MEMO ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE >) (Tapes from Calif.) First, with regard to style and general organization, I believe it 1s essential that the piece have more of what will be recognized as the Nixon trademark. I like the style of the article as it is, but, understandably, it is apparent that Price, not Nixon, 1s doing the writing. I realize that we cannot avoid thie, not only in this case, but in speeches and articles which will have to come out by the s res over the monthg ahead. But the inclusion of some thoughts and phrases which are murextmxx agent Dee EOE EARN ELE POLE RE RT. fusabaxatextrammixthextx recognizably Nixon in origin for sophisticated readers, 1t seems to me is essential, even though, I am sure that the intellectuals would undoubtedly find the piece as it is more to their liking. What I am @tmmx dictating now are just some rough ideas which might accomplish this objective. They are for mg consideration only and when I get back on Monday we can have @ conference to see how, if at all, they should be used. Let me begin with organization. I realize that my writing, whether in speeches or articles, 1s generally considered to be over-simplified and"over-organized" in the sense of pastang-as- stating positions in lewyer-like logical 1-2-3 order, However, it seems to be that EB an application of this approach to this subject might make some of the points so brilliantly Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidetandable to the average--~ developed in your draft, more unde more sophisticated readers, let alone the average reader. I believe the article begins in a most effective way - pointing out that Vietnam has obscured some exciting developments that have occurred in the rest of non-communist Asia. At that point, I think it would be well to insert a section with regard to the very significant role Vietnam has played in holding the Line so that the balance of non-commnist Asia could proceed on the progress. I will dictate in a later memo, some thoughts as to how this sectinn should be drafted. I think this should then be followed by @ brief section on the importance of Asia as an area, emphasizing that in the last thiré of a century that here, rather than in Eulrope, Africa or Latin America, is wheve-the: the area where we have the greated danger of @ confréntation which could escalate into World War III (clearly apart from Vietnam). Pointing out in addition, that it was Asia that triggered our entry into World War II and has resulted in appy- a quarter of a million casualties in Korea and Vietnam since World War II...and going on frum there to set forth the populations involved, the economic potential ete. From this section, I think logically we more on to a discussion of what Asia ___(views?) today. I think a brief paragraph might be included at the outset setting forth the change --- developing the theme.... @ brief paragraph could well develop the theme that Asia is the fastest changing area of the world, Reproduced atthe Richard3 pointing out the dramatic changes that have occured in Asis since World War II. I will dictate some notes further in this menoranium on this theme. descriptive Prom here it is logical to ave into the seserthtze passages with regard to what Asia is like today - the diversity of its peoples and mm nations, the fact that we m now look at a ‘umx with new leaders, a new generation of people tNew Asti and new ideas. All of this material, of course, has-been-- is completely covered in your draft. Then could come a section dealing with the very curity setting forth constructive move toward Asian collective the reasons why this is so vitallly importent to both the Asien nations and to the United States. I shall dictate a section on this later in the mummxantméxx memorandum. Then could tmmx follow a section with regard to the evelopment of economis,social and political insitutions in Asia with particular emphasis on the theme you have discussed { so effective, the need to make evolution exciting. And then, finallly, a specific discussion of the four giants in Asia, Here I would add @ br ief but necessary section on India which I will dtamtetrummrc dictate some thoughts on later in ths memorandum. ‘This should be folaoed by Japan, China and fianlly the role of the United States. The last three of courzse, have been completely developed in your draft. As I dicate this, I realize that this organizational pattern is Implicit in your draft, but I would like to see it more sharply fmxx focused so that the reader will_come—away_with-teus-oz-fan definite -subjects—uhich-he-will-bave- when he completes the Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Libraryate will have four or five definite themes firmly delineated in his s all these mindy rather than a blurred montage which discu: points but which does not spell them out in specific enough terms for him to grasp the ideas. Now to return to a development of some of the themes wxtexxx which might well be elaborated on in the