EDMUND HUSSERL
‘COLLECTED WoRKS
VoLuME mt
Vouwiue
1 eas Pring to a Pure Phenomenology and
124 Pesomenlogal Phibsopy
atnb Boon: Phenomenology eh the
Voueue Reise ofthe Snes
oe M1 Perini toa Pure Phomensoy and
lo Pennell Pip
; Fir Book Ge atin ae
vue I Teas Peano Pre
ining co & Pure Phenomenology an
ae Phenomenological Philosophy ee
ECON Hoon Ses inthe
Secon Hook Sti the Penoneaoy of
EDMUND HUSSERL
IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE
PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY
‘SECOND Book
STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY
(OF CONSTITUTION,
RICHARD ROJCEWICZ ap ANDRE SCHUWER
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS 1SBN 0-7925.0713-5 (paperback)
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CONTENTS:
SECOND BOOK
STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY
‘OF CONSTITUTION
Section One
‘The Constitution of Material Nature
feels anes fe comes of ae a Pe
2, Thonn aden ore ie
YE Rear ta atta, fh ert te
Bo MESS tare vie tom ed eo
EE Spiny nt mony suey al itty femme
16 TR iin tc hii i ae
1, Snjnnng anda Orting it ad i ora
EL SRESSESESS shrmat come tes »
$5. Cheptnnetscaboe sean") 5
oat sta panos an thet aon 2
BIN ite ope of mer es 2 12, Matra and anima tre
SAT eof oo rt fi
4 4 Tie nto oes for ate of naa
{15 The enc of matey tn
2) ere a of he hme ew
abn f iy Fe hie 8 wy is pen
{16 Th const fhe rope fh hin in mai eons
47 ey nd tay
118 The sajna faster: te seston of the
‘ge comm fe Othe mse ha
2) The ue gaits oh mst tg pets
2 sis pein et
4 The pois ng
6 Peyote raion 029 “Obie mae on he
‘Sint let
1 Tans fem spo inert experi
£8 More mae urn en ig
thee af inenaboe spree oe
Section Two.
‘The Constitution of Animal Nature
1 Tron te cnein of th oa mate Ob
19. Theses of nny i sn eee
ETN The nae aft mo
se
8
& gen es
ess
Si2"Tnt pe ep os epo-rae a
{2 Te poy epg he pr Eo ie Ep) io
Fee Nisatty aber to
EIS pala ta Fad Ob mm
{ie Alor ant al cooneest
te =
ee ae
to» Eat yi fami i
peer 3
Pe ae ey 28
De ocr nt at a i
12 holes Seman ste cca 7
fp eSeminars
oem ot
iio |
= 2
ta, ERs oe i ainda
1) Rpts oR apne saeco Cit
Soe jcsnn wnt ine oi Sd
sera tg peor
ja Sear ae Ee a ie
Sey nme SS
se RRS pee, s
{55 RERApony cc Cone tis i need”
SI cy ein tg a 7
Section Three
‘The Constitution of the Spiritual World
(0, The nea a news he aie
©) Leann fhe pci "
40 The enc tie sang ol be
$55 Te pron in enna cone a
15: SSC tit pre ie a
45. re Egon he ype
S95 The spit o eomprien twa te surouning
36, Meta femdom ising of iat
{) Motvaton i's nate ad oem pes
1 Retr my a tain a
aon Set fic engin ot
Sy i a aye ai Sp
457 ue a nd peo Ege at Ob flexes apes
38 The cosinor eon is
53. The em rat of re Ea
1 ei a Es}
by The“ cn” mond ote peo’ Anon Rens.
Sotsgncenten mt uncaring
) Then shen ad th em fe perc
9) Green pe ad mina! pe esas pees
01 Th pal Ep td under
sora ei a Be tie
4. Pycophsl parton ad inaction
$e. Rlnety of mar sottenen
Supplements
Scrutwen I: The Ego at pol a he Ea f babies
‘erp nr”
Sumeuent V! The reese of te ni ite fe
Sore Vs get m1 do" and “Te
Suouewent VI; The pp ad is "ean,
Seorcwenr IX: Spinal pads
Surmwent X: Parone Eo and savour wid 00) The
Krenof te conto f Oe ally O30
ue Eg ad peel EO)
suru XT min Sg aetna a de
surrucwees Xi: Seppeen 0 Sion Te
"S1 The anime between primal senibity and iets
42, Sey te peti a oe sis
‘scum Speen ad pote
0, Dewipman a te pe Epoacon and Eooacina
=
#E ie er
$3. Possbiity of the insetioe of the soul into nature ie
ie
a iz
fy pee
2 SaNTEo
ere oes
niger ieee
"
Sermament XI: “Ren ny” hotel ne
‘seme (92) The concept of Oba) (8)
5
‘TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION
[Ass made plain inthe ert! apparatus and editorial matter
appended tothe orginal German publeation of Huss’ eas
Tre tis is text wath & history. Tt undervent revision after
revision, spanning almost 20 years ia one of the most fertile
periods ofthe philosopher's ie. The book owes its frm 0 the
fork of many hands, nd is unity one that hasbeen imposed
‘eit Yet there © mohing here that cannot be traced back ¢
Huser helt Indeed, the final" clean copy” for publication,
prepared by an assistant, was completely reviewed by the master
Three times and emended by him in detail on each eczsion.
‘Neverthe, in the end the work was i fact not submited for
publication, and afer Huset's pen list touched the manuscript
{1928 t was set aide until posthumously eited and published
by the HusselArchives in 1952
“The story of the composition of Ideas 11 begins with the
*peneit manuscript of 1912. This is the ultimate textual
sure for both Ideas Hand deas I? Teas been preserved as
1 oio of 4 sheets in very dense shorthand of the Gabelsberasr
Synems written mostly with a penal Tt was composed by
Hossein one stoke” immediately after the completion of
7 Emad Hc: he a en Pines hina
Cert ce tat he ap brine Ni, 58 Gr
"Sate ee ese eno pangs
a ent” Bie Plomcope ere re
‘irae y My eet oe Hoe, Marna Nir 09 eerie
etalon Tae a an Wa al fw patie
aan hme psp Th Pr
oe aij hr ee i ad {he first Book ofthe deus." The manuscript is divided into Wo
uns, corresponding perfectly to the pan Tor the second Book
4s announeed inthe Tis. Eventually, however, the fist part
{Ue constitutive analyses) was greatly expanded and became 2
Volume on i om, Ideas 1, while the second part (studies in
Scietic theo), became, without further revision, the text of
Ideas 11 also published posthumously.
Tn 1913, Huss elaborsted and rewrote, again in shorthand,
the ist ha ofthe pencil manuscript, approximately doubling
in siz. This folio Bears a tile page withthe inscription" Ideas
11” and includes the remark, "My revision and basis for Mis
Sin.” The first page mentions thatthe wings stem from
lecture courses of 1913 and 1915 (dealing with the problem of
consuion). In fat, the editor of the publshed version
indicates that already a conglomeration of diverse wntings ean
besen inthis folio ast contain ste from various coments,
Some dating ack as eats 1908
In 1916, Edith Stein, as Hussrs assistant, completed her
first redaction of the manuseript. For the most part this
‘ofthe dispersion ofthe one thing of sight ita pair and ofthe
fusion of the pit in the form ofa continuous overlapping and
omergence in the regular retum to the former perceptual
conditions. The doubled things of sight ate indeed completely
analogous withthe other things of sgh, but only the later have
{he ational meaning of "things;” and the lived experience
has the meaning of lsed experience ef perception only as
‘elated to a certain "positon of the te eyes,” the homologous
‘one or one from the system of normal eye positions. If a
heterology now occurs, then I indeed have analogous images,
‘but ‘they mean things only in conradcion toll mortal
‘motivations. The images now oncs agin aban the apprehen-
(on,
as
0
3s
‘son, “actual thing.” precisely through the constitutive nex,
ig. the movvtion which puts them ima concordant relation 10
the sytem of motivated perceptual manifolds. tL take my eyes
fut of @ normal position into a disparate costed postion thea
‘wo semblant images anise: “"semblant images,” ie. imapes
Which woul, each for el, presen "the thing” only i lent
them normal motivations
‘A Turher important consideration deals wth other groups of
sbnormalts. If I ingest santonin, then the whole world
‘seems to change: it “alters i colo, The “alteration
isa "seeming." Afterwards, a isthe case with every change of
colored lighting, te, I once again have a word which matches
the normal: everything is then concordant snd changes or dost
‘ot change. moves or is at rest, at uno, and it dspleys the
sume systems of aspects a before
But bere it must be observed that rest and motion, change
8nd permanence, get their sense by means of the constitution of
Uhinghood as reality. in which such occurences. especialy the
limit cases of rest and permanence, play an esenti roe
Therefore the plbal coloring of al sen things can easily
‘change, "for example when a body emits rays of light which
“east their shine over all things. There is more to the
constitution ofthe “change of things acording to color than
jst a change of the fled schemata with respect to color
‘hangs of things i, from the very set, costed a cata
‘change in ration to causal circumstances, as, for example each
adveat of an iluminating bod. 1 can apprehend the change
ithout sing such an iluminating body, but tht ise the
‘usu ieumstance iin. an indeterminate way, co-appereived
‘These causal circumstances, however, ae ofthe orde of things
The relay of the span thins with reference to other oes
leterines the sense of the change iv things. Bu the psyche.
