Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Answer: Yes. Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The fact that the lawyer
obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and
not as an attorney of the complainant is of no moment.
Therefore, for issuing worthless checks, the lawyer may be held
administratively accountable. (Lawyer was suspended for three years. She
died while serving her suspension.)
Question: Can a lawyer borrow money from his client without crossing
ethical boundaries?
Answer: No. As a general rule, a lawyer should not borrow money from his
client. Canon 16.04 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice.
Reason: The lawyers duty to society demands his uprightness in his
dealings with third persons.
Thus, while the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be
justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to
show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his license and
the law confer.
Question: What circumstances may warrant a more severe penalty upon a
lawyer in disbarment proceedings where the complaint includes a criminal
offense committed by the lawyer against the complainant?
Answer: The following circumstances may warrant a severe penalty in
disbarment proceeding:
1. unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing the lawyer
to file an answer to the complaint;
2. failure to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference before the
Investigating Commissioner; and
3. blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office for her to file her counter-affidavit in a criminal case.
The above acts violate Canon 10.03: Failure to observe rules of
procedure.
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LAWYER SHOULD NOT BORROW MONEY FROM HIS CLIENT
(CANON 16.04)
SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K.
PALAA (A.C. No. 7434, August 23, 2007)
Question: Atty. Palaa borrowed from Sps. Tejada the amount of P100K
with interest of P70K payable in three months to allow him to reconstitute
the title of his real property.
After the lapse of three months without fulfilling his promise to pay the
principal of his loan and its interest, Sps. Amador asked Atty. Palaa to settle
his obligation. The demands remain unheeded. Can Atty. Palaa be held
administratively liable for not settling his loan despite persistent demand
from the creditor-spouses?
Answer: Yes. The complainants could not have been defrauded without the
representations of respondent. A promise of a high interest convinced the
complainants to give a loan of P100K to respondent lawyer. He knew that
his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for
reconstitution and other expenses including the publication of the filing of
the petition could not have cost more than P20,000. It is clear that he
employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned
money; and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money
were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the
bar.
Therefore, Atty. Palaa is liable for not paying his just obligation.
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CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS THE
COURTS
ANTONIO CONLU v. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR. (A.C. No.
4955, September 12, 2011)
Question: Can a client file an administrative complaint against a lawyer
after the former discovered that the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
for non-filing of the appellants brief within the reglamentary period?
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Question: Can a lawyer be a subject of a disbarment proceeding for
attempting to bribe a judge to secure a favorable judgment?
Answer: Yes. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins a lawyer to refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court. The
possibility of an attempted bribery is not far from reality considering
lawyers persistent phone calls to the judge.
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Therefore, he is guilty of violating his fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty
includes the task of ensuring any property held in favor the client is
adequately preserved.
Reason: A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he
is expected to respect the courts order and processes. He miserably fell
short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the
court issued. He was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the
attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons
who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the
sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took
custody of the attached vehicles without so much as informing the court, let
alone securing, its authority.
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Question: What are the formalities required before a Notary Public can affix
his signature to a notarial deed which requires acknowledgment?
Answer: The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the
instrument to present
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; and
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the notary
public; and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public competent proof of identity.
The Notary Public must ascertain the identities of the affiant(s) and the
witnesses to the document. He must also ensure that all parties must sign on
the left side margin of each and every page of the document.
The details of the notarized document must be recorded in the notarial
register (Notarial Book) of the commissioned lawyer.
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
Answer: No. The respondent judge should have not assumed jurisdiction
because at the time the case was instituted the amount involved is
P187,000 which is beyond the jurisdiction of a first level court. The
respondent judge exhibited his unfamiliarity with the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. He is guilty of violating Sections 3 and 5, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. He also betrayed his lack of
competence which is a constitutional qualification for a member of the
judiciary. He likewise violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct on
Competence and Diligence.
Question: Respondent judge took more than three (3) months to issue the
Joint Resolution ordering the return of the cases to the provincial prosecutor
for further preliminary investigation. The rule mandates that he should
resolve this issue within a period of ten (10) days. Was the action of the
judge proper?
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Answer: No. The Rules on Criminal Procedure requires a judge to submit
his resolution of the case within ten (10) days after the preliminary
investigation and transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor. There is no question that the judge took inordinate delay of three
(3) months in submitting his resolution of the preliminary investigation. He
violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires the
qualities of competence and diligence.
Question: Under the foregoing facts, what liability did the respondent judge
incur?
Answer: The judge betrayed his gross ignorance of the law. When a judge
shows utter unfamiliarity with fundamental rules and procedures, he
contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system.
Ignorance of the law is a mainspring of injustice.
When judges show professional incompetence, and are ignorant of basic and
fundamental rules, they are guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedures. This is a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.
Sec. 11(A) of Rule 140 punishes the offense. He also violated Canon 6 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct on competence and diligence.
JOSEFINA NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, PRESIDING
JUDGE, MTCC, BR. 1, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN (A.M. No. MTJ-
11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1807-MTJ], March 23, 2011)
Question: An ejectment case was filed before the MTC. On its face, the
allegations do not constitute any ground for the court to take jurisdiction.
What action must the judge take under the premises?
Answer: The judge must dismiss the case. In ejectment cases, the first
duty of a judge is to examine the allegations in the complaint and the
evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case outright on any of the
grounds apparent in the allegations and order the dismissal of a civil action.
If there is a ground for dismissal existing and apparent upon the filing of the
complaint, and yet the judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on, the
judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision. (Canon 6 on
Competence and Diligence, Code of Judicial Conduct)
Question: What would constitute undue delay in rendering a decision or
order?
Answer: Undue delay in rendering a judgment exists where a ground for
dismissing the civil case was patent on the face of the allegations and yet the
judge did not dismiss the case outright. Also, when the representatives
lack of personality was reflected in the corporate secretary's certificate
appended to the complaint and yet, respondent judge allowed the case to
unnecessarily drag on for more than five years.
