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WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES Cambridge, 1932-1935 From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald Edited by ALICE AMBROSE GREAT BOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY B Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive Amherst, New York 14228-2197Published 2001 by Prometheus Books ‘Whagenstens Lecures, Cambridge, 1932-1935: From the Notes of Alice ‘Anbrose and Margaret Macdonald. Copyright© 2001 by Alice Ambrose. All rights reseed. No par ofthis publication may be reprodiced, sored in & retieval stem, o wanted in any form or by any mess, digi le tronic, mechanical, photocopying, earn, o obese, or conveyed vathe Inmeret oa Web st without pr writen permission of the publiaber, except inthe eae of bref quotation embodied in ical aices and reviews. Ingles shoul be addressed to Prometheus Books 8 John Giemn Drive “Amer, New York 14228-2197 ‘VOICE: 716-891-0133, ext. 207 FAX: 716-564-2111 [WWW.PROMETHEUSBOOKS.COM: 05 04 08 3432 © 1979 by Alice Ambrose Fis US. paperback edison, Phoenix Books Division of “The University of Chicago Pres (1982). Library of Congress Casloging n-Publication Data Wingenstin, Ludvig, 1889-195. (Lectures, Cambie, 1932-1935] Wintgeasti’s errs, Cambridge, 1932-1935 from the notes of ‘Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald ededby Alice Ambrote 'p em. — (Great book in philosophy) ‘rignally published Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Litefeld, 1979. Inches biographical references. ISBN 1-57302-875-5, 1, Filson: 2. Mathematics—Pilosopty. I. Ambrose, Alice, 1906-2001. 1: Macdonald, Margaret I. Tide. IV. Series, 183376 W561 2001 192-421 2001019037 Prine inthe United Stes of Ameria onside paper LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN was born in Vienna, Aust, on ‘April 26, 1889, the youngest of eight children of a leading Austrian ‘Mesimaker. Educated at home until age fourteen, Wittgenstein then studied mathematics and natural sciences in an Austrian school, and Inter studied mechanical engineering for two years in Berlin, Ger- ‘many. In 1908 he engaged in seronaucal research in England He eg- {istered as a research suident athe University of Manchester, where he ‘worked in an engineering Inboraory. Bertrand Russel’s book The Principles of Mathematics (1903) had a profound influence on ‘Wingenstein, and he lft the university in 1911 to study mathematicl logic with Russell at Cambridge. ‘Wittgenstein remained at Cambridge until 1913, when he traveled to Skjolden, Norway, where he secluded himself to continue is study of ogie. Upon the outbreak of World War I he enlisted in the Austrian farm, eventually serving a an artillery officer on both the easter and ‘westem fonts. Throughout the wa, Wiigenstein continued © work on the problems of philosophy and logic. recording his thoughis in note books At the end ofthe war, he sent his manuscript to Russell, who ound a publisher for his work. Published in 1921, the Tractats Logico-Philosophicus bas been ‘universally admired, This work covers avast range of topics: the nature ‘of language; the limits of what canbe sai: loge, thes, and philoso- phys causality and iaduction; the self andthe will; death and the mys- ‘ical; good and evi, ‘Upon returning to civilian ie in 1919, Witgentein gave away the large fortune he ad inherited from his father, an lived a frogal and simple lf, Feeling that he could contribute nothing more to philoso- phy after publication of he racttus he searched for anew vocation, first teaching elementary schoo in Austria for several years then tur ‘ng to gardening and architecture. ‘In 1929 Witgenstein flt that once aguin he could do creative workin philorophy. He returned to Cambridge in 1929, where he was made a fellow of Trinity College. Through his lectures andthe wide circulatin of notes taken by his students he gradually came t exert, ‘a poverful influence on pilosophical though throughout the English- speaking world, In 1936 he began his second major work, Philosoph- leal Investigations 11939 Witgenstein was appointed to the chair in philosophy at(Cambridge University. During World War II be left Cambridge and ‘worked as «porter in Guy's hoepital in London and then a labora tory asitant inthe Royal Victoria Infirmary. In 1944 he returned to (Cambridge as profesor of philosophy, but resigned his cairn 1947 “He completed the Investigations in 1949, which he instructed should ‘be published ony after his death. Frequently ill during his remaining years, Wingenstein was diag- ‘nosed with cancer in 1949. He died in Cambridge, England, on Apeil 29, 1951. Philosophical Investigations was published in 1953, Contents Editor's Preface Par I Philosophy. Lectures, 1932-33 Part I. The Yellow Book (Selected Pats) Par ll, Lectures, 1934-35 Par IV, Philosophy for Mathematicians. Lectures, 1932-33 nEditor's Preface ‘The difficulties I have encountered in editing these notes, which ‘were inken from 1932 10 1935 when I attended Witgenstein’s lectures, have been raultipied by my not having notes of other members ofthe same clases against which 10 check my own, except for the year 1934-35, when Dr. Margaret Macdonald and I shared our notes. The first draft I made on leaving Cambridge was a compilation of her notes tnd mine fo that year, ad the original draft of her notes was kindly ‘made available to me’ by Mr. Rush Rhees, together with scattered ‘notes which Wittgenstein made at the time be gave the lecture ofthe Easter term of 1934-35. For the lectures of 1932-33, my fst year in ‘Cambridge, Ihave had to depend solely on my notes and my memory, both of lectures ofthat year entitled "Philosophy for Mathematicians” And of lectures (oa larger class throughout the yea. "The so-called Yellow Book consists of notes taken durin the year 1933-34 by Ms, Margaret Masterman and myself of lectures and in- formal discussions during intervals in the dictation of The Blue Book ‘What appears here as Part TT includes only my own notes, not those of Ms, Masterman. Notes taken on the same material by Francis Skinner, ‘ow deceased, were included inthe Yellow Book bat formed only a small part of the total, It seemed to me better on the whole t0 use nates for which I alone was responsible "My concern has been to presenta connected and fitful account of ‘what Wingensein std, Some ofthe people who might have aided me inthis endeavor by providing me with notes for comparison with my ‘own are now dead. The notes of others who were in the classes Were too meagre to be used. Wingenstein's published writings, wherever ‘they contain material overlapping with my own, are ‘of coursexii "EDITOR'S PREFACE confirmation. Where materials are not treated in the manuscripts now published, Ihave simply recorded what I had, in order o make related {exts available to philosophers. A few ofthe notes were too confused (oF obscure to permit of ineligible reconstruction, and these Ihave ‘omitted, my reason being that my noes rather than Witgenstein’s lee tures were at fault, [have also omitted notes which were duplications of well-known material already published in his Tractaus, I think he ‘would have been in agreement, and that his own deletions would have been far more extensive tis reasonable to suppose thatthe lectures entitled "Philosophy for Mathematicians” followed fairly closely the materials published in Philasophische Bemerkungen and in Phlosophische Granmatit, For this set of lectures was given in 1932-33, at about the time when Wingenstein had writen, or was writing, these two books. The notes, ofthese lectures are placed after those ofthe Easter term of 1934-35, rather than in their chronological order because of their connection ‘with the subject matter of that term. T am much indebied to two ‘mathematicians, Dr. G. T, Kneebone of Bedford College, London, and Professor H. S. M. Coxeter of Toronto University, who read cer ‘ain mathematical pars ofthese nots |AS might be expected, problems treated in the Yellow Book ate for the most part those treated in The Blue Book. Their main value lies in ‘heir sometimes being beter stated than in The Blue Book dictation, ‘hough certain things which I have included and which I think are important are not tobe found elsewhere. In addition to taking notes of lectures of 1933-34, Ms. Masterman and I took notes of his informal discussions in the intervals between dictation when, a8 he thought, and sometimes regreted, no record had been made of what he sad ‘Subsequent, explicit permission was given us to continue with note- ‘aking of his informal discussions have made litle atempr hereto collate what Ihave with his pob- lished works on a given topic, though in a few cases I have made references. Nor have I attempted always to follow the exact order of his presentation in lectures, Those who know his style of lecturing will remember tha atopic often recured, if only in a recapitulation, in a Subsequent lecture, and that even within a lecture comments on Some mater whose relevance was not clear to is class would be noted, dropped, and sometimes taken up again Inter. Chad at first thought £2 delete some of the repetitions which occurred throughout a tenm or ‘occurred in another year in lectures toa diferent class, but forthe tos pT have no done ths, a some cies have brought together i tcperaed ema ot neg tthe dacs ae ne fr Tense" exitece pots and frat. Thought, Uae in Rasher ever eal fm te ees fie as ern nee goose ne weament ofa ven problem. Ina manber of pcs | fete iuened comments of myo indeed by ogre backs, en omen ii th ee main seed ng, The Iria f th frst wo years ae ely en Ree the ore in Tach te tok tem up The mong odes hel ede and Tented for eomeien reference, Divisions in he nls ofthe ast Sear cole wit the sucetve letra each of he academic Wh ‘remains after culling and revising is, I think, substantially cone Noes when a the tepaning of 195233, ding my ist rs in Cong, th of te Testes called “Philosophy for Macca and ef ctrl “Philosophy” whch were ‘Menten clas, es sity. On the tha Bree at met of he nes in fl sevenes sort) fer Ting Clabes aves them fom the inacercy fom whch hey might Sve afd hese many yea er Intel esembing and et ipo temas fe te es fran hve el of reels sons tazcowns, who pve vero hs work teen Ph own ne! and Tam spy nee to hen fr what he Bt Sorts ero a cant of he esa rat ating res at en veg fire 9 cla pero. abled me 1 ret em 0 ho IFenn cts and aon Wiens rooms In Whew Fea. sa the ha of duson {ad with ©. Moore nhs hoya 6 Gon Ra, oe on pes Wiens naw Ss Inch ade poe forme ove sone oe lets (Meenen hch pment th storia he Yeas Conway, MassachusetsPART I Philosophy ‘Wingenstein’s Lectures 1932-33 From the notes of Alice Ambroseeet men ee Philosophy 1932-33 1 Lam going to exclude from our discussion questions which are an- swered by experience, Philosophical problems are nt solved by expe- Hence, for what we tlk about in philosophy are not facts but things for which facts are useful, Philosophical rouble arises through seeing ‘system of rules and seeing that things do nt ft it.I is like advance {ng and retreating fom a tee stump and seeing different things. We fo nearer, remember the rules, and fel satisfied, then retreat and feel ‘issatsied 12 Words and chess pieces are analogous; knowing how to use a word js like knowing how to move a chess piece. Now how do the rules tentr into paying the game? What is te difference between playing the game and aimlessly moving the pieces? 1 do not deny there is @ diference, but I want 10 say that knowing how a piece isto be used is nota particular state of mind which goes on while the game goes on ‘The mcaing of a word isto be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feling that attaches t the words. “How is the word used?” and “What is the grammar of the word?" I shall tke as being the same question. “The phrase, “bearer ofthe word", [Standing for what one points to in giving an ostensive definition), and “meaning of the word” have ‘emrely different grammars; the two are not synonymous. To expiin a ‘word suchas "red by pointing to something gives but one rule for its toes and in eases where one cannot point rules ofa different sort are ten, All the rules together give the meaning, and these are not fixed by giving an ostensive definition. The rules of grammar ar entirely it dependent of one another, Two words have the same meaning if they have the same rules for ther use[Ate the ies, for example, ~~p=p for negation, sponsible se ang wr? NT cnt tad tot responsible vo it The meaning changes when one of tt ee change. If for example, he gue of chess defined ine of Sen ae he esi ie oro» pet wet changed. Only when we are paling ofthe hsory of he ine Gan we lof change als we ur athe he ae responsible to some sort of reli—hey ae not sin to mature laws or are they resonable fo sone mening the wor sey he I smeone syste rls of negation ar not ileay Betas feos son cul nt be such tht =p =p, al at ould ve abt the later rule would nt conespond 1 the Enlsh wor! "sequen The objerton that he rules ae wot abiouy comes rom the Ting Sha tey ae responsible othe meaning. But how is he esi of “region tied, i ot bythe lt? ~~p=p docs ot foow from the meaning of no” bt cones i. Simaly poe, og doesnot depend onthe meanings of “and” and imple cone !tes ter meaning It sid at the ales of megan ara tary inamich as thy mus no contact acheter te epy tt it ere wera contradiction amg tem ve soul sinply loge calcein of them res. [i pa ofthe gemma the werd “le that 'p isa le. psp’ ote] 3 cre proces rom penises jst as physics does But he primi tive propositions of physics are results of very general experience, while those of logic are not, To distinguish between the propositions ‘of physics and those of logic, more must be done than to\ produce Dredicates such as experiential and self evident. It must be shown that 8 grammatical rule hols for one and not for the other. 4 In what sense are a of infrece las of thought? an teson be given for tiking a we do? WA his equie an tasers he ae of renin Thre eto sees re son" reason for, and ease Thee ae two eileen ode of thi One nets Yo decide ona citeron for something's beings teas Sefore son and nue can Be dings. Rewonne ite ces Inon atly done, an reason gs ack one Sep te else, ‘A reason is. eson ony inde the pane. To pve staan ogo *Philosophische Grammar. Osfrd and New York, 1960 p. 308 osonny, 1932-33 5 hough a proces of clean ata for reason i 1 ask Bow eee elt Tecan ofan comes ta eh Se Sino ays give a reason fora reatn, But hs doesnot make She resning es valid The answer tothe guesin, Why af you fghencd? nvlves a hypobese f+ case given. But here 90 ‘hypothetical element in a calculation. Mo do stg for cerain esc may ean sever things When & pron gives a his eso fr enterng a room tha here is ete, Row ds one know tht hs reason? The ron may ein ‘hen jst be ove he gves when sled. Again, reson my Bevwny ore aves ata coneson, eg. when one. mule Bx 28 eis ela, nd the Josifeaton fr te rex 325 ‘The reason fo fing dt ight const aa man's ging Ow 2 une of checking Ns ary and fing re time, The reason here ig be sald tobe ncloded inthe act he peor, Acute could nt eincloed in is ene ; Werae taling hee of the grammar of he words “eaon” and “ee nwt cas owe ye ve Ben ee fr ings enain hing nd in wba ces, x cus? I ean the question Sih you move your am?” by giving a behavior explana one hay serif case Cabies ay be covered by exe tn, but xpress dono produce eases. The wor reson” it Tic ued in comet wih expereniaton, tis semble 10s ¢ Teen found by experiment. The teraive, ahematia F- trent or eapeenal evidence?” conesponds to "Yeason or aise?” 5 Where the class defined by fcan be given by an enumeration, i... by alist, (eV is simply a logical product and (Bf a logical sum. Eg, Gif = Jfajbfe, and Bxfe.