Crim Law Case Digests 2008 Mat

Criminal Law case
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San Beda College of Law 2008 Centralized Bar Operations
RETROACTIVITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON
G.R. No. 170236 August 31, 2006
Justice Callejo, Sr.
FACTS:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. On or
about May 12, 2001, the accused, by means of force and intimidation had sexual intercourse
with one Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor. Rowel recounted
that on the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they
were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and
Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything because he was afraid of their
father. Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita
Mateo about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to
report what had transpired.
The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
VISMARCK UY over-all chair, APRIL CABEZA chair academics operations, ALDEAN
LIM chair hotel operations,
AYN SARSABA vice chair for operations, ANTHONY PURGANAN vice chair for
academics,
RONALD JOHN DECANO vice chair for secretariat, KARLA FUNTILA vice chair for
finance,
JEFFREY GALLARDO vice chair for edp, ULYSSES GONZALES vice chair for
logistics
CRIMINAL LAW
CARLA DIANA P. ALCALA subject chair
LAUREN ROSE TANYAG assistant chair
LAVIA RAE JACOBA edp
LEANNE MAUREEN APOLINAR and CONEY ROSE DE VERA criminal law 1, ART
RYAN SEACHON criminal law 2, NORMAN PAUL TURINGAN special penal laws
MEMBERS: Michael Samuel Tulay, Maria Del Carmen Beatriz Loinaz, Ari Vergil
Fabros, Genesis L. Sampaga, Pia Callueng, Christian Joy Ocampo, Anne Marie
Calonge, Ezekiel Joshua Villena, Reyjie Torres, Mary Christine Dabu, Heide Rosales,
Sheena Abella, Kat Contacto, Mark Steven Pastor, Deepee Salazar, Nabil Mutya,
Benny Claravall, Anthony Menzon, Joe Alban, Marlyn Bacani, JB Arquero, Roehl
Joson
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crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B of the Revised
Penal Code. The court imposed death penalty against the accused. The defense argued that
the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant can benefit from R.A. 9346 which abolished the death penalty
law.
HELD:
Yes. In view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is
reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the
principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are
favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws.
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for
parole."
STAGES OF EXECUTION
Frustrated v. Attempted Stage
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 150917 September 27, 2006
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
Petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted within the ShoeMart (SM) complex
along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his
post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an
identification card with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart
with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an
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open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the
supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and
again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the
cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these acts were seen
by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago
asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing
on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered.
Petitioner and Calderon were charged and, after trial, convicted of consummated
theft. Petitioner appealed, arguing that he should have been convicted of frustrated theft only.
However, his conviction was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of consummated theft?
HELD:
Yes. An easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one
hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the
acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly
in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime under the
Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining
whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the
accused as against the acts that constitute the felony under the
Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated

necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the
offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself was actually produced by
the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was "produced" after all the
acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the
felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under
the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of
execution and accompanying criminal intent.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code gives a general definition of theft as follows:
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter's consent.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the

frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be
all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it
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is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the
acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property
stolen delves into the concept of "taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the
actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the
effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would
mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished." Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most
material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one's personal property,
is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without
unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 157057 June 26, 2007
Justice Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan),
were walking to their respective homes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father.
Since the pavement going to Crisaldo's house followed a narrow pathway along the local
shrubs called banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing
thrust of a bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick
turnaround and saw his attacker, petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner
stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry,
he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused petitioner to run away. Allan then brought Crisaldo
to his father's house where Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then
brought to the Peaplata Hospital where he was given first aid and then transferred to the
Davao Medical Center where he stayed for three weeks to recuperate from his wounds.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his

arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial.
On July 5, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed
his conviction to the CA, which affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder.
HELD:
No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines
whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the offense.
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if
the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring
medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter
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survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime
was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted
by him on the victim.
In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond
reasonable doubt through the unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of execution
of the attack as well as the number of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from
behind by petitioner. When Crisaldo turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting
Crisaldo on the left arm as the latter tried to defend himself. The treacherous manner in which
petitioner perpetrated the crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon
the unsuspecting victim but also by the deliberate manner in which the assault was
perpetrated. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan
came to the aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily
desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo
and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not been completed.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the
wounds sustained by Crisaldo. No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo
would have died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that
where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically
attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not
frustrated murder.
CONSPIRACY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY TOGAHAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 174064 June 8, 2007
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
Appellants Henry Togahan (Togahan) and Emeldo Lauro (Lauro) together with 2
other accused still at large were charged under separate informations for two counts of
murder committed by shooting one Ananias Villar, Sr. (Villar) and David Gene Richardson
(Richardson).
In the course of the trial, the prosecution stated that at around 6:30 p.m., Magdalena
Villar (Mrs. Villar), her daughter Vilma Villar-Richardson (Mrs. Richardson), son-in-law
Richardson, grandchildren Kenneth, Kevin, Junelyn, Jovelyn and Michelle, and brother
Pedro Castillo were all watching television in the living room of their residence in Surigao
del Sur. Without warning, two armed men (Togahan and Lauro) wearing bonnets suddenly
arrived. At that time, the victim Villar, husband of Mrs. Villar, was in his room. When Villar
heard the commotion, he went to the door and tried to prevent the armed men from entering,
but he was shot twice, pulled towards the balcony and clubbed to death.
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Togahan, pointed a gun at Mrs. Richardson and pulled the trigger thrice. The gun did
not fire however. Lauro, then, approached Richardson and likewise pointed a gun at him.
Mrs. Richardson told her husband to run away but the latter, in an attempt to protect his wife,
struggled and tried to wrestle the gun away from Togahan instead. In the course thereof,
Lauro shot Richardson then ran out of the house with Richardson's 3-year old son. Villar and
Richardson were brought to Plaza Memorial Hospital in Patin-ay, Surigao del Sur but were
dead upon arrival.
Eyewitness Lowelito Villar (Lowelito), grandson of victim Villar, testified that on the
evening of the incident, he heard a gun burst and claims to have seen three (3) armed and
masked men he identified as Togahan, Lauro and Balindo enter the victims' house. After the
attack, all the accused ran out of the house, removing their masks in the process.
ISSUE:
Was there conspiracy?
HELD:
Yes. The existence of conspiracy among the assailants is patent. In the instant case,
by the concurrent acts of barging into the residence of the victims, holding them at gunpoint
and shooting and attacking the victims, Lauro, Togahan and their co-accused are deemed to
have agreed to commit the crime of murder. Each of their contributory acts without
semblance of desistance reflected their resolution to commit the crime. From a legal
standpoint, there is conspiracy if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the appellants
had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the appellants themselves
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
intent. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.
ENTRAPMENT v. INSTIGATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON QUIAOIT, JR.
G.R. No. 175222 July 27, 2007
Justice Chico-Nazario
FACTS:
At around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac PNP received a
report from a confidential informant that someone was selling shabu at the Golden Miles, a
videoke bar located in Barangay San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on said information, a team
was immediately organized by PNP Provincial Director Rudy Gamido Lacadin to conduct a
surveillance in order to verify the information and perform a buy-bust operation.
Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the
movements of appellant who was with the confidential informant at that time. Later, the
informant introduced PO1 Baquiran to appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu.
According to PO1 Baquiran's testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance in front of The Golden Miles' comfort room which was located at
the back of said establishment. In return, he gave appellant a marked P500.00 bill. As soon as
the exchange between appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter gave his companions
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the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. PO2 Dueas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to
arrest appellant. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was later marked
RID 1 by PO2 Dueas.
On their way back to Camp Makabulos, the informant allegedly told the buy-bust
team, through a text message, that appellant still had in his possession illegal drugs other than
that which he had sold to PO1 Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the camp, they frisked
appellant and this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which were similar to
those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran. The seized crystalline substance was subjected to test
and the result shows that it was shabu.
The appellant contends that the arrest was illegal since he was framed up by the
police and the court should consider the arrest as a result of instigation and not entrapment
contrary to the arresting officers claim.
ISSUE:
Was the arrest of the accused a result of instigation or inducement?
HELD:
No. The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is clearly
drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana, the Court explained the distinction between the
two: In instigation, the instigator practically induces the accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal; in entrapment, ways and means are resorted to
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal
plan.
Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule
is that instigation and inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of filing criminal
charges, is to be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of
means and ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is sanctioned and
permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first instance, no crime has been
committed, and to induce one to commit it makes the instigator a co-criminal. Under the last
instance, the crime has already been committed and all that is done is to entrap and capture
the law breaker. In the case at bar, the Court finds appellant's claim of instigation to be
baseless.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Self-Defense
MANUEL O. ORIENTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 155094 January 30, 2007
FACTS:
On 16 March 1996, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Arnel Tanael was on his
way to the house of Romulo Cario. He passed in front of the house of [petitioner] Manuel
Oriente and saw the latter and his companions having a drinking spree at the terrace of the
petitioner's house. He arrived at Romulo's house where the latter was drinking beer alone.
Thereafter, Romulo went out of the house to buy cigarettes. While watching television in the
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house of Romulo, Arnel Tanael heard two gunshots. Hence, he rushed outside the house to
check on what the gunshots were all about.
Peeping through potted plants perched on top of a neighbor's fence Tanael saw
Romulo Cario, Manuel Oriente, the latter's daughter, Marilou Lopez and her husband, Paul
Lopez and one Rogelio Gascon arguing. He heard Paul Lopez telling Romulo Cario, "Ikaw
Cario, ang liit-liit mo, ang yabang mo!" Then Tanael saw Marilou coming out from their
house with a lead pipe and handed it over to Paul. Paul then hit Romulo with a lead pipe at
his right arm. Accused-appellant got the lead pipe from Paul and hit Romulo on his left
eyebrow. Romulo reeled and fell down. Upon seeing Romulo fall down, Arnel got confused,
hence, he went back inside the house and switched off the light and turned the television off.
He went outside again and saw Romulo moaning. At this point, Paul Lopez was already
poking a gun at Romulo, then pulled the trigger twice but the gun did not fire. Arnel then
shouted, "Putang ina ninyo, bakit niyo ginagawa iyan sa bayaw ko, bakit ninyo ginaganito
siya, ano ba ang kasalanan niya sa inyo." Oriente and his company did not say anything.
Romulo Cario was brought by Arnel to the East Avenue Medical Center where Romulo, two
hours after, passed away.
The accused pleaded self-defense, arguing that the victim was the one who shot the
gun and that he was only defending himself and his family when he hit the victim. The RTC
rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether accused may claim self-defense.
HELD:
No. The petitioner emphasizes that the victim, allegedly a troublemaker in the
vicinity, was drunk, fired his gun twice, and then proceeded towards the petitioner and his
companions. The Court is not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show
that the killing was legally justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused
should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the elements of self-defense in order
to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden by clear and
convincing evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused,
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.
Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured
or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. All these conditions must concur. There can be no self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense.
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an

actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person
not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the
defensive action was taken against the aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there
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must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.
The testimonies of the defense witnesses, including the accused, that Cario
threatened the persons gathered in front of Oriente's house with a gun is quite difficult to
believe in view of the admissions of the same defense witnesses, including the accused, that
Cario was able to get up from the ground after being hit and ran away with gun in hand. A
person who was already threatening to kill with a gun and who was then hit with a piece of
wood in a serious manner, can be reasonably expected to make use thereof. Here, the defense
makes a rather unusual claim that Cario simply ran away and did not use the gun he was
holding while running.
Lawful Performance of a Duty
RUFINO S. MAMANGUN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 149152 February 2, 2007
Justice Garcia
FACTS:
The accused-petitioner police officer Mamangun was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of Murder. On or about the 31st day of July 1992, held at
Meycauyan, Bulacan, a hold-up- robbery was reported in the area and that the suspect went
to the rooftop of the house. The accused Mamangun, together with two other police officers
responded in the area. It is undisputed fact that the three policemen, i.e., petitioner, Diaz and
Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. There, they saw a man whom
they thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was
walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to
be Gener Contreras (Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect. Contreras died of the
gunshot wound.
The prosecution lone eyewitness said that accused Mamangun fired his gun although
Gener identified himself while uttering the words to Mamanguns group with Hindi ako,
hindi ako to which Mamangun replied, " Anong hindi ako?"
The defense denied the presence of the witness of the prosecution and corroborated
the testimonies of the three police officers. They said that the rooftop was dark. They saw
Contreras crouching on the rooftop and shouted, Pulis Tigil! whereupon the person
suddenly stopped, turned around, faced Mamangun, and raised a stainless steel pipe towards
the latter's head but Mamangun was able to evade the attack. This prompted Mamangun to
shoot the person on the left arm. All three claimed that it was only at this point that PO2 Cruz
and Diaz approached Contreras who told them, "Hindi ako. Hindi ako." Mamangun went
near Contreras and asked, "Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are policemen
here." Thus, the defense claimed self-defense and lawful performance of a duty as police
officer.
After due proceedings, Sandiganbayan came out with its decision finding the
accused- petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of only the crime of Homicide. Hence this
petition.
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ISSUE:
Can the petitioner claim the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of a duty?
HELD:
No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article 11,
of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that:
(1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty. Having admitted the fatal shooting of Contreras, petitioner is charged with the burden
of adducing convincing evidence to show that the killing was done in the fulfillment of his
duty as a policeman.
Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid

justifying circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or
established facts, the most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
to justify a claim of self defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of
unlawful aggression, petitioner's plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to
fail.
To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify
the petitioner's firing the fatal gunshot at the victim.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
Accident without Fault or Intention of Causing it
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with parricide for allegedly shooting his wife with a dart from
a rubber sling, hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. In his defense, the
accused said that he had no intention of killing his wife and that he was practicing the use of
the weapon when his wife was accidentally hit by the arrow. However, the trial court
nonetheless found him guilty on the ground that the evidence showed that the infliction of the
fatal injury upon his wife was preceded by a quarrel between her and the appellant, thus
negating the latters defense. The same was affirmed on appeal. In the present petition, the
appellant contends that assuming that he was the one who killed his wife the same was
accidental and not intentional.
ISSUE:
Is the exempting circumstance of accident applicable in the instant case?
HELD:
No. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The

following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
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"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with

clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof.
The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be
considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of
accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Voluntary Surrender
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORATO C. BELTRAN

