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    SPI - Strategy & Tactics 023 - Afrika Korp PDF

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    john_kolak

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    3- No.23,Sep-Oct 1970 sae rate Tactics SPECIAL Organization of Soviet Groun EASTFRONT ANALYSIS: 305 ! Tactical Game: *TABLE-TOP’ARMORED ComBat! 5 ‘No. 23 September-October 1970 Pop. 1522 ‘Act Director & Associate Editor Redmond & Simonsen Resoareh Director & Manaying Editor Albert A Nofi ‘Supplements Editor Nichola Matfoo ‘Office Manogor Fred Schachter (Ottis Stat# Cave Levin, ohn Shean, ‘Arc Lasky, Joe Sheon Copy Ealtor David iby Games Editor Sid Sackson Dinlomecy Editor Red Waker (Organization Charts John Keamae ‘Numerologist John Young Stall Eetors Dave Wills, Lou Zozchi, Stopben Pav, amor Flanagan, Lary Rustck, ohn Flanagan, Steve Li Fay Johraon, Ea Mahreana, Pred Vietmayer, Tony Morale Publcher Rene Vidar STRATEGY & TACTICS Mapacine is Copyright, 1970, The Simulations Publications. Corp. Printed in USA. All rights rosarved.Orgially edited and published by Chiistooher Wigner. All editor! and general mal sould bo sent to SAT, Box 296, NY 10009, Al advertising and wholesle correspon’ once should be sent to S&T, 296 Eas 46th St, NY 10017 Game Research & Design office located at 226 Cart 13th St. [NY send no mall thee). One year eubsriptons are $9.00 @ ear, Basic a vate $200/po92. holes term avaiable on aquest: CREDITS-DIPLOMACY lea vegstered trademark of the Games Research Company, Ine, 48 Wareham St, Boston, Moss. and fs used’ with permission. AFV.ilustravons by George Bradford, ctor of AFV. News and used’ with permasion. Offset printed with wim kil and Tender tloving Care by REFLEX OFFSET, 26 Wiest 20nd St, New York, NY. Presswork deftly performed by John Banks Binding expertly done by ABLE BOOKSINDERS, 26 West 15th St, NY, NY. Typography sibversivaly cone by RING. COMPUTER GRAPHICS, 110 East 20rd St, NY, NY. In This Issue... page ‘THE AFRIKA KORPS 3 Albert A. Nofi ORGANIZATION OF 4 SOVIET GROUND FORCES L____] James F. Dunnigan ‘F-34 (Tootical Game 3/20mm) 33xs ‘Amol Hendricks SHEETS OUTSIDE THIS ISSUE (20) 1.94 Rules Green Counter Shoot Mustard Counter Sheet Organization Chart Folder OUTGOING MAIL 2 GAGE REVIEW (Afika Korps) J8J Flanagan 3 PASSIN REVIEW Steve Patrick 22 DIPLOMACY Rod Walker 24 GAMES Sid Sackson 25 RECON 28 INCOMING MAIL Vox Popul.\ox Dei 29 ges Reo 4S DUTGOING MAII“o "The Number of the Beast.” POULTRON PRESS cca (212) 8331338 and kesp ying ‘Oh wall, more oF less got our collective ars Pinned back agen in ave 22. Nota serious fisue21, but you all jst didn't opt that excited over ow first PROFILE article on the Me109's, We usually do quite well with our lead articles. In sues 1921 thay all got 1. something. The 109 article reconeg 2.27, Not bod, of coures, But not 95, 900d 88 We expected. In fact, from reading the mal we fuspect that tho fighter “comparison” chart owed ‘the article frorn bring 3 compiste bomb. (see FEEDBACK quertion 72) Wall have to craw in our home on ar swt for @ while, although youl see trae wee sti in there pitening witha proposal for 9 ZEPPELIN articlegame. This one wat creamed up by our Numerotoglst(eccountant) John Young, vino hha tar for making sone out of umber, He iS'ako working (very hard and” with: many ‘rasatons)" on ‘on article (or series) on milter produetion during World War I. You won't 186 anything on that unl 1971 atthe bartest. Also’ doing pooriy was the GAMES. ‘and DIPLOMACY columns We ae working on ‘oth and wil continue to make improvernents ‘anil wo foot that thoes areas are covered 82 wo 25s possibe, Werealize that only arate large minority of our subscribers (20-40K) are Intaresed in nomistreal” games. andor DIPLOMACY, but minority interests mut be (continued on page 27) CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS: NORTH AFRICA 1940-42 oy Albert A. Nofi Part3: AFRIKA KORPS mand here, believe it or not, is the third Inctalinent of the North Attica Campaign naiyst If you haven't already noticed, ech ‘ntainent does not folow any strict format. ‘be prosonted witha game on the campaign. “The Devtches Afrika Korps is perhaps the most legendary toree in Modern Miltary History LGterally scores of books eulogize i, from al fides “of thehl”, Yet te bulk of the published ‘materia! on this fore is rot particularly useful a Undertending the performance of « military force 1 spite of legends, propaganda, and generals’ rmemoits, the Deuiches Afra Korps (OAK) was not t any time a particularly elite orc, indeed ‘wer sed, noting, “One Panzer Dwivon {al stand by for service in Ati.” LIGHT INFANTRY WEAPONS ‘At tha beginning of the war. most armies ‘ulpped their infantry witn boltecton Mog. liver Range Wolght Shell RPM. azine rifle. By the end of tho war thes Nad (mm (rete) (pound) (pound) oound) bean a signfican increas inthe proportion of ‘automatie end somtautoretie waepont inthe sriTis hands of the woops, Thie wend hed been {No.44 Rite 77 50 94 55/100, 260. Hane by the Germent end Ruins, In an Sten 3 3 % 65 26/100 €190 effort to counter lece of frepome In thal formations which became evdant se the wat GERMAN, progressed, The campelgn in North Atlee Rifle 98. ~ 60 3 660 reprowntad_ more oF law of randitlon MP 40 3 2B 3 2.5/100 180 barlod, with tha submachine gun becoming Inereasingy imoortont on both es 8s ‘nlue placed om elmed tire etined. Weight of {ire expresed in ts of 100 men firing for Heavy Ccaliver Range Wilone Shot RPM Garman doctine suhared to morters the task WEAPONS, “mm (mete) Gourd) (pound) pound) of reeshing enemy Infentty when vee Iimoretical 9 utlize machinegins, for ax: SFinisH ample, tToops on revere sioner or behind 2" Morar 5 450 2 278 25.0 other obstares. Morars ware on ocosion 3° Mortar Bt 2500 12 101 121.0 | massed for greater area fre effectiveness but Brn wc 1 730 a S.S/NCONSN IS TT ware usualy tied in. emall numbers to Viewers 27 100 50 55/100 73.7 companies and onor orgenietions. Inthe eto tighting In North Africa morters ware GERMAN, ot preety valued due to thevery pan nature Gm 38. 0 520 3 2 40.00 ofthe terrain and els to thelr ralathly short Grw 34 et 2400 135, 278 92.0 range. ‘They did, however, prove. vertu bn MG 34 739) 730 % BEI00 87 efor, INFANTRY Callbor Range Wiokht Shell RP ogular Held oriety re wae unerlioble or HOWITZERS (mm) (meter) (pound). pound). (pout), limprecticl. mh the oracle tees guns would ‘erally be signed to the ext lemants: so1g 18 % 3500: 880 119 595238.0 in tho cow of o regimantal azo etteck they #1633 150 ‘4600 3300 843 421.5500.3 | would @ Fo the gusting battalion. In Each infantry regimint in the Gecmen Army as provided with six 25mm snd two 160mm Infenty howittars of special design, These provided loss in erllery. support when defense hey would be emalaces just behind ‘the Main Line of Resistance to provide drect and immediate cofensive fre, ANTETANK aber Might PM ARTILLERY (mm). won) wound) BRITISH ‘nsepore both diferaivaly and offense. In 26 et 5240 2 2 200. Geterse they were arbloce in and ust behind Pr 57 7963 ia é 72.0, the mainline of Testnce (MLR) to prove tsharke 8 74 2 25 250,00. immasiata ond rasove antitank protection, 3.7" AA 34 170 ain at [refeably from enfleding postions. Inf fens antszank weapons would move forward ‘ERMAN. with the win attack lems prove Pena 2B see 2078 9.86 inmadiate anion protection forthe esau Poe 35/96 37 35 23 52 18.24 ing units Siza of shell on spotoximation Pak 38 50 ar s0 2283, 2.8 pera on various typee in ue Pak 2600 7627990 ta 1672 133.76. Flee 38 88 $12) C3 BSH ezaS 4400 German doctrine steed ther employment in fenflding,mutuatly supporting poeitone father than drat, front) fr, sch os wae the FiELo Coleer anor Weight shat. OME) el ar tee: Grhiettor aman Te os or ARTILLERY (rm) ret) (2h) (gourd) (BoURS) Fevers ope and slterrate-arfrar eosiont ae ‘nas slo fvoree. While thee practices tre to reduce the arcs of fie and ffctve range of 25a a 2100 0 28 280.0 sich vapors, they siso tended to ete 8 55" gun 140 16400 6a 2 1620 tough, flexible defensive portion. sinew the Seton of a partial smetacoront Gepended GERMAN Loon the effectiveness of enotor poston, terniem 108: 12038 38 228 195.0 reer ooDH toned to loner the decline SPHIB 150 13525 69 95.7 5828 And site ther weepors for cect fr, unens Clearer headed “higher aunoriy.Inervaned Weight of fire expressed in tw of 100 ound tne How, then, did this relatively undistingulsned fores become the most legendary of the War? ‘This te precisely the question to whieh this rite il sree aa LL MATERIAL FACTORS Generally sposking the most obvious expec of ‘we Arka Karp’ performance was is overall ‘ateral superiority visas ite Brith Empire ‘Snponents and Islan ales British equip nt, fit notable exceptions, was good Gormen ‘auipment, with Irsignficant exceptions, as berer ‘Small rms. Smal are are the backbone ofthe Infantry, and are carried by al troops a8 3 tmattr of course. Garman ifantrymen North ‘Avice usually carted the excellent Gewehr 3B fe or ite carbine counterpart. This was 2 Sturdy, boltaction weepon with some. sim lant tothe Briish LoeEnted, though not {uite so magnifico. The ‘08 rifle gis wel In Works War and as more or los tho equal of timilor weapons in foreign hands. Even today ® rhumber of pocee amis sil make some vt of this weapon. The weapon could be eauiped witha" grenade launcher and, In general, rendered excalient sevice in whatever rol it wae employed in. Supplementing the ‘98 rife ‘were. vere! savictabiesubmachingpune {ered machinenpstole in Granade ‘Walther ond Luger pistols. The Luger ‘8 Sram parabelum is probebly the most famous side- frm of this century ad was, i fet, superior ervie to the American.45 M1911 pista ‘Machine Guns. For North Attica the standard rmechine gun wes the MC ‘34. This wos Sevslopad before the war and could be used a both ight” and hewy" coniguration, depend ing upon the typeof mount. Ithed arelatwely high eyeic rate of fie and was ery to maintain ‘and srvice. The M42, acercendent of the'34, tons introduced rather late inthe war and does rot sm to have turned up in North Alia ia {any appreciable numbers. This weapon wat ‘Suticently superior ast stand asan snestor of ‘most of the automat weapons utilized by the ‘moior powers today. One Very praiseworthy {ature of German machine guns end shoud frre nas the randordized 792mm cary ‘hich mace ammunition supply consierably taser than i ether the British or alien sevcs ‘Thi waenoten inconsequentil factor when the Gorman supply mudcle in North Africa is conaiered Mortars Germany provided he oops with 0 bate type of mortar which need concern us hore, the 80mm Mortor "96 and the Bim Mortar", the Tatar coming in two varie, ‘Those weasons were very smi £0 those nthe Brite or Malian service. This catepory of weaponry more or les feeched 9 ploteu of deatopment during World War and most ‘modem mortars are not aporecibly superior ro ‘thossat that oe. Tanks. Germany's most datinguithed and most etinguisning weapons system in Works Wari tnee the tank Fourbesie types ark turned up in North Arica, two of which may be termed bottle tanks, Pz il and Pz1V, ane two of which ‘may be termed connaissance tanks, 2 2nd Pz Ti Thece were, of course, number of vriants of cach type. Of these the unquertioned best \nat the Pz IVE2-eemed with along 75mm gun fon a reletwely well protected and speedy haste but only # few ef thi type reached [North africa. At “Alamayn thre wore fess han 150 Pr IVe inthe Axe forces, confronting over 250 American’ Shermans—a roughly al ‘weapon, German tanks were fester, better gunned, ad ‘more reliable thon the vorious Brith veicies, ‘ion tended tobe beter protected. Reliability ios an important fector Inthe ser, forthe fence got ito everything and destroyed engines fata remarkable rate. High soted iste esetia factor in mobile warfre end this techie edge ‘requentiy gave the Germans the victory inthe ‘often chaotic fighting in the dese. Armored Cars, There were two classe of ‘Gorman armored cars in North Africa, several feurieel models and a few eight wheelers, “They were wel suited to het tasks ad rather fective voices. In tis are, be In mortars evelopment reached @ plete uring Wore War it and virwaly everyone had serviceable vehicle, Artlery, German artiery during World Wor 1 ‘ms generally excelent, though ot up to [American standards, Indeed, this i one arts here the British frequently had the ede. German equipment ne of high quality bat there usually waer't enough off. British unite had more tubes organic to them than German ‘ones had. Furthermore. ammunition suo {ded to fevor the Grits: thy had the stocks te’ permit ther to fire literally thovsaee of ‘ounds whenever they wanted to. Geman tipaly echelons were never sble to equal the oificiont British tesinsin geting the toolsof wor ferwerd ‘The workhorse ofthe German atiery wes the 108mm Kannon "18. This was sctualy 9 good Wert war piece given complste modernize. ‘ton and put inte production agai, not unl ‘the Briigh 25par. It bore the brunt of the ighting in all theaters and wes on excelent ‘weapon by all acount, However, fthe 105m ‘was he workhorse of German artillery, then the ‘horoughbted wes undoubtedly the 8mm Fk 8, ‘The 88mm gun started life es an efficent antiaierat gun but it was soon found 10 be ftfectve in ground bombardment and, par Sleulrly, nan antitank rol, to whichis ‘moderate caliber, high velocity shells suited it Imagnficntiy. There wore relatively few of ‘these weapons in North