‘hysicalcondiinalties dono Belong herein the least. Ths est
be kepe in mind. It goes without saying, however, that my Body
is indeed involved inthe causal nexuse: if ti apprehended
thing space. its certainly not apprehended a mere sche
‘ut instead asthe pont of intersection of real causlitis in the
‘eal (exclusively sptio-thingy) nexus. Belonging to ths sphere
', for example the fact tht a stoke of my hand (eosiered
(62)
(63) x0
sre ae mason oon
purely a the staking of corpora! thing. ie, exiading the
Ined experince of te" se) at exit the same as
Sok: a anyother materia thing. an, lary the fall of oy
Corporal boy ke an) other ah te
‘Now concerning the intake of ston, this fo is therefore
asenting from all" copeonstantprchic fac” a mater
‘proces. on which could very well equired by the consti
{on ofthe word of experience, or by thefts elaboration of
the constitton ofthe expr of ths worl athe cour of
new experiences. enter into reat tlaton wih the optal
hange of the rest ofthe maternal worl In isl it thas
thinkable tht would ind experiential motes for sing a
eral change inthe ear of teenie ve wold a for
‘eending the change, in is aprebeson, av realcatal
CSnsejuene ofthe materal proto nesting sanin (th
its Bodiy-materl consequences) I would bet oral prep
tion js ie anyother At long, and whence, experince
the change of all nble colors ai an optal change of he
tings mst assume 4 casa rlaton betwee whatter
using thinghoods there might be; sony in he cae nets
that change is precy a change of # thing As soon a8
pete! motives arse in opporion, then thee must neces
Saniy take paces ranformaton inthe apprehension in wie
which he "ehange” tat cen loc he ene 2 change
and Torthwith acquires the charac of "seoming 8 seman
hangs ia schemas wasfomation apprehend ab «change
"nde noma conditions. thus elation to expencces cons
ie Bu now Ghn way whch sane
the causal apprebession The caus spprchension sugested
by the given Schomate transformation, Hiss i ht mould
present & change, Sut tis under te gen sieumstanees,
Cceloded: The intake of ssntonin i not wth pect tothe
eer "change ncaa." proc whith or which could be
Spprehaded a cause Te sf in Clo of al sen things
STEER emit cat mt en a
(e
2»
2s
x0
3s
connate wana aren °
such that there # 90 even an incentive to repard it at alla 2
feal change of the ilomination (ein the manner of light
Source emitting coloved rays). Iti therefore that it presents
itself ava semblant change; everything looks "as though" there
twee a new source of ight shining, or "as if in some other
troy teal eases were thee effecting a general opal change
(even if those causes were undetermined, unknown). But such
fuses may not now be presupposed: they are, given the total
‘xperentia situation, excluded
‘We have to ask: what ea, on the bai of transformation in
the senshi, totally canel the appereepion of real charge is
‘this wa in apposition tothe cases in which sich an appereep-
tion, alteady accomplished, merely undergoes a modification
Ahoy the fact that a diferent causal nexus is substituted forthe
fone that had been supposed, tht i the assumed cause aban
‘oned but another cause acepted)? The answer i a modiion
tion in the sphere of psychophysical “caualy” oF, rather,
“conditomaliy,” wo say i Better. (For a caus in the Propet
sense it prectcty © rea! caute, The subjective, however, i ia
‘opposition to reality, an irality. Realty and irreaity belong
fogetheresenaly in the form of reality and subject, which
‘on the one hand motualy exclude one another and on the other
‘hand, as is sud, essentially requie one another). Besides the
relations ofthe real tothe rel, which belong to the essence of
herything real as spatial, temporal, and causal relations, there
also belong to this esence relations of psychophysical cond
tionality in possible expenence. Things are “experienced,” ate
“intuitively given” to the subject, necessarily as uniles of @
spato-empora-causal nexus, and necessarily pertaining to this
nexus isa pre-eminent thing, “my Body,” a8 the place whee,
And always by essential neces, a system of subjective cond-
‘onality i interwoven wth thi spsem of causality and indeed
in Such a way that in the transition from the natural aniude
(the regard directed in experience to nature ad ie) to the
subjective attitude (he regard directed to the subject and to
‘omens ofthe subjective sphere), el existence, and manifold
‘eal changes as well, are given sn conditional connection with
Subjective being, with a state of being inthe subjective sphere
Something tingly is experienced (perceptually sppercsved, to
65 0
2
as
20
s
70 sews rons oF Os
ve privilege to the orignary experience) in such a way that,
‘rough a mere shift of focus, there emerge reltions of depen
dency of the appersved sate of the thing on the sphere of
Sensation and of the rest of the subjective sphere. Here we have
{he primordial sae of psychophysical condtionality (unde this
heading are included al ondiional relations which ran back
and forth between thingly and subjective being). To every
psychophysical condtionlty there necessarily appertains some.
{ologca! causality which immediately always concers, the
telations of the ital of an event in the subjective sphere, with
Something real, the Body: then mediately the relations with an
‘extemal real thing which ima real, hence causal. connection
withthe Body
©) The significance of psychophysical conditonality
for the various levels of constitution
‘The real world is originally constituted in level, in such a
way thatthe manifold of sense things (the manifold ofthe fll
schemata) is erected as substratum in the unity of the spatial
form, The snsethings ate thereby constitued in the subjective
way of “orientation "and are constituted for us (whether or not
this « mater of necessity is a special problem) sich that a
distinctive senseching. the “Body,” is given as the constant
beater of the center of orientation The Yelling is then
‘completed in sucha way that the sense-things become states of
real things; the system of rea gules is consitate, stem
‘of regulited reciprocal relations of the sense-thingsundet the
heading, cowaly
tis the constitution of the sustraten which bestows on all
‘ings in experience, ie. insoat a8 they ae their momentary
slates, sense-hings, the most orginal psychophysical condition:
aly, The sensethings are what they areas unites "in ¢
‘manifold of perceptions ad kinesthetic constlstions of subj (66)
tivity, and they are thereby always in consciousness a8 motba
‘ng wit regard tothe corresponding aspects a motiveted. Only
in this nexus are the aspects aspects of senethings. There is
involved here essentially possible change of afitude by means
‘of which the sense hig, int vennees, is made condionaly
‘contin or ware arene n
dependent on Corporeaiy, on my opening my ees to look, on
fny eye moversents, on my running my hands, hands moved by
Subjectivity, over things im order to fel them, ef This tial
{stem of conditionality, which connects sense-things and sub-
5 jentve occurrences in 2 regulated way, is what underes the
tieher sratuan of appereption and then becomes the psycho-
Physica conditional betwen, onthe one side, my Body and
Fi causal intrweavings in extra-Bodiy nature, and, on the
ther side, the subjective courses of sensation, courses of
to hanging aspects, ete. To this primordial sate of poychophysical
Conditionals, mew conditionalts are then added, ones Which
Steady presuppose their contain, Le, ones arising from
abnormalities ofthe Bod.
