Solicitor General vs.

Metropolitan Manila Authority

Facts: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West
Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the
confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by
the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became
final and executor. Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision
transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court
regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On May
24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked
or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a
resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to
be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints
against the enforcement of such ordinance.

Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in
the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national
legislature?

Held: No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the
MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void;
and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the
license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers
licenses for traffic violations within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles
governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to
be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the
 SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991) Facts: In
Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court
held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605
and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation
of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it
allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that
Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license
plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had
never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. Later, the
Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution
requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in
light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO
32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view
that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law,
specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of
license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said
ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is
justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC Held: No. Ratio:
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites
are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting
only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect
and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case
now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the
accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal
ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with
public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The
pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There
is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila
Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such
sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and
otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates
directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.
Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including
the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not
violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
 Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in
origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To
sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy;
the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall
fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to
reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,
would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD
1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In
so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here
emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the
country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court
agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan
Manila through the imposition and enforcement
of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the
public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in
eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is
that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the
imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their
merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated
legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion,
whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply
delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without
such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license
plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver
licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF
VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by
Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns
a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing
machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal
council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said
warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.
According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in
violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses
near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the
meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code (2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of
the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. Held: The storage of abaca and copra
in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code.
At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
 trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be
unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in
case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not
err in its decision. Tatel v. Municipality of Virac Facts: Based on complaints received by the
residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca
bailing machine inside Tatels warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal
Council of Virac declaring Tatels warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article
694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a
more suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal
officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses
to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that said ordinance is
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution
and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. Issue: 1. WON
Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal
Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that
municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local
self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from
the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal
council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. For
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality
to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance 13 meets these
criteria. In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such
warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the
construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in
case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. The objections
interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its
purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon
the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing
inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and
properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there
can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government Tayaban
vs People On June 23, 2011 Municipal Corporation Police Power of LGUs In 1988,
Tayaban was the mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. He intimated a project proposal with the Governor
for a public market to be erected. The same was approved and it was funded by the
Cordillera Executive Board. The project bidding was subsequently won by Lopez Pugong.
Pugong began erecting the market but in 1989, Tayaban and Tinocs councilors enforced a
resolution to demolish the structure being built on the ground that the structure is not being
erected in the proper area as specified by Tayaban and that the structure is a public
nuisance and by virtue of police power to protect general welfare. Tayaban and some
councilors then went to the site and demolished the structure. Pugong sued Tayaban et al for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft Act). Pugong also averred that
 the resolution reviewing the said local public development project (market) that the council
passed in 1989 was not posted in a conspicuous place as required by Sections 56 and 59(a)
of the 1991 LGC (R.A. No. 7160). Tayaban lost and he appealed contending that he
demolished the structure by virtue of PD 1096 (National Building Code) and LOI 19 (removal
of illegal structures). ISSUE: Whether or not Tayabans demolition of the structure is a valid
exercise of police power by a LGU officer. HELD: No. The SC is not impressed with
Tayabans contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy,
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In
the present case, the acts of Tayaban have been established as a violation of law,
particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. On the other hand though, as
held by the OSG, Sec 56 and 59 of the LGC of 1991 is not applicable as said law was not yet
passed in 1989 hence there was no need for Tayaban to post the 89 resolution in a
conspicuous place. Also, Tayabans defense that he acted by virtue of LOI 19 and PD 1096
is a mere afterthought, nowhere in the resolution was it said that they are going to demolish
because of these two laws but rather only on the ground that the market being built is in the
wrong place. Further, Tayaban actually never specified as to where he intended the market
to be built. Parayno vs Jovellanos G.R. No. 148408 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine:
Police power Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of
said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was
referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau
of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended
to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution
No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of
existing law. According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The
Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San
Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No
neighbors were called as
witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22
June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings,
houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in
case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline
most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4)
It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but
was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline
filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case
was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the
closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid
exercise of the latters police powers HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their
previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact
admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as
defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently
defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; The foregoing were judicial
admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence,
because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44
necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities
undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling
station. As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used