QUESTION: What would be a reasonable penalty for the administrative
offense of undue delay in rendering judgment?
ANSWER: A judge who allowed several and doubtless unnecessary
postponements which contributed to the delay in the resolution of what was
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otherwise a simple case may be subjected to a monetary fine. The Court held
that undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious
offense for which respondent judge is subjected to a fine. (Violation of
Canon 6, Competence and Diligence, Code of Judicial Conduct)
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C.
CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL EMPLOYEES OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS against ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL
P. ELBINIAS, CA - Mindanao Station (A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-
J, January 11, 2011) REMINDER: VERY IMPORTANT CASE PLEASE
READ CAREFULLY ALL RELATED QUESTIONS
*Question: How may an administrative complaint be initiated against a
judge?
Answer: Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the ways on
how to institute administrative proceedings against judges. Under this rule,
the three ways to initiate the complaint are:
First, motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
Second, upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or
Third, upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.
*Question: Certain employees of the Court of Appeals filed a letter-
complaint against a justice of the court for: Gross Inefficiency; Bribe
Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises; Personal Use of
Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employees
Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through
Intemperate, Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of
Authority.
The letter-complaint was signed by all the complaining employees but
was not verified. Will the case prosper?
Answer: No. An unverified letter-complaint cannot be a basis of an
administrative complaint against a judge. Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, an administrative case against a judge must be verified.
A complainant must attest to his personal knowledge of the allegations
embodied in his verified letter-complaint.
*Question: Can the Court take cognizance of an anonymous letter-
complaint against a judge?
Answer: Yes. In Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, the Court took cognizance of the
unverified motion and subsequent letters of complainants submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator since the unverified complaint was
properly considered as an anonymous complaint and the material
allegations were not only admitted by respondent judge but are also
verifiable from public records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records of the
trial court, as aptly found by the CA.
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PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B.
BELEN, RTC, BR. 36, CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA (A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2179, September 24, 2012)
Question: Prosecutor Baculi filed information for qualified theft against
Capacete but Judge Belen dismissed the case. In the Motion for
Reconsideration, Prosecutor Baculi stated: The dismissal of the information
by the court was motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice against Asst.
State Prosecutor II Jorge Baculi, the Investigating Prosecutor at the
Preliminary Investigation.
Judge Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt and indirect contempt
for the contemptuous nature of the pleadings he filed.
Baculi filed an administrative case against Judge Belen because the judge
did not allow him to air his side for his alleged contemptuous conduct. Will
the case prosper?
Answer: NO, Judge Belen is not administratively liable. The complainant
has not presented any credible evidence to support his allegations. The fact
that Judge Belen had initiated contempt proceedings against him, and in fact
convicted him in such contempt proceedings, does not by itself amount to ill
motives on the part of Judge Belen.
*N.B. The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is not to convict but to
serve the ends of justice.
GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326,
January 30, 2013)
Question: Despite the approval of a compromise agreement in the
annulment of marriage between spouses Beckett, the presiding judge in a
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, ordered provisional custody of the
minor child to the mother when the agreement awarded custody to the father.
Was the judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
Answer: No. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes
an appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and
well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the
competence and fairness of the court which he personifies.
Not to know the law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or
acting in disregard of established rule of law as if he were not aware of the
same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is excused, especially an
RTC judge.
However, the respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata
rule nor was he impartial.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HON.
LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN (A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, September 27,
2010)
Question: Prior to his retirement, the OCA found Judge Quilatan liable for
gross inefficiency for failure to decide the 34 cases submitted for decision
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within the required period. The OCA recommended that the erring judge be
fined fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000). Is Judge Quilatan is guilty of gross
inefficiency?
Answer: Yes. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to
resolve their cases with dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious
violation of the parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Without
doubt, Judge Quilatan violated his mandate when he failed to decide 34
cases within three (3) months from their submission, for which he should be
administratively sanctioned. (Violation of Canon 6, Competence and
Diligence)
DISQUALIFICATION/INHIBITION OF JUDGES
JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO (G.R. No. 147923,
October 26, 2007)
Question: During the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution on
behalf of Go, wanted to present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of
the prosecution. However, the trial court felt no need for the testimonies of
the aforementioned witnesses. This prompted Go to file an administrative
complaint against Judge Nemesio Felix for partiality.
The CA dismissed the complaint of Go. Go failed to establish the partiality
of the presiding judge when it limited the number witnesses. It rationalized
that Judge Felix had the discretion to inhibit himself from the case unless the
ground for his inhibition is that which calls for mandatory inhibition of the
same and in this case no such ground exists. Go insists that there is a valid
ground to inhibit the judge. Is his contention tenable?
Answer: None. There is no valid ground to inhibit the judge as there was no
manifest partiality. Indeed, the adverse rulings on the denial of the proposed
testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses are judicial in nature. Absent
proof that the trial court judge had acted in a wanton, whimsical or
oppressive manner or for an illegal consideration, and similar reasons,
in giving undue advantage to respondent, inhibition is not a remedy to oust
the judge from sitting on the case.
Second, the other two (2) grounds raised by petitioner are also baseless. It is
an age old rule in civil cases that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga (A.M. OCA IPI
No. 09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013)
Question: Complainant charged Judge Wacas of Impropriety and Partiality
for not inhibiting himself in the case alleging that he is Dagadags second
cousin by affinity, the formers aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag.
Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of "some reliable sources," not
from his personal knowledge. Judge Wacas maintained that Tiggangay
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never moved for his inhibition during the entire proceedings. Should the
judge inhibit himself under the foregoing facts cited by complainant?
Answer: No. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In
the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present substantial evidence to prove
his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere
allegation is not evidence.
