The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief

that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honestbelief
that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richlydeserve such benefits.

For lack of showing of bad faith, malice or arbitrariness on the part of NHPI, there is, however, no
justifiable ground for an award of moral and exemplary damages.55 For lack of factual or legal bases,
we find no cause to award attorneys fees in favor of Leynes.

NIPPON HOUSING PHIL. INC., and/or TADASHI OTA, HOROSHI TAKADA, YUSUHIRO
KAWATA, MR. NOBOYUSHI and JOEL REYES Petitioners,
vs.
MAIAH ANGELA LEYNES,

mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith

Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer fired his employee
without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant
of moral damages under the Civil Code, i.e., that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or
fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety,
and similar injury resulted therefrom.
In addition, the lack of a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee does not ipso facto mean that
the corporate officers acted with malice or bad faith. There must be an independent proof of malice
or bad faith,52 which is absent in the case at bar.
Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive
or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
ROLANDO DS.TORRES, Petitioner,
vs.
RURAL BANK OF SAN JUAN, INC., ANDRES CANO CHUA, JOBEL GO CHUA, JESUS CANO
CHUA, MEINRADO DALISAY, JOSE MANALANSAN III, OFELIA GINA BE and NATY ASTRERO

there does not appear to be any ill will or bad faith that can be attributed to the respondent.
In Philippine American Life and General Insurance v. Gramaje,[30] bad faith is defined as a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose. It implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

9. Hence, there could not had been any dismissal in the instant case simply because the herein
complainants were never terminated from their employment but they did not report for work after
they were reprimanded for refusal to render overtime work. Abandonment is itself a form of voluntary
resignation as the initiative to terminate the employer-employee relation emanates from the
employee. This is manifested in this case.

The employee must elaborate, support or substantiate his or her complaint that he or she was
dismissed without valid cause (Ledesma, Jr. vs. NLRC, 537 SCRA 358, October 19, 2007).

These circumstances, taken together, the lack of evidence of dismissal and the lack of intent on the
part of the respondent to abandon his work, the remedy is reinstatement but without
backwages.33 However, considering that reinstatement is no longer applicable due to the strained
relationship between the parties and that Colambot already found another employment, each party
must bear his or her own loss, thus, placing them on equal footing.

Verily, in a case where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment
nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party
must bear his own loss.34

MZR INDUSTRIES, MARILOU R. QUIROZ AND LEA TIMBAL, PETITIONERS,

vs.
MAJEN COLAMBOT,

The present case, which has lasted for almost four (4) years, could have been avoided
had private respondent made previous inquiry regarding the veracity of Mr. Gaviolas
instruction, and not simply relied on the bare statement of the company guard. Private
respondent should have been more vigilant of his rights as an employee because at
stake was not only his position but also his means of livelihood. x xx

Furthermore, petitioner denied the allegation that it terminated respondent security guards
employment without just cause and even alleged that respondent guards abandoned their
employment. Thus, absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitionerhad
dismissed Mercado, Somosot and Oliver, their claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.[8]
 There being no finding that respondent security guards were illegally dismissed, there is no
basis for an award of backwages in their favor. It is axiomatic that before backwages may be
granted, there must be unjust or illegal dismissal from work.[9]
Neither did the NLRC find evidence to support petitioners allegation that Mercado, Somosot
and Oliver abandoned their employment. The records reveal that their failure to report for duty
was not caused by a willful and deliberate intent to abandon their employment.Rather, such
failure resulted from their belief, though mistaken, that they had been suspended or terminated
from work. The rule is that for abandonment to exist, two elements must concur: first, the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without justifiable
reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt acts.[10] The filing by Mercado, Somosot and Oliver of
their complaints for illegal dismissal negates the existence of any intention on their part to
abandon their employment.[11]
SECURITY AND CREDIT INVESTIGATION, INC. and VICENTE REYES,
JR., petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First
Division), FELICIANO MERCADO, EDGAR SOMOSOT and DANTE OLIVER and the
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondents.

To say that the employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed is to encroach upon the right of the
employers to hire persons who will be of service to them. (Intertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC, G. R. No.
81087, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 318).

As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered
in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment.

Resignation was voluntary, thus, there could be no illegal dismissal.

Besides, Bilbao did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that
she was forced or threatened by Saudia.

Bare and self-serving allegations of coercion or intimidation, unsubstantiated

by evidence, do not constitute proof to sufficiently support a finding of forced
resignation. It would be utterly unfair and unjust to hold that Saudia illegally
dismissed Bilbao and to impose upon it the burden of accepting back Bilbao who
unequivocally and voluntarily manifested her intent and willingness to sever her
employment ties.

It is our considered opinion [that] complainant was not dismissed, much less, illegally. On the contrary,
she resigned. It is hard for us to imagine complainant would accede to sign a resignation letter as a
precondition to her hiring considering her educational background. Thus, in the absence of any
circumstance tending to show she was probably coerced her resignation must be upheld. x x x