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Cato Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 2012). Copyright Cato Institute. All rights
reserved.
Pia M. Orrenius is a Research Officer and Senior Economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Madeline Zavodny is a Professor of Economics at Agnes
Scott College. They thank Linda Bi for excellent research assistance. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
1
In summer 2011, the Obama administration called for prosecutorial discretion in
removal cases involving unauthorized immigrants without a criminal record. This
marks a departure from what has been a relatively consistent trend toward tougher
enforcement since 2001. See http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
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FIGURE 1
Border Patrol Apprehensions along the
Southwest Border
2,000,000
IRCA passed
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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Economic Consequences of Amnesty
FIGURE 2
Family-based Immigration from Mexico after IRCA
(Legal Permanent Residents Admitted under
Family Preferences)
IRCA 245(i)
160,000 Naturalizations Reinstated
End of IRCA Begin, 245(i) for 4
Filing Period Implemented months
140,000
IRCA 245(i)
120,000 passed Ends
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
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three or ten years before they were eligible to adjust status and reen-
ter the United States. IIRIRA also increased funding for border and
interior enforcement; launched Basic Pilot, an employment verifica-
tion program that was the precursor to E-Verify; and made unautho-
rized immigrants ineligible for federal grants and loans for
post-secondary education, among other measures.
The United States had one more little-known legalization pro-
gram, the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief
Act. NACARA allowed about 65,500 Nicaraguans, Cubans,
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and former Soviet nationals to adjust to
legal status.
As policies toward unauthorized immigrants have become stricter,
life has become tougher for the undocumented population. Changes
beyond more border enforcement include rising use of E-Verify by
employers, more workplace raids and employer audits by the
Department of Homeland Security, and expanded issuance of no
match letters by the Social Security Administration when employers
submit invalid Social Security numbers. Only a couple of states still
issue drivers licenses to unauthorized immigrants, and most states
no longer renew such licenses. All of these changes make it more dif-
ficult for unauthorized immigrants to find and keep a job.
Under the Secure Communities program, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents detain and deport unauthorized
immigrants who have committed only minor offenses and who pre-
viously would never have come to the attention of immigration
authorities. Meanwhile, 287(g) agreements that allow local police
departments to check suspects legal status and detain unauthorized
immigrants make immigrants fear contact with the police, which in
turn makes them both more vulnerable to crime and less likely to
report crime.
In addition to new and revamped federal enforcement programs
since the early and mid-2000s, most states have passed their own
immigration-related legislation. State laws have included mandating
that employers use E-Verify when hiring new workers, requiring that
police check the immigration status of certain individuals with whom
they come into contact, and imposing penalties on employers who
employ unauthorized workers or individuals who transport or har-
bor undocumented persons.
Despite widespread enforcement measures, unauthorized immi-
grants do not appear to have left the United States in larger numbers
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Economic Consequences of Amnesty
2
The law is also associated with a 17 percent drop in the population of non-
citizen Hispanics, which is more than twice the population decline in neighbor-
ing states. There is no evidence that these individuals returned to their home
countries. Mexican census data show little change in return rates among
U.S. migrants during this time.
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3
If markets for legal and unauthorized workers are segmented, then legalization
should lead to workers flooding the legal labor market and driving down wages.
In a single labor market, legalizing unauthorized workers may reduce their labor
supply, pushing wages up even among competing natives.
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Economic Consequences of Amnesty
Fiscal Effects
A legalization program has several fiscal effects. On the tax side,
income and payroll tax revenues are likely to increase as some work-
ers move onto the books instead of being paid under the table.
However, estimates suggest that over half of unauthorized immi-
grants already pay income and payroll taxes through withholding,
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4
Unauthorized workers use a variety of means to comply with tax laws. Some have
been issued an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) or a Social
Security number that is invalid for work, while others use fake numbers or num-
bers that belong to somebody else. Until the early 2000s, there were few conse-
quences for workers who submitted false or fraudulent Social Security numbers
(Orrenius and Zavodny 2009).
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Macroeconomic Effects
An important macroeconomic benefit of immigration is foreign-
born workers responsiveness to variation in labor demand over time
and across regions. Immigrants, particularly low-education immi-
grants (many of whom are unauthorized), are more responsive than
natives to the business cycle. They are more willing to move across
sectors and states, and, unlike natives, they can return home or not
come at all (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003; Bean et al. 2007).
Greater mobility reduces unemployment rates, dampens the cycli-
cality of government revenues and expenditures, and helps the econ-
omy run more efficiently.
The undocumented have traditionally served as a significant
source of flexibility in the labor market. Unauthorized immigrants
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Policy Implications
Two central lessons emerge from prior experience with amnesties
in the United States. First, IRCA did not achieve its goal of reducing
illegal inflows and the size of the undocumented population. Illegal
immigration quickly resumed growing and legal immigration
increased because the families of legalization beneficiaries immi-
grated. Second, economic impacts have been fairly modest.
Legalization beneficiaries experienced small earnings gains while
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Economic Consequences of Amnesty
Conclusion
Twenty-five years have passed since the last major amnesty.
In that time, the unauthorized population has swelled to 11 million.
Until the 2000s, authorities responded largely by increasing border
enforcement. While it became more difficult to enter the United
States via the southwestern border, once inside, life for the unautho-
rized was typically not bad. The 2000s decade, howeverwith
the 9/11 attacks, the collapse of proposed immigration reform in
20062007, and the worst recession in 80 yearsushered in a num-
ber of changes that significantly worsened conditions for unautho-
rized migrants. Unprecedented interior enforcement drove down
migrants wages and employment and resulted in record removals
while heightening fear in immigrant communities (Orrenius and
Zavodny 2009). While stricter workplace enforcement has not yet
succeeded in prompting unauthorized immigrants to leave the
United States in large numbers, it appears the poor economy has had
a large effect on inflows. By some accounts, net illegal immigration is
currently near zero.
There are no good choices once a country has a large undocu-
mented population. Mass deportations risk violating civil liberties
while turning a blind eye toward the unauthorized undermines the
rule of law. Although illegal immigration has economic benefits for
the macro-economy, the costs become more apparent over time.
Having a large undocumented workforce weakens the ability of
the U.S. government to enforce labor market regulations (Hanson
2007), reduces tax revenues, and harms competing workers.
Enacting a legalization program can help solve those problems,
but without expanding channels for legal entry, it can encourage
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