N.B. As a general rule, the objection for the judge to inhibit himself must
be raised during the trial and not after the judge had rendered an adverse
ruling against the complainant.
Reason: Granting arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the
uncle of respondent Dagadag, such reality is not a ground for the mandatory
inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 1of Rule 137, Revised Rules of
Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag. Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood
relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is
related by affinity to his wifes brother, but not to the wife of his wifes
brother. There is no affinity between the husbands brother and the wifes
sister.
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his fingers at other employees present. Afterwards, respondent process
server attempted to punch one of them. Can the judge institute an
administrative complaint against Dela Cruz?
Answer: Yes. However, respondents act can only be regarded as simple
misconduct since it has no direct relation to the performance of his official
duties. Respondent committed misconduct when he verbally abused his co-
employees and appeared at his place of work drunk. Drinking during office
hours may constitute misconduct and is prohibited under the Civil Service
Rules. Drinking undermines efficiency and is counter-productive. It
generates an unwholesome consequence on a public servant. And when the
culprit is an employee of the court, the image of the judiciary as a whole
cannot but be affected.
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under RA 910, meaning a lump-sum payment of five years salary and a
monthly pension until death after the 5-year period.
Q. What are the sources of ethical standards for the members of the bench
and bar?
A. (1) Constitution Article VIII The Judicial Department, Sec. 5(5),
Article VI The Legislative Department, Sec.14,
Article VII The Executive Department, Sec. 13,
Article IX Constitutional Commissions, IX-A, Sec. 2;
(2) The Attorneys Oath;
(3) The Code of Professional Responsibility;
(4) The Code of Judicial Ethics;
(5) The Rules of Court; (6) 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice;
(7) MCLE Rules;
(8) JBC Rules;
(9) Issuances of the Supreme Court;
(10) Legislations from Congress (creation and jurisdiction of appellate and
other lower courts, also the Lapid Law on legal aid service of lawyers);
(11) Jurisprudence; and
(12) Scholarly Writings on Legal and Judicial Ethics.
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Q. What is the practice of law?
A. The practice of law is performing any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Paguia v. Office of the President, 621 SCRA 600
Q. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Balauitan. The basis of the
complaint was a Deed of Sale executed between the lawyer and the
complainant. Atty. Balauitan moved for the dismissal of the case arguing
that the matter does involve any lawyer-client relationship. Is his legal
argument tenable?
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A. A lawyer cannot have a dichotomy between his private life and his
professional responsibility as a lawyer. He can be disbarred even if there is
no lawyer-client relationship between him and a complainant in a
disbarment case and if the transaction involves his sale of a portion of his
real property. Gacias v. Balauitan (507 SCRA 8, 2006)
Q. Can an individual practicing before the Shaira court affix the prefix
ATTY. before his name?
A. No. While the Supreme Court administers the examinations for one to
practice before the Shari a courts, any one admitted is not allowed to use the
prefix ATTY. unless he is also a member of the Philippine bar. Shari a
courts have limited jurisdiction particularly on matters related to personal,
family and property law consistent with the provisions of the Constitution
and national laws. Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997
Q. Christian San Juan passed the bar with a passing grade of 80.50%. He
was not allowed to take his oath because Cristina Garcia, his childhood
sweetheart with whom he has a child without benefit of marriage, filed a
timely motion to exclude him from the oath taking ceremonies. Was
Cristina justified in preventing San Juan from taking his Attorneys Oath?
Why?
A. Yes, because San Juan does not possess good moral character which is a
requirement for admission to the bar.
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Barba v. Pedro (61SCRA 484, 1974): A bar passer who sired a child with a
public school teacher was not allowed to take his oath for lack of good moral
character but was allowed to do so after 18 years based on testimonials of
his reformation when he worked as a community social development worker
after passing the bar.
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Criminal Law, Remedial Law and Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical
Exercises.
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5. Attorney of Record: a member of the bar appointed by a client to
represent in cause of a court and upon whom service of papers may be made.
6. Of Counsel: a member of the bar who is associated with a law office but
does not normally appear as counsel of record of cases handled by the law
office.
7. Lead Counsel: a member of the bar who charged with the principal
management and direction of a party-litigant.
8. House Counsel: a member of the bar who acts as attorney for a business
company as an employee of such company and renders legal advice on
matters necessary in the ordinary course of its business.
9. Amicus Curiae: a friend of the court. A person with strong interest in or
views on the subject matter of the action. One who is considered as an
experience and impartial attorney to help in the disposition of issues
submitted to the Court. (Sec. 36, Rule 138)
10. Amicus Curiae par Excellence: bar associations who appear in court as
amici curiae or friends of the court. Like an individual amicus curiae,
amicus curiae par excellence do not represent any party to the case but act
as consultant in a doubtful issue for resolution of the court. They do not
receive any compensation for their legal services to the court.
11. Counsel de parte: a lawyer retained by a party litigant, usually, for a fee,
to prosecute or defend his cause in court. The term implies freedom of
choice either on the part of the lawyer to accept the employment or on the
part of the litigant to continue or terminate the retainer at any time.
12. Pro bono Counsel: a lawyer who renders legal services without charging
any professional fees but does not shoulder the costs of litigation on behalf
of his client.
13. Advocate: a lawyer who pleads on behalf of a third party.
14. Barrister: In England, a person entitled to practice law as an advocate
or counsel in superior courts.
15. Solicitor: In England, a person prosecuting or defending suits in a Court
of Chancery. A Court of Chancery is a court which administers equity and
proceeding according to the forms and principles of equity.
16. Proctor: In England , an attorney in in the admiralty and ecclesiastical
courts whose duties and business correspond exactly to those of an attorney-
at-law or solicitor in a Chancery.
Q. What is barratry?
A. It is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels in suits. It
is frowned upon as it is against public policy.
