Arledge 1

Name: Chris Arledge

School: Ohio University

Email: arledgechris@gmail.com

In his Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant sets forth a philosophy of

geometry within which the statements of geometry are considered to be both synthetic

and a priori forms of knowledge. Contra Hume, Kant thought that geometry is not only
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apodictic (hence a priori) but also contains propositions that are not derivable simply

from the concepts included within the propositions themselves (hence synthetic). The

decades that followed saw much assent to Kants assertion concerning the epistemic and

semantic status of geometry. However during the 19th century mathematicians developed

various non-Euclidean geometries, which posed quite a threat to Kants contention that

the propositions of Euclidean geometry have a priori necessity. To make matters worse

for Kant, the development of general relativity in the early 1900s made use of these non-

Euclidean geometries to describe the structure of space-time, thus cementing non-

Euclidean geometry into the fabric of mathematical physics.

Since then much work has been done arguing that the Kantian synthetic a priori

must be rejected in light of modern physics and mathematics.1 These arguments suffer

from several deficiencies, however. First, these arguments misread what Kant is arguing

in the Transcendental Aesthetic and as a result come to false conclusions concerning

the Kantian conception of the nature of geometry, its relation to sensible objects and the

visualization of geometrical figures. Second, the arguments from non-Euclidean

geometry operate upon a restricted notion of space. In his doctoral dissertation Carnap

offers a demarcation of the concept of space into three distinct spaces: formal, intuitive,

and physical space. 2 Each of these spaces has unique nuances that allow for a more

thorough explication of the concept of space. Following the early Carnap, I contend that

1
Cf. Nicholas Griffin, "Non-Euclidean Geometry: Still Some Problems for Kant."Studies in the
History and Philosophy of Science 22, no. 4 (1991): 661-663; Amit Hagar, "Kant and non-Euclidean
Geometry." Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift 99, no. 1 (2008): 80-98; Hans Reichenbach, The
Philosophy of Space & Time. (New York: Dover Publications, 1958).

2
Rudolph Carnap, Der Raum: Ein Beitrag Zur Wissenschaftslehre. Unpublished Translation by
Ran Cohen. 2002.
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if space is demarcated into three distinct spaces the arguments from non-Euclidean

geometry fail to refute the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.3

Before delving into the arguments, it would be beneficial to look at what Kant

actually says concerning the nature of geometry. In the introduction to the Critique of

Pure Reason (B16/17) and the Transcendental Aesthetic (B65) Kant offers an

argument for the synthetic status of geometrical propositions. He begins by claiming that,

from mere concepts only analytic knowledge, not synthetic knowledge is to be

obtained (B64/65). To put it another way one might say that if a propositions is analytic,

then it must be derivable from the concepts contained within. Geometrical propositions,

however, are unable to do this. Consider Kants proposition that Two straight lines

cannot enclose a space, and with them no figure is possible (B65). This proposition

cannot be derived from the concept of straight line and the concept of two. Since

geometrical propositions cannot be derived simply from the concepts contained within,

such propositions must be analytic.

If we accept Kants argument here a question arises concerning the alleged a

priori status of geometrical propositions and the recourse to intuition (B65) required for

deriving these propositions. If indeed intuition of sensible objects is required for an

intuition of space and if the intuition of space is required for an intuition of geometry,

does that not ultimately ground geometrical propositions in sensible objects, making such

propositions a posteriori? Furthermore, does Kant not even say in the Prolegomena that,

Pure mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have objective validity on

3
Rudolph Carnap, Der Raum: Ein Beitrag Zur Wissenschaftslehre. Unpublished Translation by
Ran Cohen. 2002.
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condition that it refers merely to objects of sense?4 Kant does affirm sensibility as a

necessary condition for the possibility of geometrical knowledge, albeit indirectly

through the intuition of space. However, this does not commit Kant to geometrical

propositions being a posteriori for the following reason. Kant makes it clear in the

introduction to the first critique that the fact that all knowledge begins in experience in no

way entails that all knowledge arises out of (is grounded in) experience. In order for us to

affirm that geometrical propositions are a posteriori it must be conceded that geometrical

propositions are derived from sensible objects and are thus grounded upon these sensible

objects. This is not, however, Kants assertion. Rather, the geometrical propositions

express the structure of the pure intuition of space. This pure intuition of space is itself a

priori because space is presupposed in the very possibility of any outer appearance and is

not an empirical concept derived from outer experience (B38-39). It is true that the pure

intuition of space requires representations of sensible objects, but this is only so because

space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense and thus cannot be

intuited directly itself. Nevertheless, space is the a priori condition for the possibility of

any outer sense and since geometry is nothing but a description of the properties of this

space, it too must be a priori.

