Suffering and Soul Making: Rethinking John Hick's Theodicy Author(s) : Mark S. M. Scott

Suffering and SoulMaking:
Rethinking John Hicks Theodicy

Author(s): MarkS.M. Scott
Source: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 90, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 313-334
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651707
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Suffering and Soul-Making:
Rethinking John Hicks Theodicy
Mark S. M. Scott / Concordia University, Montreal
John Hick transformed the shape of thinking about theodicy in con-

temporary philosophical theology with his conception of the world as
a vale of soul-making.1 Suffering, he argues, enables our development
as spiritually and morally mature persons. Without suffering we could
not cultivate virtue and character. God designs the world, therefore,
not to shield us from hardships, but to facilitate our progress toward
perfection through our constant encounters with dangers, difficulties,
and misfortunes. Hick grounds his defining contribution to theodicy
in the Greek church fathers, particularly in Irenaeus.2 Most scholars
have uncritically accepted Hicks appeal to Irenaeus, resulting in the
establishment of an Irenaean-type of theodicy.3 Introductions to phil-
osophical theology, philosophy of religion, and the problem of evil rep-
licate his own characterization of the soul-making approach as an Ir-
enaean theodicy.4 In this article I problematize the deeply entrenched
1
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966; repr., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
25361. The phrase the vale of Soul-making was coined by the poet John Keats in a letter
written to his brother and sister in April 1819. He says . . . Call the world if you Please The
vale of Soul-making. In this letter he sketches a teleological theodicy. Do you not see, he
asks, how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make it
a Soul? (259 n. 1).
2
See, in particular, John Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, in Encountering Evil: Live Options
in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (1981; repr., Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
2001), 3872, Philosophy of Religion (1963; repr., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990),
4448, and An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 11822, 35960.
3
Barry L. Whitney, ed., Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the Problem of Evil, 19601991
(Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University, 1998), 11534.
4
To give four recent examples of the uncritical appropriation of the Irenaean designation
for Hicks soul-making theodicy, see Michael J. Murray, Theodicy, in The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 100; Michael Peterson, Willian Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger,
Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 14446; Davis, Encountering Evil, 3872; and Marilyn McCord Adams,
Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 4951.
2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0022-4189/2010/9003-0002$10.00
313
classification of Hicks soul-making or person-making theodicy as

Irenaean and suggest it has more affinity with Origen than with Ir-
enaeus.5 Contrary to Irenaeus, Origen confronts the problem of evil
with a cosmic theodicy that anticipates many of the structural features
of Hicks proposal.6 Moreover, I argue that when we rethink Hicks
theodicy through an Origenian lens, it opens new constructive theo-
logical trajectories for addressing the problem of evil and suffering.
After delineating the inner logic of Hicks theodicy, I will analyze the
four salient areas of convergence between these two influentialalbeit
controversialtheologians. First, Origens allegorical interpretation of
Genesis coheres with Hicks mythological approach to the creation
story. Second, his view of the world as a schoolroom for the soul cor-
responds to Hicks central claim about the soul-making purpose of cre-
ation. Third, Origens progressive spirituality parallels Hicks theory of
the lengthy process of soul formationa process that extends into fu-
ture lives. Finally, Origens notion of the or restoration
of all creation closely approximates Hicks universalism. Given these
striking correspondences, we must reclassify his Irenaean theodicy as
an Origenian theodicy, thereby replacing Irenaeus with Origen as the
patron saint of the soul-making approach to the problem of evil.7 As
we will see, Origens theodicy supplies fertile ground for developing
Hicks theory of the person-forming potential of suffering.
hicks typologies: augustinian versus irenaean

Hick presents two basic alternatives for thinking about theodicy from
a Christian theological perspective:8 the Augustinian approach and the
Irenaean approach.9 Until recently, Hick comments, the former has
been the majority report of the Christian mind, while the latter has
5
Hick employs these terms interchangeably. See Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 46.
6
For a detailed analysis of Origens theodicy, see Mark S. M. Scott, Cosmic Theodicy:
Origen on the Problem of Evil (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008). The technical term
theodicy was coined by G. W. Leibniz. It signifies the rational attempt to reconcile the reality
of evil with the goodness and justice of God. Despite the Enlightenment origin and valences
of the term, the project of theodicy extends into the ancient world.
7
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 40.
8
Hick presents modern process theology as a third option in his outline of Christian
approaches to theodicy (Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 40, 4855) but does not add it to his
typologies of theodicy because prior to the 1970s the process option was little known outside
of process circles and since then has been subject to substantial criticism (Hick, An Ir-
enaean Theodicy, 68). In his Critique in response to An Irenaean Theodicy, David Ray
Griffin criticizes Hick for ignoring this third option in his constructive discussions of theodicy
(in Davis, Encountering Evil, 5455).
9
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 253, and An Irenaean Theodicy, 39.
314
Suffering and Soul-Making
been a minority report.10 After positing a theological antithesis be-

tween Augustine and Irenaeus, Hick opts for the Irenaean over the
Augustinian, which he rejects as philosophically and theologically de-
ficient.11 Before we embark on our analysis of Hicks (supposedly) Ir-
enaean theodicy and show its affinity to Origen, we must briefly sketch
his characterization of the Augustinian type of theodicy.
According to Hick, the Augustinian response to the problem of evil
hinges on the concept of the fall of man from an original state of
righteousness.12 It begins with the presupposition that God, conceived
of as omnipotent and benevolent, created the world good, including
humanity. At some precosmic moment Satan and his angels fell
through their misuse of freedom, and, correspondingly, Adam and Eve
were led astray by Satan, thereby ushering evil and suffering into the
universe. From this anthropological vantage point, the fall of the pri-
mordial couple becomes an unmitigated disaster of cosmic proportion.
Hence, free willboth angelic and humanaccounts for the presence
of moral and, as a result, natural evil in the universe, according to this
narrative: Evil stems from the culpable misuse of creaturely freedom
in a tragic act, of cosmic significance, in the prehistory of the human
race.13 Since evil was not created by God, it cannot have substantial
existence. Metaphysically, then, evil subsists parasitically on creation: it
is the privatio boni.14 At the end of days God will judge humanity and
consign the damned to eternal hellfire and the saved to eternal life,
restoring balance and justice to creation.
The Augustinian theodicy absolves God from culpability for evil and
suffering by transferring blame from God to the creaturely misuse of
freedom. Christian philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga have sought
to establish the logical possibility of the free-will defense, but even if
they succeed, Hick warns, they win only a Pyrrhic victory, since the
Augustinian approach rests on a prescientific worldview that negates
its tenability in the modern world.15 Hick enumerates three criticisms
against the Augustinian approach. First, it fails to give a cogent account
of the origin of evil. Why would finitely perfect beings in a finitely
10
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 39. Compare Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 253.
11
Hicks initial move of polarizing Irenaean and Augustinian theology overlooks the salient
points of intersection between these two pivotal theologians. While it may be instructive to
highlight their different theological emphases and sensibilities, Hick overstates their differ-
ences for his own constructive agenda.
12
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 40.
13
Ibid., 42.
14
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 3848. For an extensive treatment of Augustines views on
evil, see G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
15
315
perfect environment fall? How do you explain the impulse to sin un-
der these conditions? A flawless creation, Hick contends, would
never go wrong, so the Augustinian etiology of evil lacks plausibility.16
Second, modern evolutionary biology precludes the conception of a
primordial couple who fell from perfection to sin. Third, moral evil
cannot explain natural evil: they are not intrinsically related. Fourth,
the existence of hell would permanently inscribe evil into the fabric of
the universe, thereby undercutting the project of theodicy. Surely a
God of love would find a way to overcome evil and rescue fallen crea-
tion from the scourge it brought upon itself.17 On the force of these
criticisms, Hick opts for the alternative to the Augustinian type of the-
odicy: the Irenaean.
the world as soul-making: john hicks irenaean theodicy

Hicks Irenaean theodicy inverts the classical Augustinian narrative.
While both employ the creation account of Genesis, they draw drasti-
cally differently conclusions. According to Hicks reading of Irenaeus,
we attain perfection at the end, not at the beginning: Whereas the
Augustinian theology sees our perfection as lying in the distant past
. . . the Irenaean type of theology sees our perfection as lying before
us in the future, at the end of a lengthy and arduous process of further
creation through time.18 We were not created morally and spiritually
mature and perfect; instead, we are still in process of creation.19 We
were created at an epistemic distance from God, with the potentiality
for knowledge of and relationship with God, but these were not fully
actualized at the outset of our existence.20 In the terms of Gen. 1:26,
God creates humanity in the image of God, that is, with the poten-
tiality for becoming children of God, but then allows us to attain divine
likeness, that is, to realize our potential as personal and moral be-
ings.21 This two-stage concept of the creation of humankind coheres
with the evolutionary growth of Homo sapiens from lower to higher states
of cognition, moral awareness, and spiritual consciousness.22 At the cos-
mic level, God creates humanity not in a single moment but over time,
moving us toward our ultimate felicity at the eschaton. At the personal
16
17
Ibid., 4344.
18
Ibid., 45. Compare Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 11819.
19
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 254.
20
21
22
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 4041, and Evil and the God of Love, 255. Compare Irenaeus
Adversus Haereses 4.3738.
316
level, God creates us in his image but continues to shape us until we

attain divine likeness. Both cosmically and personally, then, we evolve
from spiritual and moral immaturity and imperfection to divine like-
ness through a lengthy process of maturation.
Hicks Irenaean theological anthropology radically mitigates the con-
cept of the Fall. It treats the story of Adam and Eve as a myth conveying
theological truth, not historical or literal truth. The primordial couple
fell short of the perfection God intended for them, not from original
righteousness. Hick views the Fall, then, as no more than a relatively
minor lapsea youthful errorrather than as the infinite crime and
cosmic disaster that has ruined the whole creation.23 Just as we would
not sentence a child to life in prison for a youthful indiscretion, so God
does not eternally condemn Adam and Eve and the rest of humanity
for their sin. Instead, God helps them learn from their mistake. Con-
demnation would run counter to divine justice and would be inconsis-
tent with the infinite reach of divine love. If we seek to retain the notion
of the fall (now with a lowercase f) because of its hallowed place in
the Christian tradition, it would have to be in a highly qualified
sense.24 It would merely signify the immense gap between our current
state and our future state, that is, our distance from the ultimate goal
of divine likeness.25 As persons-in-the-making, we are works in progress,
and the fall simply conveys the sense of the unfinished nature of cre-
ationboth cosmically and personally. For Hick, following Irenaeus,
the fall is only an initial stage in our growth toward maturity.
But why did God not simply create us in the divine likeness as fully
developed persons? If God created us finitely perfect, evil would never
arise. With this query we enter into the heart of Hicks theodicy. God,
he argues, desires for us to know and love him on our own volition,
without divine coercion.26 Without the epistemic distance between
God and humanity, we would not be able to approach God freely and
develop into responsible creatures. In order to fully realize our person-
hood, we must traverse the distance between who we are and who God
designs us to be: For personal life is essentially free and self-directing.
It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only through the uncompelled
responses and willing co-operation of willing individuals in their actions
and reactions in the world in which God has placed them.27 Moreover,
Hick avers that the intrinsic value of human virtue and goodness forged
23
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., 42.
27
317
in the fire of trial and temptation outweighs the intrinsic value of

ready-made virtues that require no effort.28 Hicks soul-making the-
odicy presupposes that the value of self-achieved goodness justifies
even the long travail of the soul-making process, despite the suffering
that results.29
What kind of world, then, would facilitate the soul-making process?
Hick asserts that a hedonistic paradise would be maladapted to cul-
tivate character and virtue.30 If the world were designed as a lavish
playpen, we would have no incentive for moral improvement.31 We
would simply bask in the pleasures of our safe and carefree environ-
ment. God acts toward us not as a doting parent but as a Father who
constructs a world that will foster quality and strength of character
rather than grant our every wish: This world must be a place of soul-
making. And its value is to be judged, not primarily by the quantity of
pleasure and pain occurring in it at any particular moment, but by its
fitness for its primary purpose, the purpose of soul-making.32 Without
danger, difficulty, and temptation we would never achieve moral vic-
tories or strive for excellence. Our development as persons requires
the presence of obstacles to overcome and incentives to grow: In a
world devoid of both dangers to be avoided and rewards to be won, we
may assume that virtually no development of the human intellect and
imagination would have taken place, and hence no development of the
sciences, the arts, human civilization, or culture.33 According to Hicks
theory, then, the perilous conditions and tragic features of the world
that give rise to the problem of evil actually confirm Gods goodness
rather than call it into question. God knows, like a good parent, what
will be best for us in the long run, even if it exceeds our noetic grasp
in the midst of our suffering.
Hick invites us to imagine a world without pain.34 It would seem, at
least prima facie, that this would be the best of all possible worlds. We
all wish that we lived in an accident-proof, violence-free, and painless
world. In such a world special providences would prevent every mis-
hap and deed of violence: children would never fall, cars would never
28
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4445. Compare Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 43.
29
30
Ibid., 25657. Compare Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 49.
31
Murray, Theodicy, 36365.
32
33
34
John Hick, A World without Suffering, in The Mystery of Suffering and Death, ed. Michael
J. Taylor (New York: Alba House, 1973), 2529.
318
collide, knives would never pierce, and bullets would never kill.35 Under
these conditions, however, the cultivation of character and virtue would
be impossible: Courage and fortitude would have no point in an en-
vironment in which there is, by definition, no danger or difficulty. Gen-
erosity, kindness, the agape aspect of love, prudence, unselfishness, and
other ethical notions that presuppose life in an objective environment
could not even be formed. Consequently, such a world, however well it
might promote pleasure, would be very ill adapted for the development
of the moral qualities of human personality. In relation to this purpose
it might well be the worst of all possible worlds!36
We see, then, that although we instinctively desire a world without
suffering, it would ultimately impede the realization of our full poten-
tial as persons created in the image of God. Moreover, it would pre-
clude our ability to respond to God as free, responsible beings.37 In a
padded-playroom world, we would remain insouciant, irresponsible
children, rather than mature, loving, adults because love and maturity
entail sacrifice: It is difficult to see how it [love] could ever grow to
any extent in a paradise that excluded all suffering. For such love pre-
supposes a life in which there are real difficulties to be faced and over-
come, real tasks to be performed and goals to be achieved, setbacks to
be endured, dangers to be met.38 True love, for both God and others,
must be forged in the fire of adversity.
Some have criticized Hicks theory of the soul-making value of suf-
fering as inconsistent with the soul-destroying reality of evil in the
world. We cannot always trace a direct correspondence between indi-
vidual suffering and soul-making. Hick fails to see, according to John
Roth, that suffering destroys more than it builds: Hick, I think, sees
the world too much as a schoolroom when it is actually more like a
dangerous ally.39 Hick himself raises this problem, noting that obsta-
cles, dangers, and calamities bring out the best in some people and the
worst in others: Lifes pains and agonies, which sometimes help to
create stronger and more compassionate men and women, at other
times overwhelm and crush, leaving only despair, tragedy and disinte-
35
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 46, An Irenaean Theodicy, 4647, and A World without
Suffering, 27.
36
Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 46. Compare Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 119.
37
Hick, A World without Suffering, 26.
38
Ibid., 29; Hick, Critique of David Ray Griffin, Creation out of Nothing, Creation out
of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil, in Davis, Encountering Evil, 130. Compare Hick, A World
without Suffering, 29.
39
John K. Roth, Critique of Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, in Davis, Encountering Evil, 62.
319
gration.40 Theoretically, pain and suffering need not confound us be-