Africa, usually seving with tho Luftatte’s 18. Flakaivion, but they Proved deadly tothe British AFVs. Amst at ‘00d inthis role ns the Rian 76.2rm Pak "lel. Captured late of this wore adapted to German use and shipped all over the Nazi Empire, proving #0 be elective antitank weeoons German artlry in North Africa wae fully motorized ard 8 numberof sel-proplie types ‘were ovilble. Ip point of fact, North Africa ‘es the only these nwthichthe Germans were ‘o-accompith th fat, Thisvery high degree of Motorization was very useful when waging bliahrieg. Miscelancous Equipment. The miscellaneous fequipment of the German Army wasquite good, oraily equal to Brien stander, 00d te. ‘ently superior. German motor transport es (god—perticulariy after multhweded exes ‘ere eliminated (rocks would wedge nbetweon the wiels and frequent camage te te and, ‘ccationali, the entire rim) —but there usually wan't enough of i ond captured British Imeteril had to be uted. Redlos, mings, are ride and s forth vere al evieabie and both Fees frequently used whetever they could expture intforms, Rations end Medical Service, Clot ing sued to Gorman troops was generally oF ‘920d quality, the problem wes that replace: iments ware not elvays forthcoming and the desert ate up clothing pretty quickly. The ‘Situation wos not to0 teribl, howaver, since Captured ‘British stocks wore frequently on hhand. The Germen soir was wel fed, almost ‘evil ar the Britahone, though not, of cours, {0p to the luculln. American tandorcs, Gee trany’s greet contribution tothe mtr ter war undoubtedly the canned potato. In theory tach soldier reeehed nearly 1,700 grams of {oodstatfs'¢ dey, mostly in the form of black breed (700), meat” (186), ard. foch green Segetables or fruit (250). This was supple: ‘mented by spies, ensets and other edeitives Gorman medica! serves va excellent-hich Irmpis tho, on ll wer, it was nguticent in heavy combot. One of the brightest sotsin the fsntre war was the objective sey in wich the ‘medica serves 0 i rations operated North ‘ive, eheuniform di not eount much Logics. The key to victory in the desert war ‘wet the steady flow of vital supoies, par {Teulary ol and ammunition. This was the one ‘rea whore the Germant fouled vp mapnit. leony ana where the British excolies. Tanks ‘consume fuel ata fantastic rte, axe glance at ‘the tank charts wll indicate. In heavy action fnerunition nas fred off st very high rats. Both commocities had to be replaced, The Brian maneged to bulld up an eficiont supply service which, whan linked with superior Alisd industria! might, uavally kept their troops fo ‘materiel, The Germs aed Rommel, who once remarked that he left logatce up to stttolicrs, ead to foboH the blame on the Italian Navy and most writers on North Afri have taken him to heart. An examination ofthe Halen Navy's recordin the comoy rune to North Afrce reves some Fimoresting facts ‘A critical junctures inthe campaign the Brteh ‘tempted to strange the Axis supply lines 0 North Alic, The two most ring pede were the latter portions of 1047 ond 1942, wien "Males unleashed ee flaming sword” ae the Royal Navy are Royal Air Force tied 10 intersict the Conta! MecRecroraan. An-exary ination of the accompanying chart produese some interesting retults From July to Deoer ber 1941, 16.4% of the men acl 26.9% ofthe rratriel shipped to North Afrien sled 0 arive: {rom Joly £0 December 1982, 16.1%0f terse and 35.9% of the materiel filed to rive, Supposoaly asa result of this situation the Ane nits at the front were being deprived of ‘reteiel and replacements, yet during the TTaniian Campaign of 1949 the figures were 14.7% of the men and 42% of the matarielt “There were no sar complaints from German ‘commandors at that period ang moet units vere ot greatly undersupelig. Why, then, was the problem so acute nthe erie period? ‘The key problem es rot in the sea wsnsoort but inthe lord trnshipment of the replace mente and materiel Rommel needed 60,000 {one of supoly per month in 1942. In the last ‘months of 1042 an average of 88,200 tone ‘6 of supplies were being unloaded in North Arica per month. But they hed to be un loaded in places like Tobruk, over 300 miles behind the ‘Alsmeyn position; or Benghazi, Dearly 600 miter in the rear; or even Tipo, ‘bout 1800 miles of, From thoes port itera. Iy evary ounce of materiel had ta be trucked ‘27088 the lerath of Altica up to the front Motor gasoline weighs 6.11 pounds 10 the gallon, in drums up to 7.81 pourds per gaan. ‘A.25 ton tank truck, consumes. in moving 160 kliometers, 20 gallons of garalin, ard 1.6 ‘gallons of othar pettoleum progucts, without Considering addtional consumation due to ‘near ofthe vehicle, desert elimata, and combat conditions. ‘Thus, 12. git 1000 ‘allo of {aebiine from Tobruk to the “Alamayn pos! tion costs 120 gallons of gasoline and 3.6 fan average of 10% for wastage ard spilage ‘Gur 1,000 galions now reeds 768 and ve have SEALIFT OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL T O NORTH AFRICA, 1940:1949 ‘Time periods snd con tnd on the land fronts Men Materiel (te) Landed ‘estnation Frted Unlonded ‘estnation wipva Jona September 1980 ‘Sa traffic litl opposed by enemy. Firs allan ground offeniva” (up. to Sidi Baran) ‘October 1940-Januory 1941 ‘Growing Britsh sires massures against ‘his supply trafic. Firs British ground offensive (occupation of Cyrenscal Febeuary-tune 1081 iret avs otoneve agent Mats, Fist tale German ground offensive up to Halfeya. uly Dacember 1941 Fist British senaval offensive sprint the Libyan supply traffic, Second Brien ground offensive (new ‘ecupation of Cyrenaical. Janusry-June 1982) ‘Second eltnaval offensive againat Matt, ‘and ai-nvelblockeda ofthat land. Second Malo-German ground offensive (up ‘9 ’Alamoyni. July-December 1982 ‘Second Anglo-American ai-naval offonsive ‘guint the Libyan supply traf ‘Third British ground ottensive loccupation of oof Libya). ‘Towle for Libye 13619 a905 oo east 51% 164% 162% 78st ww1% 189,198 aan 148.817 ‘7208 ver72 3e% 49435 ar g16 08%, 356,208 aais7s 355% 7409 56,200 10% TUNISIA November 1982:Fobrusry 1943 Initial phase of Anlo-Amercan air-naval ‘oltensves gains the Tunsion tretfie and the preliminaries ofthe blated ‘Anglo: marcsn ground offensive, Marche April 1943 Final phaso of the sicnaval offensive sgsist the supply atte and of the Distr ground ofersive “Totals for Tunisia 54% 11,508 7% 208 ™ ae a ausaz 308.592 790% GENERAL TOTAL bya: Tunisia 2erae8 ex 2238.487 169% ‘Tho table sets forth the rumbers of man snd fons of supplies eetually reaching’ North [Alrigon ports In Ttllan ships during tho North [ican and,” for comperison,. Tunisian Campaigns lus the percentage of mon and material not attving at thelr” propor etination, Table. does not reflect metare ‘and