2. Melba Quinto v.
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY
G.R. No. 155791; March 16, 2005
Facts: At around 7:30 a.m., eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school
pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at
Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver
Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go
fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it
was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the
entrance of the drainage system.
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,
entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high
and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco,
who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word.
Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time,
carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body
down in the grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the
scene. For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto,
Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the
drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.
The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the
respondents for Wilsons death.
Two weeks after, NBI investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco,
Garcia and petitioner Quinto. Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to
the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared
that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding
on his carabao.
NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco in
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide
by dolo against the two. An Information was later filed with the RTC, Tarlac, charging
the respondents with homicide. Respondents filed demurrer to evidence.
RTC ruling: Granted demurrer to evidence. Could not hold the respondents liable for
damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for
Wilsons death.
CA ruling: Affirmed RTC.
The petitioner filed petition for review and contends that there is preponderant
evidence on record to show that either or both the respondents caused the death of her
son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.
Respondents aver that since the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that
they committed the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not
criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The civil liability of such
person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the
offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause
and effect" relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica
del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del
ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del
herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of
the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening
the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.
The prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which
the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic
Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how
the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two
possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument
applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit
a hard object.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes
for no reason at all. However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is
relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the
person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-
motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter
was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent
Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latters death.
Petition denied.

