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Indian Foreign Policy and

International Humanitarian Norms:
A Role-Theoretical Analysis
Mischa Hansel*
Miriam Mller
Although role theory has been widely used in the field of foreign policy analysis, it has
never been comprehensively applied to the study of Indian foreign policy. This article
analyzes major foreign policy speeches of Indian decision makers in an effort to identify
salient national role conceptions. In the second part of the article, it is shown how in the
process of emerging international humanitarian norms, inherent tensions between differ-
ent role conceptions become aggravated. Thus, Indian foreign policy makers find them-
selves in the middle of intra- and inter-role conflicts. Taking the Responsibility to Protect
and International Criminal Law as examples, the article examines the way in which
decision makers have tried to mitigate and to evade conflicting role-derived expectations.
Key words: foreign policy, humanitarian norms, India, International Criminal Court, Responsibility
to Protect
Introduction
I ndias foreign policy provides a number of puzzles to analysts of international

relations. The largest democracy on earth is proud of its liberal and secular
values, and has improved its relations with Western nations in recent years. At the
same time, it is one of the staunchest defenders of the concepts of sovereignty and
nonintervention. Only reluctantly, if at all, does it encourage sanctions or military
interventions against authoritarian countries even in the face of massive human
rights abuses. India is also strongly committed to the principles of justice and law
in international relations, but lends only limited support to the work of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).
*Mischa Hansel holds the position of an Assistant Professor at the Justus Liebig Uni-
versity Giessen. Among his current research interests are Indian foreign policy, global
security policy, and the United Nations.

Miriam Mller is a peace and conflict adviser working on international engagement in
fragile states. She is also an external lecturer at the University of Cologne, with research
interests including state fragility, state- and peacebuilding, intrastate wars, and global
peace and security policy.
Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 7, Number 1Pages 79104

2015 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
80 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 7, Issue 12015
This article tries to make sense of such inconsistencies by taking a role-

theoretical perspective on Indian foreign policy. First, we identify national role
conceptions held by Indian decision makers, and thereby delve into the cognitive
and normative foundations of Indian foreign policy. In the next section, our
analysis shows how, in the process of the global institutionalization of humani-
tarian norms, role-derived expectations toward Indias foreign policy are coming
into conflict with each other. Finally, we analyze how Indian decision makers
have tried to manage such conflicting expectations in the cases of the Responsi-
bility to Protect (R2P) and International Criminal Law, respectively.
Role Theory and Indian Foreign Policy

Most scholars of Indian foreign policy draw upon realist premises (see
Ganguly, 2003; Kapur, 2006; Mohan, 2003). Indias behavior, according to this
perspective, is primarily the result of geopolitical constellations and international
power asymmetries. While certainly having its merits, a realist account does not
sufficiently explain Indian foreign policy (see also Wagner, 2005, p. 330). R2P is an
example. From the perspective of Indian decision makers, power constellations
provide both incentives to support and to oppose the R2P at the same time.
Supporting the R2P would help India stabilize relations with Western powers,
but probably alienate Russia, Iran, and/or China. By expressing its opposition to
the concept, India may hope to strengthen its energy partnerships with authori-
tarian countries. Thus, realism does not predict what position India as a power
(or security) maximizer will take vis--vis the R2P.
Despite these shortcomings, Indian foreign policy has rarely been approached
from other theoretical perspectives. Some scholars point to the competition of
different schools of thought (idealism, realism, liberalism, Hindu-nationalism)
among Indian foreign policy elites (Ollapally & Rajagopalan, 2012; Sagar, 2009;
Wulf, 2013). Yet the number of explicitly constructivist studies in this particular
field of enquiry is still comparatively low (among the few examples are Chacko,
2012; Frey, 2006; Latham, 2007; Nizamani, 2000). What all these studies have in
common is their focus on ideational influences that originate at the domestic
level: culture, identity, historical experiences, etc. We do not deny that such
factors constitute important channels of domestic elite socialization. What is
missing, in our view, is a consideration of the potential influence of international
expectations of Indias foreign policy.
Role theory can fill this gap because it integrates both domestic and interna-
tional levels of analysis. Previous studies have, for example, put much effort into
explaining how and why Chinese foreign policy makers hesitantly but succinctly
subscribed to the idea of China as a responsible stakeholder (Zoellick, 2005) in
international affairs, even though their country is still predominantly viewed as
a developing nation domestically. The main driving factor of this role-adaptation,
apparently, is growing international expectations with respect to Chinese crisis
management, economic aid, etc. (Gottwald & Duggan, 2011).
Kalevi J. Holsti, who originally formulated the concept, understood national
role conceptions as the policy makers own definitions [. . .] of the functions, if
any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system
or in subordinate regional systems (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245246). In the case of the
Indian Foreign Policy: A Role-Theoretical Analysis 81
United States, examples include, but are not limited to, hegemon, balancer,
tribune and agent of American values, catalyst/integrator, regional leader,
regional stabilizer, developer, and isolate (Le Prestre, 1997, p. 69). Once they
become salient in elite political discourse, these ideas define the range of accept-
able foreign policy options, that is, proscribing some actions and encouraging
others. It is therefore assumed that role performance, that is, the general foreign
policy behavior (Holsti, 1970, p. 245) of a government, is consistent with
policymakers role conceptions to a considerable degree.
A few words on the relationship between social roles and other immaterial
factors, such as culture or identity, may help at this point. Some authors inter-
pret the link between roles and identity as one of reciprocity or co-constitution
(Nabers, 2011, pp. 8283). According to our own view, roles imply a positioning
or functioning in the international system, that is, vis--vis other states,
regimes, or actors more generally. Identity or culture do not, except that the
former usually requires the social construction of an other (Reinke de
Buitrago, 2012, p. XVII). Yet unlike roles, notions of identity do not imply struc-
turally diverse and multifaceted social relations (for instance, between devel-
oper and developing nations, protector and protg, or liberator and defender)
that could not have been created by the simple working of a mere inclusion/
exclusion dynamic.
A second difference between roles and other ideational factors, such as
identity and culture, relates back to the levels of analysis. Foreign policy roles,
according to newer role-theoretical research, are mutually constituted by
domestic (ego) expectations and foreign (alter) expectations (Harnisch, 2011,
p. 8). Thus, social roles have an inherent conflict potential that is twofold: There
are conflicts within a role (intra-role conflicts) and conflicts between roles (inter-
role conflicts) (Harnisch, 2011, p. 8; Thies, 2010, p. 6337). The former refers to
conflicts between domestic and foreign expectations, or between several more
or less incompatible domestic expectations (on domestically contested roles, see
Brummer & Thies, 2014; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012). The latter is due to the fact that
state leaders are often guided by more than one role conception at the same
time (Holsti, 1970, p. 277). Depending on circumstances, they can therefore find
themselves in a position that requires contradictory role performances (enact-
ments) (Thies, 2010, p. 6337). Both intra- and inter-role conflicts may lead to
reinterpretation efforts that alter the substance of national role conceptions
in order to meet diverging expectations and to accommodate conflicting role
conceptions.
Although role theory has been widely used in the field of foreign policy
analysis, it has almost never been applied to the study of Indian foreign policy.
The only two exceptions, at least to our knowledge, are a study of Indias China
policy since 1988 (Vogel, 2010) and another historical study by Christian Wagner
(2005) in which he delineates the evolution of the Indian conception of great
power status. In the remainder of the article, we hope to close this research gap
by identifying the most salient role conceptions that have been expressed by
contemporary Indian decision makers in foreign policy speeches from 2001 to
2012. We also highlight some divisions between ego and alter expectations. A
comprehensive analysis of the latter would, however, require an article of its
own. For the same reason and in consideration of the current state of research, we
refrained from an analysis of the evolution of national role conceptions over time.
This, however, will be the focus of a follow-up project. Finally, our articles
approach is descriptive, not explanatory, in regard of national role conceptions.
Unraveling the causes and/or constitutive factors of national role conceptions
will require more comprehensive and different methods of data acquisition. We
will briefly come back to these questions in the concluding paragraphs where we
talk about options of a broader research agenda on role theory and Indian foreign
policy.
Data Acquisition and Methodological Issues