Tn the system of normal“ orthoaesthetc"— appear
15 ances, which coalesce into the uity of one concordant experi=
nce oersonally breaks occur. All things suddenly appear
‘hanged, the Body as well The system of the orhoaesthetic
fppearances of the same thing falls part in groups, and
Adacordant appearances can arise by groups. If we limit our-
20 seves to thete groups, ia which the thing already appears for
{lf as concordantly Mental, then, withthe transition from
the earlier nese in the same roup tothe new ones, the thing
presents isl ar “suddenly changed,” whereas it 6 given as
Uhchanged inthe other groups. By elf each partial system, a8
25 a perceptual system, has equal sights Thus we get discordance,
nd at fist it means nothing to sty summarily that perceptions
‘Of the one sense could he “retied”™ by those of the other
Senses, Supplemented perhaps. insofar as they all contribute
‘constitutively tothe pvenness of the thing. The wppearing thing
1 thus refers buck to all of them and Teaves open much, 35
‘momentary appearance, in the various sease spheres, which can
te determined more precisely, hence supplemented, by means of
‘ew pereptions and by recourse (0 perceptions of a sense
phere which was not involved but to which we were referred
38 indterminately
To betin, It ws take the case in which only one sense is
impairs one sense organ happens into an abnormal state,
‘while the other senses continue to funtion ormally. The
Impaired sense being excluded, we have a work-apprehension
(on 2 suas re mono con
that is concordant throughout, and up tothe moment of the
lmpairment, we have the sume for that sense too,
The sense organ in question can be experienced by the ote
normaly functioning. ones, and 30 can the particular thinly
5 causal crcumstanoas to which it subject. Ise, Tor example,
how my hand is burnt, oF I se that my hand 1s swollen, ete
Moreover, normal sensations within the field of sensation ofthe
‘organ in question will ars, thus ones issuing fom the side of
sesthesilogical Corporealiy. The changed data of the Geld of |
10 touch are indeed still appercsived according to appearances
but precisely as anomalies, versus the concordant appearances
‘of normally functioning sensibly. in which the same things are
ven in relation to the equally concordant and normally
appearing pars of the Body and in elation tothe whole Body
15 The change of the sense organ in question conditions. in this
relation, group of anomalous givennesser of the thine
‘Thereby I experience: i is the sime thing which is Genin &
‘modified way by the injured hand, in'& normal way by the
sound. Concordance is not canceled altogether: something not
20 unlike is appearing. just “colored” differently for the hand
which seems to be such and such, i, whichis given by the
‘other senses such and such, In short, for sense organs
changed in a certain way all things appear in a correspond
ay, and this modified giveanes refers back to the nom
25 Within the domain of the subjective perceptual conditions as
well, there thus results an “optomum’” of appearance (which
'may—with the healing of the orginally injured organ or by the
Use of artificial aids—only appear subsequently im opposition
to the former normal perception)
30 The constitution of naire By the subject mur of course be
saccomplsied in such a way that a ist i coostitutedmormally
Precisely a nature with a Body, within an open horizon of
Dossible experience of further properties of things and of the
Body. The normal constitution isthe one which constitutes the
35 first realty ofthe world and ofthe Body, the reality which has
{0 be constituted to make possible thereby the constitution of
pperceptive transformations precisely ay transformations as
incorporating. “anomalous” experiential cieumstances, taking
ino account the fealty of highar rata as the ne” Felons of
40 dependence
(6s)
as
0
ss
cnet AIA 2
“The system of causality into which the Body is imterwoven in
normal apperception is of such kind thatthe Body, throughout
I the changes undergoes, tll emains within the compass of
ta identity of ype. The changes of the Body, as a system of
perceptual organs, aze free movements of this Body, and the
‘rgans ean, without compulsion, return again tothe same base
positon They do aot thereby change in a way that would
diy the type of the sensibility; they ca always accomplish
the same thing and alvays in the same way: namely for the
‘onstition of outer eypenenes. (Likewise, there is normal
prakis of voluntary getting hold of, und working upon, the
Sensible worl) "Sensibiity™ here eles to what is Objective:
ina normal way Ihave tobe able to erasp rest precisely a est,
nopchange a8 nonshange, and therein all senses must
scord
‘Anomalies emerge when rea-casal changes of the Body fist
distur the normal function ofidivdual organs as perceptual
‘organs Eg, the finger is burnt and tis change of the physical
‘Body (of the finger as materia) has the psychophysical conse-
‘quence that the toushod body init thingy content as touched
Sopere to be endowed with quite dillerent propetcs than
‘before, and this applies to eery body touched by this finger. fa
‘our example the injury of a hand the possibliy of thing-
‘onsitation is preserved, But we have two hands, and the entire
Surface of the Body serves 25 a touch surface and the Body
itself as system of touch organs. All these furnish the touch
proper, omy in diferent degrees of perfection and also, 1
tight sy, ith diferent “coloring.” Atleast the two hands
fan take’ each others place and give essentially similar
“images.” But in any case the same thing-property Is const-
tuted ersus the difences inthe facie images
‘Bu what i the sense of touch were completely impaired or
underwent a toa! pathological change? Then again, what if
both ees were dieased and yelded images changed in an
sential wy images in which things would appear as changed.
‘with changed sense qualities? With the other organs, of cours
do not see and I ave no grasp of colors, the specifically visual
uals
‘Yt the identity ofthe thing endures —in the sense of touch—
@) " sete meaenwsnnse ov onsen
and, furthermore, 0 does the relation ofthe visual “images”
'o this same thing. The coordination of the senses, even iin a
changed way, remains preserved (otherwise would, e. have
‘colored spots inthe Feld of sensation but 0 appearances of
5 things). Is stil the sane thing which T touch and which Ise
The fact chat the spatial forms have not changed and thatthe
haziness is « mere subjective modification ofthe appearances,
‘Similar o @ normal seg, but without the proper accommo,
tion, is due to the sense of touch and to the eat sretches of
10 visual perception. prior tothe pathological change Its not that
the sense of touch as such hat a prionty. But there belongs to
‘he thing its prima constitative content, to which all exer data
intentionally tefer back; and if the sense of sight from the very
‘outset yielded only hazy contours, while the sense of touch
18 provided sharp and more sub diferentiations. then the seen
form would indeed “coincide with the tovehed, but the form
88 touched would acquire a priority. To speak more accurately
"he thing itself doesnot have two forms which are superimposed
but instead one form (and kewise one surface) which can be
20 both touched and seen, Ideally, every sense can yield the same
ata and do so equally well, but de facto one sense often
provides mote than another, and a good par of spectaces can
transform my chronic and accustomed! Hurry vision into ene 0
00d that the sense of sight achieves a priory.
25 "Tobe sure, color is nota quality that given asthe same by
‘means of several senses in diferent modes of appearance. I the
‘normal lighting circumstances (daylight, et) are absent. of iT
fam completly blind, then for me t becomes night. oot sce
Anything. all Ihave in my visual Feld is darkness The same is
530 tre iT shut my eyes oF cover them. It willbe sii that the
‘objets stil have their colo, but I'do not see them. I do not
have them in sight but they do not cease to be, and 1 ean
‘indeed peresive them by touch, By means of the sense of touch,
‘Lam always inthe world perceptual, am able to find my way
38 around init and ¥ can grasp and gett know whatever T want
But I can also se (visually, the world isnot continually given:
that is rather a privilege of the sense of touch), and We the
same things which have color, even #1 do na exactly se them,
for, unless Iam hindered, I can easily go there un ls, or
70)
2s
3s
ps uta my eget ry etd, fos ny gos,
Te th he sense of ooh way pasts arts snd
hviowlyprvged among the Cotta fo the consti
ton of ting.
Te has Ceooe nigh, all hing ein eee color, but i is
nen righ, Hght snow no more—could sucha con
‘ures ses fo mys jo tenn ing,
for instance by being stack on the eyes? Or th the
onsoues tht Bmore Hk fo be mouvate thers day
tnd night as before but | ont sean longer? depends on
the arp ft epve Oba and sabe
cepa eeumstnces arch In any case on fact rena
Tai have eyes which touching sme, But T do ts with
them any more’ For normal persons, things arene ons
te things by Balding tern out wen thing and touched
hinge There is but one ond the some thing. long ith is
proper, some of which ae predominately or exclu (a,
Ep colts and ter dsinctons) gasped by vison, oes by
touch. The thing & tot spit apart by te two. groupe of
Sppearaners: on the ‘oneuy. eis constted unary
Speretion. ‘The visuanes does nor offer any prope
Complies which sould be taken away at he hing te had
{nl eal coment as someting cold gan ore
tales no sme oan to cach ste ts propery-compleses
SS spate components of the thing any mote than ft takes
feme to cain tht the “primary propre are sooehow
Subd wer grasped by the rent ssn, Bat the clo,
Stic dee nde resets someting ofthe thing
{S constutve propery is pen peep presse lyin
Seeing It untntabe tat t would apetr a clo, by
ties of touch To bea mioring surface, 0 sie, hese 40
Iie wale properties. Butt rigs a scen property core.
Sponds mores stove and ae these not he thing
iat on andthe same? Th oor could have paral inthe
{het of tacte spperancey, cold fave etc parle eis
a dnedons, coceponding to paral sees of change under
Siar ccumstane” In that cate the some vould obtain ere
4 occurs withthe primary properties. We would then 59,
“What appears ina ceria Way ony 10 the see f vison
m 2
38
6 sreoan re nanoureiny oF coe
‘would appeat, in parallel way, tothe sense of touch as wal, in
the way appropriate fo touch.” But as 4 matter of fact, thit
oes not obtain forthe consituive appearances of sense-thingt
Uacluding percetionshings). Coler is seen abd nothing bat
seen, and yet it Belongs to the thing: st should hence be
{himkable that any sense which in general let the thing appear
‘orginarly would also do so Tor every property of this thing The
lori the color of the spat For, ust as the noah is
the smoothness ofthe sputial form the color is presly there
Where the smoothness i One could thus dedate i to be an
ideal reguirement foreach and every sense: insofar as it cans
to give the thing in the original, there must exit an ideal
possiblity of series of appearances ofthis sense in wich erry
onsite property of the thing Would come to originary
‘prenness,
‘On the other hand, we need 10 consider whether, where this
‘dealy posible correction by means of the other senses doesnot
fxs, the appereption is possbe: things “lose their color”
's sud, indoed with a certain justification, “The color changes
along withthe illumination and disappears when night conte.”
Color disappears in twilight, passes into" coloressness," ut
them i snot only the coloe of the things that dseppea, but
‘he things 100 become more and more indistinct unt finally
they are no longer visible at al, Obviously, we must hereby
istingush sewarioncolor (na generalized sense), which flows
‘over into blackness, and the thing's own color, which actualy
sappears foros.
‘AS Tong as the thing “is constituted for me," as long a the
possi (the ficult eemains open to me of experiencing the
Droperis of & thing and specfelly”of expenencing colors
lnder the experiential circumstances which belong to the con.
‘ent of the constitutive appereption then I leptimatey judge
that things ae colored and do so determined by motives which
either be in the appereeption ofthe thing itself of He mediately
in the apperceived nexuses which are attached to other experi-
‘encod things In that ets Ido not forthe moment need to sce
the color of the thing orto se anything at al. What i essential
is that the Body i e-experenoed as funeoning ia the pete.
tion. That the thine, n ther" what,” work causally pees.
i
0
x
eee n
tion, on the Body and its affected organs, and that the
Sensation. te sed up wth them in paychophysieal condition:
flity—al this aso belongs here constitutively. hence quite
‘obviously, Yet anomalies coeur) Anomalies as such can ther
ore occur only i this form, namely that the normal world
‘remains constitaively preserved, i. experienced, bythe rest of
the perceptual organs the ones which, functioning reiprocally
foreach other as such organs, continue to give us experiences in
the normal way. On the other hand, the abecrmal organ and
the eausation which has altered i also belong, by vrte ofthese
‘ther senses, to the normally given world. But the abnormal
‘organ loves, together with is normal form, ts normal psycho
physical eonditonaity and anew one ssubstted. All things
perceived by such an ofpan appear in other aspects, not the
Formal oaes. The “injured” or dsetsed organ, iis fonction:
ing in perception oceasions changed appearances of things. Or
father, the things ae not such a they then seem; they appear
pethape as chanped things would normally appear, but ths is
Imore semblance. Is 2 tegularpsychophysieacontioal con-
Sequence ofthe disease ofthe organ. Thus what does the world
{un thanks fo such experisnoer? The material world remains a2
Experienced world t presets self siti the Coxporealty is
‘normal; bats the Corporelity is abaormal, then its given in
nomalous appearances (jet these are normal snsethings or
‘more clary expessod, phantoms). Hence this is the case ithe
‘xperencing subject, within the persistent system of normal, of
what if the same, continuous, workd-consttuing experiences,
‘scovers an abwormal part ofthe Body and thereby encounters
its “unfitness,” "uselesoness," of reduced usefulness, for
rightul” experiential fonctions, or i the subject experiences
therein its wn anomalous type of psychophysical conitionali-
tie, There can then also be the experienos of the" retua to
health," of the abnormality as temporary (as isthe case when
fone is struck sharply), etc. If the function of the organ Is
disturbed, or if it as, on its own, changed abnormally, Te us
Say “pathologically,” without the subjeer’s knowing anything
bout it, then the subject wil obviously experience, im the
“experience by means of this organ.” changed thinghoods,
provided the new sense data canbe appechended as phenomenal
3) 0
1” ses ae noes or emeOR
sens-things, wholly analogous to normally motivated ones, and
ate in fit apprehended accordingly. The healthy sense organs
‘a that case present contradictory" reports.” The senses conic,
ith one another, but his confi can be resolved in ew ofthe
fact that pressely afterwards an organ must be rejected as
sbnormal. All the other senses together furnish & world prog:
ressing harmoniously, whereas the rejected sent, the one which
oes ot concord with the course of the ear experience,
‘demands 2 general and unmotivated world-shange, something
avoided in the case of the reports of the rest ofthe senses, If
they have normal validity. Obviously, the confit can remain
completely unresolved, Because is posible that no expect
preference goes to one side (N.B. as long as we take the
experiencing subjet as slips)
tis. matter of experience, already for the soipitic subject
‘oo, that eating aso as effects onthe Body and spill of
Kind as to influence the seasbity of the senses and the
peeeptual faction of the pats ofthe Body. Eg satonin has
effets just like spectacles with yellow lenses do, and ie other
effets are to provoke paralyses, make the Body pastially or
{oually anesthet, et.