G.R. No. 168051 September 27, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the evening, Ever Sales left his workplace and
proceeded home using his bicycle. While traversing the Velasquez Road, he saw Beltran
(appellant) holding a bolo and standing in front of his house situated at the side of Velasquez
Road. On the opposite side of the same road, he saw Norman H. Concepcion (Norman)
standing in front of an automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, Ever decided to stop
by and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road. Minutes later, he saw appellant,
from a distance of six meters, stalking Norman who was then walking near the automobile
shop. Appellant approached Norman, and, without a warning, hacked him with a bolo.
Norman tried to avoid the blow by moving backwards and shielding his face with his left
arm. However, Norman's left hand was hit and wounded by the bolo. When Norman turned
around and ran, appellant hacked him at the back causing him to fall down on a grassy area.
Appellant repeatedly hacked Norman with a bolo and nearly decapitated the victim which
caused the latters instant death.
Accused invoked self-defense, nonetheless, he was still convicted of murder. On

appeal, the accused wished to avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
ISSUE:
1. Can the accused avail of self-defense in committing the crime?
2. If self-defense is not availing, can voluntary surrender be appreciated as
mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
1. No. As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an assault or attack,
or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in
actual peril. It is an act positively strong showing the intent of the aggressor and not merely a
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threatening or intimidating attitude. It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked attack of
immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the person attacked.
In the instant case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Norman that
justified the act of appellant in hacking him to death. There was no actual or imminent danger
on the life of appellant when he came face to face with Norman. Norman was just walking on
the road and was not provoking appellant into a fight. It was the appellant who approached
and suddenly hacked Norman repeatedly even when the latter was already fallen on the
ground. In short, appellant was the unlawful aggressor.
2. The essential elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been
actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and
(3) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent.
Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials
just before he was turned over to the police. Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered
to the authorities, the same was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the hacking
incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother and
the next day, to his sister. It took him three long days to surrender to the police authorities.
Moreover, the flight of appellant and his act of hiding until he was apprehended by the
barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that
characterizes the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Relationship and Minority
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLANDO A. UBIA

G.R. No. 176349 July 10, 2007
Justice Ynares-Santiago
FACTS:
Appellant, Orlando Ubina, was charged with rape of his 15-year old niece. The
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial, the RTC found him guilty of rape. The
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC. However, the appellate court disregarded the
aggravating circumstance of craft and the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship of the parties in the imposition of penalty because it noted that they were not
alleged in the information. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the court err in disregarding the qualifying circumstance of relationship and
minority?
HELD:
The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances
because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As special
qualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the
information; . . . If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
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guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim the specific relationship must
be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the
case may be] within the third civil degree. The information in the instant case only
mentioned appellant as AAA's uncle, without specifically stating that he is a relative within
the third civil degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it
was proved that the relationship was within the third civil degree either of consanguinity or
affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would thereby be denied of
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant
cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and
convicted of rape in its qualified form. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the
qualifying circumstance of relationship.
However, the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the Information. When
either one of the twin special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted
or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, complainant's minority may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the penalty in
the instant case because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is
single and indivisible.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Evident Premeditation and Abuse of Superior Strength
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA

G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
FACTS:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. On
February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to
her condominium unit. After handing his employer's bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid,
accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa
heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife.
She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty.
Sua-Kho.
The accused fled using the victim's car. He was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan,
Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Several work associates of the victim in the Lawyer's Advocate Circle related that
prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided about his grudges against the
victim, such as being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked
long hours of the day and served many bosses.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he
testified, didn't want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company
guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. In the evening
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of February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to her father's house, because her
husband Daniel Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip
Robinson, the former got a knife and stabbed him with it, catching her on the wrist. Accused
managed to wrest control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times.
After he stabbed her he was shocked and left the place using the victim's car. He fled to
Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to the police.
The trial court ruled against the accused. The Court of Appeals disregarded
appellant's claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being incredible considering the
number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene.
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of murder.
HELD:
Yes. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that evident premeditation was
adequately established which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse
of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. Like any other circumstance that
qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive
evidence; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The essence of premeditation is that the
execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and reflections upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To
be considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution, to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to

appellant's state of mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim.
Both witnesses testified on appellant's ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the
crime. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely testify
against the appellant, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and their
testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit. Thus, the lower courts correctly
concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal
act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her
body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the
dastardly act without employing physical superiority over the victim. In People v. Espina, the
Court have ruled that an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex
and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself.
Treachery
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS GUZMAN

G.R. No. 169246 January 26, 2007
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FACTS:
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay,
Michael proceeded home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino
Street and Mactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who were drinking nearby,
suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of
Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the
shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of the appellant's companions, whom
the prosecution witnesses described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly
stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellant's other companion, whom the
prosecution witnesses described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife and stabbed
Michael on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife and
also stabbed Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him
at the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and
his two companions fled the scene. The appellant was convicted by the trial court with the
crime of murder. On appeal, appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death
of Michael, there was no treachery which will qualify the killing as murder. According to
him, there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had deliberately and
consciously adopted their mode of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves.
The stabbing incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people
in the area then walking in different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions
wanted to ensure that no risk would come to them, then they could have chosen another time
and place to attack Michael.
ISSUE:
Can treachery be properly appreciated in the instant case?
HELD:
Yes. Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that
renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and
severity of the attack. It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person
to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and
essential elements of treachery as an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required
in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or
manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the
part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; (2)
deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must
always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly
considered.
In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant.
Moreover, all the essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven
during the trial. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his two
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companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It
appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely
seventeen years of age then. In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely impossible for
Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two
companions. Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like
appellant and his two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three
assailants and was unarmed when he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two
companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also
deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by first
surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of
them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the
ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged
the latter's large intestine.
The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were
walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
the slightest provocation on his part. This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the
victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to
put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEOSON E. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 171272 June 7, 2007
Justice Quisumbing
FACTS:
Two informations charged the accused with Murder and Frustrated Murder
committed by means of treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, using disguise, fraud and craft to enter the dwelling and with insult to or in
disregard of the respect due on account of rank, age and sex. In the course of the trial, the
prosecution alleged that appellant Dela Cruz presented an I.D. with the name Allan B. Reyes
to Sgt. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3 of the Cinco Hermanos Subdivision. Upon
reaching the house of Pelagio, Dela Cruz was let in by Rebecca, Pelagio's daughter. Dela
Cruz went straight to the kitchen.
According to Pelagio, Dela Cruz was a messenger in his law firm who got fired
based on his secretary's recommendation that Dela Cruz had been absent without leave at
least three times. He said that he would write Dela Cruz a recommendation letter which the
latter could pick up from the office. As he escorted Dela Cruz out towards the garage gate,
the latter suddenly stabbed him at the back and kept on stabbing him until he lost his balance.
When he managed to turn and face Dela Cruz, the latter kept on stabbing him frontally. He
tried to put his arms around Dela Cruz but his attacker shook him off. As he ran towards the
kitchen, Dela Cruz chased and kept on stabbing him at the back of his left shoulder. At this
point, Juliana appeared and rushed to him begging, "Leo, tama na, tama na, tama na." Dela
Cruz dropped the knife and ran towards the garage.
As Juliana was attending to her husband, Dela Cruz suddenly reappeared and stabbed
her at the back with a letter opener. As she jerked backward, she received another stab below
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the left shoulder. She tried to ward off the letter opener with her left hand, but again was
stabbed at the back of her left arm. Pelagio shouted, "Huwag Leo, si Julie yan." When the
letter opener broke, Dela Cruz dropped the instrument and rushed outside where he was
apprehended. Juliana died as a result.
ISSUE:
In a case, can all aggravating circumstances alleged be appreciated?
HELD:
No. When treachery is present, an allegation of abuse of superior strength can no
longer be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance. The same holds true with
the circumstance of disregard of the respect on account of rank, age or sex, which in this case
could not be aggravating. In like manner, we do not find that disguise, fraud or craft attended
the commission of the crimes. Also, we find no intellectual trickery nor cunning resorted to
by appellant to lure his victims into a trap and conceal his identity.
However, the Court agrees that dwelling aggravated the commission of the crimes.
Appellant's greater perversity was revealed when he deliberately entered the victims'
domicile, at the pretext of soliciting help from its owners. The garage, where the incidents
took place, is undoubtedly an integral part of the victims' residence.
Cleary, the presence of the attending circumstances of this case qualified the killing
of Juliana to murder. As to the attack on Pelagio, the crime committed was frustrated murder
as appellant performed all acts of execution which would have claimed the life of Pelagio but
because of the prompt medical intervention, a cause independent of the appellants will,
Pelagio survived.
ACCOMPLICE
ERNESTO GARCES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173858 July 17, 2007
FACTS:
Rosendo Pacursa, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr., Aurelio Pira, and petitioner
Ernesto Garces, were charged with Forcible Abduction with Rape. On August 2, 1992, while
AAA was on her way to the chapel, the five accused suddenly appeared and approached her.
Rosendo Pacursa covered her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be
killed. He then brought her inside a nearby tobacco barn while his four companions stood
guard outside. Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought
back but to no avail. Thereafter, Pacursa succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After
a while, they heard people shouting and calling the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner
Ernesto Garces entered the barn, covered AAAs mouth, then dragged her outside. He also
threatened to kill her if she reports the incident.
Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Rosendo
Pacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented alibis as their
defense. On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and Aurelio Pira, testified that they
were watching a televised basketball game at the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. at the time the
alleged rape transpired. They denied seeing Pacursa that night.
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After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision finding Pacursa guilty of
Forcible Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an accessory to the
crime. Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Both
Pacursa and petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals. However, Pacursa
subsequently withdrew his appeal. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty as an accessory to the crime of rape.
HELD:
No. The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even
before complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and
when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the
other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he
entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is
liable as an accomplice, there being insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy, and not merely
as an accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts. The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present: (1)
community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
ABSORPTION OF CRIMES
EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez
FACTS:
In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including
petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said
soldiers. In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to
dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed
around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and

recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and
penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding
Information against them.
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Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso
Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in
the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City
an Information for coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was
consolidated involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati
City.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of
Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military
tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The
Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including
petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said
trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They
invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.
Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial

Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of
absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges
before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected,
but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court
then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail.
Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed

the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers
involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court
martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP.
The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to
the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation
of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of
February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not
service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot
compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
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ISSUE:
1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been
criminally charged of coup dtat before the regular courts.
2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided
in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055 i. It bears stressing that the charge against
the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor
and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their
professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the
service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in
character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the
stringent standard of military discipline.
Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same
has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected,
but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by
said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which
expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or
offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over
the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and
fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to
be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the
charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to
the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes' is peculiar to
criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where
different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has
jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
CONTINUOUS CRIME
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006
Justice Callejo, Sr.
FACTS:
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue
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Ribbon Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and the
alleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits
Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, among
others, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and
Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and described the modus operandi of the perpetrators as
follows:
The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions with
two deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral
deed). Another deed of sale would be signed by the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS
(bilateral deed). These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the
System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation was obviously
to evade payment of the correct taxes to the government and save money for the seller(s),
broker(s) and who knows, probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials of
RSBS, the buyer.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecute

and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who
had signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land,"
Ombudsman Investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., among
others, may be charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be charged and prosecuted for all five (5) counts of estafa
thru falsification of public documents.
HELD:
Yes. The question of the number of criminal charges that must be instituted against a
criminal respondent (whether one count or multiple counts of the same offense) is one
addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecution service. It is enough, as this Court has
already ruled, that the informations filed in these cases are based on facts establishing
probable cause for the offenses charged. This Court will not compel the Office of the
Ombudsman to file only one information for Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents when its preliminary investigation established the commission of several counts
thereof as such action on the part of this Court would constitute undue interference with the
Office of the Ombudsman's control over the prosecution of these cases. In the second place,
this Court is not persuaded that what is involved in these cases is a continuous crime, that is
to say, a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or
intent not susceptible of division, with each act in that series being merely the partial
execution of a single delict. On the contrary, the Court is of the view that what is involved
herein are several completed and distinct purported criminal acts which should be prosecuted
as multiple counts of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by the
prosecution, there are as many alleged offenses as there are alleged anomalous transactions
involved in these cases.
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PENALTIES
Graduated Scale; Effect of Amendment to the Death Penalty Law: RA 9346
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON

G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February
2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon
(appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older brother.
All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in
several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant,
their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and
appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and
6908 to attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of death penalty. The proximate
concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape which under
the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated rape, should be
computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?
HELD:
The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can
no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the
Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.
Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the
penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by
two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon
the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is
the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under
eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death
penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the
scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal,
which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted
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rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted
rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum
penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346
had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication.
However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable
penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is
the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it
follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so
followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable

by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under
the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also
reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to

death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and
consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies,
and for accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty
for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be
reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
Suspension of Sentence: P.D. 603
RENNIE DECLARADOR vs. SALVADOR GUBATON

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006
Justice Callejo
FACTS:
The Information filed charged Frank Bansales with murder for the death of Yvonne
Declarador. During trial, the prosecution showed that at around 9:45 am on July 25, 2002,
inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, accused
Bansales attacked, assaulted and stabbed with a knife victim Declarador. Consequently, the
accused inflicted 15 fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the
immediate death of Declarador. The trial court convicted Bansales of murder since the crime
was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering the accused carried a long knife
along with him from his house to the school and used it against the victim who was unarmed
and defenseless at that time. However, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603 (P.D. No.
603), the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the
Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras on the ground
that he was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
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Petitioner Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the trial court's decision of
suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
well as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the benefit of a suspended sentence
does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Bansales avers that Section 32 of Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law entitles
the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the
juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the
sentence of the accused.
ISSUE:
Is respondent Bansales entitled to the automatic suspension granted by P.D. No. 603?
HELD:
No. The accused was found guilty of murder, a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. It is clear from the words of Section 32 of P.D. No. 603 that a person who
is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is
disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. The word "punishable" does
not mean "must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as specified. The term refers to the
possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not
which is imposed. The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the
imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not
the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a
juvenile. Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge Salvador Gubaton,
nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against him. By this act,
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court granted the petition.
Civil Interdiction
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
Justice Austri-Martinez
FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery
against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were
convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial
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of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery
disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her
to share in the conjugal property?
HELD:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during
the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as
to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage
his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same
Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article
although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does
not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to
manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

PUCAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167084 October 31, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Monina Pucay (Pucay) was charged with the crime of estafa attended by
the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence/unfaithfulness. Private respondent
Asian Retailers, Inc. (ARI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of lending
money and gift checks to government employees. Petitioner Monina Pucay (Pucay) was a
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Cashier II at the Treasury Section of the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In September
1988, ARI started its lending operation at the LTO Main Office at East Avenue, Quezon City.
The operation started with the lending of gift checks to LTO employees. A year later, the
operation expanded to include lending of money at an interest. The arrangement was for
ARI's President Benjamin Gochangco (Gochangco) to provide blank sets of promissory notes
for the employees to fill up by indicating the amount of loan they wanted to obtain whether in
the form of cash or gift checks with their signatures affixed. This form served as promissory
note where the amount and the maturity date of the loan were shown. The amount of loan that
had become due and demandable was to be automatically deducted from the pay envelopes of
the debtor-employees every payday and remitted to ARI. The Head of the Treasury Section
and two other employees, including the petitioner, were responsible for carrying out the
aforesaid tasks.
When the collection to be remitted to ARI was stolen inside the Treasury Section
Office, the LTO Administration directed ARI to discontinue its lending operation in order to
avoid similar incidents in the future. Petitioner, together with Gochangco, however, decided
to continue the lending activities on their own. In a verbal agreement entered between
petitioner and Gochangco, the former undertook to deduct the amount of the loan from the
pay envelopes of the indebted employees and remit the collection to the latter or to any of his
representatives. Gochangco, in turn, will pay petitioner 2% of the interest earned by ARI
every month as her commission. This agreement went on without the knowledge of the LTO
Administration. Subsequently, Pucay failed to remit her collection in the amount of
P205,695.00. When Gochangco confronted her, petitioner reasoned that the collection was
again stolen inside the Treasury Section Office. After repeated verbal demands made upon
her, petitioner wrote a letter to Gochangco pleading to give her time to remit the amount of
P205,000.00. Despite the demand letter served by Gochangco, petitioner still failed to remit
the amount of collection.
The trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
through misappropriation as punished under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner moved for new trial before the Court of Appeals on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. She claimed that the alleged evidence is of such weight and materiality
that if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment. The appellate court
granted a new trial, thereby setting aside the trial courts judgment. Accordingly, a new trial
was conducted by the lower court where the newly discovered evidence was introduced and
admitted in the proceedings of the case. Similarly, the trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa but modified the penalty. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
What is the correct penalty to be imposed?
HELD:
The indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 20
years of reclusion temporal, in addition to the payment of actual damages in the amount
of P205,000.00. In this case, the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period is the imposable penalty if the amount of the fraud is
over P12,000 but not over P22,000. If the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty
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provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000. The total penalty, however, shall not exceed twenty years.
To get the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years
included in the two periods should be divided into three. The division of the time included in
the prescribed penalty should be divided into three equal periods of time, forming one period
for each of the three portions. The maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
prescribed penalty are therefore: Minimum period - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5
months and 10 days; Medium period 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months
and 20 days; and Maximum period 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. Hence, the
amount defrauded, being in excess of P22,000, the penalty imposable should be the
maximum period. However, Art. 315 also provides that an additional one year shall be
imposed for each additional P10,000. Here, the total amount of the fraud is P205,000.00
(P205,000 P22,000 = P183,000). Hence, an additional penalty of 18 years should be
imposed. However, the total penalty should not in any case exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
The minimum period of the indeterminate sentence, on the other hand, should be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315(1)(b), Revised
Penal Code, for the crime committed. The penalty next lower to prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (six months, one day,
to two years, four months) to prision correccional medium (two years, four months and one
day to four years and two months).
PROBATION LAW
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
of Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition
of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended.
Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the
final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two
(2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
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commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno
merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government
Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because
the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as
an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as
Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE:
Does Morenos probation grant him the right to run in public office?
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding
that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed
terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to
him, including the right to run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a
penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not
specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code.

While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which
applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general
in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the
special provisions of such earlier statute.
EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY

EMMA P. NUGUID vs. CLARITA S. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
Justice Corona
FACTS:
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation
of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that respondent and her
husband approached petitioner and asked her if they could borrow money to settle some
obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of
respondent to petitioner, the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was
persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached
P1,150,000.00.
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As security for the P1,150,000.00, respondent gave petitioner open dated checks with
the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year, petitioner can deposit
the checks.
Subsequently, petitioner demanded payment of the sums above-mentioned, but

respondent refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thereafter, petitioner deposited all
aforementioned checks in the bank totaling P1,150,000.00. The checks were all returned for
having been drawn against insufficient funds.
A verbal and written demand was made upon respondent to pay the amount
represented by the bounced checks, but to no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22
was filed against the respondent. The trial court convicted the defendant. The CA reversed
the decision, thus acquitting Nicdao. Petitioner now contends that the civil liability of the
defendant was not extinguished by the acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent remains civilly liable to petitioner despite her acquittal.
HELD:
No. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense
against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against
the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion,
espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured
by the crime.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A
person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater
than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did
not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may
still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It
may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2)
where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3)
where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
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accused was acquitted.
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As

found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and
extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that
respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely
relieved of civil liability.
REBELLION
VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013 June 1, 2007
Justice Carpio
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin
petitioners' prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and
prosecution of petitioners' cases.
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential

Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency,"
police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to
Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and
Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial
determination of probable cause. The trial court affirmed the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Is there probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion?
HELD:
No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof;
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or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd
action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors
who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other
documents. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn
before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for
two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and Raul
Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In his
affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran and
other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual. For his
part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the
CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities;
and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from
contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups
affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for
taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove,
at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14
years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that
Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in
the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a
leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not
automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes'

affidavit, dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran
as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other
petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo
government were allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in
Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under
Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in
meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory
step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution
acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the
criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely
alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit
Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try
Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
FALSIFICATION
LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
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G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006
FACTS:
Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving
deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the

release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial
documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely:
Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were
granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact
the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the
check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the
checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use
and benefit.
Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial

Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and
Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the
preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao,
Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon sister-in-law and Dennis
Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the
cooperative is not open to minors.
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.
HELD:
Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification
of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private
Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the
information.
As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it