Our research strategy is primarily inductive. Secondary sources are only used
to provide historical context and to point out the implications of our evidence in
respect of the wider debate about Indias foreign policy. Rather than starting
with predefined categories, we established certain basic criteria for what kinds
of statements would qualify as an expression of a national role conception.
Most importantly, the word India (or a substitute term such as We, Us, or
Our) had to be present, and there had to be an indication of particular respon-
sibilities or functions India performs in the international system. Following
these rules, we were able to discover and codify a number of different catego-
ries of national role conceptions. These categories, their defining elements, as
well as some characteristic examples can be found in our codebook (see Appen-
dix B). This codebook was used in a second and third round of systematic text
analysis by another two coders. Ultimately, only those passages, which at least
two of our three coders categorized in the same way, were considered suitable
for further analysis.
All speeches were accessed via the Ministry of External Affairs homepage.
From hundreds of speeches and statements, we have tried to choose only those
that covered Indian foreign policy in the most general terms. Statements at
bilateral meetings and most issue-oriented speeches were thus omitted. The total
number of selected speeches was 42. Approximately half of them were held in
India itself; the other half was issued in both Western and Asian capitals. Among
the speakers are Prime Ministers, Ministers of External Affairs, Foreign Secretar-
ies, and National Security Advisers who served from 2001 to 2012. We have
deliberately chosen to select speeches held by different senior decision makers
and in front of different audiences, both domestic and foreign, for two method-
ological reasons. First, this broader sampling increases the representativeness of
our data sources and minimizes the impact of personality traits or situational
moods. Second, we had to control for tendencies of rhetorical window-dressing.
Diverse audiences (foreign-domestic, experts-laymen) serve as a kind of anti-
dote in this regard. The more heterogeneous the grouping of audiences, the
more difficult is cheap talk, that is, tactically motivated window-dressing,
particularly in a world of (potentially) global and instantaneous communication,
where inconsistent messages will rarely remain undiscovered (on the impact of
global transparency, see Lord, 2006).1
A numbered list of each speech, including dates and speakers, can be found in
Appendix A. The citations in the remainder of the article refer to the numbers in
that list.
National Role Conceptions of Indian Decision Makers

We argue that a thorough reading of foreign policy speeches by contemporary
Indian decision makers reveals at least eight, more or less salient, national role
conceptions: These are, in no particular order, internal developer, regional inte-
grator, advocate of developing nations, active independent, moral force, great
power, liberal example, and democracy promoter.
From the earliest days of the Indian Union until today, the country has been
associated with the idea of a developing nation. Indian foreign policy makers are
thus aware that nation-building or the socio-economic transformation of India
must be the primary concern of their policies (25). The aim of providing decent
living to a billion-strong population motivates Indias interaction with the
world (11). Twenty-one of the foreign policy speeches analyzed refer to internal
development goals as the number one political priority (role of internal developer).
A focus on internal development, however, does not necessarily result in an
isolationist foreign policy. Rather, Indian policymakers aimed to work toward a
favorable international environment by, for instance, establishing trade links with
other countries or by assuring access to material resources, energy [and] tech-
nologies (38).
Complementary but distinct from this domestic agenda are Indias regional
ambitions. Being by far the largest country in South Asia, India assumes a special
responsibility for the welfare of the region (2), and is determined to switch on
the engine of South Asian prosperity (11). This is very much in line both with the
emergence of India as a new donor country (Chaturvedi, 2012; Kragelund, 2011)
and with the promotion, so far unsuccessful, of a more meaningful regional
cooperation in the framework of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation. In approximately 2/3 (29) of the individual speeches, India is
envisaged to assume asymmetric responsibilities (23) while leading economic,
infrastructural, and political integration projects in South Asia. The role of regional
integrator best describes the underlying foreign policy orientation.
Beyond the regional neighborhood, Indias commitment to SouthSouth soli-
darity translates into diplomatic activism and lobbying. India, whether in the
movement of nonaligned countries or in the United Nations (UN), has always
understood itself as an advocate of the political cause of developing nations. Thus
Indias foreign policy is geared towards promoting a greater understanding of
the legitimate needs of all developing countries (3). This role concept of an
advocate of developing nations appears in 12 of the foreign policy speeches we
analyzed. On the one hand, this confirms traditional commitments India made
to the developing world. Due to its increased leverage over global trade policy,
the country could now be of greater help for the developing world and stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with the developed world (4). India, in other words, is in
a better position to enact the role of an advocate. On the other hand, criticism
against the developed world appears somewhat less radical than it used to be,
and Indian policymakers increasingly see their country as a bridge between the
developed and the developing world (33). They nowadays face difficulties in
meeting the expectation of less developed nations, for instance by negotiating
exclusively with other major economies at the UN climate conference in Copen-
hagen (see Indian Express, 2009). This divide of alter and ego expectations is
likely to increase in the coming years.
The aforementioned role conceptions are unlikely to come into conflict with the
humanitarian agenda after the Cold War. Much more problematic in this regard
is the idea of India as an independent and anti-colonial power that can be traced
back to the dominant influence of Prime Minister Jawarhal Nehru (Tharoor, 2011,
pp. 182184). After all the suffering in the long fight for independence, it was only
natural that India would refuse to become a mere protge of any of the super-
powers. Rather, it would aim to evade and, eventually, to overcome the imperi-
alist policies of industrialized powers by promoting the ideas of mutual respect
for national sovereignty, nonaggression, mutual noninterference in domestic
affairs, equality, and peaceful coexistence. Known as the Panch Sheel principles,
these foreign policy tenets were meant as an assurance that powerful countries
could no longer oppress weaker ones on the pretext of any ideological or civi-
lizing mission. As our analysis revealed, their influence on the Indian foreign
policy discourse is still visible in the policymakers commitment to a national role
conception of active independent. Accordingly, India is determined to ensure
independence of thought and action (15). It seeks closer relations with all major
powers, but never at the expense of relations with any third country (20).
Hence, it will keep itself free of entanglement in conflicts or alliances (25) and
instead promote equity in the conduct of international relations (15). The latter
commitment is mirrored in its refusal to accept politically discriminatory prac-
tices and polarizing institutions.
Nowadays, an increasing number of scholars and practitioners seem to ques-
tion the adequacy of this traditional orientation of Indias foreign policy (see
Ganguly, 2003; Mohan, 2003; Pant, 2009, pp. 252253; Subrahmanyam, 2007).
Almost half of the speeches (19) nonetheless reaffirm the national role conception
of an active independent. There is a persistent search for strategic autonomy
(38) and an ongoing belief in the idea that India is too large a country to be
dovetailed in alliance type relationships (30). Even leading figures of the first
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government (19982004) did not deviate
from this understanding despite an announcement about doing so before taking
office. Hence, the study confirms earlier evidence of a wide-ranging continuance
of Indian foreign policy in this respect (see, for instance, Chaulia, 2002; Narlikar,
2006).
Another national role conception stems from a particular Indian version of
exceptionalism, the idea of India as a moral force that, acting peacefully and
ethically, is different from other powers. According to this understanding, Indian
foreign policy, because of age-old philosophical traditions and because the
country achieved independence in a uniquely nonviolent manner, has excep-
tional and civilizing qualities. Although Indian policymakers have always
claimed a great power status for their country (see Wagner, 2010, p. 64), many of
them also dismissed traditional power politics. India, they argue, distances itself
from the conventional idea of power, as the ability of a nation to bend other
nations to its will through coercive use of force (9). Rather, its foreign policy
would contribute to peaceful conflict resolutions, the strengthening of interna-
tional law, and a reduction of military arsenals. These commitments are most
visibly put into practice by Indias numerous participation in UN peacekeeping
missions and repeated efforts to place disarmament initiatives on top of the
international agenda. Some speakers also denounce the old mindset of balance
of power (15) and containment politics, particularly in the context of Indian-