article. = The role of Vietnam Vietnam obscures the larger picture. But let us not overlook the vital role Vietnam has mutex played in making the larger picture possible. Regardless of what one may think £ of the now unfashinnable domino theory, it can be stated categorically that had it not been for Vietnam, nonpcommnist Asia would be very different from what it is today, In specific terms, the pressure which the @kmmxx Chinese ani the Soviet Union found it necessary to apply in Vietnam relieved the pressure which otherwise might be directed toward Thailand, tex Mslaysia, Indonesia or the Philipppines. If the Chine: @tampat, for example, have Vietnam on their plates, the insurgent forces in Thailand, the Philippikes, Malaysia end earlier in Indonesia, would have received far more support. It can be said that ¥‘etsnam--- keeping the cork in the smbix bottle in Vietnam, holding the line in Vietnam, bought time for the unstable, weak and in some cases Chi-comm leaning neutrals 1ike Indonesia and Cambodia, to strengthen their political, economic and security forces and to develop in their= or own way without intolerable pressures from the Chi-comms for that matter from the Soviet. In the case of the fatelistic Emtummx Indonesians, it played @ particularly significant role. Let us recongize that Indonesia was the maJor/mriam in Southeast Asia with a hundred million people living on the richest resources in the area. The American commitment (ascerding-te--- of ground troops and airpower was tanglible proof that communism, because of the immense potential power of communist China, was not necessarily the wave of the future in Asia and that non-communist governments might have a chance to survive (where I discuss above taking the pressure off of Thailand etc., one way of sharpening it up would ve to say that the Vietnam war has diverted the Chinese communist from other targets like Indian, Thailand, Malaysia, etc.). @ne who travels through the world is struck by the fact that the Vientam War 1s not understood or supported by our friends in Europe, Africa or Latin America and that in the United States it is, mm undoubtedly, x/most unpopular misunderstood warin our history But it is understood in Asiaxfrmmr -- from Japan to India, Asian leaders know why we are in Vietnam and privabely if not publicly hope that we stay there until the war is brought to @ satisfactory conclusion. One attitude about Vietnam which is absolutely unconscionable is that the United States should not have become involved but now that we are we mst see it through in order to save our "honor." If the commitment should not have been made, Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library-6- ask American men to die tn-evder-te-- because of the mistakes made by our national leaders and diplomats. If the war is not in our national interest, the men should be brought home now. Wisdom of We can argue about the/policies which made the commitment necessary, and about the deficiencies mmt in conducting the war, but on the commitment, m itself, there should be equanimity, unpopular I think history may well record this terribly difficult/war was a great turning point mmx in the history of Asia and the Pacific, that our fighting men titrk did not fight and die in vain, that their sacrifice created the conditions which enabled non-commnist prosper Asia to survive, mrmpxerupxper/and eventually to contain the awesome threat of commmist China. (NOTE to Ray - these are, as you willk have noted, m very rough thoughts - and I am not insisting that they be included - it seems to me, however, that the theme should be developed, perhaps, not at this length, and also I should point out that this 1s une area which gives the article some timely newawerthy value, even though I have stated this theme before). The Importance of Asia In addition to pointing out the number of people, the land mess, the fact that the Soviet Union is one-third Asian = in papeiett Population and two-thirds in territory I would demolish in fairly strong words the argumemt that Asia 1s “periferal” and it might be well to refer by name to the doctrine which 1s promlgated by Lippmann, Fulbright etal. Spelling out, of course, what they say is ‘hat the Asians have a different racial background, different customs Richard Nixon Presidentialdifferent traditions. I think mmx you will also find that Schlessinger and even Galbraith, despite his being Ambassador to India, parrots the same line. This argument is not only wxmxtrterct wrong in terms of American and world strategy, 1t 1s also racism ‘and chauvenism as its worst. As I indicated above, the thene that Asia has been the focal point of three wars in the last thirty years in which the United States has been involved,x2% plus the fact that the United States 1s a Pacific power, should be put in context twxtwax. In that connection, it might be said that ¢he-- Unbtod—Seate. in view of the great leap forward in transportation and communication, the United States today xax is closer to