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III. Appearance of Non-Lawyers
Q. What is the Student Practice Rule?
A. Law Student Practice Rule: Rule 138-A of the Rules of court allows a
law student to represent indigent clients provided one has successfully
completed the 3rd year of a prescribed four-year curriculum and enrolled in
a recognized law schools clinical legal education program
> In Bar Matter No.730 dated June 10, 1998, the Supreme Court required
that law student practice before the Regional Trial Court must be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
> Under Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a law student may appear before
the first level court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of
a member of the bar.
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Q. What is the one-year ban rule on government lawyers?
A. Former government attorneys are prohibited or disqualified from the
representing any interest adverse to the government within the one-year
period when they were separated from service.
Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the interest of the state in criminal
cases?
A. Government lawyers tasked to prosecute and represent the interest of the
state are the Public Prosecutors from the DOJ and Office of the
Ombudsman.
Q. Who are the government lawyers who represent indigent litigants?
A. Lawyers who work with the Public Attorneys Office represent the
indigent litigants.
Q. Can the Supreme Court motu propio discipline lawyers?
A. Yes.
People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013.CTA in conformity with the Run
After the Smugglers (RATS) Group of the Revenue Collection Monitoring
Group (RCMG) of the BOC tried the private respondents for violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. S.C. said that it
could not countenance the following patent violations of the government
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prosecutors: failure of the prosecution failed to present certified true copies
of the documentary evidence under Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the petition for certiorari was filed
beyond the reglamentary period. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the
administration of justice and the presumption that the case was doomed by
design from the start was doomed by design from the start. Verily, the
lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be
reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high
sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court reminded the lawyers
in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
Q. May a labor arbiter apply a principle in Corporation Law to support his
decision in a labor dispute?
A. Yes. YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO
P. ANDRES v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, A.C. No. 7158, March
09, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.: This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed
against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar v. Nambi (respondent) on the ground
of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution
against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein
complainants, who are not parties to the case. The Court held that the labor
arbiter had legal basis to pierce the corporate veil to serve the ends of
justice but he was reprimanded for not complying with the lawful orders of
the IBP and the Court.
VI. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rule
of Court)
IBP Board of
Governors
REPORT
Commission
May uphold the findings
May reverse the findings
May amend the findings
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Q. Who may initiate disbarment proceedings?
A. NESTOR FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY.
DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014.The S.C. held
that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck
v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny interested person or the
court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary
that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
Disbarment proceedings being sui generis, the procedural requirement
observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest
must initiate the suit will not apply.
Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of the disbarment case against him
based on prejudicial question?
A. No. A disbarment proceeding being sui generis can proceed
independently of any criminal action instituted against the lawyer.
ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, A.C. No. 8776,
March 22, 2015, Brion, J. This is a complaint for the disbarment/suspension of
Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22, 2010 by
Antonina S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility arising from non-payment of debt.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. For violation of Rule 1.01, the lawyer was suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
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Q. Can a lawyer set up the defense of double jeopardy in a disbarment case
against him?
A. No. The defense of double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a disbarment
proceeding.
Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (21010): S.C. reiterated the rule that
laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure . . . do not apply in
the determination of lawyers qualifications or fitness for membership in the
Bar. . . The S.C. said first, that for admission a candidate must meet all the
requirements because the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and involves service to the public; and second,
admission qualifications are also required for the continued enjoyment of
the privilege to practice and lack of qualifications is a matter of public
concern and S.C. may inquire into them.
Q. Can a judge who has been dismissed from the judiciary still be a subject
of a disbarment proceeding?
A. Yes. OCA v. Liangco, 662 SCRA 103 (2011): The dismissal of a judge
from service will not preclude the filing of a disbarment case against him
before the IBP. The disbarment was based on the same grounds for his
dismissal: gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance. He failed to make a
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distinction between a Resolution and an Ordinance and that as judge, he
cannot render an Opinion but rather he must receive evidence and make a
decision after termination of trial. It will be the IBP who will investigate a
judge who has retired from the judiciary and not the Supreme Court.
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second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still
subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment
proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January
15, 2014. This case involves a PAO who advised her clients Iyak-iyakan
lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon.Thus, a complaint was lodged against her for violation of the
attorneys oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. S. C. held that
Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness. However, while her remark
was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she
was only reprimanded and sternly warned.
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO
L.CARACOL, A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of
a lawyers appearance on behalf of his client, hence: SEC. 21. Authority of
attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to
represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney
is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds
therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear
in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An
attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of
the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
An attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or
the lawyer. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and
attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, A.C. No. 8330,
March 16, 2015, Leonen, J. An administrative complaint for disbarment or
suspension was filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty.
Trina De Vera. The Court found Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious
misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
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dishonor of several post-dated checks. She was suspended from the practice
of law for one year
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Q. Can the penalty of a lawyer be mitigated by virtue of relationship?
A. Yes. ALVIN S. FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-
LOZADA, A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015. On December 13, 2005, the
Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled Bobie
Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada3 suspending Atty.
Lozada for two years for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
During her period of suspension she represented her husband where
complainant Feliciano was a party. The Supreme Court said it recognizes
the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families
will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so,
in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was
prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the
severeness of her penalty.
Tiong v. Florendo, 662 SCR A 1 (2011): The S.C. held that a lawyers act
of having an affair with his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the
laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. His
illicit relationship with the wife of his client showed that he violated Canon
17 of the CPR for abuse of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An
Affidavit of Desistance or any other sworn statement with the same effect
will not excuse the lawyer because any disciplinary proceeding is clothed
with public interest.
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4. Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system
CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reforms and in the
improvement of the administration of justice.
A lawyer is encouraged to participate in the formulation of amendments in
the Rules of Court to improve the administration of justice.
A lawyer may attend congressional hearings involving changes in
substantive laws; creation of new courts; and redefining jurisdiction of trial
and appellate courts.