Chinese relations. Overall, 21 speeches attribute an ethical exceptionalism to
Indias foreign policy.
This picture needs to be qualified, however, because such ideas were directly
challenged by other policymakers. Former Minister of External Affairs Yashwant
Sinha, for instance, remarked that idealism alone cannot suffice and that
Indias place in the comity of nations will be determined by the economic
and military strength that is there to back it up (4). Former Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, while speaking on the event of the 40th anniversary of the
Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, reminded his audience of the fact that
international relations are ultimately power relations, based on realpolitik, not
sentiment. And howsoever, we may regret it, international relations are not a
morality play (Government of India, 2005). This is not to say that we have found
a growing consensus in India that the pursuit of moral prestige has proved
unrewarding (Sagar, 2009, p. 802). It is important to note that there were alto-
gether very few references to power-balancing, containment policies, or the idea
of exclusive spheres of influence. In fact, it is interesting to see how Indian
policymakers refused to picture their country as a counterweight to a rising
China as most realists would assume, and more than a few Western policymakers
may have hoped for (see, for instance, 15 and 16).
Finally, Indian decision makers often emphasize the democratic nature of the
Indian polity and the rule of law in a country of such enormous ethnic, lingual,
religious, and social diversity (see Destradi, 2012, p. 288). The respect for human
dignity requires decision makers not only to make all efforts to alleviate poverty
(the role of internal developer) but also to protect peoples civil rights and to give
them a voice in political processes. The reality of Indian politics, of course, does
not always live up to these values. There were instances of large-scale communal
violence and, even more shocking, of state authorities being ignorant or complicit
in such cases (Guha, 2008, pp. 565566, 624650). The economic exploitation of
lower castes and tribes has also remained a problem until today. Considering,
however, the fact that political observers again and again have predicted either
the disintegration of the Indian Union or the emergence of a dictatorial political
system, the sustainment of both national unity and democracy is indeed a
remarkable achievement (Guha, 2008). Reflecting on this experience Indian
policymakers present their country as a role model for developing nations
(Destradi, 2012, p. 288). The power of the Indian example (29), they argue,
sends a message to the world (10) and motivates others to emulate Indias
achievements. India is said to be a unique model of democracy plus economic
growth (9). It has kept the flame of democracy burning bright [. . .] in the
developing world (7). The global impact of this example could not be underes-
timated as Indias choices half a century ago had made democracy a global
norm today (14). India is presented as a liberal example, often several times, and
covering plenty of paragraphs, in 16 speeches.
Such a role conception, however, does not necessarily call for efforts to actively
promote the spread of liberal values in the international system (democracy pro-
moter). Traditionally, India did not overtly express any aspirations of exporting
political norms and values to other countries (Wagner, 2009, pp. 911). In recent
years, however, India has had to increasingly accommodate expectations that it
will play a more active part in the global advancement of democracy and human
rights due to its reconciliation with the United States and other Western nations
(Wagner, 2009, p. 10). These expectations, which together inform the alter part of
Indias role conceptions, were expressed by President George W. Bush in 2006:
The world has benefited from the example of Indias democracy, and now the
world needs Indias leadership in freedoms cause. As a global power, India has an
historic duty to support democracy around the world. (quoted in Baruah, 2006)
President Barack Obama, during his visit to New Delhi in 2010, was no less
demanding, saying that:
As the worlds two largest democracies, we must never forget that the price of our
own freedom is standing up for the freedom of others [. . .] When peaceful demo-
cratic movements are suppressedas they have been in Burma, for example
then the democracies of the world cannot remain silent. [. . .] In international fora,
India has often shied away from some of these issues. But speaking up for those
who cannot do so for themselves is [. . .] staying true to our democratic principles.
(The White House, 2010)
Indian policymakers now regularly refer to democracy as the best form of

governance especially in pluralistic societies (2), they emphasise shared values
(8), and posit a natural alliance (2) or partnership (5) between themselves and the
U.S. and European countries. Sporadically, foreign policy makers also commit to
the promotion of an ethos of pluralism, tolerance, democracy and human rights,
particularly in the subregion of South Asia (7). While in the past Indias commit-
ment to democracy might have been completely unrelated to external relations (see
Destradi, 2012; Mohan, 2007), Indias contemporary foreign policy discourse
certainly has a democracy dimension (Muni, 2009). Overall, there are references
to the role of promoting democracy in 10 of the foreign policy speeches. Some of
these statements clearly commit to the challenge of promoting democracy (2).
Others are characterized by a profound ambiguity inasmuch as they leave open
whether democratization should refer to domestic or to international institutions
(see below). Only one speech mentioned democracy promotion as a priority (one
of the fundamental pillars) of Indias foreign policy (3). Finally, none of the
speakers understood the promotion of democracy as a concept that entails violent
enforcement measures. As a consequence, there is an intra-role conflict between
India and some of its Western partners.
Figure 1 summarizes our results by indicating the number of speeches in
which references to national role conceptions have been found.
In addition to intra-role conflicts (e.g., different ego and alter understandings
of being a liberal example and of democracy promotion), we have found inter-
role tensions between the traditional role conception of an active independent
and Indias newer credentials of cautiously supporting democracy and human
rights, for example, by launching the UN Democracy Fund. A speech on Indias
neighborhood policies, which was held by Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, is a
good example of the resultant ambivalence:
As a flourishing democracy, India would certainly welcome more democracy in

our neighbourhood, but that [. . .] is something that we may encourage and
promote; it is not something that we can impose upon others. The importance of
Figure 1. Relative Salience of Indian National Role Conceptions
our neighbourhood requires that we remain engaged with whichever government

is exercising authority in any country in our neighbourhood. Our sympathy will
always be with democratic and secular forces. (Ministry of External Affairs, 2005)
The difficulties of striking a delicate balance between the roles of liberal

example, democracy promoter, and active independent have been aggravated in
recent years by norm-building processes at the international level.
Indian Role Conceptions and the Humanitarian