Having reconstructed Kants arguments concerning the synthetic a priori nature of

geometrical propositions it is possible to see where the arguments from non-Euclidean

geometry misunderstand Kant. The misunderstanding is located within the relationship

between geometry and sensible objects. As was shown above, Kant conceives of

geometry as the structure of the pure intuition of space. Thus, we experience geometry in

4
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena: to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come forward as
Science. 8th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), 30-31.
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the representations of sensible objects which themselves conform to space and these

appearances can never contain anything but what geometry ascribes to them.5 Since

geometry is Euclidean for Kant he therefore considers all experience to necessarily

conform to the Euclidean metric. Furthermore, since the structure of space is Euclidean,

and since all outer sense conforms to the pure intuition of space, an experience that

falsifies this Euclidean metric is impossible.

If arguments from non-Euclidean geometry are to succeed, then an experience is

needed that will falsify the claim that appearances necessarily conform to the Euclidean

metric as found in the pure intuition of space. The question must then be asked, is the

experience of a non-Euclidean figure possible?

Hans Reichenbach answers the affirmative. Reichenbach offers a rather long

attempt to prove the possibility of visualizing non-Euclidean forms and his conclusion is

that the visualization of non-Euclidean forms is possible if one rejects the Euclidean

metric and refrains from attempting to translate non-Euclidean relations into congruent

Euclidean ones. 6 From the conclusion it would seem that if one were to augment ones

visualization techniques in the appropriate way one could visualize the various non-

Euclidean forms. This suggestion, however, seems to be simply a thought exercise as to

what is metaphysically possible, rather than what is an actual state of affairs. Perhaps we

can liken this suggestion to the suggestion that if we augmented our visualization

techniques in the appropriate way we could visualize the 6-D space-time of a Calabi-Yau

manifold. Given that we have the mathematical techniques to deal with these manifolds,

it is only a matter of visualizational technique that prohibits our visualization of these 6-D

5
Ibid. 31
6
Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, 37-58
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manifolds. While this example certainly is an extreme one the point is the same.7 In both

of these scenarios it is far from clear as to whether 1) such an adjustment is indeed

possible or 2) that such an adjustment would provide any reason for concluding that

space has the specified metric. As Reichenbach himself admits it is the image-

producing function of our visualization [that] so stubbornly rejects non-Euclidean

geometry.8 To translate this into Kantian terms we might say that it is the necessary

form of outer experience that so stubbornly rejects non-Euclidean geometry.

One caveat must be made concerning the above argument. Reichenbach makes it

clear that he divides visualization into two separate faculties: the image-producing

function and the normative function.9 The image-producing function concerns the

production of a particular object as an image. The normative function concerns the

relations in a geometric system between the geometrical elements, such as lines, points,

planes, etc. that constitute the images produced by the image-producing function. More

specifically, the normative function expresses relations to which our image-producing

function must conform. It is the normative function that Reichenbach attributes to Kants

synthetic a priori because on Kants account we are compelled by the pure intuition of

space to regard the structure of this intuition as conforming to Euclidean relations.

Reichenbach thinks, however, that since we can determine the relations within various

non-Euclidean geometrical systems we can thus impose these relations on images

produced by our image-producing function through an adjustment of our visualization

7
A possible rejoinder to this analogy would be that our physiological makeup prohibits the
visualization of such 6-D figures and thus the analogy is fallacious. However, often in utilizing non-
Euclidean geometry in physical theories such as general relativity, one must make use of a 4-D manifold,
which is not capable of being visualized in the same manner, as the 6-D manifold is not. Thus the analogy
stands.
8
Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, 58.
9
Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, 38-39.
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techniques, thus proving that Euclidean geometry is not the necessary metric of space.