mon transported in Gorman owned vests, of which 2 small number operated in the Mediterranean during this period. Alc lifted men and matriel also not considered, but not (of melor impor. ‘Totals break down a8 149,434 Italien troops, 112,010 German; 60,484 tora of POLS for the Italians,” 220,681 for the Gorman 41,147,769. tone of other meteriel for the lian Uneluding 28,466 vehicles and tn, 116,000 forthe Germans (92,288 vehicles ond tankel. Approximately 38 per cont of the cargoes taken t0. Africa were destined for Geman force, being higher during the, ‘Tunisian operations and. somewhat lower during the Western Desert fighting. yet to send the tank trucks back, which wit Cost snother 132 gallons! We have stil to bring fomverd single ounce of ammunition, pare pert, foodstufs or other POLS, and eniy 638 filons have reached the (ronti And we are Dperatig from Tobruk, rot Trill! Nov have the ealcutate in loss due to enemy action! How did the Britieh solve this problem? They {ook sdrartege of raltoad which extended from Alexandre to the vicinity of “Alamaya thd extended it across the Libyan fronton ‘That Rommel didnot activate tha line when fe captured nearly 200 miles off in mig-1982 In indeative of hie nck of ability es logs fan, Rol transport is more efficient than road: a standard. gauge steam locomotive (2:80) consumes €5 pounds of cos) per Kilometer of train being pulled, or about 700 pounds per hour Ie can tengpart, in that Kiersey, almost half million gallons-on par, Even off paper the record I presi Purthermore, reroade are very difficutt ta bets to knock out from the Band usualy can be repaired overnight, as experience in Germ fny in 198445 ond Vietnam In 196568 has proven Roma's shortightednass ip this sreo—his chef of supply in early 1961 was 2 lowly ‘rajorsmay wall Rave cost him tho campaign. Tn short, supplies were gesting t North Africa but the supply setup in Africa prevented what ‘hare wa from getting to the front. [All things being considered then, the A Korpe ha fine equipment, though nat abwa {ough of It It ar not inferior in any way to ‘the Grits in terms of quality. The Gorman froteral edge was, of itt, however, inst Felent to produce the successful campaigns of the Aleka Korps, The roots of these le fo other spheres. HISTORICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, ‘IND DOCTRINAL FACTORS. 1 one were 10 look for the peroct miltry tectaty he would not have to look further than ‘modern Germany. In the more than 300 years fom the sccemion of ‘Frederick William at Pek tt) — An obsolate tank by 1940. Stl in use Ue ate "42 in "tole battallons (28% of uni. A 20d, Tight vobiele wit, Sxcaliant” maneuverability ended up a6 9 recon vehicle aku If — Main Garment unt sriy 42. Ate MST {o hold is own aint fe vant, Brith vehicles Ata Sithocgh inferior ‘othe ABE Fusion Tce, Unly ASS Comprised haf of he thy ‘talons sgt, om + ker Il — Called they IEE "Mark 3 special” by the CN Britis becsune of ts pe + Pakw Ie — The main German “heavy” tank unt ‘erly 42. Unsolly about SUN 28 POL CONSUMPTION FOR COMBAT AND NON-CONBAT VEHICLES thicker amor and onger AS 25% of te tank botaion, ASD oo per compared to Petit “age 2a. || Amed win a vshort” “ABE 13° Sipe appacred in law "41 AES Z|] mm gon of limited vate ABE LA Selsoon comprindat of Ghee tank taraon tn il but PAN 2 fom power it ues superior Clee Pei en 8 Bain ene ond BS Sep a Bt aks Prkur 1VI2 — Called she rvve privia || AO — Tho chief Briss T¥RE Ao mark spacial” by the WIGHT St ankin 19aores, WGK Te rah beeese of is more SUN Ta || "ar roughly equal to SUN a powertul "gun Fit aloud gr || German tanks opposed, at ie Sppeared in say 82. aoe F || sitough it wor boy used “ABE Te wee ie || ona very prone to ABS Ba || Sekdoms ovntitwa AR Ey Aime His || aninterir tok ori Me ee & Siew 2 ses ae ed Zon Prac 200 Type Unit | Consimetion 160 Kem “Tonk Battalion 28 tone eu “Tonk Battalion tore rw) Motorized Unit, ‘5S tom {per 1000 ment “This wae standird consumption of POL (Petroleum, “Oils and Lubricants) of ‘basic ‘quipment. Each tank battalion rated at 50 fanks plus 120 motor vehicles Motorized iisions_normaliy had about 5 men. per ‘eicle, Thur each 1000 men equate sbout 50 “isles morty 3 ton” trucks with come heavier and some tighter). Consumption taleulsted for travel over roads. Cross country {rovel would) use same amount of fel for tout half the ditance. CRUSADER 3 — The lat t¥Pe cramae 3 fof the “Crusader” sores of WEIGHT Z1Gt eeuter” tanks iron 40mm gun. Far superior to the AMO. sitiough stil Inferign to the US M4 Seat He (Sherman) ond German Pe "Glew 3 we. Prod ano Ms — Better known a8 Tyre tse the SHERMAN, Beet tox NEI Sh inthe wore during ine SON 0 wa em intone dy Geman Pe Vand Soviet “Aue Sox T3ereo."eascaty por ABS EH design although excelent AS 2 recone rable sn 338 Bran in Norm Airey “Ee mmesived buntrads in tne Sy "2 ‘CONSTRUCTION, DEMOLITION, AND RECON ISTRUCTION ~ RAILROADS AND ROADS 'A comperitan betwean the standard one weak failrooa and’ two lane asphalt oF grveied Feud in tarain such es North Afrea provide conection costa ‘amoliven com Reconstruction | Nove that sorter catenas of wack detoyed eecrption eeofcan | usally oe reparad more chesly then short torah | rentrwkm| ioronsiw | mene | struction latancos of ones ROAD. 27 geied+ | 2164 | ©6000 | 200° 2 10.20% | amount required to erter the road bayond e' gen Immcnte use without pa Fatross fir sto usset ac, 27 (os above é ‘arama | 328 hee i ae 2 aa ROAD or AR Tunnel vores | varies | 12,000 © | seproeenes 100% | *Assuras a two lane (279 or single track Bailey through truss bridge, Demolition figie Bree }23 rna.om| 12210m | 00 26 50.90% Varies wit length of bridge rom 400" 0 800" 2000 {oe one tomar, with sidings erninals, RAILROAD a 12%denvoyag|{OWers et. including lying roadbed. Rapa . Lt thre depends uoon typ aed nature of derag, a & a [A double rack ina cont conderoby Tess thon ewig that of the snge lina ‘Desert Conaitions WATER CONSUMPTION Petts gor SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS Garman army. Word War 1 consumption | remarae Woon ‘Tworot Action | "of" | Disione! Requirement suppry | tone rvinimam 23s | mites peradsoniy roca! 24) | nor eeoiing or washing) | | tactvey 5:10ibs| 33:75 Tobies gives pounds of supplies OF wt ypes sorrel 6 cookingend weshig | |/IM@ppInG UB ||| 1820) 712%60)| needed ec solr’ Toles, whewnar combatent oF support oops, including fd, srarch or ous 8 eve Deters ight | 2025 | 150-180 | el, armunivon, ard missalioneous metre fer ‘doy but excluding ereaR ond far rear combat 26 ‘terve Reavy | 2660, | 480:890)| reculroments Orion racirerent based on Savision of 15,000 men, hesoitsized 10 | pores offensive 2550 | 180330 Elector of srandenburpPrstia in 1640, tothe in Workd Wor | vas, 