Agenda After the Cold War
After the end of the Cold War, principles of sovereign equality and noninter-
ference were increasingly called into question by both state and nonstate actors. A
number of new ideas arose that served as guideposts for international norm-
building processes. Under the rubric of good governance, financial aid and
development assistance by multilateral institutions were increasingly made con-
tingent on political criteria. The concept of human security was introduced as
supplement to, or even replacement for, the traditional state-centric understand-
ing of security (Owen, 2004; Thomas & Tow, 2002; United Nations, 1994,
pp. 2240). Rather than merely safeguarding the territorial integrity of nation-
states, the international community should preoccupy itself, first and foremost,
with the well-being of human individuals, ensuring minimum standards of
living. State capacities, of course, are indispensable in this regard. But, depending
on circumstances, national authorities can also be a source of human insecurity
themselves (Liotta & Owen, 2006, pp. 4143). For example, security forces may
quell political demonstrations or oppress national minorities. In these cases,
outside efforts toward the protection of human security are bound to come
into conflict with national sovereignty claims. The debate on humanitarian inter-
vention that, starting in the middle of the 1990s, revitalized the just war tradition
(see Hehir, 2010), reflected the unwillingness of some policymakers and nongov-
ernmental organizations to tolerate certain levels of human suffering (while

others may have joined their efforts for less lofty reasons).
How did these changes in the normative environment interact with Indias
role conceptions? On the one hand, they may have worked as reinforcement to
the idea of India as a promoter of democracy, but this influence should not be
overestimated, given the few references to the concept of a promoter of democ-
racy and human rights in the speeches we have analyzed. The number of refer-
ences to the need of spreading democratic and liberal values also did not increase
over time, despite the progress the humanitarian agenda achieved between 2002
and 2012. The concept of a liberal example, although less ambitious than the
concept of democracy promoter, was, however, also relevant in this context. At
least it did not permit Indian policymakers to altogether oppose the basic values
of the humanitarian agenda. That being said, Indian policymakers could ulti-
mately not subscribe to the weakening of national sovereignty without violating
the role of active independent in world politics.
One way to ease this situation was to suggest an alternative political agenda
that combined the advancement of liberal principles and respect for state sover-
eignty as it is traditionally defined. The most obvious example is the way in which
Indian policymakers tried to cast the reform of voting rights in international
institutions, most notably the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in terms
of a democratization of interstate relations, concomitant to the democratization of
domestic politics. Thus, it is argued that India will always stand for democracy
within and amongst countries (9) and that we cannot hope to foster a demo-
cratic culture in the world until the principal institutions are themselves
democratised and made more representative (3). The primary purpose of such
rhetoric is, of course, to legitimize Indias self-interest in gaining a permanent
UNSC seat. Yet at the same time, we argue, it helps with the enactment of the role
of a liberal example.
A similar strategy is applied in the realm of international anti-terror policies.
Here, India, as always with a view on Pakistan, insists on a more determinate
international anti-terror effort to defend the values of pluralism, freedom, peace-
ful co-existence and the rule of law (30). India also insisted on a comprehensive
approach to human security, deemphasizing the protection of the population
from war and conflict, and emphasizing the importance of socioeconomic devel-
opment (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2010). Elsewhere,
development is in fact referred to as the central pillar of human security, the
absence of which will adversely affect freedom from want and freedom from
fear (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2012). In the context of
the UN human rights policies, India is presented as a country which is equally
committed to civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social
and cultural rights on the other.2 Lasting progress toward securing the latter
rights requires equitable economic relations at the international level as a
complement to national development measures (Permanent Mission of India to
the United Nations, 2011). Thus, Indias international human rights obligations
are presented as being in line with the enactment of the role of an advocate of
developing nations.
Such reframing efforts may serve two different purposes at once: First, they can
hope to make Indias foreign policy interests appear more legitimate by linking
it with widely respected norms. This first interpretation, of course, is well in line
with interest-based rationalistic explanations of Indian foreign policy. We will
come back to the methodological issue of overdeterminacy (i.e., rationalistic and
constructivist reasoning explaining the very same outcome to some degree)
several times in the following sections. Second, such reframing may succeed in
dampening the perceived inter-role conflict at least as far as the Indian
policymakers themselves are concerned. Whether such efforts suffice to achieve
the status of a respected player on the international stage is a completely different
matter. Many scholars and practitioners doubt that holding onto traditional
norms can in the long run be reconciled with Indias global ambitions and
responsibilities (Ganguly & Sridharan, 2013; Khilnani et al., 2012, pp. 2324, 37),
quite similar to how it is argued in the case of a rising China (Cheng & Shi, 2011).
We will now turn to the question of how the role conceptions of Indian
decision makers affected Indias attitude toward more specific international
norm-building processes.
India and the Responsibility to Protect

The norm of an R2P rests on a reframing of the concept of sovereignty. Sover-
eignty, according to this understanding, implies a responsibility to protect fun-
damental human rights (first pillar). If those entitled to sovereign powers, that is,
state governments, are unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibility of pro-
tecting the basic human rights of their population, the international community
is called to assist them (second pillar). If national authorities themselves commit
massive atrocities, the international community takes over the responsibility to
protect the civilian population of these states (third pillar) (see Bellamy, 2009;
Thakur, 2002, 2011; Weiss, 2007, pp. 88118).
India does not dispute the legitimacy of the so-called second pillar of the
R2P. A norm that codifies the responsibility of the international community
to strengthen state capacities can easily be understood as an element of a more
ambitious international development agenda:
The United Nations and its Member States [. . .] must be there to offer assistance,
as required by the State, including capacity building [. . .]. The spread of education,
economic growth, equal opportunities [. . .] are factors that can contribute to help
prevent crimes. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2013a)
Supporting the second pillar, along these lines, harmonizes well with the
national role conception of a developing nation. Indian representatives also wel-
comed the international community to provide humanitarian assistance directly
to affected populations, even though they emphasized the primary role of the
affected state as international assistance to persons within its territory [. . .] takes
place with its consent and under its supervision (Permanent Mission of India to
the United Nations, 2008).
The difficulties of Indias arrangement with the R2P start with the third pillar:
[. . .] there can be little disagreement on pillars I and II. The real problem lies with
the interpretation and application of pillar III: The responsibility of the interna-
tional community to step in when a State manifestly fails to meet its responsibility
to protect its population. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2012)
In Indias view, such reasoning all too easily legitimizes humanitarian inter-
vention, a concept riddled with inconsistencies and driven by selfish motives on
the part of the developed nations (Permanent Mission of India to the United
Nations, 2012).
Whether the historical record proves Indias claims of having always opposed
military interventions is disputed among scholars (see, for instance, Mohan, 2011
versus Singh, 2003). There were some differences between rhetoric and diplo-
matic practice, for example in the 1990s (see Virk, 2013, pp. 6673). Yet when the
debate about humanitarian interventions reached a new climax in the context of
North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) air campaign against Yugoslavia in
March 1999, India condemned the operation as an arbitrary, unauthorised and
illegal military action. In accordance with its role conception of active indepen-
dent, India demanded that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
international border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must be respected
(Ministry of External Affairs, 1999).
During the international controversy that followed the experience of the
Kosovo War, India argued that even the UNSC could not legitimately authorize
humanitarian interventions, let alone changes to international law:
International law, like any other law, changes and evolves. As it presently stands,
though, if the Security Council took humanitarian action, it would violate inter-
national law, not stretch it. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations,
2000)
In 2002, India could still claim that the R2P concept has not found acceptance
among the vast majority of the membership of the United Nations (Permanent
Mission of India to the United Nations, 2002). Searching for an adequate
response to doctrines diluting the principles of sovereignty and seeking to estab-
lish a right to intervene (5), Indian decision makers continued to claim the
principle of noninterference as sacrosanct and nonviolable. The interventionist
agenda of the UNSC was thus unacceptable:
We have in recent times, [. . .] seen an application of selective criteria relating to

