G.R. No. L-27702 | Budlong v.
Pondoc Presumably, Andrea Budlong has been in possession of
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27702. September 9, 1977.]
ANDREA BUDLONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN
PONDOC, FABIO PONDOC, APOLINARIA
PONDOC, BENEDICTA PONDOC, FELICIDAD
PONDOC and FRANCISCO GARROTE,
defendants-appellees.
Eleuterio Ramo and Salvador Budlong for plaintiff-
appellant.
Maximo C. Nuez for defendants-appellees.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
This is an action for the partition of Lot No. 5447, with
an area of 12,524 square meters, situated at Barrio
Ubujan, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, assessed at six hundred
pesos in 1965.
On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and
Crispina Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a
notarial instrument their two-thirds share in the said lot
in consideration of the donee's personal services to the
donors. Andrea accepted the donation in the same
instrument. It was noted in the deed that the Court of
First Instance of Bohol had rendered a decision dated
November 28, 1933 regarding the said lot.
The deed contains the statement "that by virtue hereof,
the said Andrea Budlong is hereby vested with full
ownership and property of the lot in question." It was
acknowledged before Genaro Visarra, the mayor of
Tagbilaran, an ex oficio notary. Cdpr
Two years after the execution of the donation, or on
October 27, 1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718
was issued for the said lot. The title shows that the lot is
owned by the following co-owners: Crispina Pondoc,
1/3; Isabela Pondoc, 1/3; Francisco Garrote, 1/6, and
Isabel Garrote-Pondoc, 1/6.
Apparently, the donee, Andrea Budlong, did not
intervene in the cadastral proceeding. She was not
substituted for the donors in that proceeding maybe
because the hearing had already been terminated when
the donation was made to her. However, the owner's
duplicate of OCI No. 4718 was in the possession of
Andrea. Sometime in January, 1965, Juan Pondoc talked
with Andrea about the sale of the lot. He got the said
title from Andrea. When the projected sale did not go
through, Juan did not return the title to her.
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any
descendants in 1935 and 1937, respectively (p. 14,
Appellees' Brief). Francisco Garrote, an alleged brother
of Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc, left Bohol thirty
years before 1966 and had never returned to that
province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc died and was survived
by her five children named Juan, Fabio, Apolinaria,
Benedicta and Felicidad, all surnamed Pondoc y
Garrote.
the lot. She declared it for tax purposes in her name. She
paid the realty taxes thereon from 1936 to 1966. She
planted the lot to coconuts, bamboos, bananas and a
mango tree.
Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed of
donation. The register of deeds in a letter dated April 1,
1965 asked Juan Pondoc to surrender the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 4718. He did not comply with that
request.
On May 11, 1965 Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of
First Instance of Bohol an action for the partition of the
said lot. She was allowed to sue as a pauper. She filed
the action against Francisco Garrote and the five
children of Isabel Garrote-Pondoc. Francisco was
summoned by publication. He was declared in default.
Juan, Fabio, Apolinaria, Benedicta and Felicidad, all
surnamed Pondoc, alleged in their answer that the
donation was "fraudulently executed". They relied on
OCT No. 4718.
Visarra, the notary, declared in his deposition that the
deed of donation was voluntarily executed by the
donors.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the
registration of the lot extinguished her rights under the
deed of donation. It opined that she could not ask for the
partition of the lot because she does not appear as a co-
owner in the title thereof. The court intimated that she
could ask for an indemnity from the assurance fund.
Cdpr
From that adverse decision, Andrea appealed to this
Court. She stated in her notice of appeal that the lower
court's decision is contrary to law. She assailed the trial
court's rulings that she is guilty of laches; that the one-
year period provided in section 38 of Act No. 496
applies to this case; that it has no jurisdiction to protect
her right under the deed of donation, and that she could
not demand partition because she was no longer a co-
owner of the lot.
The trial court correctly held that the donation is valid.
Defendants-appellees' belated contention on appeal that
the donation is mortis causa (they did not raise that issue
in their answer or in the lower court) is wrong. There is
not the slightest indication in the deed that the donation
would take effect upon the donors' death. It is
indisputably an inter vivos donation.
In the deed it is expressly stipulated that the ownership
over the two-thirds proindiviso share of the donors in
Lot No. 5447 was transferred to the donee. That notarial
deed amounted to a transfer of the ownership and
possession of the lot because the execution of a public
instrument of conveyance is one of the recognized ways
by which delivery of lands may be made (Art. 1463, old
Civil Code, now art. 1498; Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals,
97 Phil. 46).
We find the appeal to be meritorious. The trial court
erred in assuming that the donee ceased to be a co-owner
because her name does not appear in OCT No. 4718
which was issued two years after the execution of the
deed of donation.
Overlooked by the trial court is the provision of section
70 of Act No. 496 that "registered land, and ownership
therein, shall in all respects be subject to the same
burdens and incidents attached by law to unregistered
land", and that nothing in Act No. 496 "shall in any way
be construed" "to change the laws of descent, or the
rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants
and other cotenants" "or to change or affect in any other
way any other rights or liabilities created by law and
applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise
expressly provided in this Act or in the amendments
hereof". Section 70 is quoted below:
"LEGAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTRATION LAND
"SEC. 70. Registered land, and ownership therein, shall
in all respects be subject to the same burdens and
incidents attached by law to unregistered land. Nothing
contained in this Act shall in any way be construed to
relieve registered land or the owners thereof from any
rights incident to the relation of husband and wife, or
from liability to attachment on mesne process or levy on
execution, or from liability to any lien of any description
established by law on land and the buildings thereon, or
the interest of the owner in such land or buildings, or to
change the laws of descent, or the rights of partition
between coparcener, joint tenants and other cotenants,
or the right to take the same by eminent domain, or to
relieve such land from liability to be appropriated in any
lawful manner for the payment of debts, or to change or
affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities
created by law and applicable to unregistered land,
except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in
the amendments hereof."
For clarity, the rules in section 70 may be restated as
follows:
1. Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens
and incidents as unregistered land and, therefore, like
unregistered land, it is subject to attachment and
execution for the payment of debts. The rights and
liabilities, which are created by law and are made
applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to
registered land, except as otherwise provided in Act No.
496.
2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and
wife are applicable to registered lands.
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any lien of any
description established by law on land and the buildings
thereon, or the interest of the owner in such land or
buildings, (b) to the laws of descent, and (c) to the rights
of partition between coparceners, joint tenants, and
other cotenants, except as otherwise expressly provided
in Act No. 496. (As to possible conflict between
sections 39 and 70 of Act No. 496, see De Jesus vs. City
of Manila, 29 Phil. 73).
The situation of Andrea Budlong is analogous to that of
a spouse whose name was not included in the Torrens
title when conjugal land was registered in the name of
the other spouse. (The spouses are co-owners of the
conjugal assets as provided in article 143 of the Civil
Code).
Thus, by reason of section 70, it was held that a parcel
of land, which was acquired during the marriage and
which was registered under the Torrens system in the
name of one spouse, is presumed to be conjugal unless
proven otherwise. The registration in the name of one
spouse does not preclude the application of the rule that
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife" (Art.
160, Civil Code, formerly article 1407; Flores vs.
Flores, 48 Phil. 288; Romero de Pratts vs. Menzi & Co.
and Sheriff of Rizal, 53 Phil. 51; Paterno Vda. de Padilla
vs. Bibby Vda. de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Seva vs. Nolan,
64 Phil. 374). cdphil
Section 70 was also applied to a case where the deceased
was survived by her legitimate daughter and an
acknowledged natural son. Although the eight parcels of
land left by the deceased were registered in the name of
her natural son, the daughter or her heirs could sue the
natural son or his heirs for the reconveyance of two-
thirds of the eight parcels, that being the daughter's share
in her mother's estate as a legal heir under the old Civil
Code. The one-year period in section 38 of Act No. 496
does not apply to that case. (Dayao vs. Robles, 74 Phil.
114).
In Sideco vs. Aznar, 92 Phil. 952, 961-2, it was held that,
by reason of section 70, an application by the widower
in a cadastral proceeding, long after the title to a parcel
of land was registered in his name in an ordinary land
registration proceeding, to have the names of his
children included in the title as co-owners, could be
granted. The registration did not affect the children's
hereditary rights. The children were not held guilty of
laches for having failed to secure the issuance of the title
in their names jointly with their father. (See Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, 494; Robles and Martin vs.
Lizarraga Hermanos, 42 Phil. 584; Gonzalez vs.
Banzon, 51 Phil. 15, 20).
Article 403 of the old Civil Code, now article 497,
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take
part in the partition of the common property. And article
400 of the old Code, now article 494, provides that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property, a provision which implies that the
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by laches.
(See art. 1965, old Civil Code).
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner
of Lot No. 5447. She became the successor-in-interest
of the donors, Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc. The
fact that in OCT No. 4718, which was issued subsequent
to the donation, the donors appear to be the co-owners
and not Andrea Budlong did not extinguish at all the
rights of Andrea as a co-owner.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It
unmistakably provides that the conversion of
unregistered land into registered land does not affect the
rights of the co-owners nor the legal rights and liabilities
applicable to unregistered land.
That the registration did not wipe out the rights of
Andrea, as the successor-in-interest of the donors, is
shown by the fact that she remained in possession of the
donated lot and that the owner's duplicate of OCT No.
4718 was given to her and was in her custody from 1936
to January, 1965, when she entrusted it to defendant
Juan Pondoc because of the plan to sell the lot and
dissolve the co-ownership. llcd
The trial court erred in applying to this case section 38
of Act No. 496 regarding review of the decree of
registration on the ground of fraud. This is not a case of
fraudulent registration.
Nor is this a case where the rule on laches is applicable.
Moreover, the defendants waived that defense because
they did not invoke it in their answer (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court; 1 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Edition, p. 263 citing Bergeon vs. Mansour,
9 Fed. Rules Service, p. 61).
In conclusion, we hold that the 1934 donation should be
given effect. It was confirmed by plaintiff-appellant's
possession of the donated lot, her improvements
thereon, her enjoyment of the fruits thereof, and her
payment of the realty taxes dues thereon for the years
1936 to 1966.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is reversed and
set aside. If the parties cannot agree on the partition of
the disputed lot, then the trial court should conduct
proceedings for the partition thereof in conformity with
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Defendant Juan Pondoc is ordered to surrender the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718 to the register of
deeds of Tagbilaran City within five days from his
counsel's receipt of the notice from the clerk of the lower
court of the remand of the records of this case from this
Court. The register of deeds is directed to register the
deed of donation, to cancel OCT No. 4718, and to issue
a new transfer certificate of title showing the two-thirds
interest of Andrea Budlong in Lot No. 5447. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion
Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 46296 | Delima v. Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 46296. September 24, 1991.]
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACIANO DELIMA, FIDEL
DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO
DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO
BACUS and PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GELILEO
DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs,
namely; FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D.
ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA,
DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER
DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's
judgment which declared as null and void the certificate
of title in the name of respondents' predecessor and
which ordered the partition of the disputed lot among
the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the
respondent appellate court and by the trial court are as
follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758
of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu
by sale on installments from the government. Lino
Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita
Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his
death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was
issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of "The Legal
Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo
Delima."
