CHAPTER IV

NOVARA (JUNE 6, 1513)

T HE victory of Ravenna, as we have seen, was the ex-

hibition by a talented amateur, aged only twenty-three,
ofa newmethod of winning battles by the skilful use of an over-
poweringartillery force, and it served as a decided check to the
Spanishtheory of war, which had been started by Gonsalvo
deCordova-the idea that the receipt for victory was to get into
afortifiedposition, well garnished with firearms great and small,
andthen to lure the enemy to attack you in it. This device
remindsone, indeed, of the old English receipt for victory, the
defensive combination of bow and lance, which had won great
favourfor more than a hundred years, but depended entirely
foritsefficiencyon getting your enemy to be obliging enough to
delivera frontal attack.
We are surprised to find, only ayear after Ravenna, a re-
currenceto another old system of tactics, that of the Swiss,
whichhad had its triumphs, but was growing out of date, as
Machiavelliclearly saw. But Novar a was a repetition of the
tacticsof Morat and Granson, the last great example of that sort
ofvictory-I mean the running down of an enemy by vast
columnsof pikemen, arranged in the chelon formation which
theSwissloved, and which, when successfully managed, had
theeffect of a tan k or a stearn-roller charging a barricade.
In its most effective form the attack of the pike-colurnn
shouldbe accompanied by surprise; its best successes had
beenagainst an enemy caught napping, with insufficient pro-
visionfor scouting, resulting in over-Iate construction of a line
ofbattle. And at Novara this important advantage was happily
secured,the attack having been delivered at dawn, against a
generalwho vainly thought that he had some hours to spare,
andthat a hostile army which had arrived on the ground dead-
beat,after a forced march, would be unlikely to make a general
advanceand force on a battle, without taking a few hours of
resto In a way Novara was a psychological as well as a tactical
triumph.
152 THE WARS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY [JUNE

It may be asked why, when we left the French victorious at

Ravenna, far to the south of the Po, we find the decisive battle
of the next year fought many miles back, on the western side of
the duchy of Milan. The reason was that Foix had won a
battle, but that the fruits of his success were lost during the
campaign that followed. The fighting round Ravenna had
been pushed to a rapid close, because Gaston knew that there
was another foe about to press in upon his back. The duchy
of Milan had been left behind him lightly guarded by insufficient
forces, under the old condottiere-captain Trivulzio. Descend-
ing from the Tyrol, an army of Swiss, having with them
Maximilian Sforza, the heir of the captive Ludovico il Moro,
fell in upon the western side of the Milanese, while a Venetian
force, acting in conjunction with them, moved against the
towns in the valley of the Po. La Palice, to whom the com-
mand of the French army had fallen on the death of Gaston de
Foix, found himself much weakened by the departure of his
landsknecht contingent, which the Emperor had recalled," and
was obliged to evacuate the recent conquests in the Romagna,
in order to fall back to keep his line of communication open.
He marched for Pavia, where there was heavy fighting with the
Swiss, but learned that Trivulzio had been forced to evacuate
Milan, except the citadel, and had retired westward. La
Palice pushed on to join him at Alessandria-nothing remained
to the French in the duchy save the citad els of Milan, Cremona,
and Brescia-all the rest had been lost without serious fighting
or a general action." In the autumn La Palice thought it
wise to draw the whole army back behind the Alps, as its
numbers were low and its moral e unsatisfactory.
It might have been expected that in the next spring Louis
XII would have left Italy alone, after having seen one more
campaign of disaster added to the list of French transalpine
expeditions. For though he succeeded during the winter in
concluding a truce for one year with Ferdinand of Spain, there
was heavy trouble impending on his northern frontiers, where
Henry VIII and the Emperor Maximilian were making
unmistakable preparations for that campaign of invasion
which was to leave the year 1513 notable for the Battle of the
1 It will be remembered that the orders for recall had reached J acob Empser
a day before the battle of Ravenna, and that he kept them secret, and led his men
to the fight. His brother Burckhard took back the survivors to Germany on getting
further dispatches from Maximilian. (See above, p. 78.)
2 See Bayard, lv. p. 216.
15131 LA TREMOUILLE INVADES LOMBARDY 153