= favfovfe. Examples are the class of primary colors and the class of tones of the octave, In such cases i nox necessary to add “and a,b,c, - «are the ony f°" ‘The statement, "in this picture I see al the primary colors”, means “T sce red and green and bive . and to add “and these are all the primary colors” says nether more nor less than “I see all... ‘whereas to add toa, , ¢ are people in the room" that a, , € are all the people inthe room says more than “(risa person inthe oom", fand to omit it isto say less. If it is correct to say the general propos tion is shorthand fora logical product or sum, asi is in some cases, then the class of things named in te product or sum is defined inthe [rammar, not by properties For example, being a fone of the octave is.6 \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES tt ly of nm Tet of nce Wa eam yee Tg in ono i Bs “evr dey hn ante cof te ewe en pti So brut a Woot preted ea pts, dec orange peta ats iio To a il alg "ante tell pt ele a es ee peer rg aay ae aha Sth lems pes tm Rehan aiela nee Shear ene Ronee ay baskctase cit drag tion croatia naa ng es ‘cases. But this was a mistake. peers ae Tite Seto ve ve we renee saree a to ners Fic nt a ee comcnin tina fen amen tere Ta etzereey amin ahere eros “ial sacs wn postin sa ih eer cae nce fog cme toronto tia ba ne shoe wy st Son ete, entre ane pie ce ey sca is Sarat ya pte inating them with turns of a micrometer, But there is no number of rt pan cae Fenner net fore ec a Ses at a a ee gc LE nag ete en sare tl la ee ey ee EScRROiny somite ees 6 Thave pointed out two kinds of cases (1) those like cases “I this mel ‘ody the composer used all the notes of the octave" all the notes being oumeabe, @) thse Ike “Alleles inthe square have cross” ussell’s notation assumes tat for every general proposition there are ane sich ct gn in niet te aueion “Which ons?” contrast to, “What sort?’). Consider (Bxyfe, the notation for amtosopny, 1932-33 7 ‘there are men on the island" and for “There is a circle in the square". Now inthe ase of human beings, where we use names, the (gestion “Which men?” has meaning. But to say there isa cicle in the square may not alow the question “"Which?” since we have n0 ny": ee, for eieles. In zome cases itis senseless to ase “Which eile?" though “What sort of circle i in the square—s red ‘one?, a large one?” may make sense. The questions “which?” and STWhat sort?” are muddled together (so that we thnk both always make sense “Consider the reading Russell would give of his notation for “There ‘sw cele inthe square”: There is a thing whic isa circle inthe square". What is the thing? Some people might answer: the patch 1 fam pointing to. But ten how should we write “There are three patches"? What is the substrate forthe property of being patch? ‘What does it mean to say “All things are circles inthe square”, or "there is nota thing that sa circle in the squre"” or “All patches are con the wall"? What are the things? These sentences have no meaning ‘To the question whether « meaning might’t be given wo “There thing which is circle in the square"” I would reply that one might ‘meen by it that one out of a lt of shapes in the square was a cil. ‘had "Al patches aze on the wall” might mean something fw contrast tras being made withthe statement that some patches were elsewhere 17 What is it to look for a hidden contradiction, or forthe proof that there is no contadition? “To look for" as two different meanings in the phrases "to look for something atthe North Pole, “0 look for & olution toa problem”. One difference between an expedition of ds- Covery to the North Pole and an attempt to find x mathematical solu- tion is that withthe former it is possible to describe beforehand what is Tooked for, whereas in mathematics when you describe the solotion {you have made the expedition and have found what you looked for. “The description ofthe proof is the proof itself, whereas 10 find the thing atthe North Pole {it € not enough to describe it. You mast ‘make the expedition. There is no meaning to saying you can describe beforchand what solution willbe like in mathematics excep i the ‘azcs where there isa known method of solution. Equations, forex: ‘ample, belong to entirely different games according to the method of solving them: "To ask whether there isa hidden contradiction isto ask an arbigu- ‘ous question. Its meaning will ary according as there is, oF isnot, a8 \WATTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES method of answering it If we have no way of lookir “contradiction” is not defined. In what sense could we describe it? ‘We might seem to have fixed it by giving the result, a Za. Butts @ ‘sult only if it isin organic connection with the construction. To find ‘contradiction is to construct it. If we have no mens of hunting for a contradiction, then to say there might be one has no sense, We must ‘ot confuse what we can do with what te calculus can do 8 Suppose the problem isto find the construction of a pentagon. The teacher gives the pupil the general idea of a pentagon by laying off lengths with « compass, and also shows the construction of tangles, Squares, and hexagons. These figures are coordinated with the cardinal numbers. The pupil has the cardinal number 5, the ide of constuction by ruler and compasses, and examples of constructions of regular fig- tres, but not the law. Compare this with being taught to multiply. ‘Were we taught ll the results, or werent we? We may not have been taught to do 61% 175, but we do it according to the rule which we have been taught. Once the rule is known, « new instance is worked ‘out easily. We are not given all the multiplications inthe enumerative ‘sense, but we are given all in one sense: any multiplication can be ‘aried out according o rule. Given the law for multiplying, any mal ‘plication ean be done. Now in telling the pupil what a pentagon is and showing what constructions with ruler and compasses ae, the teacher gives the appearance of having defined the problem ently ‘But he has not, for the series of regular Rigues isa law, but ot a law Within which one can find the constuction ofthe pentagon. When one oes not know how to construct a pentagon one usually feels thatthe result is clear but the method of geting to itis not. But the result is ‘not clear. The constructed pentagon is & new idea. I is something We have not had before. What misleads us isthe similarity of the pen. tagon consiructed 10 a measured pentagon. We call our construction the constriction of the pentagon because of its similarity to percep- ‘wally regular five-sded igure. The pentagon is analogous to other ‘gular figures; but o tell a person to find construction analogous 10 the constructions given him is not to give him any idea ofthe construc tion of a pentagon. Before the actual constuction he doesnot have the idea ofthe consrcton, ‘When someone says there must be 4 law for the distribution of primes despite the fact that nether the law nor how to go about finding itis known, we fel tha the person is right It appeals to Something in ‘auosorny, 1932-33 9 us, We take our idea ofthe distribution of primes from their distibu- tion ina nite interval, Yet we have no clear idea of the distribution of primes, In the case of the distribution of even numbers we can show it, thus: 1,2, 3, 4,5, 6)... y and also by mentioning a law which we ‘ould write out algebraically In the case of the distribution of primes ‘we can only show: 1, 2,3, 4,5, 6,75 - . (Finding a law would give | new idea of distribution) just as a new idea about the trisection of an langle is given when its proved thai isnot possible by straight edge tnd compasses, Finding & new method in mathematics changes the fame. If one is given an idea of proof by being given a series of roofs then tobe asked for a new proof is to be asked for anew idea of proof. ‘Suppose someone lid off the points ona circle inorder to show, a8 the imagined, the wisection of an angle. We would not be satisfied, ‘which means that he did not have our idea of wisecton. In order 10 lead him to admit that what be had was not trisection we should have to lead him to something new. Suppose we had a geometry allowing ‘only the operation of bisection, The impossibility of tisection in this geometry Is exactly like the impossibility of trisecting an angle in Eu- elidean geometry. And this geometry is not an incomplete Euclidean eometry, 9 Problems in mathematic are not comparable in dificult: they are centely different problems. Suppose