its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had,
under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and
general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the
rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection
clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent
municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50.
While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters
from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to
measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether
there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per
se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons
and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the
people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project
being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the
Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the
requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location
is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the
*HLURB+ staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated
Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from
enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer
her gasoline station to another location. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA Facts:
RA 4850 was enacted creating the LLDA to carry out environmental protection and ecology,
navigational safety, and sustainable development. PD 813 amended the RA because of the
concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns
of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-
industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. To more effectively perform the role
of the Authority, EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the
Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the
term "Laguna de Bay Region". Section 29 of PD 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this
manner: Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna
de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below
mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands
which form part of the bed of said lake.Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991.
The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean
that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters because of R.A. 7160. Municipal governments
thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995,
occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation
drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's
permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies
adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. To be
 sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in
the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the
lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area
with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress
of Laguna Lake. Ramos then issued instructions that all structures in the LdB not registered
with the LLDA are illegal. Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction
cases against the Authority before various RTCs. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the
cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued
in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the
fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court.
CA: dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A)
LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are
appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-
judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter
insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC
of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is
now vested with their respective local government units concerned. Issue: Which agency of
the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Section 4 (k) of the
charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of
1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals,
oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
municipal waters. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The LGC
of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the
legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should
be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, is
a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled
rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases,
is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict
between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as
possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it has
to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the LGC of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental
 protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that
the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with
the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like
any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake
surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain
into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and
Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon
provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected
with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable
development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires
judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its
ecological integrity and balance." "Managing the lake resources would mean the
implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced
growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational
use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act
4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed
to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de Bay therefore
cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local
government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The
garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or
construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but
the entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably
develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the local government units to issue fishing
privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that
Section 149 of the New LGC empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is
embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring
activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake
quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the
power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise
of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the
proper sharing of fees collected. **LLDA: regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to
pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority's pretense, however,
that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be
instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the
resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its
charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the LGC of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the
Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges
in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the
aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would
render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna
Lake Development Authority. This, the LGC of 1991 had never intended to do. Binay v.
Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by
the mayors office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family income does
not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated
available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved
Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for
the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission
on Audit for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA
disapproved R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation
thereof. The program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Issues: 1. WON R 60 is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. YES. Police power is inherent in
the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise
from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within
the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the
powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been
construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and
desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the
general welfare clause: authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law,
and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein." Sec 7 of BP 337: every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance
such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain
peace and order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein." Police power: power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers; greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government; elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. COA: there is no
perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under R 60
and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati Apparently,
COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public
safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati ." Police power of a municipal
corporation: broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty
to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience
as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in
a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government.
It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects
the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited
thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation.
Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely
indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public
purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. OSG: "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the
general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and
respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." The care for the poor is generally recognized
 as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection
clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators,
down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed
giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage
of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. The resolution is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief
of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience,
and it is
more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies
the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should
have more in law." Rural Bank of Makati vs City of Makati G.R. No. 150763 Doctrine:
General Welfare clause (Police Power of Municipality) Facts: Upon the request of the
municipal treasurer, in August 1990, Atty. Victor A.L. Valero, then the municipal attorney of
the Municipality of Makati, went to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the banks
payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. Petitioner Magdalena V. Landicho, corporate
secretary of the bank, said that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under Republic Act
No. 720, as amended. On November 19, 1990, the municipality filed complaint with the
Prosecutors Office, charging petitioners Esteban S. Silva, president and general manager of
the bank and Magdalena V. Landicho for violation of Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3 in
relation to Sections 105 and 169 of the Metropolitan Tax Code. On April 5, 1991, the
municipality submitted two (2) Information with the MTC against the respondent bank: 1) for
non-payment of the mayors permit fee and 2) for non-payment of annual business tax. While
said cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the
closure of the bank. This prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayors permit fee
and the annual fixed tax in the amount of P82,408.66. On October 18, 1991, petitioners filed
with the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages. Petitioners alleged that they
were constrained to pay the amount of P82,408.66 because of the closure order, issued
despite the pendency of the criminal cases and the lack of any notice or assessment of the
fees to be paid. They averred that the collection of the taxes/fees was oppressive, arbitrary,
unjust and illegal. Additionally, they alleged that respondent Atty. Valero had no power to
enforce laws and ordinances, thus his action in enforcing the collection of the permit fees
and business taxes was ultra vires. Respondent municipality asserted that petitioners
payment of P82,408.66 was for a legal obligation because the payment of the mayors permit
fee as well as the municipal business license was required of all business concerns.
According to respondent, said requirement was in furtherance of the police power of the
municipality to regulate businesses. RTC rules in favor of the municipal of Makati. According
to the trial court, the bank was engaged in business as a rural bank. Hence, it should secure
the necessary permit and business license, as well as pay the corresponding charges and
fees. It found that the municipality had authority to impose licenses and permit fees on
persons engaging in business, under its police power embodied under the general welfare
clause. Also, the RTC declared unmeritorious petitioners claim for exemption under Rep. Act
No. 720 since said exemption had been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 93 and the Rural
Bank Act of 1992. These statutes no longer exempted rural banks from paying corporate
income taxes and local taxes, fees and charges. The CA affirmed RTCs decision in toto. CA
also brushed aside petitioners claim that the general welfare clause is limited only to
legislative action. It declared that the exercise of police power by the municipality was
mandated by the general welfare clause, which authorizes the local government units to
enact ordinances, not only to carry into effect and discharge such duties as are conferred
upon them by law, but also those for the good of the municipality and its inhabitants. This
mandate includes the regulation of useful occupations and enterprises. Hence the present
complaint. Petitioner bank claims that the closure of the bank was an improper exercise of
 police power because a municipal corporation has no inherent but only delegated police
power, which must be exercised not by the municipal mayor but by the municipal council
through the enactment of ordinances. It also assailed the Court of Appeals for invoking the
General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which took effect in 1992, when the closure of the bank was actually done on July 31, 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipalitys police power covers the power to tax and the
power to order the respondents bank closure. HELD: Rep. Act No. 720, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4106, approved on July 19, 1964, had exempted rural banks with net
assets not exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from the payment of all taxes, charges
and fees. The records show that as of December 29, 1986, petitioner banks net assets
amounted only to P745,432.29. Hence, petitioner bank could claim to be exempt from
payment of all taxes, charges and fees under the aforementioned provision. However, EO 93
was issued by then President Aquino, withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with certain
exceptions. Notably, not included among the exceptions were those granted to rural banks
under Rep. Act No. 720. With the passage of said law, petitioner could no longer claim any
exemption from payment of business taxes and permit fees.
Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality
ordered petitioner banks closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause
invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under
the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which was then in effect, a
general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are
agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as
such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. The authority of a local government unit to exercise police
power under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already
provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917. Thus, the closure of the bank was
a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and
restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No
reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipalitys
exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned. The general welfare clause
has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal
council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety,
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its
inhabitants, and for the protection of their property. In the present case, the ordinances
imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business establishment, for purposes of
regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of the first
branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality imposing
the annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local governments as
provided for under Section 8 of B.P. Blg. 337. Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief
executive, was clothed with authority to create a Special Task Force headed by respondent
Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and implement said ordinances and resolutions and to file
appropriate charges and prosecute violators. Respondent Valero could hardly be faulted for
performing his official duties under the cited circumstances. On the issue of the closure of
the bank, we find that the bank was not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities to warrant
its outright closure. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees
are provided for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code. Said Section 62 did not provide for
closure. Moreover, the order of closure violated petitioners right to due process, considering
that the records show that the bank exercised good faith and presented what it thought was
a valid and legal justification for not paying the required taxes and fees. The violation of a
municipal ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies.
 It should have observed due process before ordering the banks closure. WHEREFORE, the
assailed Decision dated July 17, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, so that (1) the order denying any claim for refunds and
fees allegedly overpaid by the bank, as well as the denial of any award for damages and
unrealized profits, is hereby SUSTAINED; (2) the order decreeing the closure of petitioner
bank is SET ASIDE; and (3) the award of moral damages and attorneys fees to Atty. Victor
A.L. Valero is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs. Quezon City v. Ericta Facts: QC
passed an Ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of private
memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of QC. Section 9 of the
Ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers & have been residents of
QC for at least 5 years prior to their death. Seven years after the enactment of the
Ordinance, the QC Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop any
further selling of memorial parks in QC where the owners have failed to donate the required
6% cemetery space. The City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. that the Ordinance
would be enforced, so Himlayan filed a petition with the CFI seeking to annul Sec 9 of the
Ordinance. CFI declared Sec 9 null and void. MR: denied Issue: WON the ordinance is
authorized under QC Charter and a valid exercise of police power. NO. Restatement of
certain basic principles: Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which
states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law'
(Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent
powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)
police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as
'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted
in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived
of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote
the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for
injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is
the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the
least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong
vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public
regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104).
The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost
become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of
the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive
with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the
needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent
or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve
public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957). The police
power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the
broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and
the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the
foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is
a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of
an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police
regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without
due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries
for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges
of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without
compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic
Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This
has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from
laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision
lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay
by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of
fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise
of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot
stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed
after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be
considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it
accepted the permits to commence operations. Velasco vs Villegas G.R. No. L-24153
February 14, 1983 Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of
barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on
Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging
customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their
means of livelihood without due process of law. Issue: Whether said ordinance was
unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power Held: No. The attack
against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is
a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: (1) To be able to impose
payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance
No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance
regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which
might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers. The Court
has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear
the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police
power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by
municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been
liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine
 jurisprudence. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino On November
23, 2010
Police Power Not Validly Exercised Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to
be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid
exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Agustin vs Edu
November 22, 2010