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now
substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of
"Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this
affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No.
3009 was issued on February 4, 1954 in the name of
Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the
surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed
With the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional
Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition
of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with
damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and
Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party
defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the
latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision
in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which
states: cdphil
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared
owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar
Lands Estate presently covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of
one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus,
Olimpio Bacus and Purificacion Bacus (one-fourth),
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Paciano,
Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima
(one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda.
de Delima, Lily D. Arias, Helen Niadas, and Dionisio,
Antonio, Eotu, Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima
(one-fourth).
"Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null
and void and the Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered
to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof another title
with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
"After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima
since 1958, the heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to
turn over to the other heirs their respective shares of the
fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00 per
year up to the present time with legal (interest).
"Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the
parties are ordered to petition the lot in question and the
defendants are directed to immediately turn over
possession of the shares here awarded to the respective
heirs.
"Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
"The counterclaim is dismissed.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 54-55, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent
appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and
upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other
brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio,
Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and
waived their rights to the property in his favor,
considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the
remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and
the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
"1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand
partition of inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the
defenses of prescription and laches have already been
waived.
"2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners." (p.
13, Rollo).
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or
not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by
the statutory period provided by law which shall enable
Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by
acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners
from their shares in the disputed property. LLpr
Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
"Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned.
"Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
"A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years.
"Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be
presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to
benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir
who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for
himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-
heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of
the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his
co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a
depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot,
40 Phil. 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September
19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel
partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-
owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1 ,
1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims
that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo
v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44
Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the
action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied
when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the
property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to
vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is
that of a trustee. In order that such possession is
considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to
a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following
elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had
been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the
evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez
v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71;
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18,
1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in
question executed a deed of partition and on the strength
thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name
of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one
wherein he appears as the new owner of the property,
thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership
of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the
existence of the co-ownership and of their rights
thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046,
March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for
reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of
the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of
adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is
counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858,
August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420). LLphil
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the
legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo
Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed
by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo
Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his name
numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-
heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open
and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and
the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by
Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to
vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title
was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to
the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs
and started as against them the period of prescription.
Hence, when petitioners filed their action for
reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February
29, 1963, such action was already barred by
prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could
have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked
by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 124262 | Tomas Claudio Memorial College,
Inc. v. Court of
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124262. October 12, 1999.]
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE,
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ, CRISANTA DE
CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE CASTRO, EFRINA DE
CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO and ARTEMIO
DE CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.
Aladdin F. Trinidad for petitioner.
Felix E. Mendiola for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondents filed an action for Partition before
the RTC of Morong, Rizal, alleging that the land they
inherited from their father was sold by their brother
Mariano to herein petitioner without their knowledge
and consent. Private respondents contended that the sale
affected only the undivided share of Mariano. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
prescription. Allegedly, the RTC had no jurisdiction to
try the case as the causes of action therein had already
been decided with finality by the Supreme Court in
another case. When the RTC still took cognizance of the
case and the Court of Appeals allowed the same, this
special civil action of certiorari was availed of.
No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
public respondent. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether
plaintiff is entitled to the claims asserted therein.
Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to
reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier
case. And, when the court acts within its jurisdiction,
any alleged errors committed in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which
are reversible by timely appeal and not by a special civil
action of certiorari. THaAEC
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL AND CERTIORARI,
WHEN PROPER. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors
of judgment which are revisable by timely appeal and
not by a special civil action of certiorari; because
certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure
or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. And
for a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must be
shown that the respondent court committed grave abuse
of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not
enough it must be grave.
2. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF A CASE; DISCUSSED. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein. Acquiring
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not
necessarily mean that the lower court meant to reverse
the decision of the Supreme Court in the land
registration case mentioned by the petitioner. Moreover,
settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, hence the court's jurisdiction cannot be made
to depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss. This has to be so, for were the
principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be
frustrated by making the sufficiency of this kind of
action dependent upon the defendant in all cases.
3. ID.; PARTY WHO INVOKES THE
JURISDICTION OF A COURT CANNOT
THEREAFTER CHALLENGE THE SAME. It is
now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals because it was petitioner who
elevated the instant controversy to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a
party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same
case. To do otherwise would amount to speculating on
the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of
the Court.
4. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; CO-OWNERSHIP;
ACTION FOR PARTITION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.
On the issue of prescription, if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only of his
own share and not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale. Under Article 493 of the Civil
Code, the transferee becomes a co-owner and gets only
what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition
of the property owned in common. Hence, the sale is not
null and void and the proper action is the division or
partition of the entire property if it continued to remain
in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it. Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its
delivery to the buyer. Pursuant to Article 494 of the
Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong vs.
Bondoc, this Court has interpreted said provision of law
to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the
Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie
in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." EcIaTA
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside
the Decision of the Court Appeals dated August 14,
1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution
dated March 15, 1996, which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. cdrep
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an
action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-
interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they
are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also
alleged that their father owned a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan,
Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two
hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less.
They further claim that in 1979, without their
knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their
brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made
possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole
heir to the property. It is the contention of private
respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only
his undivided share to the lot in question but not the
shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths
(4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its
special defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription
and/or laches. The trial court, after hearing the motion,
dismissed the complaint in an Order dated August 18,
1984. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court, in
an Order dated October 4, 1994, reconsidered the
dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous
order. Petitioner filed its own motion for reconsideration
but it was denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari anchored on the
following grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try
and take cognizance of the case as the causes of actions
have been decided with finality by the Supreme Court,
and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and
authority in taking cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the
Court of Appeals, finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, dismissed the petition in
a Decision dated August 14, 1995. Petitioner filed a
timely motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a
Resolution dated March 15, 1996. Hence this petition.
cdasia
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the
granting of the writ of certiorari in the present case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP.
PROC. NO. 118-M). THE "CAUSES OF ACTION"
HEREIN HAVE BEEN FINALLY DECIDED BY THE
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BR.
31) MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND SUSTAINED
IN A FINAL DECISION BY THE HON. SUPREME
COURT.
SECOND GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY
WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) DATED
OCTOBER 4, 1994, AND THE ORDER DATED
JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN SAID RTC (BR. 79)
INSISTED IN TRYING THIS CASE AGAINST
TCMC WHEN IT HAS RULED ALREADY IN A
FINAL ORDER THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A
"REAL PARTY" IN INTEREST BY THE HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 170, ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO,
ET. AL. vs. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL
COLLEGE, ET. AL., WHICH CASE INVOLVED THE
SAME RELIEF, SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND
THE SAME PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY
WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY
DISREGARDED THE EXISTENCE OF RES
JUDICATA IN THIS CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are:
whether or not the Regional Trial Court and/or the Court
of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case, and if so,
whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner
invokes Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as its mode in
obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision and
Resolution. Before we dwell on the merits of this
petition, it is worth noting, that for a petition for
certiorari to be granted, it must be shown that the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not mere
errors of judgment, for certiorari is not a remedy for
errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not
enough it must be grave.
In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse
of discretion committed by the public respondent. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took
cognizance of the action for partition filed by the private
respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the possession of the property owned in common from the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the third person, but for division or partition of the entire
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted property if it continued to remain in the possession of
therein. Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such
a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court partition should result in segregating the portion
meant to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
the land registration case mentioned by the petitioner. cdrep
Cdpr In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the prescription against an action for partition is a vain
court over the subject matter is determined by the proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code,
allegations of the complaint, hence the court's "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the
up in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. This has to partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of share is concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc, this Court
justice would be frustrated by making the sufficiency of has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the
this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be
cases. barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of
jurisdiction any alleged errors committed in the exercise a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
judgment which are revisable by timely appeal and not WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
by a special civil action of certiorari. Based on the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
foregoing, even assuming for the sake of argument that AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the SO ORDERED.
trial court, which earlier denied petitioner's motion to Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.
dismiss, such actuation on the part of the appellate court Bellosillo, J., is on official leave.
cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion, hence
not correctible by certiorari, because certiorari is not
available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the judge's findings and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It was petitioner
who elevated the instant controversy to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a
party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same
case. To do otherwise would amount to speculating on
the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of
the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if
a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. Under Article
493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition
affects only the seller's share pro indiviso, and the
transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's
share in the partition of the property owned in common.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share,
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for
the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of
G.R. No. 118904 | Trinidad v. Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998.]
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and
LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Liberato R. Ibadlit for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Patricio Trinidad died leaving four (4) parcels of land to
his three children, Inocentes Trinidad and the private
respondents Felix Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad.
Petitioner Arturio Trinidad, claiming to be the
legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, filed with
the Court of First Instance an action for partition and
damages demanding from private respondents the
partition of the aforesaid land into three (3) equal shares
and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of
his late father. Private respondents denied the claim of
the petitioner contending that Inocentes was single
when he died. Petitioner, in order to prove his filiation,
he presented a Certificate of Baptism, a Certificate of
Loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan
attesting that the records of births, deaths and marriages
were either lost, burned or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of the said municipality, family
pictures of the petitioner at childbirth with private
respondents and other family members, a witness who
was personally present during the nuptial of petitioner's
parents, and another witness who testified that
petitioners parents deported themselves as husband and
wife after the marriage. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the
ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that his parents were validly married,
and that he was recognized as the legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. The appellate court likewise
held that acquisitive prescription has set in. Hence, this
petition. cAaDHT
The merits of this petition were patent. The partition of
the late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant
proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the
decedent's estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn,
depend on whether he was born during the existence of
a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother and
his putative father. The Supreme Court held that such
burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and,
thus, the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals was inevitable. Moreover, the Court
found that the totality of petitioner's positive evidence
clearly preponderates over private respondents' self-
serving negations. The Court also ruled that private
respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription since
there was no evidence that the co-ownership of
petitioner's father over the land was repudiated by the
private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXCEPTIONS TO
HEARSAY RULE; ACT OR DECLARATION
ABOUT PEDIGREE; NON-PRESENTMENT OF
CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE NOT FATAL; OTHER
COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS PROOF OF
EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE, ENUMERATED.
To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a
witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of
children born during such union, and the mention of
such nuptial in subsequent documents. In the case at bar,
petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths
and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.
This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case.
Although the marriage contract is considered the
primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its
place.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMMON REPUTATION; WITNESS
TESTIMONY IN CASE AT BAR CONSIDERED AS
COMMON REPUTATION RESPECTING
MARRIAGE. In place of a marriage contract, two
witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren,
who testified that she was present during the nuptial of
Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified
that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife
after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay
captain of Tigayon and former board member of the
local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes
and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived
only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943, Gerardo
dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth
to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal
party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes
evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. It
further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT
PEDIGREE; BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE; MEANS
ALLOWED UNDER THE LAW TO SHOW
PEDIGREE. Although a baptismal certificate is
indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation it is one of "the
other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals. TAacHE
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAMILY REPUTATION OR
TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE; FAMILY
PICTURES, NOT DIRECT PROOF OF FILIATION
BUT SHOWS ACCEPTANCE OF FILIATION ANTE
LITEM MOTAM. To prove his filiation, he presented
in evidence two family pictures. The first family picture
(Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his
second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together
with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying
petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing
Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's
first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken
before the case was instituted. Although they do not
directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they
show that petitioner was accepted by the private
respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem
motam.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT
PEDIGREE; CONSISTENT USE OF FATHER'S
SURNAME WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM
ADVERSE PARTY IS PRESUMPTIVE PROOF OF
FILIATION. Furthermore, petitioner consistently
used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection
from private respondents a presumptive proof of his
status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
6. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY;
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE; CONSTRUED;
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR IS IN
PETITIONER'S FAVOR. Preponderant evidence
means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one
side outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to
the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the
trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner
failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is
unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance
of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts
and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
thereof, and their personal credibility. Applying this
rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held
that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor.
