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    4 Theodoulou - Amp - Cahn - Public - Policy - The - Essential - Readings PDF

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    Guilherme Uchimura

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    PUBLIC , POLICY The Essential Readings Stella Z. Theodoulou Matthew A. Cahn California State University, Northridge Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458 rye ogre Catia ie ne et elit a? Acquisitions editor: Charlyoe Jones Owen Production editor: Merail Peterson Interior design: Joan Stone Copy editor: Rene Lynch Cover designer: Miguel Ortiz Production coordinator: Mary Ann Gloriande Editorial assistant: Nicole Signoretti © 1995 by Prentice Hall, Inc. Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458 Al rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in apy form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher Printed in the United States of America 1415 1617 18 19 EKMBKM 0987 ISBN 0-13-059255-2 ‘Prentice-Hall International (UK) Limited, London Prentice-Hall of Avsrala Pry. Limited, Sydney Prentice-Hall of Canada ne, Toro Prentice-Hall Hispanoamericona, S.A. Mexico ‘Prentice-Hall of Inia Private Limite, New Delhi Prentice-Hall of Japan, Ine, Tyo Prentice-Hall Asia Pre. Ltd, Singapore aitora Prentice-Hall do Brasil, Lida, Rlo de Janeiro Contents Preface PART ONE The Nature of Public Policy What is public policy, who makes it, and why study it? 1. The Contemporary Language of Public Policy: A Starting Point, Stella Z. Theodoulow 2. Political Science and Public Policy, Paul A. Sabatior 3. Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government, Theodore J. Lowi 4. Symbols and Political Quiescence, Murruy Edelman 5. ‘The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles, Robert H. Salisbury 6. With the Consent of Al, Robert A. Dahl 7. Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, Hugh Heclo 8. Imperfect Competition, Ralph Miliband ative Democracy, David B. Truman 9. Group Politics and Repre: 10, ‘The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills Vi Contents PART TWO. Making Public Policy The process, structure, and context of policy making 11, How Public Policy Is Made, Stella Z, Theodoulow 12, Issues and Agendas, Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder 13, Agenda Setting, John W. Kingdon 14. The Science of “Muddling Through,” Charles E. Lindblom 15. Nonineremental Policy Making, Paul R. Schulman 16. The Implementation Game, Eugene Bardach 17. Implementation as Evolution, Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky 18. A Conceptual Framework of the Implementation Process, Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian 19. The Role of Evaluation in Public Policy, David Nachimias 20. Trends in Policy Analysis, Stuart Nagel 21, The Politics of Public Budgets, trene $, Rubin PART THREE The Players Institutional and noninstitutional actors 22. The Players: Institutional nd Noninstitutional Actors in the Policy Process, Matthew A. Calin 25. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Morris Fiorina 24, Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayheto 25, The Presidential Policy Stream, Paul Light 26, The Two Presidencis, Aaron Wildavsky 27. The Rise ofthe Bureaucratic State, james Q. Wilson 28, Bureaucracy, Max Weber 29. Regulation; Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics, Kenneth J. Meier 30. Appellate Courts as Policy Makers, Laworence Baum 31. Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, Nathan Glazer 86 86 105 13 198 137 140 153 173 181 185 201 201 21 220 251 259 265; a7 288, 32, News That Matters, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder 33. Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide, Doris Graber 34, Parties, the Government, and the Policy Process, Samuel J. Eldersveldt 35, The Advocacy Explosion, Jeffrey M. Berry 36, ‘The Consultant Corps, Larry J. Sabato PART FOUR The Policy Game Rules, strategies, culture, and resources a7 Playing the Policy Game, Matthew A. Cahn 38, An Economie Interpretation of the Constitution, Charles Beard 39, The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, sand John Joy 40. Political Repression in t ited States, Michael Rogin m, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis apitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman 43, Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt 44, Constructing the Political Spectacle, Murray Edelman 45. A Preface to Economie Democracy, Robert A. Dahl 46, Who Rules America Now?, G. William Domhoff 41. Democracy and Capital ef Covermment 15 Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of G 1 085, Pley Analy Plc Stece Chega NleomHtlh A re tus NT6 Corcan to Compo, Lengo. Mas D Robots, Hanne Bors, Hew ogo. “fop-Down and Hatom-Up Mods of Fle tmlementtin: A Cea Pata 6 Jamsary 2118, an gee Sera ora of ue Poi 8 a a pend gs. “An Advocacy Coation Framework of Pl Sn Pley Scones Fal 12-108, ee oe me ee ne cso Priatation The Tol of Greerament Washington, DC: Th ‘Weban tsi, HALEN. 199, "Behavioral Assumptions of Pay Tool. Joumal of otis 52 (May) 510-559, ame nse nT err alt EW Na Reet program Budgeting” Public Atminusration Feciew 2 Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government Theodore J. Lowi Inthe long unl governmental poses ay be considered rediubute, be {Casein the ng ron some people ayn taxes moet they reece in sendee Grell ay be thought regulate Does, nthe Tongan, a govemsmental es sho the use of resources can only displace a private decision about the same ao aes last reduce private alteratives about the resource. But plies trum, and in the ‘ends of government decisions Policies of this kind are called ‘Novis n he short ron, and the short rum certain ts ve without regard to limited resources ist *} term first coined for nineteenth-century land policies, but easily land pe ve t coined for ni ceatended to include most contemporary public land and resource policies: rivers nt and research and de woe Cpork barrel) programs; defense procurement and - aa erin lor buses, and agora een” ses nde ‘elon, Distibtive poles ae chance yh ne ih they can be dings a hom any general rule “Panag inte fa anor he word can be taken asa synonym for “distributive” These are Fa ane ight indie decsionstht meaning of the cies that are virtual can Busines, Public Policy Case Studie and Pht Theory World 15. Rept by permission From Theodore Law.