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly
to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing
that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of
said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at
least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision,
as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of
the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such
a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of
the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past
may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent.
The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an
enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first
law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of
public safety.

Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 1 Issues on Delegation of Legislative Power
(Filling in the Details: authority to reorganize)

Chiongbian vs Orbos

Chiongbian - Congressman in third district, South Cotabato; Orbos - Executive SecretaryDate of

Promulgation:
June 22, 1995

Ponente:

Mendoza

Motion:

Certiorari and Prohibition

;
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court

Background

In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and
corporations owned or controlled by it.
Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.

Facts

The Congress passed the

Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some
provinces which resulted to 4 provinces (
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi
) in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that
those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing
administrative regions provided, however,
that the President may merge the existing regions through administrative determination.
President Cory then issued the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be merged,
transferring
provinces from their existing region to another. The petitioners who are
members of the Congress
representing legislative districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there is
no law which authorizes
the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing regions and
restructure
them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one province under its current region to
another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of
reorganization,
an alteration of the existing structures of the government. The RA 6743 only holds authority
of the president to
merge existing regions
and cannot be construed as
reorganizing
them.

Issue

W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioners stand) in

character or executive as the respondents contend

Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through administrative
determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated

Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power to

fill up
or provide the details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide
for them
Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.
The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law
. In conferring on the President the power to merge the existing regions following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of administrative regions in 1972
. (RA5453)

This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied
.
Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of
power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:
to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted
with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.

CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO
and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appella te
Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no
less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried
out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty
by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from
the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes
in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to
be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can
be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The
growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred
upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

People vs Vera
undue delagation of power; equal protection of the law
Caption: PEOPLE VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.

Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new
trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted
of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city
like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial
boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law
may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case
of Schecter, supra, is a roving commission which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of
equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

Rulings:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged
section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality
may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps
this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the
counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate
the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former
province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of
the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person
similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the
necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which
case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in
each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.

G.R. No. L-9876 US VS. PANLILIO Doctrine:

The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a
statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not
a offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS: In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio having been exposed to
the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order
of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio
of Masamat, Pampanga; that, on said place, Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being
authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted
and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined
and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his
servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place
to another for the purpose of working them. The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760
relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious
diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture?

HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such
orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the
Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit
acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any
of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is
not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they
may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes,
and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes
a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any
way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal Code which punishes
any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among
animals.
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima
undue delegation of power; separation of power

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should
not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, which states that
the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence,
the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and
4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity,
economy and welfare.33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA
9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said
IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.

Coco Levy Fund Belongs Not to the Coco Farmers in Their Private Capacities But to the
Government (Cocofed vs Rep, 2012)

Cocofed vs Republic
Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012
Full Text
Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or
ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED,
the national association of coconut producers having the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the
coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the
proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based
products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a
hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily
available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this,
Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a
commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital.
It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special
and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a
special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall
pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco
72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated
that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as
consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal
option to buy the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2%
equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the
farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were
in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98%
portion, which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital
stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to
this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and
holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.
Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be
construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid
No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof
should revert back to the general fund.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on any tax levied
for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and
if the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF
were sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut
industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned
by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is
unconstitutional.
Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which
the coco levy fund was created.
Issue 2:
W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public
in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the
shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations
the PCA may promulgate is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and
second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and
unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely
with the CCSF to the undefined coconut farmers, which negated or circumvented the national
policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private
capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any
property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public
funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the
several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions
of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also,
they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1)
scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step
beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.

(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND
FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE
LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.

Case: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENTAGENCY (GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658)
Date: November 3, 2008Ponente: J. Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36
1 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP
and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an
additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No
provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the
qualificationrequirements of candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section
36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner
of drug testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student
or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
also breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a
citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection guarantees.
Issue:
WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional
Held:
Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not.
Ratio:
Section 36 (c) and (d)

as to students and employees of private and public offices

Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying
the following reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis
with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult,
and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty;
and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory. Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicion less drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of
secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not
exactly for the same reason. For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to
the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
1 SEC. 36.
Authorized Drug Testing
. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of
the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of
the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing: x x x x(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. -
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a
random drug testing x x x;(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use
of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension
or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law; x x x x(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office
with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drugtest; (g) All candidates for public office
whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
December 30, 2011

570 SCRA 410 Political Law Qualifications of a Senator or a Congress Representative

NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and
Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was
implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations
on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a
candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification
for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that
there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It
is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience
to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the
qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot
require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure,
is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.