DTaAHS
7. CIVIL LAW; CO-OWNERSHIP; ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN AGAINST OR IN
FAVOR OF A CO-OWNER IN THE ABSENCE OF
REPUDIATION OF THE CO-OWNERSHIP.
Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-
ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-
owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership.
Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as
he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM OVER THE LAND NOT YET
TIME-BARRED; CASE AT BAR. In this particular
case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for
partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was
receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time,
recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents
was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of
their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of
petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the
titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's
name. Although private respondents had possessed
these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with
petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency
of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the
co-ownership. Considering the foregoing, Respondent
Court committed reversible error in holding that
petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-
barred. cCaIET
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth
certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?
LLphil
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for
review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals
Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994 and
Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995 in CA-GR
CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial
court and dismissed petitioner's action for partition and
damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a
complaint for partition and damages against Private
Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed
Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan,
Branch I. On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue,
so he was not substituted as a party.
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page
decision in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:
"Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion
that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad,
plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his
deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land
subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had
testified that he had been receiving [his] share from said
land before and the same was stopped, there was no
evidence introduced as to what year he stopped
receiving his share and for how much. This court
therefore cannot rule on that."
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed
the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were
legally married to each other and that acquisitive
prescription against him had set in. The assailed
Decision disposed:
"WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed
decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the
[petitioner's] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs."
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its
impugned Resolution which reads:
"The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for
reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of
merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in
the motion that merit the modification of the decision."
Hence, this petition.
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of
this case, as follows:
"On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed
with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan,
an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land,
described therein, claiming that he was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of
Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the
parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving
the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into
three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants
denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was
single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's birth.
Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in
the complaint had been in their possession since the
death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the
parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived
by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of
land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be
the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the
age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage,
Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-
mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3)
equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3)
individual shares of his late father, but defendants
refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced
by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent
portions of the trial court's decision:
"EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo,
77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is
the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan,
since 1972. She testified that before being elected as
barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-
woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the]
board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association
of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff
because they are neighbors and she knows him from the
time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as
Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato;
both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944
and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls
plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the
plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters
away from plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to go
there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the
defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio
because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the
plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the
father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed
Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead
but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows all these
[parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio
Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries
of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and
mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she
knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad
because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of
Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and
after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely:
Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was
never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of
Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for
identification and she identified a woman in the picture
as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat
holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad,
the defendant. The other woman in the picture was
pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and
Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her
in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes,
who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case,
witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to
the witness for identification. She testified the woman
in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture,
Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness
identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by
the court when . . . the picture [was] taken, counsel for
the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio
Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had
gone to the house of his parents. Witness then identified
the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The
name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and
the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as
father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit
C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also
marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also
identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew]
the land in question very well as she used to pass by it
always. It was located just near her house but she cannot
exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When
asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the
pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered
she does not know as she was not present during the
picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in
the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without
issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes
Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN
who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified having
known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio
Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are
brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio
Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the
parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name
of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad
Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a
farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to
invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting
and harvesting season. That she knows that during the
lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix
and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they
inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death
of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the
property without giving the widow of Inocentes any
share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two
brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one
possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to
the present. The witness testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when
he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew
up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up,
he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was
being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a
misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad
wanted to get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad
will not give it to him. LLphil
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was
presented as witness. He testified that defendants,
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they
being the brother and sister of his father. That the
parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio
Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father,
Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were
already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having
died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism
which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That
his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but
he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar
of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him
to live with them being their nephew as his mother was
already dead. Plaintiff's mother died when he was 13
years old. They treated him well and provided for all his
needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age
of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on
his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and
then they were invited by the defendants to live with
them. So he and his wife and children lived with the
defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with
the defendants when the latter invited him to live with
them, he presented a picture previously marked as
Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes
Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's daughter, his uncle and his
wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him.
Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A
shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff's son. According to him, these 2 pictures were
taken when he and his wife and children were living
with the defendants. That a few years after having lived
with them, the defendants made them vacate the house
for he requested for partition of the land to get his share.
He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his
case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in
controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees
and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4
months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The
boundaries are: East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo
Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio
Briones: located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters;
it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also
located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners
are East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio;
West Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and of that
belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the
defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square
meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic].
Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-
Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-
Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo
and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters
is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo
covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one
of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to
Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral
survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio
Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name
of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax
Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and
another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the
name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered
by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio
Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the
lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the
produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn.
Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes
Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They
were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain
Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is
a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff
answered he does not know because he was not yet born
at that time. That he does not have the death certificate
of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime.
That after the death of his father, he lived with his
mother and when his mother died[ ]"he lived with his
aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case That during
the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving
the share of the produce of the land. That both
defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are
single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That
[petitioner's] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES,
68 years old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook,
Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his
first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix
by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are
sister and brother. That he also knew Trinidad being the
brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead.
According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in
1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was
not married. That he knew this fact because at the time
of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing
with his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia
Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at
the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to
this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad,
and with his children before 1940 for only 3 months.
When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited
with anybody before his death, he answered, "That I do
not know", neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name
of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can
recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad
witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes
Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro
Briones, answered that he could not recall because he
was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had
gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at
Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday,
however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes
Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: "I do not
know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that although he
was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside
in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their
father was located there. When asked if he was aware of
the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this
case before the court, witness answered that he does not
know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of
Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the
time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the
witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was
around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt,
Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war.
When asked on cross examination if he knew where
Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940,
witness answered that he was buried in their own land
because the Japanese forces were roaming around the
place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the
alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the
defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the
picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as
Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said
picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad.
However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant
herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is
75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that
Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already
dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan.
That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time
and returned to Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon
arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While
his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not
aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he
arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married.
When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad
Molato, witness answered she knew her because
Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However,
according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as
husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, she said, 'Yes,' but she denied that
Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to the
witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the
defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the
name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad
Molato, having died already. When asked by the court
if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived
with her even for days, witness answered, he did not.
When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her
in her house, witness also said, 'He did not.'
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff,
Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia
Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely:
Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is
the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio
Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes
Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died
without a wife and children, in the same manner that her
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and
children. She herself testified that she does not have any
family of her own for she has [no] husband or children.
According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in
1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon
because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime
and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the
Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t]
could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March
1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and
March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not
answer the question. When she was presented with
Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein
she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad,
she answered; 'Yes.' and the child that she is holding is
Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According
to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be
brought to the church because she will be baptized and
that the baptism took place in the parish church of
Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered;
'Maybe there was.' When confronted with Exhibit A-1
which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness
identified herself and explained that she was requested
to bring the child to the church and that the picture taken
together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the
latter's child was taken during the time when she and
Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She
likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child
marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When
asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix
Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness
answered she does not know because her eyes are
already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the
woman in the picture who was at the right of the child
held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously
identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife,
witness answered that she cannot identify because she
had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for
the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff
if she knows that the one who took this picture was the
son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito
Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified
that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ
TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew
Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in
Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all
surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She
testified that a few months after the war broke out
Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola's house whose
names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified
that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime
in Manila and he went home only when his father
fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That
according to her, about 1 months after his arrival from
Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that
she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato
had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad.
According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes
Trinidad died. According to her she was born in 1928,
therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke
out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in
the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese
occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further
testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their
private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the
Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be
buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL
MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of
Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that . . . she knew
both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this
case very well as her house is only around 200 meters
from them. When asked if it is true that according to
Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from
Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15 days and died,
witness testified that he did not die in that year because
he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad
lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which
is only across the street from her house. According to
the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes
Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name
of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942
in New Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact
because she was personally present when couple was
married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that
when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in
good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that
according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a
Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors.
That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad
were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented
as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage
contract of his parents but instead a certification dated
September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New
Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of
births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New
Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time."
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or
otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent
Court ruled:
"We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has
not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to
claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as
a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the
record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad
Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes
Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad
Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that
she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988,
p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the
marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff
as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de
Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958)
acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth
Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the
defendants have been in possession of the parcels of
land involved in the concept of owners since their father
died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964,
when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still,
defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10)
years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by
acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines)."
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
"1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has
proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his
parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has
adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son
of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private
respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the
case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial Court
having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the
Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child
can be attacked collaterally by the private respondents.
LLphil
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-
appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in
question by acquisitive prescription."
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his
parents' marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to
collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on
acquisitive prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of
the late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant
proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the
decedent's estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn,
depend on whether he was born during the existence of
a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother
(Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This
Court holds that such burden was successfully
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the
assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will
not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory
conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such
rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously
pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this
case.
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and
his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he
was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This,
according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when
the question of whether a marriage has been contracted
arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the
following would constitute competent evidence: the
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after
the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records
of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned
or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to
petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence
may take its place.
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were
presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that
she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and
Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan;
and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple
deported themselves as husband and wife after the
marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of
Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-
teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and
Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived
only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943, Gerardo
dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth
to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal
party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes
evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. It
further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate
(Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were
named as the child's father and mother.
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the
following:
"ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is
proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final
judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the
preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that
records relative to his birth were either destroyed during
the last world war or burned when the old town hall was
razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his
filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures,
his baptismal certificate and Gerardo's testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner
(Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife
(Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad
(Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first daughter, and
Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another
picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1)
carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These
pictures were taken before the case was instituted.
Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation
to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by
the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante
litem motam.
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and
evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her
holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she
demurred that she did so only because she was requested
to carry the child before she was baptized. When shown
Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother but not
petitioner, his wife and the couple's children slyly
explaining that she could not clearly see because of an
alleged eye defect.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a
conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and special
laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza
vs. Court of Appeals:
"What both the trial court and the respondent court did
not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by 'any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,'
according to the Civil Code, or 'by evidence of proof in
his favor that the defendant is her father,' according to
the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
[Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]"
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a
member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity
or affinity, her testimony does not constitute family
reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by
itself, be used to establish petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive
evidence clearly preponderates over private
respondents' self-serving negations. In sum, private
respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and
without issue in March 1941. Private respondents'
witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in
1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads,
because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the
cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the
Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from
credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only
three months, and his answers on direct examination
were noncommittal and evasive:
"Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this
Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad,
where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said 'them', to whom are you referring to
[sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you
stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children
before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes
Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited
with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad
Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes
Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he
has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila
working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to
the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know
if there was anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that."