human rights by the UN Security Council in relation to countries of West Asia and
North Africa, This, of course, is contrary to the principles of the Charter which
enshrines the rights of all nations to choose their own path while interacting with
others on the sound basis of mutual respect and equality. (11)
Without respect for national sovereignty, in other words, there could be no

equality in international relations, and equality had to be cherished as a concept
from the perspective of an active independent.
The momentum behind the norm-building process, however, did not come to
a halt, and in 2005 the UN World Summit passed a modified version of the R2P,
confining its applicability to cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity (Bellamy, 2009, pp. 6697; Hehir, 2012, pp. 4050). Yet
from the Indian perspective, the concept still was little more than a repackaging
of the same old humanitarian intervention agenda (Virk, 2013, p. 78). At the
very last moment, it attempted to prevent the inclusion of the R2P in the
Outcome Document (see Teitt, 2012, pp. 199200). Ultimately though, it backed
down for fear of being held responsible for a failed summit (Bellamy, 2009, p. 88).
Four years later, India further softened its skepticism and, very much in line
with its liberal credentials, declared that sovereignty as responsibility has [. . .]
always been a defining attribute of nation states where safeguards for protection
of fundamental rights of citizens are constitutionally provided (United Nations,
2009). Coercive action might be taken by the international community, but only as
a last resort when peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities mani-
festly fail in discharging their duty (United Nations, 2009).
At the same time, India still argued for a restrictive interpretation of interna-
tional responsibilities and a focus on strengthening national capacities:
Let us remember that a solution to the avoidance of the four mass atrocities
ultimately lies in strengthening the capacity and ability of states through various
means so that they can effectively fulfil their human rights obligations. (Permanent
Mission of India to the United Nations, 2010)
The way in which the R2P was implemented in the case of NATOs Unified
Protector mission in Libya 2011 illuminated the potential for misuse from the
Indian perspective (Hall, 2013; Thakur, 2013, p. 70). More specifically, Indian
representatives lamented that:
almost all aspects of resolution 1973 [. . .] were violated not to protect civilians [. . .]
but to change the regime. It is the pursuit of regime change that generated a great
deal of unease among a number of us who support action by the international
community. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2012)
In what can be interpreted as a renewed enactment of the role of advocate of

developing nations, the Indian delegation accused the developed world of self-
ishly using the R2P in an effort to repeat the political domination of the weak:
In reality the R2P cannot be seen as a pretext for humanitarian intervention [. . .].
It cannot be seen as codifying a system of coercion, providing a tool in the hands
of powerful governments to judge weaker states, and encourage regime change
primarily on political considerations. (Permanent Mission of India to the United
Nations, 2012)
Nuances are important though. What nowadays fuels Indias opposition to

the R2P is not so much the concept itself, as its allegedly instrumental and
biased application. Thus, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, as outlined
by the Brazilian concept of responsibility while protecting, are needed to pre-
vent against an non-judicious application of Pillar III, where the R2P is being
applied selectively and in an arbitrary manner for extraneous reasons
(Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2012).
Indias overall stance toward the R2P is still unresolved and apparently influ-
enced by an amalgam of national role conceptions, with active independent,
and advocate of developing nations pulling in one direction, and liberal example,
moral force, and promoter of democracy pulling in the other direction. We
therefore agree with Kudrak Virk (2013), who, after a nuanced reading of Indias
statements after 2005, portrays India as:
a reactive actor that has been driven incrementally away from a default preference
for sovereignty as autonomy, whilst continuing to harbour deep concerns about
armed intervention to protect civilians. (pp. 5758)
Others characterize Indias statements and stances on the issue 20112012 as

falling somewhat between the stools of western pro-interventionism and
eastern anti-interventionism (Mukherjee & Malone, 2013, p. 115).
More than anything else, the remaining concerns reflect the risk of
politicization. But how exactly does India want to prevent the political misuse
of the R2P? Whereas other skeptical countries insisted on the authorization of
protective measures by the UNSC in this regard, India continued to argue both
against a permissive interpretation of the R2P and against UNSC powers:
If it decided to take or authorise humanitarian action, the Council would claim to

act on behalf of the international community. However, the Councils membership
is unrepresentative, and in its methods of work it does not welcome or accept the
views of the wider membership [. . .]. There would be wellfounded fears that the
Council would act, not for humanitarian, but for less lofty reasons. (Permanent
Mission of India to the United Nations, 2000)
Making the case for the UNSC as the final arbiter of the legitimacy of collective
military actions would be hard to swallow for India, for then it would have to
support the very same institution whose membership structure it regards as
discriminate and undemocratic (Thakur, 2011, p. 147). In other words, the issue
boils down to an intra-role policy contradiction. Either India approves the UNSC
as bulwark against the further erosion of the principle of noninterference or it
claims that neither the UNSC nor any other institution that violates the principle
of equality has the right to decide legitimately on issues of war and peace. Both
of these attitudes are only partially consistent with the national role conception of
active independent.
Indias reluctance to accept the UNSC as shield against an overzealous R2P, of
course, also fits a power- and interest-based explanation. Why should India
support the UNSC given years of unsuccessful attempts to gain permanent
member status? One can also hardly deny some self-serving and noncredible
elements in Indias overall resistance to the R2Pbe it Indias quest for UN
reform, bilateral relations with Arab oil providers, the Kashmir issue, or human
rights violations during domestic counterinsurgency operations in the East and
North-East. A rationalistic explanation of Indias R2P policies, however, does
have its shortcomings, too. One directly leads back to the UNSC reform issue, as
India has succinctly shied away from directly questioning the authority of the
Council on R2P matters in recent years. Rather, it denied the necessity of new
legal instruments by blaming past humanitarian catastrophes on the inactivity of
UNSC members (Teitt, 2012, p. 201; Virk, 2013, p. 79). This policy turnaround
happened despite the UNSC reform deadlock. Whatever motivated these
changes, they pose puzzles to rationalistic and constructivist explanations
alike.
India and International Criminal Law