4. People v. Juan Quianzon
G.R. No. 42607; September 28, 1935
Facts: A novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in
the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of the relatives and friends.
Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon,
then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in his care. It was the
second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose
whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the
place where the people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying.
Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel.
Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day after the incident.
The question to be determined is who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that
it was Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called Simeon Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Gregorio
Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness stand.
The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of Andres
Aribuabo in the abdomen by Juan Quianzon.
Roman Bagabay, one of the persons present at said gathering, testified that he saw Juan
Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards
went toward the place where the witness and the other guests were gathered, telling
that he was wounded and was going to die and naming Juan Quianzon as the person
who wounded him.
Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the incident,
forthwith conducted an investigation, questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that
it was the accused who had wounded him. Upon being brought before Juan Llaguno,
chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon confessed to Llaguno that he had
applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a bamboo spit.
Before the chief of police could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the later
retracted, denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit
Exhibit B the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck appears admitted by
Quianzon but not of having wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit.
All the appellant has been able to state in his brief to question the credibility of these
witnesses is that they were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the other witness for the
prosecution, who testified that he had not seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor to
Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime.
The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had wounded the
deceased and that he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, Dumlao and
Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the adverse testimony of these three
veracious and disinterested witnesses, all the more because neither the accused nor any
other witness for the defense has stated or insinuated that another person, not the
accused, might be the author of the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and
because it is admitted by the defense that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had been
pestering with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck with a
firebrand, after which Aribuaboappeared wounded in the abdomen, without the
accused and the witnesses for the defense explaining how and by whom the aggression
had been made.
It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted
the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide
but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal and
the deceased would have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr.
Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection.
WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES
This contention is without merit. According to the physician who examined whether he
could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally results in
traumatic peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal matter from the large
intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician that the
patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not
mean that the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act
the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in
a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable act of
the accused.
It does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and
with the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch
as self-preservation is the strongest instinct in living beings. It much be assumed,
therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological condition and to his state
of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain caused by the
wound, aggravated by the contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed
peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a perforation of the
stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated by violent shivering and pain first
localized at a point in the abdomen, extending later to the entire abdominal wall; acute
intolerable pain, which is aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming unbearable
upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it gives
frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter,
which are very annoying and terribly painful, take from the beginning and continue
while the disease lasts."
Settled rule of the common law that on who inflicts an injury on another will be held
responsible for his death, although it may appear that the deceased might have
recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical operation,
or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the
death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary
by the condition of the wound. Every person is to be held to contemplate and to be
responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts.
Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's testimony, there is no evidence of
record that the crime charged was committed by means of the knife, Exhibit A, and we
only have the extrajudicial admission of the accused that he had committed it by means
of a bamboo spit with which the wound of the deceased might have been caused
because, according to the physician who testified in this case, it was produced by a
"sharp and penetrating" instrument.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to
commit so grave a wrong as the committed should be taken into consideration in favor
of the appellant, without any aggravating circumstances adverse to him, we modify the
appealed judgment by sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of
four years of prision correccional and a maximum of a eight years of prision mayor,
affirming it in all other respect, with cost to said appellant.
5. Khosrow Minucher v. CA and Arthur Scalzo
G.R. No. 142396; February 11, 2003
Facts: The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the
Philippines to study in the UP. Under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed
Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When
the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the
United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National
Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant when the latter was brought to his house and
introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the
military. Jose Iigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty.
Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the
anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of
Jose Iigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact,
he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar,
aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his
business. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his
calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a
special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the
United States. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendants own
handwriting.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US
Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant
told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa.
"Defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo,
Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at
$27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that
defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back
the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which
he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.
"Defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's
bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess.
Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the
defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told
him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out
of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab.
Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants,
he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his
complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun.
He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed.
He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the
house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the
defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out
from defendant's attach case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of
the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near
his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the
bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being
handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by
defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was
unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to `shut up. He was
nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to
meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid
for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a
bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered
missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00,
a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed
that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was,
therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the
world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the
Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the
Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him
that they saw him on TV with said news.After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian,
they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for
three days without food and water."
Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he,
not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was
beyond the processes of the court.
RTC ruling: Motion denied.
CA ruling: Affirmed RTC.
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute
immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs
Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers
in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the
U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic
agents (to) make the actual arrest."
WHETHER OR NOT ARTHUR SCALZO IS INDEED ENTITLED TO DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, b) envoys, ministers
or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited
to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission"
are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff.
Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the
members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded
diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for
immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an
understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under
the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or
members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from
all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective
states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and
notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of
documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional
diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that
they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters.
Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature.
Scalzo asserted that he was an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission
and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attach belongs to a
category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its
cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches
belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the
foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or
departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial,
agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of
mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to
observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the
host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home
government. These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic
mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos.
414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October
1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's
initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous
assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is
clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over
his person.
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo
was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the
complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine
of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity
of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to
attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also
distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose
service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in
broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being
against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is
entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
Petition denied.
1. People v. Valentina Mananquil
G.R. No. L-35574; September 28, 1984
Facts: The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is
as follows: On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to
the NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security
guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline
Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle. She was angry of her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining
a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the
NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened,
Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON". The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline
and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim. Then, she got a matchbox
and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. The appellant was investigated by elements
of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written statement where she admitted
having burned the victim.
Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the PGH and then to the Trinity
General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. due to
pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary.
Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus: It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when
appellant returned from Olongapo City. She fed her grandson and put him to bed. After
filing the tank with water, she remembered that the next day was a Sunday and she had
to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline with which to clean
them. Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station
and bought ten centavos worth of gasoline. Then she remembered that her husband
needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his place of work.
Appellant saw her husband inside a bonding of the NAWASA standing by the window.
As the iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened
the door, but when he saw his wife he shouted at her. Appellant said that she had
brought the gasoline which he needed for his lighter, but Elias, who was under the
influence of liquor, cursed her thus: "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON". Elias
continued shouting and cursing even as appellant told him that she had come just to
bring the gasoline that he wanted. Appellant trembled and became dizzy. She was
beside herself and did not know that she was sprinkling the gasoline on her husband's
face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while. Then she remembered her
grandson who was alone in the house so she went home leaving her husband who was
walking to and fro and not paying attention to her.
She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this
apologize to her husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA, however, she found that police Court recommends her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency,
officers were present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when President Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon.
he saw her he chased her. A policeman pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the Minister of Justice.
wife of Elias. When she replied in the affirmative, the police officer accused her of
burning her husband. She denied the accusation. But the police took her to the
headquarters, and prepared a written statement, Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant was made
to sign said statement upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it.
Although she did not know the contents, she signed it because of the promise.

RTC ruling: Convicted of parricide.

