SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [369 SCRA 293 G.R. NO.

143802; 16 NOV 2001]

Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty.
Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed a
criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity)
found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for
brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
subpoena directing him to file his counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting documents. He did it the
following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with the C.A alleging that: the
warrant was null and void because the judge who issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the
p.e. and the p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the
petition holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he
conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only of one stage. He conducted the
requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only examined the
witness of the complainant. But the prosecution instead of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the
Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended the
filing of information for murder which the OMB approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented
seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination of
probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on the decision of the
Sandiganbayan

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary investigation.

(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence.

Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed because of the following
reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom completed the
preliminary investigation There was not one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing the buck, the last one
being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The
gravity of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did
nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by actually
adopting the resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for
evaluation. Thirdly, a person under preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as
maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation. This fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it was
patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMBs certification of probable cause given the
prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of the latters flawed report and one side factual findings.

The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans assertion of having found probable cause on its own, considering the
OMBs defective report and findings, which merely rekied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and
disregarded the evidence for the defense.

Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the
warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary investigation.
G.R. No. 169554 October 28, 2009

NIEVA M. MANEBO, Petitioner,

vs.

SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA and NUMERIANO SAPIANDANTE, Respondents.

FACTS:

That on or about May 4, 2000, at around 6:30 p.m. in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said three (3) accused, two (2) being armed, conspiring, confederating and
acting together, and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with malice,
intent to kill and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC, with
accused SPO1 Roel D. Acosta suddenly and unexpectedly firing several shots at her with the use of his firearm and
accused John Doe and Numeriano Sapiandante, acting as back-up and driver, respectively, thereby inflicting upon the
said BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death.

On March 23, 2001, respondents filed their appeal with the DOJ Secretary. On June 27, 2003, the DOJ Secretary issued
his Resolution10 reversing the appealed resolution directing the Chief State Prosecutor to move for the withdrawal of
the information filed against respondents. All told, the evidence against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante lack the
required quantum of proof sufficient to indict them for the offense charged.12

Pursuant to the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw the Information.

Petitioner filed an appeal13 with the Office of the President (OP) which was denied by the OP . Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 43 with the CA. the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for
lack of merit. The CA found that all was not lost for petitioner, since the denial of her petition did not mean an automatic
dismissal of the information following the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, as the RTC was mandated to independently
evaluate the merits of the case; and it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary, since
reliance on the latter alone would be an abdication of the RTC's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Justice committed
grave errors in the appreciation of facts and of laws in recommending the dismissal of the complaint based solely on the
matters, which are best, determined during a full-blown trial.

Whether or not there is probable cause to charge the respondents for the crime of murder.

Held:

In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest error in finding no probable cause to charge respondents with
the crime of murder.

The execution of Bagasan's affidavit four months after the incident should not be taken against her, as such reaction is
within the bounds of expected human behavior. Moreover, a witness' delay in reporting what she knows about a crime
does not render her testimony false or incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most
people to get involved in a criminal case. The failure of the police report to mention Sardia's name as a witness would
not detract from the fact that he saw respondent Acosta with an unidentified man running away from the chapel and
riding the waiting get- away vehicle driven by Sapiandante. Finally, we also do not agree with the DOJ Secretary's finding
that since Sardia's affidavit was also belatedly executed, the same is not credible. The DOJ ruling -- that fear could not
have been the reason, because as early as 1998 Sardia had already filed a complaint for attempted murder against
Sapiandante, which was already dismissed -- is merely speculative.

Considering the foregoing, the CA erred in affirming the DOJ's finding of the absence of probable cause to indict
respondents for murder.

10. Tabujara vs People, GR 175162, 29 Oct. 2008

Facts: The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA in CA GR 63280 denying its petition for review and
directing the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to proceed with the trial of criminal cases nos. 99-29031 and 99-29038
as well as the October 23, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that the orders of
the court should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the finding of probable
cause was based solely on the unseen statement of Mauro de Lara who never appeared during the preliminary
investigation.

Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a statement of a witness whom he did not personally
examine under oath?

Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only upon finding of probable cause
personally determined by the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he/she may produce and particularly describing the person to be seized. In the case at bar, Judge Adriatico
gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed May 2, 2000 and July 4, 2000 orders finding probable cause to hold
petitioner liable for trial and to issue warrant of arrest because it was based solely in the statement of witness de Lara
whom Judge Adriatico did not personally examine and under oath; neither did he asked propound questions. He merely
stated that in the assailed May 2, 2000 Order, he overlooked that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without
conducting a personal examination on said witness, Judge Adriatico still found de Laras allegations sufficient to establish
probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirement imposed by the Constitution.

14. Valeroso vs People, GR 164815, 3 Sept. 2009

Facts: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in
a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he
was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked
in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was
confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house and
forcibly opened a locked cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.

Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as
charged before the RTC of Quezon City. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Valeroso now appeals before
the Supreme Court for acquittal alleging that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure have been
violated by the arresting police officers; and if granted would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition
inadmissible in evidence against him.

Issue: Should the search be considered incident to a valid arrest? How should within the area of his immediate control
be construed?
Ruling: Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

The purpose of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed
by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach. However there is an exception which is that the search should not be strained beyond what is
needed to serve its purpose.

Furthermore, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase within the area of his immediate control means the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested.

In the present case, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, from where the officers found the weapon,
could no longer be considered as an area within his immediate control because there was no way for Valeroso to take
any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. Hence, the warrantless search in this case could
not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.