National Law Institute University, Bhopal

7th Trimester

Subject: International Trade Law

Analysis of:
The Dispute Resolution System within the
World Trade Organization

Submitted to:
Prof. Monica Raje

Submitted by:
Aveak Ganguly
2012BALLB80
INDEX
INDEX ............................................................................................................................................ 2
INTRODUCTION TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION ........................................................................ 3
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY ........................................................................................ 4
I Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) - article 2 of the DSU .................................................... 4
II Director-General and Secretariat of WTO ....................................................................... 4
III - Panels - articles 6, 7 and 8 of the DSU ............................................................................ 5
IV Appellate Body - article 17 of the DSU.......................................................................... 5
V - Arbitrators - article 25 of the DSU ................................................................................... 5
VI - Experts - article 13 and appendix 4 of the DSU .............................................................. 6
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE ............................................................................ 8
Pre-litigation stage ...................................................................................................................... 8
Litigation stage............................................................................................................................ 8
Timeframe ................................................................................................................................... 9
Retaliation and Sanction ............................................................................................................... 11
Confidentiality Factor ................................................................................................................... 12
WTO Dispute Settlement Jurisprudence ....................................................................................... 13
Weakness and Loophole review in the WTO Dispute Resolution System ................................... 14
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 16
INTRODUCTION TO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) annex II of all total 6 annexes of WTO
establishment agreement, done at Marrakesh 15th April 1994, was one of the outcomes of the
Uruguay Round negotiations, adopted by WTO as its dispute settlement system.

DSU can be considered as a sui generis system that stands alone within the WTO system. It
serves as government to government Dispute resolution procedure in which only WTO members
themselves may invoke WTO right and enforce WTO obligations vis--vis other member, since
such right and obligations are only applicable as between the members themselves.

The main objective of the DSU is to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if they are
found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreement. That is if a countrys trade measure has been
found to violate its WTO obligations, towards trade relationship with other country, or best
described in Art.3 (2) of the DSU as follow:

The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve
the balance of rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.

With certain exceptions, the DSU is uniformly applicable to differences that arise in the context
of all WTO agreements. WTO demands that all its Members respect the rules in the interests of a
safer and more reliable multilateral trade system. In this sense, WTO Members have agreed that,
when they judge that other Members have broken trade rules, they shall refer the matter to the
dispute settlement mechanism rather than adopting unilateral measures. This involves complying
with the agreed procedures and respecting the decisions reached by the dispute settlement bodies
set up for that purpose.
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY

WTO bodies include the political institution known as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and
the independent and quasi-judicial institutions that are the Panels, the Appellate Body and
Arbitrators:

I Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) - article 2 of the DSU

- Comprises a chairman (head of the permanent mission of one of the Member countries
appointed by consensus among the Members of WTO) and representatives of all WTO Members
(government representatives, usually diplomats who belong to ministries of trade or foreign
affairs). In their capacity as government officials, the representatives receive instructions from
their governments on the positions they must adopt and the statements they must make within the
DSB, hence the latter is considered a political body.

- The DSB is responsible for the application of the DSU, in other words it oversees the entire
dispute settlement procedure. It has the authority to set up panels, adopt panel and Appellate
Body reports, monitor the application of recommendations and authorize retaliatory measures
when a Member fails to comply with rulings.

- The DSB usually meets once a month and the Director-General may convene extraordinary
meetings at the request of Members. The staff of the WTO Secretariat provides administrative
support to the DSB.

- As a general rule, the DSB makes decisions by consensus. However, when the DSB sets up
panels, adopts reports or authorizes retaliation, the decision is automatically considered to be
adopted, unless there is a consensus to the contrary (a negative consensus).

II Director-General and Secretariat of WTO

- The Director-General of WTO participates in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the
following ways: The Director-General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices,
conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting Members to settle a dispute (article 5.6 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)),
especially in cases involving a less developed country;

If there is no agreement on the panelists, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or
Committee, shall convene DSB meetings and determine the composition of the panel (article
8.7);
The Director-General appoints an Arbitrator to determine a reasonable period of time if the
parties are unable to agree on a period of time or the appointment of an Arbitrator (article 21.3
c);

The Director-General shall examine proposed retaliatory measures in cases of non-

implementation (article 22.6). Within the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the Secretariat can act
in the following ways (article 27): Reports to the Director-General; provides assistance in respect
of dispute settlement to Members at their request; organizes special training courses and provides
additional legal advice and assistance to developing country Members; provides assistance to
parties in the formation of panels; and helps established panels and provides administrative
support to the DSB.