“ Poles ns uly 1963), 677 16 The Nature of Publi Policy only by accumulation can be called a policy. They are policies in which the in- Gulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direet confrontation. Indeed, in many instances of distributive policy, the deprived ean- not as a class be identified, because the most influential among them can be ac- commodated by further disaggregation ofthe stakes. Regulatory policies are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable ofthe almost infinite amount of disaggregation typical of distribu tive policies. Although the laws are stated in general terms (“Arrange the trans portation system artistically.” “Thou shalt not show favoritism in pricing”), the Impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reduc. ing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals ("Get off the grass!" “Pro- duce kosher if you advertise kosher!”), Regulatory policies are distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involves a direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived. Not all applicants for a single television channel or an overseas air route ean be propitiated. Enforcement of an ‘unfuir labor practice on the part of management weakens management in its deal- {ngs with labor. So, while implementation is firm-by-firm and case-by-case, poli cies cannot be disaggregated to the level ofthe individual or the single frm (as in distribution), beeause individual decisions must be made by application of a yen. eral rule and therefore become interrelated within the broader standards of law. Decisions curmulate among all individuals affected by the law in roughly the same ‘way. Since the most stable lines of pereeived common impact are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral lines, regulatory policies are usually disaggregable only down to the sector level Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations mong broad categories of private individuals ae involved and, hence, individual decisions must be interrelated. But on al other counts there are great diflerences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. They are, crudely speaking, haves and have-nots, bigness and small- ness, bourgeoisie and proletariat. The aim involved is not use of property but property itself, not equal treatment but equal possession, not behavior but being, ‘The fact that our income tax isin reality only milly redistributive does not alter the fact ofthe aims and the stakes involved in income tax policies. The same goes for our various “welfare state" programs, which are redistributive only for those who entered retirement or unemployment rolls without having contributed at al ‘The nature of «redistributive issuc is not determined by the outcome of a battle over how redistributive a policy is going to be. Expectations about what it can be, what it threatens to be, are determinative. ARENAS OF POWER Once ane posts the general tendency of these areas of policy or governmental ac- tivity to develop characteristic political structures, a number of hypotheses be- Dintribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government 17 he general come compelling, And when the various hypotheses are accumulated, the g Sito ech ofthe thee arnds bein quit to resemble, especie the thee “general” theories of politieal process, The arena that develops around di Ibtice policies ie best charactenzed inthe terms of E. E, Sehattchneider’s Tidings ca the polities of tariff legislation in the nineteen-twentles, The regular aay atena corresponds to the phiralist school, and the school's general notions are (ead to be limited pretty much to this one arena. The redistributive arena most atocely approximates, with some adaptation, an elitist view ofthe political process. yTPihe distsibutive arena can be identified in considerable detail from Schattschnelder's case-study alone.’ What he and his pluralist successors didnot See ats that the tational structure of tariff pots is also in largest part the Structure of politics of al these diverse policies identified earlier as distbutvs, ‘The arena is™pluralstic” only in the sense that a large number of small, intensely oanied interests are operating, In ic, theres even greater multiply of par eee goouregup wel on count or bee eset itis polities of every man for himself. The single person and the single frm are we major activists polities of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff are almost one-for-one applicable to rivers Mra harbors and land development poles, tax exemptions, defense procuc: inet, area redevelopinent, and government “services.” Since there is no real basis qe iiseriminating between those who should and those who should not be pro- tected indulged], says Schattschneider, Congres secks poltieal support by “ ing limited protection [indulgence] to all interests strong enough to furish formidable resistance.” Decison-inakers become “responsive to considerations o quality, consistency, impartiality, uniformity, precedent, and moderation, how cant forinal and insubstantial these may be.” Furthermore, a policy tha is so hos- Pitable and catholic... disorganizes the opposition.” PlaPl hen 1 billicnedollar issue can be disaggregated into many silions of aickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with without regard tothe others, trulpiation af interests and of aces i inevitable, and so reduction of eon: Tet All of this has the greatest bearing on the relations among participants an therefore the “power structure.” Indeed, coalitions must be bul o pass legisla tion and “make policy,” but what ofthe nature and bass of the coalitions? In the ‘iatabative arena, politcal relationships approximate what Schattschneider called Heutual noninterference"—"a mutuality under which itis proper foreach to seek dite [indulgences for himself but improper and una to oppose duties [inl toners) songhtby others” In he area of ver and harbors, references are ma {0 “pork barre” and “log-lling,” but these colloqulaisms have not been taken Sulcenty seriously. ATogeslling coalition isnt one forged af confit, compro- tne and tangential interest but, on the contrary, one composed of members who Tune absolutly nothing in common; and this is posible beeause the “pork bare see Sutainer for unrelated items, This i the typical form of relationship in the distributive arena. 18 The Nature of Public Policy The structure of these log-rolling relationships leads typically, though not always, to Congress; and the structure is relatively stable because all who have ac- ess of any sort usually support whoever are the leaders, And there tend to be “elites” of peculiar sort in the Congeessional committees whose jurisdictions in-

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