cause of their person-forming value. In reality, however, Hick realizes
that pain and suffering afflict some more than others, and their dis-
proportionate allocation defies theological rationalization: The prob-
lem consists rather in the fact that instead of serving a constructive
purpose pain and misery seem to be distributed in random and mean-
ingless ways, with the result that suffering is often undeserved and often
falls upon men in amounts exceeding anything that could be rationally
intended.41 Hick, therefore, acknowledges the discrepancies between
his theory of suffering as a means of soul-making and the reality of
soul-destroying and disproportional evil.
In response to the destructive reality of suffering and its unjust dis-
tribution, Hick invokes the concept of mystery: The mystery of dystel-
eological suffering is a real mystery, Hick concedes, impenetrable to
the rationalizing human mind. It challenges Christian faith with its ut-
terly baffling, alien, destructive meaninglessness.42 Negatively, the ap-
peal to mystery highlights our inability to explain suffering in individ-
ual cases. Positively, however, it highlights the more hidden and
paradoxical dimensions of the soul-making structure of the world. If
sin always resulted in suffering and virtue always resulted in happiness,
we could not foster the positive values of sympathy and compassion and
we would not embrace goodness for its own sake. Rather, we would
know that those in the grips of suffering either deserve their fate or
will benefit from it, which would negate the need for intervention or
compassion. We would embrace the good for fear of reprisal, not for
itself. For Hick, the haphazardness and inequity of suffering elicits
sympathy and compassion from others.43 Moreover, the randomness of
suffering ensures that we pursue goodness for its own sake rather than
for immediate reward. Thus, Hick posits the positive value of mystery
in his theodicy.44
Even the mysteriousness of the world, with all its inexplicable suffer-
ing and horrendous evils,45 contributes to its soul-making design, ac-
cording to Hick. Nevertheless, the unfinished nature of the soul-mak-
ing process in this life threatens the cogency of his theodicy.
Recognizing the problem of the incomplete state of our person-for-
40
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 360. Compare Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 47.
41
42
Ibid., 335.
43
Ibid., 33435.
44
Ibid., 335, 353.
45
To employ Marilyn Adamss famous category. See Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous
Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 2631.
320
mation at death, he posits the continuation of the process of perfection

in the afterlife: This person-making process, leading eventually to per-
fect human community, is obviously not completed on this earth. . . .
Therefore, if we are ever to reach the full realization of the potential-
ities of our human nature, this fulfillment can only come in a contin-
uation of our lives in another sphere of existence after bodily death.46
So, we need not discern a direct correlation between suffering and
character formation in this life, since most do not complete the journey
to divine likeness before death. Moreover, the heavenly bliss that awaits
us will justify retrospectively and render manifestly worthwhile all
the suffering that we encountered along the way.47 We see, therefore,
that Hicks theodicy appeals to an eschatological resolution where the
soul-making process begun on earth will reach completion in the
afterlife.
The success of Hicks theodicy hinges on universal salvation. Its com-
pletion, Hick avers, requires that all human beings shall in the end
attain the ultimate heavenly state.48 We could not justify the pain and
suffering of the world if it did not eventually result in the beatification
of all humanity.49 Hick wrestles with the conflicting biblical evidence
on the question of universalism. On the one hand, the New Testament
contains unambiguous declarations of eternal punishment for sinners.
These are, however, far less numerous than most suppose, Hick ar-
gues.50 Only Matt. 25:41, 46 explicitly affirms eternal damnation, and
it might reflect later theological sensibilities, not the original teachings
of Jesus.51 On the other hand, Hick enumerates several biblicalpar-
ticularly Paulinetexts that imply universal salvation.52 Hick then har-
monizes these universalist and nonuniversalist passages by noting their
distinctive context and function. When Jesus invokes eternal hellfire,
he speaks existentially about the dangers of living selfishly, without
46
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 51. D. Z. Phillips, in his Critique, worries that the re-
course to ignorance so fundamental in the appeal to a postmortem continuation of the soul-
making process hides a conceptual bankruptcy (in Davis, Encountering Evil, 58).
47
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 118, and Philosophy of Religion, 47.
48
49
If the justification of evil within the creative process lies in the limitless and eternal good
of the end-state to which it leads, then the completeness of the justification must depend
upon the completeness, or universality, of the salvation achieved (Hick, An Irenaean The-
odicy, 52).
50
Hick, Death and Eternal Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 24347.
51
Ibid., 24547.
52
1 Cor. 15:22; Rom. 5:18, 11:32; Eph. 1:10; and 1 Tim. 2:4 (Hick, Death and Eternal Life,
24748). Stephen T. Davis criticizes Hicks universalism as inconsistent with the data of the
Christian tradition, especially the Bible (Davis, Critique of Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy,
in Davis, Encountering Evil, 6062).
321
regard for the disenfranchised.53 When Paul speaks about universal res-
toration, he speaks in a more detached theological mode.54 While
Jesus speaks truly when he says that a self-enclosed life will eventually
result in damnation, no one, in fact, will finally choose that destiny. As
we will see below, Hicks interpretation of the existential context and
function of Jesus teaching on hell closely parallels Origen.
After resolving the complicated biblical evidence on universalism,
Hick then asks whether universal salvation threatens our freedom.
Does not genuine freedom entail the possibility of finally standing in
defiance against God? If God coerces us into submissioneven out
of loveit erases the reality of freedom. Hick argues that divine om-
nipotence does not need to override the wayward wills of men to
guarantee universal salvation.55 Rather, he posits our innate God-
ward bias that naturally drives us toward God without undermining
our freedom: 56 God has so made us that the inherent gravitation of
our being is toward him.57 We naturally seek God even while God
draws us to salvation and facilitates our growth toward divine likeness.
On the basis of Gods goodness and our innate orientation or open-
ness to the divine Hick argues for universal salvation: And it seems
to me a reasonable expectation that in the infinite resourcefulness of
infinite love working in unlimited time, God will eventually succeed
in drawing us all into the divine Kingdom.58 His theological anthro-
pology, then, negates the need for divine coercion. God draws us like
a divine therapist, not like a divine despot compelling our compli-
ance for our own good. 59 We will take up this image of God as a divine
therapist momentarily, since it coheres well with Origens image of
God as a physician who applies painful remedies for our amelioration
and ultimate salvation.
origen: the new patron saint of hicks soul-making theodicy