III - Panels - articles 6, 7 and 8 of the DSU

- Panels are quasi-judicial bodies responsible for settling differences between Members in the
first instance.

- They comprise three, and in exceptional cases five, experts specially selected for each case
(there is no permanent panel, but rather a different one is set up for each case). WTO Members
regularly put forward names to be included in the list kept by the Secretariat. People appointed to
a panel provide their services independently, in an individual capacity, and not as a
representative of any government or organization.

IV Appellate Body - article 17 of the DSU

- Unlike the panels, the Appellate Body is a standing body made up of seven members appointed
by the DSB by consensus and for a period of four years, with a maximum of two terms. The
Appellate Body examines the legal aspects of panel reports (rather than studying evidence or
facts), and represents the second and final instance of the legal process.

V - Arbitrators - article 25 of the DSU

- Arbitration is an alternative means of dispute settlement to panels and the Appellate Body.
Arbitrators can thus be called on to resolve certain issues at various stages of the dispute
settlement process (when there is no agreement on determining the reasonable period of time or
on the level of retaliation). Arbitral awards are not subject to appeal and may be enforced by the
DSB.
VI - Experts - article 13 and appendix 4 of the DSU
- Panels may seek the opinions of experts in dealing with technical or scientific issues, such as
when the case relates to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary Measures, Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

- Groups of experts act under the authority of the panel, and provide the latter with their opinion.
These groups carry out a purely consultative role. The final decision on legal issues and fact-
finding, based on expert opinion, remains with the panel.

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is composed from all Members of the WTO, has the sole
authority to establish panels no later than its second meeting from the considered written
request for a panel unless there is a consensus not to establish a panel.1 The request should
indicate the exhaustion of consultations, the specific measures in dispute and the legal basis of
the complaint.

The DSB also have the authority to accept or reject the panel findings or the results of an appeal.
It monitors the implementation of the rulings and recommendations, and has the power to
authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with a ruling or suspension of the ruling
with a reasonable reason of request.

Panel is an independent body consisting of three experts, to examine and produce

recommendations on a particular dispute in the light of WTO provisions. Members should be
selected with a view to ensuring their independence, a sufficiently diverse background and a
wide spectrum of experience.2 Citizens of Members whose governments are parties to the dispute
or third parties shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise.3

When a dispute is between a D/LDC and a DC, the panel shall, if the developing country
Member so requests, include at least one panellist from a developing country Member.4

Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or
body which it deems appropriate. However, before a panel seeks such information or advice
from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the authorities of
that Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such
information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate. In theory, failure to submit

1
DSU Article. 6.
2
Composition of panels, Article 8(2), Annex 2, Understanding the Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes.
3
Composition of panels, Article 8(3), Annex 2, Understanding the Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes.
4
DSU, Article 8(10).
information can have serious consequences, in the sense it may give rise to appropriate
inferences.

Panels are allowed to choose whether to access non-requested information submitted to them by
private sector and NGO groups, and any other information they may find relevant.

The panel may suspend its work at any time at the request of the complaining party for a period
not to exceed 12 months. In the event of such a suspension, the time-frames set out in DSU;
paragraphs 8 and 9 article 12, paragraph 1 of Article 20, and paragraph 4 of Article 21 shall be
extended by the amount of time that the work was suspended. If the work of the panel has been
suspended for more than 12 months, the authority for establishment of the panel shall lapse.5

Either side can appeal a panels ruling. Sometimes both sides do so. Appeals have to be based on
points of law such as legal interpretation, however, they cannot re-examine existing evidence or
examine new issues.6

Each appeal is heard by three members out of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body set up
by the Dispute Settlement Body and broadly representing the range of WTO membership.
Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms with the possibility of being re-appointed
once.7 They have to be individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international
trade, not affiliated with any government.8

5
DSU Article 12(12).
6
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
7
Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm>
8
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURE

Pre-litigation stage

Consultations: A filing of a Request for Consultations is the official beginning of the dispute
within WTO and brings the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU) into play. Consultations provide parties with the opportunity to debate the issue
and find a satisfactory solution without resorting to litigation. The party complained against must
reply to the request within 10 days after the date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in
good faith within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the
Member does not comply with this time frame, then the Member that requested the holding of
consultations may proceed directly to the litigation stage and request the establishment of a
panel. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the
request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel (article
4.7). However, governments are in permanent contact, and agreement may be reached at any
stage of the process (article 4). Along with good offices, conciliation and mediation,
consultations are the main non-judicial or diplomatic instrument in the WTO dispute settlement
system.

Litigation stage

1st stage (panel): If the consultations fail to settle a dispute, the complaining party may request
establishment of a panel by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The panel must be established
within 45days of the request. Once established, the panel must produce a report for the DSB
within six to nine months. This report must include an objective assessment of the facts of the
case and an examination of the measures in dispute, using the relevant provisions of the
appropriate legal instruments.

2nd stage (optional recourse to the Appellate Body): The Appellate Body examines the legal
aspects of the challenge and may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of
the panel (article 17.13).

According to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU), parties may adopt three positions in relation to reports:
Implementation: it is insisted that the party failing to fulfil its obligations comply with the
recommendations of the panel or Appellate Body. When it is impossible to do so immediately,
the DSB may establish a reasonable period of time for implementation.

Payment of compensation: when the offending party exceeds the reasonable period of time
without implementing the recommendations or determinations, the complainant may ask for
compensation. The offending party may also offer compensation.

Retaliatory measures: when the offending party fails to comply with recommendations and
refuses to offer compensation, the affected party may request DSB authorization to introduce
retaliatory measures against the offending country. In principle, these measures must be
applicable in the same sectors in which the panel has established the existence of an offence.
Only if this were considered impossible would could the application of retaliatory measures in
other sectors of the same agreement is authorized.

Timeframe
In order to provide sufficient time for the Members (DSB) to consider panel reports, the reports
shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until 20 days after the date they have been
circulated to the Members.9

Members having objections to a panel report shall give written reasons to explain their objections
for circulation at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting at which the panel report will be
considered.10
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be
adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision
to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.

The panel submits its findings containing the facts, the applicable provision of the relevant
covered agreement, rationales, and recommendations in the form of a written report to the DSB
within six months, and within three month in urgent cases including those relating to perishable
goods.

If a party has notified its decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for
adoption by the DSB until after completion of the appeal. This adoption procedure is without
prejudice to the right of Members to express their views on a panel report.11

9
DSU, Art 16(1).
10
DSU, Art 16(2).
11
DSU, Art 16(4).
The appeal can uphold, modify or reverse the panels legal findings and conclusions. Normally
appeals should not last more than 60 days, with an absolute maximum of 90 days.12

The Dispute Settlement Body has to accept or reject the appeals report within 30 days and
rejection is only possible by consensus.13

If the respondent country loses, it must follow the panel report or the appellate body
recommendation. If immediate compliance with the recommendation turns out to be impractical,
the member will be given a reasonable period of time to do so. If it fails to act within this
period, it has to enter into negotiations with the complaining country (or countries) in order to
determine mutually-acceptable compensation for instance, tariff reductions in areas of
particular interest to the complaining side.14

If after 20 days, no satisfactory compensation is agreed, the complaining side may ask the
Dispute Settlement Body for permission to impose limited trade sanctions (suspend concessions
or obligations) against the other side. The Dispute Settlement Body must grant this
authorization within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless there is a
consensus against the request.15

12
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
13
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
14
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
15
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
RETALIATION AND SANCTION
The earliest stage of what can be categorized as retaliation is the provision of compensation16
that should be resorted only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable.

