Grace Poe vs COMELEC

Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016

Summary

On COMELECs Jurisdiction

COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the determination of whether a
candidate has made a false material representation in his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility
he represented in his CoC is true.

1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding over
a presidential candidate.

2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence recognizing the COMELECs
jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility in the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it.
The ponencia disregarded the cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was
published) where it recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of determining false
material representation in a candidates CoC.

In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes CoC and
affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque.

The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure in
response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in admitting newly-
discovered evidence that had not been testified on, offered and admitted in evidence.

In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica
(a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica.
Kimberlys CoC is considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned through a
Section 78 proceeding.

2. The ponencias reliance on Fermins is out of context.

Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate.

A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation
of the winning candidate.

3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs jurisdiction in determining
the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a Section 78 proceeding.

The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78 cancellation proceeding and
a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the
COMELEC opted to provide that petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be
dismissed summarily. Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which provides for
the grounds for a petition for disqualification.

The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective
office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the
elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds
(1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after the
proclamation of the election results.

Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if
he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

4. If we were to follow the ponencias limitation on the COMELECs function to determine Poes eligibility to
become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule
on Poes citizenship and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling; any
declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.

The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited jurisdiction in Section 78
would only be expressions of the COMELECs opinion and would have no effect in the determination of the
merits of the Section 78 case before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved
or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the presidency,
with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if still necessary at that point.

On the Citizenship of Foundlings

It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that foundlings are natural born citizens.

1. Ironically, the ponencia s citation of Jose M. Aruegos recounting of the deliberations even reinforces the
position that the framers never intended to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitutions
parentage provisions.

Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation.

2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship based on the father or the
mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the
children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage,
must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy similar roots.

On Burden of Proof

Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof

1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) from the
perspective of procedure carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that
Poe made false material representations.

2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the COMELEC concluded
that the original petitioners are correct in their position that they have discharged their original burden to
prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC
considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.

3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite her
admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or
solely DNA in character) and by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is
a natural-born citizen.

Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed

4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine who its citizens are.
5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and exhaustive.

In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine
citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly
after proof that the claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.

6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.

7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not
conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen.

8. Based on these considerations, the Court majoritys ruling on burden of proof at the COMELEC level appears
to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC
closely hewed to the legal requirements. Thus, the Court majoritys positions on where and how the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the COMELEC level, the present
petitioners own burden of proof in the present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail.