Absentee Voting

Cordora v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009

Facts
A complaint for disqualification was filed by Gaudencio Cordora alleging that
Gustavo Tambunting made false assertions in his certificate for candidacy for the 2004
elections. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements since the
latter was a naturalized American citizen. However Tambunting contended that he was born
to a Filipino mother and an American father making him a dual citizen which is not an
impediment to his running for the elections.

Issue
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of
Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present
petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present
petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his
certificates of candidacy.

Held

Petition dismissed. Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother
and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting
claims that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by
birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.

The court agrees with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate
of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did
not disqualify him from running for public office.

persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
 Ugodoracion v COMELEC
April 18, 2008

Facts
Ugodoracion ang Tungol were both candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Tungol filed
a disqualification complaint against Ugodoracion alleging material representation in the COC
of the latter and that he failed to meet the residency requirement. Ugodoracion was said to
be a green card holder since 2001.

Issue
Whether there is material representation that would justify the cancellation of the
COC.

Whether Ugodorocion lost his domicile of origin

Held
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. -- The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.

We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous

to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth;
(2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
(3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his
residence or intention.
 Japson v COMELEC
G.R. No. 180088, Jan. 19, 2009

Facts
Petitioner Japson and Respondent Ty were both running for the position of Mayor
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14
May 2007. Japson sought to disqualify his opponent. According to Japson, Ty was guilty of
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy for although the latter was a natural born
Filipino he acquired American citizenship and lived in the States for almost 25 years. Hence
the latter could not have met the required citizenship and residency requirement. Ty argued
that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship,
and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of
Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-568.

Issue
Given the aforementioned facts was Ty able to meet the citizenship and residency
requirement.

Held
The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in
the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.16 At this
point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March
2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly,
became a pure Philippine citizen again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of
the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes
no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225
treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold,
at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either
in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office.
Certificate of Candidacy
 Cipriciano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004

Facts
Petitioner Elena Cipriano filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the 2002 SK
elections. However she and several others were disqualified because the COMELEC adopted
a resolution recommended by the Commissions law department to this effect because it is
said that she together with several others were not registered voters of the barangay were
they intended to run, she even won the elections.

Issue
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its
power to enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and
cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by
law? This is the issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan
Marie P. Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that she
was not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.

Held
The court disagrees. The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper
proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When
a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code,
thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board
of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course
to petitioners certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission
may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual
and proper cognizance of said body. Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false. It
states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
 Loreta-Go v COMELEC
G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001

Facts
Petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay,
Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001. However,
on February 28, 2001 she filed another certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor,
because of this she sought the withdrawal of her COC as mayor. However, the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that,
pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of
Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. Only a few minutes
were left before the deadline so instead of going to Baybay Leyte to personally seek the
cancellation she decided to just fax her withdrawal to her father living in Balay. The father
was able to send it at 12:28 am, the following day. The respondent Montejo and several other
sought the disqualification of petitioner because she filed two COCs. COMELEC gave due
course to the petition of Montejo. Hence this petition.

Issue
Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor
of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both
positions?
Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the
place where the certificate of candidacy was filed?

(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?

Held
Petition was granted, annulling the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner
disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of
Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the
law.
The court holds that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of
candidacy for governor.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if
he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any
of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may
declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be
filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus,
it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional
election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province
to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of
the said municipality.
 Salcedo II v COMELEC
312 SCRA 447, 1999

Facts
Victorino Salcedo II and Eremelita Salcedo both ran for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Sara, Iolilo. Victorino filed a disqualification complaint against Ermelita since
she was using the surename Salcedo when in fact her marriage to a certain Neptali Salcedo
was void. In her defense, Ermelita claimed that she did not know that Neptali was already
married.

Issue
Did private respondent commit any material representation by stating that her
surename was Salcedo when in fact her marriage was void.

Held
Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation

A false representation under section 78 must consist of a

"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible."

It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for
public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to
one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that
the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private
respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting
for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were
fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.

The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the
petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
 Luna v COMELEC
G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007

Facts

Joy Chrisma Luna filed her certificate of Candidacy as a substitute candidate for
Hans Roger for the 2004 elections a vice mayor of Lagayan Abra. However, Tomas Layao
together with several others filed a disqualification petition against her since she was a
registered voter of Bangued and not Lagayan Abra. Furthermore there can be no valid
substitution since Hans Roger the candidate sought to be substituted was only 20 years old
on the day of the election. COMELEC ruled in favor of the disqualification case. Hence this
petition.

Issue

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.

Held

There was a valid substitution . The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.
In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
 Jamela Salic Maruhom v COMELEC
G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009

Facts
Salic Maruhom and Abinal were bothe candidates for Mayor in the municipality of
Marantao Lanao del Sur. Abinal filed a disqualification case against Salic Maruhom due to
the fact that the latter was a registered voter in two precincts, in Marantao and Marawi.
Furthermore Abinal alleges that there were material representations in the COC of Maruhom
regarding her name and residence in Marawi and Marantao. Maruhom filed before the
COMELEC an Answer with Motion to Dismiss SPA No. 07-093 contending that she was
qualified to run as municipal mayor of Marantao, as she had all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided by law. A candidate could only be disqualified for a ground
provided by law, and there was no law declaring double registration as a ground for
disqualification. Maruhom also insisted that she did not make false material representations
in her COC. Comelec granted the disqualification complaint

Issue
Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring petitioner as a double registrant. And
disqualifying him for false representation

Held
Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a
ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a
material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed
his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidates eligibility or qualification for elective
office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from the requirement
of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words,
it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office.
Given Maruhoms double registration in Marawi and Marantao, then COMELEC
should determine which registration was valid and which one was null. COMELEC could
not consider both registrations valid because it would then give rise to the anomalous
situation where Maruhom could vote in two precincts at the same time. This would be a
dangerous precedent that would open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud.
This was precisely the situation that the COMELEC intended to address when it issued its
Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 on 25 July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007
elections in which Maruhom intended to run. To foster honesty and credibility in the
registration of voters, so as to avoid the padding of vote registration, COMELEC laid down
the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the first registration of any voter
subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio.
 Quinto v COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

Facts
Petitioners sought that the provision of the Omnibus Election code regarding the
differential treatment between appointive and elective officials be declared unconstitutional
mainly because it violates the equal protection clause and was suffering from overbreadth as
they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without
distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government,
and (b) they limit these civil servants activity regardless of whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and.
Appointive officials are said to be resigned from their positions once they filed their COCs.
At first the complaint was granted but upon motion for reconsideration by respondent
COMELEC the decision was reversed.

Issue
Is the assailed provision unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause

Held
No it does not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
test used is reasonableness which requires that:1. The classification rests on substantial
distinctions;2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;3. It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. This is as
evidenced by the case of Farinas v Executive Secretary
Pre election Remedies
 Ong v Alegre
G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006

Facts
John Stanley Alegre and Francis Ong, then incumbent mayor were both running for
the position of Mayor in the May 2004 elections in San Vicente Camarinas Norte. Ong was
proclaimed mayor for the 1995, 1998, and 2001 elections. However in 1998 when Ong was
proclaimed the winner, an election protest was filed against him by Alegre. However the
decision annulling the proclamation of Ong as winner only came out in 2001. By this time
Ong had already served his full term. It is because of this event that Alegre sought for the
disqualification of Ong. According to him Ong is banned to run for the 2004 elections as
Mayor since he has already reached his three term limit. For his defense petitioner cites
Lozanida v COMELEC. COMELEC ruled in favor of Alegre. Hence this petition.

Issue
whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service
for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

Held
Petition dismissed. The assailed COMELEC resolutions are affirmed. For the three-
term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
Petitioner cannot rely on the case of Lozanida v COMELEC. In this case,
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of
failure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as
mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For
another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an
involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case.
But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never
unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and
responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the
1998-2001 term.
 Miranda v Abaya
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999

Facts
Jose Pempe Miranda then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998
elections. Three days after, a complaint to cancel certificate of candidacy was filed against
him by Antonio Abaya which was granted. Shortly after the deadline for filing for candidacy,
Joel Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Pempe Miranda. Of course,
Abaya filed a disqualification case against Joel Miranda for void substitution. After a motion
for reconsideration, COMELEC granted Abayas complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue
1. Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was
issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private
respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

Held
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was
not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were
to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy
beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection
of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.
 Tajanan v COMELEC
G.R. No. 104443 April 13, 1992

Facts

In line with the 2004 and 2010 elections COMELEC issued a resolution adopting
the recommendation of its law department regarding the limiting of the number of
candidates to ensure the dignity and manageability of the election for the Offices of the
President, Vice-President and Senators. This is in line with the ruling in Tajanan v
COMELEC

Held
xxx This does not mean that this Court is declaring national politics as the sole
preserve of the so-called traditional politicians. However, given the complexity of the
present political exercise, which involves the election of government officials from the
President down to city and municipal officials. We recognize the need to keep the number of
candidates to a manageable level, and this means keeping those who are not serious in
running for office out of the race.

Considering the dignity that must be accorded the Offices of the President, Vice-President
and Senators, the magnitude of the responsibility of those officers, the following criteria was
observed in the determination of the candidates who have bona fide intention to run for the
office for which they seek to be elected:

1. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of candidacy, do not possess the
constitutional and legal qualifications of the office to which they aspire to be elected;

2. Candidates who, on the face of said certificate, filed their certificate of candidacy to put
the election process in mockery or disrepute;

3. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy would cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of names and surnames with other candidates; and

4. Candidates who have no intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed as shown by circumstances or acts that clearly demonstrate the lack
of such bona fide intention, such as:

a) candidate who cannot wage a nationwide campaign;

b) candidates who do not have a platform of government;

c) candidates who are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency; and

d) candidates for president or vice-president who do not present running mates for president
or vice-president, respectively, nor senatorial candidates.
 Garvida v Sales
G.R. No.122872, September 10, 1997

Facts
Lynette Garvida filed a petition for her inclusion as a member and voter of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan in Brgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui Ilocos Norte. The Board of election
Tellers denied her application since she is said to be over the age limit which is 21. She was
21 and 10 mos. Old. However, the MTCT ruled that she was qualified. Having been declared
qualified, she filed a certificate of candidacy for the SK chairman position. Her opponent,
Sales sought her disqualification filing with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial
and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against petitioner Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National
Office, Manila. The COMELEC en banc sent a resolution ordering the suspension of
proclamation of Garvida in the event that she wins.

Issues
1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or
cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)2) WON cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement
to run as an elective official of the SK is valid

Held
Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to
vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC
and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in
Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that
a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may
be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and
evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be
decided by the COMELEC itself and that the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases
before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required
number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of
the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the
COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.In the instant case,
the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the
petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
Election Propaganda
 Chavez v COMELEC
G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004

Facts
Frank Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction
against a resolution made by the COMELEC regarding premature campaigning. It is because
of this resolution that he was ordered by COMELEC to remove the billboards containing
his product endorsements along the Balintawak North Expressway months before the
election. According to him, the contracts he entered into to endorse the products were made
by him as a private individual.

Issue
Whether the assailed provision is unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross
violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the
nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to
overbreadth.

Held
Petition denied, the assailed resolutions are a valid exercise of police power. A close
examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or
poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid
reason for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC,
wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No.
6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaigning or
other political purposes, except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision
is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing
the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. This
Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country
which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the
economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our
population falling below the poverty line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the
Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an
act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a
public office. Activities included under this definition are:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or

against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or

oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate
 National Press Club v COMELEC
207 SCRA 1

Facts
In this case the representatives of the mass media filed a petition in order to declare
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 as unconstitutional. The assailed provision
prevents the media industry to sell or donate space for political advertisements. Alongside
the media representatives, two national candidates and one local candidate further allege that
such provision is a curtailment of the right to be informed.

Issue
Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.

Held
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds
of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability
in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the
reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events
relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion
by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such
comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates
covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or
commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for
political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
 Philippne Press Institute v COMELEC
244 SCRA 272

Facts
This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order against a resolution made by the COMELEC. The assailed
resolution was asking publishers for a free COMELEC space wherein they are required to
provide free space in their newspapers to be used by the COMELEC for election regulation
purposes. In addition to this they are asked to process raw data to make it camera- ready.
They contend that this was tantamount to involuntary servitude and was not a valid exercise
of police power. They move that such resolution be stricken down as unconstitutional.
In behalf of the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General contended that
such was not unconstitutional for it merely provided for guidelines to be followed for the
procurement of COMELEC space. Furthermore there were no administrative or criminal
sanctions for non- compliance. The Solicitor General is also of the view that, even if the
assailed provision is mandatory, COMELEC is still mandated to regulate and supervise the
information operations of the media industry in order to ensure the impartiality of the
elections.

Issue
Whether Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is
valid.

Held
According to the court, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as
interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media
enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however,
made too casually to require prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort
(and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power
essentially a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent
Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the
instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports,
without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity,
indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular
newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and
palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to
such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
 Osmena v COMELEC
288 SCRA 447, 1998

Facts

The petitioners Emilio Osmena and Pablo P Garcia seek for the nullification of the
decision made by the supreme court in NPC v COMELEC wherein it ruled for the validity
of the Electoral Reform Laws of 1987. Said law prohibits the selling and donating of space
for campaign and any political purposes except for COMELEC. According to them the
court erred in ruling in the NPC case that the freedom of speech was not violated for such
was a valid regulation for election purposes. According to them the ban to political
advertising creates a disadvantage to the poor candidates for they are deprived of a medium
which they can afford to pay unlike the more affluent candidates who can provide for other
means than dissemination of information through media. Instead of leveling the playing field
it worsens it.

Issue

Whether the assailed decision is unconstitutional

Held

The petition is DISMISSED. A number of decisions are cited by the court but it all
came down to the fact the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as
campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the
mass media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-government. What is
bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of the views expressed
in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.
 TELEBAP v COMELEC
289 SCRA 337, 1998

Facts

TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting

companies. GMA is a network station granted a franchise by Congress. Both contends the
validity of the provision regarding the so- called COMELEC space of Sec. 2 of the Omnibus
Election Code. They argue that such is unconstitutional for it is tantamount to the taking of
property without due process of law and that such was enacted in excess of the power
granted to COMELEC to supervise and regulate the elections.

Issue

Whether the questioned provision is tantamount to the taking of property without

due process of law and whether such is enacted in excess of the power granted to
COMELEC to supervise and regulate the elections.

Held

Petition DISMISSED. The court said in its decision that with the prohibition on
media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space
are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and
programs of government. More than merely depriving their qualifications and programs of
government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of
broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive
the people of their right to know. Art III, 7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII,
6 states that "the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish,
and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive
justice and to intervene when the common good so demands."

Furthermore, it said that to affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public
broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on
issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers
but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of
ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of
the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92,
therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to
intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in
the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of
elections is for that common good.
 SWS v COMELEC
357 SCRA 496, 2001

Facts

SWS is a research institution that conducts surveys while KPC publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation here in the Philippines. Both wanted to
conduct an election survey during the 2001 national and local elections. However a
resolution was issued by COMELEC stating that Surveys affecting national candidates shall
not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. SWS and KPC argue that such
resolution is a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech. COMELEc on their part
avers that such is a valid regulation in order not to manipulate the election results.

Issue

Whether Sec. 5.4 is a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech.

Held

The petition is GRANTED. The court rules that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression
of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.

The court has two points

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest not
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of election
survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity
of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio
and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows
a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to
statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that the
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content. Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition
imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is
only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of
expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category
of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days
immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local
election.
This sufficiently distinguishes 5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, 11(b), which this Court
found to be valid in National Press Club v. COMELEC and Osmea v. COMELEC. For the
ban imposed by R.A. No. 6646, 11(b) is not only authorized by a specific constitutional
provision, but it also provided an alternative so that, as this Court pointed out in Osmea,
there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by the COMELEC
space and COMELEC hour.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the
suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4
nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction be not
greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at
the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be
attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more
narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that
such speech creates the danger of such evils.
 Penera v COMELEC
G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009

Facts

Penera and Andanar are mayoralty candidates for the May 2007 elections in Sta.
Monica Surigao del Norte . Andanar filed a disqualification case against Penera and the other
maembers of her political party for there were witnesses that allege that Penera engaged in
premature campaigning. She was seen in a motorcade prior to the official campaign period in
certain baranggays of Sta. Monica. She admitted that she was in the motorcade but she
should not be disqualified because she and her party did not make any speech and that they
only played a marching background music and waved to the crowd. So technically according
to her, they did not ask the people to vote for them. COMELEC ruled in favor of the
disqualification case. Hence, this petition

Issue

Whether Penera should be disqualified for rengaging in premature campaigning

Held

Petition DISMISSED. The court said that a person, after filing his/her COC but
prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can
already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as
election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect
as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only
at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the
undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning,
shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to
begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature
campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.
Appreciation of Ballots
 Bautista v Castro
206 SCRA 305

Facts
Bautista and Castro were candidates for the position of Brgy. Capt. In Teacher's
Village Quezon City. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the winner
by 2 votes. Castro filed a protest. The trial court rendered a decision that Castro garnered
the same number of votes as Bautista and declared Miguel as the duly elected Brgy. Capt.
Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari

Issue
Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be
considered a valid ballot.

Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested ballots

Held
 Dojillo v COMELEC
G.R. No. 166542, July 25, 2006

Facts

Petitioner Dojillo and respondent Vidal were candidates for the 2002 barangay and
SK elections running for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal, San
Fabian, Pangasinan. Vidal was able to obtaine 374 votes while Dojillo received 371 votes. Of
course, the BET declared Vidal as the winner. Dojillo filed a disqualification case against
Vidal for misappreciation of ballots and incorrect tallying of votes. The trial court ruled in
favor of Dojillo and proclaimed him as winner. However, the COMELEC in its resolutions
reversed the decision. Hence this petition

Issue

Whether respondent is the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal,
San Fabian, Pangasinan. A discussion on the issues of appreciation of ballots

Held

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and Vidal is declared the winner. As to the

appreciation of ballots the court was guided by the pieces of evidence presented by the lower
court and COMELEC. A ballot indicates the voter's will. There is no requirement that the
entries in the ballot be written nicely or that the name of the candidate be spelled accurately.
In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed valid unless there is a
clear reason to justify its rejection. The object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain
and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable
certainty. The ballots in question had indications with reasonable certainty
Canvassing
 Castromayor v COMELEC
205 SCRA 298

Facts

Castromayor was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member Sangguniang Bayan of

the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held on May 8, 1995. After the elections
were held the Board of Canvassers began tallying the votes. On the basis of the canvass the
winners were declared. Among which was Castromayor. However Garin the chairman of the
Board of Canvassers rechecked the tally and she found out that some votes were overlooked.
According to her Dorito another candidate garnered 51 more votes than Castromayor. This
led Garin to report such incident to the COMELEC so that the board can be given the
authority to reconvene in order to re tally the votes. A fax letter was sent to the COMELEC
in order for the latter to suspend the proclamation in favor of Castromayor. COMELEC
resolved to act on the suspension of the proclamation. Upon hearing this Castromayor filed
a petiotion for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for the remedy of the losing party must
be an election protest.

Issue

Whether COMELEC holds the right to suspend the proclamation of Castromayor

Held

The Petition is DISMISSED. Indeed, since the Statement of Votes forms the basis
of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately
affects the validity of the proclamation. It begs the question, therefore, to say that this is not
a preproclamation controversy and the procedure for preproclamation controversies cannot
be applied to the correction in the computation of the totals in the Statement of Votes.

According to the court what is involved here is a simple problem of arithmetic. The
Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the
candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in computation, the
MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. Hence any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised
directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide
questions affecting elections. What has just been said also disposes of petitioner's other
contention that because his proclamation has already been made, any remedy of the losing
party is an election protest.
 Mastura v COMELEC
285 SCRA 493

Facts

Mastura and Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of
Maguindanao for the May 1995 elections. When the votes were being canvassed Dilangalen
objected to the inclusion of the ballots from the Municipality of Matonog, contending that
the same were tampered. Hence, COMELEC ordered for the examination of these ballots
and formed a new set of Board of Canvassers. They found out that the ballots were indeed
tampered with. COMELEC ordered a recount while. Of course, Mastura was not in favor of
the actions of COMELEC. From the recount Dilangalen was found to have garnered the
highest votes.

Issue

Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC

Held

It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending
its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns
from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be
falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board
of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or,
if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.
 Cawasa v COMELEC
G.R. No. 150469, May 30, 2009

Facts
Cawasa and Manamparan were the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. There were 40 precincts were the people were
said to have cast their votes but only 36 were successfully held the elections. There was a
failure of elections in the remaining 4.Hence, a special election was declared by the
COMELEC. In the regular elections Cawasa had more votes but in the special election
Manamparan took the lead. COMELEC proclaimed Cawasa the winner so Manamparan
filed a petition to annul said proclamation. the venue of the special elections was transferred
to the adjacent municipalities of Sultan Naga Dimaporo and Sapad in lieu of the regular
polling places located in barangays Bangko, Cabasaran and Liangan. There is likewise no
dispute that military personnel were appointed as members of the Board of Election
Inspectors in the 4 precincts. The Comelec held that the special elections in the 4 contested
precincts were not genuinely held and resulted in failure to elect on account of fraud.

Issue
Whether the COMELEC en banc Resolution was issued without jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

Held:
Petition DISMISSED, Resolution AFFIRMED. Petitioners fail to persuade.
Sections 152, 153 and 154 of the Omnibus Election Code shed light on this matter, to wit:
SEC. 152. Polling Place. A polling place is the building or place where the board of
election inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters shall cast their votes.

SEC. 153. Designation of polling places. The location of polling places designated in
the preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the Commission may find
necessary, after notice to registered political parties and candidates in the political unit
affected, if any, and hearing: provided, That no location shall be changed within forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election or a referendum or
plebiscite, except in case it is destroyed or it cannot be used.

SEC. 154. Requirements for polling places. Each polling place shall be, as far as
practicable, a ground floor and shall be of sufficient size to admit and comfortably
accommodate forty voters at one time outside the guard rail for the board of election
inspectors. The polling place shall be located within the territory of the precinct as centrally
as possible with respect to the residence of the voters therein and whenever possible, such
location shall be along a public road. No designation of polling places shall be changed
except upon written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement
of all the political parties or by resolution of the Commission upon prior notice and
hearing.

The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of Comelec Resolution No.
4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and 154 of
the Election Code.

The pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been
held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes and (2) that the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of
the elections. The concurrence of these two circumstances justifies the calling of special
elections. Here, the Comelec found that the special elections were vitiated by fraud due to
the illegal transfer of the polling places and the appointment of military personnel as
members of the BEI. Inevitably, the Comelec could not ascertain who voted during the
special elections. The circumstances were such that the entire electoral process was not
worthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect no election was held.
 Garay v COMELEC
261 SCRA 222, 1996

Facts
Garay and Gata jr. were candidates running for the position of vice-mayor in the
Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon. The tallied votes revealed that Garay was
ahead with 20 votes. However,this result did not include the votes in precinct 30-A of
Barangay Culasi, Matnog. This is due to the fact that some men forcibly took the balot
boxes. Hence,the Board of Canvassers did not declare a winner. BEI issued a certificate of
votes wherein Gata jr. garnered an overwhelming lead in the said precint. This was sent by
Gata to COMELEC. At first, Gata's tally board was not acknowledged but eventually
COMELEC released a resolution certiying thevotes in said precinct by annuling the results
of the special elections conducted. Aggrieved, Garay filed this petition.

Issue
Did the respondent Commission commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the results of the special election it called due to a failure
of elections and in declaring the winner on the basis of the Tally Board and the Certificate of
Votes submitted by the private respondent Gata?

Held
Petition GRANTED, assailed resolution is SET ASIDE. While it is true that the
respondent Commission has the power to annul special elections or declare a failure of
special elections where it is shown that no voting had taken place or the election therein
resulted in a failure to elect; and the votes not cast would affect the results of the.election
nonetheless, in the instant case, the June 17, 1995 electoral exercise was not a failed election,
as voting had taken place and the election did not result in a failure to elect. In other words,
the people spoke freely and honestly in a contest voluntarily participated in by both parties
herein. Hence, the
popular will as clearly expressed in the votes cast and counted should prevail over dubious
election documents of a previous failed election in the same precinct. Since the validity and
binding force of this special election has not been put at issue and since for all it is worth,
such electoral exercise, both in the casting and canvassing of votes, was conducted regularly
and peacefully, then this Court's duty is to resolve the issue "in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority" as expressed in such special election, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
Pre-proclamation
Controversy
 Patoray v COMELEC
249 SCRA 440

Facts
Patoray and Disomimba are opponents for the mayoralty post in the municipality of
Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. From the tally of the votes, Patoray was ahead by 25 votes.
DIsomimba objected to the inclusion of votes from 4 precincts saying it has been tampered
with. In a resolution, COMELEC excluded the 2 precincts resulting in a wipeout of
Patoray's lead. Patoray was earlier declared as mayor but because of the turn of events an
election protest was filed against him which was acted upon by the COMELEC. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc alleging that the procedure
in R.A. 7166 on pre-proclamation cases apply only when there is a valid ground for a pre-
proclamation controversy. Petitioner claimed that since the objections raised by private
respondent pertained to the casting and appreciation of ballots, the proper remedy was an
election protest. Hence, private respondents objection was correctly overruled by the MBC.

Issue
Whether the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion

Held
Resolution annulling petitioners proclamation is reversed and set aside, without
prejudice to the final outcome and resolution of the election protest filed by private
respondent before the RTC of Marawi City.

The court finds that the MBC did not err in refusing to consider the objections raised by
private respondent during the canvass of the returns. Section 20 of R.A. 7166 applies only
where the objection on the return being canvassed refers to issues proper in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, pre-proclamation
controversies are limited to: (1) challenges directed against the composition or proceedings
of the board of canvassers (not he board of election inspectors), or (2) challenges related to
election returns to which a party must have made specific objections.