Hick anchors his soul-making theodicy in Greek patristic theology, par-
ticularly in Irenaeus. Irenaeus and Hick, however, make strange bed-
53
Jesus was neither propounding a theological theory nor defining theological doctrines
(Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 248).
54
Ibid., 249.
55
Ibid., 251.
56
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 52. Ironically, he references Augustine on this point: You
have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in You
(Confessions I.i.1).
57
Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 251.
58
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 69. Compare Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 344.
59
322
fellows. They often work at cross-purposes. In the first place, Irenaeus

does not systematically confront the problem of evil, as Hick readily
admits: Irenaeus himself did not develop a theodicy.60 Moreover, Ir-
enaeus does not endorse many of the central tenets of Hicks theodicy,
most conspicuously, universalism. For instance, Irenaeus refutes the
universalism of his Gnostic opponents.61 Furthermore, Irenaeus clearly
advocates the rule of faith, which includes a literal account of crea-
tion.62 Finally, Hick drastically overplays the importance of the youthful
innocence of humanity in his account of the Irenaean narrative of the
fall.63 Although Irenaeus does describe Adam and Eve as children, their
youthful innocence does not attenuate their culpability or the disas-
trous consequences of the fall: Being outside the Paradise, Adam and
his wife Eve fell into many misfortunes (), walking upon this
world with much sadness and toils and lamenting.64 A close inspection
of Irenaeus reveals that he assents to theological concepts (such as the
fall, curse, and judgment) that Hick would style as Augustinian, his
antiparadigm.
Hicks specious appropriation of Irenaeus stems from his lack of en-
gagement with the Irenaean corpus. Rarely does he actually cite Iren-
aeus,65 and even less does he carefully exegete his work. Rather, he
generalizes about his theology, without sufficient analysis and contex-
tualization, and then misappropriates his insights for his theodicy. Hick
emphasizes thin parallels to his system rather than working within the
distinctive theological landscape of Irenaeus. Given the insufficient tex-
tual and theological evidence, Hicks appeal to Irenaeus as the patron
saint of his soul-making theodicy must be rejected.66 An Irenaean
Theodicy is a misnomer: it does not derive from Irenaeus nor signif-
icantly reflect his thought. While it does not serve our purposes to
detail the irreconcilable differences between Irenaeus and Hick, it is
at least clear that Hick has missed the mark, but he has not missed by
much.67 If he peered one hundred years further in the Greek theolog-
60
Ibid., 40.
61
Irenaeus Adversus Haereses 2.29.
62
Ibid. 1.22.
63
Hick, An Irenaean Theodicy, 41. See St. Irenaeus of Lyons, On the Apostolic Teaching,
trans. John Behr (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimirs Seminary Press, 1997), chaps. 1116.
64
Irenaeus, On the Apostolic Teaching, chaps. 14, 16, 17, quotation from 17.
65
For an exception, see Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 44 n. 7.
66
67
In this article I am more interested in establishing the affinity between Origen and Hick
than embarking on a detailed refutation of Hicks appeal to Irenaeus. I have shown the
fundamental incompatibilities between the two for the purpose of presenting Origen as the
new patron saint and showing the constructive potential of Origen for rethinking Hicks
theodicy of soul-making.
323
ical tradition he would discover the perfect patron saint for his soul-
making theodicy: Origen of Alexandria.
In contrast to Irenaeus, Origen directly confronts the problem of
evil in his theology.68 Origens observations of the suffering of the
world lead him to ask questions about the justice of divine providence.
Why do we find some new-born babes to be born blind, Origen asks,
when they have committed no sin, while others are born with no de-
fect at all?69 In other words, why does God allow the innocent to suf-
fer? The problem of innocent suffering, as we have seen, animates
Hicks theodicy as well. Origen then constructs a narrative about the
fall and ascent of the soul to God that functions as a theodicy: His
theological story is a kind of theodicy and has the function of explain-
ing why evil has arisen.70 Four aspects of this theological story bear
striking similarities to Hicks theodicy. First, Origen denies the literal
interpretation of the creation narrative. Second, Origen conceives of
the world as a schoolroom where God employs suffering for our edu-
cation and healing. Third, he posits the progressive ascent of the soul
in this life and in our postmortem existence. Finally, Origen speculates
about the final restoration of creation when all souls will be saved. We
will explore these four aspects of Origens theodicy in turn and analyze
how they intersect with Hicks soul-making theodicy, which will enable
us to reposition his theodicy as Origenian rather than Irenaean.
Origen, like Hick, does not interpret the story of Adam and Eve
literally. According to the prince of allegory,71 the beginning an-
nounced in Genesis refers to Jesus, not to the cosmos: Scripture is
not speaking here of any temporal beginning, but . . . the Savior.72
68
See Scott, Cosmic Theodicy.
69
Origen De Principiis (hereafter Princ.) 1.8. Compare Princ. 2.9.3. For the critical edition,
see Origene: Traite des principes, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, Tomes 15, Sources
chretiennes nos. 25253, 26869, 312 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 197684). For the English
translation (based on Koetschaus edition), see On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth
(1966; repr., London: Peter Smith, 1973). A new English translation of De Principiis is forth-
coming. See R. J. Rombs, A Note on the Status of Origens De Principiis in English, Vigiliae
Christianae 61 (2007): 2129.
70
Rowan A. Greer, Introduction, in Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, On Prayer, First
Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers,
trans. Rowan A. Greer (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 28.
71
Henri Crouzel, Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian, trans. A. S. Worrall
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 9. Only fragments remain of Origens lost Commentary
on Genesis, which contains his allegorization of Adam, who symbolizes all rational souls, and
his interpretation of the coats of skin in Genesis 3:21 as human bodies (C. P. Bammel,
Adam in Origen, in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. Rowan
Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 65).
72
Origen Homilies on Genesis (hereafter HomGen.) 1.1. Compare Origen Commentary on John
(hereafter ComJn.)1.95. For the critical edition, see Origene: Homelies sur Genese, ed. Louis
Doutreleau, Sources chretiennes no. 7 bis (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1976). For the English
324
Origen envisions a state where all preexistent souls existed in the

