‘This documeat has been reviewed pursuant te Executive Cxder 13526 and has been determined tobe decasiied Visit by Deputy Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi Our Objectives ‘ ~-Confidence Building: to assure the Egyptians of our readiness to hear their point of view and prepare the most receptive possible atmosphere for your visit to Cairo. ~-To convince Egypt that it is in its rational interest to have a stable ceasefire and a release of POWs prior to your trip, in order to create conditions in which we can all focus on negotiations looking toward a final settlement. ~-To_lay the groundwork for two important purposes of your trip: (1) to get Sadat's agreement to enter "joint auspices” negotiations without demanding Israeli acceptance of Egyptian preconditions on the territorial issue. (2) to per: \d_get him to help persuade the Arab oil producers, that an end of O31 embargoes and prod is necessary if we are to play an effective ¥ole in the peacemaking process. Analysis Fahmi (accompanied by al-Brian and Sirri) is coming for the stated purpose of reviewing the events of the past few days and giving us Egypt's view on a set-lement. 1. The Ceasefire Problem The despatch of Fahmi presumably reflects Sadat's concern at the military gains the Israelis have SECRET_- NODIS. ‘Reproduced at the Non Preside Library DECLASSIFIED= SECRET - NOpIS ~ Fs made since the first ceasefire resolution. Fahmi may take the position that Israeli willingness to move back to the October 22 lines, freeing the lines of communication to the trapped Egyptian III Corps, must « be the test of whether the superpowers are really serious in their commitment to work for a fair peace settlement. From all indications, emotions are running high on this scoré in Cairo. We surmise Sadat is in a tender mood at the moment. With the ceasefire he has salvaged a reasonable temporary situation out of a rapidly deteriorating military predicament, but he knows it is precarious. He is nervous about the fate of his III Corps, realizing that if the Israelis are allowed to force the surrender of this large force the “ceasefire with honor" that he has barely achieved would turn into a catastrophe. Even if the Israelis allow him to xeprovision the force and leave it in place, he recognizes Israel can hold it hostage for concessions. His position is sufficiently uncomfortable to make it possible that Cairo may make Israeli withdrawal to the initial ceasefire positions a pre-requisite for continuing peace negotiations. Behind this, there looms continuing distrust in Sadat's mind that in spite of the assurances he has xeportedly received from Moscow, he may yet be "sold out" by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. We do not know the nature of the Soviet assurances, but these probably went far in assuring Sadat of support for the achievement of his objectives through political action. Neither Sadat nor Moscow, however, has forgotten the long period of strain in their relations before the fighting: Sadat will be suspiciously watching for signs that the superpowers are making a deal at his expense. 2. Peace Settlement Terms A second purpose of Fahmi's trip may be to make sure we have-Cairo's views on the terms of a peace settlement early in the game, before Israeli pressures SECRET. ‘Reproduced at the Nixon Preside Library DECLASSIFIED ‘hi document ube even’ poss asi Oran hat Dr dete! ob ees ; n reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526.and has been determined to be declassifiedSECRET ~ NODIS Se on us begin to take effect, and before any "illusion about Egypt's position take hold in Washington. In his October 16 speech, Sadat said he would accept a |. ceasefire only if the resolution called for an israeli « commitment to withdraw to the pre-June 1967 lines. Sadat has settled for less than this under the pressure of military reverses in the last days of the war, but total withdrawal from Egyptian territory undoubtedly remains the cornerstone of, Egyptian policy. In his October 16 speech Sadat called for "clarity in objective, and clarity in means." Fahmi may come with the message that Cairo cannot enter negotiations that axe open-ended on the crucial territorial issue. This will not be the occasion, in our judgment, to foreshadow our own thinking on the substance of a peace settlement, although we may feell we have to gO somewhat further down this road when you see Sadat next week. For this occasion we should listen to what the Egyptians have to say, ourselves stressing that we attach the greatest importance to entry by the parties into early negotiations, before momentum is lost and attitudes begin to harden. Such negotiations can only get underway if both sides agree to enter them without preconditions as to the final outcome. Talking Points 1. General I welcome this chance for am early review of the situation with President Sadat"s representatives. I look forward to visiting Cairo next week, and these talks will help lay a useful basis. We have worked hard-in Moscuy and subsequently from Washington this past week - to get the fighting stopped in circumstances that make the prospects favor— able for progress toward a just and durable peace. \ Novis ‘Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library “DECLASSIFIED “This documeat has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decinssiied© r SECRET - NODIS This meant getting a ceasefire under honorable conditions for both sides. The Moscow agreement, coupled with our success the past few days in getting Israel to agree to relief supplies to the Egyptian III Corps and to discuss stabilizing the ceasefire with Egypt, have in our view produced such conditions. 2. On the Ceasefire Situation -- We are encouraged by the meeting which we helped arrange between Egyptian and Israeli military representatives, and the fact that a convoy with relief supplies has been allowed to pass through Israeli lines to the Egyptian III Corps. - We would like to see the situation of the III Corps stabilized, and will continue to use our influence with Israel to this end. Israel too, however, has its concerns, and there must be a two-way street. Israel would like an early and total POW exchange. 3. On the Terms of a Pedce Settlement -- Following stabilization of the ceasefire, which we will continue to work on, and a POW exchange, the first order of business will be getting negotiations underway between the parties. We want to do this fairly urgently to maintain the initial momentum of the Security Council resolutions, and before attitudes begin to solidify into their old molds. We would be interested in Egypt's present views about the terms of a peace settlement and the means of arriving at these terms. The U.S. is ready to attempt to arrange negotiations under joint US-Soviet auspices. NopIs Reproduced a the Nixon Presid Library DECLASSIFIED. “This document has been reviewed pursuant to Exceutive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassifiedSECRET - NODIS 4. On the Oil Problem -- ‘the United States has commited itself to work jointly with the Soviet Union to help the ‘ parties to achieve a peace settlement. We intend to live up to that commitment. -- We can only do so, however, if there is some degree of trust in our intentions. We cannot play this role under threats or pressure. For one thing, it would be exceedingly difficult for the President to muster the support he will need domestically to pursue the kind of role the Arabs want if, at the same time, we are being subjected to an ofl embargo. I will have more to Say on this subject when I get to Cairo but want to flag it now for Fahmi, because it is of major concern to us. SECRET - NODIS ‘Reproduced atthe Nan Presid! Library. + "DECLASSIFIED : “This dacument has been reviewed pursant to Execitive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified