Duan DOSTANI

Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

PARLIAMENTARISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY -

CARL SCHMITTS VIEW
Title: PARLIAMENTARISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY - CARL
SCHMITTS VIEW
Abstract: In this article the author analyzes Carl Schmitts understanding of
democracy and parliamentarism. Schmitt separates liberalism and
parliamentarism from democracy. He further argues that liberalism and
democracy are based on different principles and so their mixture leads to a
crisis of the modern state. Schmitt also points out that modern
parliamentarism has lost its ideological and spiritual foundation. In the
first part of the article we analyze Schmitts understanding of democracy,
and in the second part, we move on to his conception of parliamentarism.
The purpose of this work is to demonstrate the tension between liberal and
democratic ideas through the point of view of the German jurists. In this
way we can better understand liberal democracy, its limitations,
contradictions and paradoxes.
Keywords: Carl Schmitt, democracy, liberalism, parliamentarism, equality,
discussion
Contact
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Introduction However, victorious liberalism

After the breakdown of the USSR
and the failure of real-socialist experiment,
liberalism has become a dominant
ideology. Its dominance manifested itself
in economy and for all economic troubles a
cure of a free market and laissez-faire
capitalism was presented. Also in politics
the main idea was that the power of the
state ought to be limited. This kind of
strengthened liberalism lost its enemy in
socialist (communist) thought, which
wasnt able to pose as a treat and real
alternative to system of liberal democracy
and free market. After the hasty statements
about the end of ideologies, Francis
Fukuyama predicted the end of history.
rediscovered its old enemy and recognized
him in a Carl Schmitt, who is, as Karl
Popper would say the enemy of open
society. As one Serbian author said
Schmitt became actual because he became
dangerous.1 This dangerous Schmitt2 is
interesting to New European Right which
1
Neven Cvetianin, Evropska desnica izmeu maa
i zakona, Filip Vinji, Beograd, 2004, str. 11
2
According to one of the most important
researchers of German conservative revolution,
Jeffrey Herf, Schmitt was the most important critic
of liberal political theory in the conservative
revolution. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism:
Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and
the Third Reich, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1984. . 115

13
shares the anti-liberal positions with old
primordial right.1 At the same time, anti-
globalist left also embraces some parts of
Schmitts points about todays liberalism
and parliamentarism. On the other hand, as
one conservative author puts it, liberals can
benefit from studying Schmitts ideas.2
Also Roman-Catholic author such as
Heinrich Rommen recognized the
importance of Schmitt and the other anti-
liberal primordial conservatives. He writes:
In the books of De Maistre, of Donoso
Cortes, of De Bonald, of A. Muller, and
even of Charles Maurras and Carl
Schmitt (though the latter are rather the
literary and intellectual successors of
the first mentioned), the student will
find many sound criticisms of the
consequences of a secularized
liberalism and or a relativist
democratism, of the misinterpretation
of the democratic institutions by
agnostic positivism and anticlerical
laicism. The merit of "political
theology" lies, then, in certain aspects
1
New European Right is especially interested in
Schmitts conception of political, his understanding
of politics as a destiny, critic of modern
depolitisation, and democracy as homogeneity.
Equipped with this weapon New European Right
goes in its crusade against liberal-democratic
dogma founded on abstract ideology of human
rights. Tomislav Sunic, Against Democracy and
Equality: The European New Right, Arktol Media,
London, 2011, p.83-91. Also, Roger Woods,
Germanys New Right as Culture and Politics,
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2007. However, it
should be mentioned that some circles of the radical
right dont mention Schmitt as an author. For
example it is the case with Kerry Boltons book
Thinkers of the Right Challenging Materialism.
Here Bolton writes about lives and ideas of a
number of right-wing thinkers. Although there is an
interesting list of writers such as Julius Evola, Ezra
Pound, Wyndham Lewis, Yukio Mishima, Roy
Campbell and so on, and even authors who are not
exclusively right-wingers such as Nietzsche and
Yeats, Carl Schmitt is excluded. Kerry Bolton,
Thinkers of the Right Challenging Materialism,
Luton Publications, Luton, 2003
2
Mia urkovi, Kapitalizam liberalizam i drava,
Filip Vinji, Beograd, 2005, str. 57
14
of its criticism and not in its positive
system, which is inadmissible.3
In other words, we have to except
that Schmitt is an important author who
still has a lot to say to us about the
liberalism, parliamentarism and
democracy. We dont have to agree with
everything he has to say to us, and we may
think that he went too far in his
conclusions but we have to respect him as
a worthwhile theorist. This position is so to
say an intellectual imperative.
In this article we dont want to get
involved in other aspects of the Schmitts
work, his definition of political, his
thoughts on sovereignty, his political
anthropology, and so on. All these aspects
of Schmitts work are certainly quite
important, but they deserve a broader
space. So, in this article we would only
like to deal with his views upon the
contradictions between parliamentarism
and democracy. Also, we believe that
Schmitts distinction even an opposition
between parliamentarism and democracy is
not only of an importance out of purely
theoretical reasons, but can be quite useful
for political praxis of the states in
transition to democracy.
Schmitts Understanding of Democracy
More common than not, Carl
Schmitt is categorized as an anti-democrat.
However as Andreas Kalyvas puts it:
As of today, apart from a few isolated
exceptions, Carl Schmitts relationship to
democratic theory has not been carefully
explored. Never considered a promising
topic, it has remained marginal within a
constantly expanding Schmitt
scholarship. Obviously, the simple
mentioning of Schmitts name invokes
strong reactions, especially when it
comes to democracy, and with good
reasons.4
3
Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic
Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy, Herder
Book Co. London, 1950, . 115
4
Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and a Politics of the
Extraordinary Max Weber, Carl Schimitt and
Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2008. p.80
 Kalyvas is quite right when he says
that Schmitt is not against every kind of
democracy, but only against what we call
liberal democracy. Within the liberal
democracy Schmitt recognizes the
principal and essential tension between
liberalism and democracy and states that
relationship between them is no more
than historically contingent.1 He also
claims that liberalism emerged as an
opposition to the absolutist state. In that
conflict liberalism made all sorts of
coalitions with different non-liberal
elements and ideas such as: national
liberals, social liberals, Roman-Catholic
liberals, free conservatives and so on.