Logos before the physical creation.73 He thus posits two creations: an
incorporeal and physical creation.74 Likewise, Adam symbolizes all hu-
manity: The story of Adam and his sin will be interpreted philosoph-
ically by those who know that Adam means anthropos [ A
] in the Greek language, and that in what appears to be
concerned with Adam Moses is speaking of the nature of man.75 By
contrast, Irenaeus interprets the creation narrative and Adam liter-
ally.76 Hicks mythological interpretation of Genesis comes closer to
Origens allegorical approach than to that of Iranaeus. Origen, then,
comports with Hicks theodicy far better than Irenaeus does on this
point.
Origen views the world as a school for souls,77 where God facilitates
our progress into divine likeness.78 Danielou remarks on the pedagog-
ical function of creation: It might be said that being a didaskalos him-
self, Origen regarded God as a Didaskalos too, as a Master in charge of
the education of children, and looked on Gods universe as a vast di-
daskaleion in which every single thing contributed to the education of
the free human beings at school there.79 Correspondingly, we might
say that the world is a hospital for souls where we begin our spiritual
training and convalescence. Origens two dominant cosmological met-
aphors, namely, the world as a school and hospital for fallen souls,
correspond to two dominant metaphors in his theology, namely, God
as Teacher and God as Physician. God, he says, is the physician of our
souls [medicus animarum nostrarum] who, like a doctor, sometimes pre-
scribes very unpleasant and bitter medicine as a cure for ills in pro-
gressive stages, depending on the severity of our illness.80 Likewise, in
his Homilies on Ezekiel, Origen posits the remedial and educative nature
of suffering, reinforcing the correspondence between his cosmology
and theology, that is, between his view of the world as a school or
translation, see Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, trans. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the
Church 71 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1981).
73
Origen Princ. 2.1.1; HomGen. 1.1.
74
Gerald Bostock, Origens Doctrine of Creation, Expository Times 118, no. 5 (2007): 226;
Crouzel, Origen, 94.
75
Origen Contra Celsum 4.40. For the critical edition, see Origene: Contre Celse, ed. Marcel
Borret, Tome III (Livres V et VI), Sources chretiennes no. 147 (Paris: E ditions du Cerf, 1969).
For the English translation, see Origen: Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980).
76
Irenaeus Adversus Haereses 3.26.
77
Brian E. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991;
repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2003), 4464. Compare Origen Princ. 2.11.6.
78
Origen HomGen. 1.1.
79
Jean Danielou, Origen, trans., Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955), 276.
80
Origen Princ. 2.10.6.
325
hospital for fallen souls and his portrayal of God as Teacher and Phy-
sician: But it is in the same way that a very indulgent father chastens
his son in order to shame him, and as a most caring teacher chastises
the undisciplined student with a look of severity, lest the student
should perish while thinking he is in good standing. . . . Everything
that comes from God that seems to be bitter is advanced for instruction
and healing. God is a physician, God is a Father, he is a Master, and
he is not a harsh but a mild master.81 Origen conceives of suffering
as remedial, never vindictive: And when God afflicts those who de-
serve punishment, how else is it except for their good?82 God allows
us to suffer as part of the educative and remedial process that leads to
our perfection.
Similarly, Hick sees the world as a schoolroom or hospital for the
soul.83 God designs the world, he says, as a person-making environ-
ment that facilitates our moral growth and development.84 More-
over, Hick compares God to a divine Therapist who helps us over-
come all obstacles to attaining divine likeness: The divine therapy is
a matter of healing, of enabling us to fulfill our own selves and to
become more truly what our own natures cries out to be.85 Origens
view of the world as a schoolroom and hospital where God educates
and heals, sometimes through painful processes, closely parallels the
fundamental cosmological and theological presuppositions of Hicks
soul-making theodicy. For Hick, as for Origen, all suffering serves re-
demptive purposes. Just as a physician must employ painful methods
to heal his or her patient, so God uses suffering for our betterment.
As Origen states: But if he in a more bold way proceeds to cut and
cauterize, he will heal by not showing mercy, by appearing not to pity
him who is cauterized and given surgery.86 With almost identical ex-
amples, Hick comments that God may use traumatic experiences for
81
Origen Homilies on Ezekiel 1.2.23. For the critical edition, see Origene: Homelies sur Ezekiel,
trans. Marcel Borret, Sources chretiennes no. 352 (Paris: E ditions du Cerf, 1989). For the
English translation, see Origen: Homilies 114 on Ezekiel, Ancient Christian Writers, no. 62,
trans. Thomas P. Scheck (New York: Newman Press, 2010).
82
Origen Princ. 2.5.3. Compare Origen Philocalia 27.8.
83
84
Ibid., 4749.
85
Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 253. Compare Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 345.
86
Origen Homilies on Jeremiah (hereafter HomJr.) 12.4. For the critical edition, see Origene:
Homelies sur Jeremie, ed. Pierre Nautin and P. Husson, Sources chretiennes nos. 232, 238 (Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 197677). For the English translation, see Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah, Homily
on 1 Kings 28, trans. John Clark Smith, Fathers of the Church 97 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1998).
326
our amelioration just as a physician might use direct operations or

