G.R. No.

L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.

FACTS:

Caltex Philippines, for the promotion of their products, organized Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters dispensed from the
hooded gas pump at each Caltex station during a specific period, with no consideration on the
part of participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of mails for the transmission of communication related to the
contest. Caltex wrote to Enrico Palomar, the Postmaster General, with enclosed copy of the
contest rules and endeavoured to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law.

Palomar maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is
nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law. Palomar not only
denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if
the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against Caltex. Hence, Caltex,
seeking judicial intervention, prayed that their contest be declared non-violative of the Postal
Law.

The trial court held the same.

Palomar appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed contest violates the Postal Law because it is a gift enterprise.

DECISION:
No. The contest is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the
Postal Law. In the Postal Law, the term gift enterprise is used in association with the word
"lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term
"gift enterprise" be so construed.
G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. questions why the bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) which they insist as
products of the Philippines are subject to wharfage dues when in fact they are only waste of
their main product, flour, which is produced from imported wheat grains. The bran and pollard
are being exported from the Philippines.

The Commissioner of Customs (CC) and the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) stand is that, upon
receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of
the non-use of government-owned or private wharves .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with the law.

DECISION:
Yes. As stated in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code "There shall be levied, collected
and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the
Philippines ... exported from the Philippines, thus, the bran and pollard fall to the category
exported products.

The Code expressly defines the products subject to wharfage dues. There is no need for the
Court to further interpret nor construct the Code.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appelles appealed that they be refunded income tax collected by the defendant-
appellant relative to their salary because they are exempt from income tax. Based on Article
VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, their salaries as judges shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.

The lower court ruled in favour of the plaintiff-appellees, citing that the case at bar is identical
with the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552 wherein decision rendered was to refund
plaintiffs income taxes.

After the Perfecto case, Congress then passed RA No. 590, wherein Section 13 states that, No
salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the lower court to the case at bar should be reversed because of
the constitutionality of RA No. 590.

DECISION:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and ruled that RA No. 590 is
unconstitutional. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute.
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The defendant, a secret agent of the Governor of Batangas, was charged for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition when he, without necessary permit and license, wilfully
and unlawfully possessed a home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with 6
rounds of ammunition.

The defendant appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.

DECISION:
No. The law is clear in stating persons not covered in the provision, it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition. A secret agent is not explicitly mentioned. It is not within the power of
the Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

Hence, there is no need for the Court to interpret and construct the law relative to the case at
bar.
G.R. No. 34385 September 21, 1931
ALEJANDRA TORRES, ET AL., plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
FRANCISCO LIMJAP, Special Administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose B.
Henson, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 34386 September 21, 1931

SABINA VERGARA VDA. DE TORRES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
FRANCISCO LIMJAP, Special Administration of the estate of the deceased Jose B.
Henson, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Two separate cases were filed against the deceased defendant for securing chattel mortgage
on two of his drug stores (Farmacia Henson and Hensons Pharmacy) to secure a loan.

In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated the terms of the mortgage and
that, in consequence thereof they became entitled to the possession of the chattels and to
foreclose their mortgages thereon.

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

Defendants appealed, attacking the validity of the stipulation in said mortgages authorizing the
mortgagor to sell the goods covered thereby and to replace them with other goods thereafter
acquired based on last paragraph of Sec. 7 of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the mortgage is null and void for lack of sufficient particularity in the description
of the property mortgaged.

DECISION:
No. The provision of last paragraph of Sec. 7 of the Chattel Mortgage Law is not applicable to
drug stores due to its nature of a revolving and floating business. A stipulation in the mortgage,
extending its scope and effect to after-acquired property, is valid and binding, where the after-
acquired property is in renewal of, or in substitution for, goods on hand when the mortgage was
executed, or is purchased with the proceeds of the sale of such goods, etc.
G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioner began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to being the chief of
the detective bureau of Manila Police District. In 1968, he was designated acting chief of police
of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the
mayor of Manila.

Appointment was denied due to failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service
eligibility requirements for the said position as stated in section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.

Petitioner contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service
in a police agency is considered a civil service eligible, so must a person be considered
qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree.

ISSUE:
Whether or not within the meaning and intendment of the law, bachelors degree is necessary to
be appointed chief of police.

DECISION:
No. The petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police. Based on its
interpretation of the statute, a person who has served the police department of a city for at least
8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher a high school graduate, no matter how long he
has served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The Governor-General issued Executive Order No. 53 in relation to Act No. 2868 passed by
Legislature, authorizing the Governor-General to set the maximum price of palay, rice, and corn.

Ang Tang Ho was accused by the trial court of violating EO No. 53 for selling palay above the
maximum price.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ang Tang Ho is guilty due to the constitutionality of Act No. 2868.

DECISION:
No. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court. Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice,
and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

Further, in fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing
with government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are
sacred under the Constitution.
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION
AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent entered into a contract with the DPWH for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
After completion of the project, DPWH withheld payment to respondent, as ordered by the COA
on the ground that the contractors license of respondent had expired at the time of the
execution of the contract.

DPWH Legal Department ordered payment to the respondent, but still, no payment was made.

Respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before
the RTC, but such complaint was denied.

Upon appeal, CA sustained the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be paid despite expired license at the time of execution of the
contract.

DECISION:
Yes. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides that the respondent should only be
sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand
pesos. RA No. 4566 is clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired.

Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode
debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury).
G.R. No. 170735 December 17, 2007
IMMACULADA L. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION LEGAL AND COLLECTION, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, Respondents.

FACTS:
By 1980, Impact Corporation suffered losses and was unable to pay wages, 13 th month pay,
and SSS contributions of its employees.

In 2005, because the corporation has already been dissolved, petitioner, the sole surviving
director, was charged by the RTC and CA liable for the unremitted SSS contributions.

Petitioner pointed out, as provided in Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law, that the
concerned officers of an employer corporation are liable for the penalties for non-remittance of
premiums, it still affirmed the SSC Resolution holding petitioner liable for the unpaid SSS
premium contributions in addition to the penalties.

Petitioner also insisted that being a stockholder, she is liable only to the extent of her
subscription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations pertaining
to unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties.

DECISION:
Yes. The Court finds the petitioners argument ridiculous. Related to Section 28(f), Section 22
provides that every employer is required to deduct and remit such contributions. The spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in
statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a
careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made.

Further, even if the corporation has a separate juridical personality, its liability can be extended
to stockholders when piercing of the corporate veil is necessary.
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA
CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his
capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista
Party, and one (1) Senator, Taada, belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing
these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), had "acted absolutely
without power or color of authority and in clear violation ..of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution". That, consequently, the appointments of respondents are unlawful and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the election of respondents as members of the SET is valid.

DECISION:
No. The Court ruled that the election of respondents as members of the SET is null and void,
hence, they are not entitled to act as such.

It is not necessary to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest,
number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of
Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most
vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the
resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said
Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent"
"purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal
should be organized.