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent,
testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in
1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to
Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with
their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died
single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half
months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad
Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied
that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start
until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl
Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that
Inocentes died in March 1941. The Japanese forces
occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; thus, it stands
to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was
only then that local residents were unwilling to bury
their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the
Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area.
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes'
surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents a presumptive proof of his status as
Inocentes' legitimate child.
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the
evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the
adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if
awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent
Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his
legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In
determining where the preponderance of evidence lies,
a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, including the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
thereof, and their personal credibility. Applying this
rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held
that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor. It
declared:
". . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived
with defendants enjoying the status of being their
nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had
a family of his own where later on he started demanding
for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The
fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants . . . is
shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B.
These family pictures were taken at a time when
plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father's
share. . . His demand for the partition of the share of his
father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they
disowned him as their nephew. . . In this case, the
plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status
of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
defendants themselves, which status was only broken
when plaintiff demanded for the partition . . . as he was
already having a family of his own. . .
However, the disowning by the defendant [private
respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff
[petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony
of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain.
This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the
plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized
her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain
in this case as compared to the witness for the
defendants who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes
Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant,
Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no
husband nor children."
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not
permitted. Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner
chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his
parents' marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule
on the application of this doctrine to petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive
prescription sets in when one of the interested parties
openly and adversely occupies the property without
recognizing the co-ownership, and because private
respondents had been in possession in the concept of
owners of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio
died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not
acquired ownership of the property in question by
acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of
one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs
in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-
owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-
owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117
SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148
SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On
the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be
at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA
118 [1988])."
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court
committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's
claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4,
1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. LLphil
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ .,
concur.

In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the

action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-
owner, was receiving from private respondents his share
of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time,
recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents
was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of
their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of
petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the
titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's
name. Although private respondents had possessed
these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with
petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency
of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the
co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court held:
". . . Corollarily, prescription does not run against
private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words,
G.R. No. 170080 | Austria v. Lichauco
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170080. April 3, 2007.]
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs.
CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, CONSUELO Q.
JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS,
RICARDO M. QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M.
QUINTOS and TYRONE M. QUINTOS,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Petitioner Consolacion Q. Austria assails the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 68591
dated June 21, 2005 and its Resolution dated October 7,
2005, which respectively affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, dated
February 14, 2000 and its order dated August 7, 2000,
and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo
Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio
Quintos, and defendant-appellant Consolacion Austria
are siblings of full blood. Jose Alberto, Ricardo, Jr.,
Aileen and Tyrone, all surnamed Quintos, are the
nephews and niece of the defendant-appellant. AICDSa
The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2)
parcels of land with an aggregate area of six hundred
sixty one (661) square meters located in Palanan,
Makati City. The aforesaid parcels of land have
permanent improvements thereon which straddle both
lots, namely, a residential bungalow and two (2) units,
two-storey apartments, the titles of which are registered
jointly in the names of the parties as co-owners thereof.
The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the
early part of 1996, they informed defendant-appellant of
their desire to have the subject properties partitioned
based on the percentage of each co-owner's respective
share.
A realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by
which the subject properties could be physically
partitioned among the co-owners. However, the
defendant-appellant Austria refused to accede to any of
the schemes presented by the realtor for the physical
apportionment of the subject properties between the co-
owners thereof. DHacTC
Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant
Austria to partition the property, and the inability of the
co-owners to mutually agree on an arrangement
acceptable to all of them, on July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-
appellees filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 97-1485, against the defendant-
appellant Austria and two other defendants namely
Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as unwilling
co-plaintiffs) for partition of the subject property.
Within the period for filing an answer, the defendant-
appellant Austria filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
In its order dated November 10, 1997, the lower court
denied the omnibus motion to dismiss of the defendant-
appellant Austria, and directed the defendants to file
their answer within the remaining period provided by
the Rules. AHCETa
Within the prescriptive period, the defendant-appellant
Austria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
November 10, 1997 order, which the lower court denied
in an order dated February 2, 1998. HSCcTD
Not satisfied, the defendant-appellant Austria filed
before the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
which was docketed as CA-GR SP No. 46907, seeking
to annul the orders of November 10, 1997 and February
2, 1998.
In a Resolution dated July 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals
required the plaintiffs-appellees to comment, and
temporarily restrained the respondent judge, his agents,
representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf
from proceeding with Civil Case No. 97-1485 in order
that the petition may not become moot and academic.
On November 9, 1998, the defendant-appellant Austria
received a copy of the Decision dated October 30, 1998
dismissing her petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The defendant-appellant Austria moved for the
reconsideration thereof.
Subsequently, on July 19, 2001, defendant-appellant
Austria received a copy of the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated July 9, 2001, denying her motion for
reconsideration of the decision denying her petition for
certiorari and prohibition. IcHSCT
Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then filed a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court with the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the Supreme
Court denied the said petition for review for non-
compliance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit
costs in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec.
5(c), Rule 56.
Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the defendant-
appellant Austria filed a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution dated October 15, 2001 denying her
petition for review.
In its resolution dated January 24, 2002, the Supreme
Court denied with finality the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. aCHDST
During the pendency of the defendant-appellant's
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court,
the plaintiffs-appellees filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 142 where the main case
is pending, a motion dated April 6, 1998 praying that a
declaration of default be issued against all defendants
and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present evidence ex-
parte.
In an order dated July 13, 1998, the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City held in
abeyance the proceedings before it while awaiting the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration pending
before the Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the order holding in abeyance the
proceedings in the lower court, plaintiffs-appellees filed
a Manifestation and Motion dated September 14, 1998
praying for the resolution of their Motion dated April 6,
1998. In its order dated September 25, 1998, the lower
court deemed the incident submitted for resolution.
cHTCaI
While the motion for reconsideration filed by the
appellant is still pending before the Court of Appeals,
the lower court in its order dated July 6, 1999 declared
the defendants in default, set the reception of ex-parte
evidence, and commissioned the Branch Clerk of Court
to receive the ex-parte evidence and to submit her
corresponding report thereon as soon as the same is
concluded.
On August 4, 1999, the defendant-appellant Austria
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
July 6, 1999 with an urgent prayer to cancel plaintiff's
ex parte presentation of evidence on August 9, 1999,
which was however denied by the lower court, for lack
of merit, in an order dated January 14, 2000.
The plaintiffs-appellees then presented their evidence
ex-parte on January 28, 2000.
The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the
lower court on February 14, 2000, finding in favor of
the plaintiffs-appellees. HcSETI
A motion for new trial was thereafter filed by the
defendant-appellant Austria, which was, in an order
dated August 7, 2000, denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
which dismissed her petition and affirmed the trial
court's decision but deleted the order that petitioner pay
reasonable rental for her use of a portion of the disputed
properties. The appellate court denied reconsideration.
In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner avers that her motion for new trial and appeal
of the judgment by default are valid remedies under the
Rules of Court. She insists that the appellate court erred
in not reversing the declaration of default despite the
fact that she questioned the default order in the petition
for review which she seasonably filed with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner also contends that it was error for
the trial court to allow the sale of the entire property in
dispute. aHTDAc
Respondents filed a Comment dated March 30, 2006,
arguing that petitioner was correctly declared in default
because of her obstinate refusal to file an answer to the
complaint despite being ordered to do so by the trial
court. They also allege that they cannot be compelled to
remain in co-ownership only because of petitioner's
unjustified refusal to consent to a partition.
A Reply to Comment dated July 25, 2006 was filed by
petitioner who insisted that she was denied the right to
fully ventilate her case.
Only two issues are raised in this petition. The first issue
pertains to petitioner's insistence that the judgment by
default rendered by the trial court, which was
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is a
denial of her day in court. The second issue concerns the
validity of the trial court's decision alternatively
ordering the partition of the subject property or
authorizing its sale.
A defendant declared in default has the following
remedies: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default
under Sec. 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; (b) a
motion for new trial under Sec. 1 (a), Rule 37 if the
default was discovered after judgment but while appeal
is still available; (c) a petition for relief under Rule 38 if
judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an
appeal from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if
no petition to set aside the order of default has been
resorted to.
In this case, petitioner did not move to set aside the order
of default rendered by the trial court but filed a motion
for new trial after a decision had already been rendered
in the case. The motion for new trial, however, was
denied by the trial court for lack of merit. She then
appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing both the
denial of her motion for new trial and the adverse
decision of the trial court. IcHTAa
Evidently, petitioner utilized the appropriate remedies
available to her. The fact, however, that she availed of
the proper remedies does not by itself result in a
judgment in her favor or the reversal of the assailed
order and decision of the trial court. As correctly ruled
by the Court of Appeals, petitioner was declared in
default because of her adamant refusal to file an answer
despite being required to do so.
The factual circumstances in the cases of Heirs of Akut
v. Court of Appeals and Ampeloquio v. Court of
Appeals, cited by petitioner in pleading liberality, are
markedly different from this case. In Heirs of Akut,
petitioners were not able to file an answer within the
reglementary period because they failed to obtain the
services of counsel on time and two of the petitioners
were then sick. In Ampeloquio, the trial court's order
denying defendant's motion to dismiss was mistakenly
served upon one of its counsels on record and not upon
the lawyer in charge of the case. Consequently, the
answer was not filed on time. In both cases, there was
no indication that the failure to answer was intended to
delay the case. DaAETS
In contrast, the facts of this case suggest an intention on
the part of petitioner to delay the proceedings. The
complaint was first filed in 1997 but is only now being
finally laid to rest because of several procedural
stumbling blocks, including the elevation of the case to
this Court on the issue of the propriety of the trial court's
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss, hurled by
petitioner one after the other.
Parenthetically, the appellate court initially issued a
temporary restraining order as an incident to the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner questioning the trial
court's order denying her motion to dismiss but the
restraining order was lifted after its 60-day validity. The
expiration of the temporary restraining order resulted in
the running of the prescribed period to file an answer
and the continuation of the proceedings before the trial
court. Petitioner's obstinate refusal to file an answer to
the complaint despite these circumstances clearly
justifies the declaration of default by the trial court and
its affirmation by the Court of Appeals. ACTaDH
This case has crept, ever so slowly, up the ladder of
judicial process. While we are not dissuading parties
from availing of the judicial remedies outlined in the
Rules of Court, they should be cautioned to be judicious
in availing of these remedies. After all, rules of
procedure are intended to be, not tools of delay, but of
prompt and just disposition of every party's cause.
Having fully availed of, even exploited, these remedies,
petitioner cannot feign denial of her day in court. She
has been given every opportunity to fully ventilate her
side.
Now, we turn to the second issue raised by petitioner,
i.e., the validity of the trial court's decision alternatively
directing the partition of the subject properties or
authorizing their sale to a third party. ASaTHc
There are two stages in every action for partition. The
first phase is the determination of whether a co-
ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end either: (a) with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a
determination that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the
parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition
among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon.
The second phase commences when it appears that the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by
the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and
its approval by the court after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award
for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled
of their just share in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question.