In the case at bar, private respondent objected to the two returns on the ground that the
election returns are manufactured, fabricated or not authentic, considering that the election
returns includes votes on ballots which are spurious, marked and invalid ballots. The
objection, as worded, did not challenge the returns, but was directed primarily at the ballots
reflected in the returns. The issue of whether or not the ballots were manufactured,
fabricated or not authentic involves an appreciation thereof. It is settled that issues relative
to the appreciation of ballots cannot be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Appreciation of ballots is the task of the board of election inspectors, not the board of
canvassers, and questions related thereto are proper only in election protests.
 Sema v COMELEC
347 SCRA 633, 2000

Facts
Sema and Manara were candidates for city mayor of Cotabato City during the May
11, 1998
Sema together with several others filed for the exclusion of votes from 30 precincts. This
was granted by COMELEC and Sema was declared winner. Aggrieved Manara appealed. A
resolution was issued by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of Sema as winner as
well as a cease and desist order in assuming the position of Mayor.

Issue
whether or not the order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May 29, 1998 granting
Semas 28 petitions for exclusion of the 30 contested election returns is null and void for
having been issued after its earlier ruling embodied in its orders of May 22 and 23, 1998
directing the exclusion of the same returns had already become final.

Held
The COMELEC is ORDERED to direct the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato
City to reconvene within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision for the purpose of
completing the canvass of votes and proclaiming the winner. The petition for certiorari in
G.R. Nos. 134163-64 is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. The status quo order
dated July 14, 1998 is hereby ordered LIFTED.

The court rules that Maara has every right to expect a ruling from the Board on its
objection over the latters proceedings. Up to this time, however, the Board has not
complied with its statutory responsibility to come up with a ruling thereon. The failure of
the Board to discharge this obligation should not in any way prejudice Maaras right to
elevate the matter to this Commission on appeal. Otherwise, all that a partial board can do to
favor a party is to refuse to make a ruling on the latters opponents objections effectively
preventing its review by this Commission. (Abella vs. Larrazabal 180 SCRA 509). It is in
this light that the instant appeal must be considered seasonably filed. This Commission must
assume jurisdiction, entertain the allegations raised and resolve the issues involved in SPC
No. 98-240.

It is clear that the CBC acted without authority when it issued its May 29, 1998 ruling.
Consequently, the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion when it rendered the questioned resolution of October 18, 1999 denying
due course to SPC No. 98-240 for allegedly having been filed out of time and affirming the
proclamation of Sema as Mayor of Cotabato City; and the resolution of January 2, 2000
denying Maaras motion for reconsideration of the October 18, 1999 resolution.

Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null and void as it was based on an incomplete
canvass. An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. A
proclamation made where the contested returns set aside will affect the result of the election
and the board of canvassers proceeded to proclaim without the authority from the
COMELEC is null and void
 Francis Pangilinan v COMELEC
G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993

Facts
Pangilinan and Belmonte were both running for the position of Congressman in the
4th district of Quezon City. Cadano and Umali as registered voters of the 4th district and as
taxpayers filed a disqualification case against Belmonte because the latter was seen to have
been inducing the voters of some of the barangays in the 4th district. He was seen boasting
about the things that he gave the people for free. Pangilinan together with the two
complainants filed an urgent motion to suspend canvass or proclamation. in order that the
petition for disqualification against private respondent may not become moot and academic,
there was need for an immediate order directing the City Board of Canvassers of Quezon
City to suspend at once the canvassing of the election returns and the proclamation of the
winning candidate for Representative of the fourth district of Quezon City. The
COMELEC, however, failed to act on the said motion. Pangilinan further objected to the
continuation of the COMELEC. COMELEC contends that under Section 15 of R.A. No.
7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413, entitled "General Instructions for
the Provincial/City/District and Municipal Board of Canvassers" pre-proclamation
controversies are not allowed in the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issue
Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413
disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of
Representatives are unconstitutional.

Held
Petition DISMISSED
The court ruled that Sec. 15 of R.A. 7166 is not, therefore, unconstitutional. On the contrary,
it is in harmony with the 1987 Constitution. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
The petitioner's arguments are totally misplaced. In fact, Section 15, R.A. 7166 is consistent
with Section 17, Article VI which makes the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the House
of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. Petitioner's objection relating to the preparation,
transmission and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass falls within the
sole jurisdiction of the (House) Electoral