is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private
Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means
to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We
find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.
In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the
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signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by: Ibatulanon to indicate that she received
the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of
Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used
the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan
from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements,
which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which
caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty
of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of
Dennis Batulanon.
NESTOR A. BERNARDINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NOS. 170453 & 170518 October 30, 2006
FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan found Nestor Bernardino, a former Mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, and other Prequalification Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC), guilty of falsification
of public document. On December 8, 1997, the PBAC members convened as alleged.
PBAC, assisted by COA representative Rolando Ronquillo, assessed the qualifications of
four bidders who participated and thereafter awarded the construction project to MASCOM.
Prior to construction, Jose Dizon was elected Mayor of Guimba and conducted a public
bidding for the same construction project and awarded it to KYRO. Consequently,
MASCOM filed before the Ombudsman a criminal compliant against Mayor Dizon for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Mayor Dizons contention was manifested in an affidavit stating that no public
bidding was held in connection with the construction project nor was the PBAC convened on
December 8, 1997. On the basis of the admission of the affiants, the Ombudsman dismissed
the case against Mayor Dizon and instead filed the case for falsification of public documents
under Article 171(2) of the RPC against all PBAC members. The Information charged
Bernardino and the PBAC members of falsification by making it appear in the "Minutes of
the opening of bids," "Prequalification Bid and Award Committee," "Abstract of Proposal,"
and "Abstract of Bidding," that they and COA representative conducted a public bidding on
December 8, 1997, when no such bidding was in fact conducted.
At the trial, Ronquillo declared that he did not attend any public bidding regarding
the construction project on December 8, 1997. He admitted, however, that he has no personal
knowledge whether a bidding was conducted or not. The same was made by Mayor Dizon
who admitted that he does not know whether the PBAC conducted a public bidding. The
prosecution also offered in evidence the affidavits of some PBAC members in support of its
theory that no public bidding was held.
Motion for reconsideration as well as a motion for new trial on the basis of the
alleged newly discovered evidence in form of affidavits stating that the falsification was
caused by fear and intimidation of Mayor Dizon to bolster his defense in the charges against
him, was denied. Thus the petition for review.
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ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of Bernardino was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No. In the instant case, Bernardino was charged with falsification under Article
171(2) of the RPC, by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact participate. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a
public officer, employee or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position;
(3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
The evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that no bidding was conducted
on December 8, 1997 were the affidavits of PBAC members and the testimonies of Ronquillo
and Mayor Dizon could not be considered for purposes of determining whether a public
bidding was indeed held on that day because of their admission that they do not have
personal knowledge whether or not said bidding was indeed conducted. The affidavit and
testimonies were merely an expression of an opinion and not a fact since the affiants were not
in the place where the alleged bidding was held and are not in the position to declare with
moral certainty that no such bidding in fact occurred.
PEDRO S. GIRON, ET AL. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 145357-59 August 23, 2006
Justice Carpio
FACTS:
The present petition involves alleged irregularities in the construction of a two-
kilometer road connecting Barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del Sur
("Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project"). Contrary to what was stated in the Monthly Status
Report dated 25 January 1989 and the Physical Status Report dated 31 January 1989
(collectively, "Reports"), the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project was not 100% complete as
of 25 January 1989.
In a communication dated January 25, 1989, District Engr. Giron submitted to the
Regional Director of DPWH Regional Office No. XI (Davao City) the Monthly Status
Report of CY 1988 Infrastructure Program where it appeared that Kauswagan-Kinayan Road
was 100% complete as of January 25, 1989.
Thereafter, in a letter dated January 31, 1989, Engr. Lala, for and in the absence of
the District Engineer, submitted the Physical Status Reports of Project Costing P2.0 M and
below under C.Y. 1988 Infra Program to the same Regional Office of the DPWH wherein it
appeared that the Kauswagan-Kinayan Road, Barobo Surigao del Sur is 100% complete.
Contrary to the Reports, the road was not finished by 25 January 1989. On 30 June
1989, the Barangay Council of Kinayan, Barobo, Surigao del Sur resolved to request the
Ombudsman to make an immediate investigation on the irregularities of the Kinayan-
Kauswagan Road Project.
The Ombudsman, through the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, ordered the
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Provincial Auditor to conduct an investigation. On 19 June 1990, in a report addressed to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, State Auditor III Eusebia Gamulo of the Office of the
Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur wrote that: Actual implementation of the project was
very much delayed. In an interview made it was disclosed that while the road opening started
in November 1988, spreading of the delivered soil lime base course was done in October
1989 only, which was contrary to the DPWH report that said project was 100% completed as
of January 25, 1989.
ISSUE:
Whether Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are indeed guilty of falsification of documents
under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No. There are three elements in the crime of falsification of documents under Article
171(4). First, the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public. Second, the
offender takes advantage of his official position. Third, the offender falsifies a document by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. There is no doubt that all three are
public officials, as they were employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) at the time of the questioned act.
There is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone among Giron, Crizaldo and
Arreza actually took advantage of his official position. The offender takes advantage of his
official position when he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to intervene in the
preparation of the document, or he has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies. According to the Sandiganbayan, Giron testified that: In preparing these reports, the
project engineer reports to the Construction Section the degree of work they had
accomplished with respect to the project assigned to them. The reports of the project
engineers were to be consolidated into one hence arriving at a Monthly Status Report. These
reports were being submitted every 25th of the month and it takes the Office of the District
Engineer three (3) to five (5) days to prepare the said report. The Monthly Status Report was
typed by Crizaldo, checked by Cedro, and submitted by Salang in lieu of Giron. Engr. Cedro,
who supervised the preparation of the Monthly Status Report and checked the same, was
acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "he never signed the subject reports." Salang was
also acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "his participation was seemingly limited to the
acts before the actual construction of the project."
Crizaldo's item was that of a General Construction Foreman but she was not assigned
to the project site. Crizaldo was assigned in the office and was tasked to type the Monthly
Status Report. The prosecution never proved that Crizaldo had knowledge of the actual status
of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project at the time she prepared the Monthly Status Report.
Crizaldo could have merely relied on field reports submitted to her, precluding her from
making, on her own, untruthful statements at the time she prepared the Monthly Status
Report. Crizaldo could not have conspired with any other party because the Sandiganbayan
found that "there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy on the part of the
accused herein to falsify the subject reports." The Sandiganbayan ruled that "any criminal
liability should be based on their individual participation in the questioned act."
Giron's testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be used against him because he
did not sign the Monthly Status Report. Giron's facsimile signature was merely stamped on
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the Monthly Status Report. The stamped facsimile signatures of Giron do not establish his
personal participation in the preparation of the Monthly Status Report. To use this portion of
Giron's testimony to establish his personal participation is to extrapolate and speculate. This
will not suffice in a criminal action, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction.
Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project. However,
like Giron and Crizaldo, the prosecution was unable to prove his actual participation in the
questioned reports. The Sandiganbayan found that Arreza "had no participation in the
preparation and execution of the said document[s]." The Sandiganbayan also found that
Arreza "did not take advantage of his public position," and thus Arreza is liable under Artcle
172 of the Revised Penal code for falsification of a private document.
In sum, Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are acquitted for failure of the prosecution to
satisfy the requisites for the conviction of the crime of falsification of public documents. All
are public officers, However, the prosecution has failed to prove their criminal culpability
beyond reasonable doubt. There is no moral certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took
advantage of their positions to make a false statement in a narration of facts in a public
document.
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS

GABRIEL L. DUERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL.
G.R. No. 162212, January 30, 2007
Justice Quisumbing
FACTS:
The Commission on Audit (COA) ordered the examination of the cash and accounts
of the Municipal Treasurer and all other accountable officers of, among others, Tandag,
Surigao del Sur. The Special Audit Team No. 1 went to petitioners office, as then Municipal
Treasurer of Tandag, to conduct an audit of his cash and accounts from June 3, 1980 to
March 16, 1981. The audit team made the examination from March 16 to May 26, 1981. It
appeared that certain infrastructure funds from the Ministry of Public Works and Highways
(MPH) and interest earned on the municipalitys time deposit with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) were not entered by petitioner in his Books of Account. As a result, the audit
team amended petitioners cash accountability and declared these items as missing funds.
After several investigations, the audit team submitted to the Regional Director the Reports of
Examination of the Cash and Accounts of petitioner and a Narrative Report. In both
documents, however, the petitioners accountability was further reduced. Based on the audit
teams findings, the Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Information charging petitioner Gabriel L. Duero with Malversation of Public Funds, defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt but considering the mitigating circumstances of
full restitution and voluntary surrender, reduced the penalty. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds.
HELD:
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Yes. The elements of the offense of malversation of public funds are as follows: (1)
the offender is a public officer; (2) he has the custody or control of the funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (3) the funds or property involved are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and (4) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated,
or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another
person of, such funds or property.
Concededly, the first three elements are present in this case. It is the last element,
i.e., whether petitioner misappropriated said public funds, that serves as the petitioners
focus. He claims that he used the missing funds for disbursement of cash advances, and not
for his personal use. The Sandiganbayan held that this defense is unacceptable, and
indicative of petitioners guilt.
Besides, even assuming that petitioners defense could be acceptable, no vale slips
evidencing the cash advances were presented before the Sandiganbayan. True enough,
petitioner presented his demand letters to Perez and Orquina for the payment of their cash
advances. Yet, we find the same wanting for failing to state with particularity the exact
amounts of cash advances made by these officials. In fact, both of them even testified that
their computation varied from petitioners own.
MURDER
RODOLFO CONCEPCION vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167135 November 27, 2006
Justice Garcia
FACTS:
On November 14, 1995, Ramil Lopez, along with Francisco Flores, Eduardo Flores
and Nestor Bauson, was drinking and discussing a business project at the sulambi of Ramil's
house. Suddenly, the group's attention was drawn to the sound of footsteps coming from the
kitchen. Ramil focused his flashlight towards the direction of the approaching footsteps and
saw petitioner Rodolfo Concepcion aiming a gun at him and thereupon firing it, hitting Ramil
on his left arm. Eduardo was also hit on the right arm. Francisco Flores went out of the
house and focused his own flashlight to the source of the gunshot and he saw the petitioner
carrying a firearm and running away. Ramil was treated and diagnosed to have sustained a
fracture which had a healing period of more than thirty (30) days.
An Information for Frustrated Murder was filed against the petitioner before the RTC
of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
The trial court found the petitioner guilty of only the lesser crime of Attempted
Murder because the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to show
that Ramil's wound was fatal. On appeal the accused averred that he was only guilty of
serious physical injuries and not that of attempted murder. The appellate court affirmed that
of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether accused is liable only for the crime of serious physical injuries.
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HELD:
No. Petitioner would argue that even assuming he shot Ramil, at most he could only
be held liable for the crime of serious physical injuries because the wound sustained by
Ramil on his left arm was not mortal, as in fact it was medically determined to require a
healing period of more than 30 days.
The presence of the element of intent to kill determines whether the infliction of the
injury should be punished as attempted murder or consummated physical injuries. When such
intent is lacking, the resulting felony is not attempted murder but only physical injuries, and
being a mental process, the intent to kill may be inferred from the weapon used, the extent of
the injuries sustained by the offended party and the circumstances of the aggression.
Here, evidence abounds as to the clear intent on the part of the petitioner to finish off
his victim. Petitioner attacked Ramil Lopez with the use of a gun, a weapon capable of killing
from a distance. The weapon was aimed at the upper portion of Ramil's body as evidenced by
the fact that he suffered a gunshot wound on his left arm. The attack on Ramil could have
been fatal had the bullet entered any of the vital parts of his upper body. Nonetheless, even as
the prosecution had duly established the presence of intent to kill, there was no showing,
however, that the wound sustained by Ramil was fatal and would have caused his death
without immediate medical attention. The resulting crime, therefore, is only attempted
murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought
about the victim's death.
HOMICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARD MAPALO
G.R. No. 172608 February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Appellant, together with Peter Doe, John Doe and Peter Doe, Jr., was charged before
the RTC of Agoo, La Union with the crime of Murder. During trial, the lone eyewitness for
the prosecution, Calixto Garcia, established that in the early morning of 13 February 1994, at
around 3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte and the group of Lando Mapalo,
Jimmy Frigillana, and the appellant. He saw the appellant club Piamonte with a lead pipe
from behind, hitting him on the right side of the head. At that time when the appellant struck
Piamonte with a lead pipe, he saw Jimmy Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in front of
Piamonte. Later, he saw the dead body of Piamonte, which had suffered multiple stab
wounds. Garcia disclosed that he neither witnessed how Piamonte was stabbed, nor did he
see the act of stabbing Piamonte. He does not know who stabbed the latter. Apellant
interposed the defense of denial and alibi. The lower court, thereafter, convicted appellant of
the crime of murder and ruled that conspiracy was established by the prosecution. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the lower court, convicting appellant of the
crime of frustrated murder and saying that conspiracy was not properly established.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty of frustrated murder.
HELD:
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We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The
principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the
assailant's intent to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved clearly
and convincingly, so as to exclude reasonable doubt thereof. Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime
was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by
him on the victim.
In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown
either prior or subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts.
It bears reiterating that no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellant's
act of hitting the victim with a lead pipe.
Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their execution,
are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate means. We cannot
infer intent to kill from the appellant's act of hitting Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In
the first place, wounds were not shown to have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly,
absent proof of circumstances to show the intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court
cannot declare that the same was attendant.
RAPE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FILOMINO LIZANO
G.R. No. 174470 April 27, 2007
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
On 20 February 1997, appellant was charged with three (3) counts of rape in three (3)
separate Informations, which allege that accused raped the victim, a minor, 11 years of age,
against her will. The prosecution presented the mother to testify on the age of her daughter.
The mother stated in court that she was born on 14 May 1985. Her birth certificate attesting
to the same data was likewise presented in court. Appellant testified on his behalf, raising
denial and alibi as defenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
HELD:
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the credence to be
accorded to the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually the participants are
the only witnesses to the occurrences. Thus, the issue boils down to credibility.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape, which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

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2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape of
the victim, who was then under 12 years old, as proven by the prosecution through the
testimony of her mother and the presentation of her birth certificate.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND BATIANCILA