one was told to prove tata set of, {axioms is fre from contradiction but was supplied with no method of doing it. Or suppose it was said that someone had done it or that he tad found seven 7's in the development of ». Would this be under- stood? What would it mean to say that there is proof that there are seven 7's but that there is no way of specifying where they are? Without « means of finding them the concept of isthe concept of a onstruction which has no connection with the idea of seven 7's. Now it does make sense to say “There are seven 7's tn the frst 100 places", and although ‘There are seven 7s inthe development” does, ‘not mean the same as the italicized sentence, one might maintain that it nevertheless makes sense since it follows from something which ‘docs make sense, Even though you accepted tis as a rue, itis only ‘one rule. I want t0 say that if you have a proof ofthe existence of, Seven 7's which does not tell you where they are the sentence for the ‘existence theorem hasan ently’ different meaning than one for which ‘means for finding them is given. To say that a contradiction is hid-0 \WarroINSTENN's LECTURES en, where there is nevertheless a way of finding it, makes sense, but, ‘hat isthe sense in saying there isa hidden contradiction when there js no way? Again, compare a proof that an algebraic equation of nth ‘degree has n roots, in connection with which there is a method of ap. ‘proximation, witha proof for which no such method exists, Why call the later proof of exisvence? ‘Some existence proofs consist in exhibiting a particular mathemst- ‘cal arvcture, i.e, in ‘constructing an entity". Ia proof does not do this, “existence proof” and “existence theorem” aze being used in nother sense. Each new proof in muthematics widens the meaning of “proof”. With Fermat's theorem, for example, we do not know ‘what it would be like for it to be proved.* ‘What “existence” means is determined by the proof. The end-result ‘ofa proot isnot isolated from the proof but is like the end surface ofa solid. I is organically connected withthe prof which i its body. Ina construction as in a proof we seem fist 0 give the result and then find the construction o proof. But one cannot point out the result of constuction without giving the construction. The construction is the end of one’s efforts rather than a means tothe result, The result, Sy a regular pentagon, only mates insofar as itis an incitement t0 ‘make cerain manipulations. It would not be useless. For example, a {eacher who told someone to find a color beyond the rainbow would be expressing himself incorecly, but what he said would have provided ‘Useful incitement tthe person who found ultra-violet 10 tan sai propoion ice wich bs coin er, ‘opus ot ne ie fear tami fos moka epson: Forty be west Pop, wljarfna se aye tne twits ht ty canbe sini thoes ye ts Soe an dep ee paper Ino exein The wo! "igre shea) tidin cus wire cn be mit om ae hich te Whebersppsin rate seer nts eon Stor propio, oe dase y png eae mt ot thas ld down ity, But wen we hae we ae ‘Seco ay a my e's her lope coma‘ sten wer sth eng a potion "hw oe ‘Tis paragraph is ake fom The Yellow Book. (Er) prosopay, 1932-33 u as, a itis, gil prodat, ke asking wheter tee 2 Tien conatcon when tee 90 method of answering the a> ton Oar method might cont in lokng op Stns We might fe arr on ent reap es cl re ving tenn of walying »popston i ke having 8 ‘Seid or ting out wheter re 28 the prodt 25% 25,8 Te hiving# rue whch allows oe fo se wher a roposon telogo. unl and 1 both exeied 10 fd the fia elements, of “indi val and tus te penile non propos, Toi anal unl! oui hat sje rece rpostons, and 2m rele fon, for examples woud be the esa of alanis. This ex Tis arog ie af logical say Toi ana an as nike christen, And-me were ft fr giving 00 ex Spi of aoc popstions oof indus We bah in leet tryn pushed the urn of examples se. We shoul a ae said “RYe Eun ie thm because aay nt goe far nou, bat well gettin tine" Atri popestons arent he esa fan ral which ns eto be made We anak of ati popstions Pec mean the which on he face Gono comin an, "er" sorbose wich neccordance with eho of mls i oe So nt conn hese. Teese no hen stone opostons 11. In teaching a child language by pointing to things and pronoune- ing the words for them, where does the use of a proposition stat? If you teach him to touch certain colors when you say the word "red", Jou have evidently not aught him sentences. There isan ambiguity in the use ofthe word “proposition” which can be removed by making cern distinctions, [suggest defining it arbitrarily rather than trying to portray usage, Wha is called understanding a sentence is not very iferent from what a child does when he points to colors on hearing ‘olor words, Now there ae all sons of language-gumes suggested by the one in which color words are taught: games of orders and com ‘mands, of question and answer, of questions and "Yes" and “No."” ‘We might think that in teaching a child such language games we are not teaching him a language but are only preparing im for it. But these games ae complete; nothing i lacking. It might be said that a child who brought me a book when I said “The book, please” would ‘not understand this to mean "Bring me a book", as would an adult But this full sentence is no more complete than “book”. OF course2 \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES "book" is not what we calla sentence. A sentence ina language has a particular Sort of jingle. But it is misleading to suppose that "book 8 shorthand for something longer which might be ina person's mind hen itis understood. The word "book" might not lack anything, ex- cept to a person who had never heard elliptic sentences, in which case he would need a table with the ellipses on one side and sentences on the oer. [Now what role do tush and falsity play in such language-games? In the game where the child responds by pointing to color, wuth and fl- sity do not come in, If the game consists in question and answer and the child responds, say, tothe question “How many chairs?", by giv- ing the number, aguin'truth and falsity may not come in, though it might if the child were aught 10 reply “Six chairs agrees with real- ity”. If he had been taught the use of “rue” and “false” instead of "Yes" and “"No", they would of course come in. Compare how dif- {erenuly the word “false™ comes int the game where the child ie taught to shout “red” when red appears and the game where he is 10 _Buess the weather, supposing now that we use the word "false" inthe following circumstances: when he shouts “‘green"” when something ted appears, and when he makes a wrong guess about the weather. In the first case the child has not got hold of the game, he has offended agains the rules; inthe second be has made a mistake. The wo are like playing ches in violation of the rules, and playing it and losing Ta game where a child is taught to bring colors when you sty “red”, te. you might say that "Bring me red" and “I wish you 10 bring me red” are equivalent to “red infact that until the child un- derstands “red” as information about the state of mind ofthe person ‘ordering the color he doesnot understand it at all. But “wish you to bring me red” adds nothing to this game. The order "ed" cannot be sid to describe a state of mind, e.g., a wish, unless it is part of @ game containing descriptions of sates of mind. "wish . "i par ‘of larger game if there are two people who express wishes. The word is then not replaceable by "John". A new multiplicity means having another game. have wanted {0 show by means of language-games the vague way in which we use “Tanguage™, ‘proposition, “sentence”. There are ‘many things, such as orders, which we may or may not call propos tions; and not only one game can be called language. Language-games area elue tothe understanding of logic. Since what we call a propos tion is more or less arbitrary, what we call logic plays a diferent role Privosonay, 1932-33 B from that which Russell and Frege supposed. We mean all sons of things by “proposition”, and itis wrong to start witha definition of a proposition and build up logic from that. If “proposition” is defined by reference to the nation of a trut-funcion, then arithmetic equa- tions are also propositions—which does not make them the same as such a proposition as “He ran out ofthe building". When Frege tied to develop mathematics from logic he thought the calculus of logic ‘was the calelus, so that what followed from it would be correct math- eratics. Another idea on a par with this is that all mathematics could ‘be derived from cardinal arithmetic. Mathematics end logic were one building, with logic the foundation. Ths I deny; Russel’ calculus is ‘one calculus among others. It isa bit of mathematics. 