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Jeff Maxwell

Philosophy E-118

31 October 2014

The Problem of Universals: A Taxonomy of Approaches

Bertrand Russell and W.V.O. Quine both consider the nature of universals in order to

explain our ability to use general terms to refer to particular objects. Russell, in his Problems of

Philosophy, admits to the existence of universals in order to explain our use of general terms.

Quine, on the other hand, in his essay On What There Is, argues that the use of general

terms does not necessitate the existence of abstract entities like Russells universals. Russell

and Quine are responding to the problem of universals the problem of explaining how it is we

can use a general term to apply to a particular object when that general term applies to many

other particular objects. The ability to use a general term in such a manner suggests the

existence of an entity that the one particular object shares with many other particular objects

such that they can all be subsumed under a general term. Russell adopts a realist position

committed to the existence of a thing over and above the individual particulars: the sameness

that unites them in difference. Quine, however, takes an alternative position in saying that the

referent of a general term that applies to many particulars is not an existent entity, but rather it

is an imaginative construction established by names and symbolic conventions.

In The Riddles of Existence Earl Conee introduces the terrain shaped by the problem of

universals and the ways in which it has been tread by nominalist approaches. He extends his

discussion to the related problem of what concepts are and how it is that they are both acquired

and mastered. It is in light of a theory of concepts that this paper seeks to demonstrate the

limitations of Russells realism and how it is evolved by Quine's nominalism. I explicate

conceptualism as part of a taxonomy of possible approaches to the problem of universals.

Finally, I argue that it is in fact an account of concept formation that best refutes realism and
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complicates Quines nominalism in such a way that the problem of universals can be assessed

as a problem related to a theory of meaning.

It is necessary, however, to first demonstrate how the dispute between realists about

universals and nominalists hinges on the existence of essences. Essence, as referred to in this

paper, is a foundation on which to ground language. An essence is an absolute substratum of

reality on which a things name can be anchored. It is in this sense that essence can be taken

to be that which links a name and its meaning. Russells realism about universals is dependent

upon the affirmation of such essences. Quine, however, does not seek some kind of peg in

reality on which to hang language through meaning. The work done by universals substantiates

Russells reliance on essences. Language for Quine, though, is a practical activity engaged in

by human beings that does not need to be grounded in reality through meaning.

Correspondingly, Quine does not have to admit the existence of universals because he has no

need to affirm the existence of essences.

Russell, as he introduces his argument for universals, relates universals to Platos

Theory of Ideas and its entrenchment in the existence of essences. Russell summarizes the

role of essences in the Theory of Ideas: The word will be applicable to a number of particular

things because they all participate in a common nature or essence. This pure essence is what

Plato calls an idea or form (62). Russell proceeds to clarify the Platonic idea as that which

is better referred to by the term universal (63). Having equated the Platonic idea with a

universal, Russell is establishing the existence of an entity, a universal, that is shared by the

particulars instantiating it. For Russell, then, a universal is ontologically independent of its

instances as a particular. The separation of universal and particular is made apparent in

Russells use of the Platonic idea justice, which is other than any particular thing that is just. In

further defining the Platonic idea, or essence, Russell makes key note of the fact that this

essence is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible (62-63). This eternal essence to
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which Russell refers, however, cannot be experienced independently of the particulars in which

it inheres.

After establishing the nature of a universal and its concordance with the Platonic idea,

Russell focuses on the types of words that refer to universals and their difference from those

that refer to particulars. According to Russell, When we examine common words, we find that,

broadly speaking, proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjectives,

prepositions, and verbs stand for universals (63). Up to this point Russell has contained his

discussion within the framework of universals named by adjectives and substantives. In order

to emphasize universals denoted by verbs and prepositions, however, Russell shifts from his

treatment of a universal as a property of single things to a perspective from within which he can

argue for the existence of universals as having to do with the relation between two or more

things. In so doing, he pivots from the universal as that which is denoted by a common noun to

the universal as the relation of resemblance between two or more things.

Russell is quick to note, though, that it is the establishment of the relation of

resemblance as a universal that supposedly explains the existence of a property universal.

Russell takes as an example whiteness to show that while the existence of the property

whiteness cannot be strictly proven, the existence of universals can be proven by means of the

relation of resemblance among particular white things (64-65). The resemblance between many

pairs of white things cannot be taken to be a particular because, according to Russell, it would

result in resemblances resembling each other ad infinitum. To dispel the possibility of infinite

regress Russell states that it is the relation of resemblance that is a true universal (65). The

existence of a universal whiteness is thereby proven via the relations among many white things

rather than via the existence of a single property belonging to multiple particulars.