The proceedings in this case have only reached the first
phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that even if the
order decreeing partition leaves something more to be
done by the trial court for the complete disposition of
the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the
proceedings for the determination of just compensation
by the appointed commissioners, the submission of their
reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the
partition, it is considered a final order and may be
appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.
There is no question that a co-ownership exists between
petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court
was correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil
Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership.
However, the trial court went astray when it also
authorized the sale of the subject properties to a third
party and the division of the proceeds thereof. What
makes this portion of the decision all the more
objectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned
the sale upon the price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs
(respondents herein) only, and adjudicated the proceeds
of the sale again only to plaintiffs. The pertinent portion
of the trial court's disposition states:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff:
1) Directing the partition (physical division) of the
subject properties and all improvements thereon among
the co-owners in accordance with their respective
shares; or STADIH
2) Authorizing the sale, conveyance or transfer of the
above-described properties to a third-party at such
price and under such terms acceptable to plaintiffs
and thereafter, dividing the proceeds of said sale
among them in accordance with their proportionate
interests. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on
appeal resulting in the appellate court's failure to rule on
the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simply brush this
issue aside considering that its resolution is necessary in
arriving at a just disposition of the case. The
rectification of the trial court's decision is accordingly
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21,
2005 is REVERSED in so far as it affirms the portion of
the decision dated February 14, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which
authorizes the sale, conveyance or transfer of the
properties subject of this case and the division of the
proceeds of said sale to respondents herein. The
Decision dated June 21, 2005 and Resolution dated
October 7, 2005 are AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 166790 | Cabrera v. Ysaac
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166790. November 19, 2014.]
JUAN P. CABRERA, petitioner, vs. HENRY
YSAAC, respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
Unless all the co-owners have agreed to partition their
property, none of them may sell a definite portion of the
land. The co-owner may only sell his or her
proportionate interest in the co-ownership. A contract
of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite
portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio.
In this petition for review on certiorari, Juan P. Cabrera
assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 19,
2003 and resolution dated January 3, 2005. These
decisions ruled that a specific performance to execute a
deed of sale over a parcel of land is not available as a
relief for Juan Cabrera.
It appears that the heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-
owned a 5,517-square-meter parcel of land located in
Sabang, Naga City, covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 506. One of the co-owners is
respondent, Henry Ysaac.
Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to
several lessees. Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased
a 95-square-meter portion of the land beginning in 1986.
On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and
offered to sell the 95-square-meter piece of land to Juan
Cabrera. He told Henry Ysaac that the land was too
small for his needs because there was no parking space
for his vehicle.
In order to address Juan Cabrera's concerns, Henry
Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two adjoining
lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe
family and the Espiritu family. Those three parcels of
land have a combined area of 439-square-meters.
However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera that the
sale for those two parcels could only proceed if the two
families agree to it.
Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry Ysaac and
Juan Cabrera settled on the price of P250.00 per square
meter, but Juan Cabrera stated that he could only pay in
full after his retirement on June 15, 1992. Henry Ysaac
agreed but demanded for an initial payment of
P1,500.00, which Juan Cabrera paid.
According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed him
that the Borbe family and the Espiritu family were no
longer interested in purchasing the properties they were
leasing. Since Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family
initially considered purchasing the property and had
made an initial deposit for it, Juan Cabrera agreed to
reimburse this earlier payment. On June 9, 1990, Juan
Cabrera paid the amount of P6,100.00. Henry Ysaac
issued a receipt for this amount. P3,100.00 of the
amount paid was reimbursed to Mamerta Espiritu and,
in turn, she gave Juan Cabrera the receipts issued to her
by Henry Ysaac.
On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance
of the purchase price to Henry Ysaac. However, at that
time, Henry Ysaac was in the United States. The only
person in Henry Ysaac's residence was his wife. The
wife refused to accept Juan Cabrera's payment.
Sometime in September 1993, Juan Cabrera alleged that
Henry Ysaac approached him, requesting to reduce the
area of the land subject of their transaction. Part of the
439-square-meter land was going to be made into a
barangay walkway, and another part was being
occupied by a family that was difficult to eject. Juan
Cabrera agreed to the proposal. The land was surveyed
again. According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac agreed
to shoulder the costs of the resurvey, which Juan
Cabrera advanced in the amount of P3,000.00.
The resurvey shows that the area now covered by the
transaction was 321 square meters. Juan Cabrera
intended to show the sketch plan and pay the amount
due for the payment of the lot. However, on that day,
Henry Ysaac was in Manila. Once more, Henry Ysaac's
wife refused to receive the payment because of lack of
authority from her husband.
On September 21, 1994, Henry Ysaac's counsel, Atty.
Luis Ruben General, wrote a letter addressed to Atty.
Leoncio Clemente, Juan Cabrera's counsel. Atty.
General informed Atty. Clemente that his client is
formally rescinding the contract of sale because Juan
Cabrera failed to pay the balance of the purchase price
of the land between May 1990 and May 1992. The letter
also stated that Juan Cabrera's initial payment of
P1,500.00 and the subsequent payment of P6,100.00
were going to be applied as payment for overdue rent of
the parcel of land Juan Cabrera was leasing from Henry
Ysaac. The letter also denied the allegation of Juan
Cabrera that Henry Ysaac agreed to shoulder the costs
of the resurveying of the property. ASaTHc
Juan Cabrera, together with his uncle, Delfin Cabrera,
went to Henry Ysaac's house on September 16, 1995 to
settle the matter. Henry Ysaac told Juan Cabrera that he
could no longer sell the property because the new
administrator of the property was his brother, Franklin
Ysaac.
Due to Juan Cabrera's inability to enforce the contract
of sale between him and Henry Ysaac, he decided to file
a civil case for specific performance on September 20,
1995. Juan Cabrera prayed for the execution of a formal
deed of sale and for the transfer of the title of the
property in his name. He tendered the sum of
P69,650.00 to the clerk of court as payment of the
remaining balance of the original sale price. On
September 22, 1995, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated on OCT No. 560.
In his answer with counterclaim, Henry Ysaac prayed
for the dismissal of Juan Cabrera's complaint. He also
prayed for compensation in the form of moral damages,
attorney's fees, and incidental litigation expenses.
Before the Regional Trial Court decided the case, the
heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac, under the
administration of Franklin Ysaac, sold their property to
the local government of Naga City on February 12,
1997. The property was turned into a project for the
urban poor of the city.
During the trial, Corazon Borbe Combe of the Borbe
family testified that contrary to what Juan Cabrera
claimed, her family never agreed to sell the land they
were formerly leasing from Henry Ysaac in favor of
Juan Cabrera. The Borbe family bought the property
from Naga City's urban poor program after the sale
between the Ysaacs and the local government of Naga
City.
On September 22, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City ruled that the contract of sale between Juan
Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was duly rescinded when the
former failed to pay the balance of the purchase price in
the period agreed upon. The Regional Trial Court found
that there was an agreement between Juan Cabrera and
Henry Ysaac as to the sale of land and the corresponding
unit price. However, aside from the receipts turned over
by Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family to Juan
Cabrera, there was no "evidence that the other adjoining
lot occupants agreed to sell their respective
landholdings" to Juan Cabrera. The Regional Trial
Court also doubted that Juan Cabrera was willing and
able to pay Henry Ysaac on June 15, 1992. According
to the trial court:
[A]fter the said refusal of Henry Ysaac's wife, plaintiff
[Juan Cabrera] did not bother to write to the defendant
[Henry Ysaac] or to any of the co-owners his intention
to pay for the land or he could have consigned the
amount in court at the same time notifying [Henry
Ysaac] of the consignation in accordance with Article
1256 of the Civil Code.Furthermore, in September,
1993 [Juan Cabrera] was able to meet [Henry Ysaac]
when the latter allegedly talked to him about the
reduction of the area he was going to buy. There is no
showing that [Juan Cabrera] again tendered his payment
to Henry Ysaac. Instead, he allegedly made his offer
after he had the land resurveyed but defendant was then
in Manila. There is no evidence as to what date this offer
was made. . . HDITCS
. . . [T]he court does not see any serious demand made
for performance of the contract on the part of [Juan
Cabrera] in 1992 when he allegedly promised to pay the
balance of the purchase price. Neither could he demand
for the sale of the adjoining lots because the occupants
thereof did not manifest their consent thereto. At the
most, he could have demanded the sale of the lot which
he was occupying. If his payment was refused in 1995,
he cannot demand for damages because the rescission of
the contract was relayed to him in writing in Exhibit "4".
The Regional Trial Court dismissed Juan Cabrera's
complaint and Henry Ysaac's counterclaim. Juan
Cabrera appealed the Regional Trial Court's decision.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial
Court that there was a perfected contract of sale between
Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac. According to the Court
of Appeals, even if the subject of the sale is part of
Henry Ysaac's undivided property, a co-owner may sell
a definite portion of the property.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the contract of sale
between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was not validly
rescinded. For the rescission to be valid under Article
1592 of the Civil Code,it should have been done through
a judicial or notarial act and not merely through a letter.
However, due to the sale of the entire property of the
Ysaac family in favor of the local government of Naga
City, the Court of Appeals ruled that the verbal contract
between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac cannot be
subject to the remedy of specific performance. The local
government of Naga City was an innocent purchaser for
value, and following the rules on double sales, it had a
preferential right since the sale it entered into was in a
public instrument, while the one with Juan Cabrera was
only made orally. The only recourse the Court of
Appeals could do is to order Henry Ysaac to return the
initial payment of the purchase price of P10,600.00
(P1,500.00 and P6,100.00 as evidenced by the receipts
issued by Henry Ysaac to Juan Cabrera, and P3,000.00
for the surveying expenses) as payment of actual
damages. The Court of Appeals likewise awarded
attorney's fees and litigation costs. To wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision of the lower court is hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered as follows:
1. Declaring that there is no valid rescission of the
contract of sale of the subject lot between plaintiff-
appellant [Juan P. Cabrera] and defendant-appellee
[Henry Ysaac]; however, specific performance is not an
available relief to plaintiff because of the supervening
sale of the property to the City of Naga, an innocent
purchaser and for value;
2. Ordering [Henry Ysaac] to pay [Juan P. Cabrera]
actual damages in the amount of P10,600.00, with legal
interest of 12% per annum from September 20, 1995
until paid;
3. Ordering [Henry Ysaac] to pay [Juan P. Cabrera], the
amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Henry Ysaac filed his motion for reconsideration dated
July 14, 2003 of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, Juan Cabrera immediately filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this court. In the
resolution dated October 15, 2003, this court denied the
petition "for being premature since respondent's motion
for reconsideration of the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is still pending resolution."
In the resolution dated January 3, 2005, the Court of
Appeals denied Henry Ysaac's motion for
reconsideration. On February 24, 2005, Juan Cabrera
filed another petition with this court, questioning the
propriety of the Court of Appeals' decision and
resolution.
This court initially noted that the petition was filed out
of time. The stamp on the petition states that it was
received by this court on March 24, 2005, while the
reglementary period to file the petition expired on
February 28, 2005. Thus, the petition was dismissed in
this court's resolution dated April 27, 2005. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the same
was denied with finality in this court's resolution dated
August 17, 2005.
