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Operational Definitions of Variables
Operational Definitions of Variables
MA in Political Science
11685174
Introduction:
According to Schaffer, election fraud and manipulation afflict many democracies in the
world and this the reason why governments implemented or began to implement, significant clean
election reforms. (Schaffer, 2002). This paper examines the factors that may affect the credibility
of elections namely Media corruption, freedom of association and party linkages will be used to
explain this phenomenon.
Theoretical Framework:
Political Institutions are framework of formal or informal rules that generate regularized
pattern in social interaction in the making of collective choices.
Hall and Taylor explained that Rational choice institutionalists theory in political science
provides an analytical tool from the new economics of organization which emphasizes the
importance of property rights, rent-seeking, and transactions costs to the operation and
development of institutions. It employs a characteristic set of behavioral assumptions. In general,
this theory posit that the relevant actors, like media, party organizations and individual voters
have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, usually conforming to more precise conditions such as
the transitivity principle, behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these
preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation. (Hall
and Taylor, 1996)
Dependent Variable:
Independent variables:
Are men and women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public
spaces? Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which adults are able to engage in
private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces
(restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other
members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the
government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by
other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to
assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest
possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal and extremely low rights to
freedom of discussion.
Hypothesis to be tested:
H0: There is no linear relationship between clean election and media corruption
HA: There is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between media corruption
and clean election; the higher the media corruption, the higher the clean election
H0: There is no linear relationship between clean election and freedom of discussion
HA: There is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between clean election
and freedom of discussion; the higher the freedom of discussion, the higher the clean election
H0: There is no linear relationship between clean election and party linkages
HA: There is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between party linkages
and clean election; the higher the party linkages, the higher the clean election
Scatterplots and Pearsons R:
Media Corruption
4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Pearson's R 0 0.61118939. The abs value is > critical value of 0.211 at one tailed test; we
reject H0 and accept HA The relationship is moderately strong and positive. This variable is a
good candidate for linear regression.
Freedom of Discussion
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Pearson's R 0.71668738. The abs value is > critical value of 0.211 at one tailed test; we reject
H0 and accept HA The relationship is moderately strong and positive. This variable is a good
candidate for linear regression.
Party Linkgaes
4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Pearson's R 0.424813005 The abs value is > critical value of 0.211 at one tailed test; we reject
H0 and accept HA The relationship is moderately strong and positive.
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
4
3.5
2.5
2
1.5
0.5
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Freedom of Discussion Party Linkgaes
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Results:
Regression Statistics
R 0.77405
R-Squared 0.59915
Adjusted R-Squared 0.58245
S 0.19144
MSE 2.63887
RMSE 1.62446
PRESS 2.93891
PRESS RMSE 0.19665
Predicted R-Squared 0.55358
N 76
The adjusted R (coefficient of determination) is 0.59915 suggesting good fit of the data with the
model. This model has good explanatory power. 59.91% of the variation in the dependent variable
can be explained by the variation in the independent variables.
Coeffici Standar LCL UCL t Stat p-value H0 (5%)
ent d Error
Intercept - 0.07413 - - - 0.008380 rejected
0.20098 0.34876 0.05321 2.71121
Media 0.07816 0.0295 0.01936 0.13696 2.64978 0.009890 rejected
Corruption
Freedom of 0.58418 0.10653 0.37183 0.79654 5.48393 0.000001 rejected
Discussion
Party Linkages 0.0612 0.026 0.00937 0.11302 2.35404 0.021300 rejected
HA: There is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between media corruption and
clean election; the higher the media corruption, the higher the clean election. The relationship is
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level with a p-value of 0.009890. For every 1 unit
increase in media corruption, clean election increases by 0.07816 units.
HA: There is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between freedom of discussion
and freedom of discussion; the higher the freedom of discussion, the higher the clean election
The relationship is statistically significant at the 95% (up to 99%) confidence level with a p-value
of 0.000001. For every 1 unit increase in freedom of discussion, clean election increases by
0.58418 units.
HA: There is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between election linkages and
clean election; the higher the party linkages, the higher the clean election
The relationship is statistically significant at the 95% (up to 99%) confidence level with a p-value
of 0.021300. For every 1 unit increase in party linkages, clean election increases by 0.612 units.
Reference:
Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996), Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms
Frederic Charles Schaffer , Might Cleaning up Elections Keep People Away from the Polls?
Historical and Comparative International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de
science politique, Vol. 23, No. 1, Electoral Governance and Democratization. Gouvernance
electorale et democratisation (Jan., 2002), pp. 69-84
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Polling Politics, Media, and Election Campaigns:
Introduction, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 5, Polling Politics, Media, and Election
Campaigns (2005), pp. 635-641