shock treatment to restore the health of his or her patient.87
For Origen, spiritual development occurs progressively in a series of
stages, not instantaneously. He explicates his theology of ascent (theo-
logia ascendens)88 through his allegorical exegesis of the Exodus: There-
fore, the ascent from Egypt to the promised land is something by which,
as I have said, we are taught in mysterious descriptions the ascent of the
soul to heaven [adscensum animae ad caelum] and the mystery of the res-
urrection of the dead.89 When read allegorically, their historical journey
becomes a map for our spiritual journey, he suggests.90 The forty-two
stages of the Exodus correspond to specific steps in the souls pilgrimage
from sinfulness to perfection.91 These discreet steps, which Origen de-
duces from the place name of each stage, may be reduced to three: the
purgative, the illuminative, and the unitive.92
We see this triadic model in Origens interpretation of the arrange-
ment of the Solomonic trilogy: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of
Songs.93 For him, they represent the three Greek branches of learn-
ing: ethics, physics, and enoptics [, , /moralis,
naturalis, inspective], which correspond to the threefold structure of
divine philosophy: moral, natural, and contemplative knowledge.94
87
88
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Introduction, in Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of
His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2001), 13.
89
Origen Homily on Numbers (hereafter HomNum.) 27.4. For the critical edition, see Origene:
Homelies sur les Nombres, vol. 3, Homelies XXXXVIII, trans. Louis Doutreleau, Sources chre-
tiennes no. 461 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2001). For the English translation, see Origen: Homily
XXVII on Numbers, in Origen, trans. Rowan Greer, 24569. For the most recent translation, see
Origen: Homilies on Numbers, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 16883.
90
On the der innere Aufstieg of the soul in Origens Homilies on Numbers 27, see Walther
Volker, Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes: eine Untersuchung zur Geschichte der Frommigkeit und
zu den Anfangen christlicher Mystik, Beitrage zur historischen Theologie 7 (Tubingen: J.C.B.
Mohr, 1931), 6275.
91
Origen HomNum. 27.3.
92
Danielou, Origen, 305.
93
The three books of Solomon are related to the traditional divisions of Greek philosophy:
moral, natural, and contemplative. . . . It would be wrong, however, to understand Origen
in a fully systematic fashion. To be sure, he regards the three as arranged in a progressive
order. . . . But the three are mutually involved with one another, and there is a sense in
which the higher stages comprehend the lower ones. It is probably better to speak of the
three as different aspects [rather than stages] of the Christian life arranged in hierarchical
order (Greer, Introduction, 23). Compare Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical
Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5660.
94
Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, 57. The origin of some such division
is Stoic, though Origen is actually referring to the sort of division found among Middle
Platonists (ibid.). Origen habitually uses the word to designate spiritual contem-
plation, but here he employs the more esoteric term (Marguerite Harl, Les trois
327
Thus, Proverbs teaches moral science, Ecclesiastes teaches natural sci-

ence, and the Song of Songs teaches contemplative science.95 As we
progress morally, intellectually, and spiritually, we advance in perfec-
tion incrementallyin a series of progressive stages.96 Only after at-
taining virtue or morality (Proverbs) can we perceive the ephemeral
nature of the world (Ecclesiastes) and recognize the need to pursue
lasting and eternal things through divine contemplation (Song of
Songs).97 We start as beginners in Proverbs, then as advancing in Ec-
clesiastes, and, finally, as perfected lovers in the Song of Songs.98 La
triple voie enseignee par les trois ouvrages de Salomon, Harl rightly
summarizes, are purification, detachement du sensible, desir dunion a
lintelligible.99 Through his allegorical reading of the stages of the Ex-
odus and the Solomonic trilogy Origen teaches the progressive nature
of spiritual development.
Moreover, Origen speculates that the process of healing extends be-
yond this life:100 For God deals with souls not in view of the fifty
years,101 so to speak, of our life here, but in view of the endless
world.102 By broadening the time frame for the purification of the
soul, Origen resolves the problem of meaningless suffering. Not all
suffering in this life can be meaningful or redemptive, but since it can
livres de Salomon et les trois parties de la philosophie dans les Prologues des Commentaires
sur le Cantique des Cantiques (dOrigene aux Chaines exegetiques grecques), Texte und Un-
tersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur 133 [1987]: 251 n. 10). For the definition
of , see G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 648.
95
Les Proverbes donnent lenseignement ethique et conduisent a la vertu; lEcclesiaste ap-
prehend a distinguer ce qui est bon de ce qui es vain et joue ainsi le role de la physique;
le Cantique des cantiques fait connatre lamour des choses celestes, le desir du divin et de
lunion a Dieu; cest le plus haut sommet de la sagesse, amour et union permettant la con-
naissance du divin (Harl, Les trois livres de Salomon, 25152).
96
On the communication and reception of the transformative pedagogy of the Solomonic
Trilogy, see Michael Vlad Niculescu, Spiritual Leavening: The Communication and Reception
of the Good News in Origens Biblical Exegesis and Transformative Pedagogy, Journal of Early
Christian Studies 15, no. 4 (2007): 44781. See his Graph A on the communication (451) and
Graph B on the reception (467).
97
Origen Commentary on the Song of Songs (hereafter ComSg.), Prologue 3. For the critical
edition of the commentaries, see Origene: Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques, ed. Luc
Bresard and Henry Crouzel, Sources chretiennes no. 37576 (Paris: E ditions du Cerf, 1991).
For the critical edition of the homilies, see Origene: Homelies sur le Cantique des Cantiques, ed.
Oliver Rousseau, Sources chretiennes no. 37 bis (Paris: E ditions du Cerf, 2007). For the
English translation, see Origen: The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies, trans. R. P. Lawson,
Ancient Christian Writers, no. 26 (New York: Newman Press, 1956).
98
Origen ComSg., Prologue. 34. La trilogie forme une progression. Le contenu des ouv-
rages conduit par etapes jusqa lenseignement le plus haut (Harl, Les trois livres de Salomon,
249). The idea of the successiveness of the stages is often emphasized (Louth, The Origins of
the Christian Mystical Tradition, 57).
99
Harl, Les trois livres de Salomon, 252.
100
101
Rufinus says sixty years.
102
328
advance the souls purification for a future existence, all suffering be-
comes meaningful in the larger narrative of the purification of the
soul: The soul, which is immortal, is not shut out by the shortness of
our present life from the divine healing and remedies.103 Gods re-
medial work on the soul extends well beyond this life, allowing the
fallen souls to find a remedy for their wounds and be restored to
what is good or to fall further into sin: This leads us to the opinion
that since, as we have frequently said, the soul is immortal and eternal,
it is possible that in the many and endless periods throughout diverse
and immeasurable ages it may either descend from the highest good
to the lowest evil or be restored from the lowest evil to the highest
good.104 Hick, similarly, acknowledges that most of us do not complete
the soul-making process in this life. We only begin to approximate the
divine life before death, but that does diminish the progress we have
made.105 We continue our journey in future lives, picking up where
we left off on earth.106 The success of the soul-making process, then,
does not depend on its completion on earth: This person-making pro-
cess, leading eventually to perfect human community, is obviously not
completed on this earth. . . . Therefore if we are ever to reach the
full realization of the potentialities of our human nature, this fulfill-
ment can only come in a continuation of our lives in another sphere
of existence after bodily death.107 Once again Hick locates the theory
of postmortem progression within the Irenaean type of theodicy, but
we clearly see that it aligns more closely with Origen, who, like Hick,
speculates on the possibility of a future existence where we continue
to grow toward perfection.
Finally, we come to the controversial question of universalism in Or-
igen (and Hick).108 Frederick Norris surveys the conflicting passages in
Origen on universalism and comes up empty: This is a muddle, he
opines.109 How do we reconcile these two seemingly contradictory
strands in the Origen corpus that create dual pictures of Origen as
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid. 3.1.23.
105
106
Ibid., 71.
107
Ibid., 51. Compare Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 253.
108
For a detailed analysis of Origens universalism, particularly vis-a-vis the problem of his
ostensible inconsistency, see Mark S. M. Scott, Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation: The
Pastoral Pedagogy of Origens Universalism, Journal of Early Christian Studies 18, no. 3 (Fall
2010), forthcoming.
109
Frederick W. Norris, Universal Salvation in Origen and Maximus, in Universalism and
the Doctrine of Hell, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1991), 56;
cf. 52 n. 40. See also C. C. Richardson, The Condemnation of Origen, Church History 6
(1937): 5355.
329
either an arch-universalist or an exclusivist?110 Origen, I argue, affirms

