Bersamin Cases Remedial Law

FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF LAW
REMEDIAL LAW
CASE DIGESTS
Cases Penned by
Supreme Court
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
A Project by FEU IL Batch 2017
This compilation covers the period starting April 2009 to January 2017
and is limited to issues concerning Remedial Law.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Supreme Court Decisions Arranged Per Year)
2009 Cases .................................................................................................................................... 1

1. RICARDO C. DUCO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FIRST DIVISION; AND
NARCISO B. AVELINO .................................................................................................... 2
2. RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND
FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC. ................................... 5
3. ROBERT P. GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR RANDOLPH S.
TING AND SALVACION GARCIA ................................................................................. 8
4. JOWETT K. GOLANGCO vs. JONE B. FUNG ............................................................ 11
5. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE vs. RADSTOCK SECURITIES .................................................. 14
6. JUNO BATISTIS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ....................................................... 17
2010 Cases .................................................................................................................................. 19

7. ELIGIO P. MALLARI vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA ..................................................................... 20
8. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. PABLO BERENGUER ET. AL. .............. 24
9. TEOFISTO OO , ET. AL., vs. VICENTE LIM .................................................................... 26
10. CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
CONCEPCION ALCARAZ AND RAMONA ALCARAZ ............................................ 28
11. MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOCELYN
RICARDO, ARNEL TARUC, MARLENE CATAN, MARIA THERESA MENDOZA
COSTA, FIDELA ROFOLS CASTILLO, DOMINADOR BASSI, ROBERTO
MALABANAN HERNANDEZ, NERISSA MANZANO, LEONIDEZ MAGLABE
HERNANDEZ, TAGUMPAY REYES, and ELINO FAJARDO ....................................... 31
12. FRANCISCO ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC ......................................... 34
13. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO (CONSOLIDATED CASE) .............. 37
14. LOKIN, JR. vs. COMELEC ............................................................................................. 40
15. GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs. COMELEC .............................................................................. 43
16. IN RE: RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 303168
AND 303169 AND ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
IN LIEU OF THOSE LOST .................................................................................................. 45
17. SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO
SESPEE and their Children vs. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE
MAGTANUM .................................................................................................................... 48
18. JUSTINA MANIEBO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION ................................................................................................................. 51
19. SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................. 54
20. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA) vs. Hon. HANS LEO J.
CACDAC et. al. ............................................................................................................ 59
21. LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, vs. JUDGE ROMEO A.
RABACA .......................................................................................................................... 61
22. PHILIP TURNER and ELNORA TURNER vs. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION
........................................................................................................................................... 63
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23. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA B.
PLAZA vs. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., and HON.
ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN DEL
NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY ............................................................................................ 65
2011 Cases .................................................................................................................................. 67

24. PETER BEJARASCO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................................... 68
25. SPS. MOISES and CLEMENCIA ANDRADA vs. PILHINO SALES CORPORATION,
represented by its Branch Manager, JOJO S. SAET ............................................. 70
26. HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON vs. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS .. 73
27. AIR ADS INCORPORATED vs. TAGUM AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (TADECO) ......................................................................................... 76
28. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL .................. 78
29. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. Hon. VICENTE Q. ROXAS (Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 227), REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON CITY, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, and the COURT OF APPEALS............................................ 80
30. SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and
CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY ............................................................... 83
31. DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG vs. RENATO and MELBA ZAMORA ............... 85
32. DONNINA C. HALLEY vs. PRINTWELL, INC. ............................................................... 88
33. ANGELINA PAHILA GARRIDO vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO .......................................... 90
34. HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO vs. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES ............................... 93
35. PETRONILO BARAYUGA vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY .............................................. 95
36. PEZA vs. JOSE PULIDO ET AL. ....................................................................................... 97
37. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ........... 99
38. FERMAN DEVLOPMENT CORP. vs. FEDERICO AGCAOLI ................................... 101
39. DENIS B. HABAWEL AND ALEXIS F. MEDINA vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
FIRST DIVISION .............................................................................................................. 103
40. CHU/S vs. SPS. CUNANAN, BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
AND SPS. CARLOS ....................................................................................................... 106
41. PEDRO ANGELES, REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-IN FACT
vs. PASCUAL ................................................................................................................. 108
42. MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC., AND RAMON P. DAO vs. SPS. TAN 110
43. PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION (now
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES)
vs. AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET.
AL..................................................................................................................................... 113
44. PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) vs. RICHARD BRODETT
AND JORGE JOSEPH .................................................................................................. 115
45. ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL vs. JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI ..................................................... 117
46. LINA CALILAP-ASMERON, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PABLO
CRUZ,* TRINIDAD CABANTOG,** ENI S.P. ATIENZA and EMERENCIANA
CABANTOG .................................................................................................................. 119
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47. LUCIANO P. PAZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY, FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and FILINVEST
ALABANG, INC. ........................................................................................................... 122
48. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FEDERICO SUNTAY, as represented by his
Assignee, JOSEFINA LUBRICA .................................................................................. 124
2012 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 126

49. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALDEZ ................................................................. 127
50. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RELATO ................................................................. 129
51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DE LOS SANTOS .................................................. 131
52. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEL CASTILLO ...................................................... 133
53. CAGAS vs. COMELEC ................................................................................................ 136
54. CONCEPCION vs. MINEX IMPORT CORPORATION ............................................. 138
55. ALMA JOSE vs. JAVELLANA ...................................................................................... 140
56. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA ..................................... 143
57. METROBANK vs. TOBIAS III ......................................................................................... 145
58. RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR L. ONGJOCO ............................. 147
59. ROLANDO SOFIO and RUFIO SOFIO vs. ALBERTO I. VALENZUELA, GLORIA I.
VALENZUELA, REMEDIOS I. VALENZUELA, and CESAR I. VALENZUELA............. 149
60. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO ................... 151
61. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL ...................... 153
62. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIUS TAGUILID y BACOLOD .......................... 155
63. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO ................ 157
64. ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ...................................... 159
65. ROGELIO S. REYES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ........................... 161
66. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. FELIX PARAS AND INLAND
TRAILWAYS, INC., AND CA ........................................................................................ 163
67. MARCOS PRIETO vs. CA, FEBTC ............................................................................... 165
68. GOLD LINE TOURS INC. vs HEIRS OF MARIA CONCEPCION LACSA ............... 168
69. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERONICA ATEGA NABLE ........................ 170
70. SPS. MENDIOLA vs. CA .............................................................................................. 172
71. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARCILLAS ............................................................. 175
72. UP vs. DIZON ................................................................................................................. 177
73. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER ............................................................................ 180
74. BANEZ vs. CONCEPCION .......................................................................................... 182
75. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BELOCURA ........................................................... 185
76. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO LUPAC ............................................. 189
77. DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS ................. 191
78. GSIS vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MARIA A. CANCINO-ERUM .................................... 193
79. SPOUSES HUMBERTO P. DELOS SANTOS AND CARMENCITA M. DELOS SANTOS
vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY ............................................... 194
80. DENNIS Q. MORTEL vs. SALVADOR E. KERR .......................................................... 196
81. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMIN ZAKARIA y MAKASULA Y AND JOANA
ZAKARIA y SILUNGAN ................................................................................................. 198
82. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOUIE CATALAN Y DEDALA ............................. 200
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2013 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 202
83. SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO, vs. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ................ 203
84. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO ..................... 205
85. SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION vs. CANDA ............................................... 207
86. NAZARETH vs. VILLAR ................................................................................................. 209
87. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
......................................................................................................................................... 211
88. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of
ASIAN BANK CORPORATION vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, et.al. (in
their capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second
Division of SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ........... 213
89. VICTORIO P. DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LEVI STRAUSS [PHILS.],
INC .................................................................................................................................. 215
90. ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. ......................................................................................... 217
91. GALVEZ vs. CA ............................................................................................................. 219
92. AMPATUAN JR., vs. SECRETARY DE LIMA................................................................ 221
93. MALIKSI vs. COMELEC................................................................................................. 223
94. ALLEN MACASAET, ET. AL., vs. FRANCISCO CO,JR.............................................. 226
95. HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE PALICTE ............................................... 228
96. SIMPLICIA ABRIGO AND DEMETRIO ABRIGO vs. JIMMY FLORES, ET AL. ......... 230
97. RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA FABIANA AGAINST JUSTICE REYES ET AL.
......................................................................................................................................... 233
98. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (POTC) vs.
AFRICA ........................................................................................................................... 235
99. GILFREDO BACOLOD, a.k.a. GILARDO BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES .................................................................................................................... 238
100. RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................ 240
101. SPOUSES CELSO DICO, SR. AND ANGELES DICO vs. VIZCAYA MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION ............................................................................................................ 242
102. ZUELLIG FREIGHT AND CARGO SYSTEMS vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND RONALDO V. SAN MIGUEL.................................................... 244
103. DONGON vs. RAPID MOVERS................................................................................... 246
104. REPUBIC vs. BAKUNAWA ............................................................................................ 248
105. UCPB vs CHRISTOPHER and MILAGROS LUMBO ................................................. 250
106. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MERALCO and NPC ......................................... 252
107. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, etc. ......................... 255
2014 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 258

108. DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. vs. HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY
HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ .............................. 259
109. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUARIA AGRICULTURAL AND
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ................................................................. 261
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110. HERMINIA ACBANG, Petitioner, vs.HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR................... 264
111. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC vs. FAR EAST BANK
& TRUST COMPANY .................................................................................................... 266
112. HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE ............................................ 268
113. BJDC CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER/PROPRIETOR JANET S.
DELA CRUZ, vs. NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO, JANET E. LANUZO,
JOAN BERNABE E. LANUZO, RYAN JOSEE LANUZO ............................................. 271
114. LEONORA PASCUAL vs. JOSEFINO DAQUIOAG .................................................. 273
115. AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA
YBAEZ .......................................................................................................................... 275
116. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R.
TANTOCO, JR., DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA
MARCOS, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA R. TANTOCO, AND MARIA
LOURDES TANTOCO-PINEDA..................................................................................... 277
117. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JUDGE HONTANOSAS , RTC Br. 16, CEBU
CITY ................................................................................................................................ 279
118. MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. MARGARET DEFENSOR ............... 281
119. ARAULLO vs. AQUINO ................................................................................................ 282
120. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION . 285
121. ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ................................................................... 287
122. NURSERY CARE CORPORATION vs. ACEVEDO .................................................... 289
123. VINUYA vs. ROMULO .................................................................................................. 291
124. MAGSINO vs. DE OCAMPO ..................................................................................... 294
125. EMERITU C. BARUT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .............................................. 297
126. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOBBY BELGAR ................................................... 299
127. ROLANDO ROBLES vs. FERNANDO FIDEL YAPCINCO, PATROCINIO B.
YAPCINCO, MARIA CORAZON B. YAPCINCO, and MARIA ASUNCION B.
YAPCINCO-FRONDA .................................................................................................. 301
128. SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI FAMILY BANK,
INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO .................................................... 303
129. GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE vs. HON. DANILO A.
MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS
BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR.1) AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES ...................................................................................................... 305
2015 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 308

130. SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION,
INC. vs. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL ............................................................................... 309
131. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF
APPEALS ......................................................................................................................... 311
132. YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION vs. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION................................................................................ 313
133. RUBEN MANALANG, ET,AL. vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI .......... 316
134. FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA) ............................................................................................................................. 318
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135. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN,
CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMENS
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. TERRY L. RIDON, KABATAAN PARTYLIST
REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN;
MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA,
CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT ................................................... 320
136. JOSE PEPE SANICO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-
TENIO ............................................................................................................................. 327
137. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUDY NUYOK ...................................................... 329
138. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP. vs. REYNALDO CUEVAS AND JUNNEL CUEVAS
......................................................................................................................................... 331
139. BERNARDO MESINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .......................................... 333
140. GILDA JARDELEZA (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, ERNESTO
JR.,TEODORO MARIA, ROLANDO, MA. GLENDA AND MELECIO, ALL
SURNAMED JARDELEZA vs. SPS. MELENCIO & ELIZABETH JARDELEZA, JMB
TRADERS, AND TEODORO JARDELEZA.................................................................... 336
141. SPOUSES FRANCISICO AND MERCED RABAT vs. PNB ......................................... 338
142. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN ENSUGON ................................................ 340
143. ROMEO T. CALUZOR vs. DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
LORENZO LLANILLO, and MOLD EX REALTY CORPORTATION........................... 343
144. SPOUSES BENITO BAYSA and VICTORIA BAYSA vs. SPOUSES FIDEL ALEJANDRA
ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO,
HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY
ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS
VENTULA, and NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO vs.
ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTE SUNJACO ................................................. 345
145. SPOUSES BENITO BAYSA and VICTORIA BAYSA vs. SPOUSES FIDEL PLANTILLA
and SUSAN PLANTILLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and THE
SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY........................................................................................... 347
146. HORACIO SALVADOR vs. LISA CHUA .................................................................... 349
147. HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO)
vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES ..................................................................... 351
148. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO
......................................................................................................................................... 353
149. GRACE BORGONA INSIGNE, DIOSDADO BORGONA, OSBOURNE BORGONA,
IMELDA BORGONA RIVERA, AND ARISTOTLE BORGONA vs. ABRA VALLEY
COLLEGES, INC. AND FRANCIS BORGONA ......................................................... 355
150. BERLINDA ORIBELLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH
DIVISION), AND REMEDIOS ORIBELLO .................................................................... 358
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151. CHARLIE TE VS. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH
10, DAVAO CITY, ET. AL. ............................................................................................. 361
152. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES ...................................................................................................... 363
153. NILO V. CHIPONGIAN VS. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ................................................................ 365
154. ROGELIO BARONDA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HIDECO SUGAR
MILLING CO., INC. ....................................................................................................... 367
155. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. ERNESTO ROXAS ....................................... 369
2016 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 371

156. PEDRO LADINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE RAMON .... 372
157. FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES INC.
......................................................................................................................................... 374
158. ANDREW D. FYFE, RICHARD T. NUTTALL, AND RICHARD J. WALD vs. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. ............................................................................................................... 377
159. SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. AND MR. BEN YAPJOCO vs. VICTOR ALBINA,
VICENTE UY AND ALEX VELASQUEZ ......................................................................... 380
160. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON C. MAGBITANG ................................... 382
161. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR. ............................. 384
162. TRIDHARMA MARKETING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
SECOND DIVISION, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE .......... 387
163. JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN.......................................................... 389
164. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES .................................... 391
165. SULPICIO LINES INC vs. NAPOLEON SESANTE ........................................................ 393
166. MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY vs. FELICIDAD VILLAMINA.............................. 395
167. MARY JANE G. DY CHIAO vs SEBASTIAN BOLIVAR, SHERIFF IV ........................ 397
168. LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES-LURA, AND FE V. FLORES vs. ATTY.
ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA, JR. ..................................................................................... 400
169. AURORA A. SALES vs. BENJAMIN D. ADAPON, OFELIA C. ADAPON AND
TEOFILO D. ADAPON .................................................................................................. 403
170. YOLANDA LUY Y GANUELAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ........................... 406
171. ANTONIO ESCOTO vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
......................................................................................................................................... 408
172. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JEHAR REYES ....................................................... 410
173. GUILLERMO SALVADOR, REMEDIOS CASTRO, REPRESENTED BY PAZ "CHIT"
CASTRO, LEONILA GUEVARRA, FELIPE MARIANO, RICARDO DE GUZMAN,
VIRGILIO JIMENEZ, REPRESENTED BY JOSIE JIMENEZ, ASUNCION JUAMIZ,
ROLANDO BATANG, CARMENCITA SAMSON, AUGUSTO TORTOSA,
REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO TORTOSA, SUSANA MORANTE, LUZVIMINDA
BULARAN, LUZ OROZCO, JOSE SAPICO, LEONARDO PALAD, ABEL BAKING,
REPRESENTED BY ABELINA BAKING, GRACIANO ARNALDO, REPRESENTED BY
LUDY ARNALDO, JUDITH HIDALGO, AND IGMIDIO JUSTINIANO, CIRIACO
MIJARES, REPRESENTED BY FREDEZWINDA MIJARES, JENNIFER MORANTE,
TERESITA DIALA, AND ANITA P. SALAR vs. PATRICIA, INC., RESPONDENT. THE
CITY OF MANILA AND CIRIACO C. MIJARES ......................................................... 413
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174. SAMSODEN PANGCATAN vs. ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP AND
BELINDO BANKIAO ...................................................................................................... 416
175. ARSENIO TABASONDRA vs. SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO .................. 419
2017 Cases
- No Remedial Law Cases Penned by Justice Bersamin -
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PARTICIPATING STUDENT MEMBERS
(in alphabetical order)
Alvarez, Melissa
Andrade, Ricardo
Azarcon, Pia Lea Andrea
Balanay, RB
Borja, Catherine
Castillo, Shain Ann
Castillo, Rochelle
Danduan, Jake
De Guzman, Jiana
De Guzman Jabriellie
Dimaliwat, Dianne Eunice
Dizon, Jenine Andrea
Doran, Mark Anthony
Dumapias, Gay
Espinas, Harvey
Espino, Carla
Hipolito, Maria Nia
Katigbak, Paula Margareth
Lee, Mariline
Legado, Jefferson
Lubay, Angela
Manaig, Jomel
Parrone, Justine Bette
Rabanal, Michelle
Rivera, Odessa
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
Santos, Shannon
Superable, Ethel
Tomarong, Marian
Tresvalles, Kris
Tuason, Jannelle
Uy, Alexander Charles
Vizcarra, William
Yatco, Nathaniel
ix
2009 CASES
CASES PENNED BY JUSTICE LUCAS BERSAMIN 2009
CASE TITLE RICARDO C. DUCO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FIRST DIVISION;

AND NARCISO B. AVELINO
CITATION G.R. No. 183366
PROMULGATION
August 19, 2009
DATE
DIGEST BY Azarcon, Pia Lea Andrea C.
TOPIC COVERED Filing fees under Comelec Rules of Procedure
DOCTRINE:
The payment of the filing fee is a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance is a
valid basis for the dismissal of the case. The subsequent full payment of the filing fee
after the lapse of the reglementary period does not cure the jurisdictional defect
because the date of the payment of the appeal fee is deemed the actual date of the
filing of the notice of appeal.
FACTS:
Petitioner Duco was proclaimed as the elected punong barangay of Brgy.
Ibabao, Loay, Bohol. His opponent, respondent Avelino, initiated an election protest in
the MCTC alleging that the election result were spurious and fraudulent. MCTC ruled in
favor of Avelino. Duco filed his notice of appeal to the COMELEC but was dismissed
due to the deficiency of the payment of appeal fee as prescribed under the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. Duco filed MR but the same was denied for failure to pay the
necessary motion fees prescribed in Comelec Rules of Procedure as amended by
Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130. He now assails the dismissal of the appeal and the
denial of the motion for reconsideration, averring that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by strictly applying its
Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing Ducos appeal and in denying his motion for reconsideration
for having been failed to pay docket fees in full.
RULING:
No. The COMELEC did not abused its discretion in dismissing Ducos appeal and in
denying his motion for reconsideration.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the notice of appeal must be

filed within five days after the promulgation of the decision. In filing the
appeal, the appellant is required to pay the appeal fees imposed by Sec.
3, Rule 40, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130 namely: (1)
the amount of P3,000.00 as appeal fee;
xxx
2 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the fees
shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission
within the period to file the notice of appeal.
Under the same rules, Sec. 9 (a), Rule 22 provides that the appeal
may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of
the Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee;

xxx
The petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal on January 25, 2008, that is, within five
days after the promulgation of the MCTC decision on January 22, 2008. On the same
day, he paid P1,400.00 as appeal fee to the Clerk of Court of the MCTC. His payment
was, however, short by P1,800.00. Moreover, he paid the appeal fee to the MCTC
cashier, contrary to the mandate of Sec. 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
that the payment be made to the Cash Division of the COMELEC.
Hence, the dismissal of the appeal was correct and was not tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
Worthy to note that the payment of the filing fee is a jurisdictional requirement and non-
compliance is a valid basis for the dismissal of the case. The subsequent full payment of
the filing fee after the lapse of the reglementary period does not cure the jurisdictional
defect because the date of the payment of the appeal fee is deemed the actual date
of the filing of the notice of appeal. Such procedural lapse warrants the outright
dismissal of the appeal. This will leave the COMELEC with no choice except to declare
the Orders final and executory.
The court bars any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure
to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases filed after the promulgation of this
decision. In short, failure was no longer excusable.
Time and again, the court ruled that the payment of the full amount of docket fee
within the period to appeal is a sine qua non requirement for the perfection of an
appeal. Such payment is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential
requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final
and executory, as if no appeal was filed.
xxx the bare invocation of interest of substantial justice is not a magic

wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except
only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. The
Court reiterates that rules of procedure especially those prescribing the

time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of business. xxx
The petitioner ought to be reminded that appeal is not a right but a mere
statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions set
by law.
COMELEC promulgated its Resolution No. 8486, effective on July 24, 2008, ostensibly to
clarify the requirement of two appeal fees being separately imposed by different
jurisdictions, that is, by the Supreme Court, through A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, and by the
COMELEC, through its own Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 02-0130.
For the first, the appeal fees are paid to the clerk of court of the trial court; while, for the
latter, the appeal fees are paid to the clerk of court of the COMELEC.
Before July 24, 2008, the Court recognized the Comelecs discretion to allow or dismiss a
perfected appeal that lacks payment of the Comelec-prescribed appeal fee but after
July 24, 2008, The Court NOW DECLARES, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar,
that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the
matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election
cases are no longer excusable.
That being said, the dismissal of the appeal was correct and was not tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

CASE TITLE RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM

LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
CITATION A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC
PROMULGATION
August 19, 2009
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141Indigent Party
DOCTRINE:
The exemption from payment of legal fees applies only to indigent litigants and not to
foundations even if such foundation is working for indigent and underprivileged people.
Only a natural party litigant and not a juridical person may be regarded as an indigent
litigant.
FACTS:
On his letter dated May 22, 2009, addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C.
Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote:
The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of
complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this privilege to
indigent persons. In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it does
not include Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most
Indigent persons. Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and
underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people?
ISSUE:
Can the Court grant to foundations the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants?
RULING:
No. the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even
if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule
141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus:
Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his

action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex
parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket

and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the
court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other
lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien
on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless
the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any
time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should
determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as
the court may impose.
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal

fees. Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate
family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of
an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred
thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall

execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with
the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested
person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax
declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be

sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the
pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may
have been incurred.
The clear intent and language of the Rules indicate that only
a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and
possess property, incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with
the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot
be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

That foundation is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no

moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a
persons poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor
of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse
(even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by
corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also,
the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts.

CASE TITLE ROBERT P. GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR

RANDOLPH S. TING AND SALVACION GARCIA
CITATION A.M. No. P-08-2501
PROMULGATION
August 28, 2009
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Rule 64, Rule 65
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, it is necessary to file a motion for reconsideration in the court of origin before
invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a superior court. However, the rule is not a rigid one.
A prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary in some cases as indicated herein.
FACTS:
On his letter dated May 22, 2009, addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C.
Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote:
The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of
complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this privilege to
indigent persons. In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it does
not include Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most
Indigent persons. Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and
underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people?
ISSUE:
A resolution was passed authorizing city mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of
land for use as a public cemetery of the city. As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issue
and released treasury warrant. Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a
complaint in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province
against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of
Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code. After investigation,
the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissal.
The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own

resolution and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding that the acquisition of
land for a public cemetery was not considered as within the term public works; and
that, consequently, the issuance of Treasury Warrant was not for public works and was
thus in violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Not satisfied but without first filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner has
commenced this special civil action under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Rules of Court,
claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in thereby dismissing
his criminal complaint. The COMELEC stated that the petition was premature because
the petitioner did not first present a motion for reconsideration, as required by Section
1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The COMELEC asserts that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to
the petitioner was to file a motion for reconsideration vis--vis the assailed resolution, as
required in the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and that his omission to do so and
his immediately invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court instead
rendered his petition premature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is premature.
RULING:
The petition was not premature.
The indispensable elements of a petition for certiorari are: (a) that it is directed against
a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As a rule, it is necessary to file a motion for reconsideration in the court of origin before
invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a superior court. Hence, a petition for certiorari will
not be entertained unless the public respondent has been given first the opportunity
through a motion for reconsideration to correct the error being imputed to him.
The rule is not a rigid one, however, for a prior motion for reconsideration is not
necessary in some situations, including the following:
a. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
b. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question,
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless;
e. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
f. Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
h. Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
no opportunity to object; and
i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.

That the situation of the petitioner falls under the last exception is clear enough.
Presented here is an issue purely of law. Accordingly, he did not need to first seek the
reconsideration of the assailed resolution.
The distinctions between a question of law and a question of fact are well
known. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. But there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence,
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the
probabilities of the situation.

CASE TITLE JOWETT K. GOLANGCO VS. JONE B. FUNG

PROMULGATION
September 8, 2009
DATE
DIGEST BY Balanay, Rendel Bryan
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure, Rule 65. Petition for Certiorari
DOCTRINE: The Office of the Solicitor General must represent the Government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
FACTS:
Golangco filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order issued by the RTC on a
criminal case for Libel initiated by Golangco against Fung in 1995. Golangco appealed
to the CA on his own without impleading the People of the Philippines and being
represented by the OSG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a special civil action of petition for certiorari (Rule 65) to the CA may
prosper without impleading the People of the Philippines and/or being represented by
the OSG.
RULING:
No. The People of the Philippines are indispensable parties to the petition due to
Golangcos objective to set aside the RTCs order that concerned the public aspect of
criminal action. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary
rejection of his petition for certiorari. Also, Section 35(l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), mandates the OSG to
represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party. Golangco violated this order when he did not obtain the consent of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari or at the very least, furnished a
copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing of thereof.
Although the petition for certiorari bore the conformity of the public prosecutor (i.e.,
Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo Formoso of Manila), that conformity alone did not
suffice. The authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent
the People of the Philippines was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court.

CASE TITLE JOWETT K. GOLANGCO VS. JONE B. FUNG

PROMULGATION
September 8, 2009
DATE
DIGEST BY Balanay, Rendel Bryan
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure, Rule 65. Petition for Certiorari, Interlocutory
order
DOCTRINE: An order by the trial court terminating the Prosecutions presentation of

evidence is merely interlocutory and certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory
order, but only a final judgment or order that terminates the proceedings.
FACTS:
Golangco filed a criminal case for Libel against Fung in 1995. After almost 6 years, the
Prosecution had presented only two witnesses in the criminal proceedings. On February
16, 2001, the Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and
served on Atty. Oscar Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of the POEA, to compel him to
testify in the criminal case on February 20, 2001. The hearing of February 20, 2001 was,
however, reset to May 23, 2001 due to the unavailability of Atty. Ramos, for the last
time, with the courts stern warning. On May 23, 2001, the Prosecution still failed to
present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been issued to and
served on him for the purpose. Consequently, the RTC judge issued an order
terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence.
Golangco filed a petition for certiorari to the CA alleging that RTC judge committed
grave abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear
and testify in the May 23, 2001 hearing. He contended that his prior request for the
subpoena for the February 20, 2001 hearing should have been treated as a continuing
request for the subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to
apply for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time.
CA dismissed the petition holding that any request for a subpoena to a witness must
indicate the date and time when the witness must appear in court to give his or her
testimony. It is on the basis of that request that the court personnel prepares the
subpoena indicating the title of the case, the date and time for the appearance of the
intended witness. Golangco failed to comply with this rule when the request for
subpoena failed to contain the date and time when the intended witness, Atty. Oscar
Ramos, must appear in court to testify.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of the trial court terminating the Prosecutions presentation of
evidence may be a ground for petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and/or amounts to
grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
No. The criminal case had been pending since 1995 and the petitioner as the
complainant had presented only two witnesses as of the issuance of the assailed order.
The trial court had not been wanting in giving warnings to the Prosecution on the dire
consequences should the Prosecution continue to fail to complete its evidence. The
Prosecution had retained the duty to ensure that its witnesses would be present during
the trial, for its obligation to the administration of justice had been to prove its
case sans vexatious and oppressive delays. Yet, the warnings of the trial court had
gone unheeded. Instead, the Prosecution would deflect the responsibility for the delays
to the failure of the trial court to issue the subpoena to its proposed witness and to
cause the subpoena to be served. Such attitude of the Prosecution, which included the
petitioner as the complainant, manifested a lack of the requisite diligence required of
all litigants coming to the courts to seek redress.
The trial judge did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in issuing the assailed
order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari.
The trial courts assailed order terminating the Prosecutions presentation of evidence
was merely interlocutory and certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order, but
only a final judgment or order that terminates the proceedings. Certiorari will be refused
where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ
is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower court. Indeed, a writ
of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling unless the
ruling is attended by grave abuse of discretion or tainted by whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for the function of certiorari is limited to
keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieving persons from its arbitrary
acts that courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform.
Golangco should have proceed in the action until judgment, which, once rendered,
might then be reviewed on appeal, along with the assailed interlocutory order. As long
as the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, its alleged error committed in the exercise
of its jurisdiction amounted to nothing more than an error of judgment that was
reviewable by a timely appeal, not by a special civil action of certiorari.

CASE TITLE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE vs. RADSTOCK SECURITIES

PROMULGATION
December 4, 2009
DATE
DIGEST BY Borja, Catherine
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: To be able to intervene in an action, therefore, the prospective intervenor

must show an interest in the litigation. The interest must be direct and material and not
a mere expectancy, contingent or purely inchoate.
Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of judgments rendered by regional
trial courts filed with the Court of Appeals. It does not pertain to the nullification of
decisions of the Court of Appeals. Hence, Rule 47 does not allow the Court of Appeals
annul its own decision.
FACTS:
Respondent Radstock had sued for collection and damages respondent PNCC
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City. The RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Radstock, mandating PNCC to pay to Radstock the amount of
P13,151,956,528.00, plus interests and attorneys fees. PNCC appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On August 18, 2006, after negotiations held while the appeal was still pending
in the CA, PNCC and Radstock entered into a compromise agreement, agreeing to
reduce PNCCs adjudged liability in the amount of P17,040,843,968.00 as of July 31, 2006
to P6,185,000,000.
On January 25, 2007, the CA approved the compromise agreement.
STRADEC filed a motion for intervention in order to assail the compromise

agreement between PNCC and Radstock as null and void. It asserts that it became
imbued with a legal interest in the subject matter in litigation due to its being the
winning bidder during the public bidding, by which it came to have the right to acquire
the Governments shares, receivables, securities and other interests in PNCC. The matter
was then still pending in RTC Makati, docketed as Civil Case No 05-882.
The Court of Appeals denied STRADECs motion for intervention on the ground
that the motion was filed only after the Court of Appeals and the trial court had
promulgated their respective decisions.
On the other hand, Luis Sison, a stockholder of PNCC, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment approving the compromise agreement, which was raffled to
another division of the CA. The CA dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
rationalized that it no jurisdiction to annul its own final and executory judgment.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the denial of motion for intervention is proper.
2. Whether or not the denial of petition for annulment of judgment approving
the compromise agreement was proper.
RULING:
1. Yes, the denial for motion for intervention was just proper.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the motion for
intervention may be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court.
The CA found that STRADEC had filed its motion for intervention only after the CA
and the RTC had promulgated their respective decisions. Worthy to note, indeed, is that
as of the time when the joint motion for judgment based on compromise agreement
was submitted by PNCC and Radstock to the CA for consideration and approval, no
motion for intervention was as yet attached to the CA rollo. Consequently, the CA held
that STRADECs motion for intervention had been filed out of time.
Moreover, to be able to intervene in an action, the prospective intervenor must

show an interest in the litigation that is of such direct and material character that he will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of judgment.
STRADEC did not demonstrate sufficiently enough that it had the requisite legal
interest in the subject matter of the litigation between Radstock and PNCC. On the
contrary, STRADECs interest, if any, was far from direct and material, but was, at best, a
mere expectancy, contingent and purely inchoate, due to such interest being
dependent on a favorable outcome of Civil Case No. 05-882, which was then still
pending in the RTC.
(NOTE: This is a dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin. However in this issue of motion

for intervention, he joined the opinion of the majority)
2. Yes, the denial for annulment of judgment was proper.
The jurisdiction to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court is

expressly granted to the CA by Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
However, as explained in the case of Grande v University of the Philippines, the

Court definitely ruled out the application of Rule 47 to the nullification of judgment of
the CA.
Section 1 Rule 47 expressly states that the Rule shall govern the annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments of final orders and resolutions in civil action of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of judgments rendered by

regional trial courts filed with the Court of Appeals. It does not pertain to the nullification
of decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Thereby, the CA did not err, because the CA could not, on its own accord, take
cognizance of his petition to annul its own judgment absent any specific directive from
the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: This is a dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin. In this particular issue, he dissents

with the opinion of the majority. In the main case, there was no discussion on
application of Rule 47. The court, through J. Carpio, simply explained that Sison has the
legal standing to challenge the compromise agreement and in the interest of justice,
the court must take cognizance of his action.)