‘The oaly thing important is that I ave experience of these
effects that, perceiving, T know at once that my Body is in an
sbnormal sate and tha then in a corresponding one, 10 Be
Aeteined further inthe couse of experince. there occur, as
‘consequences of the absomal ‘modification of the Body,
‘changed modes of sensation or the loss of certain groupe of
Sensiton, and thereby also changed modes of givenness of
things. Te inelsion ofthe abnormalities therefore enlarges the
‘original sjstem of psjchophysialconditionaities which, along
‘with the format constitution, is dewcable through mere
change of aritude. There isthe one normally contied world as
the irae word, as “norm” of truth, and there ate multiple
smblances, deviations of the modes of givennes, which find
‘heir “expiaation™ inthe experience of the prychopbyscal
conditional. Thereby we ce that anomalies cannot contribute
tnsthing toward the constitition of things, and esther can
Psichophysialeondtonaites. What they do contribute i only
the rule of my subjectivity, which precisely reside in thi, that
ry
2»
2s
conto oF are sane »
things for subjects are experienceale things and that con
tioned rales of the series of sensations are conjoined with
(Corporea-hinglyeauslits,
“The result of this s that pereptua activities, considered
purely as relations of physical causality (the purely pysical
{spect of touching, smeling, sexing, etc.) 78 ot jut ony causal
‘elation been the Body and the things tobe pereived wl
‘weave here are, eather, causalites ofa tpical kind. The Body,
{sat thing like any other, admit, stil Beyond these, en iii
‘of causies, namely every kind of causlties whatsoever which
balong at allo things wth such physical qualities. If, hence, the
typical is Uansgrssed, the prsehophyical consequences stich
deviate fom the typical remain possible. But the Typical ere is
the conjunction of regulated groups of sensation, apprekensible
fnd actually apprehended as normal appearances of things,
thowsh of such kind that they interrupt the harmoniods
experience of nature, There also femine open. however, the
pomibty of such a change of the relevant pats of the Body
{hit no sensations whatsoever oscur or only ones which ean 20
longer be appreended as appearances of things. All such
‘r0ups of appearances and sensitions stand out as ruptures
{rom the system of "orthoaesthetc™ perceptions in which one
and the same realty is experienced harmoniously. The Body i
‘sid (0 be functioning throughout orthouestheticlly or nor
‘mally as long asthe psychophysilly dependent perceptions
for appearances are orthoaesthetic. For a solipssie subject 10
‘peak ofa pathological, abnormally functioning, Corporeality
‘only makes sense this subjet has is system of orthonesthetic
experiences and has thereby, continuously over against sel,
{he one spatiosemporalcausal nature. This again presupposes
‘that its Body is conattted in systems oforthoestete percep:
ions: thus the Body cannot be patholopcal throughout but
‘must be “normal” atleast 10 this exten, that some of i
‘organs are functioning normally, by virtue of which the patho
logical organs and parts can be given as they Objetvely
scualy are
Hand in hand with the changes ofthe Rody which condition
‘modifications in the appearances of things go other modiica-
"ons which pertain tothe subject scconding co its psyche ie
ps x
a
0
s
0
s
"0 stone or monsloeaF coMN
‘Also dependent on Bodies are the reproductions and therewith
the appereeptions. The eproductions stand within the associ
tive nets of subjectivity. The appeceptions are determined
‘through them, and that i again significant forthe things which
stand over and agaist the subject. It depends on the Body and
‘on what is proper tothe psyche, whet i that, ae wold, stands
lover and against the subject, Even abstracting fom reproduc
tive elements which enter ito the apperoeption of thing. the
psychi gains significance for the geaness of the extemal
Worl, in vire of the relations. of dependence which exist,
between the Bodily and the psychic. The use of stimulant, as
well as corporeal diseases, allet the occurence of sensations,
sensuous feelings, tendencies, ete. Convery, & psychic sate
Sch as cheerfulness or Sadness exercises an infuence om Bodily
proceses. And thanks to these connections, the appearing
xienal world shows sell at relative not any tothe Body but
foto the psrchophsial abject ava whole Hence a dsinction
is made here beren the identical thing ielf and its subj
tively conditioned modes of appearance, ie ie subjectively
conditioned features which persit in relation to me. my Body,
48d my so
Inthe sphere of intuition, there stands out from the series of
multiplicities of appearances the” optimal givenness” in which
the thing comes tothe fore along with the properties that belt
A itse.” Yet even this pveanes i givennes under certain
Objective and subjective cveumstance, though it still “the
sume” thing which under these or under ther cicumstances
prevents isl n a more or lest “favorable” was,
4) The physic thing
‘The Objectifaton accomplished in thee relations of expe-
rience witin the experiential nexus posits the thing 48 the
‘dtc substrate of identical propetes. OF course, the thing
appears ditferemy depending on whether or not I pret the eye
(Gouble images), whether or not I take santoni, te. But for
onscousnos st tthe sme, end the alteration of the coloring
des not count as an alteration, of rather, 4 ching, of the
property whichis announced bythe cole, which sven in it
8
x
2
x0
mt conte ATA Note 0
[And this holds universally. The things what ii in its thingy
rexas and "in reference” tothe experiencing subject, but i 6
Sil the same in all changes of state and of appearance i
‘undergoes as consequence of the altering citcumstances. And
ts the sme thing it has a stock of “Tasting” properties, Tis
reminds us ofthe formal logic which eas of objects in general
8nd formulates conditions of possiblity for any objctivigy
whatsoever fo beable t count as identical, a8 maintaining
is idemity harmoniously throughout, Every object is what is
in other words it ha is own proper qualities, property, 0
ich it displays its identical being and with these properties,
Sthich are its permanent ones and which belong ti entity,
enters into relations te.