Spursand the captures of Tournay and Throuanne. But

Louiswas enraged at the idea of losing his duchy of Milan,
wherehe had reigned for so many years, and he had succeeded
inconcludingan unnatural and unprofitable treaty of alliance
withthe Venetians, who had quarrelled once more with the
EmperorMaximilian. Encouraged by this diploma tic success
-but how could he expect the Venetians to prefer the King of
Francerather than a much weakened Sforza duke at Milan ?-
heprepared to collect a new army in the Alps. La Palice
servedthat year on the Flemish frontier-as did his friend
Bayard-and the King selected for the 1talian command the
veteranLa Tremouille, remembering rather his previous con-
questofthe Milanese from the sons of Ludovico il Moro in 1500,
thanhis unlucky expedition of 1503. He was accompanied
byTrivulzio,who held out great promises of being able to rouse
apro-Frenchparty in the duchy.!
The army destined for 1taly was not on the largest scale-
Venetianco-operation being (rather rashly) expected. It
consistedof about 12,000 men, inc1uding a large landsknecht
contingentcollected by that old enemy of the Emperor, Robert
dela Marck, Duke of Bouillon, whioh he had placed under
hisson Florange, the cheerful annalist, who has he1ped us at
Ravenna. He himse1f brought 100 lances. We are surprised
tofindon this expedition the wandering Scottish prince J ohn,
Dukeof Albany, as leader of a compagnz"e d'ordonnance
Thereseem to have been in all about 6000 German pikes, 4000
otherinfantry-Gascons and Navarrese-about 1000 lances and
1000 light horse, inc1uding some stradiots, for the French had
alreadymany of these Albanians in their pay. As was usual
withthe armies of Louis XII, a good train of artillery had been
provided.
Tremouille crossed the Alps unopposed, having marched
fromGrenoble earlier than the enemy expected, and carne down
upanAlessandria. The Swiss, who had sent out some detach-
mentsto watch for him, were taken by surprise, and collected
atNovara,the first strong town on the Milanese border. They
werein no great strength, as their main army had gone home,
afterhaving placed Maximilian Sforza on his father's throne
inthe preceding June. There seem to have been about 4000
1F1orange,p. II 6.
'Son of that Alexander, Duke o Albany, who had given so much trouble to his
J ames 111.
brother,
154 THE WARS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY [JUNE 6