However, the most interesting is the
relationship between liberalism and
democracy. Those two have started
together and marched together but they are
not a same thing. Whereas liberalism,
according to Schmitt, emerged as a theory
that aimed at the fragmentation of political
power and has pursued this aim by seeking
to neutralize or eliminate the constituent
power of the sovereign people, democracy,
by contrast, came forth as a theory of
(popular) power, trying to find a viable
solution to the question of how to generate,
sustain, and protect this power.2 For
Schmitt liberalism and democracy are
certainly connected, which is the case with
democracy and socialism as well. But,
when absolutism as a common enemy was
defeated and liberal-democrats took over
the power, then the connection grow out
into the tensions and contradiction. By this
contradiction Schmitt tries to explain a
breakdown of parliamentary legislative
state3 and crises of parliamentarism.
1
Richard Bellamy, Jeremy Jennings, Peter
Lassman, Political Thought in Continental Europe
during the Twentieth Century, in Gerald F. Gaus,
Chandran Kukakthas (ed) Handbook of Political
Theory, Sage Publications, London, 2004. p.397
2
Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and a Politics of the
Extraordinary Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and
Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2008. p.130
3
Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, Duke
University Press, Durham & London, 2004
15
In his book Die geistgeschichtliche
Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus4,
Schmitt exposes his own understanding of
democracy through the polemics with
parliamentarism. During the XIX century
parliamentarism and democracy were not
differentiated, but after their victory
contradictions come to the fore, and
difference between liberal-parliamentary
and mass democratic ideas cannot stay
unnoticed.5 So Schmitt takes the task to
explain the essence of democracy and
distinguish democracy form
parliamentarism. We can see that he is
quite direct when he says:
The belief in parliamentarism, in
government by discussion, belongs to
the intellectual world of liberalism. It
does not belong to democracy. Both,
liberalism and democracy, have to be
distinguished from one another so that
the patchwork picture that makes up
mass democracy can be recognized.6
During the Weimar Republic
Schmitt criticizes this state and the writers
of its constitution believing that German
republic doesnt want to accept
consequences of democracy. It is using
liberal methods against the democracy.
The fact that even in todays German
democracy there is a refusal
everywhere to accept the consequences
of the democratic can be shown through
many examples. Democracy today is
democracy without a demos, without a
people. The democratic principle
4
Schmitt's Parlamentarismus is generally viewed
as one of the most devastating critiques of
twentieth-century representative government. Its
impact is reinforced by the high degree of subtlety
employed in the delivery of the argument, if not
always in the argument's accuracy. John
McCormick, Carl Schmitts Critique of Liberalism,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997,
pp.170-171. Parliamentarismu was popular even
among the left-wingers. In its time, book caused a
wide academic polemics
5
Carl Schmitt, Suprotnost izmeu parlamentarizma
i suvremene masovne demokracije, in Carl Schmitt,
Pojam politike i ostale rasprave, Matica Hrvatska,
Zagreb, 1943. str. 104
6
Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London, 1998, pp.8-9
 demands that the people in their
entirety decide and govern responsibly.
But the methods with which todays
democracy attempts to put the peoples
sovereignty into practice are not
democratic, but liberal, methods.
Today, the peoples political decision
comes into being through the individual
secret ballot. 1
By now we might have an idea
what is parliamentarism (government by
discussion) and we have also noticed that
parliamentarism and democracy are not the
same thing as well as that Weimar
Republic was a kind of a state where
liberal and democratic principles were
mixed in such a way so that liberalism was
restricting democracy. But we still dont
know what a democracy is. To answer that
question we have to go a bit further to the
Schmitts conception of the state.
Schmitt believed that the state is the
political status of an organized people in an
enclosed territorial unit.2 In the another
place Schmitt goes on by saying: The
state, as a political unity, bases itself on
connecting two contradicting formation
principles, principle of identity (namely of
present people with itself as a political
unity, if by virtue of its own consciousness
and national will has the ability to
distinguish between friend and foe and
principle of representation by which the
political unity is shown in government.3
These two principles contradict each other
and they are bordering, extreme cases
which do not appear in its purity. It is
unrealistic to expect that one state could
give up one of these principles. Only by
mixing two of these principles can we
have a concrete form of state. That means
that we can find principle of identity, more
or less, in all political forms, but most
1
Carl Schmitt, Liberal Rule of Law, in Arthur J.
Jacobson, Berndhard Schlink, (ed.) Weimar A
Jusisprudence of Crissis, University of California
Press, Berkeley, 2000. . 298
2
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London,
2007, p.19
3
Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehr, Duncker &
Humbolt Verlag, Mnchen und Leipzig, 1928, S.
214
16
notably in democracy. Principle of identity
means that the community is conscious of
itself and that it can manifest itself as a
living community4. Self-consciousness
of community means that it is capable of
acting politically, and to distinguish friend
from an enemy, and to act against them as
a union.
On the other hand, the principle of
representation manifests itself most
distinctively in Roman Catholicism and
Roman-Catholic church, although there we
cant speak about political unity.5 Also,
parliamentarism, at least in its theoretical
foundations, keeps the idea of
representation, although here we can speak
of different kind of representation from
that of a parliamentarism.6
4
Francesco Valentini, Moderna politika misao,
kolska knjiga, Zagreb, 1982, str. 345
5
From the standpoint of the political idea of
Catholicism, the essence of the Roman-Catholic
complexio oppositorum lies in a specific, formal
superiority over the matter of human life such as no
other imperium has ever known. It has succeeded in
constituting a sustaining configuration of historical
and social reality that, despite its formal character,
retains its concrete existence at once vital and yet
rational to the nth degree. This formal character of
Roman Catholicism is based on a strict realization
of the principle of representation, the particularity
of which is most evident in its antithesis to the
economic-technical thinking dominant today. Carl
Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form,
Greenwood Press, Westport & London, 1996, p.8.