Asia than it was to Western Eureope before km World War II. Also, on the line of the importance of Ataayrttxx Asia, its potential as cumpared with Latin America and Africa might be made without affronting the kuttwxramtxx Africans and Latin Americans too mich. For example, non-communist Asia, excluding India has approximately 300 million people and 1-pweduses-as-much-se-the $00-million-wh----ueve-tha--- they produce more than the 500 millton who live in Japan and Africa. Of course, the Japanese contribution 4s @ chunk of this, but the point 1s at least a legitimate one. (NOTE to whoever is taking this off - there mmx may be blanks on some of these tapes - the first two - because of my failure to use the recording device properly - be sure to listen through the tapes completely so that at least you will be um able to take off that part that aid come off) Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library(A couple of random notes) In the section when I refer to the importance of At! stated that as Europe was the lightning rod for the great power struggles of thaxEtxatrmaxoxfx the first two-thirdds of the qwentieth Century, Asia will undoubtedly be the lightning rod for the great power struggle if one occurs in the lest third of the century. ) In the section dealing with Asian recognition of the common danger of @fmx China, it might be well to point kmmxkmmxx out how and when this recognition became acute. For the first ten years of China's existence there was admiration for what the Chinese commnists had done as well as x considerable éeubt- question as to whehter a communist system might be the best one for other countries in Asia to adopt in oréer to assure rapid progress. The disillusionment with communism has escalated in the last five years to the point that it can now be said that communism has lost the ideological battle in Asia, There are two reasons for this - the immense success of the non-communist Asien nations in bringing rapid economic progress compared with the economic difficulties being experienced by Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea (it might be added here that the utter failure of socialist systems in Burma and Indonesia has also contributed to the Asian disillusionment with Markism as a philosophy and as an economic system.) Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library~9- The @her reason for the disillusionment with the Chinese is, of course, the fear that has developed as a x result of China's foreign adventures. The Chinese participation in Korea hed very little effectiveness regard, partly because the Asians have ssexetizyperhaps subconsciously, recognized this as being a fight between the Asians and Europeans - non-white versus white and partly because the Chinese could have been considred to have had provocation aue-te-the-- as the American forces approach their border. The Chinese aggression against Quemoy and Matsu and threats against Taiwan were, of course, explained away as being internal in character. The Chinese aggression against Tibet did not draw aharp lines due se-pevhape- come-acaumption-that-dtvet—was-pwe- probably to the fact that very few people undevsteed-- considered Tibet to be a truly independent country. It was the Chinese aggression against India which woke “P non-commnist Asiansetearrermwatxtexx clear around the paxmtxx perimeter of China. India was China's friend and its defender in world councils and yet China engaged in an mgix aggression. As-- ‘Sppvexiuasely-the-came-time-- During this same period, Chinese subversion in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines Thailand, became an increasingly difficult problem for the Governments of those countries. The support of the North Vietnamese forces by China added to the rest grew to be the clincher. Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library=10- In the section on why the United States would be most reluctant to take on another Vietnam (and incidentally, I ‘et thought this was a brilliant piece of analysis) it might ve useful to point out that this attitude exists not only with regaré to Asia tut with regard to Latin America and Afrtmgxx Africa as well. The violent reaction against aiding Mobutu and egainst any assistance to the Nigerians to put down their rebellion 1s only an indication of things to come. For example if there were a serious tureattxx threat to Bolivia or Columbia or one of the other Castro targets in Latin America of the magnititude of the Duminican affair, I seriously doubt that the United States at this time mmmkxmx would move due to the reluctance of Americans to become involved in another venture like Vietnam. In other words, very briefly, there might be developed the thought that not only in Asia but in Latin America mutxkfrierx as well as in Africa, indigenous collective security arrangements mst go forward and that the role of the United States as the international policeman - always coming to tm the aid of xx governments threated by communist sub- version - in the future will be seriously limited. Incidentally, I think this theme could be another potentiel lesd in the article which moan would be pulled out by sophisticated readers In the section on ASPAC (7) I believe that a few lines tmttextex indicating why SEATO 1s obsolete would be appropriate. Basically, SEATO 1s Europeang, since the French Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library-n- left Asia and the British are leaving it, SEATO can no longer play @ significant role in Asian collective security. In the discussion on Page 8 - it might be well to state specifically that to preserve peace in this moclear age, great power confrontation presents the greatest danger of World War III and mst be averted whereever possible. Your concept of buffers between the gf great powers 1s therefore both thoughtful and very persuasive. All pattaxx policies mst be developed to reduce the possibilities of such confrontation. With regard to ASPAC, I think a little needle should be put in to the effect that even India might be persuaded to give its support, having in mind the fact that it has been the subject of Chinese communist aggression and also having in mind the fact that India dumge desires to par play a role beyond its borders and this is one of the most effective ways taxtmx it could do so. 4 small point - in referring to Latin America on Page 11, @uropean should be substituted for Spanish in view of the Portugese persons in Brazil. In developing the theme as to why we mst aid the So-called third world, the point might be made effectively by stating that in view of the eminence of the Mock Tree Plain (7) Telestar communications, etc., the world by the end of this umxtrexx century will be a & great city. The pressures on the a the=12- part of the poorgmmx for a better life will increase sm Gsvect-velatsonship--- enormously as they become closer neighbors of the rich. With regard to the Common Market, the concept 4s certainly more feasible in non-commnist Asia than in Latin America ( I don't think it's particularly feasible in either place but at least the thought might be developed.) When you discuss the differences in the types of governemnt in places like Taiwan, Thailand, ete., I think it might be well to make the point directly that while the Americans behiev- like our form of government, we mst Yecognize that it may not be the best form of governemnt for people in Afirca or Asia and Latin America with entirely @iffernet backgrounds. ( I think there has been far too mech effort on the part of the Unsted-St-- ¥.S. opinion makers to Judge the governemts of virtually all developing countries - judge whether they meet the standards of Western Bummeragyrx democracy. I am not suggesting that we should endorse dictatorship or totalitarianism. I do know that at this point in time I certainly would not advocate that Iran, Thailand and Taiwan should give up their very successful, stable governments in order to meve-sewara- become Western-style democracies like #Uraguay for example.) Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library-13- With regard to India, we should not give it extended tx treatment although I think it could be summarized in this way. India is suffering from over-population, from too mich emphasis on agrsoultuve-and-net-enough-on-industrial ization and not enough on agriculture. Too mch emphasis on government enterprise - not enough emphasis on private mmxax enterprise. Busy-india-- In giving credit to the Indians, however, they have had to survive two wars and two droughts in the past five years. Many are pessimistic about fmttexx India's future. What we have to recognize 1s that the four hundred million people of India at least are trying to progress without sacrificing basic freedoms as the most populace representative democracy in the World for India to fail while communist China, despite all of its difficulties, eventually succeeded, would be a disaster of world- wide proportions. ‘Therefore, the necessity for continued BampX cooperation with and support of Indian objectives, but With more emphasis on trying to get them to change their institutions so that they mm can Join the rest of non-commnist Asia in progress. With xmgmxctax regard to Japan, 1t can be said that twenty years ago it was unthinkable that Japan would acquire a non-nuclear military capability. Even five years ago, while some Japanese thought about it, they would not talk about it. Today, they at least talk about it although a @veat-majersty substantial majority still oppose it. Looking to Japan's future, however, Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Librarynot only can the point be made which you emphasized that a great nation like Japan cannot tolerate a situation in which it depends on other nations to defend its security. As Japan acquires economic leadership in the world, it is inevitable that the Japanese will want to assume nore of the respnsibility im the military and diplomatic fields. The point thet kmmxtusyxtmexmmtax Lee