TE the thing iS (and concordance ia the positing of being
within the netus of experience isan orignal ground of reason
Tor the assertion, “It is"), then st mast be determinable in 8
‘way which determines what is aon-datve from among the
relatives and, on the other hand, determines it out of that
‘which contains all grounds of right, out of the dats of exper
nce, hus out ofthe sensuous relates. OF course, experience
oes not exclude the posiblity thats be annoled by ftare
experience or even thatthe real not bea al, though it had been
‘ven ina concordant vay. But now there are right grounds
for posting being and consoquntly Tor the posstity and neces
sity of posting the goal ofloico-mathematical determination
'AS we work these matters out, notice should be taken of the
Aliferent role given tothe geometrical determinations ofa thing
‘vers the "sensuous qualities; this comes to be expresied, at
the Beginning of the modern age inthe distinction beeween the
Primary and secondary gualtes. I tbe constitution of 2 thing,
‘hich i accomplished forthe solitary subject with reference to
4 relate constancy of Corporeaity, we must fist of all
Aistngoich as lower lve
1 The thing itself (asic its is) with its constitutive features
45 they themseTes are, versus the diferent modes of pennies,
‘more perfect or les perfect a the case may be. The features
hich pertain to the thing “isel” afe then the “optimal”
‘ones. This alice o al features, tothe geometrical aswell 10
‘he Sensuous qualities.
m 2) Now once the “sense-thing™ i itself constituted, and $0 i
founded with i, the real-causal thing at the level of genuine
experience, nse experience, then @ new consitition of hi
level resus im regard to the relativty of this “thing” with
5 respect to the Corpreaity constitute in similar fasion, 18
this relativity which demands the constitution of ph iaistle
‘hing manifesting sel inthe itutively given thing. Buti this
telativiy the geometrical determinations and the specifically
sensuous qualities” play quite diferent cols (both taken, in
10 their own constitutive sphere as "themselves, "a8 optimal). The
sometrical determinations pertain to the physicals. Object
‘elf; what is geometrical belongs to physcaliic nature in
ise. But this is not true of the sentuous quaies, which
‘horoughly belong in the sphere af the appearances of nature,
15 Hence it must te shown presently that and why, particulary for
this relativism, they and they alone come into sonsieration
) Possibility of the constitation of
‘an “Objective nature™ om the slips evel
We have pursued the constitution of material ature through
20 various stata and have seen that steady forthe" solipisie"
subject—the subject in isolation — there exist motes forthe
istncion between an “appearing” thing, whose qualitative
content is relative to my subjectivity, andthe "Objective
‘hing. which remains what it even if changes ooeur in my
25 subjectivity and, dependent on it ia the “appearances” of the
hing. Thereby we have to understand “under the. heading
“true or “Objective” thing sil somthing double
1) the thing as it presents ste tome under “normal”
‘conditions. in opposition to all ether thnglike unites which,
50 contd nde, “abnormal” comin, re degraded to
2) the identical content of qualities which, abstraction made
rom all relativity, can be worked. out and. fixed. loieo:
‘mathematically: je the physicals thing, One thi ix known
173)
0
2
»
connor ara nara 8
and once we have, in addition, Objective knowledge of the
pevehophysial character of experiencing subject, 25 well a of
the exiting conditonalites between thing and subject, then
from that it can be determined Objectively how the thing in
{question must -be inluively characterized forthe respective
fubjectivgy—the normal oF the abnormal.
"The question now, however, is whether or aot the motives for
the neesary distinction between the subjectively conditioned
thing and the Objective thing, mosves which do present them
selves in slips experience, are sufficient or have tobe here
‘Stall. As Tong a we take eases in which change ofthe external
‘word, feigned for us by an abnormal perceptual organ,
Shown up as “eemblances” by the testimony of the other
‘reams oth extent he dtnction between “seeming” apd what
‘tctaly is always given, even if may remain undecided in
particular cases whats semblnt and what is actual. Buti we
sume for once that a subject would alvays have only normal
pereptions and would never undergo a modification of any of
fs orgs, or on the other hand would undergo a modiistion
but one that allowed for no posit of correction (loss ofthe
ertie il! of touch, oF mental diseases which alter the entire
typical character of pereption), then the motives ofthe distin
tion between “semblance” and “actualy,” assumed up 10
‘om, would be eiminated, and the level of Objective nature”
‘ould not be attained by sucha subject But the dange, that
tinder the astimed conditions the constitution of Objective
ature could not be ataned is removed a8 soon as we it the
tbstraction we hive maintained up to now and take into
‘secount the conditions wnder wich constitution takes place de
actos namely, thatthe experiencing subject, in tath, mot a
folie sject bat instead one among many.
1) Transition from solipisic to intersubjective experience
Let us consider & hile more closely the possibility of «
solpistie world, something we have assumed up to nom.
oer chs 2s
“ regs nH sowie or emeon
(everybody should substitute here hi own “I”) would exper
lence a world, and it would be exactly the same’ as the one 1
sctualy do expenence everything woul be the same, withthe
‘only exception that in my field of experience there would be no
ovis ¥ could apprehend as Bodies of other psychic subst If
this appereepive domain is lacking, then i nether determines
‘my apprehensions of things, and insofar as it does usually
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