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B. Duty to the Legal Profession
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A): A lawyer cannot be a
full-fledged member of the bar, he has not signed the Roll of Attorneys
after taking his Oath as a lawyer.
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NOTE: THIS HAS NEVER BEEN A SUBJECT OF A BAR QUESTION
Republic Act No. 9999: FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010
Legal services- any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before
the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court,
and other similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and
services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a
certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or
accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be
provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies
cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or
professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization
duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that said
legal services were actually undertaken.
Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional
partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall
be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have
been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of
the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever
is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be
exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services rendered to
indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for
Practicing Lawyers, under Bar Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court
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likewise REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this decision.
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DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for one (1)
year
(8). Disciplinary Sanctions/Death of a Notary Public
Revocation of commission ((Section 1, Rule XI)
Suspension from practice as a lawyer
Death of a Notary Public (Section 4, Rule XI)
Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5,
2014: The Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupanas revocation of his
notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for
one year are in order for failure to require the personal presence of the
affiant in an Affidavit of Loss purportedly executed in 1994.
Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No. 10185, March 12,
2014 . The S.C. held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not
notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person
executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its
contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys
free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as
a notary public for two years.
Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for failure to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession?
A. The lawyer may be disbarred by the Supreme Court which he tarnishes
the image of the legal profession which tends to erode public trust in the
administration of justice.
Keld Stemmerik v. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. 8010, June 16, 2009: A
lawyer was disbarred by taking advantage of the lack of knowledge of
Philippine laws by a foreigner. Atty. Mas drew up a Deed of Sale of a
property in Subic which is part of public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man.
OCA v. Liangco, supra: S.C. said: We are appalled by the respondents
ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes
in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property
of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.
In Re: Pactolin, supra: The S.C. ruled: As a rule, this Court exercises the
power to disbar with caution. x x yet this Court has also consistently
pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by
final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. x xx His conduct only
exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
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4. Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. (Rules 8.01-8.02)
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Article III, Section 16, Constitution Right to speedy disposition of
cases.
D. Duty to Clients
(i) Services regardless of a persons status
CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. (Rules
14.01-14.04)
Read: Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court on Duties of Attorneys (h)
and (i)
Rule 138, Section 31, Rules of Court on Attorneys for Destitute
Litigant
(ii) Services as counsel de oficio primarily in CRIMINAL CASES
- Appointment as Counsel de oficio (to represent accused in
criminal proceedings)
Read: Rule 116, Section 6, Rules of Court, Right to Counsel of an
Accused
Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court, Appointment of Counsel de
oficio during trial
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Q. What factors are considered in the appointment of a counsel de oficio?
A. The following factors are considered: gravity of the offense, difficulty of
the issues involved and experience and ability of the appointee.
Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to ask from her client for an advance for her
professional fees and thereafter not render any kind of legal service to the
client? A.
A. No. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050,
December 3, 2013. S.C. found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct for
failure pay a personal loan to her client which she initially asked as an
advance for her professional fees. The deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct. A lawyer
may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession
but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. Thus,
Atty. Espejo was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
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CECILIA AGNO VS. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN [558 SCRA 1,
December 7, 2010] A lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a
bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely
low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers,
thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should
hold in high esteem.
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Q. What is the nature of a lawyer-client relationship?
A. Josefina Carranza vida de Zaldvar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes,
Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013. S.C. suspended respondent lawyer for gross
negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18
of the CPR. S.C. reiterated that the relationship between an attorney and his
client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. Whether his services
are paid or rendered pro bono, a lawyers duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. While
such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court
has consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation.
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client
relationship is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
4. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients.
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5. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation.
6. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred
and guarded with care and to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.
(iv) Duty to apprise client: The lawyer must inform the client of the
status of the case.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
(Rules 18.01-18.04)
To summarize:
On the Duty to Serve with Competence and Diligence
(i) Adequate protection: A lawyer must ensure the appropriate legal
reliefs for his client.
(ii) Negligence: A client is bound by the negligence of his counsel.
(iii) Collaborating Counsel: With the consent of the client, a
collaborating counsel may participate in an on-going case
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law.
Q. When will the lawyer be held accountable for violation of the
responsibility to serve his client with zeal within the bounds of law?
Dimagiba v. Montalvo, Jr. Adm. Case No. 1424, October 15, 1991. Lawyer
was disbarred for stretching for almost 49 years a case involving a probate
of a will from which more than other ten criminal and civil suits were
instituted.
Ong v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417, February 6, 2003. S.C. suspended a
lawyer for six months for using harassing tactics to harass a party from him
his client wanted to obtain child support.
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Q. What is a charging lien?
A. A charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for
payment of money, and executions in pursuance of such judgments, obtained
in favor of the client, to secure reimbursement for advances made and
payment of attorneys fees.
Q. What is a retaining fee?
A. A retaining fee can partake of an acceptance fee and covers
professional fees for services rendered including the payment of such
amount of amount as may be agreed upon by the parties in the course of
handling a legal matter for the client.
Read Rule 20.01 of CPR and Rule 138, Section 24 on factors to consider
in charging fees (importance of the subject matter of controversy, extent of
services rendered, professional standing)
Q. What is the concept of Quantum Meruit?
A. A lawyer will receive such amount commensurate the services he
rendered during the period of lawyer-client relationship which may have
been severed by either party during the pendency of the referral. It may also
collected in event of the death of counsel before the resolution of the case.
Q. What is champerty?
A. A champertous contract may result where a lawyer assumes all expenses
for litigation and reimbursement is contingent on the outcome of the case.
This is strictly prohibited under Rule 16-04 of the CPR.
Champerty is different from a contingent fee contract because in the latter
the lawyer gets reimbursed for the advances made for the client in the
course of representation, whether he wins the suit or not; only the amount
of professional fees is contingent upon winning.
Q. May a lawyer have a lien on a judgment to protect his professional
fees?
