Distribution; limited Uneseo/EDesu/1962/1 PARIS, 1 March 1962 Original: English UWITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION THE PSYCHOLOGY oF LEARNING AND TEACHING MATHEMATICS by Richard R. Skemp Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester 13. England Btudy Wo. 1; this is one of several studies, on the various aspects of ‘the teaching of mathematics in secondary schools, which are intended to provide on analysis of how this subject is being taught in different parts of the world./ WS /03@2.23,es THE PSYCHOLOGY OP LEARNING AND TEACHING MATHEMATICS by Richard R, Skemp I. The aim of this papor is to discuss some of the psychological aspects of the learning and teaching of mathematics in a form which will be usable by teachers and educational psychologists. The relation between this and teaching itself is that wo shall here be concerned mainly with the metal processes involved, rather than with teaching method in detail. The opinion of an expert mathematician may carry much weight: but such a one is all the more likely to think in terms of the end results, while failing to consider the often lengthy end diffioult paths whereby these have to be reached by those less expert than himself. Successful teaching of mathematics requires first, a Imorledge of the relevant processes of learning; second, and based on this, appropriate methods of teaching; and finally, the application of these in the particular field of mathematics. This paper concentrates on the first of these. The next distinction to be made is between mathematics and ite preoursors, such as arithmetic and mensuretion. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that certain montal processes are required for algebra which are not needed for arithmetic; and for Euclidean and projective geometry, which are not needed for drawing and measurement, andso on. The distinction is in the level of abstraction involved; and the torn ‘mathematics! will be used to include those ideas which cannot be givon direct concrete representation. For example, the number seven can be represented by seven physical objects: which cannot be done for the variable x. One can draw a triangle inving sides 3, lh, 5 centimetres Dut one cennot draw "ABC, any right-angled triangle". (What one doos draw is a symbolic reprogentation of a particular class of triangles: quite a different matter.) Similarly the operation “adding 3” can be represented concretely by a physical movement of three objects: but not ‘differentiate with respect to x*, nor "project AB to infinity". Anticipating a little, this means that the subject matter of mathematics consists of purely mental objects; and it is fron this that many of its particular difficulties arise. Since the aim is to offer the ideas which follow in a form useful to teachers and educational psychologists, they will be given so far as possible in the form of basic principles having great generality, from which applications to particular teaching situations can be deduced. To supplonent this, I have listed in the bibliography several recent papers of the review type which together cover comprehensively the field of current resoarch.oo In. In view of the emphasis of the provious section on the need for a better understanding of the mental processes involved, it is logical next to ask what psychological research has been dono which bears on tho problem. Unfortunately, it must now be admitted that there is as yet remarkably little. This scercity seems to be gonerally agreed: e.g. Carr and Peel say, in a summary of research on arithmetic and mathematics, "Thore is however very little on the learning of arithnotic and mathomatics that can be callod research". (Reference 20). Likewise Wall and Biggs, of the (British) National Foundation for Educational Research say: "...research into the learning and teaching of mathematics has on the whole been short-term, scattered and piecemeal". (17). The reason for this shortage is, in view of the obvious nood, a problom in itself. An important part of the answer is, I think, the lack of a theory of learning which is applicable to mathematics. Particularly in the USA, and also to a considerable oxtent elsewhere, behaviourist learning theories have for many years held the field. These reject the study of mental processes on grounds that only behaviour is observable, and that therefore only behaviour is a valid subject for scientific study, The weaknoss of this argunont lies in the failure to distinguish between soiontific evidence itself, and theories based thereon. The former should indoed be generally observable (by eny one with the necessary Imowledge and oquipment); but in every scionce, e theoretical system is developed which unifies the observation in a system of abstract ideas. No physicist would refuso to study magnetic fields on the grounds that those were unobsorvable, and confine himself to the study of the errangenents of iron filings. The criterion for the scientific respectability of an observation is that others cen make it toos but for a scientific concept, the OFiveria are its povers to unify, to explain and to predict those observablos. In psychology, concepts relating to montal processes aro as capable as any others of satisfying the above critoric. I confess to a little hesitation before voicing this criticion of such a great volume of research into learning. This view is however implied by Well and Biges, who give (op cit) as one of our chief needs "studies... @irooted et the development of a comprchonsive general theory of learning and mathomatical leerning in perticuler"; and in America by Buswell who in his prosidontial adérecs to the Educet ional Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, said: "Without the slightest criticiem of experiments in general psychology, wo cannot continue to be satisfied with implications for education from results of oxperimonts with simple mental processes, with animals, and at the sub-languege level.” Though this ves said in 1955, it romains true. I am further enboldenod by tho possibility that this dissatisfaction with currently usod theories is more widespread than appears in that gets published, and that porheps others are only waiting for someone to say "The Emperor has no clothes"t Another weakness of contemporary learning theory is thet it only deals with the learning of isolated facts and responses, rather than integrated systems of knowledge and skills. A characteristic of all higherShc subjects of learning is the way in which earlier stages lead to and make possible the later ones; and this hiererchic dependency is particularly characteristic of mathematics. So any leerning theory which is to be applicable to mathematics must deal not only with thinking procosses, but with a highly organized and intercomected system of thinking processes. Wo such theory has yet been published. The foregoing criticisms of availablo learning theorics havo not yot shown any reason why the crisis which has arison should be in tho particular subject of mathemetics. This leads to tho question, what is tho nature of mathomatical thinking? Is there somo differonco botwoon, this ond other subjocts which makes it harder to learn? Or perhaps it involves a difforcnt learning process, so that the poorer results are due to tho unappropriate use of mcthods which may be quite suitable for other subjocts? There have boon verious studies of mathomatical thinking, of which some are listed in the bibliography (12, 13, 14). Theso however tend to bo less descriptions of m-themetical thinking than thomselves examples of it, that is, they are high order generalizctions about mathomatical thought, those gcnoralizetions being themsolves of a naturo vhich is more like higher mathemetics than anything else. Thoir other linitetion is that they describe only the end result; and mowledge of a goal is not a sufficient condition of knowing how to get there. Howover, the former information is also necossary; ond for our present purpose, mathematics may be described as one partiouler structure of abstract ways of thinking which is applicable to a wido varioty of situations, including many which are very different from those in which the former were first developed. This definition makos explicit threo points of particuler importance for the present study; tho concopual and highly structured nature of mathematics, and tho dotachability of its concepts from their original context. These points will now be devoloped further. Firstly, concepts are different from facts, and the process of concopt-formation is difforent from the learning of facts. Sccondly, the loarning of a structure is something more than tho learning of a collection of isolated details. Thirdly, whereas the rosponscs which form part of stimulus-rosponse leerning theory are automstic, stimulus- bound, and capable of being rote-learnt, true mthematics requires deliberate and gencralized operations, and thoir acquisition depends on understanding. Further, tho dotachability of these concepts and oporations fron their origins, and their doliberato extrapolation to nev dovelopmonts and applicstions, is closoly rolated to their becoming thomselves objects of consciousness. These objects of mathematical ‘thinking have, unlike those of othor sciences, only mental oxistence. Mathomatics is thus essentially a reflective process, and is qualitatively different from activitios based on sonsori-notor interaction with tho out- sido world.rele It is the failure to realize those differences which has caused much of the lack of success by teachers and researchers. The former often try to teach mathomatics as if it wore a collection of facts and responses, instond of a structure of concepts and opcrations. The latter, with a few notoworthy oxcoptions, mainly still try to use the stimulus-responso kind of loarning theory. In Europe, vhich has never boon wholly behaviourist in its psychology, an awakoning of interest in the development of conceptual thinking is indicated by the rapid recent grovth of intorest in ond rosearch doriving from the work of Piaget. This has as yet, however, received little attention in tho United States. III. For a propor understanding of the psychological bases of loarning mathomatics, wo nood to know about a) the fomation of concopts in goneral, and mathonatical concepts in particular. b) the learning of organized structures; and in relation to this, about the intornal organization of mthomatical knowledge. ¢) tho processes of mathomatical genoralization and exploration wheroby now concepts and operations arc dorivod et the abstract level from oxisting ones. 4) problom solving and tho correction of orrors. ©) the function of mathonatice! symbolism. £) motivations for learning mthematios. 2) Concept formation: A concopt is not easy to dofine, partly because there co RENy ATTTOPCRE Piade of concept, and partly because of cortain intrinsic characteristics which will appoar later. To begin with one of the simplor sort, a class-concopt is a sot of properties which characterizes a particular collection of objects. For example, "troo" is the nam of a class concopt, and so is "five". The former concept is the sot of properties common to oaks, ashes, olms, birches, pines; tho latter is the sot of proporties common to five pemies, five buttons, fivo mon, five ships. "Oak" is itsolf tho namo ofa class-concept, for it ropresonts not one pirticuler oak tree but the set of proportics held in conmon by all oak-trees. And if we group tho class~concept "troo" in a collection with other class concopts such as "plant", "forn*, "grass", "fungus", wo can derive another class-concopt *vogetablo". These concepts form a hicrarchy in which “trec" is subordinate to "vogotable*, supcrordinate to "oak", and of the somo order ca "fungus*. *Soreaftor, quotation marks will be takeri as sufficiont reminder that a word used to refer to a concopt is not tho concept itsolf. This romindor is important, because it is possible to have the word without having the concopt.-T- Suppose now that « child asks us "What iss trec?”. Should wo answer by attempting a botenical definition, or by saying “Oaks, ashos, pines, applo trees, and so on -= those ere all trees"? Undoubtedly the latter: for evon if we know the former, he would not understand it. Nor would it suffice to say "An oak is a troe", for this would probably not convey to him that birchos and firs aro also troes, but not gooseberry Dushos. In other words, ono of the onsiost ways to communicate a class- concept is to give « munber of different exanplos which bolong to tho class. The moro the number and the groater the varicty, the ercator the likelihood that tho porson will abstract just those proportics which wo intond. If we gavo os cxomple "Oaks, ashos, olms", tho child might confine hié elass-concopt to dociduous trees only; if "Apple-trocs, pear-trees, plum-troes", ho might regerd goosoberry bushes as trocs, but not larches. An important charactoristic of this way of communicating a concept is thet it mikos uso only of concopts of lowor order than itself. If the answor givon had boon "A treo is a menber of the vogetablo kingdom which is spormophytic, porennial, woody, and has one or fow main stons", tho child would not havo understood, because this definition uses concepts which arc of oqual or highor ordcr than "troo". If tho child docs not possess tho concopt "troc", ho is unlikely to havo the others oithor. ‘Tho reader nay woll bo wondoring what all this has to do with mathomatics. A great deal; for in teaching mathematics we arc concorned with tho communication of very high order concepts, and tho burden of the forogoing is thet to enyono who is not alrondy in possession of a sufficicnt munber of concepts of a givon order, now concopts of that ordor ecunot be coimunicated directly. All that can be donc is to give a nunbor of carefully chosen examples from which the person will, it is hoped, form his own concept. Ono cannot toach somoonc a concept in tho samo way as ono can toach facts; one can only try to arrango for him to loarn it. It is fo this somo rcason that it has becn nccossary to approach tho concept "concept" by such a roundabout mothod. So far, tho conoopt “class-concopt" hes (it is hoped) bocn communicated by soveral examples of class-concopte, including a mathomaticel oxenplo. To complote tho procoss, it would bo nocessery first to conmumicste a number of other particular kinds of concopt in the samo way, end to hope that fron theso, roadors would form tho superordinate concept "concopt™. Some of the kinds of concopt uscd in mathometics aro, relational concopt, operation, abstracting, generalizing. Bxamplos of rolational concepts aro "oqual", “greater than", "tends to", "function of", “{eonorphic with". ‘Bxonples of oporstions aro ‘diffcrontiction" ,"addition", "projoction", "substitution'. Bxamplos of abstracting aro *concopt formation", gotting the cquation", and ovcry caso in which arithnotical or nathomatioal data arc derived fron a practical problem. Examples of gonoralizing aro the processes of doveloping ideas about fractional and nogativo indices starting from positivo wholo numbcr indicos, and about trigonomotrical retios of angles of any magnitude from tho dofinitions for an acute anglo.~8- If the rocder hes succcedcd in forming, fran so fow instances, these particular concepts, ho may be ablo to derive from thom the superordinste concept "concopt*. Tho roason for the difficulty of giving a direct dofinition of "concopt" should also now be apparcnt: nemoly, an insufficioney of oxisting concopts of as high an ordor as itsclf. This indircct mothod will probably scom vory unsatisfactory to most teachers. How cen onc onsuro that pupils forn the right mathomatical concepts, or that they forn thom at all, oxcopt by cloar and unambiguous definitions? Unfortunately, a teacher's dosire that his pupils shell loarn accurately is Likely to dofoat its om onds. Definitions like "a parellologram is a plano four-sided figure having its opposite sidos parallel" use concopts of tho same or highor ordcr than parallologran, and cannot thoroforo conmunicctc the concept of parallologram to a boginncr in gconctry. Tho first stago has to be tho formation of a sot of concepts, by tho building-up procoss already doseribed. Definitions arc (among other things) a tidying-up procoss, in which ono decides oxactly what sot of characttristics the concept comprises That is to say, having fornod the concopt, it may bo possible to formulate it —- to mako tho concopt tho objoct of consideration in itsclf, apart from tho monbors of its class from which it was abstracted. This formulating and dofining process also has the offect of relating it to othor concepts of tho samo or higher orders. When the concept “parallelogran" is formulated by the definition givon carlior, sinco it is shown theroby to be included in the class "plane four-sided figures", ovory- thing known about tho lnttor becomes applicable to parallelograns. As soon as a squarc is known to havo its opposite sidcs parellel, it follows that it possesses all tho proportics of a parallologram. This activity of roflecting on concopts, invostigating their mutual relationships, devo loping systematic techniques of inferonco froma small nunber of basic concopts, and deducing statoncnts about particular instancos (ridors) from a combination of morc gonoral ones (thcoroms), is very cheractoristic of formal goonctry. But no ono can rofloct on concopts which arc not thore; and this, I suspoct, is whet many pupils at the socondary school stage ero trying to do. Formal goonctry only becomes possible if the basic concepts involved have first bocn formod in tho miné of thc pupil by the indircet procoss of helping hin to arrive at thom for hinsolf. Tho hiorarchic nature of mathornticel concepts is particularly clow for arithmotic and algobra. ct us consider by wey of oxamplo the simplo oxpansion (x + ye 24 oxy + Tho truth of this doponds on tho truth of tho following goncral statczonts: a) (+ yR =e (+ We + y) C2) Be st) ey) exe) eye ey) (344) xy © ye (av) xy + oxy =e oxy-9- Tho first appoars to roprosont chicfly an agroomont anong mathematicians about notation and will not bo discussod further at this stage (but sco also IV(a)). On tho othor three, howevor, doponds the validity of most of the manipulations of algobra. Let us considor bricfly what subordinate concopts arc involved in tho third of theso, xy « yx. This roprescnts synbolically tho collection of all statcnonts such as 2x 7= 7x2, 5x8~ 8x5, hx9=9xh; which is to say that it roprosonts a concopt. “This concopt can only oxist as such in tho mind of a pupil who has abstracted it himself from a sufficiont mmbor of soparate oxanples. Each of thoso exemplcs will involvo tho concopts of thc individual nunbors, of the oporation of multiplication, and of the relationship of oquality. To discuss the process of formation of tho individuel nunbor concepts would take too long here (sco 1). But it may bo worth pointing out that "multiply" is en oporational conccpt, reprosonting that which all tho individual oporations like 2x 7, 8x5, x9, ctc., have in common. Equality, again, will only cxist as a truo concopt if a pupil has abstracted it hinsclf from a mmbcr of instances, thosc instances all boing oxomplars of tho mthonatical concopt of equality and non-oxomplars of concepts rethor like it such as "thc samc as". (Compare with the formation of tho concopt “troo"). Similar discussions arc desirable for statonents (1i) and (iv), but must be omitted to losvo space for a fow words about tho variables xand y. So fer, tho oxanplos given Invo all usod the natural numbers only, Which arc concopts derived from colloctions of scparate objocts. ‘The concopt of multiplication has also only bccn dovoloped in this contoxt, whore x 7 ncans that four similar colloctions cach containing scvon unspecified objocts arc to bo mado into a singlo collection. The successive transitions by which x and y can conc to roprosont positive and nogetivo intogors and fractions, and tho goncralization of the concopt of nultiplication to make it applicable to these now concopts, cannot be doalt with at this stage because the processes of nathcmatical goncralisa- tion have not yct bocn discussod. But it may be pointod out that this pro- ccss of goncralization is hardly likely to be possible if the concopts which aro to be goncralized have not bocn forma, as truc conccpts. (This suggests, in parcnthosos, a rcason for the trouble that many children have with fractions cte., oven at tho aritimetic stagg). Even such @ sinplo algobraic procoss as the oxpansion of (x plus y)* turns out to be dopondont on a complox hicrarchy of class-concepts, relations, and operations; and a pupil who lacks any of theso subordinate concopts will not undorstand what ho is doing. It is particularly difficult for a tcechor who hinsclf posscsscs a concopt to roalize that a pupil doos not, for onco a concopt is forncd it sooms obvious to its posscssor. The conccpt, boing cvoked by and structuring tho porcoption of the data, is porccived as if it worc part of the data; and it is then difficult to imagino any other way of porceiving this data.-10- Tt is mado ovon hardor for « tcachor to know whether a pupil roally has ‘a concopt by the fact that a roasonably intelligont and industrious pupi? can roto-loarn all tho manipulations which aro nocossery in tho carly stagos. Ho will find it morc difficult, for (to enticipsto a lator scction) concoptusl learning implice schonatic lcarning, and tho lattor is casicr and moro lasting. Tho first of the basic psychological principlos on which the loarning of mathematics neods to be based is thorcforo that of tho process of concopt formation, When this principle has boon fully grasped, it can bo applicd ot 11 Icvols of mathematics upwards from thosc of the basic arithnotical and elenontary algebraic lcvels which havo horo bocn uscd as cxanples. Tho bost way to grasp this principle is contained within itsclf, nancly to oxpcricnce as mony diffcrent cxamplos as possible of the process. For this, tho rcador cannot do bettcr than road as much as ho can of what has boon writton on this topic by Dicncs (scc bibliography). This work stoms from Piagot's studios of concopt dovolopont; but I think thet many of tho idcas which he attributos to Pingot arc rozlly Dionos’ om, which he hed es a result of reading Piagct's work and subscquontly porecived as part of it. In schools at Loiccstcr, and rccontly at Harvard in collaboration with Professor Bruncr, ho hee pionocred tho formulation and nothodical application of the forogoing principles of concopt dovolopront in tho ficlds of arithmotic and carly algobra. Extonsion of those upwards to the sccondary stage is a task which still ronains to be donc. Before it con bo bogun, howovor, there arc further difforoncos botwon nathonaties and arithactic to bo discussed. b) Schomatic loarning, Ono of tho most scricus dofocts of contemporary loornting thoorice Tor our prosont purposo is their failuro to take accolmt of the way in which oxisting kmowlodge makes possiblo, and also influcnecs, subsoquont loerning, Tho moro structurod tho subjoct itsclf, the moro sorious is this doficioncy in eny thoory which attonpte to doal with tho loarning of it. In erithnotic and mathonatics for oxamplo, lmowlcdge of addition and of tho multiplication teblos make possible tho Merning of long nultiplicction; and tho lattor is nocossary (togothcr with sovoral othor procosscs) for simplo interest. Knowlcdgo of ell tho clonontcry algcbraie procossos is nocossary bofore solving oquations can be Icarnt, and tho former dopend in turn on srithnctical Imowledgo. Those facts are so obvious that thoy aro likely to be trkcn for granted; so it is usually overlooked thet lator loarning is possible only bocausc carlicr Icarning has taken a particular forn. Long division, for cxenplo, would bo vory difficult for a child who had loarnt his multiplication tablcos corroctly, but Ind learnt to write tho results only in Ronan nucrels. Difforontiation of x™ is only possible bocauso tho oxpansion of tho binonial (x plus$x)" is inom; and, whore n is other than a jositivo intogor, the lattor oxpension doponds on a thoorctical structuro of considerablo couploxity. This hicrarchical arrangenont appoars in other subjects to varying dogrecs, but to a loss cxtont. Whon loarning a lenguago, ignorance of (say) onc pago of irrogulor vorbs docs not proelude loarning the noxt pago, nor docs it intorfore with the translation of tho whole of a passage in which thoso verbs do not appoar. Ignorance of tho history of tho tonth ecntury nattcrs little to e pupil loarning tthat of tho fiftconth. In tho seicnecs, intordopondonce is much groater, but still loss than for-n- nathonatics. Taking physics as an oxanplo, most of tho theory of cloctricity and magnotisn can bo acquired without knowing enything of mochancis, or hydrostatics. Mathomatics is probably the nost intor- dopondont end hicrarchical of any structure of ‘mowlcdgo currontly ‘taught « This offect of provious loarning on a particular task has boon ealled by psychologists "transfor", and has boon the subjoct of a Linited anouxt of rathor scatterod roscorch. Probably tho bost contribution has boon thst of Ketona, whoso ingonious scrics of oxporinonts the roader is strongly rccormcnded to read in tho original work (9). Ono genoral rcsult of his rescarchos has beon to show that thore was positivo transfor, i.c. that tho loarning of ono task or solution of onc problon was a holp towards loarning anothor task or solving a further problom, if and only if sono basic principle of structure or nothod was porcoived in tho formor, and could bo applied to tho lattor. Katona's work has recoived nuch less attontion than it dosorves. Part of the reason for this is to bo found in tho provailing clinate of psychological thoory at tho tino of its publicction, and after. Ever sinco tho introduction by Ebbinghaus, in 1885, of nonscnso syllablos such as KED, WL, NAD, ctc., as matoricl for losrning oxporincnts, thoso and sinilar tasks havo beon usod oxtonsively as a moans of clininating tho offcct of provious loarming: which has boon rogardod as an irrolovant and uncontrolled variablo, to be got rid of xa fer as possible. Transfor effects, whcre studicd, ive boon rogardod es soncthing additional to and supcrinposod upon a basic loarning procoss, rathor than onc of its major dctorminants. Katona's oxporinonts were conccivod, and the rosults fornulatod, in terns of Gcstalt thoory. This school of psychological thought dovoloped as a reaction against associationist approaches to loarning, and its chief mcrit lics in its cnphasis that a twholotwhon loernt is nore than tho sun of its individual parts. Tho discovory of this 'wholo' (or Gostalt, as it is terncd) rosults in an eltorcd porcoption of all tho individual parts, with casior loaming end bettor rotontion. So groat is the effect of this chango on porcoption that tho Gestalt school has tomiod to locate this ‘whole! in the porceivod miterinl, and rogard this aspoct of learning (which they rightly stross) as an insight into the underlying structure of tho mtcrial itsolf, or, whon tho task is solving problems, into the besic principle of the problon. The true sito of tho Gestalt is, of coursc, in tho mind of the subject: and tho procoss of insight is the formtion thoroin of a concept -- class-conccpt, rolational concopt, opcretional concept, or sevoral of those togethor. Tho diffcrence botweon this abstracting proccss and the porcoption of soncthing pro-oxisting in tho matcrial is crucial, for the following roason. In tho formor caso, but not in tho letter, tho abstraction remains as part of the nontal cquipmont of the subject, and is thoroby capablo of being usod with new matcrial and for new tasks and problens. Further, onch sot of abstractions is available in conbination with abstractions derived from-2B- othor metcr inl cncountorod at