12_Tewas Frege's notion that certain words are unique, on a different level from others, e.g., “word”, ‘proposition, “world”. And ‘once thought tha cerain words could be distinguished according to their philosophical imporance: "grammar", "logic", “‘mathemat is", I should like to destroy this appearance of imporance. How is it then that in my investigations certain words come up again and again? because I am concemed with language, with rouble arising from 1 particular use of language. The characteristic trouble we are dealing with is due to our using language automatically, without thinking about the rues of grammar. In general the sentences we are tempted to ‘ter occur in practical sitations. Bu then there is a differen way we are templed to uter sentences. This is when we look at language, con- siously direct our attention omit And then we make up sentences of ‘hich we say that they also ought to make sense. A sentence of this sor might not have any particular ue, but because it sounds English ‘We consider it sensible. Ths, for example, we ak ofthe ow of time and consier it sensible to talk of it Bow, after the analogy of rivers. 13. If we look ata sver in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to these, .g., "When the 10Sth og passed, I ate dinner". Suppose the log makes a bang on passing ime. We can say these bangs ae separated by equal, or unequal, inter- vals. We could also say one set of bangs was twice as fast as snother set. But the equality of inequality of intervals so measured is entirely Aifferent from that measured by a clock. The phrase “length of inter val” has is sense in vinue of the way we determine it, and differs according tothe method of measurement. Hence the eritera for equal-4 \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES ity of intervals berween passing logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are different. We cannot say that two bangs t¥o seconds apart difer only in degree from those an hour apart, for we hhave no feeling of rhythm if the interval isan hour long. And to say ‘that one rhythm of bangs is faster than anoter is different fom saying. ‘hat the interval between these two bangs passed much more slowly ‘than the interval between another pit. ‘Suppose thatthe passing logs seem to be equal distances apart. We have an experince of what might be called the velocity of these ‘though not what is measured by a clock). Let us say the river moves ‘uniformly inthis sense. But if we say rime passed more quickly be- tween logs 1 and 100 than between logs 100 and 200, this is only an analogy; really nothing has passed more quickly. To say time passes, ‘more quickly, or that ime flows, isto imagine something flowing. We then extend the simile and talk about the direction of time. When peo- ple talk of the dzection of time, precisely the analogy of a river is before them, Of course a river can change is direction of flow, but ‘one has a feting of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed ‘The reason is thatthe notion of flowing, of something, and of the di- rection of the low is embodied in out language ‘Suppose thet at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that someone said time was circular. Would this be right or wrong? Neither. It would only be another way of expression, and we could just as well talk of a circular time. However, the picure of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one that suggests itself very vigorously ‘Suppose someone sad that the river on which the logs float had beginning and will ave an end, that there will be 100 more logs and ‘that wil be the end. It might be’ said that there isan experience which would verify these statements. Compare tis with saying that time ‘ceases. What isthe criterion for its ceasing or for its going on? You ‘might say that time ceases when ‘Time River ceases. Suppose we Jnad no substantive “time”, that we talked only of the passing of logs. ‘Then we could have a measurement of time without any substantive “time”, Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the [gs came to an end. We could in this sense talk of time coming 10 89 end, (Can ime goon spar from events? What isthe criterion for time in- volved in “Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years, ago"? Has time been created, of was the world created in time? These iosomiy, 1932-33 1s ‘questions ae asked after the analogy of Has this chair been made?” tnd are like asking whether order has been created (a “befoe"* and after"), Time"” a a substantive isteibly misleading, We have got to make the rules ofthe game before we play it. Discussion of “the flow of time" shows how philosophical problems arse. Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by extending iton looking at it, We form sentences and then wonder what they can mean. Once conscious of “xime"” asa substantive, we ask then about the creation of time. 14 If Tasked fora description of yesterday's doings and you gave me ‘an account, this account could be verified. Suppose what you gave as ‘an account of yesterday happened romorrow. This is posible state of affairs. Would you sey you remembered the future? Or would you say instead that you remembered the past? Or are both statements sense- less? ‘We have here two independent orders of events (1) the order of ‘events in our memory. Call this memory time, (2) the order in which Information is got by asking different people, S—4—3 o'clock. Call this information time. In information time there willbe past and fture ‘with reapect toa particular day. And in memory time, with respect 10 ‘an event, there will also be past and future. Now if you want to say thatthe order of information is mamory time, you ean. And if you are going to talk about both information and memory time, then you can fy that you remember the pet If you remember that which in infor- ‘mation time is future, you can say “I remember the future. 15 Ttis nota priori thatthe world becomes more and more disorgan- {zed with time, It isa matter of experience that disorganization comes ata ater rater than an earlier ime. Its imaginable, for example, that by stirring nuts and raisins in a tank of chocolate they become unshuf- fied. But itis nota mater of experience that equal distributions of nts and raisins must occur when they ae swished about. There is no expe rience of something necessarily happening. To say that if equal dis- Iriution does not occur there must be a difference in weight of the nuts and raisin, even though these have not been weighed, i to as- fume some other force to explain the unsbuffling. We tend to say that there must be some explanation if equal distribution does not occur. Similarly, we say ofa planet's observed eccentric behavior that there rust be some planet attracting it, This is analogous to saying that if16 \WATTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES {wo apples were dete apples and we found thee, one must have vanished Or ke yng tha i max ll n neo i des, When the possibility ofa d's fling on ge i excluded, and ot enue ia mai of experience tha falsely on is ie, we hve a sateen which no experience wil refi atement Of sranmar. Whenever we sy tht somehing mus be the case we te thing a orm of expression. Hers si hat reer something did nosey his uw thee mt be vile mases occu fori Ts Stuzment i ot rah or wrong, bt ay be prac or impact! Hypotee such at “invisble mses “nconcoes enl eve arenas of expres, They