After that, Schmitt continues: Therein-in its
capacity to assume juridical form-lies one of its
sociological secrets. But it has the power to assume
this or any other form only because it has the power
of representation. It represents the civitas humana.
It represents in every moment the historical
connection to the incarnation and crucifixion of
Christ. It represents the Person of Christ Himself:
God become man in historical reality. Therein lies
its superiority over an age of economic thinking.
Carl Schmitt, Op.cit., pp.18-19
6
As McCormick shows it, in his Rmischer
Katholizismus und politische Form Schmitt
differentiate Roman Catholic idea of representation
and technical representation which merely
replicates the quantitative reality of an original, thus
negating its originality and particularity. John
McCormick, Carl Schmitts Critique of Liberalism,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997,
p.159. Schmitts idea of representation is essentially
medieval, while modern parliamentarism is based
on economical-technical way of thinking. Karl
mit, Doba neutralizacija i depolitizacija in Karl
 Schmitt accepts democratic
principle from article 1 of Weimar
constitution the assertion that all
legitimate power comes from the people.
He is aware that the conflict between
democracy and monarchy is ended in the
victory of democracy.1 In his
Verfassungslehre he wrote that the
legitimacy of the Weimar constitution rests
on constitutional power of the German
people.2 It was such a common place
among German political theorist and
jurists, that in 1921. Hans Kelsen wrote
that democracy was nearly taken for
granted in political thought while for
Austro-Marxist Rudolf Hilferding
democracy was the only state form
possible after the mass experience of the
1914-1918. war.3 So, the democratic
principle was out of question but its
implementation was problematic.
Especially when we notice that Schmitt
starts from ant-individualist positions,
while liberalism and parliamentarism have
individualism as a constitutional element.
So, Schmitt takes Rousseaus definition of
democracy. For him democracy means
state form which corresponds to the
principle of identity. The people carry the
constitutional power and give itself its
constitution. ... Democracy as a state form
is a todays expression for a republic.4
After that Schmitt goes on explaining his
positions:
If the franchise is given to an
increasing number of people in an ever-
broader extension, then that is a
symptom of the endeavor to realize the
identity between state and people; at its
basis there is a particular conception
about the preconditions on which one
accepts this identity as real. But that
does not change anything about the
mit, Norma i odluka: Karl mit i njegovi kritiari,
Filip Vinji, Beograd, 2001
1
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p.22
2
Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehr, S. 88
3
Ellen Kennedy, Introduction: Carl Schmitts
Parlamentarismus in Its Historical Context, in Carl
Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and
London, 1988
4
C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, S. 22
17
fundamental conception that all
democratic arguments rest logically on
a series of identities. In this series
belong the identity of governed and
governing, sovereign and subject, the
identity of the subject and object of
state authority, the identity of the
people with their representatives in
parliament, the identity of the state and
the current voting population, the
identity of the state and the law, and
finally an identity of the quantitative
(the numerical majority or unanimity)
with the qualitative (the justice of the
laws).5
Therefore, sameness between the
law of the state and the General Will, and
the identity of the subject and object of
state authority are for Schmitt the basis of
democracy and that is what he meant by
the principle of identity. It is quite
important to emphasize that Schmitts
definition of democracy as an identity
between governed and governing has
nothing to do with egalitarianism. It
appealed to Schmitt not because of its
egalitarian and participatory implications
but because of its ability to procure order.6
Also, about this principle of identity we
have to be quite careful because Schmitts
conception of democratic homogeneity
was frequently misinterpreted as a simply
requiring that the people be naturally (or
racially) homogeneous community7. It is
however true that in his works in the
National Socialist period Schmitt was
referring to the principle of racial
homogeneity8 but this is not the case in his
Parlamentarismus. Here homogeneity is
5
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.26
6
Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and a Politics of the
Extraordinary Max Weber, Carl Schimitt and
Hannah Arendt, p.83
7
Ellen Kennedy, Op.cit., xxxii
8
The ethnic identity of the German people, united
in itself, is thus the most unavoidable
(unumgnglichste) premise and foundation of the
political leadership of the German people.
Without the principle of ethnic identity, the German
National-Socialist State cannot exist, and its legal
life would be unimaginable. Carl Schmitt, State
Movement, People, Plutarch Press, Corvallis, 2001.
p.48
directed toward the theoretical question of
political will. The essence of democracy is
that everyone will the same thing. In other
words, complete identity and homogeneity.
In accordance to this Schmitt says:
Every actual democracy rests on the
principle that not only are equals
equal but unequals will not be treated
equally. Democracy requires,
therefore, first homogeneity and
second if the need arises
elimination or eradication of
heterogeneity. A democracy
demonstrates its political power by
knowing how to refuse or keep at bay
something foreign and unequal that
threatens its homogeneity. The
question of equality is precisely not
one of abstract, logical-arithmetical
games. It is about the substance of
equality.1
Schmitt says that every democracy
is based on identity and homogeneity so it
has a right to protect its homogeneity. Only
unity of a complete homogenous people
can assume political responsibility. To find
an arguments for his claims Schmitt calls
for a Rousseau whom he considers to be a
founder of modern democracy. According
to the Contrat social there can be no
parties in the state, no special interests, no
religious differences, nothing that can
divide persons, not even a public financial
concern.2 According to Schmitt equality
is a political concept and as every other
political concept it refers to possibility of
differentiation. Equality is only
interesting and valuable politically so long
as it has substance, and for that reason at
least the possibility and the risk of
inequality.3 Schmitt wants to say that
democracy doesnt mean that all persons
are equal just because they are human. It
has nothing to do with democracy. It isnt
even a political ideal. For Schmitt that kind
of equality is also a liberal idea rooted in
individual-humanitarian moral and
worldview. Democracy counts on equality
1 5
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.9
2 6
Ibidem, 13
3
Ibidem, 9
18
and which always goes with an inequality.