other tincs, and as a basis for further abstractions. It is this cumulative procoss cspocially which Gestalt thoory fails adoquatoly to subsumo; and which is so contral to learning activitics which (1iko mathonaties) nay oxtend over poriods of the ordor of ton, twenty, or forty yoar: Tho full importance of the cxisting body of knowledgo socms to be roslizod by vory fow contemporary psychologists, and thro is virtually no rescarch into its formtion and offects. Piagot, in his ' Psychology of Intelligonco', is almost alonc in his insistence thorcon: and oven by those who arc now using Pingct's idoas oxtonsivoly, this particular ono has not yot boon taken up. This may be becauso the book in which it appoars is ono of hia rost difficult, and tho implications for lcarning thcory and cdusctional ptychology aro not nade oxplicit. Plagot, following Bartlott and Hoad, calls those structuros of oxisting kmowlodge schemata. Closoly rolatcd to this aro two othor important ideas, thoso of cssiniletion and accommodation. By tho fornor, Piaget noans tho fitting of now cxperioncos into an cxisting schona; and by tho latter, those chengos ina schona which onablo it to tale in (or lead to) now oxperioncos. It is those two procossos soparatcly, altornatoly, or in combination, which proscrvc tho continuity of thc schona fron its early sinplo boginning to tho final conploxity which it nay roach. They aro thorefore fundanental to our understanding of schonatic loerning, and it is rogrottable once again to hevo to write that I have boon able to find no oxper inonts rolating to those concepts in tho litcraturo of psychological or odueational roscarch. If howovor tho forogoing ideas aro applied to tho ficld of nathonatics in conbination with those of the previous scction on concopt formation, and thoso of tho noxt scction on nathonatical goncralization, sone very intorcsting results can bo dorivod. Those are given as hypotheses, in Section IV. In a rocent oxporinont of ninc, two artificial schormta wore dovisod, end used for a controllod oxperinont to compare the results of schematic Jearning with loarning in which an appropriate schona had not proviously deon learnt. Schonatic learning was twico as cffectivo for irmodinte rocall, which a month lator sovon ticos as much was rcealled of tho natorial schonatically learnt as of the other. Thoso rosults nko it strikingly cloar that tho prosonoe or absonco of a suitablo schora hes a vory groat offect on tho success of loarning and recall, and indicate that furthor roscarch is urgontly nocded into the nature, varictics, and node of formation of those schenata. Tho brovity of this section is a ncesuro, not of its importance, but of tho lack of rolovant rosoarch. For mathomaties abovo all subjects a schonatic loarning theory is accossary. In its absenco, the hypothcsos of Scetion IV havo therefore to do double duty; to suggest rescarch leading to such a theory, and in the neantino to sorvo in ite placo as indications on which teaching nethods ought probably to be based.es 0) Mathenetical oxploration and gonoralization; Particularly charactoristic of nathonatios is the process of exploration and gonerali~ zation whorcby now class-concepts and oporations ere derived fron cxisting ones, and oxisting class-concepts and opcrations arc applicd in ifforont fields fron those in which they wore originally fornod. In tip natural scicnces, thore is constant intoraction botwoon thoory ond oxperinent; and’now concopts are developod largcly fron offccts obtained and observed in tho sensory world of outside objects. In nathcmatice, howover, this is in gencral not the case. It is truc that its basic conccpts arise fron scnsori-notor expericnces, and that sone branches of nathonatics have thoir origins in practical problons -- c.g. trigononotry in surveying, calculus in novenonts of accclersting bodios. But those havo boon developed independently of their origins, ond practicel applicctions, porheps, found afterwards. De Moivre's thooron was Aovelopod out of a complex scherg relating concepts from the calculus, infinite scrics, and conplex mmbers as well as trigononctry. Its use= fulness in doaling with, for exanple, problens in alterncting current theory results fron its groat powor ond gonorality, and not because it was based on oxporinontal work with alternating currents. Tho developrent of now nathonttical ideas is alnost entirely conceptual, and horcin lios anothor of its spocial problons. Let us study the process in a sinple case, such as indices. The pupil first encounters those in cases where the index is a positive intoger. By examples such as x° wm X.xexXe, XP = X.K.KaKeKs, xD = x.x.x.x.x, the "generalization is reached wheroby x® is defined as tho product of g factors each equal tox. Fron first principles, codugts like x%x? are then evaluated, leading to,the general rule ee eet OD Sinilarly, x4 gaMe Fonte 8 (x2)? = x8 are arrived at. So far, the process fits oxoctly tho description of concopt fornstion described in IIIa). In the noxt stago, howover, soncthing further takes place. As derived above, tho rulos apply only whon a and b aro positive intogers such that adb ; that is to say, the field of these gonerelized operations isa linitod class of mmibers. | What happens whon a= bora€b? Again returning to first principlos, by simple algebra Se xls ih,» while by tho generalised operation we are considering, 24 xl e xt, the two opcrations can bo made to agree if the moaning 1_ is assigned to x, and in general if x™® is givon the meaning 1 | = In torms of the original definition, quantities such as x4 nave no meaning, ond tho process wheroby moaning has boon assignod to these is quite different fron thot whereby the earlier results worc obtained. When a collection of results like x72 x3 = #ied to the discovery that where a and b are positive intogers, a being greater then b, xis xbe x8D, this rule was derived as a suporordimte concept fron a sunbor of porticiar examples. But when a nonning was assigned to terns such as x4, the result of a particular division x? ¢ x/was determined was deternined by a wish to nake tho results of thie ond sinilar-ike operations consistent with this rule. In the first case, the rule wes derived fron its oxenplars; in the second, now exemplars were defined in such a way es to fit the rule after it was formed. Having obtained ono oxample of this new kind, it is of courso in this case such a short further step to generalize it in the forn x= 1 a ‘that the mathometically minded person may well take both these steps as ono. This immodiate cencralization takes plece by the process of superordinate concopt formation described earlier; and the now cless of exemplars (nogative indices) is added to the original class to give an extended field for the operation "dividing two powers of the same base by one another". Genorali- zation thus incluies the earlier process, in alternation with tho new one. Both are oxanples of accommodation of tho schema, the former spontaneous and often unconscious, the latter deliberate and nocessarily conscious. It is on this new process, however, that attention must now be centred. The process of logical deduction exemplified above is of course alroady woll known, and tho laws by which it operates have frequently been formulated in general terms. But these are only yet another example of super~ ordinate concopt formation, boing a set of generalizations about a class of ts of inforence which cone into the category “logical” (as distinct fran illogical", "wishful", otc.). What they do not make explicit is the concept of this actor or agent as an ontity in itself, capable of these acts of inference but also of other kinds of purely mental acts, such as day-dreaning, speculation, rationalization, otc. We can observe, compare, end arrange our thoughts in’ways analogous to those in which wo can observe and manipulate objects in the external cnviromont: in both cases, cither intelligently or not. For exanyle, wo can test whether an idoa is coneistont or inconsistent with our schemata, ani decide whothor to accept or reject it, in the sane way as wo can decide by physical trial whether e picce fits a space in a jig-saw puzzle, or lear whethor a violin is in tune. We can consider a sorios of mental representations of acts, and re-arrange these to give a desired out~ cone; as when we mentally plan'a car trip to make all our calls in tho shortest journey. This is to say that wo have within us a syston which is distinct fron the sonsori-notor system whereby we porceive and act on physical objects. Though the former has no visible sense organs and no sot of voluntary muscles, it is capable of both recoptor and offoctor functions; but tho objects of those activities aro not outside, physical objocts, but inside, nental objects. The system, whereby tho mind turns inward on itself, I call the reflective systen; end it is ono partioulor mode of activity of this rofloctive system on a cortain varicty of concepts which together Sonprisos methenatical exploration. As an example of this has alrecdy been given (development of concepts relating to indices); end since it involves per- coption of relationships, classification, deduction, and sinilar acts usually classed as intelligent, it is logical to include it in the sano class by calling it intelligent reflection.