G.R. No. 174280 January 30, 2007
FACTS:
On June 30, 2002, then 12-year-old private complainant XYZ was alone in their
house in Quezon City when appellant Raymond Batiancila, known to her as "Kuya Bonbon,"
came by to watch television. After an hour, appellant summoned XYZ to go inside her
mother's bedroom. Once inside, he suddenly held XYZ's hands above her head, pushed her
against the wall, and began to undress her. XYZ tried to resist, but appellant threatened to kill
her and her mother. Appellant then proceeded to remove his pants and briefs, inserted his
penis into her vagina, and had sexual intercourse with her while standing up.
After the sexual intercourse, XYZ went to the house of her relative, AAA, and
narrated what Batiancila did to her. Later, appellant was arrested, he avers that there was no
evidence of his alleged use of irresistible force and serious intimidation as he had no weapon
to threaten XYZ with during the afternoon of the alleged rape, and that there was no evidence
showing the resistance of XYZ as there were no torn clothes to prove any struggle between
the two of them. These, according to Batiancila, show that XYZ actually had consensual
intercourse with him for they were then sweethearts.
ISSUE:
Was force, violence, or intimidation employed in the commission of the crime?
HELD:
Yes. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only
on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other.
Records show that XYZ was only 12 years old when she was raped by Batiancila who was 21
years old. Understandably, a girl of such young age could only cower in fear and yield into
submission to such an adult, more especially so as he is her cousin who has moral
ascendancy over her. Rape, after all, is nothing more than a conscious process of
intimidation by which a man keeps a woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not
even impossible for a victim of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant.
It is also well settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the
rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. Besides, physical resistance
is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an
accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Thus, the law does not impose a
burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse
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with the victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY BIDOC

G.R. No. 169430 October 31, 2006
FACTS:
AAA testified that she was only 14 years of age when the first rape incident happened
on 21 November 1999. She narrated that on the said date, she was in their house. At that time,
her mother, BBB, was washing clothes in a brook, which was quite far from their house. Her
sister, CCC, who was then six years old, went with their mother, while her other siblings
DDD and EEE, who were then three and two years old, respectively, were playing outside
their house. On that very moment, when only AAA and her father, herein appellant, were left
inside the house, the latter started kissing her and went on removing her clothes. She resisted
but the appellant was much stronger, hence, despite her resistance, appellant succeeded in
undressing her, then eventually raping her. After raping her, appellant even threatened to kill
her if she will reveal to anybody what had happened. Terribly frightened and hardly able to
comprehend the situation, she could only cry out in utter helplessness and desperation. When
her mother came back, she did not tell what happened for fear that appellant might carry out
his threat. AAA was then raped for the second time one evening in December 1999.
In January 2000, AAA took chances in going to the PNP Station located in Kabugao,
Apayao, and reported that she was raped twice by the appellant. SPO1 Agculao testified that
on 6 January 2000, AAA voluntarily came to the police station to report that her own father,
herein appellant, had raped her.
Witnesses for the defense testified that the appellant was with them working in a
construction project a few kilometres away from their house, when the alleged rape incidents
occurred hence appellant could not have raped his daughter. According to appellant, her
daughter was motivated in filing the present cases against him to get even with him because
he slapped her on 3 January 2000 in front of her "barkadas" and he even threatened to kill her
for fear that she might get pregnant because of her going out at night and coming home late.
AAAs mother on the other hand tried to refute these by saying that during the months of
November and December 1999, her husband, herein appellant, was at their house.
The RTC convicted the appellant of two counts of rape. This was affirmed by the CA.
Hence this appeal. The appellant averred that the courts erred in convicting him not on the
basis of the strength of the prosecution's evidence but rather on the weakness of the defense's
evidence. And also, he should not be convicted because of the failure of the prosecution to
state the precise date of commission of the alleged rape, it being an essential element of the
crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether stating the precise date of commission is an essential element of rape.
HELD:
No. The SC said that the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its
commission. The exact date of the commission is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. In
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this case, the prosecution adequately proved the fact of sexual intercourse by appellant
against the will of AAA sometime in December 1999. The veracity of the rape charge is not
dependent on the time of the commission of the offense but on the credibility of the offended
party.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL HERMOCILLA

G.R. No. 175830 July 10, 2007
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with two counts of rape for allegedly molesting his minor
stepdaughter. It was alleged that on those occasions, he would force her to have sexual
intercourse with him or would forcibly insert his finger inside her vagina. After trial, the
RTC found the accused guilty of 2 counts of rape. The same was affirmed by the CA. In this
appeal, appellant assails the victims credibility claiming that her failure to confide the
alleged rape to her mother, father and grandmother despite several opportunities to do so
renders such accusations doubtful.
ISSUE:
1. Did the CA correctly uphold the accuseds conviction?
2. Can the qualifying circumstance of relationship be considered in the imposition of
the proper penalty?
HELD:
1. Yes. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of
two counts of rape. In the first rape incident, the prosecution proved that appellant had carnal
knowledge of M by inserting his penis into her vagina through force and intimidation. Under
Art. 266-B, in relation to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge of a
woman through force or intimidation shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. The second
incident whereby appellant inserted his fingers into M's vagina likewise constituted rape
through sexual assault. In People v. Palma, it was held that the insertion of the appellant's
finger into the victim's vagina constituted the crime of rape through sexual assault under
Republic Act No. 8353 or "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997".
2. No. Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed with

any aggravating or qualifying circumstances. The Information in the present case mentioned
the victim as appellant's stepdaughter and an 11-year old minor. A stepdaughter is a daughter
of one's spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of one's mother by
virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. In the
instant case, appellant and the victims mother were never married. Hence, appellant is not
the victims stepfather; vice-versa, the victim is not appellant's stepdaughter. Appellant is the
common law spouse of the victims mother. However, since this relationship was not
specifically pleaded in the information, it cannot be considered in the imposition of the
proper penalty.
QUALIFIED RAPE
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LITO BEJIC
G.R. No. 174060 June 25, 2007
FACTS:
An information was filed against the accused wherein he was charged with qualified
rape for allegedly sexually molesting his 14 year old daughter. The qualifying aggravating
circumstances of minority and relationship were stated in the information. Trial ensued with
the RTC finding him guilty of the said crime. The same was affirmed on appeal. In this
petition, appellant contends that the court erred in convicting him of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Is the appellant guilty of simple rape only?
HELD:
No. The appellant is guilty of qualified rape and not just simple rape. Paragraph 1
(1), Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, states
that one circumstance which qualifies or aggravates the crime of rape is when the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In the instant case, it was specifically alleged in the information that the victim was
14 years old at the time she was raped by appellant. It was also categorically alleged therein
that accused-appellant is her father. In proving the minority of the victim at the time she was
raped, the prosecution presented the certified true copy of the victims birth certificate,
showing that she was 14 years old when she was raped by appellant. As regards her paternal
relation with appellant, the prosecution submitted the same certified true copy of AAA's birth
certificate naming appellant as her father. The prosecution also submitted the marriage
contract of appellant and the victims mother which stated that they were legally married.
Moreover, the victim testified that appellant was her father, and significantly, appellant
admitted that that the victim is his daughter; was a minor at the time she was raped; and that
the victims mother is his legal wife.
STATUTORY RAPE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO CARPIO
G.R. No. 170840 November 29, 2006
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
Two informations charged the appellant with two counts of statutory rape committed
against AAA, his grandniece. The sexual assault on AAA began sometime in 1991, when the
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child was nine (9) years old. Around after lunch on the day she was raped, the appellant
summoned AAA from her home to remove his earwax. He brought her to a nipa hut, about
only six (6) meters away from his house. After removing the earwax of appellant, he brought
her to the room of his house. The appellant locked the door, lay the victim on the bed and
undressed her. Thereafter, he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA.
BBB, mother of AAA, testified that her kumadre told her that she saw appellant
kissing AAA. When she confronted her daughter, the latter told her everything. The following
day, BBB took AAA to the Doa Gregoria Memorial Hospital. The medical examination
conducted on AAA revealed that AAA's genetalia bore reddish discoloration, with "old
hymenal lacerations at 9 and 3:00 o'clock positions." Dr. Elflida Bautista (Dr. Bautista), who
examined AAA, testified that she examined AAA when the child was just eleven (11) years
old and found old lacerations of the hymen which could have been obtained two (2) months
to two (2) years prior to the examination. Dr. Bautista opined that the two lacerations she
found on the hymen of AAA are not normal to an 11-year old child whose hymen should still
be intact.
ISSUE:
Was statutory rape sufficiently proved?
HELD:
Yes. The medical certificate and testimony of Dr. Bautista corroborate AAA's
allegations of rape. Dr. Bautista found two old hymenal lacerations at 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock
positions in her examination of AAA. The rupture of AAA's hymen, she explained, was
caused by the insertion of a hard object, possibly an erect human penis.
What is material is that all the elements of statutory rape have been properly alleged
and adequately proved in this case. In statutory rape, only two elements need to be
established: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party; and (2) that the
offended party was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the sexual assault. Force or
intimidation, not being an essential element of the crime, need not be proven.
QUALIFIED THEFT
LORBE REBUCAN BALTAZAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164545 November 20, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as a saleslady of Thumbelina Books and Office Supplies
(TBOS) owned by private complainant Grazia Athena Zaulda. She was later promoted
therein as a cashier. While private complainant was inspecting the operations of TBOS, she
noticed that her employees used the sheets of paper containing the lists and computations of
purchases as wrappers for the rolled cartolina paper and Manila paper merchandises of
TBOS. Out of curiosity, private complainant took one of the lists dated 27 February 1994 and
computed the figures/purchases stated therein. To her shock and disbelief, she discovered that
the computation/addition in one of the columns under the name "Bhing" (the nickname of
petitioner) was understated. She removed the other lists from the stocks of rolled cartolina
paper and Manila paper and examined the same. Again, she found that the computations in
some of the columns under the name "Bhing" were understated. When confronted, petitioner
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trembled and told her in their native dialect, "Whatever the amount is, I will pay. Private
complainant asked petitioner to elaborate on the understatements in the listings but the latter
did not say a word. Hence, she told petitioner to take a vacation. More understated listings
were found under the nickname of petitioner. When the petitioner arrived at the TBOS, she
showed to her the understated lists but the latter merely looked at it and kept her silence. She
told the petitioner that her employment was already terminated. Thereafter, she filed a
complaint for 72 counts of qualified theft against petitioner.
The RTC found petitioner guilty of 13 counts of qualified theft. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC. The modifications pertain only to the
penalties imposed by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
Yes. During the trial, all of the witnesses for the prosecution testified under oath that
the understatement of the figures in the lists were made by the petitioner since they are all
very familiar with her handwriting as they were co-employees for many years. Moreover, a
closer examination of the lists reveals that the handwritten understated figures are uniform
and consistent. Petitioner admitted that, as the former cashier of TBOS, she wrote and
computed the understated figures in the lists. Although she claimed that there were
insertions/alterations in the lists, she failed to point out or identify such during the trial.
Based on Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of theft may be
deduced as follows: 1. That there be taking of personal property; 2. That said property
belongs to another; 3. That the taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and 5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Relatively, Article 310 of the
same Code states that the crime of theft becomes qualified when it is, among others,
committed with grave abuse of confidence. The elements of theft as well as the circumstances
that made the same as qualified theft were sufficiently established by the prosecution.
ROBBERY WITH RAPE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO SUYU
G.R. No. 170191 August 16, 2006
Justice Callejo
FACTS:
At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a third-year
student of St. Paul University, was with her boyfriend, William Ferrer. They were eating
snacks inside a pick-up truck parked in a vacant lot. Suddenly, a man, who turned out to be
Rommel Macarubbo, appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them and said: "This is a
holdup. If you will start the engine of the car, I will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who
turned out to be Willy Suyu, lifted the lock on William's side and entered the pick-up. Willy
Suyu then took Ferrer's wallet which contained around P150.00. A third man, who turned out
to be Francis Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry valued at around P2, 500.00 and cash
amounting to P10.00. Thereafter, Willy Suyu clubbed William and dragged him out of the
truck. Fortunately, William was able to escape and immediately went to the police station to
report the incident. Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of the pick-up truck at Clarissa's
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side. Macarubbo then opened the door. The two and Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place,
not far away. Macarubbo and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan
knife at her. There, they ravished her.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed?
HELD:
Robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
RPC. While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she
was raped after the robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon
for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what really transpired.
Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an
indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was
unreasonable and unexplained.
Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan does not
conclusively suggest that Clarissa was raped, for during the examination, her deportment was
not of that of a rape victim and the examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible
assault.The said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which are usually
inflicted when there is complete penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape
as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes
place. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is deemed
consummated in either case. Dr. Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the
victim, which bolsters Clarissa's recount that she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped.
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The intent to rob must precede
the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is
accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the
robbery. There is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes
committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a
single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN CABBAB, JR.
G.R. No. 173479 July 12, 2007
Justice Garcia
FACTS:
Appellant was charged along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, with the
crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery committed with treachery,
evident premeditation, with intent to kill and intent to gain. The prosecution alleges that
father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe
Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, attended a "fiesta" celebration, but it was
already over when they got there. On their way home, they were met by accused-appellant
Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the game
of "russian poker." Winner Agbulos won the game. While walking on their way home, PO
William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava
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fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Calpito and a companion running up a hill.
Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then
walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a
canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-appellant. PO William Belmes
ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the group, and
informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by accused-
appellant and Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead
body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The
three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the
crime where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was
Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who ambushed them and took the money, estimated at
P12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was
brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day.
The Trial Court acquitted Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two
crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. The CA modified the
trial court's decision and found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed
appellant's conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted
murder.
ISSUE:
What crime did appellant commit?
HELD:
Robbery with Homicide. To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
(a)the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(b)the property taken belongs to another; (c)the taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animo lucrandi; and (d)by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed.
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by
mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two
or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. In
pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his
companion, Eddie Quindasan.
However, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate
crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or
attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is
absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that
remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed
in connection with the robbery.
KIDNAPPING
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL CENAHONON
G.R. No. 169962 July 12, 2007
Justice Nachura
FACTS:
On November 25, 1999, around 9:00 a.m., Jometh Magaway (Magaway), the driver
of spouses Fortunato and Daisy Medina, was driving out of the Medina residence in BF
Homes, Paraaque City, to bring the couple's four-year-old son, Kenneth, to school. A man,
later identified as Erdaje, suddenly approached, poked a gun at Magaway, opened the vehicle
door, and told Magaway to move over from the driver's seat. Magaway followed and sat with
Kenneth at the front passenger seat. Erdaje's companion, later identified as Cenahonon,
occupied the back seat. Erdaje handed the gun to Cenahonon, who poked it at Magaway from
behind. Erdaje then drove the car away.
The maid of the Medinas, who saw the incident, immediately reported to Fortunato,
then descending from the house, what happened. Fortunato tried to intercept the CRV at the
village gate, but failed. He returned home and called Daisy at their office in Alabang,
Muntinlupa City. He told her about the incident and instructed her to call the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). He, in turn, called the Paraaque City Police
Department.
Meanwhile, inside the CRV, both accused informed Magaway that they would call the
Medina family to demand a P5 million ransom. Upon reaching Las Pias City, the former
ordered Magaway to alight.
Magaway proceeded to Medina's office in Alabang and related to Daisy how Kenneth
was abducted. Daisy instructed Magaway to return to the Medina residence where the
Paraaque Police and the PAOCTF men were waiting.
Around 1:00 p.m. that day, somebody called the Medina residence and talked to
Fortunato. A speaker phone was used so everyone in the house heard the telephone
conversation. The caller demanded P5,000,000.00 for Kenneth's release. A PAOCTF member
instructed Fortunato to negotiate. The caller made several calls that same afternoon to
negotiate for the ransom. Fortunately the culprits were later apprehended and Kenneth was
rescued.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed?
HELD:
Kidnapping for ransom was committed. The elements of kidnapping for ransom
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 warranting the
imposition of the death penalty, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive
the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of
the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. Neither actual demand
for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient
that the deprivation of liberty was for extorting ransom even if none of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration. Based on the
evidence proven during trial and as above discussed, the elements of the crime were present.
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UNJUST VEXATION
RENATO BALEROS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 138033 January 30, 2007
Justice Garcia
FACTS:
At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila,
the accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of
cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, tried to rape the victim by lying on top of her
with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance,
said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Renato Baleros, Jr. moved for a partial reconsideration of a SC decision acquitting