10 a considerable extent, er men survivd the poster pure instituted by fall of Adolah Hier 8 Funrer of Germany In 1005, tha leader ofthe Prussan-German state but rarely sppesred in publi out of uniforrn, ‘ath the exception of the ephemeral Weimer Republic {1918-1934}. Duting thir period al of ‘hese indiviguats and there were ony theteen of them, ware or aspired tobe generale-axceptin of course, President Fraderick Eb (1918-4825). Napoleon sic, "Prussie was hatched from acannon bal" and Frederick the Great put it even mare succinctly when si, "The Army Is Prussia” The sparsenesr of the statement belie ts implications. The Army wat ot the product of Prussia, Prussia was the product ot the Army. Until the Electors of BrandenborpPrusia bogen to build an army, ‘heir state nas but a fow miserable square miles Inthe midst of some ofthe finest campaigning (gourd in Central Europe. During the Thirty ‘Years war eer yone nad marched over Brande burg, though the sate was fochnialy nautel for much of the conflict. The Army made Prussia secure, made Ht potent, and’ made it ‘Timo en again thismapiticent to! proved the salvation of Prussia and, in 1871, of Germany Its after it won vires ajc wars in six yoore to bring about the long cherished dream of & United Germeny, Victory aches the victor a geal deal, Defeat teaches the vanquished more, Germany's defeat fesponsible for ‘Germany's achiovements World War 11. The unjust and vindictive Freaty ‘of Versailles, aside from providing German Dropagandists with ammunition, setully par. ‘mitted the German ‘Armed Forces to lay the foundations for tha all conquering Wehrmacht (of 1998-1842. Ifthe Aro vas to be imitd 12 109,000 long serve oop Onn that Army saw tot that they were 100,000 leaders: men abe, 1 full mobilization, to move up tom corporal {0 sergeant, from liovtonants to majors form colonels to" general. A force possessing that Unique quality which turns mots int armies leaders. Similarly, the Varssiles etcoment deprived Germany of tanks and aircraft and forbade her to cevolop along thee lines. This ts, met, {2 blessing in disqi, While between the wars {he Allied ernst ie along on old World lor stocks and limited production runs which fod to last ten or more years, the Gormen Army ould utilize 9 fow hard erates prototypes far ‘ff in Russia or Sweden or Fintand, When the ‘ime for full produation coms the rchnies bugs hhad been overcome and there was no obsolete ‘equipment vingarcund tofu taining, “The los ofthe war alsa rlived Germany ofthe burden of short of “victorious” old warhores men ike those who would prove burden to France: Weygand, Gamal, Petin. ny yours ‘General Hane von Seekt2sagniicently sist. fr cheractor~and only the best of those, Yor Seokt convened aboard to examine the esses (ofthe Gefest are one conctusion vat hat tore as 100 great a communication gap between the officers ond the man. These were the men who ad imoibed inflation tatee on the Eastern Front wth Hutir, iho had sean tanks panic thei men in the West fa 1948, and who ‘RoUld lbe young in 1928, “The Aemy was sail but It wae pure and the ‘eniries gave Ht the benetic of reli waning. ‘The Spenish Chil Wor wor not partisulery Informative for the Gurmane, their real rle 0 ‘the war vas insignificant when compared vith ‘thar roputed role, But other operations were Imore important, lessspeeacula Thescupa tion of Ausiria in 1897, of Ue Sudeteniang in 1898, ar of Czechosiovakian 1930haped the German’ Army iron out ite command. and communications networks, heed sat office's become fair with thai jos, and helped ld ‘officers acauire fel Yor terrain under highly ‘alse conditions. These operations sso went far towards locating and correcting the defects i the organization and employment of mb) troops Mobile, or panzer, roops were one area in which Hitler "made a very great contribution. He favored the new concepts and wasinatumen GERMAN ARMORED DIVISION ‘The seruewre glen here is, at best, an pproximation of she baie rructure of the etn and. 2iet Panzer Divisione. in North [lcca The T/OBE of these formations varied considerably from battle to. battle, indeed {kom doy to day. In fect, the entire Afrika Korps was something of 8 big happy fami. tnd, while three bare divisional formationg 16th and. 21st Panaoe sn 90th Light Afrika Diviion-were always ‘maintained, troops were often shifted about In ‘der to. mission orient. certain of the formations. The wee done much mo ffecovaly than inthe Britsh Army” and ‘sional integrity” wes valued considerably more inthe Afrika Korps. For the basi Sructure of the infantry divisions and lower ‘organizations the reader ie refered t0 the afte on the SOVIET GROUND FORCES. in overcoming the objections ofthe last ofthe ‘waditionaite” to the new sveapons. He treated the mobile woops in much the Some fashion thn Eighteenth Century monerch troateahieavaty ‘The Polish Campaign proved the final training sxercae. Germany could undoubtesty have won ‘without the panzersbut te sso leerned were Trvatasle whan the tine care to confront the Franeh and Enlish ard Russians iter Basically the German Army sant two of 2 hatfdozen or more division types to North ‘Alica, the Penzse’ Division and the Light ivi, In tine with standard German practice there orgenizations had a base T/OBE which formed the core ofthe unt. To this coro were then attached sdeltionalcloments as roaded engineers, antitank, antrawerat, machine funners, nds0 0, “The German division was 8 magnificent organ: feation desgned fora high dogree a fexbty vet aye able 1 function are division. Thus, ‘ne division might be broken down into four oF ‘more kamotgrupoen~tak forces—but all kamp> faruppen would remain under cvsionel com ‘mand end operate in tha some aes, faery from the Brits practice, which often found the brigades of @ cision seatered sit over the battled with title or ro aivsonal super ‘sion powible. This high degree of flexblity in the German divison may be likened t0 the ‘modern duisional concept, with its non-T/OBE brigade eructur, permittiag varied but inter related mesons. “Tne Panzer Division sficint infantry 980 represent an intgrated force: there masro nets {reall on the Light Dison for footers Similarly the Light Divisione were sufficiently upaled ith tanks and other AFVsas to pert them to operate independently of the Panzer Dnisons. This ultimately meant that aGerman Commander who knew his trade-sod most Sid -could operate with fewer unite He would be etiiing ne reuroge to the fullest. NO ‘iuional sft or support elemant need st out the fight in the rear because all or part ofits combat elements were off somennere ol Finally German organization sessed thet the commander be present on the field eather than bck at some communications center or other ‘aide from morale implications this permitted ‘more rapid restion to tactical developments tnd. went for towards cresting an eiient German tactics were Interesting 10 sy thea. Ute in Work! War | they Rad developed 9 ‘acti system for beating the trench deadlock Father than the mechanic! solution useaby te [iler-the tant. This es infrotion tacts ons fil stands a he bai of madera conventional, factes Even in Wer Wer tit was not ented 0 (Germans slone, Pershing’s Doughboy: knew something about. Sesially inftration tactics may be termed ‘peimitve” One wont fornord, posily afar a bret bambarament, avoiding points of sth Fesistanee. The idea was to gain ground ‘rly a8 pomible and to let the rear slements ‘mop up the enery'sstrong points. The Germans ‘ppl’ this technique to armores-mabile a fuperior term-werfers and came up with biltekrag afar throwing in close ie support Punch bole inthe enemy's postion, pour though with mobile troops, ae! romp aero the enemy's supply end communications lines ‘sie elnfantry mops up the bypassed troops Inthe dca tis wae even eas then eeonhers ‘thare wat alvays a gop In tho enemy's poston, slong his southom flank. The Britsh even went Se for as 0 cooperateby locking their reops uD in "boxes," thereby permitting te By basing Of strong bode of troupe with even greater fossa, The slow roving Italian infantry could fereon ielates “owes” with litte Gorman helpand ioition in the desert uavaly meant doom In defensive attesthe Germans unually rad to trm the operation into an setive ane, As the tnamy gave agre of going ove tothe attack the ‘Handard Geerman procedure wosto pullback the forward oops end let te attack ors out ‘on mineiade, machine guns, ant tan atl, Sd fea gun. Meare they would gate up their motile elementsprimarly tanks inthe rear ard ty to launeh aflanking counter attack, ‘ether an easy possibilty nthe desert due to the Constantly exoosed southern flank. That, ia & ‘utahelymasit. The Grits never leer to des) with thee tactes, they just grew cautious and ‘ic for material supertorty. “Thu combination of superior organization and tactie with excellent materiel wa virtually Unbeatable, yet the Afrika Korps had sill more ingforit Il, PS¥CHOLOGICAL AND ‘SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS, “Tho soca an psychological foundation of th OAK's victories were fundamentally sete swith those which parmitted the great German Vetere of 1999-1982 and’ the tenaciour ‘German resistance of 1943-1945, a vie Tid Reich rumbled Into the destroction which i ‘rovoked. Thes factors were—ond porhopsst fre-deapiy ingrained in the. fabric. ofthe Prossgn German State, ae we noted above, in provided some 470.000 motor vehicis, which was about equal to the {etal German’ production and. considerably ‘nore than Ue Russians themselves produce. ‘The westrm Allies alo provided considerable arounts of ammunition, raw materials, eth: ing and food. But the Ausione detested the Germans ving Fussln weapons, Russian of ganization, Fusion tastes, Rusin lederehia nd, above al, Russian nanpome Any study ofthe Fusslan ground forces during ‘rls War Two must include ® comporieon vith their opponents, the Geemans. For thie Fearon ne wil crow frequent and detailed comparsore” between Russian and German fmethods and materia. Otherwise we would hove ro way of evaluating what we are ety ing. This analysis wil over the Soviet ground {orees in term of organization, tactic, nado ship, weapons and equipment. Again, sting ‘Srgpoeation by itself comes off as a sterile atistcal exert, But frst wre must unravel @ litle bockground material about Russa and ite ‘rmed frees, Jn 1961 Rusia contsines some 170 milion people, about 25 milion of them were av Sie for military servien All adult males ware Table for two yoats of service end each yeoe's ‘ass" (minus 8 1 26R oF "ansuitble™ de ending on amy ned) wnt into the reerver iter competing thei tisining. A certain lmount of the army was composed of "regu are" and many ‘Units were mere. sklatone (vith more equipment than manpower fo be fit out by recatod reserva when mobslice tion was declared. In 1941 the “pool” of trained reervists qumbored some eleven to twelve malin men, The "active" army con. tained some nine milion men, although only 47 milion were in European Fussa (there was il'b danger of wor wih Japan in tie For Est, where many of tho best Soviet unite were then stationed. At the tine the Sovit ground forces contained some rite infantry) ci sions. thirty calvary civisone and 78 tank and ‘motorized brigades, ‘The peace time training of Soviet army troops was characterized by. ong and tasious pro: {yams of instction. Most of this "ote type Teaching was found useless during the war and the aiting programs were revampsd after the ‘oar although they sill tended to be quite long {a ine month program wo used for NCOs wile officer cancidater wont trough @ two year coutel. During the war the NCO course was towered to three monthe, and to. sh ‘month for officer candiater Forth orvats the taining wes sls0 long and tedious, and ‘often uninspired. The reasons, for all thie redundant taining, go back to te educational ‘fatut oF all Sovee solders On the average, Fusion privates had about four yeort of schooling, NCO's soven yass ace seven £0 ton {Years for officrs. although most Soviet itt ere were literate, thoy had Title sdueetion beyond that. Tht, of cores, war a watts provement over the largely” iterate Czor's Stmies in World War One) But despite. the {tfors of the Communit government to edu ste he Rusins people, they could only 30 0 ‘much in the 24 years they ware in power before 1941, Even though German sles had 50 to 80% mare education, the ganera eroey Of the Soviet atmy wos'2 entice factor In Russia's defeat ofthe Nox war machine ‘Among its oer achievements, the Communist party had “opened up” the Russian armed forces £9 ll thore who were abe. An “artes racy of the sie" had ren t0 positions of ‘commend and despite the. general level of ignorance stil around in 1981 it was atleast, possible forthe Musians to get peak perform: roe out of the manpower they had The Soviet ciettor Stn, ci, Howere, alos erwoy this achievement in the ite 1920' tntien, in af of Baronoi, he caused most oF the higher commaners of the Russian ory {0 be exteuted, jaled or sperated rom the sevice for “trenson” Half of al the Soviet Sry’ officers were thus diapoved of, includ: Ing 80% of al generale and 80% of a! colonels. Many of those jaled were. "rohabitcated™ ‘when the war Broke out. But the momentary lack of experienced niger commanders almost proved fatal On the olus sido the “purge” did rable many able younger officers 10 rise more Fapicly than would otheniae Rave been pos ‘Bole, Ae it os, the leadership of Ue Soviet (pound forces wae much younger sed much tore “proven inaction) than in most other ‘orld War Two armies Because the “Red. Workers ond. Peasant’: ‘Aeray” (he oficial tite) wos basically a evo. Iutionary organization, it had ld the word In veloping new, promising and untried. il {ory Innovations. For example, the Rea Army teas the fast to establish parachute Units, 3 “ool as large motorized and tank units. But the Inck ‘of a broad roucetinal bane” (as ios teallable in America ond. Germany) made it Sifeult, i not moon, for the Rustans to ‘ake al ofthe Innovations «military reality ‘The most glaring failure wasn the Use of parechute fee and the use of “convention Combined srms organization. The Tack of @ Parachute force large "combined arms” units proved to be slmost fatal. How the Russian ‘vercare that particular groblery i, intel ‘he major theme ofthis anaiv, ts wel ne the tmajorremon for their sucess in defesting the Germans ‘The Divisional Organization Chart clearly shows that the 9/39 infontry division wae ‘rgenized_ along traditional "wertrn” lines. ‘Thats, was 8 “combined sera” fore, This mana ‘that the divison eomtaned sli the \neapons and specialist support units necessary {or most combst situations. But Russa, dex pite ir energetic (albeit teclous) attempts at taining “spectliss” il not realy poss the ‘ained manpower "poot” Irom whieh to am all the ‘echnicaly competent Tenpower 19 fan auch unite. The organizations! policy {otced upon it by the emergency demans wat too radical for evan the “evolution” ringed rower leaders (0 imagine. The Russo-Finish Weer of 1940" di, however, give then a important hint st whet wes 0 come, The Finns, a western” type country much smaller ‘than "Husia hed beaten of! the. "puede. combined arms army” of Russie. The result tags the 5/41 infentry division. Many of the larger specialized units, such athe ight tank, engineer and. antiaircraft bettlions, ware taken out of the division. Other unis In the Ghision, fuoh at the rifle regiments and battalions, were also stripped of ther “speca {st units (usually signal ene engineer. But the ‘rain purpose of this "first reorganization” ‘es 1 provide greter end ‘more ecole eserves of these specialized motorized, ong hee, ailery and techrial unit The Rue ‘Sant wore stil not Tuly eonviness that they ~ vi33 | 1466 | = s |e a : 3 4 iso | 82 oo | 288 74 14 | 60 6 rR 21 | 21 | 219 | 249 am |) 12 wet | ast | ae [zw | sree | eae | ze tor | ane 7 0 u In emty 41 ware wigsd out during ta test Garman advances, Aftor that, as more armored vehicles came off the production lings, small armored units were formed that would Tater be Combined into the Russion equivalent of the German “panzerdivision." The Soviet Tank CCorpr wa, for ll pracie! purposes, © tank Sision. Ard 9 particularly well organized one Bt that. It avoided one glaring evar of al the arly western tank divisions; too many tanks tee not enough infantry. By 1943/44 most ‘Semin had resized their err and thier tank ‘dvsions ware about 20% infantry, The Tek Corps wae the same, 22% of is vrength was Infantry, slmost al of SMG armed, tt also contained 240 arrored fighting vehicles (ARV, tanks and other gun armed and armored ‘hile Its ona main weakness wae lack of srtilly, forall practical purposes there mas fone. Thus if the tank corps came un agsinet ny organized (backed Up by ortlery) rex fence it had to elther try aed rash is way ‘ough (risky undertaking, go sround the Tesetanea or pull back and wait for friendly frtanery ane ratory te show up. This lost ‘ption vival signalled the and of wetaver “offensive” the tank corps was participating in. Another deficiency of the Soviet tank forces was the lack of an efficient supaly sarvie, parcularty a motorized one. One of the things which prevented the Germans from cverrunning sit oF Rusia in 1041 war ¢ tly rmatorzed” supply service, “To a certsin axtent this was also tue of the Allod sdvance aeross France in 1844, Sutin this area, where tho western Alles were best [Souipped and the Germans somewhat ie wall ‘off, the Fusions were really in trouble. One hat only to look. at the proportions of combat” troops to other “support” Woops to se the differance. In the Soviat army 86% of the ‘oops tere in combat Unite, in the German army 40% were in combat unite 9 the Armerican army oniy 23% ware geting sot ‘However, during the war the Americans hod the finest artery force ever put into the il, the Rusia the last efficient. They nesded very men atthe front. Thus usian “offers: Fer” were usualy limited to the amount of mileage the Tanks could get out of one oF wo, Teac of foe, Butte tae corps ha plant oF good points It vas 9 rlotiely small foree with. large “punch.” The ‘Gorman a4 Donzrdivision had 13,760 men, 200 infantry, Bis wrtilerywespors ond 180 AFV. The Soviet tank cores hed 13% fewer men ito be fed and supplied end replaced when wounded), 278 foworinfonty (but all wore wed wath Butomatic. woopors), en. equal amount of frtilery weapons (elthough the Geren ones were often more efficient), and 60% more AAFV (of eaval if not superior design. More. lover, by the end of 1943 the Russians has ‘more tank corps (28) than the Germans haa ‘anzerivsone inthe eae (25). At this point ‘the Russians were sso beginning to overtake ‘the Germans in tote numer of AFV sala fom the entre front (6026 to 5400 for the Germans) Both the Germans and the Russians alo used [AF in other types of units. The Germans had heir "parzergrenedierdivion” shile the uslane hed Aechanized Corps. Again, the Fusian mechanized corps was aothing more than a motorized infantry division. But f wos 2 very tage vison, as large es the eral 41039 sowat rifle civiion. fe vas the largest "division" size unit the Rusiane ud, There ere never very many of them a6 it WE xerematy dificult te obtain the large number t required to man them. A com the Germen paraergrenadierdn ‘Son is ilumineting The’ German unit hac 132800 men, 7100 infentry, 243. artillery weapons and 92 AFV. The mechanid corpe had 26% ‘mere men, 2% more intatey, 22% ‘more artilry weapons ard 150% more AFV. ‘The mechanized corot wes ¢ Wuly "speci laad"” "unit ts epeciaty wes allowing. up breaks ereoted inthe German lene and moving forwoed for 6 posible and then, whe ould goo. further, digging. in wth is Suneane infantry and holding off everything {he Germans could throw at thar (Kh wae often considorabla at the macnanined corse had the habit of occupying critical commun {ations canter far in the Fer of the Garman lines) uot the Soviet infantry could catch up. During 1943, and even occasionally In 1044, many tank corps in similar posione Were (ipod “out. ‘This rorly” Moppened tothe “heavier” machenizad corps. But, as wo men tioned before, there were never enough brparionced