ener langage to embl fo there ms be eases. (They ar ke te hypothe cute proportional to the effet fan explosion occrs ben 6 ball Groped, we sy tht sme phenomenon mux have osruned o make the cause proportional ote eet On hunting forthe penonenoe tnd not ding we sy that ha eey ot et ben fund) We tebve we ae dealing nih snail lew prior, whereas we we dealing wih 8 norm of exprenion ta we carves have ne. ‘Whenever we ty tht someting must be te case we have given ah inion oa foe reultion of ur expression, ef ne were 1 say “Everyody i rely going to Pars. Tre, some Jon get thre, bat all tr movenets re pelininay” "The satemen hat here must ea cie shows that we have got 8 re of langage. Wher all vloctes can beacon fr by the SSsumption of invinible mae Isa question of mathematics, or gram tar abd snot ob sete by experience I sted befered. I isa qosion of the adopted norm of explanation, In a spon of rechanies, for example, tere i ysem of ees, albough here tay be oo cases nae syne, A system cd be made up in ‘ich we would wi the expresion "My breakdown ha no eases Tt ve weigh ato on alane and tock he differen readings sv ex ins over we cul ler sy tht tee sch ing ooh. Itty ast weighing ort each weighing Is accurate ut that he ‘eight changes inantnaccolnible manner. If we say we ae nt foing to actu forthe changes, then we woud hve « sysem in ‘hich thee are no cuns, We ought wc sty that tee ae no cases innate, bt oly hat we have stem ich hr ae no causes Dein and interim ae poperie of sytem which re fixed wily vritosoriy, 1932-33 7 16 We begin withthe question whether the toothache someone else has is the same as the toothache I have. Is his toothache merely ‘outward behavior? Oris it that he has the same as T am having now ‘but that I don't know it since I can only say of another person that he is manifesting certain behavior? A series of questions arises about per ‘sonal experience, Isn't it thinkable that Ihave toothache in someone eles toeh? It might be argued thet my having toothache requires my mouth, But the experience of my having toothache is the same wher ‘ever the toth is that is aching, and whoever’s mouth itis in. The o- tality of pain is not given by naming a possessor. Further, isnt it imaginable that I live all my life looking in w mieror, where I saw faces and did not know which was my face, nor how my mouth was Aitnguished from anyone else's? IF this were in fact the case, would say I had toothache in my mou? Ina mieror I could speak with some- ‘one else's mouth, in which case what would we call me? Isn't thinkable that I change my body and that 1 would have a feeling comelated with someone's else's raising his arm? "The grammar of “ving toothache" is very different from that of “having apiece of chalk”, a8 is also the grammar of “I have tooth sche’ from “Moore has toothache". The sense of “Moore has ooth- che" is given by the criterion for its truth. Fora statement gets its Sense from its verification, The use of the word “toothache” when [ have toothache and when someone else has it belongs to different ‘games, (To find out with what meaning a word is used, make several investigations. For example, the words “before” and “afer” mean something diferent according es one depends on memory or on docu ‘ments to establish the time of an event.) Since the criteria for “He has toothache" and “I have toothache" are so different thai, since their ‘vetfcaions are of diferent sorts, I might seem tobe denying that he has toothache. But | am not saying he realy hasnt go it. Ofcourse he has itt isnt that he behaves as iF he had it but really doesnt. For we have criteria for his rally having it as against his simulating it. Never theless, i is felt hat | should say that I do not know he has it ‘Suppose I say that when he has toothache he has what T have, © cept that [know i indirectly in his ease and direetly in mine. Tis is ‘wrong, Judging that he has toothache isnot like judging that he has money but I jst can't se his bllfold. Suppose itis held that T must judge indirecily since I can’t feel his ache. Now what sense is there t0 this? And what sense is thereto “T ean fee! my ache"? It makes sense8 \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES {o say “His ache is worse than mine", but not to say “I fee! my ‘toothache and ‘Two people can’t have the same pain. Consider the ‘statement that no two people can ever see the same sense datum. If being in the same position as another person were taken as the crite ‘on for someones seing the same sense datum as he does, then one could imagine a person seeing the same datum, say, by seeing through ‘someone's head. But if there is no criterion for seing the same datum, then “can’t know that he sees what I see” does not make sense. We tare likely to muddle statements of fact which are undisputed with grammatical statements, Statements of fact and grammatical sate. ‘ents are not to be confused. ‘The question whether someone elie has what Ihave when I have toothache may be mesningless, though in an ordinary situation it might be a question of fact, andthe answer, “He has not”, a sate- ‘ment of fact. Bu the philosopher who says of someone else, “He has ot got what Ihave”, is nt stating a fact.* He is not saying that in fact someone else has not got toothache, It might be the cate that Someone else has it. And the statement that he has it has the meaning sven it that is, whatever sense is given by the criterion. The di fculy ies inthe grammar of "having toothache". Nonsense is pro- duced by trying to express ina proposition something which belongs to the grammar of our language. By “I can't fel his toothache" is ‘meant that Ican'try. It isthe character ofthe logical cannot that ne can‘ try. Of couse this doesn't gt you far, as you can ask whether ou can try to ty. Inthe arguments of idealists and realists somewhere {here always occur the words “can” ‘cannot, “must”. No atempt {is made to prove thei doctrines by experience. The words “possbi- " and “necessity” express part of grammar, although patterned ‘after their analogy to “physical possibility" and “physical necessity". Another way in which the grammars of“ have toothache" and “He has toothache" differ is that it does not make sense to sey “I Seem to have toothache”, whereas it is sensible to say "He seems to have toothache". The sttements “I have toothache" and “He has toothache" have different verifications; but “erifcation'” does not have the same meaning in the two cases. The verification of my hav- ing toothache is havin it, It makes no sense for me to answer the ‘tis paiulartycifcut 0 dacover that an aserton tat « metaphyician fuakes egress dscortetnent with our grammar ti te wars ot hs serton ca ls be used to sate «Tat of txpeence "The Blue Boot Ox fond and New York, 1969, pp. 86-7 (Edith Paunosopay, 1932-33 9 question, “How go you know you have toothache?", by “T know it because I feel i Infact there is something wrong withthe question; and the answer is absurd. Likewise the answer, “T know i¢by inspec tion”. The process of inspection is looking, not seeing. The statement, “know it by looking”. could be sensible, e.g, concentrating atten” tion on one finger among several fora pain. But as we use the word "ache" it makes no sense to say that I Took frit T donot say I wll find out whether I have tothache by tapping my teeth. OF He has Yoothache"* it is sensible to ask “How do you know?" and criteria can be given which cannot be given in one's own ease. In one's own case it makes no sense 10 atk “How do I know?"” ‘It might be thought that since my saying “He seems to have tooth- ‘ache’ is sensible but not my saying a similar thing of myself. 