him of the crime of attempted rape but adjudging him guilty of light coercion. It is Baleros'
submission that his conviction for light coercion under an Information for attempted rape,
runs counter to the en banc ruling in People v. Contreras where the Court held: The SOLGEN
contends that Contreras should be held liable for unjust vexation under Art. 287(2) of the
RPC. However, the elements of unjust vexation do not form part of the crime of rape as
defined in Art. 335. Moreover, the circumstances stated in the information do not constitute
the elements of the said crime. Contreras, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjust vexation.
ISSUE:
Whether Renato Baleros, Jr. is guilty of unjust vexation.
HELD:
Yes. He argues that the Information against him does not allege that the act of
covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and disturbance. The SC wish to stress that malice,
compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust
vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the
term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
The paramount question in a prosecution for unjust vexation is whether the offender's
act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident cried while relating to her classmates
what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape
proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the Baleros.
ESTAFA
MIGUEL COSME, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149753 November 27, 2006
FACTS:
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Judith Rodriguez and the private complainant, Paul Bunda, entered into a
Memorandum Agreement concerning lots nos. 1 and 2 situated at Barrio Almanza, Las Pias,
Metro Manila. Under the agreement, Judith agreed to assign and convey 40% of the
aforementioned lots in favor of the complainant as consideration for the payment by the latter
of the accrued real estate taxes on the property. The complainant then visited the property
and, for the first time, met the accused who represented himself as the overseer of the
property where he also resided. Subsequently, the complainant and the accused met at the
Aurelio Hotel on Roxas Blvd., Manila and the accused convinced the complainant to entrust
to him Two Million Pesos for the payment of the accrued real estate taxes on the property,
telling the complainant that he was a nephew of the then incumbent mayor of Las Pias and
had good connections with the Mayor's Office as well as with the Offices of the Treasurer
and of the Assessor of Las Pias. The complainant again met the accused in 2 different
occasions and gave to the latter a total of P200, 000.00. Both payments were unreceipted.
When the accused failed to comply, information for estafa was filed against the
former. Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, RTC rendered its
decision convicting the accused with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed the case to the CA. The latter found petitioner guilty
of Estafa as defined under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) as ruled by the CA.
HELD:
No. As correctly enumerated by the CA, the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as
defined under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud; (3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) that as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.
The CA ruled that the deceit employed by petitioner consisted in his act of
pretending "that he had the authority and capability to cover the payment of the realty taxes
for he is influential in Las Pias and has connections with the Assessor's & Treasurer's
Offices being an alleged nephew of then incumbent Mayor Casimiro of Las Pias City."
However, a reading of the Information filed against petitioner shows that while it
contains conclusions that petitioner committed fraud against private complainant, there are no
allegations indicating specific acts which constitute fraud as contemplated under Article 315
(2) (a) of the RPC, more particularly petitioner's alleged act of falsely pretending that he had
the needed connections to settle the realty taxes due on the subject property.
In People v. Almendral, the Court held thus: The information filed against an accused
is intended to inform him of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately
prepare his defense. It is thus textbook doctrine that an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. It must embody the
essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have
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a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for
and undertake his defense.
In the present case, the Information filed against petitioner did not specify the alleged
fraudulent acts or false pretenses that supposedly induced private complainant to part with his
money. Hence, petitioner may not be convicted of Estafa as defined under Article 315 (2) (a)
of the RPC since the prosecution failed to allege the essential elements of this kind of
offense.
However, the RTC correctly found that petitioner has been properly charged with
estafa as defined under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC. In Lee v. People, this Court held that
the elements of Estafa by conversion or misappropriation as defined under Article 315 (1) (b)
of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his
part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another.
Clearly, the aforequoted Information filed by the prosecution against petitioner was
able to allege all the essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
ALFONSO FIRAZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 154721 March 22, 2007
Justice Carpio
FACTS:
Henry Samar, Jr. (private complainant) was the owner of a parcel land located in
Peafrancia, Daraga, Albay. In an agreement dated 13 May 1994, private complainant sold
the land to Alfonzo Firaza to be paid on several occasion. When private complainant
presented PNB Check No. 395532-S for payment, the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
dishonored the check by reason of account closed. Meanwhile, petitioner subdivided the
land, sold the subdivided lots, and retained the unsold lots.
Despite verbal and written demands for the payment of the value of the check,
petitioner failed to pay the amount of the dishonored check. Thus, private complainant
charged petitioner with estafa for violation of paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the revised
Penal Code.
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. After due trial, the
trial court convicted petitioner and ruled that petitioner knew t the time of the issuance of the
check that it was not funded. The trial court did not accept petitioners defense that the
private complainant knew that said check was not funded and that the same was issued only
as a guaranty for the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the land.
Upon appeal, the decision was appealed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present
case.
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ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is guilty of estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Articled 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
The elements of estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the RPC are the
following:
1. Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued;
2. Lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
3. Damage to payee.
All the elements are present in this case. Petitioner issued PNB Check No. 395532-S
to obtain the title of the land from private complainant. As found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner issued the check to induce private complainant to execute the deed of sale in his
favor. Petitioners claim that private complainant knew that the checks did not have sufficient
funds was denied by private complainant who testified that he was informed that petitioners
account was in good standing and that there were sufficient funds for the postdated checks
issued. It was established that private complainant would not have parted with his property if
he knew that the checks were not funded. The damage suffered by private complainant had
also been established. Private complainant had already transferred the title to the property to
petitioner who subsequently subdivided the land and started selling the subdivided portions
of the land. Yet, despite several demands, petitioner failed to pay the value of the dishonored
check.
LIBEL
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. MANUEL M. SERRANO
G.R. No. 163255 June 22, 2007.
Chief Justice Puno
FACTS:
In June 1987, respondent Manuel M. Serrano bought from petitioner Insular Life
Assurance Company, Limited, a life insurance policy called "Diamond Jubilee, Participating"
on his understanding that he shall be paying premiums for seven (7) years only. Dividend
accumulations and earned interests were to be applied to subsequent premium payments.
Respondent obtained six Diamond Jubilee Life Insurance policies, and religiously paid the
premiums.
In early 1996, respondent was informed by his accountant that he had been paying
premiums on some of his policies even beyond the seven-year period of their effectivity.
Consequently, respondent wrote a letter to Atty. Ernesto G. Montalban, petitioner's Senior
Vice President, Sales Operations Group, requesting that the overpayments be applied as
premium payments of his other policies which have not reached the seven-year period. The
request was denied on the ground that the self-liquidating option of the policies was not
guaranteed because it was based on dividends which vary. Atty. Montalban, however, assured
respondent that some of his policies will self-liquidate but only on specific dates. On October
8 and 11, 1996, respondent caused a notice to be published in the Manila Bulletin, viz:
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URGENT NOTICE TO ALL INSULAR LIFE DIAMOND JUBILEE POLICY-

HOLDERS IF YOU ARE A VICTIM OF INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE'S
REFUSAL TO HONOR ITS REPRESENTATION THAT YOUR POLICY
BECOMES SELF-LIQUIDATING AFTER A LAPSE OF SEVEN (7) YEARS,
PLEASE ATTEND A SPECIAL MEETING OF SIMILARLY SITUATED POLICY
HOLDERS AND CO-OWNERS OF INSULAR LIFE ON OCTOBER 16, 1996,
2:00 P.M. AT THE MAKATI SPORTS CLUB, ALFARO ST., SALCEDO
VILLAGE, MAKATI, TO CONSIDER COLLECTIVE ACTION TO PROTECT
YOUR INTERESTS. RSVP CALL MRS. VILLAROYA OR MRS. CARIAGA
AT 817-22-35 OR 816-25-64
In addition, respondent filed on December 11, 1996 a civil case for specific
performance, sum of money, and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
against petitioner and some of its officers. In turn, petitioner filed in May 1997 a complaint
for libel against respondent before the City Prosecution Office of Makati City. On October 6,
1997, the City Prosecutor of Makati dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of probable
cause, ruling that there was no defamatory imputation, and no malice in the publication.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner sought a review before the
Secretary of Justice. On April 18, 2002, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint for lack of probable cause. Petitioner assailed the ruling before the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari which was dismissed. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Was there probable cause for respondent to be charged with libel?
HELD:
No. The City Prosecutor dismissed petitioner's complaint for libel because two
elements of the crime were missing, defamatory imputation and malice. Under Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be held liable for the crime if the following
elements concur, viz: (1) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another,
(2) publication of the charge, (3) identity of the person defamed, and (4) existence of malice.
In determining whether there was prima facie case for libel against respondent,
the City Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice viewed the subject article in its entirety, and
considered the same as a mere notice of meeting addressed to Diamond Jubilee
policyholders. The words "victim" and "refusal to honor its representation," although used in
the notice, were dismissed as not defamatory per se. Mere assertion that a person failed or
refused to perform a contractual obligation does not, in and of itself, injure that person's
business reputation or deprive him of public confidence. Whatever defamatory interpretation
of which the subject notice may have been susceptible of was considered debunked by the
good faith that motivated the respondent in causing the publication of the notice, i.e., to
redress what he considered to be a violation of his rights and those of others similarly situated
as himself. Respondent's action was considered inconsistent with "malice" which is
characterized by a reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of one's remarks.
GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. vs. JESUS G. BUSTOS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006
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Justice Garcia
FACTS:
A libel complaint was filed against GMA NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey
Vidal. The issue started from the Petition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessful examinees
of the physicians licensure examinations before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and
the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged,
mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test
questions vitiated the results of the examinations.
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news
from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the
mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the
news coverage for the ten o'clock evening news edition of GMA's Channel 7 Headline News,
quoting thereof the allegations of the unsuccessful examiners that the gross, massive,
haphazard, whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should
now be stopped once and for all. Simultaneous with the news, was an old video footage
showing physicians wearing black armbands.
Along these lines, respondents claimed that the said report was false, malicious and
one-sided. Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them
by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7.
They added that, the showing of the unrelated old footage was done purposely so as to make
a forceful impact on their audience making it appear that other doctors were supporting and
sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees.
In defense of the alleged libel, GMA Network argued that the same was but a
privileged communication.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication
2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and the used of video footage were
libelous
HELD:
1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in
the said Petition for Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the same fall within
the protected ambit of privileged communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for
damages claimed by respondents for simply bringing to fore information on subjects of
public concern.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are