universalism to the spiritually advanced for whom it poses no moral
threat, while to the spiritually simple he affirms the threat of hellfire
to prod them to higher levels of spiritual maturity.111 Origen hinges
his universalism on the logic of creation and divine goodness: It would
certainly not have been logical that beings once created by God for
the enjoyment of life should utterly perish.112 In 1 Cor. 15:28 we find
the biblical spark that ignites Origens eschatological imagination, par-
ticularly the statement that God will be all in all. What does it mean
for God to be ? Origen envisions a state where God
saturates every pore of every being, where all beings contemplate
God in perfect purity and harmony, and where they participate in the
divine nature itself.113 When all Gods enemies submit to the Logos,
God will permeate all being:
Now I myself think that when it is said that God is all in all, it means that he
is also all things in each individual person. And he will be all things in each
person in such a way that everything which the rational mind, when purified
from all the dregs of its vices and utterly cleared from every cloud of wicked-
ness, can feel or understand or think will be all God and the mind will no
longer be conscious of anything besides or other than God, but will think God
and hold God and God will be the mode and measure of its every movement;
and in this way God will be all to it.114
After a lengthy process of purification, where we shed the dross of all

our sin and vice, all will be saved at the [apokatastasis]
or restoration.115
Despite the clarity of his eschatological vision of the restoration, Or-
110
Tom Greggs, Exclusivist or Universalist? Origen the Wise Steward of the Word
(CommRom. V.1.7) and the Issue of Genre, International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 3
(July 2007): 315.
111
Like all preachers, Origen was convinced that fear of the pains of hell was a useful spur
to progress along the path toward perfection (Adele Monaci Castagno, Origen the Scholar
and Pastor, trans. Frances Cooper, in Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and
Byzantine Homiletics, ed. Mary B. Cunningham and Pauline Allen [Leiden: Brill, 1998], 84).
112
Origen Princ. 1.2.4. On the affirmation of universal salvation, see also Princ. 2.10.8; 3.5.7;
4.4.9.
113
Origen Princ. 1.6.2. The key to Origens understanding of the concept of deification is
the concept of participation (Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic
Tradition [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 147).
114
115
Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, 195. On the end of evil and the apokatastasis in Origens
theology and cosmology, see the following articles by Ilaria L.E. Ramelli: Christian Soteriology
and Christian Platonism: Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Biblical and Philosophical Basis
of the Doctrine of the Apokatastasis, Vigiliae Christianae 61 (2007): 31356, and Origens
Interpretation of Hebrews 10:13: The Eventual Elimination of Evil and the Apocatastasis,
Augustinianum 47, no. 1 (2007): 8594.
330
igen categorically rejects universalism, particularly the salvation of the

devil, in his Letter to Friends in Alexandria.116 How do we resolve this
apparent contradiction? If we distinguish between the devil qua the
sinful being he has become and the devil qua the sinless being created
by God, we resolve the contradiction.117 While our sinful identity per-
ishes in hell, that is, in the process of purification, our original created
identity, purged of every trace of evil, will be restored to its primal
goodness. Recognizing the ruinous spiritual potential of teaching uni-
versalism to immature souls, he employs a dual strategy of warning the
simple multitude of the danger of hellfire in his homilies while spec-
ulating on the possibility of universalism to the spiritual elite, often
(though not always) in his theoretical works.118 Origens theology and
cosmology logically entail universalism, even though he cautiously
avoids explicating his beliefs to the simple multitude.
The plausibility of Hicks soul-making theodicy depends on the via-
bility of the doctrine of universal salvation. It is the linchpin of his
entire theory. The eternal loss of a single soul would permanently in-
scribe evil into the cosmos and negate the soul-making function of
suffering. Without universal salvation, suffering would be rendered un-
just, unredemptive, and meaningless and the soul-making process
would fail: Only if it includes the entire human race can it justify the
sins and sufferings of the entire human race throughout all history.119
Universalism does not express our well-meaning but unrealistic hopes
for the future. Rather, for Hick, it is a logical corollary of the doctrine
116
Henri Crouzel, A Letter from Origen to Friends in Alexandria, trans. J. D. Gauthier,
in The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Honor of George Vasilievich Florovsky, ed. D. Neiman
and M. Schatkin (Rome: Pontificio Istituo Orientale, 1973), 13550, particularly 14344.
Elizabeth Dively Lauro outlines some of the relevant anti-universalist passages in Origen: In
places, he suggests that salvation is not universal (PArch 2.9.8; HomJr 18; ComJn 19.88). For
example, he states that he does not know if hell is final (ComJn 28.6366) and that it may
indeed be final for some (HomJr 12.5; 19.15; HomLev 3.4; 14.4), especially demons and Satan
(HomJos 8.5; ComJn 20.174; ComRm 8.9; HomJr 18 and 19), who have become non-beings by
falling so far from God (ComJn 2.9398) (Elizabeth A. Dively Lauro, Universalism, in The
Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. J. A. McGuckin (London: Westminster/John Knox Press,
2004), 212.
117
Ronald E. Heine, Introduction, in Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John,
Books 1332, trans. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 89 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 1993), 65. Compare Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,
Books 110, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, Fathers of the Church 1034 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of America Press, 20012), 168 n. 233.
118
Jerome, Letter 84.9, trans. W. H. Fremantle, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 6, ed.
Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (1893; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 180. Compare
Richardson, The Condemnation of Origen, 56. Jerome accuses Origen of teaching univer-
salism in secret while denying it publicly. See David Satran, The Salvation of the Devil: Origen
and Origenism in Jeromes Biblical Commentaries, in Studia Patristica, vol. 23, ed. Elizabeth
A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters, 1989), 17274.
119
331
of divine love and omnipotence: We must thus affirm in faith that

