Friday, December 21, 2012

PEOPLE vs ALFREDO BON Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON

G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006

FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with
the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial.
The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both
AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped
them.

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter
being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted
rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which
ended the imposition of death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty
for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of
consummated rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?

HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be
affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the
death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose
instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.

Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty to be imposed
upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a
felony.
The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is the prescribed
penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age
and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty
two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a
maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of
the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would
have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to
the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within
reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of
death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346?
If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion
perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise
in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem
right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the
consummated and frustrated felony.

Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason
of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to
the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from
two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum
term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,
prision mayor.

http://pinoycasedigest.blogspot.com/2012/12/people-vs-alfredo-bon-case-digest.html

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V. CA

292 SCRA 260

FACTS:
Marasigan was the holder of a BPI credit card. Due to his delinquency in payment, immediate demand
was given by BPI to pay account. Marasigan issued a postdated check. The check was thereafter
kept in custiody by BPI and card was temporarily suspended. And on a relevant date, Marasigan
after eating in Caf Adriatico tried to use his card to pay but it was dishonored.

HELD:

The issuance of the postdated check was not effective payment on the part of Marasigan and thus, the
bank was justified in suspending temporarily his use of the credit card. A check is only a substitute
for money and not money, and the delivery of such instrument doesn't itself operate as
payment.

https://www.batasnatin.com/law-library/mercantile-law/jurisprudence1/883-bpi-express-card-
corporation-v-ca-292-scra-260.html

PANTALEON VS AMERICAN EXPRESS

Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM

G.R. No. 174269, May 8 2009 [Credit Transaction]

FACTS:

After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American Express Card to approve his credit
card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary
damages before the RTC against American Express. He said that he and his family experienced inconvenience and
humiliation due to the delays in credit authorization. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed
the award of damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its obligations to Pantaleon, as the
purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.

2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.

RULING:

1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved within seconds, there really is no strict, legally
determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a
customers purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. One hour appears to be patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase.
 The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioners purchase, but the more
elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that AmExs credit
authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why it could not have
promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some
time.

2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred delay, but because
the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil
Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at
Coster that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay would redound
to the injury of his several traveling companions gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.

http://pinoycasedigest.blogspot.com/2012/12/people-vs-alfredo-bon-case-digest.html

Facts:

1. The petitioner (Pantaleon) and his family, joined an escorted tour of Western Europe.
2. In Coster Diamond House, Amsterdam, Mrs. Pantaleon (wife) was about to bought a 2.5
karat diamond brilliant cut, a pendant and a chain, all of which totaled U.S. $13,826.00.
3. To pay these purchases, around 9:15am, Pantaleon presented his American Express
Credit Card together with his passport.
4. By 9:40am, Pantaleon was already worried about further inconveniencing the tour group,
he asked the store clerk to cancel the sale. the store manager though asked him to wait a
few more minutes.
5. Around 10:00am (around 45 minutes after Pantaleon had presented his AmexCard),
Coster decided to release the items even without American Express International, Inc.s
(herein respondent, Amex for brevity) approval of the purchase. This was 30 minutes after
the tour group was supposed to have left the store.
6. The spouses Pantelon returned. Their offers of apology were met by their tourmates with
stony silence. The tour groups visible irritation was aggravated when the tour guide
announced that the city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of remaing
time. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up weeping.
7. After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United
States before returning to Manila. While in the United States, Pantaleon continued to use
his AmEx card, several times without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents similar
to the Amsterdam brouhaha.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Amex was in default or mora.

2. Whether Amex (Credit Card Company) is in mora solvendi or in mora accipiendi.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court is convinced that Amexs delay constituted breach of its contractual
obligation to act on his use of the card abroad with special handling.:

Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card purchases are approved WITHIN
SECONDS, there really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how
long must it take for a credit car company to approve or disapprove a customers purchase,
much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. yet this is one of those instances
when youd know it what youd see it, and one hour appears to be an awfully long,
patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchases. It
is long enough time for the customer to walk to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw money
over the counter, and return to the store.