The establishment of an ICC is the culmination of almost a century of efforts to
institutionalize the principle of individual culpability for a number of grave
crimes and to authorize the prosecution of these crimes at the international level
in case they are not prosecuted by state authorities themselves (see Maogoto,
2004, pp. 203234; Schiff, 2008). The responsibility to protect and the responsibil-
ity to prosecute constitute two sides of the same coin (Thakur, 2011, pp. 112113).
Whereas the former conceptualizes individuals as owners of international
rights, international criminal law is based on the idea of individual accountability
and entails the duty of states to assist with the prosecution of human rights
violators.
India was overall quite sympathetic to the cause of ending impunity. The
international prosecution of individuals who committed massive human rights
abuses can, after all, be conceived of as an externalization of the domestic rule of
law. The regretful remarks at the beginning of Indias explanation of its negative
vote on the Rome Statute were telling in this regard:
As the worlds largest democracy [. . .] whose contribution to the jurisprudence on

the rights of individuals is almost unmatched, we would have wanted to be one of
the first signatories of the ICC. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations,
1998a)
As recently as April 2013, India embraced international criminal justice as an

important instrument for the purpose of reconciliation as part of postconflict
peace-building. Believing that peace and justice are intertwined, Manjeev
Singh Puri, Ambassador of India to the UN, explained that a coherent applica-
tion of the rule of law at all levels of governance is a precondition of avoiding
conflicts and ensuring peace and justice (Permanent Mission of India to the
United Nations, 2013b), therefore:
Publicly vindicating human rights norms and punishing those who are guilty
helps to prevent future atrocities in conflict and post-conflict peace building.
(Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2013b)
While fostering the development of international criminal law is certainly in

accordance with the expectations associated with the role of a liberal example in
world politics, India could not wholeheartedly support the creation of the ICC
without failing to fulfill some of the other role expectations to which its foreign
policy is committed. First, the ICC statute restricts state sovereignty by dissenting
from the principle of state consent and by making jurisdictional rights contingent
on a number of criteria (such as an unbiased performance of the judicial system).
As in the case of the R2P, Indian decision makers were not in opposition to the
international community assisting weak states or acting as a substitute in case of
failed states:
ICC can step in [. . .] when a national judicial system is nonexistent or unable to

deal with the particular crimes covered by the statute. (Permanent Mission of India
to the United Nations, 1998b)
But the Indian delegation wanted to make state consent a precondition for any
involvement of the ICC, and they challenged the idea that all nations must
constantly prove the viability of their judicial structures or find these overridden
by the ICC (Indian delegate, quoted in Ramanathan, 2005, p. 633). Second, the
scope of the Rome Statute was much too broad from Indias perspective and was
probably at risk of being misused for political purposes.
These concerns reflect, among other things, the inclusion of war crimes in
internal armed conflicts. Hence, the Indian establishment feared that after becom-
ing an ICC member, the actions of Indian security forces in Kashmir or the
North-East could be referred to the ICC (Banerjee, 2011, p. 462; Ramanathan, 2005,
p. 631). Again, rationalistic and interest-based explanations are just as plausible as
a constructivist reading of Indias opposition to the ICC in this regard.
That the actual working of the ICC is indeed distorted by politicization from
the Indian perspective is implied in the statement that:
India firmly believes that we need to strengthen the rule of law at the international
level by avoiding selectivity, partiality, and double standards as well as by freeing
the international criminal justice institutions from the clutches of political consid-
erations. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2013b)
Third, India views the powers of the UNSC as problematic because they can, in
accordance with the ICC statute, be used to subjugate even nonmembers to ICC
jurisdiction (see Ainley, 2011, p. 315; Banerjee, 2011, pp. 462463). During the
negotiations of the Rome Statute, it had already tried to have all references to a
UNSC role deleted (see Burroughs, 1999). The power to bind non-State Parties to
any international treaty violated international law as it was not given to the
Council by the Charter (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations,
1998a).
India is also not prepared to see the UNSC as an institutional counterweight
against overzealous prosecutors because of its discriminating and nonrepresen-
tative structure:
There is no legal basis for the Security Council to either refer matters of peace and
security to the ICC or to veto cases from coming before the ICC [. . .] Any preemi-
nent role for the Security Council in triggering ICC jurisdiction constitutes a
violation of sovereign equality. (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations,
1998b)
Again, Indias positioning is overdetermined, with both rationalistic (promot-

ing a UNSC permanent member status for India) and role-theoretical approaches
providing plausible explanations.
Finally, India, in accordance with the role conception of a moral force, wanted,
but failed, to include the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity in
the Rome Statute (see Burroughs, 1999). It continues to argue for this provision.
Such a posture is very much in line with Indias political support of many
disarmament initiatives. Given Indias own nuclear capabilities, it can hardly be
explained from a rationalistic point of view and lends credibility to a construc-
tivist explanation.
Future Directions
Why does India, the worlds largest democracy, only very cautiously support
emerging international humanitarian norms? We have argued that this puzzle
can be better understood by taking into account the cognitive and normative
foundations of Indian foreign policy. Applying a role-theoretical framework, we
have found that Indian foreign policy makers find themselves in the middle of
severe inter- and intra-role conflicts. Indias policies vis--vis international

humanitarian norms can thus be at least partly understood as being motivated by
the desire to ameliorate the tensions between divergent and sometimes incom-
patible role expectations. In particular, this applies to the conflict between the
roles of a liberal example and democracy promoter, and that of an active
independent.
Our analysis for the very first time employs role-theory to the realm of Indian
foreign policy. It is thus only logical that our conclusions are premature and
additional research is needed to answer a number of open questions. One of
these questions is concerned with domestic politics and the way national role
concepts are contested among political parties, interest groups, experts, and the
media. Where did national role conceptions originate (on this point, see Brummer
& Thies, 2014)? Who is challenging them? Is there still a foreign policy consensus?
Has there ever been one? A comparison of foreign policy speeches from different
periods (Nehruvian, the years of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, the 1990s) is needed to
test assumptions of change and continuity in the Indian foreign policy discourse.
Such a study would, of course, also include foreign policy speeches of the new
BJP-led government. Our analysis, so far, does not support the assumption that
intra- and inter-role conflicts are organized along party lines. Recall that, for
example, both figures from the Congress as well as from the BJP questioned the
possibility of an exceptionally ethical foreign policy. Hence, this intra-role conflict
tends to be a bipartisan issue.
Other research efforts may concentrate on the expectations of Indias interna-
tional partners such as the United States or the European Union, thus shedding
more light on the alter part of Indias foreign policy roles. One of our expectations
in this regard is that India will face ever more pressure to cross the line between
the roles of liberal example and democracy promoter. Doing so will, however,
only be possible by dismissing the traditional role conception of active indepen-
dent. If and to what extent India will decide to meet these expectations depend on
the overall importance of its Western partnerships. As matters stand now, we
regard as unlikely a scenario in which India clearly takes sides with the West at
the expense of its bilateral relations with China and Russia. As a consequence, we
expect the severe inter-role conflict between liberal example and active indepen-
dent to persist. Only if Western countries themselves became more skeptical with
respect to humanitarian norms and/or if there occurred a general norm erosion,
would India be able to durably solve this fundamental role conflict.
Finally, future research may also focus on methodological and epistemological
issues. Most importantly, identifying more distinct observable implications of
role-theoretical explanations of Indian foreign policy would facilitate a much-
needed interparadigm dialogue.
Appendix A
Selected Foreign Policy Speeches (all speeches have been accessed