A. Yes. Conchita Baltazar, et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Baez, Jr., A.C. No.
9091, December 11, 2013.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in
a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. The
court, may at its discretion, allow the lawyer to have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services
have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal
services is in the nature of a champertous contract an agreement whereby
an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the
clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute. Such contracts are prohibited under Canon 16.04 of the CPR, which
states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the
interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
they are handling for the client.
Q. What is the nature of a champertous contract?
A. In Re: The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and
Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased), substituted by their Heirs,
namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel,
Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No.
173188. January 15, 2014.The Court held that the contingent fee of P2000
should control the agreement of counsel and his clients although the same
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was contingent upon winning the case. The Court said that granting
arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into
an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the
subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is
contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to conduct the
litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment
is obnoxious to the law.
CANON 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
9. Withdrawal of Services: valid, justifiable reasons for withdrawal
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3. Common qualification for all members of the judiciary, Section 7(3),
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides: A member of the Judiciary
must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.
4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that
members of the judiciary shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach 70 years old or they become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office.
5. Manner of Selection and Appointment (Read Section 8, Article VIII,
1987 Constitution for the composition, powers and term of office of
members of the Judicial and Bar Council)
Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012: Congress is entitled
only to one seat in the JBC and not one for each house.
Recent rulings related to the JBC:
Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a 5-year
period before he can be promoted as RTC judge. The Court sustained the
power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the screening of qualified candidates
to the judiciary to ensure that only men of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence will be appointed to the bench.
Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied
due process, Jardeleza should be included in the list of nominees to be
appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An issue about his integrity was
raised in the selection process but Jardeleza was never given the opportunity
to be heard to overturn the allegation against him.
Law
Appointments made by the President in the judiciary do not need any
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (Section 9. Article
VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Please note that:
Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from
the occurrence thereof. (Section 4(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90
days from the submission of the list. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution)
Requirements in the discharge of responsibilities of members of the
judiciary:
1. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly, the facts and law on which it is
based. (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
2. Dedicated service to the judiciary
3. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Section12,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
4. SALN Requirement
Members of the Supreme Court shall not only report all their
assets, liabilities, and net worth upon assumption to duty but they
must disclose such to the PUBLIC in the manner provided by law.
(Section 17, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)
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5. Allegiance to the Philippine Government. Any public officer owes
allegiance to the Philippine government and its Constitution and a
public officer who seeks to change citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall
be dealt with by law.(Section 18, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
III. Qualities (Commit this MEMORY AS THIS REPRESENTS THE
SIX CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: I.I.I. PECd):
Canon 1: Independence
Canon 2: Integrity
Canon 3: Impartiality
Canon 4: Propriety
Canon 5: Equality
Canon 6: Competence and diligence
A. Uphold the Dignity and Independence of the Court
CANON 1 A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the
Judiciary. (Sections 1-7)
Two aspects of independence: institutional independence and personal
independence: What is expected of judges: to discharge their functions based
solely on a fair assessment of the facts and invoking the appropriate
provision of law in resolving issues presented before the court; and shield
themselves from any kind of influence from any party involved in the case.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664 SCRA 465
(2012): A complaint against justices of the Court of Appeals must be
dismissed if the same is baseless and the recourse of the party is to seek
judicial relief from an adverse decision.
In Re: S.C. Resolution dated 28April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 146817 and
145822, (Atty. Pena) 669 SCRA 530(2012): A motion to inhibit the ponente
in a pending case before the S.C. based on suspicion of bribery in the form
of a brand new Mercedes Benz and collusion with another senior associate
justice of S.C. cannot be given due course. Counsel must show proof that a
connection and direct correlation exists between his failure to receive a copy
of its Motion for Clarification of the other party. He alleged that the incident
did not allow him to refute the allegations therein. The Court said that such
imputation is completely untenable and irresponsible.
Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, A.M. 1. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996: A judge
was dismissed from service for gross misconduct for sexually harassing his
Clerk of Court.
Go v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA
165. The Court held that the complainant was not deprived of due process
when the charge against him was upgraded from grave serious injuries to
homicide. It said that when the death occurred after the filing of the first
information the same can be amended as a matter of course.
B. Avoid Impropriety: CANON 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Sections 1-3)
Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842.
February 24, 2014.The Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 190, and of gross ignorance of
the law. He was suspended for six months for having notarized affidavits of
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cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his
official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public
were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer,
the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without
legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can
notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties
requirements for marriage. Circular No. 190 dated February 26, 1990.
Circular No. 190 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries
public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties.
Samson v. Judge Caballero, A. M. No. RT J-08- 213, 595 SCRA 423. The
newly appointed judge was not allowed to assume his post as RTC judge of
Cabanatuan City for his material misrepresentation in his application form.
Caballero did not disclose that a graft and corruption charge was filed
against him before the Office of the Ombudsman when he served as a
prosecutor.
Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A. M. No. RT J-06-2014, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA
491. A judge was dismissed from service due to gross misconduct. The
judge was found to have officiated several marriage rites in a short span of
time without having resolved the numerous cases pending before his court.
Santos v. Judge Arcaya- Chua, A. M. No. MT J-07-20093, February 17,
2009. A judge was suspended by the Court for having accepted money to
intercede on behalf of her husbands relative in a pending case before the
Supreme Court where she was previously employed.
Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A. M. No. RT J-09-2175, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA
168. A judge was fined by the Court for oppressive conduct for citing a
driver in contempt of court for having parked the car of his employer in the
parking slot assigned to the judge. The judge imposed upon the driver a
monetary fine.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014. The
Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses, specifically the
non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded
employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses
manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations
issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts, to the
extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of his Branch
and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit the
inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of
Court. Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty.
Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the
Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with
the responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed
employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida,
Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the
duty to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court
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personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would have become
aware.