To say that all persons are equal is not a
political principle. An absolute human
equality, then, would be an equality
understood only in terms of itself and
without risk; it would be an equality
without the necessary correlate of
inequality, and as a result conceptually and
practically meaningless, an indifferent
equality.4 Unlike liberal equality, this
democratic equality is a political concept.5
Of course Schmitt is quite aware that that
kind of absolute human equality doesnt
exist anywhere in the world.
Schmitt concludes that from
democratic point of view different kinds of
exclusion could be justified. It was the case
in old Athens, as well as in todays
England and France. It means that state can
base itself on a suffrage which is neither
universal nor equal and still be a
democracy.
Of the more than four hundred million
inhabitants of the British Empire more
than three hundred million are not
British citizens. If English democracy,
universal suffrage, or universal
equality is spoken of, then these
hundreds of millions in English
democracy are just as unquestionably
ignored as were slaves in Athenian
democracy. Even a democratic
state, let us say the United States of
America, is far from allowing
foreigners to share in its power or its
wealth. Until now there has never been
a democracy that did not recognize the
concept "foreign" and that could have
realized the equality of all men. If one
were serious about a democracy of
mankind and really wanted to make
every person the equal politically of
every other person, then that would be
an equality in which every person took
part as a consequence of birth or age
and nothing else. 6
4
Ibidem, 12.
Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, Verso,
London, New York, 2000, pp.40-41
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, pp.10-11
 These words could be interpreted as
an accusation against hypocrisy in France
and England1 as well as a principal stance,
because democracy means substantial
equality. According to that, Australia was a
democracy when it excluded a certain kind
of immigration on a racial ground, same as
Turkey which expelled Greek population.
Moreover, they have democracy because
of its ability to separate from the equally
unequal.
This brings us to Schmitts view
upon pluralism. He believes that pluralism
within the state destroys the state as a
political unity by reducing it to a
compromise between heterogeneous
2
groups. But although he doesnt allow
pluralism within the democratic state, no
different groups, not even minorities,
Schmitt leaves a space for the whole world
of different states where different
principles of equality could be applied. As
he argues in Staatsethik und pluralistischer
Staat: Democracy, on the other hand,
leads to recognition of each of the many
peoples as a political unity. The
plurality of statesthat is, the political
entities of various peoples is thus the
genuine expression of pluralism, correctly
understood.3 Here as in his Begriff des
Politischen Schmitt has in mind that the
political world is a pluriverse not a
universe4. So in democracies difference
between us and them is what matters and
not the actual criteria. Criteria for a
substantial equality could be various.
These could be physical or moral qualities,
religious believes, and since XIX century
criterion for substantial equality is
nationality. What Schmitt has in mind is an
1
Tomislav Sunic, Against Democracy and
Equality: The European New Right, Arktol Media,
London, 2011, p.85
2
Karl mit, uvar ustava in Karl mit, Norma i
odluka: Karl mit i njegovi kritiari, Filip Vinji,
Beograd, 2001, str. 250
3 5
Carl Schmitt, State Ethics and Pluralist State, in
Arthur J. Jacobson, Berndhard Schlink, (ed.)
Weimar A Jusisprudence of Crissis, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 2000. pp.308-309
4
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London,
2007, p.53
19
image of a homogeneous nation (Volk)
united by a common purpose.5 This
substantial equality (in this case national
equality) is so important that without it we
cannot speak about democracy.
One must assume that, by virtue of
being part of the same people, all
those similarly situated would in
essence will the same thing. If the
assumption of an indivisible, national
commonality is no longer tenable, then
the abstract empty functionalism of
pure mathematical majority
determination is the opposite of
neutrality and objectivity. It is only
quantitatively larger or smaller, forced
subordination of the defeated and,
therefore, suppressed minority. The
democratic identity of governing and
governed, those commanding and
those obeying, stops. The majority
commands and minority must obey.
Arithmetic calculability also stops,
because one can only responsibly
produce a sum from that which is very
similar.6
So without some equality
everything else including elections, vote
counting and so on doesnt make sense.
When there is some substantial equality we
cant speak about voting down the
minority. Actually there cant be any
minority and the vote is there only to
permit latent and presupposed consensus to
become evident. In unified people there
isnt and cant be any minority let alone
permanent minority.7
So here we can examine the
difference between Schmitts
understanding of democracy and those of
liberal authors such as John Stuart Mill,
Madison, Hamilton, and Tocqueville and
so on. All of them intended to defend
minorities and their rights from the
majorities. Plurality of opinion and
Richard Bellamy, Jeremy Jennings, Peter
Lassman, Political Thought in Continental Europe
during the Twentieth Century, in Gerald F. Gaus,
Chandran Kukakthas (ed.) Handbook of Political
Theory, Sage Publications, London, 2004. p.397
6
Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, p.28
7
Ibidem
plurality of interest are the constitutive
parts of liberalism. According to Schmitt,
these things have nothing to do with
democracy, so there cant be any special
rights for minorities. We see that Schmitt
is interested in the essence of democracy
and that means identity and homogeneity
while Madison and Hamilton are trying to
eliminate or to moderate shortcoming of
democracy. Schmitt again refers to
Rousseau. According to Rousseau this
unanimity must go so far that the laws
come into existence sans discussion. Even
judges and parties in a suit must want the
same, whereby it has never even been
asked which of the two parties, accused or
accuser, want the same. In short,
homogeneity elevated into an identity
understands itself completely from itself.1
Unlike parliamentarism, which is for
Schmitt a government by discussion,
democracy presupposes unanimity and so
it doesnt need any kind of discussion.