not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged
communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion
provides an absolute bar to the action. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally
privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance
is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of
privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided
the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs
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"private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling
under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of
conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the
speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of
public interest.The news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged
matter.
2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the ambit of privileged
communication. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the
presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged.
Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video constitute malice on the part of the
petitioners. Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying character-generated words "file
video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of
televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the
phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not
to confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use of file
footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice." the absence of the accompanying
character-generated words "file video" would not nevertheless, change the legal situation
insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. In
view of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without
accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing
derogatory in nature.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125813 February 6, 2007
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
An Information for Libel was filed before the RTC of Manila against private
respondents Baskinas and Manapat, with petitioner Francisco Chavez as the complainant.
Private respondents moved to quash the Information and the warrants of arrest which
was denied by the RTC. Private respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA,
which was granted holding that the fact that the Information against private respondents
states that the libelous matter was "caused to be published in Smart File, a magazine of
general circulation in Manila." CA held that the Information failed to allege where the written
defamation was "printed and first published," an allegation sine qua non "if the circumstances
as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the
publication." The Information, it was noted, did not indicate that the libelous articles were
printed or first published in Manila, or that petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the
publication of the articles.
The CA further observed that even during the preliminary investigation, private
respondents had already interposed that Smart File was actually printed and first published in
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the City of Makati, and that the address of the publisher Animal Farms Publication as
indicated in the editorial page of the publication itself was a post office box with the Makati
Central Post Office.
ISSUE:
Does the subject information sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the Manila trial courts to
hear the libel charge, in consonance with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
NO. The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the

criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided
at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time
of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not
that they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where
Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed.
The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish
that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national
dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation
in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.
Petitioner does submit that there is no need to employ the clause "printed and first
published" in indicating where the crime of libel was committed, as the term "publish" is
"generic and within the general context of the term 'print' in so far as the latter term is utilized
to refer to the physical act of producing the publication." Where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in

Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no
impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general
circulation.
If this disquisition impresses an unduly formalistic reading of the Information at

hand, it should be reiterated that the flaws in the Information strike at the very heart of the
jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Article 360 states, in as unequivocal a manner as possible, that the
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criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed with the court of the province or city "where
the libelous article is printed and first published, or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense." If the Information for libel does not
establish with particularity any of these two venue requirements, the trial court would have
no jurisdiction to hear the criminal case.
R.A. 3019: ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO
G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007
FACTS:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee)
which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and
recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61

expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-
performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. Among the accounts referred to the
Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII
and PNB. After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest
because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner
alleges that respondents violated the provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo

recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of
probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman
Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999,
which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999. Petitioner elevated the case
to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
offense leveled against respondents has prescribed.
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious. Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
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discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the ground of prescription. Respondents
members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation
of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
increased the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years. The applicable law in the
computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended.In cases
involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved
party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were
made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the
offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Behest Loans. As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of
Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. Records show that the act complained of
was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April
5, 1995, or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint
was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
SANTOS NACAYTUNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171144 November 24, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna, who was then Municipal Mayor of San Miguel,
Surigao del Sur appointed his wife, the private complainant Marydole V. Nacaytuna as
Municipal Health Officer. In the course of her employment, Marydole drafted a letter of
resignation dated April 7, 2000 which petitioner purportedly received on even date. In May
2001, Marydole left the conjugal home and lived separately from petitioner. Sometime in
April 2002, a certain Marly Prieto informed Marydole that petitioner has accepted her
resignation effective at the end of April 2002. Marydole questioned the acceptance of her
resignation before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Office of the Ombudsman
claiming that she never tendered the resignation letter to which the CSC declared the
acceptance of Marydole's resignation illegal. With the recommendation of the Ombudsman,
an information was filed against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Sandiganbayan found Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating

Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as charged, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
HELD:
Yes. Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:
1.)The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private

persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2.) The public officer committed the prohibited act
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during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position; 3.) The public
officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4.)His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.
Petitioner, as Municipal Mayor, was a public officer. His acceptance of Marydole's

resignation was done in the performance of his official duty. It was also proved that Marydole
never tendered the resignation letter hence petitioner was evidently acting in bad faith when
he made it appear that it was submitted. Worse, he accepted the same knowing that it was
never tendered in the first place. Petitioner's actuations caused undue injury to Marydole
because it resulted to her removal from office and the withholding of her salaries.
Resignation is the "act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his
office and renounces the further right to use it. It implies an expression of the incumbent in
some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the
office and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority." To constitute a complete and
operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of
the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
In the instant case, the intention to relinquish and the act of relinquishment are clearly
absent. While Marydole admits having written and prepared the resignation letter dated April
7, 2000, the evidence shows that she did not actually tender the same and refrained from
pursuing her intention to resign.
As observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's account of how he received the

resignation letter is rife with inconsistencies. Before the CSC, he claimed that Marydole's
resignation letter "reached him not through the normal course of transmitting written
communications" because protocol is not strictly observed between them as husband and
wife.
Otherwise he could have just asked the complainant if she was resigning or not, but
he failed to do so. Such failure and his belated acceptance of the complainant's untendered
resignation, which may have been motivated by their apparent marital problems, are clear
indications of evident bad faith.
VENANCIO R. NAVA vs. RODOLFO G. PALATTAO

G.R. No. 160211 August 28, 2006.
Chief Justice Panganiban
FACTS:
In the Audit Report prepared by COA Regional Office, the amount of P603,265.00
was shown to have been released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to
the newly nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the initiative of
accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was called among his seven (7) schools division
superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of
Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the
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allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the nationalized high schools for the
improvement of their facilities, accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools
division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities
for the calendar year 1990.
In the purchase of SLTD's, the provision on the conduct of a public bidding was not
followed. Instead the purchase was done through negotiation. The items were purchased from
two stores in Metro Manila. As disclosed by the audit report, the prices of the [SLTDs] as
purchased from the above-named sellers exceeded the prevailing market price ranging from
56% to 1,175% based on the mathematical computation done by the COA audit team. The
report concluded that the government lost P380,013.60.
Nava was charged with the of crime of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act particularly Section 3(g) thereof, or entering on behalf of government in any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same whether or not the
pubic officer profited or will profit thereby. The Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty as
charged.
ISSUE:
Is Nava guilty of the crime for which he was convicted?
HELD:
Yes. To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be
clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the
evidence presented warranted a verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who
approved the transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial
loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the
samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury. Indeed, the
discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
It must be emphasized however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of
an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No.
3019, Section 3(g); namely, that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the governmentLack of public bidding alone does not result in a
manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the
government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to
graft and corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest
and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government.
R.A. 9165: COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

Illegal Possession
ANDY QUELNAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 150917 September 27, 2006.
Justice Tinga
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FACTS:
A team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) went to the Cityland Condominium in
Makati to implement a search warrant. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office
of said building to seek assistance in serving a warrant. Security Officer Celedonio Punsaran
(Punsaran) accompanied the group and they proceeded to Unit 615.
At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door. He was
later identified as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to petitioner. Upon
entry, the police operatives searched the unit, which was composed of a small room with a
plywood divider separating the sala from the bedroom. In the presence of petitioner and
Punsaran, the group started searching the place and eventually found on top of the bedroom
table three (3) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances
later confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu,
plastic tubings, weighing scales, an improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic sachets.
Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of the properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly
Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their presence and that of Punsaran. Petitioner was
arrested and subsequently charged in court.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of the crime for which he was convicted?
HELD:
Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b)
the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess the drug. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and
dominion, as well as the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the
existence and character of the drug in the place where he exercises dominion and control is
an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the
house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in
the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the
bedroom of the subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the
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only person in said premises. Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching team in the
subject premises, appellant was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court
correctly concluded, only "indicates extreme familiarity and gives the impression of he being
at home" in the premises, of which he was the registered owner.
Illegal Sale
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO ORTEZA

G.R. No. 173051 July 31, 2007
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
The information charged appellant with illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. In the course of the trial, the prosecution alleged that a
team comprised of police officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend
suspected drug peddlers. The suspects have previously been under a week-long surveillance
after the police officers received reports about their illegal activities. The appointed poseur-
buyer SPO1 Ramos, together with the informant, approached the two (2) suspects Leng Leng
and Buboy while the back-up team positioned itself nearby. SPO1 Ramos purchased one (1)
sachet of shabu for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) from Buboy. Then, SPO1 Ramos gave the
pre-arranged signal. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the scene and placed the two
(2) suspects under arrest. After a body search, the marked money was recovered from Buboy
and another sachet of shabu was confiscated from Leng Leng. Thereafter, the suspects were
brought to Camp Macabulos where Buboy identified himself as Gerardo Orteza. Later upon
examination, Engr. Marcene Agala of the Regional Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, confirmed that the two (2) sachets recovered from the scene were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
ISSUE:
Is the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer fatal to this case?
HELD:
Yes. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be
proven: (a) that the transaction or sale took place; (b) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was
presented as evidence; and (c) that the buyer and seller were identified. What is material is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the
entrapping officers and the accused.
The Court believes that the prosecution was not able to establish with certainty all the
elements necessary for the conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu.
First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with
the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any
apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should,
immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
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Secondly, the Court observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer
who had personal knowledge of the transaction. In this case, though, after the poseur-buyer,
SPO1 Ramos, failed to appear in court despite having been subpoenaed six (6) times, the
prosecution did not even bother to offer any explanation for his non-appearance considering
that he, a police officer, was no different from the other witnesses who were presented in the
end by the prosecution. In Ramos's place, the prosecution presented two other police officers,
who although members of the back-up team of the buy-bust operation were, in the Court's
view, not reliable eyewitnesses to the transaction.
Moreover, the testimonies of the two police officers did not include any positive
face-to-face identification in open court of appellant as the seller of shabu, an aspect which
was crucial to establish appellant's role in the alleged transaction. As such, the testimony of
the poseur-buyer, in this case Ramos, was pivotal as only he could testify on what had really
transpired during the moment of the alleged sale of shabu. His non-presentation in this case
was fatal, absent any explanation for his non-appearance and reliable eyewitness who could
testify in his place.
Buy-Bust Operation
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDO F. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 170234 February 8, 2007
FACTS:
In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo
Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, for allegedly having sold one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.42
gram of white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco.
During trial, the prosecution testified that the accused was caught in a buy-bust
operation conducted by the team of PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, PO2 Montefalcon, PO2 Orig
and SPO2 Zipagan through the information given by a confidential informant, who went with
the said team during the operation. Accused, however, refuted said claims, saying that: 1)
there was no buy-bust operation and that the shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride)
allegedly sold by him to the poseur buyer was planted evidence; and 2) the trumped-up
charge is a way of getting even with him because he, together with his wife, had filed a case
before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for grave misconduct against several
policemen (PO2 Joel Tapec, PO1 Christopher Semana and five John Does) assigned at the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing their
house on 5 February 2002.
In support of his first argument, accused claimed that the non-conduct of a

surveillance and the absence of any agreement as regards the money to be used in buying the
shabu and as regards the signal to inform the back-up policemen that the transaction has been
consummated shows that there is so much doubt as to the existence of a buy-bust operation.
After trial, the lower court decided convicting the accused. The Court of Appeals then
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affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Are the non-conduct of surveillance and the absence of any agreement as regards the
money to be used in buying the shabu and as regards the signal to inform the back-up
policemen that the transaction has been consummated essential to establish the existence of a
buy-bust operation?
HELD:
No. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-
bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of
effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is
not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant
during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. In the case at bar, the buy-
bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the
informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.
The fact that the team leader and the other members of the team did not discuss or
talk about the marked money does not necessarily mean that there was no buy-bust operation.
As explained by SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2 Damasco was the designated poseur buyer it was
the latter's discretion as to how to prepare the marked money. It is not required that all the
members of the buy-bust team know how the marked money is to be produced and marked
inasmuch as they have their respective roles to perform in the operation. As this Court sees it,
the other members of the team left the matter of the marked money to one person the
poseur buyer because it was he who was to deal directly with the drug pusher.
As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal, same is not fatal to the cause of the
prosecution. The employment of a pre-arranged signal, or the lack of it, is not indispensable
in a buy-bust operation. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is
proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Law. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs
are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. In the case under
consideration, all these elements have been established.
B.P. 22: BOUNCING CHECK LAW