1 could then go on to say ‘This is so for him but not for me”. Is there then a private language Iam refering to, which he cannot understand, and thus that he cannot understand my statement that I have tooth- ache? If this is 80, itis not a mater of experience that he cannot. He is ‘prevented from understanding, not because of a mental shorcoming Dut by a fact of grammar. If a thing is @ priori impossible, it is ‘excluded from language. Sometimes we introduce a sentence into our language without re- izing that we have to show rules for its use. (By introducing third king into a chess game we have done nothing until we have given, rules for it.) How am I to persuade someone that "I fel my pain" does not make sense? If he insists that it does he would probably say “make ita rule that it makes sense. This i ike introducing a third king, and I then would raise many questions, for example, “Does it make sense to say I have tothache but don’t feel i” Suppose the reply was tha it did. Then I could ask how one knows that one has i ‘but does not fel it. Could one find tis ou by looking into a miror and on finding a bad tooth know that one has 2 tothache? To show What sense a statement makes requires saying how it can be verified ‘and what can be done with it. Just because a sentence is constructed afer a model does not make it part ofa game. We must provide a sys tem of application. ‘The question, “What is its vevificaton?", is a good translation of "How can one know it?". Some people say thatthe question, “How ‘can one know such thing?” is ivelevant to the question, *"What is the meaning?" But an answer gives the meaning by showing the rel tion of the proposition to other propositions. That is, it shows what i0 \wirtoENsTEIN's LECTURES follows from and what follows from it. It gives the grammar of the proposition, which is what the question, “What woud it be like for it to be tme?", asks for. In physics, for example, we ask forthe mean- ing of a statement in terms ofits verification. T have remarked that it makes no sense to say “seem to have toothache”, which presupposes that it makes sense to say 1 can, of ‘cannot, doubt it. The use ofthe word “cannot” here isnot at all ike its use in “I cannot if the scutle™. This brings us tothe question: ‘What is the extrion for a sentence making sense? Consider the an- swer, “It makes sense if i is consructed according to the rules of sgrammar'’. Then does this question mean anything: What must the rules be like to give it sense? If the rules of grammar are arbitrary, wy not let the sentence make sense by altering the rles of grammar? Why not simply say "I make it a rule that this sentence makes 17 To sey what rues of grammar make up & propositions! game would require giving the characteris of propositions, ther gram- tar, We ae thi ed tothe question, What «proposition? I shall not try to give a gene deinton of “proposition” x itis impoubl 4o so. This is no more possbe than iti 10 give a dfniton ofthe word "game". For any lie we might draw woud be arblrary. Out ‘ay of aling about propositions is always in terms of specific ex- amples, for we cannot alk about these more generaly than abou pe- ‘ite games. We could begin by giving examples such a the propsi- tion "There isa ice onthe blackboard 2 inches from the top and and 5 inches rom the sige, Let us represent this ws "(2,5)". Now lt Us constuct something tht would be std to make no sense: “"@.5,7)". This would have to be explained (and you could give it sense), or else you could sty itis a mistake ora joke. But if you ay it makes no Sense, you can explain why by explaining the game in which {thas no use. Nonsense can lok les nd les like a sentence, less and es ke a par of language. “Goodness is red" and "ME $ came to {oiay’s edness” would be called nonsense, whereas we would neve say a whistle was nonsense. An arrangement of chairs coud be taken 35a language, so that cerainarangemenis would be nonsense, Theo- ‘ally you cou alvays say ofa symbol hati kes sense, Buti you did so you would be called upon to explain its sense, tht Show the wie you give it how you operate with it, The words rantosopay, 1932-33 a Sense" and "sense" get their meaning only in particular cases and may vary from case to ease, We can ail talk of sense without giving a cleat meaning to “sense”, just as we talk of winning or losing without the meaning of our terms being absolutely clear In philosophy we gve rules of grammar wherever we encounter a Aificuly. {To show what we do in philosophy I compare playing 2 ‘ame by rules and just playing about) * We might fee! that» complete logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a word. But there is no such thing as a completed grammar. However, giving & rule has a use if someone makes an opposite rule which we do not with 0 follow. When we discover rules for the use of a known term we do not thereby complete our knowledge of its use, and we do not tell people how fo use the erm, asi they didnot know how. Logical analysis isan antidote. [is importance is to sop the muddle someone ‘makes on reflecting on words. 18 To rerum to the differing grammars of “I have toothache" and “He has toothache", which show up in the fact thatthe statements have diferent verifications and also inthe fact that it is sensible 10 ask, in the later case, “How do I know this?" but notin the former. ‘The solpss is right in implying that these two are on diferent levels. have said that we confuse “have a piece of chalk” and “He has & piece of chalk" with “Ihave an ache" and "He has an ache. Inthe ase ofthe ist pir the verifications are analogous, although not in the ‘ase of the second pir. The function ‘x has toothache" has various values, Smith, Jones, ete. But not sina class by itself. The word "I does not refer toa possessor in sentences about having an experi- ence, unlike its use in "I bave a cigar”. We could have a language from which “I's omited from sentences describing a personal expe- rience, (Instead of saying "think or “Ihave an ache" one might say "It thinks" (ike “IC rains"), and in place of“ have an ache”, ‘There is an ache here". Under ceain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away wih the simple use of “I”. We con- stanly judge a language from the stndpoint of the language we are ‘accustomed to, and hence we think we describe phenomena incom: pletely if we leave out personal pronouns. tis as though we had omit- shall thoughout use braces to indict insertions from The Yellow Book (aloo)2 \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES ted pointing to something, since the word “I seems o pont toa per- son. But we can leave out the word “I” and still describe the ‘Phenomenon formerly described. Its not the cate that certain changes {nour symbolism are really omissions. One symbolism is in fact a8 good as the next; no one symbolism is necessary } 19. The soipsst who says “Only my expeciences ar real" i saying that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are rel.* ‘This is absurd if ken to bea statement of fact. Now {if ti logically Impossible for another person to have toothache, itis eqully 80 for ‘me to have toothache. To the person who says “Only I have rel toothache” the reply should be: “If only you can have real toothache, there is no sense in saying ‘Only T have real toothache’. Either you dont need I’ or you don’t need ‘real’... ‘Ti no longer opposed to ‘anything. You had much beter sey “There is toothache'.”" The sate ‘ment, “Only have real toothache," ether has commonsense mean ing, or, if itis a grammatical proposition, i is meant tobe a statement ‘of are. The solipsst wishes to say, "T shoul lke to put, instead of the notation ‘I have rel toothache" “There is toothache", What the solpsst wants is not a notation in which the ego has a monopoly, but ‘one in which the ego vanishes.) (Were the solipsst to embody in his notation the restriction of the pithet “real” to what we should call his experiences and exclude “A has real toothache" (where A. is not he), this would come to using “There is real toothache" instead of “Smith (the Slip) has toot ‘ache'™* (Getting into the solipsstic mood means not using the word “in describing a personal experience.