After the case has been decided, there is more to do before trade sanctions (the conventional
form of penalty) are imposed. The priority at this stage is for the defendant to bring its policy
into line with the ruling or recommendations. The dispute settlement agreement stresses that
prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.17

In principle, the sanctions should be imposed in the same sector as the dispute. If this is not
practical or would not be effective, the sanctions can be imposed in a different sector of the same
agreement, this practices called cross-retaliations.18

The first time that the WTO ever endorsed the right of cross retaliation case is in Ecuador - EC-
Bananas III case. Ecuador while collaborating as a claimant with the US made a careful
separate move to seek an authority to retaliate against the EU by induce benefits in areas outside
of merchandise trade in goods marking Ecuadors innovative request to cross retaliate focused
on the intellectual property rights of European firms in several sensitive sectors, including
industrial design patents, copyrights in the music industry, and (most significantly) geographical
indications for alcoholic beverages. By obtaining this authority, Ecuador signaled its
commitment to press for full compliance on the part of the EU, enhancing its leverage in
subsequent negotiations.

16
DSU Article 3(7)
17
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
18
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
CONFIDENTIALITY FACTOR
Complainants should not bring trade remedy cases simply to uncover their competitors business
secret nor should they be deterred from bringing cases by the fear that their own business secret
would be revealed. Law does not permit the release of information submitted to the investigating
authorities, including to a WTO panel, without the consent of the party submitting it.
Nevertheless, the argument that a member is precluded by the confidential provisions of a WTO
agreement body from submitting information to a WTO panel is explicitly rejected. As the panel
have the right to request for information that is deemed to be needed.19

Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization
from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member providing the information.20

Finally panels have repeatedly emphasized their willingness to create special procedures beyond
the general rules in the DSU to protect Business Confidential Information (BCI).

However, unfortunately incident of breach of confidentiality happen in the EC-Export Subsidies

on Sugar Australia, Brazil and Thailand as a claimant in dispute regarding the different quotas
and price level of three different classification of sugar.

Brazil informed the Panel on 2 June 2004 that the amicus curiae brief submitted by WVZ; an
European Company, disclosed information that Brazil had submitted to the Panel in confidential.
Brazil, accordingly, wished to bring this breach of confidentiality to the Panel's attention, and
requested that the Panel "investigate how the breach occurred". Thailand supported the request
made by Brazil in this regard.

Australia also observed that the cost of production data cited by WVZ also include a confidential
information submitted by Australia and requested the Panel to undertake an investigation of the
source of the information cited by WVZ.

The Panel has come to the conclusion that a breach of confidentiality did occur in the framework
of these proceedings. The Panel is therefore concerned and deeply deplores this breach of
confidentiality and the disregard of a requirement imposed by the DSU and the Panel's Working
Procedures. The Panel considers that it has used its best endeavors to investigate the alleged
breach of confidentiality. However, the Panel has not been able to determine the source of the
breach. The Panel thereby reports the incident to the Dispute Settlement Body.

19
DSU Article 13
20
DSU, Art 13(1).
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The jurisdiction of DSB has been accepted by all WTO members through their ratification of the
WTO treaty. Thus a WTO member cannot refuse to participate in a WTO dispute settlement
procedure if a complaint is brought against it.

Panels and the Appellate Body also often cite principles of public international law. In this
regard, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is frequently referred to as a guide in
interpreting the WTO agreements.

WTO dispute settlement mechanism, operates on amalgam of the two; a common law and, or a
civil law model. It is authorized to interpret the facts and arguments before on its own authority
as well as in light of stare decisis nevertheless; panels are not formally bound by prior decisions
or interpretations.

The WTO dispute settlement system is a court of limited jurisdiction in two relevant senses: (a)
the claims that it can consider, and (b) the law it can apply. Or in broader terms are as follows;

a) Distinguish between the use of general international law in connection with the
interpretation and construction of WTO law, and the use of general international law as
applicable law.

b) Distinguish between jurisdiction over claims and jurisdiction to apply law. As explained
above, the WTO dispute settlement system only deals with claims of violation of WTO
law. So the critical question is whether WTO dispute settlement includes jurisdiction to
apply other international law in cases based on claims of violation of WTO law. The
main point is whether WTO dispute settlement can bring in non-WTO law as a
substantive defense against a claim of violation of WTO law.
WEAKNESS AND LOOPHOLE REVIEW IN
THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SYSTEM
The compensation provision21 can be misused as a covered bribery and probably will
not reach its original intention. Compensation might be used by the politicians or
statesman of the winning D/LDCs as a short cut to enrich them self, result of unavoidable
dependency of D/LDCs for short term liquidity that fulfilled by the value of the
compensation or simply just the easiest and cheapest way for the DC to avoid further and
fair consequences that it should bear of it is unfair trade practices. This additional
intention deviation will defect the WTO objective for fair trade liberalization between
countries.