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, petitioner
argued that it would be unfair to him if a clerical error
would deprive his petition from being judged on the
merits. Petitioner emphasized that the registry receipts
show that he filed the petition on February 24, 2005, not
March 24, 2005, as noted by this court in his pleading.
This court treated the letter as a second motion for
reconsideration. In the resolution dated March 31, 2006,
this court found merit in petitioner's letter. The petition
was reinstated, and respondent was ordered to file his
comment. Respondent filed his comment on September
18, 2006. This court required petitioner to file a reply,
which petitioner complied with on January 15, 2007.
The issues raised by petitioner and respondent are
summarized as follows:
1. Whether this court could take cognizance of issues
not raised by petitioner but by respondent in his
comment to the petition for review; THIAaD
2. Whether there was a valid contract of sale between
petitioner and respondent;
3. Whether the contract of sale still subsisted:
a. Whether the contract was terminated through
rescission;
b. Whether the contract was no longer enforceable due
to the supervening sale of the property to the local
government of Naga City.
4. Whether petitioner is entitled to the execution of a
deed of sale in his favor; and
5. Whether petitioner is entitled to actual damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of litigation.
The petition should be denied.
I never agreed to allow the sale of the property in favor of
This court can resolve issues raised
by both parties
Petitioner stated that the errors in this case are: (1) "the
[Court of Appeals] erred in holding that the relief of
specific performance is not available to [petitioner]
supposedly because of the supervening sale of [the]
property to the City Government of Naga"; and (2)
"consequently, the [Court of Appeals] erred in not
ordering the execution of the necessary deed of sale in
favor of [petitioner]." Petitioner argues that this court
should limit its adjudication to these two errors.
On the other hand, respondent raised issues on the
validity of the contract of sale in favor of petitioner, and
the propriety of the award of actual damages with
interest, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
For petitioner, if respondent wanted to raise issues
regarding the Court of Appeals' decision, respondent
should have interposed a separate appeal.
Petitioner's position is erroneous. This court can resolve
issues and assignments of error argued by petitioner and
respondent.
This court "is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to
arrive at a just decision of the case." We can consider
errors not raised by the parties, more so if these errors
were raised by respondent.
Respondent raised different issues compared with those
raised by petitioner. However, the assignment of error
of respondent was still responsive to the main argument
of petitioner. Petitioner's argument works on the
premise that there was a valid contract. By attacking the
validity of the contract, respondent was merely
responding to the premise of petitioner's main argument.
The issue is relevant to the final disposition of this case;
hence, it should be considered by this court in arriving
at a decision.
II
There was no valid contract of sale
between petitioner and respondent
Petitioner agrees with the decision of the Court of
Appeals that there was a perfected contract of sale
between him and respondent.
Respondent, however, argues that there was no contract
between him and petitioner because under Article 1475
of the Civil Code,there has to be a meeting of the minds
as to the price and the object of the contract. Respondent
argues that there was no meeting of the minds as to the
final price and size of the property subject of the sale.
In addition, while respondent admits that he was willing
to sell the property being leased from him by the Borbe
family and the Espiritu family, petitioner presented no
evidence to show that these families agreed to the sale
in favor of petitioner. During trial, Corazon Borbe
Combe of the Borbe family testified that her family
petitioner. Respondent likewise alleged that Mamerta
Espiritu of the Espiritu family eventually bought the
property occupied by her family, which is contrary to
the claim that petitioner obtained the consent of
Mamerta Espiritu to have the land sold in his favor.
Petitioner replied that respondent sold 113 square
meters of the 321-square-meter property to the Espiritu
family on January 17, 1996. Petitioner argued that
Mamerta Espiritu was not a buyer in good faith because
in 1990, she voluntarily agreed to surrender the lot for
sale in favor of petitioner because she did not have the
money to pay for the lot. Hence, the sale in favor of
Mamerta Espiritu should not supersede the sale in favor
of petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that there was a valid
contract of sale, although it found that there was no
evidence to support petitioner's claim that he was able
to secure the consent of the Espiritu family and the
Borbe family to the sale of the land. There was a valid
contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition, but
the suspensive condition was not complied with.
DEcTCa
For the Court of Appeals, there was a valid contract of
sale. The Court of Appeals' ruling was based on the idea
that a co-owner could sell a definite portion of the land
owned in common, and not because the suspensive
conditions of the contract were complied with. In ruling
this way, the Court of Appeals relied on Pamplona v.
Morato, which stated that:
. . . [A] "co-owner may validly sell his undivided share
of the property owned in common. (If the part sold
happens to be his allotted share after partition, the
transaction is entirely valid). Now then if there has been
no express partition as yet, but the co-owner who sells
points out to his buyers the boundaries of the part he was
selling, and the other co-owners make no objection,
there is in effect already a partial partition, and the sale
of the definite portion can no longer be assailed."
We find that there was no contract of sale. It was null ab
initio.
As defined by the Civil Code,"[a] contract is a meeting
of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service." For there to be a valid contract,
there must be consent of the contracting parties, an
object certain which is the subject matter of the contract,
and cause of the obligation which is established.
Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates himself to
deliver a determinate thing and to transfer its ownership
to the buyer. In turn, the buyer pays for a price certain
in money or its equivalent. A "contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price." The seller and buyer must agree as to
the certain thing that will be subject of the sale as well
as the price in which the thing will be sold. The thing to
be sold is the object of the contract, while the price is
the cause or consideration.
The object of a valid sales contract must be owned by
the seller. If the seller is not the owner, the seller must
be authorized by the owner to sell the object.
Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object
of the contract. Sale of a portion of the property is
considered an alteration of the thing owned in common.
Under the Civil Code,such disposition requires the
unanimous consent of the other co-owners. However,
the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate his or her part
in the co-ownership.
These two rules are reconciled through jurisprudence.
If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner
cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent
from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the
undivided interest of the co-owned property. As
summarized in Lopez v. Ilustre, "[i]f he is the owner of
an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell
and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to
divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of
one part by metes and bounds."
The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to
as the "ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share."
On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers
to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.
To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally
by ten co-owners, the undivided interest of a co-owner
is one hectare. The definite portion of that interest is
usually determined during judicial or extrajudicial
partition. After partition, a definite portion of the
property held in common is allocated to a specific co-
owner. The co-ownership is dissolved and, in effect,
each of the former co-owners is free to exercise
autonomously the rights attached to his or her ownership
over the definite portion of the land. It is crucial that the
co-owners agree to which portion of the land goes to
whom.
Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of
common property requires the consent of all co-owners
because it operates to partition the land with respect to
the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or
seller is already marking which portion should redound
to his or her autonomous ownership upon future
partition.
The object of the sales contract between petitioner and
respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned parcel
of land. At the time of the alleged sale between
petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still
held in common. This is evidenced by the original
certificate of title, which was under the names of
Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac,
respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma
Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac,
Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and
Maridel Ysaac.
The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest
in the co-ownership. However, this was not the object
of the sale between him and petitioner. The object of the
sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent
who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract
to petitioner, respondent has "no right to sell or alienate
a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common, because his right over the thing is
represented by quota or ideal portion without any
physical adjudication." THaAEC
There was no showing that respondent was authorized
by his co-owners to sell the portion of land occupied by
Juan Cabrera, the Espiritu family, or the Borbe family.
Without the consent of his co-owners, respondent could
not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.
Respondent had no right to define a 95-square-meter
parcel of land, a 439-square-meter parcel of land, or a
321-square-meter parcel of land for purposes of selling
to petitioner. The determination of those metes and
bounds are not binding to the co-ownership and, hence,
cannot be subject to sale, unless consented to by all the
co-owners.
In finding that there was a valid contract of sale between
petitioner and respondent, the Court of Appeals erred in
the application of Pamplona v. Moreto. The ruling in
Pamplona should be read and applied only in situations
similar to the context of that case.
Pamplona involved the Spouses Moreto who owned
three (3) parcels of land with a total area of 2,346 square
meters. The spouses had six (6) children. After the wife
had died, the husband sold one of the parcels to the
Pamplona family, even if the conjugal partnership had
not yet been liquidated. The parcel sold measured 781
square meters, which was less than the ideal share of the
husband in the estate. This court allowed the sale to
prosper because of the tolerance from the husband's co-
heirs. This court ruled:
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences
were to be erected without objection, protest or
complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation
and possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was
created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano
Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein
from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any
right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed
by said vendor Flaviano Moreto. (Emphasis supplied)
In Pamplona, the co-heirs of Flaviano Moreto only
questioned the sale to the Pamplona family nine (9)
years after the sale. By then, the Pamplona family had
exercised several acts of ownership over the land. That
is why this court considered it acquiescence or tolerance
on the part of the co-heirs when they allowed the
Pamplonas to take possession and build upon the land
sold, and only questioned these acts several years later.
The ruling in Pamplona does not apply to petitioner.
There was no evidence adduced during the trial that
respondent's co-owners acquiesced or tolerated the sale
to petitioner. The co-owners tolerated petitioner's
possession of a portion of their land because petitioner
was a lessee over a 95-square-meter portion of the
property, not the buyer of the 321-square-meter portion.
There was also no evidence of consent to sell from the
co-owners. When petitioner approached respondent in
1995 to enforce the contract of sale, respondent referred
him to Franklin Ysaac, the administrator over the entire
property. Respondent's act suggests the absence of
consent from the co-owners. Petitioner did not show that
he sought Franklin Ysaac's consent as administrator and
the consent of the other co-owners. Without the consent
of the co-owners, no partial partition operated in favor
of the sale to petitioner.
At best, the agreement between petitioner and
respondent is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. A
contract to sell is a promise to sell an object, subject to
suspensive conditions. Without the fulfillment of these
suspensive conditions, the sale does not operate to
determine the obligation of the seller to deliver the
object.
A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite
portion of the property. However, such contract is still
subject to the suspensive condition of the partition of the
property, and that the other co-owners agree that the part
subject of the contract to sell vests in favor of the co-
owner's buyer. Hence, the co-owners' consent is an
important factor for the sale to ripen.
A non-existent contract cannot be a
source of obligations, and it cannot
be enforced by the courts
Since petitioner believes that there was a perfected
contract of sale between him and respondent, he argues
that a deed of sale should be formally executed.
Petitioner agrees with the Court of Appeals' finding that
there was no valid rescission of the contract in
accordance with Article 1592 of the Civil Code.
However, petitioner disagrees with the Court of Appeals
when it ruled that the contract was no longer enforceable
due to the supervening sale with the local government
of Naga City. Petitioner argues that the sale in favor of
the local government of Naga City was not made in
good faith. Before the sale was finalized between the
local government and the heirs of Luis and Matilde
Ysaac, petitioner had a notice of lis pendens annotated
to OCT No. 506. It was presumed that the local
government had due notice of petitioner's adverse claim,
thus, it cannot be considered an innocent purchaser.
ASTcEa
For respondent, due to the inexistence of a valid contract
of sale, petitioner cannot demand specific performance
from respondent. Respondent disagrees with the Court
of Appeals when it stated that Article 1592 of the
rescission of contract of sale applies. There is no need
to apply Article 1592 because there was no contract to
begin with. The contract between respondent and
petitioner was terminated by virtue of the letter dated
September 21, 1994.