Such a conclusion would lead to a rejection of Euclidean geometry as synthetic a priori

knowledge. However, Kant does not seem to restrict his discussion to relations contained

within a geometrical system. Rather, his discussion of the synthetic a priori status of

geometry pivots on geometrys relationship with sensible objects through the pure

intuition of space. An example of this would be the line from the Prolegomena in which

Kant states, pure geometry, can only have objective validity on condition that it refers

merely to objects of sense10. This passage indicates that Kant is dealing with more than

the normative function in his discussion of the status of geometry. There is an implicit

appeal to the image-producing function, which relates geometrical propositions to the

objects located within the pure intuition of space. Thus, Reichenbach is mistaken to limit

Kants discussion to the normative function only and once we admit the image-producing

function, non-Euclidean geometry becomes much less visible.

II

A good many of the problems of the arguments from non-Euclidean geometry,

including the problem concerning the visualization of non-Euclidean geometrical figures,

are found in the arguments all-too-broad scope of the notion of space. For instance,

Reichenbachs normative function of visualization properly belongs to the domain of

intuitive space, as will be shown below; but had he demarcated the various conceptions

of space, he may have seen the error of restricting Kant to the normative function of

visualization. Carnap in his dissertation Der Raum did in fact demarcate space into three

distinct spaces in an attempt to explicate the concept of space in its totality. Through an

10
Kant, Prolegomena, 31
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analysis of each of the three distinct spaces the conclusion shall be reached that while two

types of spaces do indeed preclude the possibility of synthetic a priori geometry, one type

of space maintains the possibility of synthetic a priori geometrical knowledge and thus,

once again, the arguments from non-Euclidean geometry fail in their attempts to

eliminate the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.

The first type of space Carnap outlines is what he entitles formal space. Formal

space is a space consisting only of the relations between mathematical and logical

elements. This space is irrelevant to the current argument, however, and will be bypassed.

The second demarcation of space Carnap offers is physical space. Physical space

is very simply the space occupied by particular physical objects. Physical space is the

space of physics. The physical geometry located within physical space necessarily

contains synthetic propositions, which are a posteriori since such propositions express

specific assertions about specific physical objects, such as the assertion that my cat is 10

feet from the stove. The notion of physical space is not especially important to this

portion of the argument concerning non-Euclidean geometry, but serves as a limit for the

boundaries of the next type of space.

The final type of space demarcated by Carnap is what he calls intuitive space.

Such a space lies between the formal structure of relations (formal space) and the objects

that produce appearances within the mind (physical space). Carnap defines such a space

as the structure of relations between spatial shapes in the customary sense, hence

between elements of line, plane, and space whose specific peculiarity we grasp on

occasion of a sensual perception or even mere imagination.11 If we translate Carnaps

11
Carnap, Der Raum, 4.
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words into Kantian, terminology the concept of intuitive space becomes clearer. Intuitive

space is the space that is the structural condition for the possibility of all outer

experience. It does not persist outside of the mind but, unlike formal space, cannot be

intuited without sensibility either, giving it both an empirical and transcendentally ideal

character. It is within intuitive space that we find the foundation for Kants geometrical

propositions mentioned in the Transcendental Aesthetic. For instance, the proposition

three lines can enclose a space is not merely a relation, but is a relation between

geometrical elements, namely the lines, and yet these lines are given no referent in

physical space. Thus we see that propositions within intuitive space cannot be analytic,

for the propositions are not derivable merely from the concepts employed. The

propositions also must be a priori because they interact with elements that may be said to

possess no particular referent (such as the things in physical space). Prima Facie, then, it

would seem that the synthetic a priori has been established.

It is easy to see the problem with this argument. Consider the parallel postulate in

Euclidean geometry, For any plane on which there is a line L and a point P that is not on

L, there is one and only one line L, on the plane, that passes through P and is parallel to

L.12 Such a postulate belongs in intuitive space because it expresses a relation between

generic geometrical elements. However, within both Riemannian and Lobachevskian

geometries different, mutually inconsistent parallel postulates are given. For instance, in

Riemannian geometry the postulate can be restated as For any plane on which there is a

line L and a point P that is not on L, there exists no line that passes through P and is

parallel to L. Likewise in Lobachevskis geometry there exists multiple parallels. The

12
Rudolph, Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics; an Introduction to the Philosophy of
Science. (New York: Basic Books, inc. 1966), 126.
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various postulates, though mutually inconsistent, are perfectly consistent within their

system and meet the requirements needed to belong to the realm of intuitive space. It

would appear that Kant has been defeated after all.