CA ruling: Referred to SC since penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

WHETHER OR NOT THE BURNS SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM CONTRIBUTED TO CAUSE

PNEUMONIA WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH

The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice
to exculpate the appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused
by taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage
so as to produce an almost comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect
a diminution of the oxygen content of the body. In fine, as correctly pointed out by the
Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an efficient supervening
cause of his death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four days after the burning.
The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns
2' secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by
the post-mortem findings immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The
evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While
accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state
that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns.
It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became
as to the cause of death, merely contributory.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred.
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed;
and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. Every person is held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts.
In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be
increased to P30,000.00.
3. People v. Fernando Iligan
G.R. No. 75369; Nov 26, 1990
Facts: Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their
arraignment, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the prosecution presented the following version of the
commission of the crime.virtual law library
At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. and
his companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto.
Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of
the ricemill of a certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew,
Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside
thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the
accused that they had no desire to fight. Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall,
drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran
pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half an hour, passing by the house of
Quiones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that they were no longer being
chased. After resting for a short while, Quiones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him
to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work as a bus
conductor.
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiones, Jr., the 3 accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiones, Jr. with
his bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. Horrified, Felix
Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they
heard shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na."
On the spot where Quiones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him
already dead with his head busted. They helped the brother of Quiones, Jr. in carrying
him to their house.
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria
Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E.
Abas. The postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death
certificate reveals that Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died.
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in
their respective houses at the time the crime was committed. The defense made capital
of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiones, Jr. died
because of a vehicular accident.
CFI ruling: Convicted Iligan and Asis of murder. Appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan
and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the aforementioned
penalty.
WHETHER OR NOT ILIGANS HACKING OF DECEASEDS HEAD IS THE PPROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE LATTERS DEATH
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan.
That it was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside
the point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiones, Jr. and
the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but
to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking of Quiones, Jr.s head Iligan.
might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latters death.
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom." In other words, the sequence
of events from Iligans assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle
is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events.
Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability. library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of
Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses.
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated
by the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiones,
Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. There must
be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make
it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. In this case, the hacking
of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was
a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants.
The group of Quiones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks
against them.
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been
met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of
sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower courts
finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis
liable as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in the
infliction of the wound on the head of Quiones, Jr., which led to his running over by a
vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying
a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and
coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan,
Edmundo Asis must have known of the formers criminal intent but mere knowledge,
acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional
participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make
him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by
38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion
temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum
and reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for
which he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiones,
Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.
6. U.S. v. Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272; March 19, 1910
Facts: On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant Ah Chong,
who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill
you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought
that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which
it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's
wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was
employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies
he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when
either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with
his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his
friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The 3 returned from their walk at
about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual
going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting
on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to
No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that
he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the
door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings. The defendant was charged
with the crime of assassination.
Trial court ruling: Guilty of homicide.
WHETHER IN THIS JURISDICTION ONE CAN BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE WHO,
BY REASON OF A MISTAKE AS TO THE FACTS, DOES AN ACT FOR WHICH HE WOULD BE
EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IF THE FACTS WERE AS HE SUPPOSED THEM TO BE
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief
that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he
would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that
he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness
in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient
of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes
intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal
liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate
in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a
form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means
little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to
extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that
is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean,
as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another,
"without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily
unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which
he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary"
as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act,
and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention)
there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words
"con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the
code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use
in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said
to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be
done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence,
nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
 Trial court ruling: Guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.

WHETHER OR NOT MISTAKE OF FACT MAY BE APPRECIATED IN FAVOR OF THE

ACCUSED
7. People v. Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta
G.R. No. L-47722; July 27, 1943 The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
Facts: Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan,
malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un
Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get
de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked
producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes
gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed.
Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the
pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43
telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were
Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done,
instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained
a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether
he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the
same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of
whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5,
of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal
liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and
office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house
justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said
or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have acted
that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to
in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour.
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man
duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him
sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene
making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised
fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall,
Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
in such case, be imposed.
paramour.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared
The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he
guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly
asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis,
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to
answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital
fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the
and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32
heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
costs.

It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest

performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas,
they incur no criminal liability.