only of them left in the duchy when the French struck. This
being a force obviously insufficient to stop Tremouille, hasty
messages were sent to the federal diet, asking for prompt help.
These appeals required some time to work, and though the
Cantons voted the raising of an army of succour without delay,
it took several weeks to gather. The total appears to have been
about seven or eight thousand pikes. Meanwhile the force
already in Lombardy, unable to take the field for want of
numbers, stationed itself at N ovara, and was gradually out-
flanked on both sides by La Tremouille, cut off from its base
at Milan, and finally blockaded in its positions. Duke Maxi-
milian had joined it with a couple of hundred of his own horse-
all that he could muster. Before the army of succour could
appear the French captured Milan aided by treachery from
within, for there 'was a strong anti-Sforza party among the
citizens.
Many other towns sent in their prompt submission-Como
was about the onlyexception. Having achieved this success, La
Tremouille pressed in upon N ovara, and opened trenches against
it: he was aware that a siege would be a long business, for the
garrison was large and the place strong. But he relied upon
the power of his battering train, and thought that the Swiss
(as in 1500) might possibly be ready to abandon the falling
cause of the Sforzas.! Breaches had been opened, and pre-
parations for a storm were being made, when news carne that
the Swiss army of relief was close at hand on the road from
Ivrea, and on the morning of the 5th June its vanguard was in
sight. La Tremouille resolved not to be caught in his siege-
lines, but to fight on ground selected by himself, and drew off
all his troops towards Trecate, a small town on a rising ground
two miles east of N ovara on the road to Milan. Here his army
encamped that night, in no great order, for the artillery and
train had got off late, and the landsknecht infantry escorting it
reached Trecate after dark. Tremouille kept the troops under
arms for an hour or two, thinking that the Swiss might have
followed the retreating columns, but seeing no trace of a pursuit
dismissed them to their bivouacs-' quils pouvoient dormir
sensment, et faire bonne chre.' 2 He had come to the not
unnatural conclusion that the enemy would take a night's rest
after a forced march, and he had learnt that not the whole of
1 For secret intrigues with certain Swiss captains, see Giovio, xi. p. 219.
2 Florange, p. 131.
1513] SWISS TACTICS AT NOVARA 155
them had yet reached N ovara, there being still columns which
couldonly arrive next morning.
The French army encamped just where it stood: Tremouille
himselftook quarters in the town of Trecate with many of the
horse. The artillery and the landsknechts lay outside, with
some marshy ground between them and the town. Several
chroniclersnote that Robert de la Marck had brought with him,
withgreat trouble, a provision of posts and palisades to form a
defenceagainst cavalry, also a number of ' arquebuses a croc '-
swivelguns, so to speak-which were to be placed behind the
woodwork. But all this stuff was not unpacked, and lying
in the waggons when the blow carne." It was to be put up in
front of a position, and the position was not yet chosen.
The conduct of the Swiss captains was wholly unexpected
by their enemy. Instead o resting the troops and waiting for
themissing columns to come up, they resolved to attack before
dawn, by surprise, with such force as they had in hand, which
(evenincluding the old garrison) did not exceed eight or nine
thousand pikes. There were only 200 horse, Maximilian
Sforza'sretinue-' few, but all gentlemen and the flower of the
country' 2-and of field artillery only eight falconets. According
to the old Swiss practice the army formed up outside N ovara
inthree blocks of pikemen, but of very unequal size. Two were
small,and intended only to make demonstrations, which would
keepthe French cavalry in check; the third, made up to 6000
or 7000 men, was to strike at the exposed bivouacs of the lands-
knecht infantry, along with whom the French artillery was
parked. After taking a me al and only three hours' sleep, the
columnsstarted off for Trecate.
The French were completely surprised, the first warning of
whatwas impending being a rush of Swiss skirmishers (enfants
perdus) against the pickets in front of the house where La
Tremouille himself was lodged-he had just time to escape
by the back door, and mount his horse only partly armed. The
trumpets sounded and the men-at-arms began to call for their
chargers and assemble, in great confusion. But the attack
onthe town was not, to their surprise, pressed forward.