The Credit Authorization System (CAS) record on the Amsterdam transaction shows how
Amexco Netherlands viewed the delay as unusually frustrating. In sequence expressed in
Phoenix time from 01:20 when the charge purchased was referred for authorization:

01:22 the authorization is referred to manila Amexco.

01:32 Netherlands gives information that the identification of the card member has
been presented and he is buying jewelries worth US $13,826

01:33 Netherlands asks How long will this take?

02:08 Netherlands is still asking How long will this take?

The Amex has a right to verify whether the credit it is extending upon on a particular
purchase was indeed contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is within his
means to make such transaction. The culpable failure of respondent herein is not the
failure to timely approve petitioners purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely
act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming the respondents credit
authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason
why Amex could not have promptly informed petitioner the reason for the delay, and duly
advised him that resolving the same could take some time. In that way, petitioner would
have had informed basis on whether or not to pursue the transaction at Coster, given the
attending circumstances. instead, Pantaleon was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly
autumn winds in a foreign land and soon forced to confront the wrath of foreign folk.

The delay committed by Amex was clearly attended by unjustified neglect and bad faith,
since it alleges to have consumed more than one hour to simply go over Pantaleons pas
credit history with Amex, his payment record and his credit and bank references, when
all such data are already stored and readily available from its computer. There is nothing
in Pantaleons billing history that would warrant the imprudent suspension of action by
Amex in processing the purchase.
2. Amex is in mora solvendi. Generally, the relationship between a credit card provided and
its card holder is that of creditor-debtore, with the card company as a the creditor
extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the
creditor. The relationship already takes exception to the general rule that as between a
bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is
considered as the creditor. In the present case, we should shift perspectives and again see
the credit card company as the debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the obligation to the
customer as creditor/obligee to act promptly on its purchases on credit.

If there was delay on the part of Amex in its normal role as creditor to the cardholder,
such delay would not have been in acceptance of the performance of the debtors
obligation (i.e., the repayment of the debt), but it would be delay in the extension of the
credit in the first place. Such delay would not fall under mora accipiendi, which
contemplates that the obligation of the debtor, such as the actual purchases on credit has
already been instituted. The establishment of the debt itself (purchases on credit of the
jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it remained pending the approval or consent of the
credit card company.

Notes / Doctrine:

Requisites of Mora Solvendi (delay of debtor)

1. Obligation is demandable and liquidated;

2. debtor delays performance; and
3. the creditor judicially or extrajudicially required the debtors performance.

Requisites of Mora Accipiendi

1. An offer of performance by the debtor who has the required capacity;

2. offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be performed; and
3. creditor refuses the performance without just cause.

Moral damages

Can be availed in cases of breach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
In the present case, there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by Pantaleon
before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions gave
rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation sustained by Panaleon family. These circumstances are fairly unusual, and
should not give rise to a general entitlement for damages under a more mundane set of
facts.
 There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable
amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts,
however, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.
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https://lawreviewhurjaelubag.wordpress.com/2017/01/25/pantaleon-v-american-express-international-
inc-g-r-no-174269-may-8-2009/

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992

ESTERIA F. GARCIANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EMERITO LABAJO, LUNISITA MARODA, LALIANA DIONES,
CANONISA PANINSORO, DIONISIO ROSAL, REMEDIOS GALUSO, FLORDELUNA
PETALCORIN, MELCHIZEDECH LOON, NORBERTA MARODA and JOSEPH
WIERTZ, respondents.

Basilio E. Duaban for petitioner.

Julius Z. Neri for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint for
damages filed by the petitioner against the private respondents.

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion
Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before the school year ended, she
applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her
daughter was employed (Exh. B). The application was recommended for approval by the school
principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors (Exh.
B-1).

On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband, Sotero
Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's
founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to
terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written
contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the
difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position
without a written contract (Exhs. C and 1). Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June,
1982, she received the letter informing her that her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute
had been terminated. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the
members of the Board of Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a
letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher
. . . effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received by you before this
date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared
null and void . . ." (Exhs. D and 2).

On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of
Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason
that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs.
Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision" (Exh. E).