Russell admits to the problem of proving the existence of universals as qualities inherent

in individual objects of a certain kind, so he alternatively seeks to prove the existence of

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universals by saying that resemblance relations need a higher level resemblance, a similarity

universal, to explain their similarity to each other. In other words, according to Russell, one

resemblance needs a universal to explain why all of the resemblances are similar. By resorting

to proving the entitiness of universals in this way, Russell appears to depart from strict

adherence to universals as Platonic ideas. In fact, he states that we cannot strictly prove

that there are such entities as qualities, i.e. the universals represented by adjectives and

substantives (64). Russell shies away from offering a strict argument for the existence of

universals denoted by adjectives and substantives (i.e. Platonic ideas), and he instead seeks to

prove universals via relations. But merely proving the existence of universals as relations of

resemblance does not prove the existence of universals as qualities. Moreover, Russells

insistence that one resemblance needs a universal to explain its similarity to other

resemblances is contestable. Similarities among particulars can account for their similarities to

each other. In effect, Russell seemingly abandons a defense of universals as qualities in order

to take up his argument for the existence of universals as relations of resemblance, but in so

doing he does not prove the necessity of a resemblance universal.

In contrast to Russells reliance on an objective universal to explain the sense of

similarity generated by a word or object of a certain kind, Quine argues that there is no reason

to posit such entities and that an effort to eliminate them should be made. In a broad sense,

Quine refutes Russells realist position on universals by undermining the necessity of

universals, which he does by emphasizing the marked difference between naming and

meaning. By destabilizing any inherent connection between naming and meaning Quine not

only differentiates naming from meaning, but he also shows how a predicates having meaning

does not entail that it names an object.

First, Quine employs an example to show the difference between naming and meaning:

the term Evening Star names a star, Venus, but so also does the term Morning Star.
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Although both terms name the same thing, Venus, they mean two different things. Evening

Star refers to Venus when it is in the west after sunset, while Morning Star refers to Venus

when it is in the east before sunrise ("On What There Is" 9). Quine then ties his demonstration

of the difference between naming and meaning to his example case of the noun Pegasus. For

Quine, the noun Pegasus does not have to name something in order to have meaning (11). In

fact, there is an illusion of referring that can be exposed by means of paraphrase.

Quine demonstrates the use of paraphrase in the case of the word Pegasus which he

first rephrases as a description: "the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon" (6). The

phrase no longer names the entity Pegasus. 'Pegasus' must first be rephrased as a description

that replaces the objective reference to an object Pegasus with words that do not name a

specific entity, but rather, as Quine says, "they refer to entities generally, with a kind of studied

ambiguity peculiar to themselves" (6). Since 'Pegasus' has been rephrased as a description,

the existence of an entity Pegasus can be analyzed in terms of that description: "the winged

horse that was captured by Bellerophon" becomes "something is winged and is a horse and

was captured by Bellerophon, and nothing else is winged and is a horse that was captured by

Bellerophon." This analysis of the descriptive phrase does not contain an expression that

names Pegasus, which shows how it is possible to meaningfully use names without

presupposing the existence of entities to which the names refer.

Having established the fact that meaning and naming are two different things, Quine

applies his argument to refute his hypothetical philosophical opponent, McX, on the subject of

the meaningfulness of the predicate 'red.' McX argues that for the predicate 'red' to be

meaningful it must name an object and that object named must be a universal ("On What There

Is" 11). Quine, however, says that this argument is not valid given that having meaning and

being named are two different things, and that the one does not entail the other. Basically,

Quine refutes McX on the grounds that for a predicate to have meaning does not presuppose
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that it name something, let alone does it name a universal. The analysis of descriptive

paraphrase reveals how a name is not anchored to an object named, and so a word's meaning

is no longer tied to the word's objective referent since there is no objective referent. A word's

meaning does not hang on the existence of some kind of essence (a universal) that is denoted

by that word.

Quine allows for McX to make the rebuttal claim that the fact that 'red' is meaningful

necessitates the existence of a universal because meanings, whether they are named or not,

are still universals (11). Not only does McXs rebuttal expose the problem of universals as

being deeply related to a theory of meaning, but it also compels Quine to deny the existence of

meanings as objects. Quines denial of meaning, however, is not to be construed as a

repudiation of meaningfulness (11). There is a stark discrepancy between McXs and Quines

criteria for meaningfulness. McXs criteria consists of a words having of an abstract entity that

he calls a meaning. Quine says that the significance of an utterance can be derived from

analyzing peoples reactions to that utterance and to those of a similar sort (11-12). In other

words, the significance of an utterance can be assessed within the framework of conventional

language use. Quine frees language from being grounded in McX's grammar of meaning and

its associated affirmation of universals.

The essence of Quines nominalist project rests on the conversion of names to

descriptions and a subsequent analysis of such descriptions that demonstrates how language

can be used without commitment to objective reference ("On What There Is" 12). The

elimination of objective entities to which a name may allegedly refer effectively does away with

any need to appeal to the existence of abstract entities such as universals. Quine notes that

language can still be used meaningfully without requiring the existence of universals; the

meaningful use of language does not depend on the existence of objects at a foundational level

of reality to which words and names can be pinned (12).