via http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements)
(1) Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister, The Role of India in the New World
Order, December 14, 2001, New Delhi.
(2) Jaswant Singh, External Affairs Minister, Indias Foreign Policy in the
New Millennium, September 26, 2002, Kuala Lumpur.
(3) Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, Future Directions of Indias
Foreign Policy, October 30, 2002, London.
(4) Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, Indias Foreign Policy: Suc-
cesses, Failures and Visions in the Changing World Order, November 18,
2002, New Delhi.
(5) Kanwal Sibal, Foreign Secretary, Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and
Prospects, January 23, 2003, Geneva.
(6) Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, Indias Foreign Policy Today,
February 20, 2003, Moscow.
(7) Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, Resurgent India in Asia, Sep-
tember 29, 2003, Cambridge (MA).
(8) Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, India and the Emerging World
Order, October 18, 2003, New Delhi.
(9) Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, Geopolitics: What it Takes to be
a World Power, March 12, 2004, New Delhi.
(10) Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister, India and the World: A Blueprint for
Partnership and Growth, November 5, 2004, New Delhi.
(11) Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister, 50 Years of Panchsheel: Towards
a New International Order Based on Genuine Multilateralism, November
18, 2004, New Delhi.
(12) Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister, India: The Next Decade, June
27, 2005, London.
(13) Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister, The Argument for India, Sep-
tember 23, 2005, Providence (RI).
(14) Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister, Why India Matters, September
27, 2005, Montreal.
(15) Shyam Saran, Foreign Secretary, Present Dimensions of the Indian
Foreign Policy, January 11, 2006, Shanghai.
(16) Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister, Indian Foreign Policy: A
Road Map for the Decade Ahead, November 15, 2006, New Delhi.
(17) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, The Challenges Ahead for Indias
Foreign Policy, April 10, 2007, New Delhi.
(18) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, India and International Security,
May 3, 2007, London.
(19) Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister, Indias Foreign Policy Pri-
orities, June 20, 2007, Singapore.
(20) Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister, Indias Foreign Policy and
Future India-US Relations, October 1, 2007, New York.
(21) Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister, Indias Creditable Role in
World Affairs, June 14, 2008, Kolkata.
(22) Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister, Emerging IndiaEconomic
and Security Perspective, September 17, 2008, New Delhi.
(23) Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister, Indias Security Challenges
and Foreign Policy Imperatives, November 3, 2008, New Delhi.
(24) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, Indias Foreign Policy, January
19, 2009, New Delhi.
(25) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, Indias Foreign Policy, February
4, 2009, Paris.
(26) S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister, July 12, 2009, New Delhi.
(27) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, Indian Foreign Policy: Opportu-
nities and Challenges, July 21, 2009, New Delhi.
(28) Shashi Tharoor, Minister of State for External Affairs, Why Foreign Policy
Matters, August 21, 2009, New Delhi University.
(29) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, Perspectives on Foreign Policy for
a 21st Century India, February 22, 2010, London.
(30) Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary, Indias Global Role, September
20, 2010, Cambridge (MA).
(31) S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister, India in the 21st Century: Strate-
gic Imperatives, September 28, 2010, New York.
(32) Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, The Role of Force in
Strategic Affairs, October 21, 2010, New Delhi.
(33) Nirupama Rao, Foreign Secretary, Challenges in Indias Foreign Policy,
November 19, 2010, New Delhi.
(34) Nirupama Rao, Foreign Secretary, Role of India in Global Affairs, May 5,
2011, Paris.
(35) Nirupama Rao, Foreign Secretary, Key Priorities for Indias Foreign
Policy, June 27, 2011, London.
(36) Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, The Role of Militaries in
International Relations, October 5, 2011, New Delhi.
(37) Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, Transitions and Transfor-
mations in Global Politics, October 22, 2011, New Delhi.
(38) Ranjan Mathai, Foreign Secretary, Security Dimensions of Indias Foreign
Policy, November 23, 2011, New Delhi.
(39) S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister, Indias External Environment and
Current Foreign Policy Challenges, March 9, 2012, Singapore.
(40) Ranjan Mathai, Foreign Secretary, Building Global Security, April 16,
2012, New Delhi.
(41) S.M. Krishna, External Affairs Minister, Indias Foreign Policy Priorities
for the 21st Century, September 29, 2012, Providence (RI).
(42) Salman Kurshid, External Affairs Minister, The Dawning of the Asian
Century: Emerging Challenges before Theory and Practices of International
Relations in India, December 10, 2012, New Delhi.
Appendix B
Codebook
General Selection Criteria

Select any statement (whether embedded in one sentence or extending over
several sentences) wherein India is described as an actor with certain responsi-
bilities in the present international system. Also select any statement according to
which India currently fulfills certain functions or enjoys a particular status in the
international system.
We, Us, and Our may substitute for India depending on the particular
context. Additionally, there is the possibility of We, Us, and Our denoting
a group of which India is a part. Such statements can also be selected if Indias
belonging to the group is unambiguously made clear.
National Role Conceptions

There is the possibility of speakers referring to a number of different national
role conceptions (NRCs) in the same sentence. Please count each individual
evocation of an NRC separately in this case.
If a statement evocating an NRC covers several sentences in a row, it should be
counted only once. If, however, the same NRC is evoked in different parts of the
manuscript (either if they are disconnected by other content or if they appear in
separate paragraphs), they should be counted separately.
Categories
Great power. This NRC defines India as one of the leading powers in the
international system and indispensable actor for solving world problems.
great power key player global player major power world power
Internal developer. This NRC refers to the belief that the primary foreign
policy responsibility is to contribute to domestic welfare.
Indias search for great power status is not an end in itself. It is but a means to
improve the quality of life of her one billion people (9). So, for ourselves we
seek, first and foremost, security and economic prosperity. These are not clichs,
but essential to our providing decent living to a billion-strong population. These
objectives must motivate Indias interactions with the world in all matters (11).
The primary tasks of Indian foreign policy has to remain the facilitation of
Indias development processes (16).
Development provider. This NRC refers to the belief that the country is
committed to increasing the material well-being of other countries in the devel-
oping world.
Examples: South-South Cooperation has been and remains an important tenet
of Indias Foreign Policy. We believe in sharing our experience with fellow
developing countries (2). India is also emerging as an aid provider to countries
in greater need and we seek to make our human resources training capacity
available to others where possible (13). Indias foreign policy has always had a
strong element of developing country solidarity and south-south cooperation.
[. . .] In recent years these ties have been bolstered by transcontinental links [. . .]
(16). India remains ready to contribute what it can. We are today a net aid donor,
with programmes extending to a number of developing countries (19).
Regional integrator. This NRC refers to the perceived obligation to deepen