ISMAEL F. MEJIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149937 June 21, 2007
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez
:
FACTS:
Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. was a client of Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, petitioner. Sometime
in January 1985, Bernardo requested petitioner to pay his real estate taxes. Bernardo then
delivered to petitioner a blank check. Petitioner wrote the amount of P27,700.00 with his
name as payee. Thereafter, he encashed the check. On March 14, 1985, petitioner furnished
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Bernardo a statement of account showing that only P17,700.00 was actually spent for realty
taxes. Petitioner explained that he spent the remaining P10,000.00 for the hospitalization of
his wife. Both parties treated this amount of P10,000.00 as petitioner's loan. Thereupon,
petitioner requested Bernardo to lend him an additional amount of P40,000.00 as he needed
the money for his wife's medication. Bernardo agreed and gave P40,000.00 more to
petitioner. To secure the payment of his P50,000.00 loan, petitioner issued Philippine
National Bank (PNB) Check No. 156919 dated May 15, 1985 in the amount of P50,000.00 in
favor of Bernardo. Petitioner also handed to Bernardo a Promissory Note, also of the same
date, stating that he will pay the loan on or before May 15, 1985.
When the check became due and demandable, petitioner requested Bernardo not to
encash it until July 15, 1985. But petitioner failed to pay on that day. Instead, he asked
Bernardo again to defer the encashment of the check. On October 8, 1985, Bernardo
deposited the check but it was dishonored by the PNB, the drawee bank, due to petitioner's
closed account. Bernardo then sent petitioner a letter informing him that the check was
dishonored and demanding payment therefor. But petitioner refused to pay. He then delivered
a list of his attorney's fees to Bernardo which the latter did not pay. Thus, the petitioner was
charged with the violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) to which the trial court and the
Court of Appeals held him guilty, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. 22.
HELD:
For violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The trial court found that petitioner issued the check as guarantee for his loan
obtained from Bernardo. At the time he issued the check, he knew that his account with the
PNB had been closed. When Bernardo deposited the check, it was dishonored by the PNB,
the drawee bank, for the reason "account closed." Petitioner was duly notified of such
dishonor. In fact, he admitted having received Bernardo's demand letter urging him to make
good the check within five (5) banking days from notice. But petitioner failed to heed such
demand.
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a
bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to
its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in
banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
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R.A. 7610: SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,

EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR
G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
An information for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610
was filed against appellant Simplicio Delantar y Redondo. The testimony of AAA shows that
appellant procured her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the first, an Arab national
named Mr. Hammond and the second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos. AAA testified that
she was brought to the first client at least eleven (11) times between the period 1994 to June
1996. Once left alone with AAA, the client would perform lascivious acts on AAA, the
recurrent salient points of her harrowing experience revolved around the client's kissing her,
touching her breasts, embracing her, and inserting his finger in her private parts. After their
first visit to the client, AAA told appellant that she did not want to go back because the client
was "bastos." Appellant promised her that they would no longer go back but the promise was
broken as they went back a few more times.
As with the first client, appellant would tell AAA that they had to go to the second
client because they had obligations to pay. During each of these visits, the client would give
AAA money ranging from P2,000.00 to P10,000.00. The details of what transpired when
AAA was left alone with the second client were vividly recounted in People v. Jalosjos,
where the second client was convicted of two (2) counts of rape and six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness, all committed against AAA on various dates.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation
of Section 5 (a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610. On appeal, the CA
found the appellant guilty of only one count of violation of Section 5 (a), paragraphs 1, 4 and
5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE:
Was the accused guilty for violation of R.A. No. 7610?
HELD:
Yes. There is no doubt, drawing from the evidence, that AAA was a child who was
exploited in prostitution as defined in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The law
punishes not only the person who commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with the child but also those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child
prostitution. Appellant is one such person. Appellant, in his brief, does not deny that he
brought AAA to the clients. He, however, attempts to exculpate himself by stating that he did
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not coerce or influence AAA to go to the two clients to be exploited in prostitution. Verily, it
was against AAA's will and consent to see the two clients. But even if AAA had in fact
consented, appellant may still be prosecuted for child prostitution under Section 5, Article III
of R.A. No. 7610 because the child's consent or lack of it is not an element of the offense.
CLEMENT JOHN FERDINAND M. NAVARRETE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

G.R. No. 147913 January 31, 2007
Justice Corona
FACTS:
The facts show that BBB, who was at that time five years old, and petitioner were
neighbors. On October 30, 1995, at around past 9:00 in the evening, BBB went to petitioner's
house to watch television, which was something she often did. Only petitioner and BBB
were there that night. BBB testified that it was on this occasion that petitioner sexually
abused her.
The next day, on October 31, 1995, Dr. Noel Minay, medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation, examined BBB. He found that her maidenhead was short,
intact and had a narrow opening at 0.3 cm. in diameter. He concluded that these findings
precluded complete penetration by an average-sized Filipino male organ in full erection.
Testifying in his own behalf, petitioner denied the accusation against him and claimed
that the childs mother, AAA merely concocted the charge against him. He alleged that she
had ill feelings against his mother who she thought had something to do with the separation
of her (AAA's) son from the Philippine Postal Corporation. He also posited that she resented
the Navarretes' refusal to allow her to place a "jumper" on their electrical connection.
The RTC convicted petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act).
Petitioner insists that Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 refers only to those who commit the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution and
argues that this does not apply in this case since the victim is not a child exploited in
prostitution.
ISSUE:
Can the accused be convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610: Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
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abuseThose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended], for rape or lascivious
conduct as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Under this provision, when the victim is under 12 years old, the accused shall be
prosecuted under either Article 335 (for rape) or Article 336 (for acts of lasciviousness) of the
RPC. Accordingly, although an accused is charged in the information with the crime of
statutory rape (i.e., carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age), the offender
can be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, which is included in rape.
In People v. Larin (and reiterated in several subsequent cases), we emphasized that

the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which
a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of
Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of RA 7610 shows that it
applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Here, BBB was sexually
abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner (who poked her neck with a
knife) to indulge in lascivious conduct.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS

ANGEL CELINO, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007
Justice Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed before the RTC charging petitioner with
violation of the gunban and illegal possession of firearms. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms (R.A. 8294) . . . if
he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun
ban under the same set of facts. The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground
that "the other offense charged . . . is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 . . . ."
The denial was affirmed on appeal. Hence this petition, where petitioner contends that the
mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE:
Did the court err in denying the Motion to Quash?
HELD:
No. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the
intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no
showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. Consequently, the
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proviso does not yet apply.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294,
any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal
possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either
considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element
of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Conversely, when the other
offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for
illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
P.D. 705: FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

RODOLFO TIGOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 144640. June 26, 2006
Justice Azcuna
FACTS:
Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986,
was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his
intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del
Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and
Bertodazo.
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and
petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy to bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del
Norte. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the
construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang
and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o'clock in the morning
the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were
half-covered with canvas.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, the Ozamis City police received a report that
two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, did not stop at the checkpoint. Thus, some
police officers boarded their patrol vehicle to intercept the two trucks. Upon inspection, the
police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks. The
police officers inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber but the latter could not
produce any.
After an investigation was held by the police and the DENR office in the city, an
Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy
for possession of forest products without legal permit in violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation
to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court found both Ong and Tigoy guilty. On appeal, Ong was
acquitted while Tigoys conviction was upheld.
ISSUE:
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Is Tigoy guilty of possession of forest products without permit?
HELD:
Yes. There are two ways of violating the said Section 68: 1) by cutting, gathering
and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing
timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit
which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. The appellant, Sumagang and the rest of
their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as they were
transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City. Tigoy contends that he did not
know that the truck was loaded with timber without the necessary permit. However, the
circumstances shows otherwise. Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did
they fear inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is grease
money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these
questions is that the drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber.
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by

a special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime
itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by
which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. It is not even
required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence it.
P.D. 533: ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974

ERNESTO PIL-EY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 154941. July 9, 2007
Justice Nachura
FACTS:
On April 16, 1994, private complainant Rita Khayad of Bontoc, Mt. Province
discovered that her 3-year-old white and black-spotted cow was missing. She and her
children searched for it but to no avail. She was later informed by her grandson, Ronnie
Faluyan, that in the afternoon of April 15, 1994, while the latter was with his friends, he saw
a cow similar to that of his grandmother's loaded in a blue Ford Fiera driven along the
national highway by accused Manochon. With Manochon in the Fiera was his helper,
petitioner Pil-ey. Manochon was a butcher and meat vendor. After having ascertained from
people in the market that the cow was already slaughtered, Rita reported the matter to the
police. During the confrontation between the parties, petitioner Pil-ey admitted that they were
the ones who took the cow.
Traversing the prosecution evidence, accused Manochon and Pil-eys defense was
that there was a mistake of fact when they took the wrong cow they believed belonged to
Anamot. For his part, Anamot denied having conspired with his co-accused in taking the
subject cow. He denied seeing and talking to Manochon and Pil-ey on April 15, 1994 and
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instructing them to get the cow. He stated that after the meeting on April 12, 1994, he saw his
co-accused again when they were already behind bars.
On May 27, 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC charging petitioner Ernesto
Pil-ey and his two co-accused, Constancio Manochon and Waclet Anamot, with of the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law. After trial, the trial court found the three guilty of the crime charged.
Hence, the present case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the evidence on record, petitioner is guilty of violating the
provisions of P.D. No. 533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
HELD:
Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the
consent of the owner or raiser, of any cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass or other domesticated
member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things; and it includes
the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser.
Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the concurrence of the following elements:

(1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of
the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is
done with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Considering that the gravamen
of the crime is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat or hide without the
consent of the owner or raiser, conviction for the same need only be supported by the fact of
taking without the cattle owner's consent.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Rita
Khayad's white and black-spotted cow was taken from Sitio Taed where it was grazing; that
its taking was without Rita's consent; and that the said cattle was later seen in the possession
of the petitioner and his co-accused. Thus, the foregoing elements of the crime of cattle-
rustling are present.Its takers have not offered a satisfactory explanation for their possession
of the missing bovine. It is the rule that when stolen property is found in the possession of
one, not the owner, and without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he is presumed
to be the thief. This is in consonance with the disputable presumption that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of
the whole act.
71
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SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the

LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his

MANUEL O. ORIENTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an

Lawful Performance of a Duty

RUFINO S. MAMANGUN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid

Accident without Fault or Intention of Causing it

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The

"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORATO C. BELTRAN

Accused invoked self-defense, nonetheless, he was still convicted of murder. On

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLANDO A. UBIA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA

Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS GUZMAN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEOSON E. DELA CRUZ

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial

Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecute

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable

Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to

Suspension of Sentence: P.D. 603

RENNIE DECLARADOR vs. SALVADOR GUBATON

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code.

EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY

Subsequently, petitioner demanded payment of the sums above-mentioned, but

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential

The elements of the offense are:

In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes'

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it

NESTOR A. BERNARDINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEDRO S. GIRON, ET AL. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS

1. By using force or intimidation;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND BATIANCILA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY BIDOC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL HERMOCILLA

2. No. Rape by sexual assault is punishable by reclusion temporal if committed with

ROBBERY WITH RAPE

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

Renato Baleros, Jr. moved for a partial reconsideration of a SC decision acquitting

ALFONSO FIRAZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

URGENT NOTICE TO ALL INSULAR LIFE DIAMOND JUBILEE POLICY-

GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. vs. JESUS G. BUSTOS, ET AL.

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in