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While Quine argues effectively against the existence of entities such as universals, he

does not offer a reductive analysis of how, or why, it is so seemingly easy to commit to them.

Quine's answer to how it is that one comes to identify a common term with multiple unique

particulars is that this process is done through "inductive generalization" ("Identity" 68).

Generality is achieved through induction from ostensive demonstration:

When I point in a direction where red is visible and say 'This is red', and repeat

the performance at various places over a period of time, I provide an inductive

basis for gauging the intended spread of the attribute of redness. The difference

would seem to be merely that the spread concerned here is a conceptual spread,

generality, rather than spatio-temporal spread. (68-69)

Learning to use 'red' by means of induction through ostensive demonstration, however, would

require that the instances pointed to by the demonstrator be taken by both the demonstrator and

the object of demonstration to resemble one another. If the resemblance has no basis in reality

then it is difficult to conceive of how the ostensive lesson can be shared between demonstrator

and the object of demonstration. If, on the other hand, the basis of resemblance among the

instances is a real resemblance, then it calls for an explanation as to why this real resemblance

does not constitute a universal. Russell, for instance, would claim that the instances used in

demonstration would have to resemble one another in some way (i.e. in redness). So, while

Quine has fractured the grounds on which realism stands, he still accounts for generality in a

way that is subject to realist criticisms.

The search for an account of generality that does not lead one to unnecessarily commit

to realist universals yet provides an adequate explanation of how generalities are formed may

appear to have been exhausted. The realist can argue that one can learn to use the word 'red',

for instance, from ostended instances because in perceiving the particulars that are the

ostended instances so is the redness inhering in those instances also perceived. A nominalist,
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like Quine, must account for the perception of resemblance from ostended instances as being

due to conceptualization. Concepts, in turn, must bear the burden of mediating between input

from particulars and some kind of generality generating output.

Earl Conee presents a theory of concepts that concerns itself with what it is that can be

done when a concept is possessed and how the transition from perception to conceptualization

occurs. At its bare minimum, however, Conee states that a concept is that by which our

thoughts are constituted (Conceptualism). He addresses the familiar problem of ostensive

demonstration, but locates it within the context of concept application. He supplies an example

in which the meaningless term 'blurg' is applied to multiple instances through the procedure of

"pointing and stipulating" (Conceptualism). The term 'blurg' can be applied in this way without

presupposing any resemblance among the things to which it applies. The problem with this kind

of application of a concept, however, is that 'blurg' does not come to be associated with any

general meaning. Consequently, the term 'blurg' is thereby restricted to the instances that have

been singled out ostensively. So, while the application of concepts in this manner does not

require its instances to share anything in common, it suffers from the severe limitations placed

on its generality of application. This ambiguity, or indeterminacy, of application prevents the

attachment of a general meaning to the term 'blurg', which, according to Conee, obstructs the

formation of a concept (Conceptualism). Conceptualism confronts the problem of how to apply

concepts to the world non-arbitrarily.

The successful conceptualist refutation of Russellian realism that is also in accord with

Quine's nominalism requires an explanation of how, in a world of particulars, certain sensory

stimulations come to be perceived as similar to subjects. An account of a theory of concepts

that does not fall prey to Russell's real resemblances yet still offers a reductive analysis of

universals is needed to give a more comprehensive account of generality. The key to bolstering

Quine's refutation of universals depends on a form of conceptualism that can describe how a
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mental image ascertained through perception comes to be taken as resembling other

perceptions such that those perceptions give rise to the impression that their objects form a

kind. In turn, such a form of conceptualism would need to account for how it is that the mutual

differences among particulars come to be overlooked so as to allow for generalization. The

application of language and concepts to things in the world requires that the differences that

exist between all particulars be ignored. The naming of things in the world, as Quine has

shown, does not refer to the individual occurrences of any given entity due to the fact that

particulars are beyond linguistic representation.

A functional account of the particulars could, for instance, show that particulars that

appear to perform a common function (which they actually cannot because they are particulars)

only really share a common difference from the things that do not perform that function. This

common difference could not constitute a real resemblance or universal since difference is not

a positive entity. Such a function-based take on conceptual construction shows how generality

can be established without having to resort to real resemblances or universals. This is only one

way in which a theory of concepts can offer a more substantial explanation of generality without

having to entertain the existence of entities like universals. Conceptualism has the potential to

advance nominalism without necessarily introducing the usually concomitant fear of backsliding

into realism and having to account for its ontological baggage.

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Works Cited

Conee, Earl. "Universals." The Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Earl

Conee and Theodore Sider. Oxford UP, 2007. Chapter 8. Epub e-book.

Quine, Willard Van Orman. "Identity, ostension, and hypostasis." From a Logical Point of

View. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003. 65-79. Print.

Quine, Willard Van Orman. On What There Is. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge:

Harvard UP, 2003. 1-19. Print.

Russell, Bertrand. The World of Universals. The Problems of Philosophy. Rockville, M.D.:

Arc Manor, 2008. 62-67. Print.