} [Acceptance of such change is tempting] because the description of sentation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ. Ask yourself, How do I, the person, come in? How, for example, does a person enter into the description of a visual sensation? If we describe the vis tual fel, no person necessarily comes into it. We can say the visual field has certain intemal properties, but its being mine isnot essential tots description, That is, tis not an intrinsic property ofa visual sen- sation, or a pain, 0 belong to someone. There wil be no such thing as ‘my image or someone else's. The locality ofa pain has nothing to do See The Blue Book, p. $9. (Bato + Based on notes of The Yellow Book ken by Margaret Maserman. (Edie) vrmosopay, 1932-33 2 is a body or an organ of sight necessary tothe description of the visual eld. The same applies to the description ofan auditory sensation. The tnuth of the proposition, “"The noise is approaching my right ear, does not require the existence of aphysical ear itis a description of an tuditory experience, the experience being logically independent of the ence of my ears. The auible phenomenon isin an auditoy space, the subject who bears has nothing to do with the human body. ‘Similarly, we can tlk of a toothache without there being any teth, oF ‘of thinking without there being ahead involved, Pains have a spac to move in, s do auditory experiences and visual data. The idea that a ‘visual field belongs essentially to an organ of sight o to s human body hving this organ isnot based on whar is seen, It is based on such facts of experience as that closing one's lids is accompanied by an ‘event in one’s visual feld, or the experience of raising one's arm towards one's eye. It isan experiential proposition that an eye sees ‘We can establith connections berween a human body and a visual felé which are vey different from those we are accustomed to Iti imag Fnable that [should see with my body rather than with my eyes, or that TTeould see with someone else's eyes and have toothache in his tooth I we had a tube to our eyes and looked into & miror, the ides of @ perceiving organ could be dispensed with. Were all human bodies seen in a minor, with a loudspeaker making the sounds when mouths ‘moved, the idea of an ego speaking and seeing would become very sifferent 20 he sis dot ot go rough wit station om wich ter or et" hdl} He uye "Only my expences e tea, have eal tox or TR nl pn ts el TS fet" Tos provoke somene objet srl hs uns teh ns would ot ely rete spit any moet he tes ie est, The realist who kek fe one cect in Singita if be ising toe word “rea” opposed toot tel" Hs cinder answers the gueton st rel ov halcie {Sy BL Re does ot ft te elt is ot deed y is econ, They sl seo disap. Atough be sols hin tring Thve todas” as ig on # fin level fom "He fr endathe hs steer bt he us someting tat noone ie Tessa of he pron wo deer ar gual sar. "Only ty expences ae alan venjoe expences ae a” gual omenm \WATTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES 21. Let us turn to a diferent task. What isthe enterion for “This is, ‘ny bod"? There isa criterion for “This i my’ nose: the nose would be possessed by the body to which i is atached. There isa temptation ‘fo say there is a soul to which the body belongs and that my Body is the body that belongs to me. Suppose that all bodies were seen in @ ‘mimor, so that all were on the same level. I could talk of A's nose and ‘my nose in the same way. But if | singled out a body as mine, the grammar changes. Pointing to a mirot body and saying “This is my body" doesnot asset the same relation of possession between me and my body a is asserted by “"Ths is A's nose" between A's body and {A's nose. What isthe criterion for one of the bodies being mine? It might be said thatthe body which moved when I had certain feeling willbe mine. (Recall thatthe "I" in “Ihave a feeling" does not de- ‘note a possessor.) Compare “Which of these is my body?" with “Which of these is A's body?", in which “my"” is replaced by "A's, What isthe erteron for the truth of the answer tothe ler? ‘There is a criterion for this, which in the case of the answer to “Which is mine?" there isnot. I all bodies are seen in a mitror and the bodies themselves become transparent but the mirror images ‘main, my body will be where the miror image i, And the exiterion for something being my nose will be very diferent from its belonging to the body 10 which it is atached. In the mieror word, wil decii which body is mine be like deciding which body is A's? If the later is decided by refering to a voice called "A" which is correlated tothe body, then if | answer “Which is my body?” by refering t0 a voice called Witgensein, it will make no Sens to ask which is my voice. ‘There are two kinds of use ofthe word "I'" when it occurs in an- ‘wer tothe question “Who has toothache?", For the most part the an- swer “'" Is a sign coming from a certain body. (If when people spoke, the sounds always came from a loudspeaker and the Voices were alike, the word "would have no use at all it would be absurd to say “have toothache". The speakers could not be recognized by it*] Although there is sense in which answering “I” to the ques- tion, "Who has toothache?" makes a reference 10 a body, even to this body of mine, my answer tothe question whether I have tothache isnot made by reference 19 any body. Ihave no need of a criterion, “My body and the toothache ae independent. Thus one answer to the ‘question “Who?” is made by reference to a body, and another seems ot tobe, and to be of a diferent kind ‘From the Yellow Book nots of Margret Masterman, (Editor) pamosopay, 1932-33 2 2 Let us tum tothe view, which is connected with “All that is ral is my experience”, namely, solipsism of the present moment: “All that is real i the experience of the present moment" (Cf. Wm. Snes’ remark “The present thought is the only thinker”, which ‘makes the subject of thinking equivalent tothe experience.) {We may be inclined to make our language such that we will call only the present experience “experience. This will be a slisistc language, but of course we must not make a solipsstic language without saying ‘exactly what we mean by the word which in our old language meant “present” Rustell sid that remembering cannot prove that what is remembered actually occured, because the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago, with acts of remembering intact, We ‘could go on to say tat it might have been created one minute ago, and finally, tha it might have been created inthe present moment. Were this later the sintation we should have the equivalent of “All that is rea isthe present moment", Now if itis possible to say the world was (seated five minutes ago, coud it be sad thatthe world perished five ‘minutes ago? This would amount to saying that the only reality was five minutes ago. ‘Why does one feel tempted to say “The only reality is the ‘presen’"? The temptation to say this is as strong as that of saying that fly my experience is real, The person who says only the present is real because pat and fture are not here has before his mind the image of something moving. ‘This image is mis- past préseat _finure leading, just asthe blurred image we would draw of our visual ld is misleading inasmuch asthe field has no boundary. That the statement "Only the present experince is eal" seems to mean something is due to familiar images we associate with it, images of things passing Us in space, {When in philosophy we talk ofthe present, we seem tbe re- ferrng o a sort of Euclidean point. Yet when we tk of present expe- rience itis impossible o identify the present with such a point. The ‘icuy is with the word “presen.} There isa grammatical confu- sion here. A person who says the present experience alone is real is ot stating an empirical fat, comparable to the fact that Mr. S. always ‘wears a brown suit. And the person who objects tothe assertion that the present alone is real with "Surely the past and fuure ar jut as real” somehow does not meet the point. Both statements mean noth- sng, 'By examining Russells hypothesis thatthe world was created five minutes ago T shall try to explain what I mean in saying that itis% \WITTOENSTEIN'S LECTURES ‘meaningless. Russell's hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear it out or refute it, Whatever our experience might be, it would be in agreement with it. The point of saying tht something has happened