CASE TITLE JUNO BATISTIS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROMULGATION
December 16, 2009
DATE
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only raise questions of
law. A question of law exists when there is doubt on what the law applicable to a
certain set of facts.
FACTS:
The Fundador trademark characterized the brandy products manufactured by
Pedro Domecq, S.A. of Cadiz, Spain. It was duly registered in the Principal Register of
the Philippines Patent Office on July 12, 1968 under Certificate of Registration No. 15987,
for a term of 20 years from November 5, 1970. The registration was renewed for another
20 years effective November 5, 1990.
Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized to

distribute Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in finished form,
initiated this case against Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted a test-buy in the premises of Batistis, and thereby
confirmed that he was actively engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
counterfeit Fundador brandy products. Upon application of the NBI agents based on
the positive results of the test-buy, Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Manila RTC
issued on December 20, 2001 Search Warrant No. 01-2576, authorizing the search of the
premises of Batistis located at No.1664 Onyx St., San Andres Bukid, Sta. Ana, Manila. The
search yielded 20 empty Carlos I bottles, 10 empty bottles of Black Label whiskey, two
empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an empty bottle of Remy Martin XO, an empty
bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador bottles, 163 boxes of Fundador, a half sack of
Fundador plastic caps, two filled bottles of Fundador brandy, and eight cartons of
empty Jose Cuervo bottles.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila formally charged Batistis in the RTC in
Manila with two separate offenses, namely, infringement of trademark and unfair
competition.
The RTC convicted Batistis. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Batistis appealed to the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is proper in this
case.

RULING:
No. Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is proper in this case.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Whether a question
of law or a question of fact is involved is explained in Belgica v. Belgica:
xxx [t]here exists a question of law when there is doubt on what the law
applicable to a certain set of facts is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise when
there is an issue regarding the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. Questions on
whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded probative value or whether
the proofs presented by one party are clear, convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition are issues of fact. Such questions are not subject to review by this Court. As
a general rule, we review cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law
raised and distinctly set forth in the petition.
Batistis assigned errors stated in the petition for review on certiorari require a re-
appreciation and re-examination of the trial evidence. As such, they raise issues
evidentiary and factual in nature. The appeal is dismissible on that basis, because, one,
the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions,
and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the
CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.
Moreover, The factual findings of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if
considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were ignored, misconstrued or
misinterpreted.

2010 CASES
CASE TITLE ELIGIO P. MALLARI vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA
PROMULGATION
January 25, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY CASTILLO, SHAIN ANN
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE - RULE 39, RULE 65, RULE 71
DOCTRINE:
No notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required before a writ
of execution is issued when a decision has already become final.
The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession is ex parte and
summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice being
sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without
giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought.
A person may be charged with indirect contempt only by either of two
alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against which the contempt is
committed. Also, there must be with tender and payment of filing fees.
FACTS:
Petitioner obtained two loans from respondent GSIS. To secure the performance of his
obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wife names.
What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves of the petitioner to delay
the efforts of GSIS to recover on the debt, and to have the unhampered possession of
the foreclosed property.
Petitioner requested a final accounting, but did not do anything more. Nearly three
years later, GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of
his failure to settle his account. Again, petitioner persuaded the sheriff to hold the
publication of the foreclosure notice in abeyance, to await action on his pending
request for final accounting. GSIS responded to his request and rendered a detailed
explanation of the account. It sent another updated statement of account. On July 21,
1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because
he had meanwhile made no further payments.
Petitioner sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the RTC ostensibly to
enjoin them from proceeding against him.
RTC: In favor of petitioner, nullifies the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale;
CA: reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996. The petitioner elevated the CA decision to the
Supreme Court, via petition for review on certiorari.
SC: denied petitioner's petition for review
20 Castillo , Castillo, Danduan, De Guzman, De Guzman, Dimaliwat, Rodriguez REMEDIAL LAW

As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory,
rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale and the
issuance of TCT in the name of GSIS. GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution
and for a writ of possession. Granting the ex parte motion on October 8, 1999, the RTC
issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999, ordering the
sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the properties.
The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of the petitioners request
for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS
acceded to the request. Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties,
but instead filed his first motion for reconsideration (2000 MR) and/or to quash the writ of
execution.
In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed two motions in contempt of court for painting the
fence of the properties during the pendency of his MR and/or to quash the writ of
execution. He filed another motion in the same case, dated April 17, 2000, to hold GSIS
and its local manager in contempt of court for ordering the electric company to cut off
the electric services to the properties.
RTC: DENIED motions for contempt of court and re-implemented of the writ of execution
cum writ of possession. The petitioner sought for a second motion for reconsideration
(2001 MR), but it was denied on February 11, 2002. He again filed a petition for certiorari
on March 2002.
CA: CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
MAIN ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER: The petitioner claims that he had not been notified of
the motion seeking the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; hence,
the writ was invalid.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Petition for Certiorari in CA was Filed Beyond the 60 day
reglementary period?
2. Whether the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution and writ of
possession are invalid?
3. Whether the Petitioners Motion for Indirect Contempt was proper even without a
verified petition?
RULING:
1. Yes. Considering that the "2001 motion for reconsideration" denied by the order
dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second MR, the orders of
the CA which ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is valid and issuance of writ of
possession of the RTC, could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari.
Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy
for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed "not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution," or, in case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said
motion."
It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because

the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
2. No. Petitioner, as defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act 3135, as
amended, and its pertinent jurisprudence to any prior notice of the application for the
issuance of the writ of possession.
A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real
property, may be issued in:
(1) land registration proceedings (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must redeem the foreclosed property within
one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds in order to avoid
the title from consolidating in the purchaser. By failing to redeem, the mortgagor loses
all interest over the foreclosed property. In this case, Petitioner did not redeem the
property within 1 year.
It is clear from the foregoing that a non-redeeming mortgagor like the petitioner had no
more right to challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession
upon the ex parte application of GSIS. He could not also impugn anymore the
extrajudicial foreclosure, and could not undo the consolidation in GSIS of the ownership
of the properties covered by TCT, which consolidation was already irreversible. Hence,
his moves against the writ of execution cum writ of possession were tainted by bad
faith, for he was only too aware, being his own lawyer, of the dire consequences of his
non-redemption within the period provided by law for that purpose.
3. No. A charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless
the charge is directly made by the court against which the contemptuous act is
committed pursuant to Section 4, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Clearly, the petitioners charging GSIS, et al. with indirect contempt by mere motions
was not permitted by the Rules of Court.
And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt could be initiated by motion,
the petitioner should have tendered filing fees. The need to tender filing fees derived
from the fact that the procedure for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Rules of Court
was an independent special civil action. Yet, the petitioner did not tender and pay
filing fees, resulting in the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the action. Truly, the
omission to tender filing fees would have also warranted the dismissal of the charges.

CASE TITLE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. PABLO BERENGUER ET. AL.
PROMULGATION
March 09, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine S.
TOPIC COVERED RULE 43 & RULE 65 CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Petition for certiorari filed with the CA within 15-day reglementary period for
filing the petition for review could be treated as a petition for review, for that would be
in accord with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice. Further, the court had occasion to expound on the exceptions to the
rule that a recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 rendered the petition
dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule,
to wit: a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; b) when
broader interest of justice so requires; c)when the writs issued are null and void; or d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Hence, in this case, exception C is applicable in the present case.
FACTS:
The respondents were the registered owners of several residential and industrial
lands in Sorsogon and covered by different certificates of title. In April1998, respondents
received from petitioner DAR notices of coverage of their said landholdings by the
Governments Comptehensive Agrarian Reform Programt (CARP). They protested the
notices coverage in the Office of DAR (filed an application for exclusion of their
landholdings from CARP coverage and praying for the lifting of the notice of coverage.
In October 1998, Petitioner ( thru DAR Secretary) without acting on the

respondents application for exclusion, cancelled their titles and issued certificates of
land ownership awards (CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to members of the
Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative, not respondents
workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not impleaded in the respondents
application for exclusion.
DAR regional director denied the application for exclusion. Respondents

appealed to DAR Secretary. Meanwhile, Baribag filed before the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) a petition seeking to implement the order of Regional
director (denial of petition for exclusion filed by respondents). RARAD issued an
implementing writ placing Baribag in possession of respondents landholdings. MR by
respondents was likewise denied. Respondents, then, filed an appeal before the
Department of Agararian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) but the same was
denied. Accordingly, a writ of possession was issued in favour of Baribag.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which treated the
petition as petition for review. Respondents maintained that the DAR secretary had no
jurisdiction over their landholdings the same being outside of the coverage of CARL
due to the fact the land was originally devoted to pasture and livestock raising and

later already classified as industrial and residential lands; and as early as 1981 HLURB
had classified the landholdings as residential and industrial lands.
CA: granted the petition of the respondents and set aside the writ of execution and writ
of possession issued by RARAD and ordered the cancellation of CLOAs and ordered the
restoration of the respondents.
Aggrived, petitioners insisted that CA committed 4 errors in ruling in favour of

respondents: one of which was the act of the CA when the latter considered the
respondents petition for certiorari as a petition for review over their (respondents)
manifested insistence that their petition was one for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUES:
Whether CA erred when it treated respondents petition for certiorari as a petition for
review under Rule 43; in as much as there was no timely perfection of appeal, said DAR
order had become final and executory, and was thus removed from the CAs power of
review.
RULING:
No, the CA did not err in treating the petition for certiorari as a petition for review.
Citing the case of DepED vs Cunanan, the court ruled that the petition for certiorari filed
by therein by respondent Cunanan with the CA within 15-day reglementary period for
filing the petition for review could be treated as a petition for review, for that would be in
accord with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice. The court had occasion to expound on the exceptions to the rule
that a recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 rendered the petition dismissible
for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule, to wit: a)
when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; b) when broader
interest of justice so requires; c)when the writs issued are null and void; or d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Hence, in this
case, exception C is applicable in the present case.
Furthermore, while a MR is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for

certiorari, immediate recourse to extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is an extreme urgency for relief;
where the proceedings in the lower court are nullity for lack of due process; where the
proceedings was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.
These exceptions find application in the case.

CASE TITLE TEOFISTO OO , ET. AL., VS. VICENTE LIM

PROMULGATION
March 09, 2010
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 45 CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 1
DOCTRINE: Forgery, being a question of fact, could not be dealt with by the SC. SC
cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence, because
the Court is not a trier of facts. Although the rule admits of certain exceptions (see
exceptions below). When the petitioners submitted that Lims evidence did not
preponderantly show that the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and
that both trial and appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonios signature
on the confirmation sale was a forgery. Clearly, the petitioners sought a review of the
evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.
FACTS:
In 1992, Lim filed in RTC-Cebu a petition for reconstitution of an OCT alleging the
same that had been lost by her mother, Luisa, during WWII. The said lot covered by the
OCT was sold to Luisa in 1937 by Spouses OO, the registered owners; and that although
the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oo (the
only legitimate heir of Spouses Oo), had executed a notarized document denominated
as confirmation of sale, which was duly filed in the provincial assessors office. Zosimo
OO and petitioner Teofisto Oo opposed Lims petition, contending that they had the
title in their possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oo; and the confirmation
of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not
being authentic based on the testimony of the expert witness. Thus, on account of the
opposition and upon order of RTC, Lim converted his petition into a complaint for
quieting of title.
RTC: ruled in favour of Lim. RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of
the land since 1937 and never been disturbed by Oos.
Petitioners appealed and maintained that the confirmation of sale was spurious
because of the forged signature of Antonio.
CA: Affirmed the lower court, however, found that Spouses Oo sold the land to Luisa
based on the testimony of the Notary Public; and such sale had been confirmed by
Antonio. Hence, the action for quieting was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the
title. MR was denied.
ISSUES:
Whether SC can decide that the signature purportedly of Antonio in the confirmation
sale was genuine or authentic?

RULING:
No. Forgery, being a question of fact, could not be dealt with now by the SC.
The SC cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence,
because the Court is not a trier of facts. Although the rule admits of certain exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a
grave of discretion ;(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case, and the findings are contrary to the admission of both
appellant and appelle; (7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusion without specific evidence on which
they are based ;(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record , it does not appear now that any of the
exceptions is present in the case.
When the petitioners submitted that Lims evidence did not preponderantly show
that the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both trial and
appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonios signature on the confirmation
sale was a forgery. Clearly, the petitioners sought a review of the evaluation and
appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.
It is emphasize, too, that CA upheld the conclusion of RTC that the signature of
Antonio had not been simulated or forged. Therefore, the concurrence of the
conclusions of RTC and CA on the genuineness of Antonios signature binds the
Supreme Court.

CASE TITLE CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF

QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION ALCARAZ AND RAMONA
ALCARAZ
PROMULGATION DATE March 29, 2010
TOPIC COVERED RULE 39 Section 10 and Section 47 (b) CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Under res judicata, the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issues more than once; that when the a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
parties and their privies. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action,
the ff requisites must be complied with: a.) the former judgment must be final; b.) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties; c.) it must be a judgment on the merits; d.) there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter and identity of cause of
action.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, personal property or to

deliver deeds xxx, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by
the party.
FACTS:
In January 1985, The Coronels executed a document entitled receipt of down
payment, stipulating that they received from private respondent Ramona ALcaraz thru
the latters mother, Concepcion Alcaraz, the sum of P50K as down payment on the
total purchase price of P1,240,000 for their house and lot covered by a TCT registered
with RD-Quezon City. However, sometime in February 1985, the Coronels sold the same
property to the petitioner for the higher price of P1.5 million after the latter delivered an
initial sum of P300K. For this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona
by depositing her down payment in the bank in trust for Ramona. Consequently, Private
respondent Concepcion filed a complaint for specific performance and damages thru
her attorney-in-fact, Noel before the RTC of QC. Later, PR Concepcion caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendes on said TCT.
Petitioner had a notice of adverse claim annotated on the disputed TCT. In April
1985, the Coronels executed a deed of absolute sale in favour of petitioner.
Accordingly, a TCT was issued in the name of the petitioner. Concepcion sought leave
of court to amend the complaint to implead Ramona as a co-plaintiff.
RTC: Ruled in favour of the private respondents and ordered the Coronels to execute in
favour of private respondents a deed of sale covering the parcel of land. MR was
likewise denied. CA: Affirmed the order of RTC.

The decision of RTC became final and executory. RTC, then, issued a writ of execution
in favour of PR. Petitioners and Coronel opposed. RTC ordered the implementation of
the writ however petitioners failed to comply with the writ of execution. The RTC , then,
approved the respondents motion for appointment of suitable person to execute deed
and ordered the clerk of court to execute the deed in favour of Ramona in lieu of the
petitioners and Coronels. Petitioners filed MR before the CA but it was denied. Following
such denial, petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari in CA to assail
the RTCs action. In the appeal, petitioner alleged that CA erred in sustaining the
registration of the RD of the deed of absolute sale despite the lack of citizenship of the
buyer over the property; and in sustaining the order of RTC directing the branch clerk of
court to execute the deed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners opposition/objection as regards to the question of private

respondents citizenship was barred by reason of res judicata?
2. Whether petitioner has the capacity to institute the suit
3. Whether the RTC erred in ordering the branch clerk of court to execute the deed of
sales on the strength of the implementation of the writ of execution
RULING:
1. Yes. The objection of petitioner was barred. Res judicata is applicable in the
case. Firstly, in the complaint filed by respondent Concepcion as plaintiff, she
categorically averred that she was a Filipino citizen. However, the petitioner did not
raise against Ramonas qualifications to own lands in the Philippines during trial or
before finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner did not deny or disprove the
averment of Filipino citizenship. Now, when the final decision of RTC is already being
implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by assailing the directive of the
RTC on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines.
Hence, petitioner deemed to have waived the objection, pursuant to Sec. 1 Rule 9 of
the ROC: Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. In every action, parties and counsels are enjoined to
present all available defences and objections in order that the matter in issue can
finally be laid to rest. Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because a
dissatisfied litigant may simply raise new or additional issue in order to prevent, defeat or
delay implementation of an already final and executory judgment. Secondly, the
present case has not been the only recourse taken by the petitioner and her counsel to
assail the citizenship of Ramona and her qualification to acquire lands in the Philippines
as the petitioner had instituted several actions such as an administrative case filed
against the counsel of Ramona for disbarment.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the ff requisites must
be complied with: a.) the former judgment must be final; b.) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; c.) it must
be a judgment on the merits; d.) there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, identity of the subject matter and identity of cause of action. Under
res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by the court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suits. The principle is
founded upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same issues more than once; that when the a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon parties and their privies.
2. No, petitioner lacked the capacity to institute suit to question the citizenship of
Ramona. Under Sec. 7 of BP 185, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute
escheat proceedings against its violators.
3. No, RTC did not err. The deed of absolute sale executed by the branch clerk of court
was valid as found by the CA petitioner did not comply with the notice of the sheriff of
the implementation of the judgment thru the writ of execution; and that her non-
compliance then justified the RTCs orders to the branch clerk of court to execute the
deed to implement the final judgment rendered by the RTC. The fact that the petitioner
and her counsel maneuvered to thwart or delay the inevitable execution of the
judgment warranted the RTCs directing the clerk of court execute the deed of
absolute sale to implement the judgment. Such deliberate refusal called for RTC to
order the branch clerk of court to execute the deed in favour of Ramona, which move
was authorized by Rule 39, Section 10 of the ROC, to wit: If a judgment directs a party
to execute a conveyance of land, personal property or to deliver deeds xxx, and the
party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done
at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and
the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party.

CASE TITLE MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

JOCELYN RICARDO, ARNEL TARUC, MARLENE CATAN, MARIA
THERESA MENDOZA COSTA, FIDELA ROFOLS CASTILLO, DOMINADOR
BASSI, ROBERTO MALABANAN HERNANDEZ, NERISSA MANZANO,
LEONIDEZ MAGLABE HERNANDEZ, TAGUMPAY REYES, and ELINO
FAJARDO
CITATION G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962
PROMULGATION
April 7, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY CASTILLO, ROCH
TOPIC COVERED REVISIONS OF ELECTION RETURNS
DOCTRINE: The synchronized revision of ballots by the SET and the Division is allowed
under Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, which provides:
Section 3. The Tribunals, the Commission and the Courts shall

coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as not to delay or
interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted. The synchronization of
revision of ballots shall be such that the expeditious disposition of the
respective protest cases shall be the primary concern.
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, all the parties ran for elective local offices
in Tagaytay City. Tolentino and De Castro were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor
and Vice-Mayor, respectively. The private respondents contested the election results in
116 ballot boxes by filing three separate election protests against the proclaimed
winning candidates for Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sanggunian
Panlungsod.
The protests were raffled to the Second Division of the COMELEC. After finding
the protests sufficient in form and substance, the Division required the City Treasurer of
Tagaytay City to inventory the protested ballot boxes and to turn them over to the
Election Officer of Tagaytay City for delivery and submission to the COMELECs Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) in Manila.
However, the delivery and submission took place only on December 17,
2008 due to the moves of Tolentino and De Castro of taking turns to suspend the
transmittal of the ballot boxes to ECAD. Tolentino moved to defer the transmittal of the
ballot boxes to ECAD on the premise that he had to complete the photocopying and
verification of the contested ballots; upon denial of his motion, he elevated the issue to
the Court by petition for certiorari. The petition was dismissed.
On November 21, 2008, De Castro again sought the suspension of the revision
proceedings, citing the order issued on November 17, 2008 by the SET, asserting the
SETs preferential custody pursuant to Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812 over

the ballot boxes, election documents, and election paraphernalia in connection with
SET Case No. 001-07. However, the Division resolved not to suspend the revision
proceedings, and instead directed the Election Officer of Tagaytay City to deliver the
affected ballot boxes to the SET, with the remainder of the ballot boxes to be deposited
in the ECAD Ballot Box Storage Area in Manila. 40 ballot boxes out of the 116 protested
ones were set aside due to apparent sealing defects or irregularities.
On January 6, 2009, upon receipt of the 72 ballot boxes, the Division ordered the
constitution of four Revision Committees, for the committees to convene and
commence the revision of the 72 ballot boxes in such a way that whenever a ballot box
was opened, its contents should be revised for all of the three protest cases before
opening the next ballot box.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revision of the forty four (44) ballots boxes with the Senate is
valid.
RULING:
At the outset, the Court holds that the order of revision and the revision of ballots
synchronized with that of the SET were proper.
1. In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in

the counting of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting
of votes. This process of examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Section 6. Revision of Ballots. When the allegations in a

protest or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of
the Commission or Division the interest of justice so demands, it shall
immediately order the ballot boxes containing ballots and their
keys, list of voters with voting records, book of voters, and other
documents used in the election to be brought before the
Commission, and shall order the revision of the ballots.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns
and the veracity of the counting of the ballots.
2. The synchronized revision of ballots by the SET and the Division is allowed
under Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, which provides:
Section 3. The Tribunals, the Commission and the Courts shall

coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as not to
delay or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted. The
synchronization of revision of ballots shall be such that the
expeditious disposition of the respective protest cases shall be the
primary concern.

In the proper exercise of its jurisdiction, therefore, the Division, mindful of the
need for the expeditious disposition of the cases, formally requested the SET
to permit the revision of the 44 ballot boxes within its premises. The Division
made this request although it had suspended the revision proceedings
through a previous order on account of the then incomplete number of
ballot boxes in ECADs custody. In this connection, the contention that the
Divisions suspension order became immutable cannot be upheld; such an
order, being essentially interlocutory in character, could not attain finality. An
interlocutory order is one that resolves an incidental or collateral matter
without putting an end to the case, and for that reason does not become
final and immutable upon the expiration of the period prescribed for taking
an appeal from a judgment or final order.
It is clear that by its suspension order the Division only adopted an auxiliary
means necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect. In that light, we should
find that there was no irregularity in the Divisions lifting of the suspension, for,
after all, nothing prohibited the COMELEC from undertaking the appreciation
of ballots in tandem with the SETs own revision of ballots for the senatorial
electoral protest.
3. Under Section 11, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, one of the
most indispensable informations that should appear in the revision report
relates to the conditions of the ballot boxes. The importance of this
information cannot be understated.

CASE TITLE FRANCISCO ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC

PROMULGATION
April 20, 2010
DATE
TOPIC HIERARCHY OF COURTS, PARTIES & LEGAL INTEREST
DOCTRINE:
1. The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA stands
between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment has been precisely to
take over much of the work that used to be done by the Court. Historically, the
CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues,
and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors that
ordinarily might escape detection.
2. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party in interest is
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and sole heir of the
late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the
pendency of this case, and was substituted by his legal heirs.
In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N.

Alonso had acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government
in or about the year 1911.
Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No. 727-D-2
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been administratively reconstituted from the
owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 in the name of United
Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc
(Cebu Country Club).
With his discoveries, Francisco formally demanded upon Cebu Country Club to
restore the ownership and possession of Lot727-D-2 to him. However, Cebu Country
Club denied Franciscos demand and claim of ownership, and refused to deliver the
possession to him.

On September 25, 1992, Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in

the RTC in Cebu City an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of
deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property. The
RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club. Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which ultimately affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the
denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Whether or not R.A. No. 9443 gave the petitioners a legal interest to assail the
RTCs orders.
RULING:
1. The petitioners breach of the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court
to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC via petition for review on certiorari.
They should not have done so, bypassing a review by the Court of Appeals (CA),
because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the efficient functioning of the
courts and to the orderly administration of justice. Their non-observance of the
hierarchy of courts has forthwith enlarged the docket of the Court by one more
case, which, though it may not seem burdensome to the layman, is one case
too much to the Court, which has to devote time and effort in poring over the
papers submitted herein, only to discover in the end that a review should have
first been made by the CA. The time and effort could have been dedicated to
other cases of importance and impact on the lives and rights of others.
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA

stands between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment have been
precisely to take over much of the work that used to be done by the
Court. Historically, the CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in
synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and
in identifying errors that ordinarily might escape detection.
The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also underscored by the
reality that determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest
entitled to bring this appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As
such, the CA was in the better position to review and to determine. In that
regard, the petitioners violate Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which demands that an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari be limited to questions of law.
2. The pronouncement in G.R. No. 130876 renders beyond dispute that the non-
execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now
hold no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the
proper parties to assail the questioned orders of the RTC, because they stand to
derive nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club.
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real

party in interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party in
interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. One having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in
an action.
Thus, an appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in

interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must
of necessity continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that entitles him
to the avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an
exercise in futility. So it is with the petitioners!
In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is
the only party adversely affected by the denial, and is the proper party entitled
to assail the denial.

CASE TITLE ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO (CONSOLIDATED CASE)
CITATION G. R. No. 191002
PROMULGATION
April 20, 2010
DATE
TOPIC APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
DOCTRINE: The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not
controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not
obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to
call for a rectification.[5] The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-
law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of
Parliament.[6] But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may
be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and
justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and
justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for
the sake of convenience and stability.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting
(G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.);
Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others
(BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the
Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and
Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose
belated intervention was allowed.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment made of the President is valid.
Whether or not the Valenzuela Doctrine is applicable in this case.
RULING:
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters
being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the
decision of March 17, 2010.

First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply
means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative
authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts
within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or
overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents
are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may
be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence
of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon
to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.[3] In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower
courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest
court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to
its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled
by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to
follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a
precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant,
and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be
applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of
convenience and stability.
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence
that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or
Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The
records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might
not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr.
withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII (t)o avoid any
further complication, such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13,
Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:

Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

CASE TITLE LOKIN, JR. vs. COMELEC

CITATION G.R. No. 179431-32
PROMULGATION DATE June 22, 2010
DIGEST BY Danduan, Jake
TOPIC COVERED Special Civil Action Rule 64; Forum-shopping; Withdrawal of
party-list nominations
DOCTRINE: As Rule 64 states, the mode of review (of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC) is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to
be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
The consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus did not
violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought
were different.
FACTS:
The party-list group CIBAC (Citizens Battle Against Corruption), through its president
Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees, which includes (1) Emmanuel Joel
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin
Tugna; and (5) Emil Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang, and substituted Armi Jane Borje as one of the nominees. The
amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales,
and (3) Borje.
After the elections, Villanueva submitted a letter to the COMELEC transmitting therewith
signed petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members confirming the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang. CIBAC was then proclaimed as a winner and
it had garnered enough votes to qualify for an additional seat.
Subsequently, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed a motion before the
COMELEC En Banc seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. This
motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
COMELEC En Banc later confirmed, based on Sec. 13 of its Resolution 7804, the
withdrawal of the nominations, especially of Lokin. As a result, Cruz-Gonzales was
proclaimed as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Thus, Lokin filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court, and also filed a
petition for certiorari to assail the resolutions of the COMELEC for unduly expanding
Section 8 of R.A. 7941. For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for
filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both
petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the controversy? YES.
(2) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping? NO.
(3) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act? YES.
RULING:
(1) YES. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case. COMELEC argued that Lokin
should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil
action for quo warranto in the HRET because the proclamation and assumption of
office already took place. BUT, according to the Supreme Court, the controversy
involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one
party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine
which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained
the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a nominee of a
particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same
party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of
the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Hence, Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review (of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC) is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to
be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
(2) Lokin is not guilty of forum shopping. Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to
compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second nominee of CIBAC. On the other
hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the resolution of the
COMELEC approving the withdrawal of the nominations, and to challenge the validity
of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELECs basis for allowing CIBACs
withdrawal of Lokins nomination.
The consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus did not
violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were
different.
(3) Sec. 13 of Resolution 7804 is invalid. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs
must comply with the following requisites to be valid: (a) Its promulgation must be
authorized by the Legislature; (b) It must be within the scope of the authority given by
the Legislature; (c) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure; and (d) It must be reasonable.
In this case, the second and fourth requisites are lacking. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
provides that "x x x. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated
in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned." (Emphasis ours).
The provision is clear. Furthermore, exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive.
Hence, the insertion of the new ground withdrawal of the nomination by the party
by Sec. 13 of Resolution 7804 was invalid.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC
was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its
substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual.

CASE TITLE GOMEZ-CASTILLO vs. COMELEC

PROMULGATION DATE June 22, 2010
TOPICS COVERED Venue of protests; Period of Appeal
DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in which
said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised.
The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction.
The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so
lightly regarded, for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying
the stability of our judicial system.
FACTS:
Petitioner Minerva Gomez-Castillo (Castillo) and respondent Strike Revilla ran for
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite. Revilla was proclaimed winner. Castillo filed here
election protest and was raffled to Branch 19 of RTC in Bacoor, Cavite. Revilla sought
the dismissal of the protest alleging that it was filed in the wrong RTC branch. He
pointed out that SCAO No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite
and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests
involving municipal officials in Cavite.
Branch 19 dismissed the protest for being violative of SCAO No. 54-2007. The COMELEC
First Division dismissed the appeal of Castillo for being filed out of the five-day
reglementary period provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and also under
the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials (A.M. 07-4-15-SC). It noted that although Castillo had received the November
21, 2008 Order of the RTC on December 15, 2008, she filed her notice of appeal on
December 23, 2008, a day too late to appeal. Reconsideration was also denied for
failure to pay the required fees under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE:
(1) Was the error of petitioner in filing her protest in RTC Bacoor jurisdictional? NO.
(2) In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal of its order
of dismissal despite its having attained finality? NO.
RULING:
(1) The error of petitioner in filing the protest in RTC Bacoor is not jurisdictional. It is well-
settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in
Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
Consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in
which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be
exercised. The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been
vested in the RTC by Section 251 of Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue, only spelled out the manner by which
an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice, and is
permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of
election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.
Castillos filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong
choice of venue. Hence, the dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain
error, considering that her wrong choice did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What
Branch 19 should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the protest to
Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was the proper venue. Such transfer was
proper, whether she as the protestant sought it or not, given that the determination of
the will of the electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to the process set forth by law
was of the highest concern of our institutions, particularly of the courts.
(2) Castillos tardy appeal should be dismissed. The period of appeal and the perfection
of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they are essential to
the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial system.
Contrary to Castillos posture, we cannot also presume the timeliness of her appeal
from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by its elevating the protest to
the COMELEC. The presumption of timeliness would not arise if her appeal was actually
tardy.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the COMELECs assailed actions were appropriate
and lawful, not tainted by either arbitrariness or whimsicality.

CASE TITLE IN RE: RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS.

303168 AND 303169 AND ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN LIEU OF THOSE LOST.
ROLANDO EDWARD G. LIM,

Petitioner.
PROMULGATION
July 6, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY De Guzman, Jiana
TOPIC COVERED Remedial Law Forum Shopping
DOCTRINES:
1. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction,
same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders
were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two
objectives were sought.
2. A violation of the rule against forum-shopping other than a willful and deliberate
forum shopping does not authorize the RTC to dismiss the proceeding without
motion and hearing.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando Edward Lim seeks to reverse the decision of the RTC dismissing his
petition for judicial reconstitution of TCT upon a finding that he was guilty of forum-
shopping.
Lim filed an action for the reconstitution of TCTs and for the issuance of owners
duplicate copies of said TCTs before the RTC on December 29, 1998. Subsequently, the
RTC issued an order, setting the petition for hearing. The RTC required the publication of
the copy of the order in the Official Gazette to which the petitioner complied.
Thereafter, the RTC received a report from the LRA stating that the TCTs have already
been applied for reconstitution under Administrative Reconstitution Proceedings
pursuant to R.A. 6732. The aforesaid TCTs are included in Administrative Reconstitution
Order No. Q-577 dated November 3, 1998, however, they were not reconstituted
administratively, it appearing that their owner's duplicate were likewise lost.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the stated facts and circumstances, petitioner can be deemed
to have engaged in forum shopping.
RULING:
We hold that the dismissal was unwarranted and arbitrary for emanating from an
erroneous application of the rule against forum shopping. Thus, we undo the dismissal
and reinstate the application for judicial reconstitution.

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements
of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two
distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.
Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of his application for
the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial
reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were not identical.
When he applied for the administrative reconstitution in the LRA on July 21,1988, he still
had his co-owners duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but by the time the LRA
resolved his application on November 3, 1998, allowing the relief prayed for, his co-
owners duplicate copies of the TCTs had meanwhile been destroyed by fire on
February 24, 1998, a fact that he had duly reported in an affidavit dated May 29, 1998
presented on June 1, 1998 to the Office of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City. Thus,
the intervening loss of the owners duplicate copies that left the favorable ruling of the
LRA no longer implementable gave rise to his need to apply for judicial reconstitution in
the RTC pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.
The bases for the administrative reconstitution were the owners duplicate copies of the
TCTs, while those for judicial reconstitution would be other documents that in the
judgment of the court are sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title. The RTC should have also noted soon enough that his
resort to judicial reconstitution was not because his earlier resort to administrative
reconstitution had been denied but because the intervening loss to fire of the only
permissible basis for administrative reconstitution of the TCTs mandated his resort to the
RTC. Indeed, he came to court as the law directed him to do, unlike the litigant
involved in the undesirable practice of forum shopping who would go from one court
to another to secure a favorable relief after being denied the desired relief by another
court.

The motu proprio dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by the RTC although
the Government did not file a motion to dismiss grounded on the petitioners supposed
failure to comply with the contents of the required certification was yet another glaring
error of the RTC. A violation of the rule against forum-shopping other than a willful and
deliberate forum shopping did not authorize the RTC to dismiss the proceeding without
motion and hearing. Specifically, the submission of a false certification of non-forum
shopping did not automatically warrant the dismissal of the proceeding, even if it might
have constituted contempt of court, for Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, has been clear and forthright, to wit:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping.--The plaintiff or principal party shall

certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as cause for administrative sanctions.

