h i s t
- and r e f u t e d them a s w e l l .
views on abhiiva
I n t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f abhzva J a y a n t a followed Gautama

and VZtsya:r:.*na s t r i c t l y a n d d e s c r i b e d mutual absence and c o n s t a n t

absence a s mere v a r i e t i e s o f ?rag-abhgva-. He a l s o n e n t i o n e d

two f u r t h e r v a r i e t i e s o f absence
apeksabhzva, and sZmGthya3hZva
was - - 1 -
of *ic.i: tkie former he s a i d , a v a r i e t y o f p r i o s absenc.:,
anc? t h e l a t t e r might bcarisumed sornetinies u n d e r d e s t r u c t i o n . lie
triesto reduc e a l l t y p e s abhava i n t o prG-abha'va and dhvamsihhaira,
- - ----
I t may b e a l s o observe d t h a t Jayanta i s o f t h e v i e w t h a t abhzva
..----
i s t h a t which i s r e f e r r e d t o by a . n e g a t i v e judgement, e x p r e s s e d
-
by t h e n e g a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n c o n t a i n i n g t h e p a r t i c l e %asn . Abhava
- 1_1

i s a d i s t i n c t o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y which i s n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e
cognition of o t h e rt h i n g o r which c a n n o t b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h
any o t h e r t h i n g . The c o g n i t i o n o f Abhava canno t a r i s e from
b

existence. Though abhgva i s a d i s t i n c t t y p e o f knowledge o b j e c t ,

-
y e t it i s simply c a p a b l e o f being cognized through t h e method
of p e r c e p t i o n and t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no ne?d o f a c c e p t i n g
anupalabdhi a s a d i s t i n c t way o f knowing. Finally, it shoul d
be n o t i c s d t h a t , normall y t h e NsiyZyikas a r g u e t h i s t o p i c a g a i n s t
t h s p 6 b h a k a r a s , b u t it i s J a y a n t a a l o n e who c i t e d t h e B u d d h i s t s
argument:;, a%'?in.St t h e r e a l i t v of Anupalabdhi (asmabhist u
bhavavadabhSvah a p i j n " ~ n amj a s a m r t h a
isyate) .
-_ lllll__l-- ^"

.
-- -
W i l e commenting on t h e momentariness o f Buddhists h e
s t a t e s t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between v i c i o u s and h a r m l e s s
i n f i n i t i e s was known t o t h e I n d i a n s a t l e a s t a s e a r l y a s t h e
s i x t h o r t h e sevent h c e n t u r y A.D., and h e quote s a pa3:sage
. -.--- -
which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h e two c l e a r l y .
" ~ ~ l a k s kat r?rna??uhi anavast h a 6 hi diisanarn
-r *- L

I _. .- .-
With regard t o t h e view o f
-i s a
t h e ~ Z r n ~ i s a ktah a t i a k t i
d i s t i n c t category J a y a n t a t s ? r e f e r e n c e g o e s i n favour o f h i s
p r e d e c e s s o r s . He a l i k e t h e Naiyayikas m a i n t a i n t h a t s/ a k t i
not a distinct in -
is padartha b u t included causal factor. His
c o n t r i b u t i o n and view i s b r i e f e d by him s e l f i n t h e f o l l o w i n g
couplet.
na h i katpayitud iaktam saktirn anygm atindriygrn NM p t o ~ . p . 6 1

-- -
Jayanta? view on szmanya and samavgya i s s i m i l a r t o t h e -
Naiya-
y i k a s . The s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n o f J a y a n t a i n t h i s regard
i s h i s r e f u t a t i o n of t h e 3uddhists arguments a g a i n s t t h e
acceptance o f samavgy:~ and sgrnihya.
J a y a n t a has ably and a p t y r e f u t e d t h e i r arguments and has

e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t both samavgya and szmanya a r e t o be a c c e p t e d .

He h a s a l s o througaly c r i t i c i s e d t'ne B h z t t a s view on

... ..
samavgya. 21s l o g i c i n favour of samavgya i s unique, which may
--
be quoted:
/
pratitibhedat
b 3 e d o 1 s t i desabhedas t u nesyate
-- .-.-
t e n a t r a k r i y a t e v r t t i h sarnavaya p r a k i r t i t a h NM. p t . II.p.23.
* -' -
- 0

30 f a r t'ne shortcomings, a r e concerned WE a r e v e r y f o r t u n a t e

t o have v e r y l i t t l e t o p o i n t out . I n some c a s e s J a y a n t a has l e f t
PrGhiikaras unnoticed, which may be c o n s i d e r e d a s h i s weak ? o i n t .
By ~fma'hsakashe p r i m a r i l y means KumErila, whom he q u o t a s by
repeating t h e a c t u a l words.
It i s n o t i c s d t h a t J a y a n t a defends Vatsya'y-+na1sview against

his opponents by hook o r crook.