That means that there are no mechanisms
for institutional protection of different
interests. In this sense, in his Der Hter
der Verfassung, Schmitt criticize Hans
Kelsens conception of democracy as
compromise between minority and
majority.2 Democracy was always a rule of
majority and Kelsens view is just an
example of how political ideas can turn to
its contradiction.3 Democracy is not a
compromise with minority. Political
strength of democracy lies in an excluding
that which is not identical, and not in a
compromise with foreign will. Having
Rousseau but also Lock on his side Schmitt
claims that democracy actually means
ignoring minority: That the outvoted
minority must be ignored in this only
causes theoretical and superficial
difficulties. In reality even this rests on the
identity that constantly recurs in
democratic logic and on the essential
democratic argument as will be seen
1 4
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.14
2 5
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State,
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, London,
2006, p.288
3 8
Karl mit, uvar ustava, str. 219
20
immediately that the will of the
outvoted minority is in truth identical with
the will of the majority.4
At the same time Schmitt is quite
aware that these identities which are the
foundations of democracy, dont exist in
reality. All of these identities are not
palpable reality, but rest on a recognition
of the identity. It is not a matter of
something actually equal legally,
politically, or sociologically, but rather of
identifications.5 As we have noted above,
every state needs both principles identity
and representation. It means that
democracy has its natural limits. The main
question is how a general will is to be
formed. Sometimes a minority can
represent a true will of the nation. Also as
we know the people can be misled,
moreover there are different techniques of
propaganda. Also there is a chance for
elitism in democracy. All of this represents
dialectic of democracy. Thats why
Schmitt concludes: Democracy seems
fated then to destroy itself in the problem
of the formation of a will.6
Schmitts understanding of democracy
reaches its peak in conclusion that
democracy doesnt contradict the
dictatorship. He states that democracy lost
its precision and its content when
monarchy was abolished.7 Same as all
other political concepts democracy too is a
polemical concept, it doesnt have a clear
content so its only an organizational
framework. While democracy is only and
organizational framework it cant establish
any form of government. A democracy
can be militarist or pacifist, absolutist or
liberal, centralized or decentralized,
progressive or reactionary, and again
different at different times without ceasing
to be a democracy.8 So, what happens
when democrats are in the minority? What
will happen when democratic rights would
be used to abolish democracy? Can a
Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,
p.25
Schmitt, Op.cit., pp.26-27
6
Ibidem, p.28
7
Ibidem, p.24
Ibidem, p.25
democrat afford to be a democrat at any
price? Schmitt gives his answer:
Then the familiar program of
people's education unfolds: The
people can be brought to recognize
and express their own will correctly
through the right education. This
means nothing else but that the
educator identifies his will at least
provisionally with that of the people,
not to mention that the content of the
education that the pupil will receive is
also decided by the educator.1
In other words democracy permits a
dictatorship. So, democracy could be
suspended for some time in order to
produce a real democracy some day in
future. Dictatorship can defend and
preserve that democratic identity and
homogeneity and people`s will can really
matter. We can easily look to caesarism. In
some sense modern democracy and
caesarism have the same roots in French
Revolution.2 Actually, dictatorship doesnt
abolish democracy neither in theory nor in
practice. Even more, it could be more
democratic than the parliamentary regime.
Schmitt refers to Erwin Jacobi by saying:
In logically consistent essay Erwin
Jacobi shows that in a democratic
state form, the expression of the
peoples will through a direct vote is
superior to every indirect form of
expression, thus even parliamentary
decisions, and a statute that
consequently comes about through a
referendum cannot be eliminated or
amended through a passage of a
statute by Reichtag. That is fully
consistent in terms of the principles of
a democratic state form.3
Therefore a mix of a strong leader
and peoples will expressed through
referendum is more democratic than
parliamentary regime. There he states his
argument against methods of liberal
democracy. Ballots given at the elections
1
Ibidem, p.28
2 4
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum,
Telos Press Publishing, New York, 2006, p.63
3 7
C. Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, p.60
21
are not the true choice of the people. Even
more, choice is impossible. Secret ballots
lead to a situation in which political issues
are decided by all of these politically
uninterested, politically irresponsible
4
people. So, a true democracy needs
strong political leaders who have made
political decisions and people at
referendum can say yes or no. In a
way this is a paradox of democracy. People
is a holder of a legislative will, but people
doesnt rule nor governs. Similar view
upon the democracy was quite common at
the time within the German conservative
circles, for example general Ludendorff.5
What Schmitt wants is to preserve a strong
leadership within the democracy. His
political formula is sovereignty from
below, and authority from above.
Due to their dependence on the posing
of a question, all plebiscitary methods
presuppose a government that not only
attends to business but also has the
authority to properly undertake the
plebiscitary questioning at the right
moment. The question can only be
posed from above; the answer only
comes from below. Here, again, the
formula of the great constitutional
designer Sieys, holds true: authority
from above, confidence from below.
Plebiscitary legitimacy requires a
government or some other
authoritarian organ in which one can
have confidence that it will pose a
correct question in the proper way and
not misuse the great power that lies in
the posing of question.6
In the end someone can say that this
type of regime would destroy freedom, but
Schmitt has a ready answer. An absolute
democracy destroys freedom no less than
an absolute monarchy. This is always the
consequence when the monarchic or the
aristocratic or the democratic formative
element is accomplished in its purity.7
The idea is that every principle which can
produce a political unity is in contradiction
Carl Schmitt, Liberal Rule of Law, . 299
5
John McCormick, Op.cit., . 178
6
C. Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, p.90
C. Schmitt, Liberal Rule of Law, . 296
with liberal idea of personal freedom. As
we can see, Schmitt like Guizot before him
considered democracy to be as much of a
curse as monarchical absolutism.1 So
democracy is far away from liberalism as
much as it is the case with absolute
monarchy.
Schmitts View upon Parliamentarism
When speaking about
parliamentarism Schmitt emphasis that it is
an expression of liberalism and has nothing
to do with democracy as he understands it.
It is also important to keep in mind that
Schmitt differentiates between
parliaentarism in broad and narrow sense.