The panels adjudications are not bound to follow stare decisis, which has been affirmed
in India- Patent Protection for pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical products.22
This means that the panel may hold and recommend quite the opposite of what was held
previously in similar disputes. This situation may cause uncertainty in law and under
certain condition can make the panel prone to an allegation of error of logic, because of
non-sequitur recommendation.

The Appellate Body cannot re-examine existing evidence23 which probably could have a
different impact to the dispute resolution outcome.

The arguments that such data did not yet exist and the confidentiality argument can be
used as a shield by the party obliged to present it; therefore the panels decision can be
infringed by having analysed incomplete or non-existence data. The burden of proof then
fall into the hands of the claimant solely without the lenience of the confidentiality
doctrine shall he tried to present the deemed necessary evidence that is claimed as
confidential by the respondent.

The DSU places emphasis on speeding the resolution process of disputes and imposes
strict time frames. Nonetheless, delays in the process remain common. In fact the time
frame is typically exceeded by an average of eight month. Delayed implementation is

21
DSU article 3(7).

22
WT/DS79/R, adopted 22 September 1998, DSR 1998: VI, 2661.
23
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes; A unique contribution
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm>
 almost common feature of compliance by the US, the EC, Japan, Canada and Australia
while the D/LDCs have mostly been well of implementing the DSB ruling within the
given time limit. Recent examples of such officially endorsed delay in the main include:
US subsidies on upland cotton,24 EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar,25 Mexico-Definitive
anti-dumping on beef and rice26 and US Softwood Lumber IV.27

There are no legal test criteria for the admissible of an appeal.

There is no minimum threshold for even the clearest cases of violation. It is therefore
benefiting mostly to the DCs. A developing country lacks this economic advantage
suffered more. And if it wins the case against a DC, it still obliged to wait out the appeal
process without any right to compensation for past damages.

There are no definitive criteria about reasonable time for implementation of the
recommendation, retaliation, countermeasure and its suspension (SCOO).

The System does not provide any remedy for past damages.

Hard to measure the fair and equal countermeasure.

24
WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 2001, DSR 2001:XII, 6027
25
DS 265, 266, 283
26
DS295/R, DS295/AB/R, adopted on 20 December 2005
27
Art.21(5)-Canada, 257/AB/RW, adopted on 20 December 2005
CONCLUSION
The core of disputes in the WTO is about broken promises. WTO members believe that their
trading partners whom must also a member of the WTO has failed to exercise the agreed trade
practices. Members however are expected to use their own resources to resolve the dispute
before lodging them to the DSB, and only use the DSB as the last resort.

WTO members filed 17 new disputes in 2010, slightly higher than 14 in 2009 and total 419
disputes since 1995.28 Despite its shortcoming and some failures, it is one of the most effective
international dispute resolution systems.

Prevention of the disputes should have obtain more emphasis in the light of the WTO members;
to contribute to improve adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines, and commitments
under the multilateral trade agreements and, where applicable, the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, and hence to smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.
Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of
the full range of individual Members trade policies and practices and their impact on the
functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not however, intended to serve as a basis for
the enforcement of specific obligations under the agreements or for dispute settlement procedure
or to impose new policy commitments on Members.

The WTOs underscores and respects the law in general meaning in their efforts to make the
dispute settlement system more secure, definite and affixed. The system so far is defined in the
best possible narrative compilation of words to ensure its non-ambiguity and clarity of meaning,
accomplished with timetables for completing a case but without a means of settling disputes, the
rules-based system would be worthless because the rules could not be enforced.

The WTO system works only to the extent of how members want it to work, and within the
consideration of the effect of compliance to their overall economic interest. The Dispute
Settlement system is effective if it can safely be said to put an end to the dispute with a mutual
acceptation of the panel recommendation and set back the fair trade measures between countries.
However like everything else in life, the system is not perfect but for the time being it is the best
that available.

28
WTO 2011 Annual Report.