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court held the
conduct of Judge Austria of and posting a picture with indecent attire for the
publics consumption in her Frendster account is inappropriate. The Court
held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them
in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the
public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The Court said Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos
of herself wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress and made this
available for public viewing. .
C. Maintain Impartiality
CANON 3 A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with
impartiality and diligence. (Sections 1-6)
Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA 364. A judge
together with the Clerk of Court and the court stenographer assigned to his
court were also sanctioned by the S.C. The Court said that except for
clarificatory questions, the judge may not be allowed to ask questions that
would elicit answers to favor one of the parties to the case. It is not also
proper for the judge to allow the Clerk of Court to conduct any proceeding
in the absence of the judge and for the stenographer to transcribe such
proceedings.
Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated Sept. 14, 2011 filed by
Inter-Petal Recreational Corp., A.M. No. 12-6-10 SC, June 13, 2012. The
complaint raised the issue on the capacity of then Chief Justice to decide on
a pending case without any bias. The S.C. dismissed the complaint because
the same has become moot and academic with the impeachment and
eventual removal of Chief Justice Corona from office.
Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594.
This case was filed by Justice Villaluz, the former spouse of Pasay City RTC
Judge Mijares, against her. The S.C. called the attention of Mijares that the
Rules of Court prohibit judges from hearing cases involving relatives up to
the sixth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same fashion a
member of the bench may not hear cases where a counsel is a relative up to
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
D. Duty to Improve the Law and the Administration of Justice
CANON 4: A judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in
activities to improve the law, the legal system and the administration of
justice. (Sections 1-15)
Albos v. Alaba, A.M.No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994. A judge who failed to
sign the order granting bail to the accused and who left for an out of town
was found to have been remised of his responsibility as a judge.
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Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013. The
S.C. held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should
decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that
may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific
to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to
disregard Judge Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal
compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and
the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note
the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the
Motion to Dismiss. .
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former
Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No.
RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.For his failure to sufficiently explain why
he failed to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for
decision/resolution, the S.C. imposed upon him administrative sanctions.
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.
The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his
judicial duties for his failure to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for
decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he
compulsorily retired. Such unreasonable delay in deciding cases and
resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining
cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency.
Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases
Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch
27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
The S. C. said that Carbonells failure to decide cases within the
reglamentary 90-day period without any justifiable and credible reasons
constitutes gross inefficiency. The reiterated that as a frontline official of the
Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain
professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his
guiding principle.
E. Duty to Avoid Conflict with Judicial Responsibilities
CANON 5: A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the
risk of conflict of judicial duties. (Sections 1 - 5)
Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543 SCRA.
The Court held that a judge cannot be suspended in the discharge of her
responsibilities until after conviction of a criminal offense she allegedly
committed has become final and executory.
Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38. The Court reminded the family
court judge to avoid using vulgar language in the course of the trial. Use of
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vulgar language insults a witness and may also diminish the respect of the
litigants towards the court because court proceedings are held in public.
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A. M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374.
The Court will not condone the acts of judges of accepting money from a
litigant with a pending case before his court nor should a judge be seen
dining with a litigant facing a criminal case before his court.
F. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence
CANON 6: Competence and Diligence (Sections 1-7)
Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon
City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013. S.C. said that
as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The Court reminded
parties that resort to judicial remedies must be exercised to question the
decision of the trial judge. Bad faith on the part of the trial judge should
never be imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.
Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559 SCRA 344. The
apparent bias exhibited by the judge shown in the delay in the legal
procedure cannot be condoned. S.C. held reminded judges of their pivotal
role in the administration of justice.
Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577 SCRA 93. S.C. held
that gross misconduct and serious lapses in the conduct of the affairs of the
court merit dismissal from the judiciary except for reasons of compassion,
the Court awarded the retirement benefits of the judge who died during the
pendency of this administrative case.
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutors Office, Tacloban City v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C.
Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M.
No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014. The Court held
Judge Bitas judge liable for gross ignorance of the law when he deviated
from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail and
aggravated his offense when he also granted bail to Miralles without neither
conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail When an error is
so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith.
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court reiterated
the rule that in administrative cases and disbarment proceedings, the
complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by
substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of
authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant
failed to establish Judge Austrias bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures
and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove
the accusations. Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her
judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
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complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for
every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a
judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal.
Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-
Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014. The Supreme Court
held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. In this case, the civil case was already
submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the
Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the
submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision
must be issued. In violation of this rule, Judge Regencia rendered judgment
only more than two years later the judge failed to proffer any acceptable
reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. .
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Rule 3.12. A Judge should take no part in proceeding where the
judges impartially might reasonably be questioned. These
cases include, among others, proceedings where:
The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustees or
lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of
the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or
lawyer was a material witness therein;
The judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant
within the sixth degree or to co-counsel within the fourth degree;
The judge knows that his spouse or child has a financial interest, as
heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
1. Voluntary Inhibition: When voluntary inhibition be done: A judge
is allowed under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary inhibit from a case for just or valid
reasons other than those grounds of disqualification.
Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T.
Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-
203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013. Complainant
charged Justice Hernando with manifest bias because he voluntarily
inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the
promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions.
Complainant alleged that she should have been informed of the voluntary
inhibition. The Court, however, said that under the internal rules of the
C.A., the same was not necessary. In the spirit of transparency, the Court
held that henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should
be immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or voluntary
inhibition of the Justice who has participated in any action of the court,
stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the
disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause
injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause.
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How remittal is effected: This process is allowed under Section 6 of the
same Canon which provides:
A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of disqualification. If, based on
such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judges
participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial
or unsubstantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The
Agreement, signed by all the parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in
the record of the proceedings.