We rule in favor of respondent.
The absence of a contract of sale means that there is no
source of obligations for respondent, as seller, or
petitioner, as buyer. Rescission is impossible because
there is no contract to rescind. The rule in Article 1592
that requires a judicial or notarial act to formalize
rescission of a contract of sale of an immovable property
does not apply. This court does not need to rule whether
a letter is a valid method of rescinding a sales contract
over an immovable property because the question is
moot and academic.
Even if we assume that respondent had full ownership
of the property and that he agreed to sell a portion of the
property to petitioner, the letter was enough to cancel
the contract to sell.
Generally, "[t]he power to rescind obligations is implied
in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent on him."
For the sale of immovable property, the following
provision governs its rescission:
Article 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even
though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to
pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of
the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may
pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as
no demand for rescission of the contract has been made
upon him either judicially or by notarial act. After the
demand, the court may not grant him a new term.
This provision contemplates (1) a contract of sale of an
immovable property and (2) a stipulation in the contract
that failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon will
cause the rescission of the contract. The vendee or the
buyer can still pay even after the time agreed upon, if
the agreement between the parties has these requisites.
This right of the vendee to pay ceases when the vendor
or the seller demands the rescission of the contract
judicially or extrajudicially. In case of an extrajudicial
demand to rescind the contract, it should be notarized.
Hence, this provision does not apply if it is not a contract
of sale of an immovable property and merely a contract
to sell an immovable property. A contract to sell is
"where the ownership or title is retained by the seller
and is not to pass until the full payment of the price, such
payment being a positive suspensive condition and
failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but
simply an event that prevented the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force."
In a similar case entitled Manuel v. Rodriguez, Eusebio
Manuel offered to buy the land owned by Payatas
Subdivision, Inc. The Secretary-Treasurer of Payatas
Subdivision, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., agreed to sell the
land to Eusebio Manuel after negotiations. Similar to
this case, the agreement was only made orally and not
in writing. An initial payment was made, and a final
payment was to be made nine (9) to ten (10) months
later. Manuel never paid for the latter installment;
hence, Eulogio Rodriguez cancelled their agreement
and sold the land to someone else.
In Manuel, this court categorically stated that Article
1592 "does not apply to a contract to sell or promise to
sell, where title remains with the vendor until fulfillment
to a positive suspensive condition, such as full payment
of the price." This court upheld that the contract to sell
was validly cancelled through the non-payment of
Eusebio Manuel. The same conclusion applies in this
case.
The law does not prescribe a form to rescind a contract
to sell immovable property. In Manuel, the non-
payment operated to cancel the contract. If mere non-
payment is enough to cancel a contract to sell, the letter
given to petitioner's lawyer is also an acceptable form of
rescinding the contract. The law does not require
notarization for a letter to rescind a contract to sell
immovable property. Notarization is only required if a
contract of sale is being rescinded.
Petitioner argued that he was willing to comply with the
suspensive condition on the contract to sell because he
was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price on
June 15, 1992. However, his argument is unmeritorious.
As ruled by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner should
have resorted to the various modes of consignment
when respondent's wife refused to accept the payment
on respondent's behalf.
Therefore, even if we assumed that the contract between
petitioner and respondents were perfected, the strict
requisites in Article 1592 did not apply because the only
perfected contract was a contract to sell, not a contract
of sale. The courts cannot enforce the right of petitioner
to buy respondent's property. We cannot order the
execution of a deed of sale between petitioner and
respondent. DSacAE
The question of double sale also becomes moot and
academic. There was no valid sale between petitioner
and respondent, while there was a valid sale between the
local government of Naga City and respondent and his
co-owners. Since there is only one valid sale, the rule on
double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code does
not apply.
Compensatory damages, attorney's
fees, and costs of litigation
Respondent argued that petitioner is not entitled to the
compensatory damages that the Court of Appeals
awarded. According to respondent, petitioner continues
to occupy the 95-square-meter property that he has been
leasing since 1986 because the parcel was not included
in the sale to the local government of Naga City. Since
April 30, 1990, petitioner has not been paying rent to
respondent despite his continued occupation of the
property. Therefore, there was no unjust enrichment on
the part of respondent when he applied petitioner's
initial payment over the sale of the property as payment
for rent.
Respondent argued further that the award of attorney's
fees and litigation expenses in favor of petitioner was
also erroneous because prior to this litigation,
respondent already informed petitioner that his claim
has no basis in law and fact. Yet, petitioner persisted on
filing this case.
We rule that petitioner is entitled to the return of the
amount of money because he paid it as consideration for
ownership of the land. Since the ownership of the land
could not be transferred to him, the money he paid for
that purpose must be returned to him. Otherwise,
respondent will be unjustly enriched.
Respondent's claim for rent in arrears is a separate cause
of action from this case. For petitioner's earnest money
payment to be considered payment for his rent
liabilities, the rules of compensation under Article 1279
of the Civil Code must be followed.
It was not proven during trial if petitioner's rental
liability to respondent is due, or if it is already liquidated
and demandable. Hence, this court is limited to uphold
the ruling of the Court of Appeals, but such payment
could be subject to the rule on compensation.
However, petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees and
the costs of litigation. The Court of Appeals awarded
attorney's fees to petitioner "just to protect his right
[because petitioner] reached this court to seek justice for
himself."
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling, we find that
petitioner did not have a clear right over the property in
question. The Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees
and litigation costs on the premise that the contract
between petitioner and respondent was perfected.
Without a valid contract that stipulates his rights,
petitioner risked litigation in order to determine if he has
rights, and not to protect rights that he currently has.
Hence, the award of attorney's fees and litigation costs
was not properly justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' decision dated June 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65869 is SET ASIDE. The contract between
petitioner and respondent is DECLARED invalid and,
therefore, cannot be subject to specific performance.
Respondent is ORDERED to return P10,600.00 to
petitioner, with legal interest of 12% per annum from
September 20, 1995 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. The award of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 76351 | Aguilar v. Court of Appeals
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76351. October 29, 1993.]
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.
Siruelo, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRE-
TRIAL; APPEARANCE OF PARTIES THEREIN;
MANDATORY. The law is clear that the appearance
of parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. A party who fails
to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default. In the case at bar, where private
respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled
pre-trial, the trial court has authority to declare
respondent in default.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OR DENIAL OF
POSTPONEMENT THEREOF; SUBJECT TO THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE;
CASE AT BAR. Although respondent's counsel filed
a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or
denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, which should take into account two factors in the
grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely:
(a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of
the case of movant. In the instant case, the trial court
found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for
respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit.
Counsel's explanation that he had to go to Iloilo by boat
as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and
accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27
April 1979 where she was one of the principal sponsors,
cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify
postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of Appeals
did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain
the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion
in denying the postponement for lack of merit.
Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory
process as pre-trial would require much more than mere
attendance in a social function. It is time indeed we
emphasize that there should be much more than mere
perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its
observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its
objective, i. e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition
of cases.
3. CIVIL LAW; CO-OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF CO-
OWNER OVER AN INDIVISIBLE PROPERTY.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that
each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one
of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted
to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked
by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b)
the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property
upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one
case, this Court upheld the order of the trial court
directing the holding of a public sale of the properties
owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil
Code. However, being a co-owner respondent has the
right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property
owned in common so long as it is in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not
injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. Each co-
owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a
division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with
his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
4. ID.; ID.; TERMINATION THEREOF; EFFECT;
CASE AT BAR. Since petitioner has decided to
enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the
house and lot and respondent has not refuted the
allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the
property by his continued occupancy of the premises,
justice and equity demand that respondent and his
family vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner,
respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month,
with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered
him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other
half of the property appertaining to petitioner. When
petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the
property and the trial court granted the petition and
ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership
was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued
stay of respondent and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property
should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on,
respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals
until he and his family vacate.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and
void the orders of 23 and 26 April 1979, the judgment
by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22 October
1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay
City, Branch 30, and directing the trial court to set the
case for pre-trial conference. LLjur
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers;
Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children of the late
Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28
October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and
lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and
enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.
Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the
co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was
one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23
February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that
henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be
equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage
obligation of the original owners with the Social
Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession
and enjoyment of the house together with their father.
llcd
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a
loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale
would be executed and the title registered in the
meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed
that Senen would take care of their father and his needs
since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate
the house and that the property be sold and proceeds
thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to
petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979
an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that
the they could divide the proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of
the sale be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his
favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also
prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by
respondent after their father died. cdphil
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that
he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling
price could be obtained; that if the sale would be
effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally;
and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use
and enjoyment of the property.
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial
on 26 April 1979 with the lawyers of both parties
notified of the pre-trial and served with the pre-trial
order, with private respondent executing a special power
of attorney to his lawyer to appear at the pre-trial and
enter into any amicable settlement in his behalf.
On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua,
counsel for respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial
on the ground that he would be accompanying his wife
to Dumaguete City where she would be a principal
sponsor in a wedding.
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be
without merit, the trial court denied the motion and
directed that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled.
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on
26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared.
Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in whose
favor he executed a special power of attorney to
represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the trial
court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant as in
default and ordered reception of plaintiff's evidence ex
parte.
On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an
omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default and
to defer reception of evidence. The trial court denied the
motion and plaintiff presented his evidence.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against
defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be
co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares on the
basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that
plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the
property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the
house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals
and continued maneuvers of defendant to delay
partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff
as co-owner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could
not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that the property
should be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided
equally between the parties.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the
property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals 2 from
January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest
from the time the action was filed.
On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus
motion for new trial but on 22 October 1979 the trial
court denied the motion.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals
praying that the following orders and decision of the
trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970
denying defendant's motion for postponement of the
pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order of 26 April
1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff
to present his evidence ex-parte; (c) the default
judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22
October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the
order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the
assailed judgment rendered by default. The appellate
court found the explanation of counsel for defendant in
his motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid
of a manifest intention to delay the disposition of the
case. It also ruled that the trial court should have granted
the motion for postponement filed by counsel for
defendant who should not have been declared as in
default for the absence of his counsel. LLpr
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred (1) in not holding that the motion of
defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was
dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the
trial court for pre-trial and trial.
The issues to be resolved are: whether the trial court
correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure
to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to
present his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial
court correctly rendered the default judgment against
respondent.
We find merit in the petition.
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the
appearance of parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. A
party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may
be non-suited or considered as in default. In the case at
bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to
appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial court has
authority to declare respondent in default.
Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to
postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, which
should take into account two factors in the grant or
denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the
reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of the
case of movant.
In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated
in the motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the
pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that
he had to go to Iloilo by boat as early as 25 March 1979
to fetch his wife and accompany her to a wedding in
Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she was one of
the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it
insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and
the Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the
denial. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not
abuse its discretion in denying the postponement for
lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a
mandatory process as pre-trial would require much
more than mere attendance in a social function. It is time
indeed we emphasize that there should be much more
than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial
procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is
to attain its objective., i.e., the speedy and inexpensive
disposition of cases. LLpr
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for
postponement three (3) days before the scheduled pre-
trial. If, indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend
the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least
should have personally appeared in order not to be
declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for
him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in
default and directing the presentation of petitioner's
evidence ex parte was proper.