CASE TITLE SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by:

ROSARIO SESPEE and their Children, Petitioners, -versus- APOLONIA
G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM, Respondents.
PROMULGATION
August 4, 2010
DATE
TOPIC COVERED REM Res Judicata; CIV Succession
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata is founded on the broad principle that it is to the
interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over
a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine is put upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and necessity,
which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation
(reipublicae ut sit finis litium); the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be
vexed twice for one and the same cause(nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem
causa).
FACTS:
The parcel of land subject of this case was originally owned by the late Alejandra
Sespee, who had two marriages. The first marriage was with Gaudencio Franco, by
whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second
marriage was with Jose Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia, who
married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by
Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in
1924) and Victor Miralles.
The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not
parties herein, charging them with stealing coconut fruits from the land subject of the
present case. The CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty. CA affirmed
their conviction and rejected respondent Apolonias defense of ownership of the land.
In the meanwhile, or prior to the CAs rendition of its decision in the criminal case, the
petitioners commenced this suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property with damages against the respondents in the CFI. The suit involved the same
parcel of land from where the coconut fruits subject of the crime of qualified theft had
been taken.
RTC (formerly CFI) rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners holding that the
plaintiffs were able to establish that Rosario Sespee Tumbokon purchased the land in
question from Cresenciana Inog. Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land by
purchase from Victor Miralles.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a son-in-law is a compulsory heir.
2. Whether or not the ruling in a criminal prosecution for qualified theft bound the
petitioners and the respondents on the issue of ownership of the land, which was
brought up as a defense, as to preclude the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the
Court of Appeals (CA) from adjudicating the same issue in a civil case filed prior
to the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case.
RULING:
1. No.
A decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents
estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887, Civil Code,viz:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and
2; neither do they exclude one another.
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent
Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded
Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased
Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have
inherited. Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to the succession by
law and not by the person represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not
Ciriaca.
Therefore, Victor is not an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as the husband
of Ciriaca). Thus, the statement in the deed of absolute sale entered into between
Victor Miralles and Cresenciana Inog, to the effect that the parcel of land was inherited
from the deceased Alejandra Sespee by Victor Miralles being the sole heir of the said
Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters, was outrightly false.

2. Bar by res judicata is not applicable.

Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions (a)
identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior judgment,
or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; the second, known
as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule of auter action pendant, ordains
that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the
effect of preclusion of issues only.
The first aspect of the doctrine, is not applicable, because the causes of action in the
civil and the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil
action is for the recovery of ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the
criminal action was to determine whether the act of the respondents of taking the
coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of
qualified theft. The issue of guilt or innocence was not dependent on the ownership of
the land, inasmuch as a person could be guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he
were the owner of the land.
Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves

commenced both actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial of both
actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the CA to determine the ownership
of the land based on the evidence presented in the civil action applied only to the
petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil action after the
CA had ruled adversely against them.

CASE TITLE JUSTINA MANIEBO, Petitioner, -versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.
PROMULGATION
August 10, 2010
DATE
TOPIC COVERED REM Rule 43 ; CONSTI Civil Service Commission (Eligibility)
DOCTRINES:
1. Dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the
penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense.
2. Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it
finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay,
or at that questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration;
or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition,
not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice.
FACTS:
Justina Maniebo, an employee of a local government unit, was dismissed from the
service after her dishonesty in presenting herself as holding a civil service eligibility.
Justina was issued a promotional appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro because she
appeared to possess the qualifications for the position. But when the CSC Regional
Office No. IV verified her name in the Masterlist of Eligibles, she was found out to have
actually failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only 60%.
She was then charged with possessing of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave
misconduct and dishonesty after having indicated in her Personal Data Sheet that she
had passed the CSC (professional) examination with a rating of 74.01%.
She appealed the decision of the CSC to the CA wherein CA dismissed her complaint
for failure to accompany the petition for review with the requisite certified true copies
of the material portions of the record referred to therein, i.e., the preliminary
investigation and charge for possession of spurious report of rating, the answer, the
decision of CSC Regional Office, CSC Resolution, and other supporting papers and the
evidences submitted before the CSC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for review for
failure to attach the certified copy of the annexes when the Rules and
jurisprudence do not require that all annexes attached to the petition should be
certified.
2. Whether CA erred in dismissing the petition based on alleged technicality which

was not sanctioned by jurisprudence.

3. Whether the CSC committed grave error in not considering good faith on the
report of the petitioner in the determination of the appealed decision.
4. Whether the CSC was correct in imposing the penalty of dismissal in view of the
circumstances obtaining in the case.
RULING:
1. NO. CA did not err in dismissing the petition.
The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions
of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers. The requirement is
intended to immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to
the appeal or not by having all the material necessary to make such determination
before it. This is because an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal,
which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to
file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice.
2. The petitioner was not entitled to a liberal construction of the rules of procedure.
Although her petition cited decisions of the Court declaring that only the copies of the
decisions or final orders assailed on appeal needed to be certified, it is acknowledged
even in the cited decisions of the Court that there should at least be a substantial
compliance with the rules. She should not forget that her petition for review in the CA
was essentially assailing not only CSC Resolution 02-1028 (denying her motion for
reconsideration) but also CSC Resolution No. 02-0433 (the very decision of the CSC
finding her guilty of possession of the spurious report of rating, falsification, grave
misconduct, and dishonesty, and imposing the penalty of dismissal from the service).
Nonetheless, we point out that even in her prohibited second motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner did not tender any explanation for her failure to make
good her undertaking to furnish to the CA the required certified or legible copies of the
material portions of the record. Instead, she contented herself with merely reiterating
the grounds previously used in her first motion for reconsideration, adding only that any
further documents needed by the CA could be made available once the records of
the case were transmitted by the CSC to the CA, as provided in Section 11, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.
The petitioner repeatedly disregarded the rules too many times to merit any tolerance
by the Court, thereby exhibiting a deplorable tendency to trivialize the rules of
procedure. Yet, such rules were not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance might have resulted in prejudicing a partys substantive rights. The
bare invocation of substantial justice was not a magic wand that would compel the
suspension of the rules of procedure. Of necessity, the reviewing court had also to
assess whether the appeal was substantially meritorious on its face, or not, for only after

such finding could the review court ease the often stringent rules of procedure.
Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be reduced to mere trifles.
3. NO. The CSC committed no error in not appreciating good faith.

In Civil Service Commission v. Cayobit, the Court ruled that as between a government
employees self-serving claim that she passed the Civil Service Examination, and the
actual score appearing in the Masterlist of Eligibles, the latter must prevail.
4. Lastly, the petitioners posture, that her dismissal from the service was too harsh a
punishment, considering that she had rendered 20 years of efficient service in the
Government, does not convince.
The facts and evidence, coupled with respondents admission, sufficiently established his
culpability. Respondents use of a false certificate of eligibility constitutes an act of
dishonesty under civil service rules and his act of making a false statement in his
personal data sheet renders him administratively liable for falsification. Under Section
23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification
(par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service
upon commission of the first offense.

CASE TITLE SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PROMULGATION
August 25, 2010
DATE
TOPIC COVERED REM CrimPro(Warrantless Arrest)
DOCTRINE: A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual
suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-
and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
(Penned by Justice Carpio Morales)
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Esquillo was convicted by the RTC for violating Sec.11 of Article II of R.A.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
PO1 Cruzin, witness for the prosecution, stated that after he alighted from the private
vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the
direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a
yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruzin was not sure what the plastic
sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as
he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner
and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case.
Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was
timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent
plastic sachet from the cigarette case. After apprising petitioner of her constitutional
rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet.
On the contrary, Susan alleged that while she was sick and resting at home, policemen
arrived in the place and inquired about the whereabouts of a certain Ryan. When she
answered in the negative, the policemen forced her to go with them in the police
station. She claimed that the evidence against her was planted, stemming from an all
too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her family.

On trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary
evidence of the prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports
issued by NBI Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen. However, on appeal before the CA,
petitioner questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant which thus, renders any
evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of petitioner was valid.
RULING:
Appellants conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment.
Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised
the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the
occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court. By such
omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed
engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers
were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement
officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That
petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer
and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid
search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches;

(2) as an incident to a lawful arrest;
(3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws;
(4) searches of moving vehicles;
(5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;
(6) where the prohibited articles are in plain view;
(7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations;
and
(8) stop and frisk operations.
The Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid stop-
and-frisk operation. At the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious
behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.

DISSENTING OPINION:
DOCTRINES:
1. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. (People v.
Lapitaje)
2. Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him.
3. If the reasonableness of a Terry stop and search is tested in the light of the totality
of the circumstances in each case, a dual inquiry is necessary:- whether the
officers action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances, which justified the interference in the first
place.
4. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to
ones consciousness of guilt.
Justice Lucas Bersamin submits the following:
1. The petitioners failure to assail the invalidity of her arrest prior to her arraignment,
and her objecting to the inadmissibility of the evidence for the first time only on appeal
on the ground that the search was illegal for being done despite her not committing
any unlawful act to give a justification for the search did not amount to a waiver of her
objection to the admissibility of the evidence against her.
The failure to object to the irregularity of an arrest prior to the arraignment does not
involve a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence. It only amounts to a submission to
the jurisdiction of the trial court.
2. To me, a Terry protective search is strictly limited to what is necessary for the
discovery of weapons that may be used to harm the officer of the law or others nearby.
There must then be a genuine reason to believe that the accused is armed and
presently dangerous. Being an exception to the rule requiring a search
warrant, a Terry protective search is strictly construed; hence, it cannot go beyond
what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed. Anything beyond is no longer
valid and the fruits of the search will be suppressed.
Moreover, the genuine reason to believe required for a Terry protective search need
not amount or equate to probable cause, which infers that an offense is being
committed or has been committed. If the reason amounts to probable cause, the
officer can already validly effect an outright warrantless arrest, and his ensuing search
will not be limited to a merely protective one for weapons but will be for anything
related to the offense being committed or has been committed. Such a search is one
incidental to a lawful arrest.

The search and confiscation of the shabu by PO1 Cruzin resulted neither from a
valid Terry stop-and-frisk nor from a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The petitioner
was merely placing a transparent plastic sachet inside her cigarette case in public. PO1
Cruzin himself indicated in his testimony that he did not see or know what the plastic
sachet contained before deciding to intrude into her privacy.
In People v. Aminnudin, the Court declared the warrantless arrest of Aminnudin as he

was coming down a vessel to be unconstitutional because, to all appearances, such
coming down was no less innocent than the coming down of the other disembarking
passengers. The Court observed that Aminnudin had not committed, nor was he
actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer, nor was he even acting suspiciously.
If the reasonableness of a Terry stop and search is tested in the light of the totality of the
circumstances in each case, a dual inquiry is necessary:- whether the officers action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances, which justified the interference in the first place.
Here, however, the dual inquiry was not successfully met. The police officers were not
even surveying the area of arrest for the presence of drug violators. Neither did they
have any informants tip that the area was a known place for drug users or drug
pushers. Considering that they were not even shown to have been specially trained to
determine and identify shabu from a distance, the only acceptable conclusion to be
reached is that PO1 Cruzin had no reasonable suspicion about any illegal or criminal
activity on the part of the petitioner. In fact, he admitted that only his curiosity had
prompted him to approach her in order to inquire about the content of the plastic
sachet.
Relevantly, it is observed that the majority do not categorically state what the
suspicious behavior of the petitioner was.
PO1 Cruzins restraining of the petitioner because she attempted to flee as he

approached her was not also legitimate or reasonable. Flight alone was no basis for
any reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Indeed, a persons flight
cannot immediately justify an investigatory stop, for even in high crime areas there are
many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers,
unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a
guilty party.
I contend, therefore, that contrary to the CAs dangerous position the purpose of the
Terry dictum to enable the officer to discover weapons that may be used to harm him
or others nearby forbids any overindulgence in stopping and searching persons who
have given no indication of impending criminal activity. Such purpose really delineates
a boundary for all stop-and-frisk situations that limits the search to the persons outer
clothing, subject to the officer having a genuine reason, in light of his and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Any search done beyond the boundary cannot be justified as a
valid stop-and-frisk under Terry, for it cannot be a limited protective search, or a

preventive measure, or an act of self-preservation against a potentially dangerous
criminal from harming the officer and others.
Thus, we should exclude the evidence then seized from the petitioner, for that is the
only way by which the Court can effectively enforce the guarantee of the Bill of Rights
to her right to privacy and personal security expressed under its Section 2, supra.

CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA) vs. Hon. HANS
LEO J. CACDAC et. al.
PROMULGATION
September 27, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY De Guzman, Jabriellie
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure Rule 65, Section 1
DOCTRINE: Relief in a special civil action for certiorari is available only when the
following essential requisites concur: (a) the petition must be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions (b) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (c) there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular
rand and file employees of PAL. The 5-year term of its officers has expired thus PALEA
held a general election. Regional Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, acting
upon the petition of some of the presidential candidates as well as some members of
the union, nullified the general election and proclamation of the winners. It was alleged
that the general election was found to be riddled with fraud and irregularities; and
ordered the holding of another general election under the direct supervision of DOLE.
Jose Penas III, who was proclaimed as the winning candidate for president in the
nullified election, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the
resolution of the BLR but was dismissed. The DOLE then carried out pre-election
proceedings. During the pre-election, some PALEA members assigned in the PAL Cargo
sub department filed with the BLR a petition to conduct a plebiscite to amend the
PALEA Constitution and By-laws in order that they would have a representative in the
PALEA Board of Directors but was dismissed. BLR denied the appeal because the order
was interlocutory in nature considering that the petition to conduct the plebiscite to
amend the PALEA Constitution and By-Laws was merely incidental to the issue of the
conduct of election. The general election was then set.
PALEA, through its holdover president, filed a petition for certiorari, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the BLR Director praying that a
TRO be issued to restrain the holding of the general election. The CA issued a TRO on
the day of the general election, but the Comelec received the TRO only after the close
of the polls and the canvass of the ballots was about to start. In the end, the CA
dismissed the petition for and ordered the Comelec to complete the canvass of the
results and to proclaim the winners because the petition for certiorari was clearly
intended to forestall the implementation of the already final and executory judgment
rendered upholding the resolution BLR Director directing the immediate conduct of
election of PALEA. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by PALEA.
RULING:
No. The CA found that PALEA had assailed the order of the Regional Director
and the BLR Director (dismissing the petition to amend the PALEA Constitution and By-
Laws for lack of merit), but the arguments PALEA advanced in its petition for certiorari
and its other pleadings did not at all touch on the supposed subject matter and
assailed only the manner by which the election had been conducted. In view of its
rationalization of its dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the CA acted properly and
correctly considering that PALEA was unjustified in commencing its special civil action
for certiorari.
Relief in a special civil action for certiorari is available only when the following
essential requisites concur: (a) the petition must be directed against a tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions (b) the tribunal, board, or officer
must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (c) there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
There is no concurrence of the requisites. Firstly, PALEA should have first waited
for the final election results as certified by DOLE-NCR before filing the petition for
certiorari. As the BLR Director pointed out, the petition for the plebiscite to amend
PALEAs Constitution and By-Laws was merely incidental to the conduct of the general
election pursuant to the final and executory decision of the BLR. As such, the recourse
open to PALEA was not to forthwith file the petition for certiorari to assail such denial,
but to first await the final election results as certified by DOLE NCR. That PALEA did not
so wait signified that it ignored the character of certiorari as an extraordinary recourse
to resort to when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. And, secondly, the Regional Director and the BLR Director were definitely not
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respectively issuing the order. Instead,
they were thereby performing the purely ministerial act of enforcing the already final
and executory BLR resolution directing the conduct of the general election which the
CA had affirmed through its final and executory judgment.

CASE TITLE LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, vs. JUDGE

ROMEO A. RABACA
CITATION A.M. No. MTJ051580
PROMULGATION
October 6, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY De Guzman, Jabriellie
DOCTRINE: It is the ministerial duty of the judge to grant the plaintiffs motion for
immediate execution in an ejectment case upon the defendants failure to file the
sufficient supersedeas bond. The perfection of the appeal by the defendant in an
ejectment case does not forbid a favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for
immediate executiononly the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the
deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled
with the perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution.
FACTS:
The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in
a civil case (ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc. v.
Conrado Cano. After trial, respondent Judge, ruled in favor of the plaintiff thus ordering
the defendant to vacate premises and surrender it to the plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel
filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued for
the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment. in accordance with Section 19,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In his order, however, respondent Judge denied the
motion for immediate execution because a notice of appeal has been seasonably
filed by the respondent. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration but it was likewise
denied by the respondent Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Rabaca erred in not granting the plaintinffs motion for
immediate execution.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate
execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond
despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution
became his ministerial duty upon the defendants failure to file the sufficient
supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty.
Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue
of the defendants appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of
the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did
not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. The
execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. Only
the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of
the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal,

could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his omission or by
asserting lack of malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not
be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation.
Good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a
noncompliance only when there is an as yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or
applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his
court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to the present
case, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the
pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact that
further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.
We agree, therefore, that respondent Judges omission to apply Section 19 was

inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the
rule made in the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt
about his authority to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us
believe, he could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules
of Court, which he well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his
judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that
he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a
duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively
accountable. This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level
courts to adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court
to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient
supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and
the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent
the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be
borne in mind.

CASE TITLE PHILIP TURNER and ELNORA TURNER vs. LORENZO SHIPPING
CORPORATION
PROMULGATION
November 24, 2010
DATE
DIGEST BY DIMALIWAT, DIANNE EUNICE T.
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Cause of Action
DOCTRINE: Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after
the filing of the complaint cure the lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The
petitioners right of action could only spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a
complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of
action during the pendency of the action. For, only when there is an invasion of primary
rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative. Verily, a
premature invocation of the courts intervention renders the complaint without a cause
of action and dismissible on such ground.
FACTS:
The petitioners held 1,010,000 shares of stock of the respondent. In 1999, the respondent
decided to amend its articles of incorporation to remove the stockholders pre-emptive
rights to newly issued shares of stock. Feeling that the corporate move would be
prejudicial to their interest as stockholders, the petitioners voted against the
amendment and demanded payment of their shares at the rate of P2.276/share based
on the book value of the shares, or a total of P2,298,760.00. The respondent found the
fair value of the shares demanded by the petitioners unacceptable. It insisted that the
market value on the date before the action to remove the pre-emptive right was taken
should be the value, or P0.41/share (or a total ofP414,100.00). The disagreement on the
valuation of the shares led the parties to constitute an appraisal committee.
On October 27, 2000, the appraisal committee reported its valuation of P2.54/share, for
an aggregate value ofP2,565,400.00 for the petitioners.
The petitioners demanded payment based on the valuation of the appraisal

committee. In its letter to the petitioners dated January 2, 2001, the respondent refused
the petitioners demand, explaining that pursuant to the Corporation Code, the
dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could be paid only when the
corporation had unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but
that it had no retained earnings at the time of the petitioners demand, as borne out by
its Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 1999 showing a deficit of P72,973,114.00 as of
December 31, 1999.
Upon the respondents refusal to pay, the petitioners sued the respondent for collection
and damages in the RTC. The respondent opposed stating that the petitioners did not
have a cause of action against the respondent.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners stating the evidence submitted by plaintiffs
shows that in its quarterly financial statement it submitted to the Securities and

Exchange Commission, the defendant has retained earnings of P11,975,490 as of March

21, 2002. The law does not say that the unrestricted retained earnings must exist at the
time of the demand. Even if there are no retained earnings at the time the demand is
made if there are retained earnings later, the fair value of such stocks must be paid. The
only restriction is that there must be sufficient funds to cover the creditors after the
dissenting stockholder is paid.
The CA reversed the RTCs decision stating that the Turners right of action arose only
when petitioner had already retained earnings in the amount of P11,975,490.00
on March 21, 2002; such right of action was inexistent on January 22, 2001 when they
filed the Complaint. Subject to certain qualifications, and except as otherwise provided
by law, an action commenced before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely
brought and should be dismissed. The fact that the cause of action accrues after the
action is commenced and while it is pending is of no moment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners cause of action was premature
RULING:
Yes. That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books
at the time the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 01-086 on January 22, 2001
proved that the respondents legal obligation to pay the value of the petitioners shares
did not yet arise. Thus, the CA did not err in holding that the petitioners had no cause of
action, and in ruling that the RTC did not validly render the partial summary judgment.
The RTCs construal of the Corporation Code was unsustainable, because it did not take
into account the petitioners lack of a cause of action against the respondent. In order
to give rise to any obligation to pay on the part of the respondent, the petitioners
should first make a valid demand that the respondent refused to pay despite having
unrestricted retained earnings. Otherwise, the respondent could not be said to be guilty
of any actionable omission that could sustain their action to collect.
Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of
the complaint cure the lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners
right of action could only spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a complaint
whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during
the pendency of the action. For, only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not
before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative. Verily, a premature
invocation of the courts intervention renders the complaint without a cause of action
and dismissible on such ground.

CASE TITLE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA
B. PLAZA vs. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC.,
and HON. ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH
2, OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY
PROMULGATION
December 1, 2010
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Preliminary Injunction
DOCTRINE: No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary
restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said
twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within
the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
FACTS:
In 2002, City Mayor Plaza wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit its support for
her decision to deny the application for mayors permit of respondent CBS, and to
eventually close down CBSs radio station. She justified her decision by claiming that
CBSs operating its broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential
area, had violated the Citys zoning ordinance. Based on this letter, CBS was informed
that it couldnt situate their business in the area as it violates our zoning ordinance.
However, they have pleaded and were agreeable to operate in the area by virtue of a
Temporary Use Permit (TUP). The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only for a
very limited period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was good only for one year, which can
be renewed every year for a maximum of 5 years or until 1999. Thus, right from the
beginning they have been informed and forewarned that they cannot operate in the
area forever and that they have to relocate to a proper area. And hence, Mayor Plaza
decided to deny their application for a mayor's permit and thereafter to close the radio
station. The Sangguninang Panlungsod strongly supported Mayor Plazas decision.
The Citys licensing officer served on CBSs station manager a final/last notice of
violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he
would recommend the closure of its business in case of non-compliance. CBS and its
manager, Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages
against the petitioners in the RTC with prayer for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and preventing its
business operations.

Judge Dabalos issued a TRO against the petitioners. Thereafter, the CBSs prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction was granted. The petitioners then commenced a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. The CA dismissed the said
petition upon finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion in acting upon CBS
application for preliminary injunction. The CA held that the writ of preliminary injunction
had properly issued, because the petitioners had threatened to defeat CBSs existing
franchise to operate its radio station in Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its
broadcast business.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBS application for preliminary
injunction
RULING:
No. The conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that
right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove
its entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on the
basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature,
and that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors permit and resulting
closure of the radio station) were imminent and, unless enjoined, would curtail or set at
naught CBSs rights under the franchise. It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist
that the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued
the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on
the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to
show cause why the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue,
thus:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No

preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective
only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why
the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their
refusal to comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that
effect, the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.

2011 CASES
CASE TITLE PETER BEJARASCO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
CITATION GR No. 159781
PROMULGATION
February 02, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Dizon, Jenine Andrea
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsels acts, including
even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. A recognized exception to the rule
is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due
process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not
be accompanied by the clients own negligence or malice, considering that the client
has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on
the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse
judgment is rendered against him.
FACTS:
The petitioner was convicted on February 16, 2001, for grave threats and grave oral
defamation in the MTC in Sibonga, Cebu. On July 31, 2001, the RTC in Argao, Cebu
affirmed the convictions.
In due course, the petitioner, then represented by the PAO, sought the reconsideration
of the RTC decision, claiming that he had not filed his appeal memorandum because
of the MTCs failure to give him free copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. He
argued that the RTCs decision should be set aside and the criminal cases against him
should be dismissed due to the prematurity and the serious errors of facts and law.
However, the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On October 12, 2001, the petitioner, this time represented by Atty. Luzmindo B. Besario,
a private practitioner, filed in the CA a motion for extension of time to file his petition for
review. The CA granted his motion. Instead of filing his petition for review within the
period granted, however, Atty. Besario sought another extension, but still failed in the
end to file the petition for review.
Thus, on March 13, 2002, the CA dismissed his appeal. After the dismissal became final
and executory, entry of judgment was made on April 4, 2002.
On March 31, 2003, the MTC issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner, who
surrendered himself on May 22, 2003.
On July 16, 2003, the petitioner filed in the CA his petition for review through another
attorney, alleging that Atty. Besario had recklessly abandoned him and had
disappeared without leaving a trace.
The CA denied admission to the petition for review and ordered it expunged from the
records; and reiterated its March 13, 2002 resolution of dismissal.
68 Dizon, Doran, Dumapias, Espinas, Espino, Hipolito, Tomarong REMEDIAL LAW

Aggrieved, the petitioner is now before the Court to plead his cause. He submits that
Atty. Besarios reckless abandonment of his case effectively deprived him of his day in
court and of his right to due process; and that said former counsels actuation
constituted reckless and gross negligence that should not be binding against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Bejarasco is bound by the negligence of his former counsel
Atty. Besario.
RULING:
YES.
That Atty. Besario was negligent in handling the petitioners case was clear. Indeed, his
abject failure to file the petition for review in the CA despite his two motions for
extension for that purpose warranted no other conclusion but that he was negligent.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsels acts, including even mistakes
in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once
retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to
the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or
omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law,
as the act or omission of the client himself.
A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the
counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however,
the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the clients own negligence or
malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests
by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client
should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.
Here, the petitioner took nearly 16 months from the issuance of the entry of judgment
by the CA, and almost 22 months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before
he actually filed his petition for review in the CA. He ought to have been sooner alerted
about his dire situation by the fact that an unreasonably long time had lapsed since the
RTC had handed down its dismissal of his appeal without Atty. Besario having updated
him on the developments, including showing to him a copy of the expected petition for
review. Also, he could have himself verified at the CA whether or not the petition for
review had been filed, especially upon realizing that Atty. Besario had started making
himself scarce to him.

CASE TITLE SPS. MOISES and CLEMENCIA ANDRADA vs. PILHINO SALES
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JOJO S. SAET
PROMULGATION
February 23, 2011
DATE
DOCTRINE: An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only
questions of law. Thus, the herein petition for review must fail for raising a question
essentially of fact.
FACTS:
Pilhino Sales Corporation sued Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife, Maxima, to
recover P240,863.00, plus interest and incidental charge. Upon Pilhinos application, the
RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which came to be implemented against a
Hino truck and a Fuso truck both owned by Jose Andrada, Jr. However, the levies on
attachment were lifted after Jose filed a counter-attachment bond.
The RTC rendered a decision against Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife. Pilhino opted to
enforce the writ of execution against the properties of the Andrada instead of claiming
against the counter-attachment bond. The sheriff seized the Hino truck and sold it at
the ensuing public auction, with Pilhino as the highest bidder. However, the Hino truck
could not be transferred to Pilhinos name due to its having been already registered in
the name of Moises Andrada. It appears that the Hino truck had been meanwhile sold
by Jose Andrada, Jr. to Moises Andrada, which sale was unknown to Pilhino, and that
Moises had mortgaged the truck to BA Finance Corporation to secure his own
obligation.
BA Finance sued Moises Andrada for his failure to pay the loan issued, by which the
sheriff levied upon and seized the Hino truck while it was in the possession of Pilhino and
sold it at public auction, with BA Finance as the highest bidder.
Consequently, Pilhino instituted this action in the RTC in Davao City against Spouses
Jose Andrada, Jr. and Maxima Andrada, Spouses Moises Andrada and Clemencia
Andrada, Jose Andrada, Sr., BA Finance, Land Transportation Office, the Registrar of
Deeds of General Santos City to annul the following: (a) the deed of sale between Jose
Andrada, Jr. and Moises Andrada; (b) the chattel mortgage involving the Hino truck
between Moises Andrada and BA Finance; (c) the deed of conveyance executed by
Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of his father, Jose Andrada, Sr., involving a hard-top jeep;
and (d) the certificate of registration of the Hino truck in the name of Moises Andrada
as well as the registration of the chattel mortgage with the Registry of Deeds of General
Santos City
The RTC, citing the compromise agreement between Pilhino and Jose Andrada, Jr. that
had settled all the claims of Pilhino against Jose Andrada, Jr., and the good faith of
Pilhino and BA Finance in filing their respective actions, rendered its decision, dismissing

the case insofar as the spouses Moises Andrada and Clemencia Andrada, Jose
Andrada, Sr. and BA Finance Corporation, now accordingly BA Savings Bank, including
the counterclaims.
RTC declared that the deed of sale of the Hino truck between Jose Andrada, Jr. and
Moises Andrada had been simulated, and approved the compromise agreement
between Pilhino and Spouses Jose Andrada, Jr. and Maxima Andrada. CA affirmed the
RTCs decision.
Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada are now before the Court via petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sps. Andradas petition for review on certiorari is proper.
RULING:
NO.
In this case, the second and third elements of abuse of rights, were not established,
require the consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot
succeed, for an appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine factual
issues.
In the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial. Perforce, the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court.
This restriction of the review to questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
It is true that the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the restriction. Among the
recognized exceptions are the following, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee;
(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.
However, the circumstances of this case do not warrant reversing or modifying the
findings of the CA, which are consistent with the established facts. Verily, the petitioners
did not prove the concurrence of the elements of abuse of rights.

CASE TITLE HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON vs. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS
PROMULGATION
February 23, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure; Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from
the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under BP 22.
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of

the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at
least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and,
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the
third becomes nil.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the MeTC an information charging
the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of BP 22.
More than three years later, Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil
action for the collection of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment. He alleged in his complaint that defendant employing fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the
amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly funded
and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the Philippines. However,
when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground
that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been
closed. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the
payment of the value of the check but despite such demand defendant refused and
continues to refuse to comply with plaintiffs valid demand. Plaintiff has been
compelled to retain the services of counsel.
The MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. Simon filed an
urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages. Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MeTC in Pasay City granted Simons
urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for
damages, dismissing the complaint of Chan on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint. CA overturned the RTC
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was
an independent civil action.
Whether or not the pendency of the civil action in MeTC in Manila bar the filing of the
civil case in MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia.
RULING:
For the first issue

NO.
Rule 111, Sec. 1 (b) of the Rules of Court provides that the criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Also, in Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states any provision of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be
observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or
credit that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in
the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under
both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
For the second issue

YES.
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of

the following requisites is necessary, namely:
a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
both actions;
b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and,
c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in respect of the other.
Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.
In this case, all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the
both cases are Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information and the

complaint both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would
necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice
upon the same claim.

CASE TITLE AIR ADS INCORPORATED vs. TAGUM AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (TADECO)
PROMULGATION
March 23, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Doran, Mark Anthony
DOCTRINE: Under Section 1, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amendment is done by

adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in
any other respect. A perusal of the original and the substitute third party complaints
shows that their averments are substantially the same; and that the substitute third party
complaint did not strike out any allegation of the prior one.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a Civil Case in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, in Davao
City (RTC) entitled Elva O. Pormento v. Tagum Agricultural Development Corporation
and Edwin Yap, an action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiffs husband
and attorneys fees.
On April 6, 2000, respondent Tagum Agricultural Development Corporation (TADECO),

as defendant, filed through counsel ACCRA Law Office an answer with compulsory
counterclaims and motion for leave to file third party complaint, impleading petitioner
Air Ads, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer) as third-party
defendants. The RTC admitted TADECOs third party complaint on April 14, 2000. On
June 16, 2000, however, ACCRA Law Office, upon realizing that Pioneer was a client of
its Makati Office, filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice to third party complaint
only against Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation.
Ten days later, TADECO filed through another counsel Dominguez Paderna & Tan Law
Offices (Dominguez Law Office) a motion to withdraw notice of dismissal without
prejudice of third party complaint only against Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation
or motion for reconsideration. On June 29, 2000, the RTC granted the notice of dismissal
without prejudice etc.
Nearly a month later, the RTC also granted the motion to withdraw notice of dismissal
without prejudice of third party complaint only against Pioneer Insurance & Surety
Corporation or motion for reconsideration, and set aside the dismissal of the third party
complaint against Pioneer.
Following the grant of its motion to withdraw the notice of dismissal etc., TADECO, still
through Dominguez Law Office, filed a motion to admit third party complaint in
substitution of the third party complaint filed by the third party plaintiffs former counsel,
explaining that the substitute third party complaint was being filed to avoid putting
ACCRA Law Office in an awkward situation, and to avoid the appearance that new
counsel Dominguez Law Office was merely adopting the previous third party complaint.

On August 28, 2000, the RTC granted the motion to admit third party complaint in
substitution of the third party complaint filed by the third party plaintiffs former counsel
Air Ads then filed a motion to dismiss against the third party complaint, averring that it
had been dropped as third party defendant under TADECOs substitute third party
complaint; and arguing that the filing of the substitute third party complaint had the
effect of entirely superseding the original third party complaint, which should
consequently be stricken out from the records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the substitute third party complaint had the effect of
superseding the original third party complaint thus dropping them as third party
defendant.
RULING:
The records indicate that: firstly, both TADECO and Pioneer were clients of ACCRA Law
Office; secondly, TADECO engaged Dominguez Law Office as its counsel in lieu of
ACCRA Law Office with respect only to its third party complaint against Pioneer; thirdly,
the RTC dismissed the third party complaint only against Pioneer upon the notice of
withdrawal filed by TADECO through ACCRA Law Office; and fourthly, the RTC granted
the motion to admit the substitute third party complaint only against Pioneer. These
rendered it plain and clear that the substitute third party complaint merely replaced
the third party complaint earlier filed against Pioneer.
The notice of dismissal clearly stated that the dismissal pertains only to the third party
complaint against Pioneer Insurance, not as against petitioner Air Ads. The third-party
complaint against petitioner was never dismissed. Thus, when TADECOs new counsel
sought to revive the third-party complaint against Pioneer, the allegations in the
substitute third-party complaint pertain only to Pioneer since petitioner Air Ads was
never dropped as third-party defendant in the proceedings. Petitioners motion to
dismiss was correctly denied by the trial court.

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL
PROMULGATION
March 30, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Mark Anthony, Doran
DOCTRINE: Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is not a
trivial matter to be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of the demurrer to
evidence without express leave of court operates as a waiver that binds the accused
pursuant to the express provision of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
The information charged the accused with qualified theft, alleging:
That on or about the 2nd of January, 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, OLIVIA ALETH
GARCIA CRISTOBAL, being then the teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, Sto.
Rosario Street, Angeles City, and as such is entrusted with cash and other
accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles
Main Branch, represented by its Branch Manager, EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the damage
and prejudice of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, in the aforementioned amount
of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P260,000.00), Philippine Currency and parity rate.
After the accused pleaded not guilty at arraignment, the State presented four
witnesses, namely: Prudential Bank Branch Manager Edgardo Panlilio, Sr., Bank Auditor
Virgilio Frias, Bank Cashier Noel Cunanan, and account holder Apolinario Tayag.
Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the
charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her filing her
demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule
119, of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused waived his right to present evidence by filing a Demurrer to
evidence.
RULING:
Appellants theory that prior leave of court had been requested because her demurrer
was, at the same time, also a motion to defer defense evidence, cannot be sustained.

A motion to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence. In fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court to
consider the demurrer before proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is
nothing in appellants Demurrer from which it can be inferred that appellant was asking
the Trial Court permission to move for the dismissal of the case.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the
accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present
defense evidence is unqualified.

CASE TITLE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. Hon. VICENTE Q. ROXAS
(Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 227),
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, and the
COURT OF APPEALS
PROMULGATION
April 6, 2011
DATE
DOCTRINE: The omission was fatal to the petition for certiorari of NHA. Section 3, Rule 46,
of the Rules of Court, supra, expressly provides that: "The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition." Dismissal of the petition was the recourse of the CA, because
the requirements imposed by the Rules of Court were not to be lightly treated or
disregarded due to the omitted documents being essential in a special civil action for
certiorari, a proceeding by which a superior court determines whether the respondent
court or judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), NHAs predecessor, was the
registered owner of two large parcels of land situated in the then Municipality of San
Juan Del Monte, Province of Rizal, but now a part of Quezon City (QC), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1356 of the QC Register of Deeds (QCRD), with an
estimated area of 386,732.40 square meters and 15,555,534.60 square meters. TCT No.
1356 was subdivided into 17,387 lots, more or less, under several survey plans. The
subdivided lots were sold and disposed off to NHAs beneficiaries/lot buyers.
In 1987, NHA delivered its owners copy of TCT No. 1356 to the QCRD to facilitate the
numerous partial cancellations of TCT No. 1356 on account of the deeds of sale
executed by NHA in favor of the beneficiaries. However, on June 11, 1988, fire razed the
entire premises of QCRD and destroyed the original and the owners duplicate copies
of TCT No. 1356, along with many other records and documents then in the possession
and custody of QCRD.
On March 12, 1999, NHA filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 1356 in the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). The RTC set the petition for initial hearing on
April 13, 1999 and directed NHA to submit twelve copies of the petition, certified true
copies or originals of the annexes, certified true copies of tax declarations and tax
receipts, and other jurisdictional requirements as provided by law.
NHA failed to comply with the directive and to appear at the initial hearing. Thus, on
April 13, 1999, the RTC issued an order archiving LRC Case No. Q-99-11347 until
compliance by NHA with the jurisdictional requirements.

On December 27, 2000, the RTC issued a resolution denying the NHAs petition for
reconstitution for lack of merit. NHA sought reconsideration, explaining that it was ready
and very much willing to comply with all of the requirements except for the certified
true copies of the tax declarations and tax receipts that the Assessors Office of Quezon
City had not yet completed because of the voluminous documents involving the
hundreds of hectares covered by TCT No. 1356. The RTC set NHAs motion for
reconsideration for hearing on May 8, 2001 and directed NHA to comply with the legal
requirements in order to show its good faith.
In compliance, NHA submitted twelve copies of its petition for reconstitution (with
annexes and original copies of the tax declarations covering 31 subdivided lots in the
Malaya/East Subdivision, Bago-Bantay and Kamuning); and a letter from the QC
Assessors Office informing NHA of the failure to accede to NHAs request for the tax
declarations and tax receipts. At the RTCs order, NHA filed its memorandum, to which it
attached a certified true copy of a photocopy of TCT No. 1356.
Nonetheless, the RTC issued two orders on May 30, 2001 and June 29, 2001 denying
NHAs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner's failure to present any additional documents on Motion for Reconsideration

in compliance with jurisdictional requirements a few of which were directed to be
complied with, as stated in the March 17, 1999 Order of this Court shows that the Motion
For Reconsideration is without merit. This Petition has been pending for a long time now
with petitioner having been given many years to comply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing NHAs petition for certiorari on technical
grounds.
RULING:
Anent whether the CA correctly dismissed NHAs petition for certiorari, the Court stresses
that NHA, as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic requirements
for the filing of a petition for certiorari prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
specifically to accompany the petition with a "certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
As the CAs resolution of September 7, 2001 revealed, NHA did not attach "the petition
for reconstitution filed with the trial Court and other resolutions or orders of the court
before its dismissal of the petition, documents which are considered relevant and
pertinent thereto."
The omission was fatal to the petition for certiorari of NHA. Section 3, Rule 46, of the
Rules of Court, supra, expressly provides that: "The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition." Dismissal of the petition was the recourse of the CA, because the

requirements imposed by the Rules of Court were not to be lightly treated or
disregarded due to the omitted documents being essential in a special civil action for
certiorari, a proceeding by which a superior court determines whether the respondent
court or judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

CASE TITLE SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY
MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY
PROMULGATION
April 6, 2011
DATE
DOCTRINE: The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise
of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. The writ
of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated
between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway,
Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they
rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only
source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted

Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to
take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the
purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city
inhabitants.
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the
Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552
due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for
lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City
Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail
judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil
action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act
of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act.
However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null
and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of
Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners
and their heirs of their only property; that there was no due process in the passage of
Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent
hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their opposition; and that the

purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not
benefit the greater number of inhabitants.
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Prohibition lie against expropriation.
RULING:
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal
authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. The writ of
prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse of
discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate that the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner,
by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that
the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such
jurisdiction or acted without any authority.
The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any
other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the
petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate

possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always
that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation to the owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the
power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for
public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the
power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain,
the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to
determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the
taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just
compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available.

CASE TITLE DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, petitioner vs. RENATO and

MELBA ZAMORA, respondent
PROMULGATION
May 30, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Dumapias, Gay
TOPIC COVERED Cause of action; Unlawful detainer; Rules of Court Rule 40, Sec. 7
DOCTRINE:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not limited in its review of the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide on
the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such
memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging that
the petitioner sold to respondents a residential land and that the petitioner requested
to be allowed to live in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be
able to find a new residence. They further alleged that despite their demand after a
year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.
Petitioner was served with summons but did not file an answer. The MTCC
declared her in default upon the respondents motion to declare her in default, and
proceeded to receive the respondents oral testimony and documentary evidence.
MTCC rendered judgment against petitioner ordering her to vacate the

properties in question.
RTC resolved the appeal dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.
Respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for disregarding
the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or non-existence of a
cause of action.
CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision
in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction
is limited to the assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief filed before it or
whether it can decide the case based on the entire records of the case, as
provided for in Rule 40, Sec. 7.

II. Whether or not in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was no prior
demand to vacate and comply with the conditions of the lease made, a valid
cause of action exists?
III. Whether or not in reinstating and affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, which was tried and decided in violation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the Court of Appeals sanctioned a gross departure from the usual
course of judicial proceedings?
RULING:
I.
As an appellate court, RTC may rule

upon an issue not raised on appeal
Had the appeal been a first appeal from the RTC to the CA or another proper
superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to appeals from the
RTC to the CA, imposes the express limitation of the review to only those specified in the
assignment of errors or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the appellants brief. But the petitioners appeal from the decision of
the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.
The court incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Court, specifically under

Section 7 of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed cases on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda as are filed. RTC presently decides all appeals from the MTC based on the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda or
briefs as are filed in the RTC.
II.
Ejectment was not proper due

to defense of ownership being established
Despite holding that the respondents demand to vacate sufficed, we

uphold the result of the RTC decision in favor of the petitioner. This we do because the
respondents exhibits by demanding payment from the petitioner, revealed the true
nature of the transaction involving the property in question as one of equitable
mortgage, not a sale. Submissions of the petitioner supported the findings of the RTC on
the equitable mortgage: (1) there was the earlier dated instrument (deed of pactode
retro)involving the same property; (2) there were two receipts for the payments the
petitioner had made to the respondents; (3), the former secretary of respondent Melba
Zamora executed an affidavit acknowledging that the petitioner had already paid a

total of P500,000.00 to the respondents. All these confirmed the petitioners claim that
she remained the owner of the property and was still entitled to its possession. Where
the cause of action in an ejectment suit is based on ownership of the property, the
defense that the defendant retained title or ownership is a proper subject for
determination by the MTC but only for the purpose of adjudicating the rightful possessor
of the property. This is based on Rule 70, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court.
In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts
alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a
valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked
for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for
purposes of applying the test.
Based on respondents allegations (through a letter demanding petitioner to

vacate), the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
III.
MTC committed procedural lapses

that must be noted and corrected
The first lapse was the MTCCs granting of the respondents motion to declare the
petitioner in default following her failure to file an answer. The proper procedure was
not for the plaintiffs to move for the declaration in default of the defendant who failed
to file the answer. Such a motion to declare in default has been expressly prohibited
under Section 13, Rule 70 of theRules of Court. Instead, either motu proprio or on motion
of the plaintiff, the court should render judgment as the facts alleged in the complaint
might warrant. In other words, the defendants failure to file an answer under Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court might result to a judgment by default, not to a declaration of default.
The second lapse was the MTCCs reception of the oral testimony of respondent
Melba Zamora. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court has envisioned the submission only of
affidavits of the witnesses (not oral testimony) and other proofs on the factual issues
defined in the order.

CASE TITLE DONNINA C. HALLEY , petitioner vs. PRINTWELL, INC., respondent
PROMULGATION
May 30, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Dumapias, Gay
TOPIC COVERED Section 1,Rule 36 of the Rules of Court
DOCTRINE: A judgment or final order of a court should state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
FACTS:
The petitioner was an incorporator and original director of Business Media
Philippines, Inc. (BMPI), which, at its incorporation on November 12, 1987. Printwell, on
the other hand is engaged in commercial and industrial printing. BMPI commissioned
Printwell for the printing of the magazine Philippines, Inc. that BMPI published and sold.
For that purpose, Printwell extended 30-day credit accommodations to BMPI. BMPI paid
only P25,000.00 so Printwell sued BMPI on for the collection of the unpaid balance.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Printwell, rejecting the allegation of payment

in full of the subscriptions in view of an irregularity in the issuance of the Ors.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC.
Petitioner contends that the RTC lifted verbatim from the memorandum of
Printwell; and submits that the RTC thereby violated the requirement imposed in Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution as well as in Section 1,Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, to
the effect that a judgment or final order of a court should state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. RTC did not analyze the case before rendering
its decision. A suspicion of partiality arose from the fact that the RTC decision was but a
replica of Printwells memorandum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming in toto the decision that
did not state the facts and the law upon which the judgment was based but merely
copied the contents of respondents memorandum adopting the same as the reason
for the decision.
RULING:
The contention of the petitioner is unfounded.
It is noted that starting from its page 5, the decision of the RTC copied verbatim
the allegations of Respondents in its Memorandum before the said court, as if the
Memorandum was the draft of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, but fails
to specify either the portions allegedly lifted verbatim from the memorandum, or why
she regards the decision as copied. Mere similarity in language or thought between
Printwells memorandum and the trial courts decision did not necessarily justify the
conclusion that the RTC simply lifted verbatim or copied from the memorandum.

A trial or appellate judge may view a partys memorandum or brief either

entirely or partly. The judge may adopt and incorporate in his adjudication the
memorandum or the parts of it he deems suitable, and yet not be guilty of the
accusation of lifting or copying from the memorandum. This is because of the objective
of the memorandum to contribute in the proper illumination and correct determination
of the controversy.
Our own reading of the trial courts decision persuasively shows that the RTC did
comply with the requirements regarding the content and the manner of writing a
decision prescribed in the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The decision of the RTC
contained clear and distinct findings of facts, and stated the applicable law and
jurisprudence, fully explaining why the defendants were being held liable to the
plaintiff. In short, the reader was at once informed of the factual and legal reasons for
the ultimate result.

CASE TITLE ANGELINA PAHILA GARRIDO vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO
PROMULGATION
August 17, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY ESPINAS, LYLE HARVEY A.
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
DOCTRINE: Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment
should not be hampered or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties
rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of
justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the full execution of final and
executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the
enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict
observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence. Any such
remedy allowed in violation of established rules and guidelines connotes but a
capricious exercise of discretion that must be struck down in order that the prevailing
party is not deprived of the fruits of victory.
FACTS:
An action for ejection with a prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict the
respondent was commenced by Danilo Pahila before the MTCC. He amended the
complaint adding the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died while the
case is pending and his surviving spouse Angelina has substituted him.
The defendants were divided into two groups; one is represented by Atty. Subaldo. The
defendants in this group relied on the common defense of being agricultural tenants on
the land. While, the other one is represented by Atty. Dela Fuente and their defense
was the plaintiffs title was not valid because their respective portions were situated on
foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas were subject
to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.
The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff. All the defendants appealed
before the RTC. However, the RTC denied their appeal and affirmed the MTCCs
decision.
It was only the second group which appealed the RTCs decision to the CA. Such being
the case the RTCs decision became final and executory as to the first group. With
respect to the second group, their appeal is then denied by the CA.
The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition for certiorari.
In the meantime, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the
description of the properties involved. None of the parties challenged or objected the
correction.

Subsequently the MTCC issued a writ of execution upon the petitioners motion. The
respondents were duly notified. On the other hand, the respondent filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution on the ground that the land covered by the writ was a
foreshore land belonging to the state. Further, They argued that such supervening
event directly affected the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision and its
amendment, whose continued execution affecting foreshore land would be unjust to
the occupants or possessors of the property, including themselves.
However, the respondents motion was denied. Hence, they filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was also denied. Thereby, the latter filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The respondent presented memorandum issued by DENR. The
petition was granted On November 12, 2002. Hence, the RTC issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to annul and set aside the writ.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November 12, 2002
order of the RTC.
2. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and executory March 17,
1999 decision of the MTCC.
RULING:
1. NO. BECAUSE THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHICH WAS FILED BY THE PETITIONOR
IS/WAS UNDER RULE 45.
In determining whether or not the remedy availed by the parties is/was proper, it
is necessary to determine first if the order is an interlocutory or a final order. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an

appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ
of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not
be the subject of an appeal.
NOTA BENE: For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given
due course, it must be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the
order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b)
the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal
cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief.

2. NO. The RTC Judges issuance of the assailed order dated November 12, 2002
granting the respondents application for the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction constituted manifestly grave abuse of discretion.
It must be stressed that a writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event

and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to
protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights
on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the matter
within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for
being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect
a right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
Here, the respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be
protected by injunction. They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim
in the property subject of the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution.
Their claim to any right as of then was merely contingent, and was something
that might not even arise in the future. Simply stated, they could not lay proper
claim to the land before the State has taken a positive act of first properly
classifying the land as foreshore land and the courts have first conclusively
determined and adjudged the ownership in their favor in a suit brought for the
purpose.
Without the States positive act of classification and the courts adjudication, all
that the respondents had was an inchoate expectation that might not at all
materialize, especially if we consider that the petitioner was already the
registered owner of the same property, as evidenced by her existing and valid
transfer certificate of title covering the land for which she enjoyed the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

CASE TITLE HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO vs. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES
PROMULGATION
AUGUST 17, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE: SEC. 1, RULE 41 AND SEC. 9 RULE 37 OF THE RULES
OF COURT
DOCTRINE: The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the
order granting the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order
for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to
do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
FACTS:
On May 2, 2000, the petitioner commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC. They averred that they were the true owners of the disputed
land having inherited the same from their father who had been a grantee of the land
by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors in
interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land
for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1,
1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights,
interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate
No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
The respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case due to the fact that the land is friar land, and that the
petitioners had no legal personality to commence an action.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff then filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, it was denied. Subsequently thereafter, they assailed the
dismissal via petition for certiorari. But the same was denied. Hence, they appealed this
matter before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA HAS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISREGARDING THE
PROVISION OF SECTION 1 RULE 41, SECOND PAR (A) AND SECTION 9 OF RULE 37, 1997
RULES OF COURT.
RULING:
NO. The CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the order
granting the respondents motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.

Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being
availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their proper
remedy to assail the order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure, specifically
pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court (An
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy
being an appeal from the judgment or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of
the motion for reconsideration, and that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41
of the Rules of Court ( No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion
for new trial or reconsideration) expressly declared that an order denying a motion for
reconsideration was not appealable.
They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in
the instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
THIS POSITION HAS NO BASIS
The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting
the respondents motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The
fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby
completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the
action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners,
indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents motion to dismiss.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration

independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for
reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment
or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a)
the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a
motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no
reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the
judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the
course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

CASE TITLE PETRONILO BARAYUGA vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY
PROMULGATION
August 17, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DOCTRINE: The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff does not
demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected by injunction, his suit for
injunction must be dismissed for lack of a cause of action.
FACTS:
AUP, a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational institution incorporated under
Philippine laws and was directly under the North Philippine Union Mission(NPUM). On the
other hand, the petitioner in this case is a duly elected secretary of AUP. After 2 months,
the latter was appointed by the Board of Trustees as the president of AUP.
During his tenure, the NPUM conducted an external audit and they found out that the
petitioner has committed a serious violation of the fundamental rules and procedure in
the disbursement of fund. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner is duly notified and
required to answer the allegation.
The Board of trustees conducted a special meeting in which they proposed the
dismissal of the petitioner. Eventually, the petitioner was then dismissed. The latter
requested for reconsideration but it was denied by the board. Hence, he petitioner
brought his suit for injunction and damages in the RTC, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondent filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to nullify the writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, the CA rendered a decision nullifying the RTCs writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to the position of
President of AUP that could be protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.
RULING:
Yes. The CA is correct.
The injunctive writ issued by the RTC was meant to protect the petitioners right to stay in
office as President. Given that the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-
extensive with the duration of the act sought to be prohibited, this injunctive relief
already became moot in the face of the admission by the petitioner himself, through his
affidavit, that his term of office premised on his alleged five-year tenure as President
had lasted only until December 2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC
had expired upon the end of the term of office (as posited by him).

Therefore, he could no longer avail the writ of preliminary injunction due to the fact that
his term has already lapsed and the act sought to be prohibited has also lapsed.
It must be stressed that a valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of
evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishing: (a) a present and unmistakable right to
be protected; (b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such right;
and (c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave
abuse of discretion and will result to nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage sans
proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.
Here, it is clear to us, based on the foregoing principles guiding the issuance of the TRO
and the writ of injunction, that the issuance of the assailed order constituted patently
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, and that the CA rightly set aside the
order of the RTC.

CASE TITLE PEZA vs. JOSE PULIDO ET AL.
PROMULGATION
AUGUST 24, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 67 EXPROPRIATION
DOCTRINE: The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the
State to take private property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose;
and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish
that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public purpose, which, here, is already
settled. What remains to be determined is the just compensation.
In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank, the Court has held that compensation cannot
be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is
prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the
loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income.
FACTS:
THE petitioner has commenced an action for expropriation of three parcels of Riceland
located in Rosario, Cavite. The subject lands were lot 1408 which is owed by Jose
Pulido; lot 1409-B owned by Spouses Prodigalidad and lot 1406 which is owned by Salud
Jimenez.
During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406 was subdivided into Lot 1406-A and 1406-B.
the RTC sustained the right of the petitioner to expropriate the three parcels of rice
land, but later partly reconsidered and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation. The
petitioner appealed to the CA.
Meanwhile, the petitioner and the Estate of Salud Jimenez (due to Salud Jimenez
having meanwhile died on October 30, 1984) entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Under the compromise agreement it provides that: The just compensation for Lot 1406-B
should be based on the value or assessment rate prevalent in 1993, the year the parties
entered into the Compromise Agreement and thereby agreed that the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434
In due time, the CA remanded the case to the RTC for the consideration and approval
of the Compromise Agreement. The RTC approved the Compromise Agreement.
Contrary to its express undertaking under the Compromise Agreement, the petitioner
failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of Salud Jimenez because the
registered owner was Progressive Realty Estate, Inc., not the petitioner. As a result, the
Estate of Salud Jimenez filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23,
1993.

The RTC annulled the Compromise Agreement and directed the petitioner to
peacefully return Lot 1406-B to the Estate of Salud Jimenez. The petitioner went to the
CA by petition for certiorari and prohibition, essentially to nullify the order dated August
4, 1997.
The CA partially granted the petition and set aside the order of the RTC on the return of
the property to the estate of salud. Hence, the latter appealed but was then denied on
the ground that the Estate of Salud Jimenez had already acknowledged the propriety
of the expropriation of Lot 1406-B by entering into the Compromise Agreement; and
that the provisions of the Compromise Agreement had consequently related only to the
form or mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot 1406-B, that is, in lieu of cash,
another lot (Lot 434) was to be delivered as just compensation to the Estate of Salud
Jimenez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be based on the value of Lot 1406-B
prevailing in 1981 or in 1993.
RULING:
The value of Lot 1406-B in 1993
The Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized that
the agreed upon mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot 1406-B with Lot 434
was cancelled. It is notable that the Court mentioned nothing therein about the
invalidation of the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of
payment, which was the value of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Courts
acknowledgment that the parties understood and accepted, by entering into the
Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434
(or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap in 1993 was definitely much
higher than Lot 434s value in 1981).
We further completely agree with the CAs conclusion that by agreeing to a land swap
in 1993 in the ill-fated compromise agreement, [PEZA] had impliedly agreed to paying
just compensation using the market values in 1993.

CASE TITLE LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT
PROMULGATION
AUGUST 31,2011
DATE
DIGEST BY ESPINAS, LYLE HARVEY
TOPIC COVERED RULE 71 CONTEMPT
DOCTRINE: Mere allegation, that said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court
because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the
Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds
of the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude, was insufficient,
without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
FACTS:
The petitioner in this case filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect
contempt of court for including allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called
Sea Transport Update concerning the Courts resolutions entitled Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines, et al. v. Administrator Oscar Sevilla,
Maritime Industry Authority, et al.
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising

respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a
computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required
for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with
MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153
To clarify the said memo, MARINA issued an EO 213 entitled Deregulating Domestic
Shipping rates. The respondent challenge the constitutionality of said EO by way of a
special civil action for certiorari. However, it was dismissed. Hence, the respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was also denied. The respondent thereafter
appealed before the CA but it was then denied by the CA.
In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of
which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora
Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update,
stating that: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least
3 to 6 months.
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the
respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted
indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the
petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly
debased the Supreme Court by making scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by
the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the Supreme Court ruling
issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.

They averred that the respondents purpose, taken in the context of the entire
publication, was to defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the
Supreme Court was influenced.
ISSUE:
Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to
indirect contempt of court?
RULING:
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents publication of the Sea
Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of court
under Section 3 of Rule 71,
The petitioners mere allegation, that said publication unfairly debases the Supreme
Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that
the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil
minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme
Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months, was
insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea Transport
Update stating: The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was
denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented, or the
phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading Supreme Court ruling issued in one month
only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.
Contrary to the petitioners urging that such phrases be considered as scurrilous,

malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo and as indicative that the Court allowed
itself to be influenced by the petitioners or that the point that respondents wanted to
convey was crystal clear: defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the
Supreme Court was influenced!
We find the phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No.
152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAPs members to defy the resolutions. The
unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAPs members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to
MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.
CASE TITLE FERMAN DEVLOPMENT CORP. vs. FEDERICO AGCAOLI
PROMULGATION
AUGUST 31, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED EXAMPLE: RULE 71 CIVIL PROCEDURE, SEC 1, ARTICLE 3 BILL OF
RIGHTS CONSTITUTION
DOCTRINE: The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial
court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of
court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires
jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency
assessment.
FACTS:
FDC was the owner and developer of a condominium project known as Fedman Suites
Building (FSB) located on Salcedo Street, Legazpi Village, Makati City. Interchem
Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased FSBs Unit 411 under a contract to sell.
On March 31, 1977, FDC executed a Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, and
formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to manage FSB and hold
title over its common areas.
Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent Federico
Agcaoili a practicing lawyer who was then a member of the provincial board of
Quezon province. Agcaoli then agreed to pay Interchem 150,000.00 o deliver to FDC
the balance of 137,286.83 in 135 equal monthly installments of 1,857.24 effective
October 1980, inclusive of 12% interest per annum on the diminishing balance. The
obligations Agcaoili assumed totaled 302,760.00.
The centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. Thereby, Agcaoli
wrote a letter to the management requesting to repair the same. Not getting
immediate reply, He then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the
payment of his condominium dues and monthly amortizations.
FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric supply to
the unit. Agcaoili was thus prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in the RTC injunction and
damages.
The parties later executed a compromise agreement that the RTC approved through its
decision of August 26, 1985. As stipulated in the compromise agreement, Agcaoili paid
FDC the sum of 39,002.04 as amortizations for the period from November 1983 to July
1985; and also paid FSCC an amount of 17,858.37 for accrued condominium dues,
realty taxes, electric bills, and surcharges as of March 1985. As a result, FDC reinstated
the contract to sell and allowed Agcaoili to temporarily install two window-type air-
conditioners in Unit 411.
However, FDC again disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411.Thus moved Agcaoli
for the execution of the RTC decision dated August 26, 1985. On July 17, 1986, the RTC
issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili to obtain his electric supply from the other
units in the fourth floor of FSB until the main meter was restored. Thereafter, Agcaoili
lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and FSCC in the RTC. The RTC ruled in
favor of Agcaoli.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to pay the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for
the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case; and that, consequently, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over this case.
RULING:
The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim.
In an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums of money and damages, the
docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount being claimed.
Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading must specify the sums of money to
be recovered and the damages being sought in order that the clerk of court may be
put in a position to compute the correct amount of docket fees.
If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought,
the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency. The non-
specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial court of
its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the
Government on the part of the plaintiff.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time
of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a
reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The prescriptive period
that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action
must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of
the prescriptive period.
Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the deficiency
is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over the
complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard, considering that the
deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule
141. The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not
fair if the party has acted in good faith.
Herein, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed docket
fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government.
CASE TITLE DENIS B. HABAWEL AND ALEXIS F. MEDINA vs. THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION
PROMULGATION
September 7, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Espino, Carla Divina
TOPIC COVERED RULE 71 CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: The sanction for direct contempt has usually been set depending on
whether the offensive language is viewed as contempt of court or as ethical
misconduct.
FACTS:
Petitioners Habawel and Medina were the counsel of Surfield Development
Corporation, which claim for refund of excess realty taxes paid were denied by the
Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City. When Surfield filed a petition for
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court, the latter dismissed the petition petition on the
ground that the period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Also, the RTC ruled that the grant of a tax
refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus. Surfield,
represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the respondent Court of Tax
Appeals via a petition for review. CTA First Division denied the petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust the remedies. The petitioners sought
reconsideration in behalf of Surfield. They argued that CTA First Division committed gross
ignorance of the law to heave held that it has no jurisdiction over the petition and that
it manifested its lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.
Respondent court then ordered the petitioners to explain within five days why they
should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary actions.
Petitioners complied but respondent court finds no sincerity and humility when the
former asked for apology and even openly pointed the courts alleged ignorance and
grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, respondent adjudged both of the petitioners
guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the
integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten
days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioners are guilty of direct contempt;
(2) If so, whether or not the penalty imposed by the respondent court is proper
RULING:
(1) Yes, petitioners are guilty of direct contempt. It is settled that derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions
presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are
treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed
in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not
read in open court. In this case, by branding the CTA and the members of its First
Division, in their Motion for Reconsideration, as "totally unaware or ignorant" of the law
and making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal
learning of the members of the CTA First Division. This, therefore, an imputation in a
pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of
any evidence, is a serious allegation, and constitutes direct contempt of court.
No, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive
punishment of the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous and offensive
language and verges on the vindictive. The Courts treatment of contemptuous and
offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other written submissions to the
courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with
contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or administrative or
ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged from a warning (to be more
circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition of the misconduct, a
fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of
law. The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is
viewed as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. The Court still impose on each
of them a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71,
taking into consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as
the Court of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. However, the penalty of
imprisonment is deleted.
CASE TITLE CHU/S vs. SPS. CUNANAN, BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, AND SPS. CARLOS
PROMULGATION
September 12, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Tomarong, Marian C.
TOPIC COVERED RULES 2 AND 16 CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making

reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It
encompasses the objects specifically stated therein and is binding on the contracting
parties, being expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them. It has
the effect and authority of res judicata upon the parties. Under the doctrine of res
judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on
all points and matters determined in the previous suit.
FACTS:
On September 30, 1986, petitioner spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed
a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their five parcels of land with TCTs
registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Province of Pampanga, in favor of
Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan). The parties stipulated that the ownership of the lots
would be transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment of the total
consideration and compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage. Nevertheless, Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her
name without the knowledge of the Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as
security without paying the balance of the purchase price to the Chus. She transferred
two of the lots to respondent spouses Carloses. Furthermore, despite the Chus caused
the annotation of an unpaid vendors lien on three of the lots still they assigned the
remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty. Hence, the Chus commenced an action for
the recovery of the unpaid balance from respondent spouses Cunanans (Civil Case No.
G-1936) in the RTC. On April 19, 1993, the Chus amended the complaint to seek the
annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued
pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty,
Beneda Estate, and the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as defendants in
addition to the Cunanans.
Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion to dismiss and alleged that they are
purchasers in good faith. However, the RTC denied the same. The CA annulled the
RTCs denial and dismissed the case against Benelda Estate. On March 1, 2001, the
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the said case. On December 2, 1999, the Chus,
the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise agreement for and
in consideration of the full settlement of their case." The RTC approved the same. On
April 30, 2001, the petitioners (i.e., Catalina Chu and her children) brought another suit
(Civil Case No. 12251) against the Carloses and Benelda Estate, seeking the
cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate. They amended
their complaint to implead the Cunanans as additional defendants. The defendants
moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The RTC denied the motions to dismiss. Upon
appeal, the CA nullified the challenged orders of the RTC. Hence, in the instant petition,
petitioners argued that the compromise agreement did not apply or extend to the
Carloses and Benelda Estate thus their Civil Case No. 12251 was not barred by res
judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata
RULING:
YES. Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits splitting a single cause of action. The
contravention of the policy will merit the dismissal of the case on the ground of res
judicata. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second
actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause
of action. In this case, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action
to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and all the
requisites in order to dismiss the case based on res judicata are present.
First, Civil Case No. G-1936 was already terminated under the compromise agreement
which was immediately final and unappealable. Second, The RTC had jurisdiction over
the cause of action in Civil Case No. G-1936. Third, the compromise agreement
explicitly settled the entirety of the prior case (Civil Case No.G-1936) by resolving all the
claims of the parties against each other. Fourth, the requirement of the identity of
parties was fully met, because the Chus and the Cunanans were the parties in both
cases along with their respective privies. The fact that the Carloses and Benelda Estate,
defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, were not parties in the compromise agreement was
inconsequential, for they were also the privies of the Cunanans as transferees and
successors-in-interest. Mere substantial identity of parties, or even community of interests
between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not
impleaded in the first case, was sufficient. As to identity of the subject matter, both
actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also met; Civil Case No. 12251 reprised
Civil Case No. G-1936, the only difference between them being that the petitioners
alleged in the former that Benelda Estate was "not also a purchaser for value and in
good faith."
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis--vis the five lots were all defined and
governed by the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract
between them. Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the
respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite the silence of the compromise agreement
as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where
the contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all
their claims and damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of
action and make that single cause of action the basis of several suits.
CASE TITLE PEDRO ANGELES, REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-
IN FACT vs. PASCUAL
PROMULGATION
September 21, 2011
DATE
DOCTRINE: In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,

because the Supreme Court is not a Trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are
received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain
exceptions.
FACTS:
Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered
owners of adjacent parcels of land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4,
Block 2 (Lot 4) of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-951, covered by Transfer
Certificate Title No. T-43707 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Angeles owned
Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same consolidation-subdivision plan covered by TCT No. T-
9459 of the same Registry of Deeds. When Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2
(Lot 3), caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered
that Pascuals house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank
successfully ejected Pascual.
Then, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that
Angeles house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4,
Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square
meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from
Angeles, or the removal of Angeles house. However, the latter refused to do so.
Thus, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Cabanatuan City. Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic
engineer who had conducted the relocation survey and had made the relocation plan
of Lot 4 and testified that Angeles house was erected on Lot 4. On the other hand,
Angeles presented Juan Fernandez, the geodetic engineer who had prepared the
sketch plan and explained that he had performed only a "table work," that is, he did
not actually go to the site but his finding was based on the description of the sketch
plan.
RTC held that Pascual proved Angeles encroachment on Lot 4 by preponderant

evidence; and that Pascual was entitled to relief. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Angeles sought motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA accorded to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo as
opposed to the survey plan prepared by Fernandez;
RULING:
YES. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review
on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." A
question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of
facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts.
The followings are issues of fact (these questions are not reviewable by the Supreme
Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law
raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth):
a.) Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or
weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or
b.) whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and
adequate to establish a proposition in issue;
c.) whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed
in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be
strong, clear and convincing;
d.) whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded
full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the
other side;
e.) Whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such
gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight.
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule. However, the
circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.
The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was
conclusive to the Supreme Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the
RTC. Resultantly, the fact of Angeles encroachment on Pascuals Lot 4 was proved by
preponderant evidence.
CASE TITLE MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC., AND RAMON P. DAO vs. SPS.
TAN
PROMULGATION
September 21, 2011
DATE
DOCTRINE: Appeal under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law. A question, to be one of

law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. Indeed, there is a question of law in a given case when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts. Furthermore, an appeal is frivolous when it does not present any
justiciable question, or is one so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of
the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can succeed.
FACTS:
On August 28, 1996, a vehicular accident happened in Davao-Agusan Road in Lanang,
Davao City, which involved the Fuso truck owned by petitioner Maglana Rice and Corn
Mill, Inc., driven by its employee, petitioner Ramon P. Dao, and the Honda Accord
sedan owned by the respondents, driven by respondent Manuel Tan.
The truck hit the car at its rear. Both vehicles sustained damage. The respondents
demanded reimbursement of their expenses for the repair of their car, but the
petitioners, denying liability, refused the demand. Consequently, the respondents filed
a complaint in the MTCC. Both of them gave their different versions of facts.
Respondent averred that when upon reaching the All Trac Compund they had to stop
due to the traffic slowdown caused by an earlier collision between a car and a jeep
not far ahead. However, petitioner Dao failed to stop, thus, his truck bumped the car at
its rear. The latter averred that a upon reaching the All Trac Compound, he spotted an
accident involving a car and a jeep ahead of his truck, and immediately shifted to
second gear to slow down to about 20 kilometers/hour. As he decelerated preparatory
to coming to a full stop, the respondents car overtook the truck from the right lane and
suddenly cut into his lane at a very unsafe distance. This cutting-in caused the right front
portion of the truck to come into contact with the left rear of the respondents car just
when the car was in a diagonal position with about two feet of its rear still on the right
lane.
MTCC accorded greater credence to the version of the respondents and concluded
that the proximate cause of the accident was the lack of foresight and vigilance of
Dao. RTC upheld the decision of the MTCC. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioners sought motion for reconsideration but it was proved futile. Hence, petitioners
appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appeal of the petitioner is proper
(2) Whether or not the appeal is frivolous
RULING:
(1) NO. The issue in this appeal poses concerns the real cause of the vehicular
accident, that is, whether or not the respondents car suddenly cut into the lane of the
petitioners truck, and whether or not Dao simply failed to stop on time despite the
respondents car having already come to a full stop due to traffic congestion along the
road. Hence, it is obviously a factual one because it requires the ascertainment of
which driver was negligent.
However, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the limitation of an
appeal by certiorari to only questions of law, including:
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion,
In the instant case, the appeal does not come under the exceptions.
(2) YES. In this recourse, the petitioners, after the CA upheld the appellate judgment
of the RTC, should have desisted on their own volition from coming to the Court, seeing
that the only issues that they would be raising were plainly factual in nature. They did
not desist despite their attorney being surely aware of the limitation to questions of law
of any appeal to the Court on account of its not being a trier of facts. Under such
circumstances, their appeal was made notwithstanding its being patently frivolous.
A frivolous appeal is one where no error can be brought before the appellate court, or
whose result is obvious and the arguments of error are totally bereft of merit, or which is
prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to established law and unsupported by a
reasoned, colorable argument for change. Thus, a losing party has no right to
prosecute a frivolous appeal, because he and his counsel are not relieved from the
obligation to demonstrate persuasively even when appeal is a matter of right the
substantial and reversible errors committed during the trial.
CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION
(now TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES) vs. AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET. AL.
PROMULGATION
September 28, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 18 CIVIL PROCEDURE; ARTICLES 1169 AND 1144 NEW CIVIL
CODE
DOCTRINE: The pre-trial order is not exclusive about the issues to be resolved by the trial
court. As in this case, the issue of whether Cuevas and Saddul were liable on the
deficiency claim was proper for the ascertainment and determination by the RTC,
notwithstanding the silence of the pre-trial order, because such issue was deemed
necessarily included in or inferred from the issue of whether there was a deficiency still
to be paid by AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul.
FACTS:
Respondent Amalgamated Management and Development Corporation (AMDC)
obtained from the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) a loan
amounting to SR 3.3 million (equivalent to P9,000,000.00) to finance the working capital
requirements and the down payment for the trucks to be used in AMDCs hauling
project in the Middle East. Upon respondents request, petitioner Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation issued a letter or guaranty in favor of NCBSA as
the lending bank. To secure the guaranty, a real estate mortgage was executed in
favor of the petitioner. A Deed of Undertaking was also executed, where AMDC,
Cuevas and Saddul, as President and Vice President of AMDC respectively, jointly and
severally bound themselves to pay the petitioner whatever damages and liabilities that
the petitioner would incur by reason of the guaranty. When AMDC defaulted on their
obligation with NCBSA, petitioner paid the obligation to the latter. Thereafter, petitioner
made repeated demands for payment to respondent AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul, but
to no avail. Petitioner then extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. As the
proceeds therefrom were not sufficient to cover the guaranty, petitioner sued AMDC,
Cuevas and Saddul to collect the deficiency. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner, but Cuevas and Saddul were absolved from the obligation. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme
Court where it posits that based on the RTCs pre-trial order, the only issue to be
resolved was whether there was a deficiency claim after the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage and that the liability of Cuevas and Saddul on the deficiency claim
was already an admitted fact under the pre-trial order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the trial courts decision should be exclusive to the issue of
deficiency claim after the foreclosure sale
(2) Whether or not the respondents were still liable for the deficiency claimed by
petitioner.
RULING:
(1) No, trial courts decision is not exclusive to the issue of deficiency claim after the
foreclosure sale. It is true that Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that
should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to
be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action.
However, the pre-trial order is not exclusive about the issues to be resolved by the trial
court. A pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every
issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are issues that
are impliedly included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by
necessary implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those
expressly listed. In the case at bar, the issue of whether Cuevas and Saddul were liable
on the deficiency claim was proper for the ascertainment and determination by the
RTC as the trial court and the CA as the appellate tribunal, notwithstanding the silence
of the pre-trial order on it, because such issue was deemed necessarily included in or
inferred from the stated issue of whether there was a deficiency still to be paid by
AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul. Further, with Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be
affected by the judgment, it was only appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and
determine their liability for the purpose of arriving at a complete determination of the
suit. Thereby, the RTC did not err in resolving the issue of Cuevas and Sadduls liability.
(2) Yes, respondents were still liable for the deficiency claimed by petitioner. Article
1169 of the Civil Code provides that the obligor incurs in delay from the time the
obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands the fulfillment of the obligation. In the case
at bar, petitioner claims that it made a demand on Cuevas and Saddul to pay the
deficiency claim, but they still deny the claim. It is noted that the petitioners complaint
to recover its deficiency claim from obligors AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul, being a
judicial demand, sufficed to render Cuevas and Saddul in delay in the payment of the
deficiency claim. Cuevas and Saddul bound themselves, in the deed of undertaking, to
reimburse or to pay to the petitioner their obligation under the guaranty upon the
latters demand.
Also, petitioners claim against Cuevas and Saddul had not prescribed, contrary to
CAs finding. It is submitted that the prescriptive period of the petitioners deficiency
claim is ten years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. The court ruled that the 10-year
period to recover a deficiency claim starts to run upon the foreclosure of the property
mortgaged. In the case at bar, the real property mortgage having been foreclosed on
February 22, 1988 and March 24, 1988, the petitioners filing on February 17, 1994 of its
complaint to recover the deficiency claim was well within the 10-year prescriptive
period.
CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) vs. RICHARD
BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH
PROMULGATION
September 28, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 126 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings
to which it relates have terminated, even if owned by third person who is not liable for
the unlawful act, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.
FACTS:
On April 13, 2009, Information was filed charging respondent Richard Brodett and Jorge
Joseph with violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b) of Republic Act No. 9165,
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Regional Trial Court. Also,
another Information was filed, this time, charging only Brodett with violation of Section
11 of R.A. No. 9165. During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, respondent
Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence. He alleged that the petitioner
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency had seized several personal non-drug effects,
including a Honda Accord car and PDEA refused to return his personal effects despite
repeated demands for their return. The RTC ordered the release of the car to its rightful
owner, Myra Brodett and directed that the personal properties of accused be brought
to the court for safekeeping to be held as needed. PDEA assailed the order of the RTC
in the CA, but the latter dismissed the appeal. PDEA argued that the decision of the CA
was not in the accord with the provisions of R.A. 9165 and the car had been seized from
accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be released
from the custody of the law. Brodett countered that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly
and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments
of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless
such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the release of the car to Ms. Brodett
RULING:
Yes. Personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by
authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, if the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the
personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense;
or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
or that which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of
dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in
the commission of an offense. Consequently, generally, the trial court is vested with
considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence, and this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event
the accused claims the property was wrongfully taken from him. In particular, the trial
court has the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful owners, whether
the property was legally or illegally seized by the Government. Property used as
evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have
terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.
In relation thereto, Section 20 of R.A. 9165 forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer
of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court, even if the owned by a third person who is not liable for the
unlawful act. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court
and the parties access to it as evidence. Hence, in the case at bar, the order of release
of the car was premature and was also made in contravention of Section 20 of R.A.
9165. The car cannot be released and returned to Ms. Brodett, even if she was not
liable for the offense, until the termination of the proceedings which involves the car as
part of evidence. Also, photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not
enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the
prosecution.
Nonetheless, the failure of the prosecution to establish all the links in the chain of
custody is fatal to the case at bar. The presumption of regularity should bow down to
the presumption of innocence of the accused. Therefore, the directive to return the
non-drug evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render further action
upon it superfluous.
CASE TITLE ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL vs. JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI
CITATION A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845
PROMULGATION
October 5, 2011
DATE
DOCTRINE: A hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is
a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a
capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
FACTS:
Information was filed, with a recommendation for bail, in the RTC charging certain
Faustino Ancheta with murder. This criminal case was raffled to respondent Judge
Infantes branch. Respondent judge then issued twin orders, one granting bail to
Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody. Upon learning the issuance of
the twin order, private prosecutor Atty. Gacal, complainant herein, filed a so-called
Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To
Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very
Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Proprio Correct An Apparent And Patent Error
(very urgent motion). Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion. The
public prosecutor filed a comment stating that he had recommended bail as a matter
of course, and that the orders approving bail upon his recommendation and releasing
the accused were proper. Further, he states that his recommendation of bail was in
effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to a bail hearing. As there was no order
regarding the matter of bail was issued, Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge
Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence manifested by his failure to exercise
judicial power to resolve the issue of bail. Thereafter, Judge Infante definitively denied
the very urgent motion. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an
administrative complaint filed by Atty. Gacal against Judge Infante. After investigation,
OCA recommended that Judge Infante be fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 stating
that respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting bail based merely on
the order issued by the Fiscal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge can, in granting bail, dispense with the hearing of
application for bail
RULING:
No, bail hearing is mandatory. A hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of
bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in
criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
states that: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action." In this case, the accused is
charged with murder however Judge Infante specifically cited judicial experience as
sanctioning his adoption and approval of the public prosecutors recommendation on
the fixing of bail. Yet, it was not concealed from him that the public prosecutors
recommendation had been mainly based on the documentary evidence
adduced, and on the public prosecutors misguided position that the evidence of guilt
was weak because only circumstantial evidence had been presented. As such, Judge
Infantes unquestioning echoing of the public prosecutors conclusion about the
evidence of guilt not being sufficient to deny bail did not justify his dispensing with the
bail hearing. Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing
was a merely minor rule to be dispensed with.
Lastly, In case no application for bail is filed, bail hearing is not dispensable. This hearing
is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime. The prosecution must be given a chance to
show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. Hence,
even where there is no petition for bail in a case like the criminal case herein, a hearing
should still be held.
CASE TITLE LINA CALILAP-ASMERON, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PABLO CRUZ,* TRINIDAD CABANTOG,** ENI S.P. ATIENZA
and EMERENCIANA CABANTOG
PROMULGATION
November 23, 2011
DATE
DIGEST BY Hipolito, Ma. Nia Anthonette L.
TOPIC COVERED RULE 45, CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be the proper
subject of an appeal in this Court. The version of Section 1 of Rule 45 in force at the time
the petitioner commenced her present recourse on April 28, 2003 expressly so stated, to
wit:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
FACTS:
On March 17, 1975, the petitioner and her brother Celedonio Calilap constituted a real
estate mortgage over parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-164117 and TCT No.T-160929, both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, to secure the
performance of their loan obligation with respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). With the principal obligation being ultimately unpaid, DBP foreclosed
the mortgage. The mortgaged parcels of land were then sold to DBP as the highest
bidder. The one-year redemption period expired on September 1, 1981. As to what
thereafter transpired, the petitioner and DBP tendered conflicting versions.
In August 1982, the petitioner negotiated with DBP to buy back the property covered
by TCT No. 164117 by offering P15,000.00 as downpayment. Her offer was rejected by
an executive officer of DBPs Acquired Assets Department, who required her to pay the
full purchase price of P55,500.00 for the property within ten days. She returned to DBP
with the amount, only to be told that DBP would not sell back only one lot. Being made
to believe that the lot covered by TCT No. 164117 would be released after paying two
amortizations for the other lot (TCT No. 160929), however, she signed the deed of
conditional sale covering both lots for the total consideration of P157,000.00. When she
later on requested the release of the property under TCT No. 164117 after paying two
quarterly amortizations, DBP did not approve the release. She continued paying the
amortizations until she had paid P40,000.00 in all, at which point she sought again the
release of the lot under TCT No. 164117. DBP still denied her request, warning that it
would rescind the contract should her remaining amortizations be still not paid. On
August 7, 1985, DBP rescinded the deed of conditional sale over her objections.
On November 25, 1987, DBP sold the lot covered by TCT No. 164117 to respondent
Pablo Cruz via a deed of absolute sale. The petitioner consequently filed a complaint
for the rescission of the sale to Cruz on January 30, 1987. Notwithstanding their
knowledge of her pending suit against Cruz, respondents Emerenciana Cabantog and
Eni S.P. Atienza still bought the property from Cruz. Hence, Cabantog and Atienza were
impleaded as additional defendants by amendment.
The petitioner subsequently made the downpayment on September 10, 1992, and DBP
formally accepted the offer through its letter dated September 14, 1982, stating therein
the terms and conditions. Said terms and conditions, which were later embodied in the
deed of conditional sale executed on January 21, 1983, included one that bound her
to pay the first amortization of P7,304.15 three months from the execution of the deed,
and the remaining amortizations to be due and payable every three months thereafter.
DBP presented the duplicate copies of the receipts indicating her timely payment for
the first quarterly amortization; however, she incurred delays in her subsequent
installments. She made her last payment amounting to P4,500.00 on March 12, 1985,
leaving five quarterly amortizations unpaid. DBP replied by its letter dated February 5,
1986, demanding payment of the petitioners remaining obligation of P121,013.75 in
cash, otherwise, it would be constrained to sell the property. She responded via
telegram, informing DBP that she would be arriving on March 4, 1986. The telegram was
followed by a handwritten letter dated March 5, 1986 stating her willingness to pay 10%
of her outstanding obligations.
On March 12, 1986, DBP demanded the immediate remittance of the promised amount
via telegram. When she did not pay the six quarterly amortizations, DBP rescinded the
deed of conditional sale and applied for a writ of possession on November 17, 1986 in
the RTC (Branch 17) in Malolos, Bulacan. Its application for the writ of possession was
granted on November 18, 1986.
On June 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC, pointing out that the petitioner had not
presented testimonial or documentary evidence to support or corroborate her claim
that she had been misled into signing the deed of conditional sale. It ruled that DBP
could rescind the contract pursuant to the terms of the deed of conditional sale itself,
and that DBP exercised its right to rescind only after she had failed to pay her quarterly
amortizations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners submissions, that her testimonial evidence sufficiently
established the facts behind the execution of the deed of conditional sale, and that
she had not fully understood the terms contained in the deed of conditional sale,
involved questions of fact, is dismissible for raising factual issues.
RULING:
Appeal under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law only. The Court has always reminded
that in exercising its power of review the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case. For that reason, the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court. It is true that the Court has recognized several
exceptions, in which it has undertaken the review and re-appreciation of the evidence.
Among the exceptions have been: (a) when the findings of the CA are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made by the
CA is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA; (d) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts of the CA are conflicting; (f)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of the
CA are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Although the petitioner submits that the CA made findings of fact not supported by the
evidence on record, this case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Her
claim that she had established the circumstances to prove her having been misled into
signing the deed of conditional sale was unfounded. The petitioner apparently relied
solely on her bare testimony to establish her allegation of having been misled, and did
not present other evidence for the purpose. She seemingly forgot that, firstly, her bare
allegation of having been misled was not tantamount to proof, and that, secondly, she,
as the party alleging a disputed fact, carried the burden of proving her allegation. In
other words, her main duty was to establish her allegation by preponderance of
evidence, because her failure to do so would result in her defeat. Therefore, she did not
discharge her burden.
CASE TITLE LUCIANO P. PAZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
and FILINVEST ALABANG, INC.
PROMULGATION
November 23, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
DOCTRINE: As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are
reversible by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. A Petition for
Certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or
corrected only by appeal.
FACTS:
On November 29, 2000, the petitioner brought a petition for the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 684 docketed as LRC Case No. 00-059. The petition,
ostensibly made under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), Filinvest Development Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest Alabang,
Inc. (FAI) as respondents. The petition averred that the petitioner was the owner of
Parcel 1, Plan 11-69, with an area of 71,692,754 square meters, situated in Paraaque
City, Pasay City, Taguig City and San Pedro, Laguna, and Parcel 2 Plan 11-69, with a
total area of 71,409,413 square meters, situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Paraaque
City and Las Pias City; that the total landholding of the petitioner consisted of
143,102,167 square meters, or approximately 14,310 hectares; that OCT No. 684 was
registered in the name of the Republic, and included Lot 392 of the Muntinlupa Estate
with an area of approximately 244 hectares; that Lot 392 was segregated from OCT No.
684, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185552, also in the
name of the Republic; that FDC and FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision based on
their joint venture agreement with the Government; that pursuant to the joint venture
agreement, Lot 392 was further subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT No. 185552,
and the issuance of TCTs for the resulting individual subdivision lots in the names of the
Republic and FAI; and that the subdivision lots were then sold to third parties.
On January 19, 2001, FDC and FAI moved to dismiss the petition for cancellation on the
following grounds. The petitioner countered that his petition for cancellation was not an
initiatory pleading that must comply with the regular rules of civil procedure but a mere
incident of a past registration proceeding; that unlike in an ordinary action, land
registration was not commenced by complaint or petition, and did not require
summons to bring the persons of the respondents within the jurisdiction of the trial court;
and that a service of the petition sufficed to bring the respondents within the jurisdiction
of the trial court.
RTC ruled that the petition is a fresh lawsuit, involving title to a land or an interest
thereon "arising after the original" proceeding, which should be filed and entitled under
the original land registration case under the instructions of Sec. 2 of PD 1529. Indeed,
this Section states further post registration cause of an aggrieved party who complains
of being deprived of a land wrongfully or fraudulently titled in the name of another. As
such it is fair and logical to assume that this is covered by the current rules on an
initiatory pleading and becomes vulnerable to dismissal under any grounds invoked by
the respondent which are mandatory and jurisdictional requirements under the present
rules, including the payment of docket fees and the certification of non forum
shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was correct in insisting that his petition filed under Section
108 of P.D. 1529 should not be dismissed because it was exempt from the requirements
of paying docket fees, of service of summons, and of the certification against forum
shopping due to its not being an initiatory pleading.
RULING:
The dismissal of the petition for certiorari by the CA was proper and correct because
the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely. Based on the provision, the
proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108
of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely: (a) when
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been
created which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been
changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married,
the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will
thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has
been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and
(g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. Both the
CA and the RTC were correct in finding that the petitioner was in reality seeking the
reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of a
certificate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his petition did
not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 108, and was for that reason
rightly dismissed.
The petition was not a mere continuation of a previous registration proceeding. Shorn of
the thin disguise the petitioner gave to it, the petition was exposed as a distinct and
independent action to seek the reconveyance of realty and to recover damages.
Accordingly, he should perform jurisdictional acts, like paying the correct amount of
docket fees for the filing of an initiatory pleading, causing the service of summons on
the adverse parties in order to vest personal jurisdiction over them in the trial court, and
attaching a certification against forum shopping (as required for all initiatory pleadings).
He ought to know that his taking such required acts for granted was immediately fatal
to his petition, warranting the granting of the respondents motion to dismiss.
CASE TITLE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FEDERICO SUNTAY, as
represented by his Assignee, JOSEFINA LUBRICA
PROMULGATION
December 14, 2011
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated Regional Trial Courts] shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this
Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian
Courts, unless modified by this Act.
It is clear from Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be void. What
adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate
power to decide this question.
FACTS:
Respondent Federico Suntay (Suntay) owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of Suntays land pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27. Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the
expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68.
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of just
compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of
Region IV, DARAB, his petition was assigned to RARAD Conchita Mias (RARAD Mias).
On January 24, 2001, after summary administrative proceeding in DARAB Case, RARAD
Mias rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated
portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration, but RARAD Mias
denied its motion on March 14, 2001. It received the denial on March 26, 2001.
On April 20, 2001, Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special
Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay and RARAD Mias. The petition essentially prayed
that the total just compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only
P4,251,141.67. Meanehile, Suntay filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Land Banks
petition for judicial determination of just compensation had been filed beyond the 15-
day reglementary period prescribed in Section 11, Rule XIII of the New Rules of
Procedure of DARAB; and that, by virtue of such tardiness, RARAD Mias decision had
become final and executory. The RTC granted Suntays motion to dismiss and Land
Bank sought reconsideration, maintaining that its petition for judicial determination of
just compensation was a separate action that did not emanate from the case in the
RARAD. The RTC denied Land Banks motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition for the determination of
just compensation.
RULING:
The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition. It bears stressing that the petition is
not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the
determination of the just compensation for respondents expropriated property, over
which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. This is clear from Section 57 of R.A.
No. 6657 which provides:
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated Regional
Trial Courts] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
In the instant case, the Land Bank properly instituted its petition for the determination of
just compensation before the RTC in accordance with R.A. No. 6657. The RTC erred in
dismissing the petition. To repeat, Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 is explicit in vesting the
RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners."
Consequently, although the new rules particularly Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB
New Rules of Procedure speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Section 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be void.
What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner
the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the
ultimate power to decide this question.
2012 CASES
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
PROMULGATION DATE January 18, 2012
TOPICS COVERED Sufficiency of allegation (of treachery) in the information
DOCTRINE:
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the
elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the
ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation.
FACTS:
The accused PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez were charged with three counts
of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson.
On March 1, 2000, the Sayson family was having a birthday party for Wilfredo Lladones,
Estrella Sayson's second husband. At about 10:00 P.M., the accused arrived at the
place and asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out. Moises approached
the accused and tried to reason with them. Estrella then heard one of the accused
threaten Moises. Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was
continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand
immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however
was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run
away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine.
RTC and CA decided to convict the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction was proper? YES. But, PO2 Valdez is guilty of homicides only.
RULING:
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of
homicide due to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances
constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the States witnesses did not really see the events as
they transpired; and that they wrongly identified the two accused as the persons who
had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were themselves the aggressors.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her purported
failure to see who between the accused threatened and who shot her son Moises, by
pointing out that she was then facing Moises because she was preventing him from
approaching the accused. Estrella categorically stated that she saw the accused
alight from their motorcycle. She could not have been mistaken about the identity of
the accused for the simple reason that they are her neighbors and that their father is
her "cumpadre." When the incident happened, the accused were about eight (8) to
127 Danduan, Katigbak, Lee, Legado, Lubay, Manaig, Parrone REMEDIAL LAW
ten (10) meters away from where she and her son Moises were standing. She also saw
with her own eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots
(approximately 9 shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing.
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the aggressors
who had attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated during the trial that he
dodged the bullet fired from the gun of Ferdinand (one of the victims), causing the
bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim); that he played dead to avoid being shot at
again, and walked away with his terrified son only after the way was clear for them to
leave; and that he heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third victim) grappled for
control of a gun, and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun and Ferdinand.
However, the testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the
physical evidence.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Here, both accused were
convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of
assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not
only from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but
also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at
Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one
after the other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same
motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability
for the crime.
Here, the averments of the informations did not sufficiently set forth the facts and
circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be
difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun,
without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially
ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make.
Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are
other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing
but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were
missing from the informations.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. RELATO
TOPICS COVERED Chain of custody in drugs cases
DOCTRINE: Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited

drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the
evidence to be presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the
successful prosecution of illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that PO3 Sonny Evasco of the Bulan Police Station received a
tip from his asset to the effect that Relato would be peddling illegal drugs around
midnight in Barangay Aquino, Bulan, Sorsogon. A team was formed to conduct a buy-
bust operation. When the accused Darwin Relato was arrested, the police had seized
from Relato the marked P500.00 buy-bust bill.
On the other hand, the defense alleged that on the night of the arrest, Relato and his
companion, Pido Paredes, were proceeding to his grandfathers wake in Magallanes,
Sorsogon on board his motorcycle, with Paredes driving. They stopped upon reaching
Barangay Aquino to allow Relato to adjust the fuel cock of the motorcycle. Police
officers suddenly came, subdued and arrested them. SPO1 Masujer then seized Relatos
3310 Nokia cellphone, its charger, and his personal money of P3,500.00. In the police
station, SPO1 Masujer and PO2 Villaroya required him to remove his pants. He complied.
They then searched his person but did not find anything on him. He then saw Masujer
take two sachets from his own wallet and placed them on top of a table. Masujer then
told Relato to point to the sachets, and a picture was then taken of him in that pose.
Meanwhile, Paredes notified his family about his arrest.
RTC convicted Relato, which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Was the chain of custody followed? NO. Therefore, accused should be acquitted.
RULING:
A review of the records establishes that the procedure laid down by R.A. 9165 and its
IRR was not followed. Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily
apparent. No photograph of the seized shabu was taken. The buy-bust team did not
immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the presence of
Relato and witnesses. Although there was testimony about the marking of the seized
items being made at the police station, the records do not show that the marking was
done in the presence of Relato or his chosen representative. Fourthly, no representative
of the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official attended the
taking of the physical inventory and to sign the inventory.
Under the rules, the marking immediately after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or related items will
use the markings as reference. It further serves to segregate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar and related evidence from the time they are seized from
the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. It is crucial in ensuring the
integrity of the chain of custody.
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition;
Here, the Prosecution tendered no explanation why the buy-bust team had failed to
mark the seized shabu immediately after the arrest. There was lack of a credible
showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-bust team to keep the shabu intact while
in transit to the police station. Hence, the saving mechanism under Section 21(a) of the
IRR of R.A. 9165, stating that non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items, is not applicable in this case.
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride

prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of
proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the
corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not
establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is
missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance
raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as
evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less than complete in terms
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves
exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in
the face of the weakness of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. DE LOS SANTOS
TOPICS COVERED Animus possidendi in drugs cases; Admission
DOCTRINE:
The mere denial of knowledge that a substance is a regulated drug is insufficient to
exculpate the person found in possession of it, for he must have to satisfactorily explain
how the drug came to his possession. Without his satisfactory explanation, he will be
presumed to have animus possidendi, or the intent to possess. His guilt will then be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
An alert security guard halted Geron Delos Santos as he was about to bring a gift-
wrapped box out of the Somerset Condominium in Pasay City. When Delos Santos
opened the box for inspection upon demand of the security guard, the box contained
plastic bags with 6.2 kilograms of suspected shabu. The security guard forthwith
apprehended Delos Santos and impounded the box and its contents. The NBI was
immediately notified of the incident, and it dispatched its agents to the place.
Subsequently, Delos Santos was charged with a violation of Section 16 of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
On his part, Delos Santos denied the accusation, claiming that while he went to Unit 706
for cleaning, a non-tenant known to him only as Wilson requested him to bring the gift-
wrapped box to someone near the Jollibee Vito Cruz Branch.
RTC convicted Delos Santos. This, the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Was the conviction proper? YES.
RULING:
Firstly, Delos Santos objects to the testimonies of NBI agent Esmeralda and building
security supervisor Zabat on the discovery of the shabu as hearsay. He asserts that the
State consequently had no evidence with which to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in view of the failure to present the apprehending security guard as a
witness against him.
The objection deserves no consideration. To begin with, Delos Santos waived the
objection by not raising it during the trial. Equally significant in this regard is that he
expressly admitted during the trial his actual possession of the box containing the
shabu. His admission thereby rendered the testimony of the security guard unnecessary
and superfluous. Moreover, it is erroneous for him to treat the testimonies of NBI agent
Esmeralda and building security supervisor Zabat as hearsay as to his possession of the
shabu. They were actually eyewitnesses as far as the physical turn-over of the shabu
seized from Delos Santos was concerned. That physical turn-over directly linked Delos
Santos to the shabu presented and admitted as evidence at the trial. As such, the turn-
over constituted strong evidence of the possession of the shabu by Delos Santos.
And, secondly, Delos Santos contends that the State did not establish that he had
animus possidendi, or the intent to possess the regulated substances in question.
The contention is not correct.
In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, proof of animus possidendi on the

part of the accused is indispensable. Upon the States presenting to the trial court of the
facts and circumstances from which to infer the existence of animus possidendi, it
becomes incumbent upon the Defense to rebut the inference with evidence that the
accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not
intend to do so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he
did not know that he had possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus
possidendi is then presumed to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have
performed an act that the law prohibited and punished.
It cannot be disputed that Delos Santos had animus possidendi. His conduct prior to
and following his apprehension evinced his guilty knowledge of the contents of the gift-
wrapped box as shabu. His uncorroborated story of having been summoned to help in
the cleaning of Unit 706 was a sham excuse that he peddled to explain his presence in
the Somerset Condominium. His explanation was useless, however, because he was no
longer employed as a janitor of the Somerset Condominium at the time of his arrest
after being already terminated from employment. Correlatively, his willingness to run for
Wilson the errand of delivering the gift-wrapped box to the unnamed person near the
Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch proved that he was serving as a courier of shabu.
Besides, his guilty knowledge was confirmed by his unreasonable refusal to exit from Unit
706 despite the demand of the NBI agents to do so, and by his stealthy transfer to the
adjoining Unit 705. Had he been truly innocent, he would have voluntarily cooperated
with the NBI agents instead of attempting to escape from them.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. DEL CASTILLO
TOPICS COVERED Denial, alibi, self-defense, defense of stranger
DOCTRINE:
Denial and alibi are not the best defenses when there is positive identification of the
accused for their complicity in the commission of a crime.
FACTS:
On the evening of March 20, 2000, the eyewitness Froilan Perfinian was on his way
home when he heard someone pleading: Huwag po, huwag po! He followed the
direction of the voice, and saw the assault by all the accused against the victims
Sabino Guinhawa, Graciano Delgado, and Victor Noriega. He recognized all the
accused because he saw them from only six meters away and the moon was very
bright. Perfinian recalled that the accused surrounded their victims during the assault;
that Arnold stabbed Graciano on the stomach with a bolo; that Rico hacked Graciano
with a bolo; that when Victor tried to run away, Hermogenes and Felix pursued and
caught up with him; that Felix hacked Victor; and that when Sabino ran away, Melanio
and Joven pursued him. Perfinian rushed home as soon as all the accused had left. He
narrated to his wife everything he had just witnessed.
On the following day, the police authorities found the dead bodies of Sabino, Graciano
and Victor. Afraid of being implicated and fearing for his own safety, Perfinian left for his
fathers house in Marinduque. He did not return until after he learned that all the
accused had been arrested. When he returned home, he relayed to the victims
families everything he knew about the killings. Also, he gave a statement to the
Batangas City Police.
The accused admitted being in Bulihan at the time of the incident, but denied liability.
Arnold and Joven invoked self-defense and defense of strangers, while Melanio,
Hermogenes, Rico and Felix interposed denial.
RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a