I Both Du Bellay, p. 16, and Florange, p. 1I9, mention these contraptions, which
werenever used, and also Giovio, xi. p. 223.
I Florange, p. 132, no doubt exaggerates when he says that the Duke had 500
horse,but these were la eur des gens de guerre du pays.' Giovio (p. 222) calls
them molto pocchi roa tutti nobilissime.'
156 THE WARS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY [JUNE 6
The Swiss captains, who must have been guided in the dark
by persons accurately acquainted with the face of the country
and all its byroads, had prepared a most elaborate scheme.
On the extreme left was a small column consisting of only 1000
pikes and Maximilian Sforza's handful of 200 cavalry. It
coasted right round Trecate, and fell upon the packed baggage
of the French, which had been sent ahead, and was in the rear
of the town, under charge of the Albanian stradiots and other
light horse. Being behind La Tremouille's position they had
taken no precautions for keeping watch, but just had time to
assemble, and were engaged for some time with the turning
column, but finally broke and abandoned the whole waggon-
train to the enemy, who started plundering a rich booty.
The second column, a little stronger, some 2000 pikes, had
advanced up the high road. In front of Trecate there was a
wood through which the road passed: under cover of this they
got quite close to the town. It was their 'forlorn hope.'
composed of arquebusiers, which had alarrned La Tremouille
and set the French horse mustering. But when they saw the
enemy in confusion, and hastily forming some sort of a line of
battle, the arquebusiers fell back on to the edge of the wood and
continued shooting from its skirts. But the bulk of the column,
under cover of the demonstration, swerved to the left behind
the wood, and fell upon the French infantry-Navarrese and
Gascons-who were encamped to the north of the town, and were
still imperfectly drawn up. They were routed, and their com-
mander, the Sieur de Beaumont, was killed: by all accounts
they made no great stand. But the main blow of the Swiss,
their left-hand column, at least 6000 strong, had been directed
against the camp of the French landsknechts. We are told
that they marched by bypaths through fields of standing corn,
which so hid them that when the enemy's artillery was hastily
put into action, most of the balls went over their heads.!
But Florange had got his landsknechts into some sort of
a line before the clash carne, and had the artillery drawn up
in their front. The Swiss columns charged, somewhat flank-
wise, as we are told, and risked the cannon-balls-trusting to
their speed in running in before more than two or three dis-
charges could be made. This was expensive-the last salvo
tore through the thickest of their ranks, and killed the com-
1 If this is correct, and great detail is given (Giovio, book xi. p. 223), the dawn
must have been breaking, to allow the Swiss column to be visible at a11.
 ROUT OF FLORANGE'S INFANTRY 157
mandersof the Bernese and Zurich contingents and many scores
more. But the column closed up, overran and captured the
guns,and fell upon the line of the landsknechts. There was a
furiousclash, but not a very long one, for the landsknechts were
run down-all their captains save two were killed, and (as
theircornmander Florange relates) 1 the whole front rank save
eight men went down dead. Florange says that a body of
halberdiers,distinct from the main column, fell upon his arque-
busiers,whom he had placed on one side, and having routed
them,turned against the flank of his landsknechts. To put
it shortly,we lost the battle, and the landsknechts got no help :
forof the French infantry not aman stood to fight when they
sawthe other Swiss column coming down upon them, so my
landsknechts were broken and routed, and all the artillery
wastaken.' The only succour that carne to hand was from
Florange's father, Robert of Bouillon, who, seeing his son's
corpsbeaten, carne down with his own company of gendarmes
fromthe main position-La Tremouille seems to have sent no
help, and this was Bouillon's own inspiration. My father
carnedown seeking after his sons, and found them in a very bad
way. He first picked up my brother J amets, who was on his
horsetrying to rally the flying landsknechts, and after he
foundme, lying among the dead, and quite unrecognizable,
for1had forty-six cuts upon me, which took six weeks to heal.
Heput me upon a strong horse and sent me to the rear. When
theysewed me up at Vercelli, the surgeons put in 72 (or was
it 74?)stitches, and 1 could use neither arm, hand, leg, nor eye,
andhad to be carried on a litter. My father tried to rally the
landsknechtstwice or thrice, but the Swiss turned the French
guns,which they had taken, upon them, and that broke their
spirits,and all the best of them had been killed.' 2
Meanwhile, what had become of the French cavalry, of
whornwe have no notice save of Robert of Bouillon's own
cornpany? It would appear that they were never properly
engaged. Tremouille, hearing of the attack of the right-hand
Swisscolumn upon his baggage in the rear, sent off some in
that direction. But the main body, it would seem, were
occupiedin waiting for the false attack from the wood in
I Florange, p. 135.