there will in the final accounting be no personal life that is unper-
fected and no suffering that has not eventually become a phase in the
fulfilment of Gods good purpose. Only so, I suggest, is it possible to
believe both in the perfect goodness of God and in His unlimited ca-
pacity to perform His will. For if there are finally wasted lives and
finally unredeemed sufferings, either God is not perfect in love or He
is not sovereign in rule over His creation.120 Like Origen, Hick sees
no incompatibility between teachings on hell and universalism. The
doctrine of hell functions pedagogically as a warning meant to dis-
suade selfishness and promote progress in virtue, thereby hastening
our perfection and diminishing our suffering.121 As a parent might de-
ceive a child in order to prevent his or her harm, so Jesus teaches about
hell to spare us needless suffering, Hick (and Origen) avers.122 In re-
ality, then, no one will ever experience eternal damnation. Eventually,
over the infinite expanse of time, God will draw all humanity to per-
fection through persuasion, not coercion. In the end, every soul will
go through the soul-making process successfully and attain divine
likeness.
conclusion
Hick dubs Irenaeus the patron saint of his Irenaean type of theodicy
even though he concedes that it cannot, as such, be attributed to
Irenaeus, and scholars have adopted his attribution without critical
scrutiny.123 If Irenaeus did not develop a theodicy, as Hick admits, why
canonize him as the theological inspiration for his approach to the
problem of evil? Why not consider other Greek-speaking Christian
writers who constructed alternative frameworks to Augustine for
thinking about the problem of evil?124 As we have seen, Origens cosmic
theodicy anticipates the central tenets of Hicks soul-making theodicy.
Moreover, his expansive worldview and speculative theological ap-
proach, in stark contrast to Irenaeus, comports well with Hicks revi-
sionist agenda. Origen would be more willing than Irenaeus to dance
on the edge of orthodoxy with Hick, and sometimes transgress it, for
higher theological purposes.
120
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 340. If there is continued life after death, and if God is
ceaselessly at work for the salvation of his children, it follows that he will continue to be at
work until the work is done (Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 258).
121
122
Ibid. Compare Origen HomJr. 19.15.45, 20.3.2.
123
124
Ibid.
332
Given the striking parallels in their content and approach, it would

make more sense to canonize Origen as the patron saint of Hicks soul-
making theodicy rather than Irenaeus, who might consider it a dubious
accolade, at any rate.125 Hick follows the right theological trajectory,
but chooses the wrong interlocutor and ambassador for his ideas. We
must then dispense with the false categorization of Hicks soul-making
approach as Irenaean. After this important corrective move, which
should result in the revision of many introductions to the philosophy
of religion and the problem of evil, we can then reclassify Hicks in-
fluential soul-making theodicy as Origenian and show their fruitful af-
finities, paving the way for further refinement of and reflection on this
approach to theodicy.
Let me briefly indicate three areas where Origens theodicy, stripped
of its cosmology, has constructive potential to enrich and enhance the
soul-making approach. First, Origens theology accents the hidden
depths of Gods love, exploring the latent possibilities of divine be-
nevolence toward creation. His governing theological metaphors of
God as Father, Physician, and Teacher provide a positive theological
starting point for thinking about Gods relation to the world. Reflec-
tion on these fertile metaphors would enhance the theological ground-
ing of Hicks theodicy. Second, Origens theology of ascent, that is, his
view of life as a journey toward perfection, frames the problem of evil
within a narrative of the souls ascent to God. Origens detailed spiri-
tual programmatic, drawn from his allegorical reading of the Exodus
and the Solomonic trilogy, highlights the transformative dimension of
125
In a personal correspondence (September 9, 2008), John Hick affirms my essential thesis
but explains why he would still uphold Irenaeus as his patron saint: I think you demonstrate
that in many ways Origen is a stronger precursor than Irenaeus of the soul-making theodicy.
Irenaeus understands the fall literally, although he negates it by reducing it to a childish
mistake: he actually, in his Proof of the Apostolic Teaching, describes Adam and Eve as children.
Origen is better here in seeing the metaphorical character of the narrative; but on the other
hand he is eccentric in teaching the pre-existence of souls. Again, he does have a presumably
literal fall, but in the souls pre-existent state. Both Irenaeus and Origen teach the gradual
development of souls towards perfection, but Origen more explicitly. And Origen teaches
eventual universal salvation. So in several ways he is nearer to a modern soul-making theodicy.
But on the other hand, Irenaeus was earlier, and Origen can be seen as developing the basic
idea further and more fully. Again, considered as patron saints, Irenaeus has the advantage
of having been a bishop and now a saint, whereas Origen, although the greater thinker, has
the disadvantage of having declared a heretic. So I am inclined to stick with Irenaeus as
providing the earliest known foundation of a soul-making theodicy and as, from a PR point
of view, a more suitable patron saint. But I nevertheless see your focus on Origen, who is
much more studied today than Irenaeus, as very useful. There is room in any discussion of
theodicy for both of them. Hick, while recognizing the affinities between his approach and
Origens, hesitates to replace Irenaeus with Origen primarily for practical and political reasons.
We have shown, however, that the Irenaean categorization of his theodicy does not withstand
critical scrutiny and that Origen provides a surer foundation for his theodicy.
333
theodicy that is inherent to the soul-making perspective. Finally, on a

related point, Origen posits the interconnection between the intellec-
tual and spiritual dimensions of theodicy. We cannot dissociate the
logical problem of evil from the spiritual problem of evil: they are
inextricably linked. Hicks theory of the soul-making value of suffering
comports well with Origens expansive treatment of the problem of
evil. These, then, are just three areas where Origens theodicy enriches
and enhances Hicks soul-making approach. By rethinking his theodicy
in creative dialogue with Origen (rather than Irenaeus), Hick would
discover a vast reservoir of untapped theological insight that might give
it renewed vitality.
334

Suffering and Soul Making: Rethinking John Hick's Theodicy Author(s) : Mark S. M. Scott

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Suffering and SoulMaking:

Rethinking John Hicks Theodicy

John Hick transformed the shape of thinking about theodicy in con-

classification of Hicks soul-making or person-making theodicy as

hicks typologies: augustinian versus irenaean

been a minority report.10 After positing a theological antithesis be-

the world as soul-making: john hicks irenaean theodicy

level, God creates us in his image but continues to shape us until we

in the fire of trial and temptation outweighs the intrinsic value of

gration.40 Theoretically, pain and suffering need not confound us be-

mation at death, he posits the continuation of the process of perfection

origen: the new patron saint of hicks soul-making theodicy

fellows. They often work at cross-purposes. In the first place, Irenaeus

Origen envisions a state where all preexistent souls existed in the

our amelioration just as a physician might use direct operations or

Thus, Proverbs teaches moral science, Ecclesiastes teaches natural sci-

either an arch-universalist or an exclusivist?110 Origen, I argue, affirms

After a lengthy process of purification, where we shed the dross of all

igen categorically rejects universalism, particularly the salvation of the

of divine love and omnipotence: We must thus affirm in faith that

Given the striking parallels in their content and approach, it would

theodicy that is inherent to the soul-making perspective. Finally, on a

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