economic and political ties and thus to improve living conditions in the
(sub-)region.
Examples: Given our size and resources, we recognise that India has a special
responsibility in switching on the engine of South Asian prosperity (11).
Within South Asia itself, India [. . .] is clearly the motor of development and
many of its neighbours can reap benefits by taking advantage of expanding
opportunities [. . .] Our future lies in building a vibrant and dynamic economic
community (13). India matters because its growth can today provide the basis
for a larger regional harmony and prosperity (14).
Advocate of developing nations. According to this NRC, the country

enjoys the status of a leader of the developing world and is expected (or volun-
tarily aims) to speak on behalf of the Global South in international political
institutions.
Examples: Indias foreign policy is geared towards promoting a greater
understanding of the legitimate needs of all developing countries (3). With this
respect which India commands, it should be possible for us to be of greater help
for the developing world and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the developed
world. We will continue to work for a better world order in the economic sphere
(4). Our pursuit of power is firmly anchored in an international mission aimed
at [. . .] striving for a new deal for developing countries (9). In redefining the
world order, we believe that India has to play an even larger role in the decision
making structures of the UN and bring to the table, the perspective of developing
countries (11). India and China can together lend greater voice to the aspiration
of the developing world (15).
Active independent. According to this NRC, autonomous decision-making

capacities are indispensable. Also, the NRC is linked to a principal refusal to take
sides in world politics by joining coalitions or alliance systems. Rather, the active
independent is required to oppose any politically discriminatory and exclusive
practices and institutions.
Examples: [. . .] according to enduring principles of our foreign policy that
sought never to define relations with any one country through the prism of any
other country or regional equations or alliance systems (5). Our foreign policy
has been an independent one since the days of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and
must remain thus (11). India has maintained a remarkable continuity in
the fundamental tenets of its policy. The core of this continuity is to ensure
autonomy in our decision making. It is to ensure independence of thought and
action (15).
Moral force. This NRC is based on the idea of exceptional ethical qualities
of the country and the belief that because of these qualities, the country is
able to behave in a much more civilized and peaceful manner than conven-
tional great powers do. More specifically, the country places high restrictions
on the use of force, displays a generally nonaggressive attitude, sponsors
peace initiatives and arms control, and does not economically exploit other
countries.
Examples: India distances itself from the conventional idea of power, as the
ability of a nation to bend other nations to its will through coercive use of force.
It is also essential to make clear at the outset that India approaches the notion of
power with an alternate vision and a deep consciousness of its responsibilities
(9). Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with
international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture
that tends instinctively to [. . .] a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law
before recourse to the use of force (32).
Liberal example. According to this NRC, the country enjoys the status of a
role model and motivates others to emulate its liberal and pluralistic institutions.
Examples: India is a unique model of democracy plus economic growth (9).
Indias most important contribution to the world is the idea of syncretic plural-
ism that has shaped the institutions of an inclusive democracy (10). The expe-
rience of a democracy like ours can be of some help in enabling Societies in
Transition to evolve into open, inclusive, plural, democratic societies (10). The
world today admires how India has nurtured the spirit of freedom and ensured
that it permeates all our democratic institutions (14).
Democracy promoter. This NRC is linked to the belief that the country is
committed to actively support the spread of democratic values and institutions in
the international system.
Examples: All democratic societies together should face the challenge of
promoting democracy (2). One of the fundamental pillars of our foreign policy,
based on our status as the worlds largest democracy, has been the promotion of
the democratic way of life (3).
Acknowledgments
We thank the three anonymous reviewers whose suggestions helped improve and clarify this
article. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 9th Convention of the Central and East
European International Studies Association (CEEISA) in Krakow in September 2012. We wish to
thank Simon Lightfoot and all panelists for a fruitful discussion and helpful comments. Furthermore,
we owe particular thanks to a number of colleagues, Cameron Thies, Ramesh Thakur, Christian
Wagner, Sandra Destradi, Herbert Wulf, Kudrat Virk, and Raphalle Khan, who commented on draft
versions of this article. Finally, we thank Nina Winchenbach for her assistance during the process of
our content analysis of Indian foreign policy speeches.
Notes
1
It bears mentioning in this regard that symbolic politics and rhetorical window-dressing, far from
being exogenous to role-theoretical explanations, may be very helpful in revealing the essence of the
alter part of national role conceptions. To make ones actions appear legitimate and ethical in the eyes
of allies and partners, after all, is trying to meet their social expectations.
2
One should note that India, despite such rhetoric, is anything but a leader in terms of human
development. Compared with socioeconomic development indicators of its South Asian neighbors
and other Asian countries, it has even fallen behind in many ways in recent years (Drze & Sen, 2013;
see also Corbridge, Harriss, & Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 4797, 100117).
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Indian Foreign Policy and

I ndias foreign policy provides a number of puzzles to analysts of international

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 7, Number 1Pages 79104

This article tries to make sense of such inconsistencies by taking a role-

Role Theory and Indian Foreign Policy

Data Acquisition and Methodological Issues

National Role Conceptions of Indian Decision Makers

of power (15) and containment politics, particularly in the context of Indian-

Indian policymakers now regularly refer to democracy as the best form of

As a flourishing democracy, India would certainly welcome more democracy in

Figure 1. Relative Salience of Indian National Role Conceptions

our neighbourhood requires that we remain engaged with whichever government

The difficulties of striking a delicate balance between the roles of liberal

Indian Role Conceptions and the Humanitarian

ernmental organizations to tolerate certain levels of human suffering (while

India and the Responsibility to Protect

We have in recent times, [. . .] seen an application of selective criteria relating to

Without respect for national sovereignty, in other words, there could be no

In what can be interpreted as a renewed enactment of the role of advocate of

Nuances are important though. What nowadays fuels Indias opposition to

Others characterize Indias statements and stances on the issue 20112012 as

If it decided to take or authorise humanitarian action, the Council would claim to

India and International Criminal Law

As the worlds largest democracy [. . .] whose contribution to the jurisprudence on

As recently as April 2013, India embraced international criminal justice as an

While fostering the development of international criminal law is certainly in

ICC can step in [. . .] when a national judicial system is nonexistent or unable to

Again, Indias positioning is overdetermined, with both rationalistic (promot-

severe inter- and intra-role conflicts. Indias policies vis--vis international

Selected Foreign Policy Speeches (all speeches have been accessed

General Selection Criteria

National Role Conceptions

Regional integrator. This NRC refers to the perceived obligation to deepen

Advocate of developing nations. According to this NRC, the country

Active independent. According to this NRC, autonomous decision-making

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