On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu,
Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for
discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering the defendants jointly
and severally to pay her P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, P32,400 as
lost earnings for nine years, and P10,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
10692), which on August 30, 1990 reversed the trial court's decision thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, the complaint is dismissed,

and defendants-appellants are absolved from any liability to plaintiff-appellee. With
costs against plaintiff-appellee. (p. 13, Rollo.)

The plaintiff-appellee (now petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied on October 26, 1990. Hence, this petition for review wherein the lone error assigned by
petitioner reads:

Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in absolving the private respondents

from liability by faulting the petitioner for her failure to report back to her work. (p.
6, Rollo.)

After a careful perusal of the petition and the respondents' comments, the Court resolved to deny the
petition for lack of merit.

The board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which alone possesses the authority
to hire and fire teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact
directed her to report for work. While the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through
her husband, they admittedly had no authority to do so. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:

We agree with defendants-appellants, however, that they should not have been held
liable to plaintiff-appellee for damages. Defendants-appellants had no authority to
dismiss plaintiff-appellee and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of
termination sent to her through her husband (Exhs. C and 1) by defendants-
appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from
reporting for work. What is more, it was subsequently repudiated by the Board of
Directors which directed her to report for work. (Exhs. D and 2) There was, therefore,
 no reason why she did not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had
been presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for
work. The fact that defendants-appellants had "acidly" received the action of the
Board of Directors repudiating their decision to terminate plaintiff-appellee is not
proof that defendants-appellants had effectively and physically prevented plaintiff-
appellee from resuming her post. It was nothing more than a reaction to what
defendants-appellants perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It would
appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in
the school and has no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants. (p.
13, Rollo.)

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful
or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her
own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did
nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of
Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her,
and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to
her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from
the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy.
They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered
to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever
loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.

With respect to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is
based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article
21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not
themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited in Padilla, Civil Code
Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral damages are recoverable only if the case falls under
Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114 SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioners
is not without fault. Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed to report back in
time for the regular opening of classes. Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to
sign a written contract of employment. Lastly, she ignored the Board of Directors' order for her to
report for duty on July 5, 1982.

The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for she is not entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages. (Art. 2234, Civil Code).

In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the damages awarded by the trial court to the
petitioner for they did not have any legal or factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz , Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_96126_1992.html

Uypitching v. Quiamco G.R. No. 146322

G.R. NO. 146322, DECEMBER 06, 2006

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING AND RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ERNESTO QUIAMCO,
RESPONDENT .
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his
due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.

In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,[2] Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to
amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery[3] filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red
Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of
registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
respondent's business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.[4]

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In
September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation's collector,
Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent's men."

Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,[5] went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to
recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for
respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment
uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his residence
while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the
policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's objection, took
the motorcycle.

On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law[6] against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.[7] Respondent moved for dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint[8] and denied petitioner Uypitching's subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.[9] He
sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark
(that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and
embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.

ISSUE:

Whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor
warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs in favor of respondent.

Petitioners' suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent's establishment in an
abusive manner.

Correctness of the Findings

of the RTC and CA

As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a
crime to respondent[14] but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such
findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to respondent.

Nevertheless, to address petitioners' concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of the
complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate
act."[15] Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following
findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:

x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutor's Office] because Atty. Ernesto
Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that
[respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching
Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because
the motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Verao in informing Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was [']taken['], not [']unlawfully
taken['] or 'stolen.' Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the [complaint-affidavit]
wherein he named [respondent] as 'the suspect' of the stolen motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of 'qualified theft and
fencing activity' before the City [Prosecutor's] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the
presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not accuse
[respondent] or the latter's men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft before the
authorities. That Atty. Uypitching's act in charging [respondent] with qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is
also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga [16] [during one of their conversations] - "why should you still file a
complaint" You have already recovered the motorcycle..."[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the
thief of motorcycle.")[17]

Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA.

Petitioners Abused Their

Right of Recovery as
Mortgagee(s)

Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation's exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover
the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly
mistaken.

True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right
thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is
unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such
possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.[18]

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead,
petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement.

No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the
enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every
one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary
to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.[19] It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a
legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.[20] The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention
to harm another.[21] Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners' instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners' exercise of the
right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act
of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners' actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate
and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to
law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.[22

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