There is, however, a possible rejoinder to the above objection that retains the

possibility of geometry as synthetic a priori knowledge. In his dissertation Carnap offers

a further demarcation within each of the three types of space that divides each space into

three portions: projective, metrical, and topological space. For our purposes, projective

space is irrelevant as it concerns the logical form of spatial structures. However, the

demarcation between metrical and topological space is central to the argument and it is to

these I now turn.

Metrical space is the space of measurement. The structure of this metrical space is

dependent upon what Carnap calls the metrical stipulation which is the choice of a

metric between various competing metrics. For instance, since General Relativity utilizes

Riemannian geometry in its mathematical formulations, the metrical stipulation is

Riemannian. Intuitive metrical space cannot contain synthetic a priori propositions. Given

that the metrical stipulation is chosen rather than necessitated, no a priori certainty can be

granted to the geometrical propositions within. Reichenbachs conception of the

normative function of visualization fits quite clearly into the fabric of intuitive metrical

space. Since the normative function is concerned with the relations between geometrical

elements it belongs in intuitive space. However, the manner in which these elements

interact is determined by the metrical stipulation chosen by the measurer. This forces the

determination that any geometry located within intuitive metrical space is synthetic, but

not a priori due to the lack of the necessity of any particular metric. Thus, if Kants
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geometry is found within intuitive metric space then his geometry would be synthetic a

posteriori. However, metrical space is not the pure intuition that is considered to be the

condition of the possibility of all outer experience. Metrical space succeeds this pure

intuition when the cognizer chooses to augment his pure intuition with a non-Euclidean

metric for the purposes of measurement. Since Kants geometry applies to the pure

intuition of the condition for the possibility of all outer experience, his geometry cannot

reside in intuitive metrical space.

Topological space is the space that reproduces univocally what is present in our

experience.13 Topological intuitive space is therefore the space that reproduces

univocally what is present in our experience of the structure of the condition of all

possible outer experience (or the pure intuition of space). This demarcation of space

retains geometrical propositions as synthetic because the space is intuitive, but it also

restricts intuitive space to the transcendental structure of space that we experience in

sensible intuition. Since we experience this space in an a priori manner, the propositions

pertaining to the geometry of this space, which is Euclidean in the Kantian system, must

also be a priori too. It might here be objected that it is rather uncertain as to whether our

experience of intuitive topological space takes on a Euclidean metric. However, as

Poincar shows, any attempt to falsify the necessity of a Euclidean metric using empirical

means always falls short due to the mere possibility that non-Euclidean physical theories

can be translated into Euclidean physical theories.14 While this does not establish the

necessity of Euclidean geometry, it fails to show the contingency of Euclidean geometry

and allows for the possibility that Euclidean geometry is in fact the necessary structure of

13
Carnap, Der Raum, 31.
14
Henri Poincar. Science and Hypothesis. (New York: Science Press, 1905), 98.
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our intuitive space. Thus, arguments from non-Euclidean geometry fail to refute Kants

assertion concerning the nature of geometry.

Bibliography

Carnap, Rudolf. Philosophical Foundations of Physics; an Introduction to the Philosophy

of Science. New York: Basic Books, inc. 1966.

Carnap, Rudolph. Der Raum: Ein Beitrag Zur Wissenschaftslehre. Unpublished

Translation by Ran Cohen. 2002.
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Griffin, Nicholas. "Non-Euclidean Geometry: Still Some Problems for Kant."Studies in

the History and Philosophy of Science 22, no. 4 (1991): 661-663.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Reissued
ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena: to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come
forward as Science. 8th ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990.

Poincare, Henri. Science and Hypothesis. New York: Science Press, 1905.

Reichenbach, Hans. The Philosophy of Space & Time. New York: Dover Publications,
1958.