It means that even presidentialism is a kind
of parliamentary system in broad sense.2
He tries to discover the essence of
liberalism and finds it in liberal
metaphysics, at the one distinct
metaphysical principle. He used the same
method in his Politische Romantik. As for
every genuine explanation, here too the
metaphysical formula is the best criterion.
Every movement is based, first of all, on a
specific characteristic attitude toward the
world; and second, on a specific idea, even
if it is not always conscious, of an ultimate
authority, an absolute center.3 According
to his methodological position Schmitt
claims:
It is essential that liberalism be
understood as a consistent,
comprehensive metaphysical system.
Normally one only discusses the
economic line of reasoning that social
harmony and the maximization of
wealth follow from the free economic
competition of individuals, from
freedom of contract, freedom of trade,
free enterprise. But all this is only an
application of a general liberal
principle. It is exactly the same: That
the truth can be found through an
1
Paul E. Gottfried, After Liberalism: Mass
Democracy in Managerial State, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1999,
p.30.
2 4
Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehr, S. 306
3
Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.16
22
unrestrained clash of opinion and that
competition will produce harmony.
The intellectual core of this thought
resides finally in its specific
relationship to truth, which becomes a
mere function of the eternal
competition of opinions. In contrast to
the truth, it means renouncing a
definite result.4
So the essence of liberalism is
eternal competition. In German
romanticism the expression of that
principle was idea of eternal discussion
(Das erwige Gesprch) and in liberal
economy the idea of eternal market.
According to Schmitt liberalism isnt able
to produce a distinct form of state.
However, in realm of politics liberal
expression is parliamentarism. It is based
on a same liberal principle. So, according
to Schmitt, parliament is the most
characteristic liberal institution. Emerged
from liberalism, parliament is there to put
limits to politics. In other words its a
typical bourgeois institution which should
protect citizens from a state. In accordance
with early advocates of parliamentarism
(Burke, Bentham, Gizot, and John Stuart
Mill) and in accordance with metaphysical
principle of liberalism Schmitt accepts
definition of parliamentarism as a
government by discussion. The ratio of
parliament rests, according to the apt
characterization of Rudolf Smend, in a
dynamic-dialectic, that is, in a process of
confrontation of differences and opinions,
from which the real political will results.
The essence of parliament is therefore
public deliberation of argument and
counterargument, public debate and public
discussion, parley, and all this without
taking democracy into account.5
Schmitt explicitly states that
parliamentarism as such, is essentially
distinct from democracy. Parliamentarism
institutionalizes eternal conversation. In
Verfassungslehre Schmitt repeats his
claim. For the parliamentary system is not
a result, nor is it an application, of the
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.35
5
Ibidem, pp.34-35
democratic principle of identity. Instead,
by forming its actual system of
government, the parliamentary system is
part of a modern bourgeois Rechtstaat
constitution. It rests on an application and
mixture of different and even opposing
political elements.1 It is also important to
notice that Schmitt defines bourgeoisie in a
terms of Donoso Corts, as a discussing
class2. So, there we have a logical
conclusion. A discussing class whose
ideology is based upon discussion and
concurrence naturally demands a harmony and the maximization of
government by discussion as well. So all
old liberal freedoms particularly freedom
of speech, freedom of press, and freedom
of assembly are not just some useful and
independent factors. They can only make
sense in terms of a correct understanding
of discussion. They are essentially
connected to the liberal metaphysics.
Schmitt tries to find arguments for his
thesis in a work of liberal authors.
In view of the system of a Condorcet,
for example, whose typical meaning
Wolzendorff, perhaps because of
intellectual affinity, recognized and
superbly described, one must truly
believe that the ideal of political life
consists in discussing, not only in the
legislative body but also among the
entire population, if human society will
transform itself into a monstrous club,
and if truth will emerge automatically
through voting.3
Here we can see a liberal-
parliamentary relationship to the truth. Idea
is that truth will emerge through a
discourse and discussion of arguments and
counterarguments without any use of force.
It is presumed that in this kind of
discussion reason will prevail. In
competition of ideas and opinions the most
rational and the one closest to the truth will
win. To Schmitt this is a kind of a rational
relativism. Also, we can see a similarity
between Schmitts and Poppers
1
Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehr, S. 304
2 5
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Four Chapters
on the Concept of Sovereignty, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 2006, p.59
3
Ibidem, p.63
23
conception of liberalism. But as Schmitt
sees it a relative rationalism is limited to
the relative truth.4 Thus, there is no definite
and final result, no final solutions, and
naturally no eternal truth or any other basic
beliefs which are out of question. The only
eternal thing is discussion itself. However
Schmitt argues that no truth can be
produced in this way, and that discussion
produces only more and more discussion.
Normally one only discusses the
economic line of reasoning that social
wealth follow from the free economic
competition of individuals, from
freedom of contract, freedom of trade,
free enterprise. But all this is only an
application of a general liberal
principle. It is exactly the same: That
the truth can be found through an
unrestrained clash of opinion and that
competition will produce harmony.
The intellectual core of this thought
resides finally in its specific
relationship to truth, which becomes a
mere function of the eternal
competition of opinions.5
Ellen Kennedy also thinks that the
necessity for discussion is no less
epistemological than it is political.6 She
agrees with Schmitt that liberal political
theory thus depends on the assumptions
that political conflict can be transformed
into a matter of opinion. Of course Schmitt
doesnt believe in such conflict solving
mechanism. It means that it is possible to
answer a question Christ or Barrabas?
with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a
commission of investigation.7 That is the
logic of parliamentarism and thus
parliamentarism cant produce any
political decision. Here we can see a
contradiction between parliamentarism and
democracy. As we have seen democracy,
according to Rousseau, demands that all
that the laws come into existence sans
4
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.46
Ibidem, p.35
6
Ellen Kennedy, Op.cit., xix
7
C. Schmitt, Political Theology, Four Chapters on
the Concept of Sovereignty, p.62
discussion, while at the other hand
parliamentarism is bases upon discussion.