and technically trained Russian {woops avaiable to form more than a dazen of these unite ‘The drain of ‘lented manpower into the rmochanized orcas (os wel as nto the airforce, fawy and arilry) naturally fate the infantry With the lest talented menpower (this happer ‘chin all other armies so), Thus the Soviet, "Motorized Grou Fores” became, a nthe German my, the. elite” of the. ground forces They had th best manpower, the best ining andthe best ond. most powerel ‘equipment. While the Soviet infantry di most (of the fohting (ard dying) throughout the war, it_was th mechanized forees which ‘etverad the "knockout punch" ard provised the “lan line of defen” during German Ereakthroughelalthough this wat nat ganeraily ‘wue during the fist year and a helt of the war ‘The infantry was not without mechanized forces altogether During the frst year ofthe war most of the Soviet AFV were diributes in small units (20 t0 00 vehicles) to rifle lusions. ‘This practice sscounted for some 160% af tho 10,000 AFV (mosty lent nd/or cbsolets) evade in June 1047. A year later ‘most of these vehicles were gone, Srl were Feplacad with newer models alrdy. it mas froduetion Inthe fst thea months of 7842 unis producad 4700 AFV (Gormany produc ‘25 5800 for the entre year. Only 20% of ‘hese were the “medium” 7-34 and KV. ‘module, while 85% wore of the Nanvier clas ‘Thow new AFV ware invataaly formed int indeoendant Tenk Srigaas, which were vie IW only employed in’ mass formation, ‘The Germans, capabi of more efficent “combined as” operations, employed. about 25% of their AFV in non divisional tank and ant tank Units As the war progressd, the Germans tended to. spread “their AFV out among Infantry divisions in the form of aeault gun snd ontitanke unite. Thit "etifening” was Imcesary becouse of the enormous” trons Being. held by “the infantry disione (20 Kilometers was common), trontages which twote too great t0 be ssequetaly covered BY sriery alone. So the AFV (primary “azote uns.""28% of all Garman AFV in 42, 35% in "3 and 50% in “4h wore rely disributed mong the infantry. The rest ofthe AFV want fo e_pancer/panzerrenasiersnisans, ond these ware primarily sank. but &e Sova hss such masses of infantry usally at West TWICE ae much as the Germans and their es") that they could afford to place almost ail of theie AFV into large unit; te Tank and Mechanized Corps. she beginning of the war ‘here were 78 tank and mechanized brigades {tho bone unies forthe larger "Compe" and, ssthough most of these were wiped ovt during 94 ond "42, new anes were constentlyrisad ‘nd, as thoy survived (many dn) they were ‘rentualy formed inte Tank Core, Indapend fom Tank "Regiments (ef 40 vehicles} we fro formed, but thoes were stapgap mosis nd most were either upg adoa to brigades oF onverteg "toa fow special "heavy tank” Feaiments. When the fist lore quantities of Fssian “axeslt guns” (he SU and JSU series) bbcare ovilable in stl "43 they were also formed into “regiments,” although mort went Ineo the Tank ang Mechan'2 brigades nets fof independent rogimente There were Says ‘more Independent tank brigedee than tank corps, and those brigades would be vad to Drovide whetover"stfening” usually for ttacks te rill divisions might need ‘Aside from their lack of ffcint organic artery, the Russian Tank ang Mechanized Corps were probably. the most atiiently ‘organizes “vison #20" armored formations to ee ection during the wat. This was 50 ‘rimariy beceuse ofthe efficient integrtion fF ARV, infantry and support weapons. And Finally, sere we he abiity oF the Russane to iraster the "art" of mabe warfare, It 200% ‘thor to yours to do ft, and the organisation fof their mobile units contains mony hints on how they. wore able to scheve. what. the Germans thovghe was en impossibility THE SOVIET ARTILLERY FORCES Although not as obvious in their seiovemants ‘5 the mobile foes, the Soviet artery forces {many guna aa the mobil forces had AFU by {the ond of 1948, Even in the mide of 1983 the arilery forces outnumbered the mobile forces by 2.4 to 1 in men and four to ane In vwospons. Here we ust the ual Sovit Getinton of "guns": sny artilery piece oF mortar largr than Amn sn caliber Tencapt mm mortars. Thus you con se at # glance ‘on the Divisional Organizetion Chort hon wel ‘auinped each unit was with artilary. This figures does not include guns mounted on AV. Those wore almost all high velocity laces unsuitable for regular atilry work, ‘This wos due to two factors Fst, there was wear ‘on the gun's tube, High velocity. guns wore Out their tubes faster than lower velocity field erillry pieces. Secondly, high velocity ‘ammunition had to heve a heaunr shell fbwro. the higher pressures encountered in high veocity tre. This meant lat apace for an lexplosive chargo for use against non-armoed ‘orgets. The. ammunition supply esa ited in ARV. Ever since World War and in_many case even earlier) most battle cauatie have Bean fused by artery. During Word War I, the Germans sufered nosy 80% of thei cana ties because of ertilry when tghtig the western alls, The wattern alles in turn ‘suffered 70808 of thir casulties because of German actilery. But in Russi it was only the ussans who fered the maloriy of ther ‘omialtes because. of enemy artery. The Germans sofered only about 50% of their ‘ratios because of Russian artilry. The remainder wore caused. by light infantry weapons: ile, grenades, mines and expecially ‘sutomatic wempons This points out the fact that, no. meter how abundont the Soviet arliery ume, I've never oe efficient ge the German artery. And ofiiency 1s probsbiy the tingle most important slrment in using artillery, The guns may bo infaror, as well 6s their numbers, and you can still have superior artilery if it ie efficiently ured. This te Precisely what happened in the act. The Fussians, ier 1942, atvays had more and better guns than the Germans. Yet, unlos the Germans were overwhelmad by heer weigh of ‘numbers or ® shortage of ammunition, they were alnays abe to detest the Rusian guns ‘The reasons for this go back tothe fundarnen- 2" lage artilery force you needed 2 large umber of tachnieans. ‘The solution, oF course was the ono they chose for all ther specialise” snra. Spovalize. This meant not nly. forming loge artilry_ unis Torgades, Giisions and oven corps) but luo restieting the use of these unite They were primarily offensive. They were to avoid contact with fnemy ground frogs (which could ter thom {© pices) at all costs. Thus tho Burdon of the efenso romained, always, on the Soviet infantry. Defending with artery mas @ highly techincal process, requiring the uumost eff ency. Towards the end. of the var the Russian artilry reached 9 point (opanst ©

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