mitigating circumstance in favor of Hermogenes. CA affirmed the conviction.
The accused have come to the SC in a final appeal, submitting that because Arnold
and Joven had already admitted killing the victims, the rest of them should be
exculpated; that Arnold and Joven should be absolved of criminal liability because
they acted in self-defense and defense of strangers; and that conspiracy among them
was not proven.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction was proper? YES.
RULING:
Conviction of appellants is affirmed.
Both the RTC and the CA considered Perfinians eyewitness testimony credible. We
have no reason to disregard their having accorded total credence to Perfinians
eyewitness account of the killings. In contrast, we have the bare denials of Melanio,
Hermogenes, Felix, and Rico, but such denials were weak for being self-serving and
unnatural. Their own actuations and conduct following the attack even confirmed their
guilt, for had Melanio, Felix, and Rico been innocent, it was puzzling that they had to
suddenly abandon their homes to go to Antipolo City, Rizal. Their explanation for the
hasty departure - that Arnold and Joven warned them to leave because dead bodies
had been found near Melanios house, and they might be implicated - was unnatural
and contrary to human nature. The normal reaction of innocent persons was not to run
away, or instead to report to the police whatever they knew about the dead bodies. In
any case, they did not need to be apprehensive about being implicated if they had no
participation in the crimes.
Perfinians identification of all the accused as the perpetrators was positive and reliable
for being based on his recognition of each of them during the incident. His being
familiar with each of them eliminated any possibility of mistaken identification. He
spotted them from a distance of only six meters away under a good condition of
visibility. Consequently, their denials and alibi were properly rejected.
Likewise, Perfinian detailed the distinct acts done by each of the accused during their
assault. The results of the post-mortem examinations showing that the victims had
sustained multiple stab and hack wounds confirmed his testimonial declarations about
the victims having been repeatedly stabbed and hacked. Also, the blood-stained
bolos and blood-stained clothing recovered from the possession of the accused
confirmed his declarations that the accused had used bolos in inflicting deadly blows
on their victims. It is notable, on the other hand, that the Defense did not challenge the
sincerity of Perfinians eyewitness identification.
Arnold and Joven did not act in self-defense and in defense of strangers. Arnold and
Joven did not adequately prove unlawful aggression; hence, neither self-defense nor
defense of stranger was a viable defense for them. In addition to the eyewitness
account of Perfinian directly incriminating them, their own actuations immediately after
the incident confirmed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Their flight from the
neighborhood where the crimes were committed, their concealing of the weapons
used in the commission of the crimes, their non-reporting of the crimes to the police,
and their failure to surrender themselves to the police authorities fully warranted the
RTCs rejection of their claim of self-defense and defense of stranger.
Nonetheless, even if we were to believe Arnold and Jovens version of the incident, the
element of unlawful aggression by the victims would still be lacking. The allegation that
one of the victims had held Winifredas hand did not indicate that the act had gravely
endangered Winifredas life. Similarly, the victims supposed motion to draw something
from their waists did not put Arnold and Jovens lives in any actual or imminent danger.
What the records inform us is that Arnold and Joven did not actually see if the victims
had any weapons to draw from their waists. That no weapons belonging to the victims
were recovered from the crime scene confirmed their being unarmed. Lastly, had they
been only defending themselves, Arnold and Joven did not tell the trial court why they
had repeatedly hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not themselves
even sustain any physical injury. Thus, the CA and the RTC rightly rejected their plea of
self-defense and defense of stranger, for the nature and the number of wounds
sustained by the victims were important indicia to disprove self-defense.
The State duly established conspiracy and abuse of superior strength. The accused,
armed with bolos, surrounded and attacked the victims, and pursued whoever of the
latter attempted to escape from their assault. Thereafter, the accused, except
Hermogenes, fled their homes and together hastily proceeded to Antipolo, Rizal. Their
individual and collective acts prior to, during and following the attack on the victims
reflected a common objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused, without
exception, were co-conspirators.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rejects the pleas for exculpation of the other
accused grounded on their respective alibis considering that Arnold and Jovens
admission of sole responsibility for the killings did not eliminate their liability as co-
conspirators.
The accused clearly used their superiority in number and arms to ensure the killing of the
victims. Abuse of superior strength is attendant if the accused took advantage of their
superiority in number and their being armed with bolos. Accordingly, the crimes
committed were three counts of murder.
CASE TITLE CAGAS vs. COMELEC
TOPICS COVERED Review of interlocutory orders of COMELEC Divisions
DOCTRINE:
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during
the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
FACTS:
The petitioner Douglas Cagas and respondent Claude Bautista contested the position
of Governor of Davao del Sur in the May 2010 elections. Cagas was proclaimed the
winner. Bautista filed an electoral protest which was raffled to the COMELEC First
Division. Cagas averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make
the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The Division denied these
affirmative defenses.
Cagas moved to reconsider on the ground that the factual and legal basis of the
denial were not discussed, and prayed that the matter be referred to COMELEC En
Banc. On the other hand, Bautista argued that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. But, the Division still
denied reconsideration. Hence, Cagas filed this petition for certiorari to the SC alleging
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC First Division.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has power to review via certiorari an order or a
decision of a COMELEC Division? NO.
(2) Whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC En Banc?
RULING:
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC is
prescribed in Article IX of the Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. x x x. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any

decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof."
We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a Division of the COMELEC must be

reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
(2) As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en
banc, this Court finds the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held that
no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will necessitate the
elevation of the case and its records to the COMELEC En Banc. No less than the
Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and decided first in division and
any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc. Apparently, the assailed orders are issuances of a Commission in division and are
all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental issue. In such a
situation, the rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case
pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself,
and not on the Commission en banc.
Kho vs Commission on Elections provided an exception from the above rule. The Court
may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the
COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the
members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of
necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC
en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed
interlocutory order can be reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application in the case
at bar because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine whether
or not the protest should be dismissed for lack of specifications.
CASE TITLE CONCEPCION vs. MINEX IMPORT CORPORATION
TOPICS COVERED Dismissal for just cause without due process
DOCTRINE:
The employer may validly dismiss for loss of trust and confidence an employee who
commits an act of fraud prejudicial to the interest of the employer. Neither a criminal
prosecution nor a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is a requisite for
the validity of the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal for a just or lawful cause must still
be made upon compliance with the requirements of due process under the Labor
Code; otherwise, the employer is liable to pay nominal damages as indemnity to the
dismissed employee.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lolita Concepcion was a supervisor at the SM Harrison Plaza kiosk of the
respondent Minex. On November 10, 1997, petitioner phoned Vina Mariano, an
Assistant Manager of Minex, to report that P50,912 was stolen from the stall. However,
her superiors arrived with a policeman who immediately placed the petitioner under
arrest. Concepcion was detained for a day. Thereafter, Concepcion filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal on November 12, 1997.
On November 14, 1997, Minex filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against
Concepcion. Thus, she was charged before RTC Manila.
Meanwhile, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of

Concepcion illegal. This was reversed by the NLRC saying that petitioner was not
dismissed but had abandoned her job, and that even if she had been dismissed, her
dismissal would be justifiable for loss of trust and confidence in the light of the finding of
probable cause for qualified theft against her. CA sustained the NLRC ruling.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there just cause for the dismissal of Concepcion? YES.
(2) Whether or not the requirements of due process prior to the termination was
followed? NO.
RULING:
(1) Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the Petitioner took the money from the
drawer in the cabinet in the Kiosk. But, direct evidence that the Petitioner took the
money is not required for the Petitioner to be lawfully dismissed for the loss of the money
of the Private Respondent corporation. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to
anchor a factual basis for the dismissal of the Petitioner for loss of confidence.
The conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not indispensable to warrant his

dismissal by his employer. If there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee has
been guilty of a breach of trust, or that his employer has ample reason to distrust him, it
cannot justly deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such employee. All that is
incumbent upon the NLRC to determine is whether the proposed dismissal is for just
cause. It is not necessary for said court to find that an employee has been guilty of a
crime beyond reasonable doubt in order to authorize his dismissal.
The quantum of proof required for convicting an accused is thus higher proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt than the quantum prescribed for dismissing an employee
substantial evidence.
Here, no less than the DOJ Secretary found probable cause for qualified theft against
the petitioner. That finding was enough to justify her termination for loss of confidence.
To repeat, her responsibility as the supervisor tasked to oversee the affairs of the kiosk,
including seeing to the secure handling of the sales proceeds, could not be ignored or
downplayed. The employers loss of trust and confidence in her was directly rooted in
the manner of how she, as the supervisor, had negligently handled the large amount of
sales by simply leaving the amount inside the cabinet drawer of the kiosk despite being
aware of the great risk of theft.
(2) The petitioner plainly demonstrated how quickly and summarily her dismissal was
carried out without first requiring her to explain anything in her defense. Instead, the
respondents forthwith had her arrested and investigated by the police authorities for
qualified theft. This was a denial of her right to due process of law. In fact, their decision
to dismiss her was already final even before the police authority commenced an
investigation of the theft, the finality being confirmed by no less than Sylvia Mariano
herself telling the petitioner during their phone conversation following the latters
release from police custody that she (Sylvia) "no longer wanted to see" her.
The fact that the petitioner was the only person suspected of being responsible for the
theft aggravated the denial of due process. When the respondents confronted her in
the morning of November 10, 1997 for the first time after the theft, they brought along a
police officer to arrest her to make her answer for the theft. They evidently already
concluded that she was the culprit.
Thus, where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However,
the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The
indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of
"dismiss now, pay later."
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00.
CASE TITLE ALMA JOSE vs. JAVELLANA
TOPICS COVERED Interlocutory vs. Final Order; Fresh Period Rule; Forum Shopping
DOCTRINE:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the motion to dismiss of
the defendant is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to
leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the
claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to
appeal the denial.
FACTS:
Margrita Alma Jose had sold the subject parcels of land to private respondent Ramon
Javellana for P160,000. It was agreed that P80,000 would be paid upon execution of
the deed, while the other P80,000 would be paid upon registration of the lands to be
undertaken by Margarita. In case Margarita becomes incapacitated, her son Juvenal
and her daughter Priscilla would receive the payment of the balance and proceed
with the registration.
Margarita and Juvenal died, leaving Priscilla with the undertaking to register the
property. But, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking. Instead, she wanted to
convert the land to become a subdivision. So, Javellana filed an action for specific
performance.
The action was dismissed by the RTC on June 24, 1999 upon motion by Priscilla on the
ground of lack of cause of action because Javellana was not able to show payment of
the balance. This order was received by Javellana on July 9, 1999. Reconsideration was
filed on July 21, 1999, but it was denied in an order on June 21, 2000, which Javellana
received on July 13, 2000. Javellana appealed on July 19, 2000.
Priscilla argued that appeal was not proper because the order denying reconsideration
was interlocutory, that the appeal was filed out of time for being three days late, and
that Javellana was forum shopping as he filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail
the same orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal is interlocutory? NO.
(2) Whether or not the notice of appeal by Javellana was filed out of time? NO.
(3) Whether or not Javellana was guilty of forum shopping? NO.
RULING:
(1) NO. The denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final
order and appealable.
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal
considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may
be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is
final.
In this case, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be
done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of the case. It was clearly a final
order, not an interlocutory one.
The prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration

referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
(2) Appeal was made in time pursuant to Neypes vs. CA. An aggrieved party desirous
of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order
denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
(3) No forum shopping was committed. Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum
shopping by filing a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same
orders. It has been ruled in the cases of Young vs. CA, and Zosa vs. Estrella that the
successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the
same objective of nullifying the trial courts dismissal orders constituted forum shopping
that warranted the dismissal of both cases.
However, the outcome in Young and Zosa is unjust here even if the orders of the RTC
being challenged through appeal and the petition for certiorari were the same. The
unjustness exists because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought
different objectives. In his appeal, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous
dismissal of the civil case; but his petition for certiorari, which was denied by the CA,
had the ostensible objective "to prevent Priscilla from developing the subject property
and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved."
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping
designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. Multiplicity of suits would not materialize
considering that the appeal was a continuity of the civil case, whereas the petition for
certiorari dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion. The
unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable
ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would also not arise because the
CA had not yet decided the appeal as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches to be

the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas counsel on the efficacy of the
appeal to stave off his caretakers eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the
development of them into a residential or commercial subdivision pending the appeal.
In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his appeal was
"inadequate and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her
transferee/assignee from developing and disposing of the subject property to other
parties to the total deprivation of petitioners rights of possession and ownership over
the subject property," and that the dismissal by the RTC had "emboldened private
respondents to fully develop the property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an
ejectment case against petitioners overseer." Thereby, it became far-fetched that
Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against forum
shopping.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA
TOPICS COVERED Self-defense
DOCTRINE:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an
unlawful aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the
accused cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
FACTS:
Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso
Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais
fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of
stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and
Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away.
Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Fontanilla was thus charged with murder. He pleaded self-defense. He said that on the
night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, a
karate expert, who was wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed
him in the stomach and continued to hit him. He had thus been forced to defend
himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victims head,
causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene
for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.
RTC and CA both rejected the claim of self-defense by Fontanilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was valid self-defense? NO.
RULING:
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression
is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to
the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. The
character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified
killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or
imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material
attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c)
the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an
attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude
of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. He assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
Fontanilla was not able to discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that
Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, Fontanillas act of
hitting the victims head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to,
and constituted an unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some
injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was
found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital. Nor was
any medication applied to him. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver
of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-
defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to
prevent or repel an attack from Olais.
Treachery was attendant. Fontanilla had appeared out of nowhere to strike Olais on
the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone, causing Olais to fall to
the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack effectively
denied to Olais the ability to defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
CASE TITLE METROBANK vs. TOBIAS III
TOPICS COVERED Preliminary Investigation; Presumption of Authorship
DOCTRINE:
The courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger
applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.
FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Tobias III obtained loans from Metrobank totaling P40,000,000.
Tobias gave as security four parcels of land covered by TCT M-16751 supposedly
located in Malabon. When Tobias defaulted in payment, Metrobank foreclosed the
properties and was issued certificate of sale. But when the sale was presented for
registration, TCT M-16751 was found to be fictitious.
Thus, Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public documents by
Malabon City Prosecutor. Tobias requested for reinvestigation. He explained that he
purchased the lands from one Leonardo Fajardo. Metrobank advised him to transfer
the title to his name so that he could obtain the loan. This, he did and so he was able to
obtain the loan after investigation and verifications made by Metrobank. But still, the
Prosecutor found probable cause against Tobias.
When Tobias appealed to the DOJ, then Secretary of Justice ordered the withdrawal of
the information finding that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the resolution saying that Tobias had overcome the disputable
presumption of authorship of the falsified documents by sufficiently establishing his
good faith and lack of criminal intent.
ISSUE:
Does the presumption of authorship apply in this case? NO.
RULING:
The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of
probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Metrobank
urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias. However, the
presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies
only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.
As found by the CA, the actuations of Tobias showed that he had the least intentions to
deceive the Bank. Tobias had to undergo the usual process of the investigative arm or
machine of the Bank. Tobias also paid the unnecessary interests on the loan. More
importantly, the loan was not released until after the mortgage was duly registered.
Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the
information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he
came to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as
done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave.
It is evident that Metrobank did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and
the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had
no one to blame but itself.
CASE TITLE RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR L. ONGJOCO
CITATION A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J
TOPIC COVERED Power of review; Disciplinary proceedings are not subtitutes for
judicial remedies
DOCTRINE:
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to
the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.
It is not within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his Deputies,
directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of
the land. The power of reviewby appeal or special civil actionis not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-
defined and long established hierarchy, and long standing processes and procedures.
No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
FACTS:
The case sprung from the filing of criminal charges against several Sangguniang
Panlungsod of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan by Engr. Oscar Ongjoco, in behalf of the
FH GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative. It was alleged by Ongjoco
that the accused exhibited their bias in denying the request of FH GYMN to be
authorized to issue tricycle operators permits while favoring existing franchisees,
FRAHTODA and BMTODA.
The criminal complaints were eventually dismissed by the Deputy Ombudsman.

Members of the CA Sixth Division denied the petition for review and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration by FH GYMN. Thereupon, Ongjoco initiated an administrative
case against the members of the CA Sixth Division for allegedly summarily denying the
petition without stating the facts and law upon which the denial was based, and for
allegedly manipulating the delivery of the copy of the CA decision to FH-GYMN to
prevent it from timely filing a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Can the administrative complaint against the members of the CA Sixth Division be
given due course?
RULING:
We find the administrative complaint against respondent Justices of the Court of
Appeals baseless and utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and outrightly dismiss it.
The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. In the present case, the Deputy Ombudsman
found no substantial evidence to prove that there was interference in the internal
affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a violation of the law by the respondents. Thus, the CA
Sixth Division expressly found that FH-GYMN had not discharged its burden as the
petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial evidence.
Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know that his administrative complaint must rest on the
quality of the evidence; and that his basing his plain accusations on hunches and
speculations would not suffice to hold them administratively liable for rendering the
adverse decision. Nonetheless, he exhibited disrespect for the judicial office by still filing
this administrative complaint against them despite conceding in the administrative
complaint itself his having no proof of his charges.
Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to
the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may
feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting
to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only
one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative or
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.
Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and
executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment
against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step, confer
the prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but
to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its
findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of
administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out,
within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his Deputies, directly or
vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land.
The power of reviewby appeal or special civil actionis not only lodged exclusively
in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and
long established hierarchy, and long standing processes and procedures. No other
review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.
CASE TITLE ROLANDO SOFIO and RUFIO SOFIO vs. ALBERTO I. VALENZUELA,
GLORIA I. VALENZUELA, REMEDIOS I. VALENZUELA, and CESAR I.
VALENZUELA
PROMULGATION
February 15, 2012
DATE
DIGEST BY Katigbak, Paula Margareth
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Rule 36
DOCTRINE: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general
rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that
cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable.
FACTS:
Respondents are brothers and sisters. They are the co-owners of a parcel of
agricultural land Alberto had been planting sugarcane in the entire property, but poor
drainage had led him to abandon his cultivation. Without their knowledge, Rolando
Sofio had obtained permission to farm the abandoned area for free from Socorro
Valenzuela, the respondents mother, on condition that Rolando would return the
portion once the owners needed it. When Gloria learned this, and after the petitioners
refused her demand for the return of the 1.8 hectares, she lodged a complaint against
Rolando with the Barangay Chairman of Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental, and
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). The parties did not reach an amicable
settlement.
The petitioners then informed Gloria that, being the identified tenants under
Presidential Decree No. 27, they had already paid the rentals on the portions they were
cultivating, and that they would be paying subsequent rentals to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP). Gloria replied that, except for the area that Wilma had been
cultivating as tenant in lieu of her late father, the petitioners were not tenants of any
portion of respondents lands. Emancipation patents (EPs) were then issued to Rolando
and Rufio covering their respective areas of tillage.
The respondents brought in the DARAB a complaint against the petitioners, seeking the
cancellation of the EPs, recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that the
petitioners cultivation of their land had been illegal because they had not consented
to it. The PARAD of Negros Occidental, ordered the cancellation of petitioners EPs.
DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD.
The respondents elevated the DARABs decision to the CA which reinstated the
PARAD decision. The decision of the CA became final and executory after the
petitioners neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed by certiorari to the Court. A
writ of execution was then issued.
The petitioners, represented by new counsel, filed in the PARAD a motion for
relief from judgment, motion for reconsideration, and motion to recall writ of execution
alleging that there was neglect on the part of their former counsel. The PARAD held
that it had no authority to grant the motion for relief from judgment due to its subject
matter being a judgment of the CA, a superior court. The petitioners then filed in the CA
a motion to recall entry of judgment with motion for leave of court to file a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the motion to recall entry of judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred when it rejected the petitioners motion to recall the entry of
judgment?
RULING:
No. The Court finds no cause to disturb the promulgated decision of the CA. A
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This doctrine of finality and immutability
of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice to the effect that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts
must become final at some definite date set by law.
Given this doctrine, courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result, and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies. The only
exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments rendering
execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here.
Emphasizing the object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a
new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one
placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered,
to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not
to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have
rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the
court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. Based on such definition and
characterization, the petitioners situation did not fall within the scope of a nunc pro
tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was not mere clarification,
but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the reinstatement of
the DARAB decision.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO
PROMULGATION
February 22, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence, Rule 131, Section 1; Civil Procedure, Rule 7, Section3
DOCTRINE: An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide

that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae,
or both.
FACTS:
Johnny Bolanon was stabbed in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his
assailant ran away. Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B.
Estao in order to seek help and his uncle rushed him to the PGH by taxicab. On their
way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him.
He eventually died. The stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.
Rodrigo Salafranca was found guilty of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and Salafrancas positive identification as the
culprit by Mendoza.
ISSUE:
Whether the ante-mortem declaration of Bolonan be admissible either as a dying
declaration or part of res gestae?
RULING:
Yes. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its
hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur,
namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is
competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the
time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained
a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great
difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few
minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. Lastly,
the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which
Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on
board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca
having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes
as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL
PROMULGATION
March 14, 2012
DATE
DIGEST BY Lee, Mariline
TOPIC COVERED Evidence
DOCTRINE: The task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing
their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he
derives while the witnesses testify before him. The demeanor on the witness chair of
persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a significant element of judicial
adjudication because it can draw the line between fact and fancy.
FACTS:
AAA was walking along Dapitan Street in Makati City to fetch her employers son from
school when she was suddenly grabbed by Sabadlad, the man who persistently
greeted every time she bought pandesal at a store near her employers house.
Sabadlad ordered her to go with him with a gun poked at her throat. Two other men
joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat of a parked car where
she was blindfolded and after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was
brought out of the car. Sabadlab removed her clothes with her hands tied behind her
back and Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although
blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his
name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her
hands still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took
their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab
stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers.
After the three ravished her again and again, she was taken back to where she was
picked up and sternly warned that they would surely kill her if she told anyone about
the rapes. The noticeable kiss marks on her mark led her to admitting to her employer
that she was raped. She was then brought to the police station and crime laboratory
where the findings yielded condition compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought
pandesal and there Sabadlad was arrested.
RTC convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape and CA sustained his
conviction.
Sabadlab indicates in his supplemental brief9 that AAAs version was ambiguous and
implausible, and conflicted with human experience as borne by the following, namely:
(a) the State did not present any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were shown to
prove that AAA had resisted the sexual intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and
(d) AAA did not escape despite several opportunities to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent
testimony of the witness
RULING:
The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the
matter of who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling,
because her confusion did not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and
rendered naked. Nor did the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the
crime charged, it being without dispute that the tearing of the victims apparel was not
necessary in the commission of the crime charged. In fact, she did not even state that
her clothes had been torn when Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details
and matters that did not detract from the commission of the crime did not diminish her
credibility.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses and of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the
first-hand impressions he derives while the witnesses testify before him. The demeanor
on the witness chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial proceedings is a
significant element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the line between fact
and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry
tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest blushes or guilty blanches - all
these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in their teeth. As the final
appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm to accord the
utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached
by the trial judge on account of his unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses
and on account of his personal access to the various indicia available but not reflected
in the record.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIUS TAGUILID y BACOLOD
PROMULGATION
April 11, 2012
DATE
DOCTRINE: The Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given
situation involving a startling occurrence. Indeed, the workings of the human mind
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some
may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if
there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion.
FACTS:
Taguilid suddenly entered AAAs room while she was resting; that upon entering her
room, he pushed her down on her back, then inserted his finger in her vagina and later
on inserted his penis in her vagina; that she cried and pushed him away, but to no avail;
that he next turned her over and penetrated her anus with his penis while in that
position; and that she did not shout for help because he threatened to kill her if she did.
At the time of the rape, AAA was 12 years and ten months old, having been born on
July 28, 1989.
AAAs father, was at the time tending to the family store at the ground floor when he
decided to go up to the third floor to look for and talk to AAA; that upon reaching her
room, he found Taguilid standing by her bed in the act of raising the zipper of his pants,
and AAA was on her bed, crying and uttering inaudible words; that BBB saw that her
skirt was raised up to her waist, and her panties, though still on her, were disheveled
(wala sa ayos); and that it seemed to BBB that his sudden appearance in the room had
taken Taguilid by surprise, causing the latter to hurriedly leave the room even before
BBB could say anything to him.
BBB later on brought his daughter to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in
Quezon City for a medico-legal examination before reporting the matter to the
barangay office. He lodged a complaint for rape with the police authorities in order to
seek their assistance in the arrest of Taguilid.
For his defense, Tanguilid said that he and AAA had an argument after she refused to
follow his instruction to wash the dishes; that he whipped her with two sticks of walis
tingting, but she retaliated by stabbing his shorts, causing his shorts to fall off; that it was
while he was pulling up his shorts and zipping them when BBB suddently appeared and
found him inside her room in that pose. Later on, he averred that the sexual congress
was consensual as there was absence of physical struggle or resistance on the part of
the private complainant. RTC found Tanguilid guilty of rape. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT
RULING:
Hymenal injury has never been an element of rape, for a female might still be raped
without such injury resulting. The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either
against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is
demented). Thus, although AAA testified on her sexual penetration by Taguilid, the fact
that her hymenal injury was not fresh but already deep-healed was not incompatible
with the evidence of rape by him.
AAAs failure to shout for help although she knew that her father was tending to the
family store just downstairs was not a factor to discredit her or to diminish the credibility
of her evidence on the rape. She explained her failure by stating that Taguilid had
threatened to harm her should she shout. The Court has recognized that different
people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. Indeed,
the workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and
people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be
shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the
intrusion.
There can be no question that the testimony of a child who has been a victim in rape is
normally given full weight and credence. Judicial experience has enabled the courts to
accept the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape was committed against her.22 The credibility of such a
rape victim is surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests
the possibility of her being actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused.
Truly, a rape victims testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross-examination and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points is entitled to full faith
and credit.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO
PROMULGATION
April 11, 2012
DATE
DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the

commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.
FACTS:
On July 2, 1999, Marita was only four. She had been playing at the rear of their
residence when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from home. By noontime,
because Marita had not turned up, Julia called her husband Manito to look for their
daughter but their search was in vain. The next day, following the clairvoyants
direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack. inside
the comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own
house. Her face was black and blue, and bloody. She had been tortured and strangled
till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum,
who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita. The
police thus arrested Villaflores. The two witnesses narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in
the morning of July 2, 1999, they saw Edmundo Villaflores, leading Marita by the hand.
Jovie related that about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he heard cries
of a child as he passed by the house of Batman. At about 7:00 oclock in the evening,
Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. He thought
that the child must have been in the sack because it appeared heavy. It was the sack
that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide because the State did not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable
doubt every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged.
RULING:
The Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of
the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. Circumstantial evidence indirectly proves
a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several
circumstances, which when "appreciated together and not piece by piece," were seen
as "strands which create a pattern when interwoven," and formed an unbroken chain
that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was
guilty of rape with homicide.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following. Firstly, Aldrin
Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at
around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999, leading the child through the alley going towards the
direction of his house about 6 houses away from the victims house. Secondly, Marita
went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on
the following day. Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July
2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from inside.
Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house
carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned
house where the childs lifeless body was later found. Fifthly, Manito, the father of
Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of his
daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body; Manito also
mentioned that a blue sack covered her body. Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed
between the abandoned house where Maritas body was found and Villaflores house,
because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house
without having to pass any other houses.35 This indicated Villaflores familiarity and
access to the abandoned house. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered
from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims neck and the
yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the
door of his house,36 and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet. Eighthly, the
medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation,
which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the
multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds.
Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood
from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested
positive for spermatozoa. And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already in the second
stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The
medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had
been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a
moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide. Anent the identification
of Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and Bautista attesting to Villaflores
as the person they had seen holding Marita by the hand going towards the
abandoned house before the victim went missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning
and crying of a child from within Villaflores house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the
yellow sack and the white rope found at the crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to
the crime.
CASE TITLE ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROMULGATION
April 11, 2012
DATE
DOCTRINE: A witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
The petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, and as a sales representative she was
authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming from different and to
collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of
Footluckers for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit
the receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of
sales was quite high, but later on dropped. The branch manager, Go summoned the
accounting clerk to verify, they discovered erasures on some collection receipts. He
then decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan who
testified that she found discrepancies on petitioners ledgers. She based her testimony
on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the
customers, which were presented as evidenced and marked as Exhibits B to YY. Go
learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had
already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers
records.
A complaint for estafa was filed against petitioner and she was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for such by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
Under Sec. 36 Rule 130, a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of
a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be
called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction
or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the
declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the
adverse partys witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the

truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to cross-examine her
adversarys witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require
that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath
or affirmation and the second is to cross-examine the witness.
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to

YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion because Guivencan has no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footluckers.
Moreoever, there is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private
documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the
four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner
provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
CASE TITLE ROGELIO S. REYES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PROMULGATION
April 18, 2012
DATE
DOCTRINE: The non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the rule on chain of custody
was held not to be fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground for it, and for as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized articles were
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
FACTS:
Because of the report of a lady confidential informant regarding the drug-dealing
activities of the petitioner, Alias Boy, a buy-bust team of ten members, including PO2
Erwin Payumo as designated poseur-buyer, was formed.
From the police station, the lady confidential informant called petitioner by phone and
they agreed to meet at M. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. Upon meeting the
informant and PO2 Payumo, who was the poseur-buyer, he instructed Payumo to follow
him to his house and told him to wait. Two other individuals, later identified as Conchita
Carlos and Jeonilo Flores, were also waiting for petitioner.
When the sale was concluded, PO2 Payumo placed a missed call to PO1 Miguelito Gil,
a member of the buy-bust team, thereby giving the pre-arranged signal showing that
the transaction was completed. PO2 Payumo then arrested petitioner after identifying
himself as an officer. The rest of the buy-bust team meanwhile came around and
recovered two sachets also containing white crystalline substance from the sofa where
Conchita and Jeonilo were sitting. The buy-bust team thus also arrested Conchita and
Jeonilo.
Back at the police station, PO2 Payumo placed on the plastic sachet that petitioner
had handed him the marking "RRS-1" and on the other sachet recovered from
petitioners right hand the marking "RRS-2."19 The seized items were thereafter turned
over to the Western Police District Crime Laboratory for examination by P/Insp. Judycel
Macapagal, who found the items positive for methampethamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
On the other hand, petitioner denied that there had been a buy-bust operation, and
claimed that he had been framed up.
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
findings of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
For the offenses charged, it is crucial that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the
seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from
the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as
evidence in court.
This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged
only when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken.
"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer or custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting

lawmen of the rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous drugs
were inventoried and photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence of
petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official, was not shown.
The non-compliance by the buy-bust team with this rule was held not to be fatal for as
long as there was justifiable ground for it, and for as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized articles were properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. However, the omissions noted herein indicated that the
State did not establish the identity of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner with the same exacting certitude required for a finding of guilt. Although PO2
Payumo declared that he was the one who had received and marked the sachet of
shabu ("RRS-1" and RRS-2) from petitioner nothing more to support the fact that the
evidence thus seized had remained intact was adduced. In fact, the State did not
anymore establish to whom the seized articles had been endorsed after PO2 Payumo
had placed the markings at the station, and with whose custody or safekeeping the
seized articles had remained until their endorsement to P/Insp. Macapagal for the
laboratory examination. Also, the Prosecution did not show to whom the seized articles
had been turned over following the conduct of the laboratory examination, and how
the seized articles had been kept in a manner that preserved their integrity until their
final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Such lapses of the
Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they demonstrated that the chain of
custody did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the integrity and identity of the
dangerous drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes charged.
CASE TITLE PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. FELIX PARAS AND INLAND
TRAILWAYS, INC., AND CA
PROMULGATION
April 25, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure Law
DOCTRINE: Allowing the recovery of damages based on quasi-delict, despite the

complaint being upon contractual breach, served the judicial policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits and circuity of actions by disposing of the entire subject matter in a
single litigation.
FACTS:
Paras, on his way home to Manila from Bicol Region, boarded a bus owned and
operated by and driven by its driver Calvin Coner. While the said bus was travelling
along Maharlika Highway, Tiaong, Quezon, it was bumped at the rear by another bus
owned and operated by Philtranco. As a result of the strong and violent impact, the
Inland bus was pushed forward and smashed into a cargo truck parked along the outer
right portion of the highway and the shoulder thereof. Consequently, the said accident
bought considerable damage to the vehicles involved and caused physical injuries to
the passengers and crew of the two buses, including the death of Coner who was the
driver of the Inland Bus at the time of the incident.
Paras, due to the accident, underwent two (2) operations affecting the fractured
portions of his body. Unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland for the
costs of his operations, hospitalization, doctors fees and other miscellaneous expenses,
Paras filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against
Inland.
Inland denied responsibility, by alleging, among others, that its driver Coner had
observed an utmost and extraordinary care and diligence to ensure the safety of its
passengers and that based on the Police Investigation Report, it was established that
the Philtranco bus driver, Apolinar Miralles, was the one which violently bumped the
rear portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and proximate cause of Paras
injuries. Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco.
RTC ruled against Philtranco and awarded among others, moral damages to Paras. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in awarding moral damages to Paras despite the fact
that the complaint had been anchored on breach of contract of carriage.
RULING:
Paras can recover moral damages in this suit based on quasi-delict.
As a general rule, indeed, moral damages are not recoverable in an action predicated
on a breach of contract. This is because such action is not included in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code as one of the actions in which moral damages may be recovered. By
way of exception, moral damages are recoverable in an action predicated on a
breach of contract: (a) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, (3),7 of the Civil Code; and (b) where
the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.
Although this action does not fall under either of the exceptions, the award of moral
damages to Paras was nonetheless proper and valid. There is no question that Inland
filed its third-party complaint against Philtranco and its driver in order to establish in this
action that they, instead of Inland, should be directly liable to Paras for the physical
injuries he had sustained because of their negligence. This was in accord with Section
12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then applicable, viz:
Section 12. Third-party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending

party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponents claim.
It does not compel the defendant to bring the third-parties into the litigation, rather it
simply permits the inclusion of anyone who meets the standard set forth in the rule. The
impleader of new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to relief exists under
the applicable substantive law. Here, the substantive law on which the right of Inland to
seek such other relief through its third-party complaint rested were Article 2176 and
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Paras cause of action against Inland (breach of contract of carriage) did not need to
be the same as the cause of action of Inland against Philtranco and its driver (tort or
quasi-delict) in the impleader. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may
join as third-party defendants those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiffs
claim against him, or even directly to the plaintiff.
Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant
either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of direct liability to
the plaintiff-; or, (c) both (a) and (b). The situation in (a) is covered by the phrase "for
contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c) are subsumed under the
catch all "or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim."
Allowing the recovery of damages by Paras based on quasi-delict, despite his

complaint being upon contractual breach, served the judicial policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits and circuity of actions by disposing of the entire subject matter in a
single litigation.
CASE TITLE MARCOS PRIETO vs. CA, FEBTC
PROMULGATION
JUNE 18, 2012
DATE
DIGEST BY LEGADO, Jefferson
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure Appeal vis-a-vis application of Liberality Rule
DOCTRINE: On the plea for application for the liberality rule, it must be stressed that
there are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the
period for perfecting an appeal. Doctrinally entrenched is that the right of appeal is a
statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or
rules. Consequently, failing to perfect an appeal within the time and manner specified
by law, deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less
entertain the appeal. Timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even
the Supreme Court can trifle with.
FACTS:
On October 27, 1997, the Spouses Marcos V. Prieto (Marcos) and Susan M. Prieto filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bauang, La Union a complaint against Far East Bank
and Trust Company (FEBTC) and the Spouses Antonio Prieto (Antonio) and Monette
Prieto to declare the nullity of several real estate mortgage contracts.
The plaintiffs narrated that in January 1996, they had executed a special power of
attorney (SPA) to authorize Antonio to borrow money from FEBTC, using as collateral
their real property consisting of a parcel of land located in Calumbaya, Bauang, La
Union (the property) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 of the
Registry of Deeds of La Union; that defendant spouses, using the property as collateral,
had thereafter obtained from FEBTC a series of loans totaling P5,000,000.00, evidenced
by promissory notes, and secured by separate real estate mortgage contracts; that
defendant spouses had failed to pay the loans, leading FEBTC to initiate the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages; that the foreclosure sale had been scheduled on
October 31, 1997; and that the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage
contracts were in the name of defendant spouses for themselves alone, who had
incurred the obligations, rendering the promissory notes and the mortgage contracts
null and void ab initio.
On July 31, 2001 the RTC rendered its decision dismissing the complaint.
Marcos received the decision on August 28, 2001, and filed a motion for
reconsideration on September 12, 2001, the last day for him to do so under the Rules of
Court. On November 19, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Marcos
received the denial of the motion on November 21, 2001, but he filed his notice of
appeal only on November 26, 2001.
On December 11, 2001, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having
been filed four days beyond the reglementary period for perfecting the appeal.
Marcos sought the reconsideration of the denial of due course to the notice of appeal,
but the RTC still denied his motion, reiterating that the failure to perfect an appeal
rendered the decision final and executory.
On April 16, 2002, Marcos filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA),
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC in disallowing his notice of appeal. He
argued that his notice of appeal had been filed only two days late, and that the delay
should be treated only as excusable negligence because at that time, he had been
deprived of clear thinking due to the pain and disappointment he and his wife had
suffered over the failure of the recent medical procedures they had undergone.
On April 24, 2002, the CA Ninth Division held that Marcos had failed to perfect his
appeal on time.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion, Marcos filed a 65 petition.
ISSUE:
Is there a perfected appeal. May the liberality rule apply?
RULING:
SC cannot sustain the contention of petitioner. He himself conceded that his filing of the
notice of appeal had been tardy by two days. Thereby, he was aware that he had lost
his right to appeal the RTCs decision. As such, the petition for certiorari he thereafter
filed in the CA was designed to substitute his loss of the right to appeal.
Admittedly, petitioner received the Decision in Civil Case No. 1114-BG dated July 31,
2001 on August 28, 2001 and filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day, or on
September 12, 2001. Petitioner received the denial of his motion for reconsideration on
November 21, 2001, thereby leaving him with only one (1) day to perfect an appeal.
Unfortunately, the notice of appeal was submitted only on November 26, 2001, or four
(4) days beyond the reglementary period.
To justify the late filing of his appeal, petitioner ratiocinated that on November 22, 2001,
the last day of appeal, he brought his wife to Manila for an embryo transfer and
returned to San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 25, 2001. Other than the bare
allegations of the petitioner, however, the pretended excusable neglect remained
unsupported and uncorroborated. Worthy of note still is that the notice of appeal
submitted mentioned nothing about the embryo transplant. Worse, the notice of
appeal misleadingly averred that petitioner is giving notice of his intention to appeal to
this Court "from the judgment entered therein by this Court on 19th November 2001,
which was received by plaintiffs on 21st day of November 2001," thereby making it
appear that the notice of appeal was indeed filed on time, stating that what he
received on November 21, 2001 was the Decision dated July 31, 2001, not the denial of
the reconsideration.
On the plea for application for the liberality rule, it must be stressed that there are
certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the period for
perfecting an appeal. Doctrinally entrenched is that the right of appeal is a statutory
right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The
Rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the
failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just
as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his or her
case.
CASE TITLE GOLD LINE TOURS INC. vs HEIRS OF MARIA CONCEPCION LACSA
PROMULGATION
JUNE 18, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Special Civil Action Rule 65
DOCTRINE: A petition for the writ of certiorari neither deals with errors of judgment nor
extends to a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties evidence or in the
evaluation of their relative weight. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility.
FACTS:
This is a piercing case. Basically RTC pierced the corporate fiction of Gold Line Travels
and Travel &Tours advisers Inc. and made them liable to pay the Heirs of Maria
Concepcion Lacsa. CA affirmed.
On August 2, 1993, Ma. Concepcion Lacsa and her sister, Miriam Lacsa, boarded a
Goldline passenger bus with Plate No. NXM-105 owned and operated by Travel &Tours
Advisers, Inc. They were enroute from Sorsogon to Cubao, Quezon City. Upon reaching
the highway at Barangay San Agustin in Pili, Camarines Sur, the Goldline bus, driven by
Rene Abania (Abania), collided with a passenger jeepney with Plate No. EAV-313
coming from the opposite direction and driven by Alejandro Belbis.8 As a result, a metal
part of the jeepney was detached and struck Concepcion in the chest, causing her
instant death.
On August 23, 1993, Concepcions heirs, represented by Teodoro Lacsa, instituted in the
RTC a suit against Travel & Tours Advisers Inc. and Abania to recover damages arising
from breach of contract of carriage.
The RTC found that a contract of carriage had been forged between Travel & Tours
Advisers, Inc. and Concepcion as soon as she had boarded the Goldline bus as a
paying passenger; RTC found Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc that it had been at fault or
had been negligent in the performance of its obligations towards the passenger.
On May 10, 2000, the sheriff implementing the writ of execution rendered a Sheriffs
Partial Return,33 certifying that the writ of execution had been personally served and a
copy of it had been duly tendered to Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. or William Cheng,
through his secretary, Grace Miranda, and that Cheng had failed to settle the
judgment amount despite promising to do so. Accordingly, a tourist bus bearing Plate
No. NWW-883 was levied pursuant to the writ of execution.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner submitted a so-called verified third party claim,37 claiming
that the tourist bus bearing Plate No. NWW-883 be returned to petitioner because it was
the owner; that petitioner had not been made a party to Civil Case No. 93-5917; and
that petitioner was a corporation entirely different from Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc., the
defendant in Civil Case No. 93-5917.
RTC ruled that the levy was proper. The CA affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the SC under rule 65 assailing that the CA is wrong for not finding the RTC
gravely abused its discretion.
ISSUE:
Did the CA rightly find and conclude that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying petitioners verified third-party claim?
RULING:
SC found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion and that the levy
was proper and the trial courts finding that the two companies are actually one and
the same, hence the levy of the bus in question was proper.
A petition for the writ of certiorari neither deals with errors of judgment nor extends to a
mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties evidence or in the evaluation of
their relative weight. It is timely to remind that the petitioner in a special civil action for
certiorari commenced against a trial court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings
bears the burden to demonstrate not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent trial
court in issuing the impugned order. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. Yet, here,
petitioner did not discharge its burden because it failed to demonstrate that the CA
erred in holding that the RTC had not committed grave abuse of discretion. A review of
the records shows, indeed, that the RTC correctly rejected petitioners third-party claim.
Hence, the rejection did not come within the domain of the writ of certioraris limiting
requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction.
CASE TITLE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERONICA ATEGA NABLE
PROMULGATION
JUNE 27, 2012
DATE
DOCTRINE: Factual findings and conclusions of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are
conclusive on the Court. We step in to review the factual findings of the CA only when
we have a compelling reason to do so.
FACTS:
Veronica Atega Nable (Nable) was the sole owner of a landholding consisting of three
contiguous agricultural lots situated in Barangay Taligaman, Butuan City and covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-5 whose total area aggregated to 129.4615
hectares. In 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired a
portion of the landholding with an area of 127.3365 hectares pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, or CARL). LBP valued the
affected landholding at only P 5,125,036.05, but Nable rejected the valuation.
Nable instituted against DAR and LBP a petition for the judicial determination of just
compensation in the RTC in Butuan City, praying that the affected landholding and its
improvements be valued at P 350,000.00/hectare, for an aggregate valuation
of P 44,567,775.00.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to refer the determination of just compensation to a
board of commissioners,8who ultimately submitted a written report to the RTC on June
27, 2003 recommending P 57,660,058.00 as the just compensation for Nable.
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment. The total amount
of P26,523,180.00 for the land and improvements and the 6% interest based on the total
amount as Just Compensation to be reckoned at the time of taking that is January
1993. Land Bank appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC with modification
that Respondent pay the remaining balance of P31,034,819.00 plus twelve (12%)
percent per annum as interest (computed from the above remaining balance and
from 1993 until full payment thereof).
ISSUE:
W/N the decision of the RTC and CA were inaccurate thus the computation must not
be sustained.
RULING:
The SC sustain the computation. factual findings and conclusions of the RTC, when
affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the Court. We step in to review the factual
findings of the CA only when we have a compelling reason to do so, such as any of the
following:
1. When the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are contradictory;
2. When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
3. When the inference made by the CA is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
4. When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
5. When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
6. When the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
7. When the CA fails to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion;
8. When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and,
10. When the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence, but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Considering that LBP has not shown and established the attendance of any of the
foregoing compelling reasons to justify a review of the findings of fact of the CA, we do
not disturb the findings of fact of the CA and the RTC.
CASE TITLE SPS. MENDIOLA vs. CA
PROMULGATION
July 18, 2012
DATE
DIGEST BY LUBAY, ANGELA
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE
FACTS:
Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of petroleum products
Pacific, owned Ramon. To secure Pacifics performance, petitioners a real estate
mortgage in favor of Shell. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure
schedule, petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and
time but did not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the sheriff
supposed to conduct the auction despite their being present in Paranaque City Hall.
They later learned that the auction had been held in Makati, and that their mortgaged
realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty.
After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a
deficiency representing the foreclosure expenses equivalent of 25% of the amount
claimed plus interest remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued
in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. In his answer with counterclaim, Ramon
asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in
fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action were made in bad
faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights. Thereafter,
petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure
As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for
dismissal, stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that the Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due
to the pendency of the Manila case; (b) that the complaint stated no cause of action,
the Makati case having been filed more than a year after the registration of the
certificate of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the same subject
matter was pending; (d) that the venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati
case was already barred by petitioners failure to raise its cause of action as a
compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case.
After the Makati RTC denied both motions, Shell filed its answer ad cautelam,
whereby it denied petitioners allegation that no auction had been held; insisted that
there had been proper accounting of the deliveries made to Pacific and its clients; and
averred that petitioners failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case
already barred the action. RTC ruled in favor of sps. Mendiola.
Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision, maintaining that the issues
raised on the validity of the foreclosure sale and on the amount of the outstanding
obligation of Pacific had been settled in the Manila case; and that the Makati RTC
became bereft of jurisdiction to render judgment on the same issues pursuant to the
principle of res judicata. But the same was denied by the RTC.
Thereafter, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal with the CA. Instead of
filing their appellees brief, petitioners submitted a motion to dismiss appeal, mainly
positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prohibited an appeal of the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA thereafter denied their appeal. Hence,
petitioners brought these special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition,
insisting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying their motion to dismiss appeal and their motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1.) WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the appeal of
Shell and Tabangao in contravention of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
which proscribes an appeal of the denial of a motion for reconsideration.
2.) WON the case is barred by res judicata and waiver
RULING:
1.) The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lacks merit.
It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly limited an appeal to a judgment or final order, and proscribed the taking of
an appeal from an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration

independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for
reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment
or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a)
the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an
interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue
inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The
appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and
assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a

complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to
the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and
nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Not being an
interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is
an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be
an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after
the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under
the Rules.
2.) The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground
of litis pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should
have been dismissed on the ground of being barred by res judicata.
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily

connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction
to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original
action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of
the amount.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the
following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation
between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim.
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The
Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment
of petitioners credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell.
Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity
of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to
be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier
shown, Ramons cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure was a
true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case.
True, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present
causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. It
has been held that a party cannot by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties and their
privies.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. ARCILLAS
PROMULGATION
July 30, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: The information must jointly allege these qualifying circumstances to afford
the accused his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
mandate that the qualifying circumstance should be alleged in the information.
FACTS:
AAA, allegedly Arcillas step-daughter, brought a complaint for qualified rape against
him. After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate
ultimately filed an information charging him with qualified rape in the RTC, averring:
That on or about May 12, 2000 at more or less 11:00 oclock in the evening thereof, at
Brgy. Magsaysay, Municipality of Uson, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the step-
father of AAA, with deliberate intent, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his own step-daughter, AAA, a 13-year-old girl, against her will.
RTC convicted Arcillas for the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE and sentenced him to suffer
death penalty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the finding of guilt against Arcillas but
downgraded the crime to simple rape on the ground that the information did not
allege that he was her mothers common-law husband, instead of the victims step-
father, the qualifying circumstance the information alleged.
CA RULING: It must be noted that the Information alleged that accused-appellant was
the step-father of the rape victim. The evidence shows, however, that he was merely
the common-law husband or live-in partner of the latters mother. In order that the
accused may be convicted of qualified rape, the circumstances of relationship and
minority must be jointly alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Thus, the
accused can only be convicted of simple rape where the information alleges that the
accused is the step-father of the victim but the evidence shows that he is merely the
common-law husband of the natural mother of the victim.
In People vs. Escultor, the Supreme Court held:

Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the correct penalty for the two counts of rape
committed by appellant because the information failed to correctly state appellants
relationship with Jenelyn. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically
allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of the
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender. The information must jointly
allege these qualifying circumstances to afford the accused his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly mandate that the qualifying
circumstance should be alleged in the information.
Although the prosecution proved that appellant was the common-law spouse of
(AAAs) mother, what appears in the informations is that the victim is the stepdaughter
of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of ones spouse by a previous marriage.
For appellant to be the stepfather of (AAA), he must be legally married to (AAAs)
mother. However, appellant and the victims mother were not legally married but
merely lived in common-law relation. The two informations failed to allege specifically
that appellant was the common-law spouse of the victims mother. Instead, the two
informations erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the
stepfather of the victim. Hence, appellant is liable only for two counts of simple
statutory rape punishable with reclusion perpetua for each count.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in downgrading the crime.
RULING:
NO. Rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the victims parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the victims parent. However, an
accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information alleges the
circumstances of the victims over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her
relationship with him. The reason is that such circumstances alter the nature of the crime
of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are special qualifying circumstances. As
such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be
specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during the
trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
The minority of AAA was sufficiently alleged in the information that stated that she was
"a 13-year-old girl." The Prosecution established that her age when the rape committed
by presenting her birth certificate. As to her relationship with Arcillas, the information
averred that he was "then the step-father of AAA." It turned out, however, that he was
not her stepfather, being only the common-law husband of BBB. The RTC itself found
that he and BBB were only "live-in partners." In addition, AAAs birth certificate disclosed
that her father was CCC, who had been married to BBB, who was widowed upon the
death of CCC in 1996. No evidence was adduced to establish that BBB and Arcilla
legally married after CCCs death.
Arcillas being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the
rape, even if established during the trial, could not be appreciated because the
information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he
would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.
SC AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF CA.
CASE TITLE UP vs. DIZON
PROMULGATION
August 3, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration
FACTS:
University of the Philippines entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the
campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However,
the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the COA.
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders.
Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the
motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP
but the OLS in Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied
due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4,
2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became
final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution
despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of
execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for
execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of
execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment
to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds. Aggrieved,
UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of time
RULING:
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of
P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality
of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC
declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the
highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not
been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction
of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any
party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea
for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the
declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs
right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the
counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is
settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such
counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13. Secondly,
even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that
the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it
would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and
immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002.
In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC
applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the
running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might
not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period
rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application of the fresh-period
rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to
any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when
Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal
was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of
15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end
on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day,
or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule
22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls
on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day."
Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
CASE TITLE MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER
PROMULGATION
August 29, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE: if the record was not kept in the Philippines a certificate of the person
having custody must accompany the copy of the document that was duly attested
stating that such person had custody of the documents, the deviation was not enough
reason to reject the utility of the documents for the purposes they were intended to
serve.
FACTS:
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper (Harper) came to Manila on a
business trip. He checked in at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at Room
1428. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date,
however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors.
Thus, the heirs of Christian Harper sued the hotel for damages. Col. Rodrigo de Guzman,
the hotels Security Manager, testified that the management practice prior to the
murder of Harper had been to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three
or four floors of the building; that such ratio had not been enough considering the L-
shape configuration of the hotel that rendered the hallways not visible from one or the
other end; and that he had recommended to management to post a guard for each
floor, but his recommendation had been disapproved because the hotel "was not
doing well" at that particular time.
And to prove heirship of the plaintiffs-appellees, they presented several documents

which were all kept in Norway. The documents had been authenticated by the Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also bore the official seal of the Ministry and
signature of one, Tanja Sorlie. The documents were also accompanied by an
Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm,
Sweden to the effect that, Tanja Sorlie was duly authorized to legalize official
documents for the Ministry.
The RTC ruled in favor of Christian Harpers heirs and found the hotel negligent. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs substantially complied with the rules on the authentication and
proof of documents set by Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
The requirements for authentication of documents establishing respondents legal

relationship with the victim as his heirs were complied with.
Although Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and Exhibit R-1 were not attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record or by his deputy in the manner required in
Section 25 of Rule 132, and said documents did not comply with the requirement under
Section 24 of Rule 132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines a
certificate of the person having custody must accompany the copy of the document
that was duly attested stating that such person had custody of the documents, the
deviation was not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for the purposes
they were intended to serve. The official participation in the authentication process of
Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the attachment of the
official seal of that office on each authentication indicated that Exhibit Q, Exhibit R,
Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were documents of a public nature in Norway, not merely
private documents.
That rules of procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not forbid a
showing of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances, because substantial
compliance does not equate to a disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial
compliance and strict adherence are not always incompatible and do not always
clash in discord.
CASE TITLE BANEZ vs. CONCEPCION
PROMULGATION
August 29, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE: An order denying a motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be

the basis of a petition for certiorari. An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of
a certiorari challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings in which it is
issued. To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not only delays the
administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts.
FACTS:
Leodegario B. Ramos (Ramos), one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 722-M-
2002, discovered that a parcel of land, which was a portion of a bigger tract of land in
Bulacan that he had adjudicated solely to himself upon his mothers death had been
earlier transferred by his mother to one Ricardo Asuncion, who had, in turn, sold it to the
late Rodrigo Gomez.
Ramos alleging that Gomez had induced him to sell the 1,233 square meters to
Gomez on the understanding that Gomez would settle Ramos obligation to three other
persons, commenced in the RTC in Valenzuela an action against Gomez seeking the
rescission of their contract of sale and the payment of damages
Before the Valenzuela RTC could decide, Ramos and Gomez entered into a
compromise agreement.7 The RTC approved their compromise agreement. The
petitioner, being then the counsel of Ramos, assisted Ramos in entering into the
compromise agreement "to finally terminate this case." Ramos failed to fulfill his part.
Gomez died and was survived by his wife and children. The estate of Gomez sued
Ramos for specific performance. Again, Ramos entered into a compromise with the
estate of Gomez and then again he failed to fulfill his obligations. Accordingly, Estate of
Gomez brought a complaint for specific performance against Ramos and the
petitioner in the RTC in Valenzuela to recover the 1,233 square meter lot. Valenzuela
RTC dismissed the complaint on April 1, 1996 upon the motion of Ramos and the
petitioner on the ground of improper venue because the objective was to recover the
ownership and possession of realty situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and because the
proper recourse was to enforce the judgment by compromise Agreement rendered on
October 9, 1990 through a motion for execution. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
On September 20, 2002, the Estate of Gomez commenced Civil Case No. 722-M-
2002 in the Valenzuela RTC, ostensibly to revive the judgment by compromise rendered
on October 9, 1990. The petitioner was impleaded as a party-defendant because of his
having guaranteed the performance by Ramos of his obligation and for having actively
participated in the transaction.
The petitioner moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 722-M-2002, alleging that
the action was already barred by res judicata and by prescription; that he was not a
real party-in-interest; and that the amount he had guaranteed with his personal check
had already been paid by Ramos with his own money. RTC granted the petitioners
motion to dismiss, finding that the right of action had already prescribed due to more
than 12 years having elapsed from the approval. Hence, this special civil action
for certiorari commenced. The petitioner insists that:
xxx the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of, or in
excess of jurisdiction, when, after having correctly ordered the dismissal of the case
below, on the ground of prescription under Art. 1144, par. 3, of the Civil Code, it
reconsidered and set aside the same, on the factually baseless and legally untenable
Motion for Reconsideration of Private Respondent, insisting, with grave abuse of
discretion, if not bordering on ignorance of law, and too afraid to face reality, that it is
Art. 1155 of the same code, as invoked by Private Respondents, that applies, and
required herein petitioner to file his answer, despite petitioners first Motion for
Reconsideration, which it treated as a mere scrap of paper, yet, at the same [sic] again
it insisted that Article 1155 of the Civil Code should apply, and, thereafter when, with
like, if not greater grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in excess of
jurisdiction, it again denied petitioners Second Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit, and giving petitioner a non-extendible period of ten 10 days from notice, to file his
answer.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court gravely abuse his discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he dismissed the case despite the action not being barred by
prescription.
RULING:
We dismiss the petition for certiorari.
An order denying a motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of
a petition for certiorari. An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of
a certiorari challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings in which it is
issued. To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not only delays the
administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts.
But a petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued
without jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is because as to such order there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The petitioner has not demonstrated how the assailed orders could have been issued
without jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nor has he convinced us that he had no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In fact and in law,
he has, like filing his answer and going to pre-trial and trial. In the end, should he still
have the need to seek the review of the decision of the RTC, he could also even
appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. That, in reality, was his proper remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Yet another reason to dismiss the petition for certiorari exists. Although the Court, the CA
and the RTC have concurrence of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner
had no unrestrained freedom to choose which among the several courts his petition for
certiorari might be filed in. In other words, he must observe the hierarchy of courts, the
policy in relation to which has been explicitly defined in Section 4 of Rule 65 concerning
the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Accordingly, his direct filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court instead of in the CA
should be disallowed considering that he did not present in the petition any special and
compelling reasons to support his choice of this Court as the forum.
Still, even granting that the petition for certiorari might be directly filed in this Court, its
dismissal must also follow because its consideration and resolution would unavoidably
demand the consideration and evaluation of evidentiary matters. The Court is not a
trier of facts, and cannot accept the petition for certiorari for that reason.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. BELOCURA
PROMULGATION
August 29, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FACTS:
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823
grams of marijuana in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003 by the
RTC in Manila.
After Belocura pleaded not guilty, the State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp.
Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief Insp. Ferdinand Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P.
Rojas. On the other hand, the Defense presented Belocura as its sole witness.
Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the Western Police District
(WPD) he received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself for fear of
reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be staged along Lopez Street,
Tondo, Manila.
Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, Divina spotted
an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas
Street and told the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted
white. The driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for
Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped off towards
Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocuras jeep until they blocked its path with their
Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop. Divina and the rest of the team
approached the jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp.
Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated Belocuras
Berreta 9 mm. pistol when he could not produce the appropriate documents for the
pistol and the government plate. They arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the
drivers seat. Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag,
which turned out to be two bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, that SPO1 Rojas
examined the contents of the bag in his presence. SPO1 Rojas conceded that he was
not present when the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana was seized,
and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time only at the police station.
Belocura denied the charge that he was on his way to work on board his owner-type
jeep when about thirty police officers blocked his path. He introduced himself to them
as a police officer, but they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed and handcuffed him,
and confiscated the memorandum receipt covering his firearm, his money and his
police ID card. They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD
headquarters. They informed him of the drug-related charge to be filed against him
only three days later. He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks
of marijuana to be found under the drivers seat of his jeep on account of the
clearance from the flooring being only about three inches. Belocura said that his arrest
was effected possibly because he had incurred the ire of a superior.
That his owner-type jeep had been assembled in 1995, and that he had attached the
plate number assigned to his old vehicle pending the registration of the jeep despite
knowing that doing so was a violation of law; and that the incident involving the arrest
of the nephew of Captain Sukila was the only reason he could think of why charges
were filed against him.
ISSUE:
1. Won the trial court erred in convicting Belocura on the inconsistent and contradictory
statements of the prosecution witness. - YES
2. Won the court erred in admitting in evidence the marijuana despite the illegality of its
seizures due to the absence of a valid search warrant.
RULING:
1. The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of

the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were
insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was
personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks
from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering
that the Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of
his own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own perception.
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of
the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the
RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos as a
witness against Belocura.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocuras
vehicle beyond the viewing distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the
Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably established the recovery from
Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as "SHIN TON
YON." Without PO2 Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas declaration of seeing PO2
Santos recover the red plastic bag from under the drivers seat of Belocuras jeep was
worthless. The explanation why none of the other police officers could credibly attest to
Belocuras possession of the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time supposedly
performing different tasks during the operation. Under the circumstances, only PO2
Santos was competent to prove Belocuras possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that
constituted the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any
search being actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs
were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must
account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and
confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight
of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the
issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in
issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an
actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the
reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence
are important.
2. No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of personal security and privacy
and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than the
Constitution.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal

security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of
the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article
III of the Constitution
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search
and seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search
and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the
circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a
private person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; (b) seizure of
evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless
search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent
and emergency circumstances. In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a
search warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of
the incriminating bricks ofmarijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under
the Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal
use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no probable
cause to search his vehicle for anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught
in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an
eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability,
because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption." Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the
presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which
Belocura was apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby
became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and effects for
weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from
him and the area within his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or
other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting
policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon.
Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his
acquittal.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO LUPAC
PROMULGATION
September 19, 2012
DATE
DIGEST BY Manaig, Jomel
TOPIC COVERED Evidence Rule 130, Section 42
DOCTRINE: The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
FACTS:
The victim, AAA, is the minor child of BBB. The accused, Lucas, is the brother of BBB. On
May 21, 1999, BBB left AAA in the house with Lupac to sell peanuts. AAA told Lucas that
she would sleep in the bedroom. When AAA woke up, she found herself naked from the
waist down and Lucas was standing beside her wearing only his underwear. Lucas said
that he really did not intend to do that to her.
Seeing a chance to escape, AAA rushed out of the house and ran to a neighbour, Tita
Terry. AAA revealed to Tita Terry what Lucas had done to her, saying: Inano ako ni
Kuya Ega. She also uttered the word hindot.
Lucas was charged and convicted of the crime of statutory rape. He assailed, among
others, the admissibility of the denunciation of the rape by AAA to Tita Terry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denunciation of the rape by AAA to Tita Terry may be used as
evidence to convict Lucas?
RULING:
Yes. The SC held that AAAs denunciation of Lupac as her rapist to Tita Terry and her
own mother with the use of the words hindot and inano ni Kuya Ega without any
appreciable length of time having intervened following her discovery of the rape was
part of res gestae under Rule 130, Section 42 of the Rules of Court.
For the application of this rule, three requisites must concur, namely:
1. That the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence;
2. The statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood; and
3. The statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
The aforementioned requisites were met in the instant case. AAA went to Tita Terrys
house immediately after fleeing from Lupac and spontaneously, unhesitatingly and
immediately declared to Tita Terry that Lupac had sexually abused her. AAAs use of
the words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega said enough about her being raped.
CASE TITLE DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
PROMULGATION
September 24, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure Rule 39, Section 47; Rule 47, Section 1
DOCTRINE: A decision rendered a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not

bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely
affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party.
Hence, such person cannot bring an action for the annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, except if he has been a successor in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in
rem the judgment in which is binding against him.
FACTS:
Petitioner corporation acquired a parcel of land from private respondent Goc-ong in
1994. It was later discovered that Goc-ong executed a joint affidavit in 1990 whereby
she mortgaged the same parcel of land to private respondent Ng to secure the
formers obligation to the latter. Upon Goc-ongs failure to pay her obligation to Ng, the
latter brought a complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The RTC rendered a judgment
declaring Ng as the owner of the parcel of land.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals an action for the annulment of the
RTC judgment. However, the CA dismissed the petition outright.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the RTC decision?
Whether or not the petitioner may file an action to annul the RTC judgment?
RULING:
In the first issue, the petitioner is not bound by the RTC decision.
The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or

proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. No man should be prejudiced by any proceeding to
which he was a stranger.
In the second issue, the petitioners resort to annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was
unnecessary since the RTC judgment did not prejudice it.
Section 1 of Rule 47 extends the remedy of annulment only to a party in whose favour
the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal and petition for relief from judgment
are no longer available through no fault of said party. As such, the petitioner, being a
non-party to the civil case brought by Ng to foreclose the parcel of land, could not
bring the action for annulment of judgment due to unavailability to it of the remedies of
new trial, reconsideration, appeal or setting the judgment aside through a petition for
relief.
Petitioners proper recourse was either an action for quieting of title or an action for
reconveyance of property.
CASE TITLE GSIS vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MARIA A. CANCINO-ERUM
CITATION A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182
PROMULGATION
September 25, 2012
DATE
DOCTRINE: The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive method of assigning
cases among several branches of a court in the same station is two-fold: one, to
equalize the distribution of the cases among the several branches, and thereby foster
the Courts policy of promoting speedy and efficient disposition of cases; and, two, to
ensure the impartial adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any suspicion regarding
assignment of cases to predetermined judges.
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System charged the respondent judge with violation
of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court or non-raffling of a case (Civil Case No. MC08-
3660) where GSIS was a party. An application for the issuance of a TRO was included in
the said civil case. According to GSIS, for the conduct of the raffle, a roulette bearing
the numbers 208, 212, 213 and 214 (representing the RTC branches involved in the
raffle) was brought inside the courtroom. However, Judge Erum announced that Civil
Case No. MC08-3660 was being assigned to Branch 213 because the other three (3)
branches had already been assigned an injunction case each, leaving only Branch 213
without an injunction case. She then explained that this was a long-standing practice in
the RTC of Mandaluyong City.
GSIS subsequently requested that Civil Case No. MC08-3660 be re-raffled but Judge
Erum denied the request on the ground that there was nothing irregular in the
assignment of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents violated the standing rules on the raffle of cases?
RULING:
No. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made the raffle the exclusive
method of assigning cases among several branches of a court in a judicial station.
However, despite not having strictly followed the procedure in assigning Civil Case No.
MC08-3660, the respondent could not be held to have violated the rule on exclusivity of
raffle.
The practice did not absolutely contravene the rule on exclusivity of the raffle in view of
Circular No. 7 issued by the Supreme Court on September 23, 1974 which expressly
excepts any incidental or interlocutory matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO
application) that might not wait for the regular raffle.
The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt action and immediate
attention, thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay.
CASE TITLE SPOUSES HUMBERTO P. DELOS SANTOS AND CARMENCITA M. DELOS
SANTOS vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
PROMULGATION
October 24, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Special Civil Action Rule 65, Section 1
DOCTRINE: The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
FACTS:
Petitioners took out several loans from respondent bank and constituted a mortgage
over their parcel of land to secure the performance of the obligation. Upon default by
the petitioners, the respondent sought to extrajudicially foreclose the real estate
mortgage.
The petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC for damages against the respondent.
They also applied for, and were granted, an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The respondent moved for reconsideration. No opposition from
the petitioners were filed nor did they attend the scheduled hearing on the motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration.
A reconsideration of the order was sought by the petitioners but was denied by the
RTC. Thus, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition. It further
held that the RTC did not excessively exercise its judicial authority and that the denial of
the petitioners motion for reconsideration was due to faults attributable to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari?
RULING:
No. The CA justly and properly dismissed the petition for the writ of certiorari.
In this jurisdiction, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely
regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a
superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer.
Pursuant to Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner must show that:
1. The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
2. There is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
Without the strong showing either of the RTCs lack or excess of jurisdiction, or of grave
abuse of discretion by the RTC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the writ of
certiorari would not issue for being bereft of legal and factual bases.
CASE TITLE DENNIS Q. MORTEL vs. SALVADOR E. KERR
PROMULGATION
November 12, 2012
DATE
DIGEST BY Parrone, Justine Bette
DOCTRINE: As a rule, a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and