Also, Schmitt believed that there is a
contradiction within the parliamentarism.
On the one hand parliament should form a
political will out of discussion, but on the
other it cant do so because discussion
produces only more and more discussion
and not a political decision. This
contradiction cant be solved within a
liberal logic.
Also Schmitt noticed that as much
as a liberal state was a mixture of political
forms we can see that is the case with
parliamentarism as well. However,
according to Schmitt parliamentarism has a
substantial amount of aristocratic element.
It is a special form of representation and a
case of aristocracy. Parliamentary
government is a case of aristocracy (or in a
degenerate form: oligarchy).1 However it
has nothing to do with feudal aristocracy.
Modern parliament represents a spiritual
aristocracy. It also represents a public mind
which manifests itself through the
discussion. In that sense, parliament is a
faith in a new aristocracy, aristocracy of
spirit, reason, and knowledge, the faith that
the best men of the nation can find best
solutions for our problems. However,
parliament can have its representative
character only when his work is carried out
in public.
Representation can occur only in the
public sphere. There is no
representation that occurs in secret
and between two people, and no
representation that would be a private
matter. A parliament has
representative character only as long
as one believes that its actual activity
lies in the public sphere. Secret
sessions, secret agreements, and
deliberation of some committee may be
very meaningful and important, but
they never have a representative
character.2
It is very important to keep in mind
a distinction between discussion and
negotiation. Negotiation is a matter of
1 3
Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehr, S. 218
2
Ibidem, S. 208
24
calculating particular interests and the
chances of winning. It has nothing to do
with rational discussion and exchange of
opinions, arguments and
counterarguments. Its essence is
calculation, to give less and to win more.
During the negotiation sides cant give up
the interests they are defending, while
discussants leave a possibility that their
positions are wrong, so if the other side has
better arguments they can change their
opinion. Thus parliamentarism is based on
discussion and not negotiation.
Discussion means an exchange of
opinion that is governed by the
purpose of persuading one's opponent
through argument of the truth or
justice of something, or allowing
oneself to be persuaded of something
as true and just. Gentz in this
matter still instructed by the liberal
Burke puts it well: The
characteristic of all representative
constitutions (he meant modern
parliament in contrast to corporative
representation or the estates) is that
laws arise out of a conflict of opinions
(not out of a struggle of interests). To
discussion belong shared convictions
as premises, the willingness to be
persuaded, independence of party ties,
freedom from selfish interests. Most
people today would regard such
disinterestedness as scarcely possible.
But even this skepticism belongs to the
crisis of parliamentarism.3
So, all parliamentary institutions
are made in such way to secure a free and
open discussion. This is the case with an
institution of a free mandate. Schmitt made
a distinction between Member of a
Parliament as a trustee and advocate and
between imperative and free mandate.
Apart from discussion another
important principle of parilamentarism is
publicity and openness. It also serves the
purpose to secure the competition of
opinions and to make sure that the best
argument wins. This principle counts with
common human rationality and ability of
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.5
all persons to recognize a good and rational
argument. Again all liberal freedoms are
there to secure principle of publicity and
openness. All specifically parliamentary
arrangements and norms receive their
meaning first through discussion and
openness.1 Publicity and openness are
measures against secret agreements, secret
politics and corruption. Openness separates
discussion and deliberation from
negotiation.
On a several places Schmitt writes
about parliamentarism as a mixture of
political forms.
Parliamentarism presents itself as a
complicated system of a mixture of
political forms. The democratic
principle of parliaments dependence
on the people is retained, but with
sufficient effective counter-elements.
The government is simultaneously
dependent upon and independent of
parliament; most important is its
implicit power to dissolve parliament.
The position of president of the Reich
is constructed completely like that of a
temporary monarch, but here, too, the
monarchic political form fuses
aristocratic and democratic elements.2
The same idea Schmitt repeats in
his Parlamentarismus and
Verfassungslehre. In other words,
parliamentarism cant survive without
division of power and something like a
check and balance system. It is essential
for parliamentarism as it is case with
discussion. Without a balance, competition
as a liberal metaphysical principle becomes
impossible. It secures that the power isnt
to be concentrated on single place. Within
the parliamentarism division and balance
of power have double significance. First, it
means a division of power between
institutions, between legislative, executive
and judiciary. It is a complicated system of
checks and balances. As Schmitt puts it
government is simultaneously dependent
upon and independent of parliament.
Indeed it is a mixture of democratic,
aristocratic and monarchist elements.
1
Ibidem, p.3
2 7
C. Schmitt, Liberal Rule of Law, . 297
25
Balance is to secure that between those
elements neither has an absolute power.3
On the other hand, there is a balance within
a parliament itself. There should be a
balance between various views and
opinions. Every different opinion which is
present among the people must be
represented within the parliament. Schmitt
concludes that the purpose of parliament is
political integration and constant renewal
of political unity. However, he quickly
replays that because of politics of balance
parliament is incapable to complete such
task. It is so because parliamentarism as a
political system of bourgeois Rechtstaat
refuses to accept consequences of political
formations principle.4 However, during the
struggle against monarchy parliamentarism
was able to form a political unity of the
people against the monarch, but with the
enemy its strength also disappeared. So to
say, parliamentarism was a victim of its
success. Instead of representation of
political unity of the people, parliament
became a reflection of the socio-economic
contradictions5 while its decisions are
products of the discussions and coalitions
of a multiparty system.6 So according to
Schmitt all those institutions are made to
secure the way of finding the truth. But as
with discussion, neither truth nor anything
so value-laden could survive the
multiplicitous technical apparatus that is
constructed to produce it. According to
Schmitt, the mechanical conception of
division of powers within the state
perpetuates itself to the point of
absurdity.7
Schmitt also notices that
parliamentarism has a distinct concept of
law, which can be traced back to
Monarchomachians. Like liberalism,
parliamentarism is based upon old belief in
a rule of law. Its purpose is to replace the
concrete person of the king with an
3
C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, S. 305
4
Ibidem, S. 305
5
Karl mit, uvar ustava, str. 252
6
Carl Schmitt, The Constitution of Freedom, in
Arthur J. Jacobson, Berndhard Schlink, (ed.)