V. Discipline of Members of the Judiciary
A. Members of the Supreme Court: Impeachment. (Section 2, Article
XI, 1987 Constitution); Grounds; and Proceedings
In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-19, S.C. The
Court fined a retired justice of the Supreme Court with P500, 000.00 and
indefinite suspension for premature release of a decision involving the
citizenship requirement of a member of the House of Representatives.
In Re: Letter Complaint of Atty. Pena against Justices Carpio and Sereno,
A.M. No. 12-6-11- SC. The Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty.
Pena to substantiate his allegations and that the same are purely conjectures
which cannot be a subject of judicial review.
B. Discipline of Appellate Justices and Lower Court Judges: Read
Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
1. Jurisdiction over disciplinary cases: The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline appellate justices and lower court judges.
2. Vote required dismissing a member of the judiciary: A majority vote of
all justices who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial judges
4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture of
benefits and disbarment
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Daniel R. Liangco (A.C.
No.5355, December 11, 2011). A trial court judge was dismissed from
service for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. He allowed a
local government unit to take possession and awarded ownership of a
private property without any expropriation proceedings having been filed by
the government. As a defense, the judge said that what he rendered was not
a decision but only an opinion. After his dismissal, the Court initiated
disbarment proceedings against him before the IBP. The IBP recommended
his disbarment which the Court affirmed.
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D. Costs: Recovery of costs (Rule 142): a) Prevailing party; b) Dismissed
appeal or action
c) Frivolous appeal; d) False allegations; and e) Non-appearance of
witness
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The Court further said that to deserve the trust and confidence of the people,
Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have her dealings with the public to be
always sincere and above board. She should not lead others to believe that
despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to
influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the
expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had
deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the
complainant in the adoption of her niece and nephew.
Concerned Citizen v. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br.
50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16,
2013.Respondent stenographer was dismissed from service for gross
dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was
accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility
Examination in her stead. Before the Decision was imposed, however,
respondent resigned but the Court said that despite this, it did not lose
jurisdiction over the complaint and that it did not warrant the dismissal of
the same. The Court emphasized that cessation from office by virtue of her
intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when
she was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the
administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility
for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
The Court therefore also ordered her eligibility to be cancelled, her
retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-
employment in the government service to be perpetual. Her intervening
resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer
be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of
the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49,
et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690. . The Court held that respondents acts of
using the levied car for personal errands and losing it while under their
safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. The
Court said misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior,
willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. A misconduct is grave
or gross if it is out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful
or such conduct as is not to be excused. Such flagrant and shameful acts
and should not be countenanced. Respondents acts warrant the penalty of
dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As for respondent Buencamino,
his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him.
Respondent Buencaminos acts take away the publics faith in the judiciary,
and these acts should be sanctioned despite his death.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are repositories of public trust and are
under obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and
to the best of their abilities. Being frontline officials of the justice
system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public
trust in the performance of their duties.
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Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P. ___________:
For the respondents lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the
writ of execution, he was found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as
the failure of an employee to give attention to the task expected of him.
Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave . Section 53 of the same
Rules allows the disciplining authority to consider mitigating circumstances
in favor of the respondent. The court considered his length of service in the
Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family
circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was
also found to be entitled to the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his
more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a clear record other than
for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the
informal settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-
grounded recognition that he could not undertake any demolition without
the appropriate court order. After considering the attendant facts and the
mitigating circumstances, the court also considered that the efficiency of
court operations may ensue if the respondents work were to be left
unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of
fine instead of suspension from service.
Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant
IV and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014.
The Court held that the act of soliciting or receiving money from litigants
constitutes grave misconduct. The S.C. reiterated that The Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest
in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not
receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the
judiciary. Further, court personnel cannot take advantage of the
vulnerability of partylitigants. In this case, respondents were found guilty
of grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from holding public office
in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government
owned or controlled corporations.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No.
P-04-1903, September 10, 2013. The S.C. once again called the attention of
court personnel that no position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a
heavy burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of
justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity.
They must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work there.
The respondent court employees were meted out with penalties because the
audit team of the Court discovered cash shortages in the books of accounts
of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty.
Apusen is primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court,
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whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is
under his supervision and control. As custodian of court funds, revenues,
records, properties and premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk,
Savadera is an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of
collecting money belonging to the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably
failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages.
Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-
13-3141. January 21, 2014. The Court held that in this case, Dela Cruz
failed to live up to these exacting standards. The inculpatory acts committed
by Dela Cruz are so grave as to call for the most severe administrative
penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a
grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service. This penalty is
in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc.,
et al. /Re: Report on the financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan
Trial Court etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January
21, 2014. The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her
liability does not exculpate Atty. Buencamino from her own negligence. A
clerk of court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel
of the court. The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to
the prompt and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As
custodian of court funds and revenues, the clerk of court is primarily
accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally
received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision
and control. Atty. Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties
as clerk of court. Atty. Buencamino failed to supervise Mapue and to
properly manage the court funds entrusted to her,
Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25,
Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014. Sheriff Macusi was
held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for simple neglect of duty
which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due
to carelessness or indifference. The Court held that the 30-day period
imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment has been received by
the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory. A
return which Macusi referred to as his Partial Report is not acceptable
because the court issues a writ, it is incumbent upon the sheriff to enforce it.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-
13-3132, June 4, 2014. The Court dismissed from service Ampong for being
liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil
Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Under
section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b)
forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
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government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every
employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness,
and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069,
January 20, 2014. The Court said that absent a TRO, an order of quashal,
or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff
has no alternative but to enforce the writ. The S.C. did not find the sheriff
guilty of the charge of grave misconduct. He did not enforce the writ of
execution because there was still a pending Motion for Reconsideration
before the trial court. S.C. said that misconduct has been defined as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must
necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. In this case, there
was no element of misconduct established against the accused.
The sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion
whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his
hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in
accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the
order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein
where the nature of the case requires immediate execution.
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