the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Appasaheb and Another v.

State of Maharashtra
reported in (2007) 9 SCC 721, wherein the Honble Apex Court has held as under:

Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under:

2. Definition of dowry.- In this Act, dowry means any property or valuable security given
or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the
marriage or to any other person,
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties,
but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law
(Shariat) applies.

11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word dowry any property or valuable security
should be given or agreed or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage
of the parties and a correlation to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time
after the and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or
taking marriage of property between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with
the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed.
Dowry is a fairly well-known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of
interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business
of transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or
transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be
construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India v. Garage Nylons Ltd. and
Chemical and Fibres India Ltd. v. Union of India). A demand for money on account of some
financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure
cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood.
Dying declaration given b

The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is
made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world
is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must
be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of
the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a
man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of
his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are
dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that
the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its
truthfulness and correctness.

In the case of Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2010) 14 SCC 444], the Court
expressed a caution that a mechanical approach in relying upon the dying declaration just
because it is there, is extremely dangerous. The court has to examine a dying declaration
scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary,
truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by other persons and
where these ingredients are satisfied, the Court expressed the view that it cannot be said that
on the sole basis of a dying declaration, the order of conviction could not be passed.

When there is variance in dying declaration there must be corroborative evidence to the dying
declaration.1 The Supre Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. JayaraiBhai Punjabhai VAru
has observed that the trend of accepting dying declaration which supports the prosecution
alone and rejecting innocent dying declaration is extremely dangerous

In Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. (2004) 9 SCC 713, this Court had occasion to consider
the legality and acceptability of two dying declarations. Noticing the inconsistency between
the two dying declarations, the Court held that it is not safe to act solely on the said
declarations to convict the accused persons

1 State of Rajasthan and Shravan Ram and another, 2013 ALL M.R. (Cri.) 2254 (SC.)
So in the present case there