Weimar A Jusisprudence of Crissis, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 2000. . 324
John McCormick, Op.cit, . 183.
impersonal authority and a universal
reason, which according to Aristotelian-
scholastic tradition constitutes the essence
of law.1 In that sense parliamentarism is
related to law and judicial norm as a
counterbalance to a personal decision of a
ruler. Schmitt refers to Krabbe for whom
the modern idea of state replaces personal
force (of the king, of the authorities) with
spiritual power.2 Thats another thing
which parliamentarism, Rechtstaat and
liberalism have in common. According to
this, Schmitt accepts Otto Kirchheimers
claim that legitimacy of parliamentary
democracy resides only in its legality and
today obviously legal restrictions are
equated with legitimacy.3 In other words,
Schmitt concludes that parliamentarism is
incapable of constituting its own theory of
legitimacy. Thats why legality should
deny every legitimacy, be it monarchist or
plebiscitary democratic.
In such constellation rationalist
concept of law is quite important. Law is
an expression of a reason and justice. The
law which is made through discussion and
deliberation has a different basis and a
different character from an authoritarian
command. This is an old distinction
between law and command, ratio and
voluntas, intelligence and blind will
without a basis in the norm.4 However, it is
important to notice that Schmitt rejects
such concept of the law. In his Staat,
Bewegung, Volk he writes: So-called
precedence of the law over all the other
kinds of statal activity aims at the political
subjection of the State to the allegedly
apolitical society, because in that ranking
system, the law is essentially a decision of
parliament, but parliament is the
representation of the non-statal society
against the State.5 So, according to
Schmitt, a real purpose of the
parliamentarism and the rule of law are to
1 6
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, p.42
2 7
C. Schmitt, Political Theology, Four Chapters on
the Concept of Sovereignty, p.22
3
C. Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, p.9
4
Ibidem, p.11
5
Carl Schmitt, State Movement, People, p.25
26
neutralize anything political and to subject
political and the state to the forces of the
society which means to essentially
economic forces. By rejecting the jurist
normativism, Schmitt stays loyal to the
rulers command and decision. For him, as
well as for Hobbes autoritas, non veritas
facit legem.
It is important to mention that in his
Parlamentarismus Schmitt severely
criticize praxis of parliamentarism. His
conclusion is that modern parliaments have
lost its moral and spiritual ground. It
betrayed its founding principles of
discussion, openness, publicity, balance,
deliberation representation and so on.
Thus, parliament has lost its legitimacy
because no one believes in it. Everyone
can see that the main political decisions are
made outside of the parliaments so the
parliament is only an empty machine or a
facade. There isnt a real concurrence
anymore. Also parliament cant produce
spiritual aristocracy.6 These are the main
arguments in his Parlamentarismus, which
we also find in other of Schmitts works.
Also parliament fails to integrate the
proletariat, a propertyless and uneducated
mass, into a political unity.7 In other words
parliament became a disintegrative factor.
Schmitt concludes that if a parliament
cant produce integration it should be
achieved by other means. As Henning
Ottmann puts it, Schmitt claimed that
parliamentarism is only one of myths of
modern politics same as the myth of class
struggle or a national myth, only weaker
than they are.8 It was a reason for the great
polemics between Schmitt and other
German jurists like Hans Kelsen, Richard
Thoma, Herman Heller and so on. Space
doesnt permit us to go any further on this
matter.
Conclusion
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary
Democracy, pp.6-12
C. Schmitt, Liberal Rule of Law, p.297
8
Henning Ottmann, Geschichte des politischen
Denkens: Das 20. Jahrhundert: Der Totalitarismus
und seine berwindung, J. B. Metzler, Stutgart,
Weimar, 2010, S. 236-237
 We have seen how Schmitt
managed to separate democracy from
parliamentarism. He also underlines
essential tensions and contradictions
between the two. First of all there are two
different principles identity and
discussion. Democracy doesnt need
discussion while it is essential for
parliamentarism. Actually,
parliamentarism is nothing else but a
government by discussion. Also,
democracy demands homogeneity. It
refuses every sign of pluralism, balance
and even minority within the political
unity. Parliamentarism is founded on idea
of balance, minority protection, and
institutional arrangements against a
tyranny of majority. We have to be aware
that there are two different concepts of
equality. Democrats and liberals have
different concepts of equality. For Schmitt
democratic equality is a substantial
equality while liberals assume an abstract
equality is based on general human
equality. Also, Schmitt is quite explicit
when he claims that parliamentarism is
actually a special kind of aristocracy.
Naturally democracy and parliament have
different concepts of law and in
accordance with it different ideas of
legitimacy. Decisions of parliament should
be based in reason and deliberation while
democracy counts with General Will. So,
we have a contradiction between concepts
of reason and will. Schmitts final cut is his
conclusion that democracy doesnt
contradict dictatorship as it is the case with
liberalism.
As we can see even today this
contradiction matters because there is a
tension between freedom and democracy.
Most of the modern authors suggest some
kind of mixture of a liberal democracy
while Schmitts answer is different. His
idea is that we cant have both. We can
choose either, but the mixture is the worst
possible option because liberalism would
denaturalize democracy, and democracy
would distort democracy. Parliamentarism
leads to crises of democracy while
democracy makes crises of
parliamentarism.
27
What we can learn from Schmitt?
Of course we dont have to agree with
everything he says, but we have to admit
that todays contradictions within the
modern state have its roots in mixture of
two different principles. Thus democracy
and parliamentarism limit each other. So,
Schmitt helps us to better understand
liberal-democracy and the world we live
in.
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