, All this from Florange's interesting personal narrative, which must be followed
in preerence to the romantic narrative o some chroniclers, who say that Bouillon
carriedoff bis wounded son on his own horse, and broke through the Swiss in spite
o (hedouble load; e.g, Giovio, xi. p. 225.
158 THE WARS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY [JUNE 6
front, where there were only a few Swiss skirmishers. French
authorities, trying to find some excuse for the general, say
that he was separated by marshy ground from the spot where
the landsknechts were being cut up. But this is obviously a
mere excuse, for Robert of Bouillon got across the swamp in
his endeavour to save his sons. It would rather seem that
La Tremouille was paralysed by the demonstrations, and never
made any serious attempt to strike where a stroke was wanted.
Italian authors accuse him of cowardice-which does not fit
in at all with his military record, and add that the French
men-at-arms fell not only into disorder but into actual panic.
It is more probable that, having thoroughly misjudged the
situation, and having taken a long time to get his squadrons
together, La Tremouille waited for an attack that never carne,
while his unfortunate infantry was being cut up.
When it was certain that all his foot-soldiery, French and
German, was routed and in flight, while behind him, on the
Milan road, a Swiss force of uncertain strength was in possession
of his baggage train and blocking the way, La Tremouille
gave orders for a retreat in lateral directions, since he believed
that he could not get to Milan. The cavalry split up into two
columns on different roads, and made a rapid and disorder1y
retirement via Vercelli and Susa, which did not stop till the
wrecks of the army had passed the Alps.! 'If the Swiss had
possessed any cavalry there would have been a general
slaughter.' 2 Fortunately for the French they had only to
fear Maximilian Sforza's handful of men-at-arms, who were
too few to do anything.
This was a disgraceful affair both for La Tremouille and
for his gendarmerie-only forty French men-at-arms fell,
though their infantry had been cut to pieces. The casualties
included Louis de Beaumont, commander of the Navarrese
foot; Monfalcone, commander of the stradiots; and practically
all the officers of the landsknechts, except their wounded
commander Florange, his brother J amets, and two others.
Of the 10,000 infantry more than half were left on the field.
The Swiss loss was as much as 1300, all practically in the
conflict with the landsknechts-the salvos of artillery poured
into their attacking column are said to have killed 700 men in
1 The Italian chroniclers insert bitter taunts made by Trivulzio and the Venetian
deputy Grtt, who was with the army, to the fiying French.
2 Florange, p. I35.
 I5I3l LAST TRIUMPH OF SWISS T ACTICS 159
threeminutes. Among them were the captains of the cantonal
unitsof Unterwalden, Zurich, and Bern.! On the news of the
battleall the towns of the Milanese fell back into the hands of
MaximilianSforza, except a few which the Venetians had
occupied-the French reconquest of the duchy had lasted for
onlythree weeks.
This victory, the last great Swiss triumph, can only be
ascribedto an almost impudent tour de force-the reliance on
surprisefor the discomfiture of a careless and improvident
enemy. If La Tremouille had taken ordinary precautions, he
shouldnot have been beaten by an enemy practically destitute
ofcavalry and .guns. But it was precisely the knowledge of
hiscarelessness,and his reckless disposition of his army which
madethe Swiss try their bold game. If he had made up his
mindto retreat a little earlier, had gone back a little farther, and
takena properly selected position, they must have tried some
othermethod of attack. But their tactics show a real knowledge
ofthe art of war-to mask and distract the most important
partof the hostile army by trifling detachments, while striking
withfull force at its exposed wing, was afine exhibition of
militaryability. Unfortunately for themselves the Swiss were
onlybattle-folk-not capable of utilizing their own victory.
Theyfollowed up the conquest of Milan by an invasion of
France,and reached Dijon in force, but then allowed themselves
lobebought off-taking a vast war indemnity from the French
kingin return for granting him peace. The Emperor Maxi-
milianand Henry of England, who had been relying on Swiss
co-operationfrom the east while executing their invasion of
Picardy,called them sordid, petty-minded hucksters for making
sucha peace, and with some justification. For if Louis XII
haddifficultyin making head against his enemies in the north,
whatcould he have done to meet the simultaneous invasion
ofthe east by a large and victorious army? The explanation,
presumably,is that the Swiss did not desire the destruction of
theFrench monarchy, and looked to their own profit, with a
serenedisregard of treaty obligation to their allies.

1 Giovio ca1ls them Mottinus, Graff, and Antius. He has a story that Albert
01Stein, commander of the column which arrived too late for the battle, hanged a
captain, Vertio de Glarona (Werter of Glarus ?), who had been intriguing with the
Frenchduring the siege of Novara. .