With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial
court by default, which respondent appellate court did
not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds
that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the
evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents
are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares;
either one of them may demand the same of the house
and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly
rentals to petitioner from the time their father died in
1975 and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to
third persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's
continued stay in the property hinders its disposal to the
prejudice of petitioner. On the part of petitioner, he
claims that he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a
monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered
respondent to vacate the property so that it could be sold
to third persons and the proceeds divided between them
equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half
(1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as monthly
rental, conformably with their stipulated sharing
reflected in their written agreement.
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner,
except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly
rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here
declare to commence only after the trial court ordered
respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26
July 1979. LLphil
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that
each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one
of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted
to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked
by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b)
the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property
upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one
case, this Court upheld the order of the trial court
directing the holding of a public sale of the properties
owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil
Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to
use the house and lot without paying any compensation
to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in
common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to
the interest of the other co-owners. 9 Each co-owner of
property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no
other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests
of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division
is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with
his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court
to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has
been preventing the sale of the property by his continued
occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand
that respondent and his family vacate the property so
that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to
petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00
per month, with legal interest from the time the trial
court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment
of the other half of the property appertaining to
petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the
property and the trial court granted the petition and
ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership
was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued
stay of respondent and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property
should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on,
respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals
until he and his family vacate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6912-P dated 26 July 1979
is REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent
Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in
question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision, and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a
monthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal
rate from the time he received the decision of the trial
court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves
the premises. LLpr
The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps
to implement this decision conformably with Art. 498
of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This decision
is final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. 171914 | Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.]
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO
Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,
respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under
the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence,
any settlement of property between the parties of the
first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an
incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable
against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated
on November 11, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered
on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, in Makati City. The CA thereby denied her
right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in
a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as
follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name
partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna,
Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that
time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil
ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral
in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In
ATTY. LUNA's marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal,
Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana
Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina
Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost
two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and
EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each
other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property. CAHaST
On January 12, 1977, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce
decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil
and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription
of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to
the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife
until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law
firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing
partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY.
LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa
St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36
months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium
unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON. After
full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and
CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which
was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN,
married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
. . ."
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100
share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko,
for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February
7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married
to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) . . ."
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but
the same was still registered in common under CCT No.
21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY.
LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100
share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed
another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their
office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY.
JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father
to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own
law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent
of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in
the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of
ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the
latter's last will and testament; and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the
owner of the 1/2 portion of the subject properties; that
the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals
on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed
to preserve and administer the subject properties; and
that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay
attorney's fees and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.
EIaDHS
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after
trial upon the aforementioned facts, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Luces Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been made for transport
and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors
to the RTC namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE
MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA
AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT
IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT; cAaDHT
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY
CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED
BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO
PAY FILING FEE.
In contrast, the respondents attributed the following
errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF'S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA'S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
modified decision, holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on July 12, 1997.
The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA
in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior
marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-
appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Lung (first marriage), having been acquired
from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces
Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and
valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as
owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds
of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces
Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna"; SHaATC
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) are hereby
declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On March 13, 2006, the CA denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for
review on certiorari that:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was
not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
recognizing the Dominican Republic court's approval of
the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner Failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subject
condominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law
books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the
Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly,
whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first
marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage
entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1.
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna. and Eugenia,
both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued
to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although
living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both
Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage. DHIcET
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first
marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with
the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It
affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must
be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or
upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long
as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2.
The Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable
against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations. This is because the Spanish
Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their
marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any
marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community
of property, or upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until
terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code,viz.:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as
follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
cCaSHA
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been
declared absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
xxx xxx xxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition
for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may
appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may
protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition
stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient
in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of
gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no
question that the approval took place only as an incident
of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their
execution of the Agreement were identical to the
grounds raised in the action for divorce. With the
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under
Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement
was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the
lifetime of their marriage.
3.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being
bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for
being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved
by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted
until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting
a second or subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
cDTCIA
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative
for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and
competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her
favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to
the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that
they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition
of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's
defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant
such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved
her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino
totaling P146,825.30; and that such aggregate
contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost
the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the
unit's purchase price of P1,449,056.00.
The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were
paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which
Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; that
she had the financial capacity to make the contributions
and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the
properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the
co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioner's assertions on her actual contributions
through the following findings and conclusions,
namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that her own independent funds were used to
buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case proof that
was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and
Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases
where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or
under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-
ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void
at first because it applied only if the parties were not in
any way incapacitated or were without impediment to
marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man
and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption
of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be
equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of
actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith was not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The
rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in
bad faith. SDTIHA
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby
marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs.
Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in
the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks
that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition
of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial
court, viz.:
". . . The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00
payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months
before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was
signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the
amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to
Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, this was in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was
dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of
Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for
P4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff
to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. . . ."
SOLEDAD's claim that she made a cash contribution of
P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no
basis for SOLEDAD's claim of co-ownership over the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial
court correctly found that the same was acquired
through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name of
the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse
of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking
Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff
does not have evidence to show that she paid for them
fully or partially. . . ."
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No.
21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA,
married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So
it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in
the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm.
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the
law office amortization and for the law books. It is more
logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his
earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for
use of the law firm that he headed. STcEaI
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and
conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not
been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed,
the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership,
did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did
not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence
of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties
out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It
should then be justly concluded that the properties in
litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty.
Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks
pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty.
Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 159310 | Borromeo v. Descallar
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]
CAMILO F. BORROMEO,
petitioner,vs.ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J p:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-
interest) who acquired real properties in the country as
against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name
the properties were registered under the Torrens
system? CaAIES
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his
employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an Austrian
company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he
transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of
the National Power Corporation. There, he met
respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated
mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at
St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and
asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, respondent
agreed. The tutorials were held in Antonietta's residence
at a squatters' area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live
together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue
City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots
at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue
City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985
and March 10, 1986 covering the properties, Jambrich
and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 was likewise
issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the
ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently,
Jambrich's name was erased from the document. But it
could be noted that his signature remained on the left
hand margin of page 1, beside respondent's signature as
buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is
the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued
in respondent's name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondent's two sons
in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, and per Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5,
1988.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then,
respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich
began to live with another woman in Danao City.
Jambrich supported respondent's sons for only two
months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime
in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a
hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he
became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To
pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the
Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment".
On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three
lots have been transferred in the name of respondent,
and that the subject property has already been
mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner
alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18,
1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do
not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich
alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive
funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of
the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich
executed in his favor. IcSEAH
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she
did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On
the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and
exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and
pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in
question",and that Jambrich, being an alien, was
prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her
alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property
with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner,
in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and
documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries
which Jambrich received while still employed by the
Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the
purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under
litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and
earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not
only supported by documentary evidence but also by the
admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla.
So that, Jambrich's financial capacity to acquire and
purchase the properties ...is not disputed.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, evidence ...clearly show that before
defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of
1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St.
Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and
was ...renting and living only in ...[a] room at ...[a]
squatter area at Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City; that Jambrich
took pity of her and the situation of her children that he
offered her a better life which she readily accepted. In
fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her
two children ...are all stated and reflected in the Child
Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-
1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who
prepared the same when she was personally interviewed
by her in connection with the adoption of her two
children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts
were not true because these are now denied by her ...and
if it was also true that during this time she was already
earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per
month from her copra business, it would be highly
unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in
such a miserable condition since it is the observation of
this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an
expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to
impress this Court in order to have a big saving as
clearly shown by her actuation when she was already
cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to
her ...the allowance given ...by him in the amount of
$500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education
and maintenance of her children. IDAESH
This being the case, it is highly improbable and
impossible that she could acquire the properties
under litigation or could contribute any amount for
their acquisition which according to her is worth more
than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a]
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a
month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00
she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of
her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that
she was really in financial distress when she met and
accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with
him because that was a big financial opportunity for
her and her children who were already abandoned
by her husband.
xxx xxx xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name
appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the
deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as
buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a
scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken
advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time
was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good
attitude shown by her to him since he could still very
well provide for everything she needs, he being earning
(sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this
Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation
was at the time when their relationship was still going
smoothly and harmoniously. [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, ...Decision is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the
residential house of strong materials and three parcels of
land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered
by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791
and 24792 issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to
cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name
of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new
ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits
"I","K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the properties in
question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
ATSIED
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees
in the amount of P25,000.00 and litigation expenses in
the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated April 10, 2002, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the
respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court's conclusion. The
circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower
court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme
Court which upheld the validity of the title of the
subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at
bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the
subject property has been issued in the name of the alien
transferee (Godinez et al. vs. Fong Pak Luen et al.,120
SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila,79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World
Ministries vs. Sebastian,159 SCRA 446, citing the case
of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco,113 SCRA
547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma,138 SCRA 78).In the case at
bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of
Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has
no title thereto.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND
OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH'S PARTICIPATION,
INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES
IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE
TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-
REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE). HTScEI
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial
court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties
in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an Austrian company. He
was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00.
Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one
year where his monthly salary was approximately
P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a
waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not
more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land
were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her
during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of
income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The
supposed copra business was actually the business of
her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has
no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income
tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were
lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already
scrap. Further, the Child Study Report submitted by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondent's
two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children
until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with
money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are
(sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the
end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming
because of the situation in the Philippines at that time.
Her financial problem started then. She was even
renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo
Ave.,Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial
distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later
offered her a decent place for herself and her children.
The DSWD Home Study Report further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz
when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses
of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl
and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language.
Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need
of additional income to support [her] 2 young children
who were abandoned by their father. Their session was
agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence
of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of
the family particularly the children who were
malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr.
Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent
place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for
the children. Antonietta who was miserable and
financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for
the sake of the children. aSTECA
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence
point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase
the three parcels of land, and to construct the house
thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath,
during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question,
but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute
Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed
as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in
installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account
with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments
were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with
Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where she
was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where
he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to
respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interests and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he
executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court,
subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case,
we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the
trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert
the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only
in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
acquired during the couple's cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but
are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not
apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally
married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-
ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
DcaCSE
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the
properties in the name of respondent alone. Having
found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots
was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the
effect of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large.
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does
not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that
the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time,
nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were
then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from
acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which is basically
a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." Private land may be transferred only
to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain". Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only
by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was
made by a former natural-born citizen.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from
Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church
Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court
reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that
if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it
to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for
World Ministries,the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic)
Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
[were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who
is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is
valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of
petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in
the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner
in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials
and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and
5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City
to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial
court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner
P25,000 as attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation
expenses, as well as the costs of suit. DScTaC
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United
Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases, is this since the ban on aliens is
intended to preserve the nation's land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified
person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public
policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated
July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City
in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ.,
concur.