Kuan Yew made turtamntaxtyx was that the Japanese are a great people and that no great matien-- people will accept as their national destiny better nmaking/transistor radios and teaching the under-developed peoples how to grow rice." In other words, this is @ second,more subtle point that the Japanese trust to realize their destiny will inevitably lead them to developing some military capability. The other point which I think could be developed in the article more is why 1t is that Japan now can play a role in the balance of non-commnist Asia which it could not have played even five years ago - and certainly not ten years ago. The Japahese as the conquerors of Asia were flet-ef-course---- both feared and hated in the balance of Asia. But as Lee Kuan Yew points out, we have @ new generation - half the people living in Asia were born after World War IT and the new generation has neither the old gilts (the Japanese) or the old fears (the Philippinos, Thais, Malaysians etc.) Whtey- Therefore, for the first time the Japanese can play a role in Asia due to this changed situation. I think the Chinese section may prove to be the most important identialrm ‘end I will be working on it extensively next week. But some preliminary thoughts might well be stated now. In the last ‘utrax third of this century, the major threat to peace in the world will be the Chinese communists. In three to xix five years they will have significant mclear capability and will be outside the non-proliferation treaty...eble to scatter these weapens to liberation forces around the world. With regard to the options that the United Sates hes in addtion to the four that you mention, I think another needs to be added. In Western Europe, there is considerable discussion to the effect that the United Statesy-the Sevet-Undony-gotn-- should join with the Soviet Union in common pact against the Chinese. I think there is no policy which is more tempting short-range but more disastrous long-range than this one. Apart from the fact that this would permanently isolate a billion of the potentially most able people on earth, outside the nuclear club, it would, in addition, = have the connotation of pitting Europe against Asie - the ktktexagatmatxx twmxxx white against the non-white - with ell the repercussions that that would create around the world. How do we get China to change? Going overboard and recognizing them and admitting them to the tuttmt U.N. at a time ‘hat they are in their aggressive posture and = particularly at a time that they are supporting and instigating amx aggression in Vietnam, would be a major mistake. We need & bridge to Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Libraryaie these remarkable people, but in view of their leadership, all we can and should do 1s to build one end of the bridge. When China changes, it will do so as did the Soviet - because of necessity and not by choice. It will be a change of the head and not of the heart. These factors will induce that change. In Yiwm Vietnam we mst demonstrate that conquest by support of Tevolution will not wmtx be tolera‘ed and is dangerous to those Who engage in it. Second, non-commnist Asia, 1ike non-commnist Europe, must continue to be x strengthened economically ani eventually, militarily so that the Chiese will recognize that this also 1s a dead end street for them. It 1s here of course, thet Japan mist patyxtumrrx play their major role. China will change when there interests will better tw served by tm turning their immeDs¢ energies inward rather than trying to expand outward. When they make this decision, the dialogue between the United States and China can begin. It should be pointed ‘© out that the Ghanes United States has a great well of friendship among the Chinese people. We would hope that this well has not been Poisoned too mich by the communist rulers. On our part, we should make it clear that once China resists in its foreign adventures ‘that they will have our eumprattenxtenmmxmkatriar cooperation in what will truly be a great leap forward. It could also be pointed out that the Chinese xmm potential is dramtically demonstrated by what the Chinese in non-commnist &t Asia have done through a ® tribute to the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan in which they ere ina majority (assuming that Taiwanese can be called Chinese) Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library-17- 4s well as to the contributions they have made in Malaysia, Singapore, fx Thailand and the Philippines and even in Vietnam as well. Their contribution in Indonesia, of course, was also significant until they became entangled with the Chinese communist political machine. The whole thrust of this section on China should be that I am taking a hard line at the present but in the long range that I recognize the absolute necessity of @ dialogue with China and that I reject completely the idea of the Soviet-U.5. alliance which would aktx alienate China forever. Reproduced atthe Richard Nixon Presidential Library