mistake in handling a case. But the rule admits of exceptions. In several rulings, the
Court held the client not concluded by the negligence, incompetence or mistake of
the counsel. An exception to the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross that the client was deprived of
his day in court, thereby also depriving the client of his property without due process of
law.
FACTS:
On July 19, 2000, respondent Kerr instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage
against Dennis Q. Mortel, who duly filed an answer through Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. On
the fifth setting of the pre-trial, Mortel and Atty. Mas were not around when the case
was called and upon motion they were declared as in default. On December 28, 2000,
Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak filed a notice of appearance in behalf of Mortel, but the RTC
did not act on the notice of appearance. The RTC rendered a decision in favour of
Kerr.
Then, Mortel, through Atty. Lacambra, filed a motion for new trial. The RTC denied
Mortels motion for new trial. It held that considering that the records of the case
showed that Atty. Mas had received the decision on March 1, 2001, the motion for new
trial had been filed out of time on March 20, 2001. On May 4, 2001, Mortel, this time
through Atty. Tumulak, filed a verified petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the verified petition for relief from judgment on the
ground that the petition for relief had been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60
days.
On August 26, 2002, Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed in the CA a petition for review
on certiorari. The CA issued a resolution dismissing Mortels petition for review for failing
to state the specific material dates showing that the petition had been filed within the
reglementary period. It observed that Mortel thereby resorted to the wrong remedy
considering that he was assailing the propriety of the RTCs order declaring him in
default, against which the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari.
On October 14, 2002, Mortel sought the reconsideration of the denial of his petition for
review but the CA denied the same. Atty. Tumulak received the denial by the CA on
December 5, 2002. Instead of appealing via petition for review on certiorari in the SC,
Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed in the CA an urgent motion for extension of time to
appeal to the SC. On December 23, 2002, Mortel, by himself, sought an extension of
time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Mortel, still by himself, filed his petition for
review on certiorari assailing the CAs dismissal of his petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the negligence of Mortels counsels binds him
RULING:
As a rule, a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistake in
handling a case. But the rule admits of exceptions. In several rulings, the Court held the
client not concluded by the negligence, incompetence or mistake of the counsel.
We hold that the negligence of Mortels counsels was so gross and palpable as to
deprive him of his property without due process of law.
Mortel did not have his day in court, because he was unable to submit his evidence to
controvert the claim of Kerr. He explained that he was only late because he arrived in
court a few minutes after the case had been called. His explanation appears plausible,
considering that he had unfailingly appeared in court in the previous settings of the pre-
trial. The RTC could have allowed a second or a third call instead of immediately
granting his adverse partys motion to declare him as in default.
Nevertheless, the negligence that actually warrants the undoing of the RTCs decision
was serial on the part of Atty. Mas, the RTC and Atty. Tumulak. The primary negligence
occurred on the part of Atty. Mas when he did not appear at the pre-trial despite being
notified of it. Moreover, he did not offer any explanation for his non-appearance at the
pre-trial despite notice to him. His nonappearance despite notice and his subsequent
inaction for his clients cause manifested his indifference and lack of professionalism.
Atty. Tumulak shared the blame for the predicament of Mortel through his own series of
errors that mirrored an ignorance of the rules of procedure. Atty. Tumulaks first error was
in filing a motion for reconsideration vis--vis the RTCs denial of the petition for relief
from judgment without including a proper notice of hearing. He next filed a motion for
reconsideration vis--vis the RTCs denial of his first motion for reconsideration, which the
RTC then denied on the ground of its being already a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration. The series of errors did not end there, for Atty. Tumulak opted to file in
the CA a petition for review on certiorari instead of a petition for certiorari, which was
the appropriate remedy due to his alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC. The ultimate error was not any less serious, because Atty. Tumulak filed in the CA
instead of in this Court the motion for extension of time to appeal the CAs denial of
Mortels motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Tumulaks moves in behalf of Mortel, no matter how well intentioned, were
contrary to the pertinent rules of procedure and worked against the clients interest. The
negligence and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and
palpable that they denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable
asset. They thereby prevented him from presenting his side, which was potentially highly
unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being plausible and seemingly
meritorious.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMIN ZAKARIA y MAKASULA Y AND
JOANA ZAKARIA y SILUNGAN
PROMULGATION
November 26, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Chain of Custody
DOCTRINE: Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized
dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the
accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that
succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point.
FACTS:
A confidential informant went to the CALABARZON Regional Office of the PDEA and
informed Chief Supt. Abe Lemos that he had entered into a drug deal for 35 grams of
shabu worth P98,000.00 with alias Danny and alias Joana.
In the morning of January 7, 2005, the buy-bust team arrived at the target area at
around 1:45 p.m. The confidential informant then called Danny and told him that he
and the buyer were already in the vicinity. Once Danny got in the Revo, the
confidential informant introduced PO2 Aninias to Danny as the buyer of shabu. Danny
asked PO2 Aninias about the money. PO2 Aninias showed to Danny the white window
envelope containing the P500.00 bill and boodle money. After nearly 15 minutes, Danny
returned with a woman and introduced the woman as his wife Joana. Danny pulled
three sachets containing white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the
sachets to PO2 Aninias, who turned over the white window envelope to Joana. As
Danny was about to count the money in the envelope, PO2 Aninias drew and pointed
his gun at Danny and Joana. The rest of the team quickly arrested the two suspects.
PO2 Aninias immediately placed his initials on the three sachets received from Danny,
while PO3 Valdez recovered the boodle money from Joana. The team then brought
Danny and Joana to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Danny was identified as
Samin Zakaria y Makasulay and Joana as Joana Zakaria y Silungan. PO2 Aninias turned
over the seized sachets and their contents to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory,
where Forensic Chemist Sr. Insp. Donna Villa Huelgas conducted qualitative and
quantitative examinations on the contents. The examinations yielded positive results for
the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. A certificate of
inventory was issued by the PDEA Regional Office and was signed by Insp. Ablang, Bell
Desolo of Abante-Tonite, and Victor Penid, an official of Barangay Mapayapa.
On the other hand, Joana said that at about 12:00 noon on January 7, 2005, she left to
fetch her child and that on her return home with her child she immediately noticed that
at least eight men in civilian clothes were inside their house. She saw her husband, lying
face down on the floor and one of the men was stepping on her husbands head. On
the way to Camp Vicente Lim on board a white Revo, PO3 Valdez demanded
P100,000.00 in exchange for their release. Joana recalled that she and her husband
were detained for a while in a small room in Camp Vicente Lim before being shown by
PO2 Aninias plastic sachets containing shabu that had been supposedly recovered
from them. But she protested and argued that they were not selling shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has established the origin of the seized drugs and proved that
the chain of custody has been observed
RULING:
In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the presentation of the
seized dangerous drugs as evidence in court is indispensable. It is essential that the
identity of the dangerous drugs be established beyond doubt. What is more, the fact
that the dangerous drugs bought during the buy-bust operation are the same
dangerous drugs offered in court should be established. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking
upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the
evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting or contamination of evidence.
The records show that the buy-bust team did not observe the mandatory procedures
under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. Although PO2 Aninias supposedly marked the
confiscated shabu with his initials immediately upon seizure, he did not do so in the
presence of the accused or of their representatives and any representative from the
media and DOJ, or any elected public official. If he had, he would have readily stated
so in court. In fact, both PO2 Aninias and PO3 Valdez themselves revealed that no
media or DOJ representative, or elected public official was present during the buy-bust
operation and at the time of the recovery of the evidence at the target area. Instead,
the media were only around in the PDEA regional headquarters.
Another serious lapse committed was that the buy-bust team did not take any
photographs of the sachets of shabu upon their seizure. The photographs were
intended by the law as another means to confirm the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOUIE CATALAN Y DEDALA
PROMULGATION
November 28, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Chain of Custody
DOCTRINE: In cases of violation of Republic Act No. 9165, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal if the Prosecution does not establish that the links in the chain of custody from
the time of the seizure of the dangerous drugs until the time of their presentation as
evidence in court are unbroken. The arresting officer cannot thereby be presumed to
have regularly performed his duty.
FACTS:
On February 8, 2004, a civilian informant told PO1 Alvin Echipare that a certain Louie
was engaged in selling shabu in a billiard hall in Brgy. San Roque, San Pedro, Laguna. At
10:00 p.m. of the same day, PO1 Ignacio and PO1 Echipare proceeded to the said
billiard hall to conduct a buy-bust operation against Louie.
Seeing two persons having a suspected transaction in shabu, PO1 Ignacio alighted and
approached them, telling the person who appeared to be the seller that he was
buying shabu worth P100.00, simultaneously tendering the P100.00 buy-bust money to
the seller. The latter handed a plastic sachet to PO1 Ignacio. Upon receiving the plastic
sachet, PO1 Ignacio introduced himself as a police officer and moved to seize the
seller, but the latter was able to run away. PO1 Ignacio caught up with the suspect,
frisked him, and recovered from him another plastic sachet and the buy-bust money.
The team brought the suspect with them to the police station where he identified
himself as Louie Catalan.
At the police station, PO1 Ignacio turned the two plastic sachets and their contents
over to the investigator, who placed the marking BLCO 020804 on the sachet handed
to him by the accused in exchange for the P100.00. The confiscated articles were
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for forensic examination.
On the other hand, the accused alleged that he and his live-in partner were having
dinner in his house when three men barged into his house. They frisked him and
searched his house but did not find what they were looking for. Later on, the men put
handcuffs on him and brought him with them to their office, where PO1 Echipare told
the accused to come up with P40,000.00 in exchange for his release. After the accused
did not accede to the demand, the policemen took him to the San Pedro Police
Station for investigation. The RTC convicted the accused which was upheld by the
Court of Appeals.
The Appellant complains that PO1 Ignacio made contradictory statement in his
affidavit that he was the one who signed the plastic sachet while in court he testified
that it was Investigator Alzona who made the markings in his presence. Appellant insists
that the prosecution thus failed to prove the first link in the chain of custody because of
such contradictory statement as to who made the markings in the confiscated plastic
sachets of shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, RA 9165
RULING:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to a
judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity
of the evidence presented in court.
A review of the records exposes the abject failure of the buy-bust team to comply with
the statutory procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR on ensuring the
integrity of the chain of custody. First of all, PO1 Ignacio himself did not do the marking
despite being the arresting officer taking initial custody of the plastic sachet of shabu
the accused handed to him. Instead, he said that it was the investigator who marked
the plastic sachet of shabu, and that the investigator did so only after the accused had
been brought to the police station.
To us, that marking by the investigator, not by the arresting officer, was irregular,
because the investigator was not the person who had taken initial custody of the
plastic sachet of shabu right after the seizure. Moreover, PO1 Ignacio should also have
described the circumstances of how (including saying if the accused actually
witnessed the marking) and when the investigator had actually made the marking,
because such circumstances were precisely the details necessary to uphold the
integrity of the chain of custody.
The Prosecution did not present the investigator as its witness to directly validate his
marking of BLCO 020804 in court. The omission diminished the importance of the
marking as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. Lastly, the
buy-bust team did not conduct a physical inventory and did not take any photograph
of the seized shabu either at the place of seizure, or in the police station. This omission
was also fatal because the conduct of the physical inventory and the taking of a
photograph were also measures designed by the law to preserve the integrity of the
chain of custody of the seized shabu.
Given the foregoing, the accused deserves exculpation, not because we accord
credence to his defense of frame-up but because the Prosecution did not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2013 CASES
CASE TITLE SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO, vs.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
PROMULGATION
January 8, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Rabanal, Jane Michelle B.
TOPIC COVERED Special Civil Action; Mandamus
DOCTRINE: The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a

ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.
FACTS:
Petitionersresidents of Bacaca Road, Davao City were among the investors whom
Celso G. Delos Angeles, his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy
Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Groups buy back agreement that
earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for
the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order
No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors,
and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of
Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182
violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and
their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court?
203 Rabanal, Rivera, Rodriguez, Andrade, Santos, Tomarong REMEDIAL LAW

RULING:
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and
merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to
the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering
therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition. We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy
against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum
from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court
is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings
the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should
ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is
explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If
it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners direct resort to the Court was
permissible, the petition must still be dismissed. The writ of certiorari is available only
when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must
concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance
with the requisites.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus for lack of merit.

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO
PROMULGATION
January 8, 2013
DATE
DOCTRINE: There has never been any uniformity or consistency of behavior to be

expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested.
FACTS:
This case tells the revolting story of a lecherous father who made two of his very young
daughters his sex slaves for several years right in the family home.
The accused was his own sole witness. He denied raping AAA and BBB.
The accused testified that he was a shoemaker earning an average of

P15,000.00/month; that although he thought that his income sufficed for him and his
family, CCC felt differently, because she was envious of their rich neighbors; that CCC
suggested that he change his livelihood and deal in prohibited drugs; that because he
refused, CCC became angry and caused AAA and BBB to bring the false charges
against him; that CCC also wanted to reconcile with her former live-in partner with
whom she had cohabited prior to their marriage; that he could not understand why she
wanted to do that, but there was nothing he could do about it; that in May 1999, CCC
left their conjugal home along with their two youngest daughters; that he had no idea
about where they had gone to until he learned that they were sheltered in the DSWD
Haven in Alabang; and that they returned home after six months only when he was
already in detention.
The accused continues to assail the credibility of AAA and BBB, stressing that their
testimonies were replete with incredulous statements, and insisting that they were
motivated by anger and revenge rather than by a sincere call for justice.
The RTC convicted the accused for two counts of rape and . Elevated to the Court on
automatic appeal, the records were transferred to the CA for intermediate review. In
due course the CA affirmed the conviction.
Hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

RULING:
The appeal has no merit.
In reviewing rape convictions, the Court has been guided by three principles, namely:
(a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the
complainant to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving only two persons,
the rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the Prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the Defense.
Ultimately and frequently, the resolution of the charge of rape hinges on the credibility
of the victims testimony. Here, the RTC as the trial court and the CA as the
intermediately reviewing tribunal did not overlook or disregard any fact or
circumstance of significance. Instead, they correctly appreciated the evidence, and
rightly concluded that the accused committed the rapes of his own daughters. They
regarded and accepted AAA and BBB as credible witnesses whose recollections about
their fathers lecherous acts deserved the fullest faith and credence.
The ill motive that supposedly impelled AAA and BBB to initiate the charges against their
own father (i.e., they hated him because of the physical abuse he had inflicted on
them and on their mother) is unworthy of serious consideration. To start with, the
imputation of ill motive, being outrightly speculative, was unreliable. Moreover, the
imputed ill motive, even assuming it to be true, did not necessarily mean that the very
serious charges of rape were fabricated only to get back at him. And, finally, the Court
has not been deterred from affirming the conviction in incestuous rape by rejecting the
lecherous fathers imputation of ill motive based on alleged familial discord and undue
influence, hostility or revenge, or on parental punishment or disciplinary chastisement.
In fine, the proof of guilt adduced against the accused for each of the rapes charged
was beyond reasonable doubt if all he could assert in his defense was a mere denial of
the positive declarations of his two minor daughters. He now deserves to the fullest
extent the condign penalties the law sets for his crimes.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on April 27, 2005 in all
respects, subject to the MODIFICATION that: (a) the penalty in Criminal Case No.
974-V-99 is reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole; (b) the amount of exemplary
damages in Criminal Case No. 912-V- 99 and Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 is raised to
P30,000.00 each; and (c) all the items of civil liability shall earn interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

CASE TITLE SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION vs. CANDA

PROMULGATION
January 14, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Special Civil Actions; Mandamus
DOCTRINE: A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that
such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary.
FACTS:
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization
project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the
tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified
water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities.
The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the
project, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings
and said that the project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental
Examination is required.
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight required certifications but petitioner
failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (RO- MGB) to the effect that the project area was not located along a fault
line/fault zone or a critical slope because RO- MGB did not have the data and
expertise to render such finding, and thus had to forward the petitioners request to the
MGB Central Office.
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayons letter dated February
4, 2003 declared that the project was within an environmentally critical area, and that
the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC.
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Loay, Bohol, alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a
matter of right after having complied with the certification requirements; and that the
EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same
area.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONERS DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF
RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID
DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER;
RULING:
The reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not establish
that the grant of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the
part of RD Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a proper remedy.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such
extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart from the
other remedial writs, i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and to coerce the
performance of a pre-existing duty. In fact, a doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right
to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an
imperative duty to perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that
there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding
compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.
The petitioners disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for mandamus

rendered its petition in the RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

CASE TITLE NAZARETH vs. VILLAR

PROMULGATION
January 29, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Special Civil Actions; Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Commission on Audit (COA); Only when the Commission on Audit (COA) has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari
brought to assail its actions.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST.
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be
appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the
enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits
to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence
of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the
post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Vargas several NDs were issued
disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits.
The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to
request the Office of the President (OP) for the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to
pay the Magna Carta benefits. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by
authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region
IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Sescon, urging the lifting of
the disallowance of the Magna Carta. She anchored her appeal on Memorandum of
Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of 1998.
The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director (RLAD), COA
Regional Office IX in Zamboanga City, which denied the appeal and affirmed the
grounds stated in the NDs. Not satisfied with the result, the petitioner elevated the
matter to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office in Quezon City which later on also
denied.

On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration in the COA
Legal and Adjudication Office- National in Quezon City but such was also denied.
Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the COA Head Office, the latter
maintained the disallowance of the benefits for CY 2001 on the ground that they were
not covered by the authorization granted by the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 of
Executive Secretary Zamora.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner insisting that the COA
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No.
8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 did not cover the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for certiorari is proper?
RULING:
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and
grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of
Court, demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two,
there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as
the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
the petitioner should establish that the COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in
a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse
of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the
decision issued on June 4, 2009 by the Commission Proper of the Commission on Audit
in COA Case No. 2009-045; and DECLARES that the covered officials and employees of
the Department of Science and Technology who received the Magna Carta benefits
for calendar year 2001 are not required to refund the disallowed benefits received.
No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN
VALDEZ
PROMULGATION
February 13, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Rabanal, Jane Michelle
TOPIC COVERED Admissibility of Evidence;Credibility of Witnesses
DOCTRINE: DOCTRINE: The justification for this is that trial court was in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand observation of the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The only time when a
reviewing court was not bound by the trial courts assessment of credibility arises upon
a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that was overlooked and,
if considered, could affect the outcome of the case. No such fact or circumstance has
been brought to the Courts attention.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC
with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and
Joselito Sayson.
On March 1, 2000, the birthday celebration of the second husband (Wilfredo

Lladones) of Estrella Sayson - at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting
station) owned by her son (deceased Moises Sayson) a former policeman, and his wife,
(Susan Sayson) and also managed the betting station - was interrupted when two men
(Eduardo and Edwin) alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. They
asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then
attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo
and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with
guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not
heed his mothers warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force
Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants
threaten Moises with the words Gusto mo unahin na kita? Moises replied huwag.
Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon
even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the
scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot. Somebody told Joselito
to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. After shooting the Sayson
brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime. On the other hand,
the accused denied the allegation using alibi as a defense.
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and on appeal,
the CA affirmed the convictions. Hence, the accused came to the SC to seek
acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw
appeal, which was granted, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.
Thus, the Supreme Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez.
ISSUE:

Whether the States witnesses are credible as PO2 Eduardo Valdez asserts their
inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies
HELD:
YES. Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial courts findings of fact, its
calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight,
as well as its conclusions, the Court accords high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the
CAs findings. It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory; and that inaccuracies noted in testimony may even suggest that the witness is
telling the truth and has not been rehearsed. To properly appreciate the worth of
testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the individual words or phrases alone
but seek out the whole impression or effect of what has been said and done.
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the physical
evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a
gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds entered Joselitos back and the
right side of his neck;and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four
gunshot wounds in the chest.Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office
opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range.Given that physical evidence was of the
highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put together, the
congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence
rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.

CASE TITLE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successorininterest

of ASIAN BANK CORPORATION vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL,
et.al. (in their capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of
the Second Division of SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
PROMULGATION
February 18, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure; Separate Trials
DOCTRINE: The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a

separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or thirdparty complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, thirdparty
complaints or issues.
FACTS:
The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was obviously to recover
allegedly illgotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents.
Among the properties subject of the action were two parcels of commercial land.
On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order
to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion.It appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as the
registered owner. Asian Bank was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ
of possession issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City.
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the
original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial against
Asian Bank.
Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the
motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and
documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against the original
defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate
trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the
evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional
defendant.
In its reply to Asian Banks comment, the Republic maintained that a separate trial for
Asian Bank was proper be cause its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely
distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants

On June 25, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the
Republics motion for separate trial.
Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan
denied its motion through the second assailed resolution issued on July 13, 2005.
Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action for certiorari as the successorin-
interest of Asian Bank and transferee of the properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank?
RULING:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate
trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or thirdparty complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, thirdparty complaints or
issues. The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a
separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third party complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, thirdparty
complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.
We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in

ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue
against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants.
Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues
in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan,
supra, that a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to
the parties and the courts. Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when
there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised
in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues
will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties.
Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

CASE TITLE VICTORIO P. DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LEVI STRAUSS
[PHILS.], INC
PROMULGATION
February 18, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure; Appellants Brief
DOCTRINE: The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the
dismissal of the appeal upon failure to file the appellants brief is not mandatory, but
discretionary. Verily, the failure to serve and file the required number of copies of the
appellants brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have the
immediate effect of causing the outright dismissal of the appeal.
FACTS:
On February 10, 2000, the Department of Justice filed two informations charging Diaz
with violation of Section 155, in relation to Section 170, of Republic Act No. 8293, also
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (Intellectual Property Code).
On February 13, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision finding Diaz guilty as charged.
Diaz appealed, but the CA dismissed the appeal on July 17, 2007 on the ground that
Diaz had not filed his appellants brief on time despite being granted his requested
several extension periods.
The records reveal that Diazs counsel thrice sought an extension of the period to file
the appellants brief. The first time was on March 12, 2007, the request being for an
extension of 30 days to commence on March 11, 2007. The CA granted his motion
under its resolution of March 21, 2007. On April 10, 2007, the last day of the 30day
extension, the counsel filed another motion, seeking an additional 15 days. The CA
allowed the counsel until April 25, 2007 to serve and file the appellants brief. On April
25, 2007, the counsel went a third time to the CA with another request for 15 days. The
CA still granted such third motion for extension, giving the counsel until May 10, 2007.
Notwithstanding the liberality of the CA, the counsel did not literally comply, filing the
appellants brief only on May 28, 2007, which was the 18th day beyond the third
extension period granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA properly dismissed the appeal of Diaz due to the late filing of his
appellants brief.
RULING:
Under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the appellant is required to file the
appellants brief in the CA within fortyfive (45) days from receipt of the notice of the

clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven
(7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of
service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee. Section 1(e) of Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court grants to the CA the discretion to dismiss an appeal either motu proprio
or on motion of the appellee should the appellant fail to serve and file the required
number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court.
The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the
appeal upon failure to file the appellants brief is not mandatory, but discretionary.
Verily, the failure to serve and file the required number of copies of the appellants brief
within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of
causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss the
appeal on that basis is lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may still allow the
appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the appellants brief, when the
circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to dismiss the appeal, then, the CA is
bound to exercise its sound discretion upon taking all the pertinent circumstances into
due consideration.
Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellants brief on time rightly deserved
the outright rejection of the appeal. The acts of his counsel bound Diaz like any other
client. It was, of course, only the counsel who was well aware that the Rules of Court
fixed the periods to file pleadings and equally significant papers like the appellants
brief with the lofty objective of avoiding delays in the administration of justice.
We feel that despite the CA being probably right in dismissing the excuses of oversight
and excusable negligence tendered by Diazs counsel to justify the belated filing of the
appellants brief as unworthy of serious consideration, Diaz should not be made to suffer
the dire consequence. Any accused in his shoes, with his personal liberty as well as his
personal fortune at stake, expectedly but innocently put his fullest trust in his counsels
abilities and professionalism in the handling of his appeal. He thereby delivered his fate
to the hands of his counsel. Whether or not those hands were efficient or trained
enough for the job of handling the appeal was a learning that he would get only in the
end. Likelier than not, he was probably even unaware of the three times that his
counsel had requested the CA for extensions. If he were now to be left to his unwanted
fate, he would surely suffer despite his innocence. How costly a learning it would be for
him! That is where the Court comes in. It is most important for us as dispensers of justice
not to allow the inadvertence or incompetence of any counsel to result in the outright
deprivation of an appellants right to life, liberty or property.
We do not mind if this softening of judicial attitudes be mislabeled as excessive

leniency. With so much on the line, the people whose futures hang in a balance should
not be left to suffer from the incompetence, mindlessness or lack of professionalism of
any member of the Law Profession. They reasonably expect a just result in every
litigation. The courts must give them that just result. That assurance is the peoples
birthright. Thus, we have to undo Diazs dire fate.

CASE TITLE ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO

BARREDO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
PROMULGATION
February 20, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Rabanal, Jane Michelle
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure;Rule 45
DOCTRINE: An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order
raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners.
FACTS:
IPI Employees Union Associated Labor Union, representing the workers, had a
bargaining Deadlock with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union
staging a strike and IPI ordering a lockout. After assuming jurisdiction over the dispute,
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres dismissed the complaint of the employees and
directed the IPI to enter a new CBA with the Union. Secretary Torres, however, reversed
its decision and directed IPI to reinstate the employees to their respective positions with
full back wages and other benefits of the affected workers. With the finality of the, the
Union, moved in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for execution. This was
granted.
A writ of execution was then issued in favor of 15 employees. Acting DOLE

Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on IPIs appeal, recalled and quashed the writ of
execution, and declared and considered the case closed and terminated. Aggrieved,
the 15 employees sought the reconsideration and, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing granted the Motion for Reconsideration and reinstated the writ of
execution. Pending resolution of IPIs motion for reconsideration the sheriff garnished
the amount of P3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPI with China Banking Corporation,
which released the amount. Hence, the 15 employees executed a Satisfaction of
Judgment and Quitclaim/Release upon receipt of their respective portions of the
award, subject to the reservation of their right to claim unsatisfied amounts of
separation pay as well as backwages. Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction
of judgment and quitclaim/release, Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in
behalf of the 15 employees but also in behalf of other employees named in the notice
of computation/execution seeking another writ of execution to recover the further sum
of P58,546,767.83 but was denied along with IPIs motion for reconsideration. The CA
affirmed this decision stating that all decisions and incidents concerning the case
between the parties have long attained finality.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
No. An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order
raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners.
Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CAs May
30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.G. R. SP No. 65970 upon their
allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper. The
averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing of
the petition for certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due
course under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an
extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires the petition for certiorari to comply with the
following requisites, namely: (1) the writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, a
board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions (2) such tribunal, board,
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy of

certiorari may be deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment (c) where there may be danger of a failure of
justice (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient (e) where the
issue raised is one purely of law (f) where public interest is involved and (g) in case of
urgency. Yet, a reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that the
petition does not come under any of the situations. Specifically, the petitioners have not
shown that the grant of the writ of certiorari will be necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice to them.
In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over
a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal
committed not a merely reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Showing mere abuse of
discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Under the circumstances,
the CA committed no abuse of discretion, least of all grave, because its justifications
were supported by the history of the dispute and borne out by the applicable laws and
jurisprudence.

CASE TITLE GALVEZ vs. CA

PROMULGATION
April 03, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Rivera, Odessa C.
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure; Petition for review; Failure to attached pleadings
DOCTRINE: The mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal of
a petition for review. The allegations of the petition must be examined to determine the
sufficiency of the attachments appended thereto.
FACTS:
Spouses Eustacio and Segundina Galvez owned a lot, after their separation
Eustacio sold it to their daughter Jovita without the knowledge or consent of
Segundina. Jovita constituted a mortgage on the property on March 9, 1981 to secure
her loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Jovita failed to pay her obligation.
Hence, PNB had the property extrajudicially foreclosed being no redemption, the
property became PNBs acquired asset. It was purchased by the Spouses Honorio and
Susana Montao they tried to get the actual possession of the property, but Segundina
refused to vacate. The Montaos sued Segundina for recovery of ownership and
possession, and damages Segundina countered that the sale of the property by
Eustacio to Jovita was null and void for having been done without her knowledge and
consent; that the sale to PNB as well as to the Montaos were consequently void; and
that the Montaos were also buyers in bad faith.
MTC : Ruled in favor of the Montaos, holding that the sale by Eustacio to Jovita was
voidable, not null and void; that because Segundina had not brought an action for the
annulment of the sale within 10 years from the date of the transaction, as provided in
Article 173 of the Civil Code, the sale remained valid this was affirmed by the RTC
CA : Promulgated its resolution showing that no copies of pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations were attached as annexes in
violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Segundina moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, arguing that it was
within her judgment as petitioner to decide what documents, pleadings or portions of
the records would support her petition; that her exercise of judgment was not a
technical error that warranted the outright dismissal of her petition; that the rule
requiring all pleadings and material portions of the records to be attached to the
petition was an "absurd requirement"; and that attaching the pleadings and other
portions of the record was not an indispensable requirement the non-compliance with
which would cause the denial of the petition.
Segundina insists that the failure to attach the complaint, answer and reply to
her petition for review did not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition for review;

that the MTC decision had already stated the respective claims and defenses of the
parties, making the attachment of the complaint, answer and reply to serve no useful
purpose, but instead only to increase her expenses for photocopying; that attaching all
pleadings was not required in the other modes of review. That even if a specific
pleading should be needed to decide her petition for review, its absence should only
justify the holding that a particular allegation was unsupported, but should not cause
the dismissal of the entire petition; and that the CA could even direct the clerk of court
of the RTC to elevate the original records and the evidence in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attachment of the pleading and material portion of the records is
an indispensable requirement in a petition for review as would support the allegations
of the petition?
RULING:
NO. First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached
to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The
test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material
allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not
be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another
document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a
position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a
certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still
be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner
later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice
that the case be decided on the merits.
The Court considers the attachments of Segundinas petition for review (i.e., the
certified true copies of the MTC decision and the RTC decision ) already sufficient to
enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her appeal even without
the pleadings and other portions of the records. To still deny due course to her petition
for not attaching the complaint and the answer despite the MTC decision having
substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit and purpose of the
requirement to give sufficient information to the CA. The Court reiterates what it has
cautioned the CA in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora not to be overzealous in its
enforcement of the rules.
The CA could have itself called upon Segundina to submit additional

documents, or could have itself directed the clerk of court of the R TC to elevate the
original records to enable it to make a complete adjudication of the case. Outright
denial of due course under the circumstances contravened Segundina's right to be
heard on her appeal, and constituted a gross error on the part of the CA.

CASE TITLE AMPATUAN JR., vs. SECRETARY DE LIMA

PROMULGATION
April 03, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Rivera, Odessa C.
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure; Writ of Mandamus
DOCTRINE: In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus

cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion
are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ
of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the
information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way,
i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.
FACTS:
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010 the panel of prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao Massacre.
In issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on
the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag he was admitted into the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ wherein he was listed as one of the Prosecution witness. Petitioner,
through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. But, Secretary De
Lima denied petitioners request. On December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for
mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777), seeking to compel
respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases
undergoing trial in the QC RTC. On December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for
mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as
another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. The RTC in
Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 respondents questioned the
propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. On June 27, 2011, the
RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the
petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as
an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his
admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
RULING:
No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the
Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the
right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with

a wide range of discretion, the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public
prosecutors.
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount
of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate
criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus shall

issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel
respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot
be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised or to
compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
judgment or discretion.
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-

request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or
deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already
denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

CASE TITLE MALIKSI vs. COMELEC

PROMULGATION
April 11, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Rivera, Odessa
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure; Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
DOCTRINE:
Action for extremely urgent motion for consideration may be granted in cases
when there is failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the
substantial prejudice to be caused to the parties, or to any of them.
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Canvassers on election 2010 proclaimed Saquilayan the
winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, who garnered the second
highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC alleging that there
were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the
RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared
Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist
from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.
Meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi
was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards.It issued an order requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The First Division on August 15, 2012 issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs
decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he
had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the
printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not
been preserved. However, the COMELEC En Banc deny Maliksis motion for
reconsideration.
Maliksi filed a petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the
use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the
First Division but the same has been dismissed. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not

been denied due process because he had received notices of the decryption, printing,
and examination of the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the
First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images and he had been able to raise his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration.
Maliksi filed his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, he insists that (1) he
had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and to be present at
every stage; (2) that he was deprived of such rights when he was not informed of the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division; (3) that
the orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders
did not state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot
images; and (4) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate
in the decryption proceedings.
Moreover Maliksi contends that the First Divisions motu proprio directive for the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images was highly irregular. He
asserts that the decryption, printing, and examination should have taken place during
the revision before the trial court and after the revision committee had determined that
the integrity of the official ballots had not been preserved the trial court did not make
such determination. In fact, Saquilayan did not allege or present any proof in the RTC to
show that the ballots or the ballot boxes had been tampered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for reconsideration should be granted
in lieu of the violation of the right to due process.
RULING:
Yes. The Court grants Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and
reverses the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC because it denied him the
right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the
ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by
the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.
The First Division arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings,
contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing
the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the
picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Unexpectedly, the
COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Divisions unwarranted deviation from the standard
procedures.
Based on ruling in Alliance of Barangay Concerns v. Commission on Elections,

the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution
of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to
be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues
and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of
the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any
of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions
deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election
protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an
opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

CASE TITLE ALLEN MACASAET, ET. AL., vs. FRANCISCO CO, JR.
PROMULGATION
June 5, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 14 CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 6 & 7
DOCTRINE: To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the
complaint, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant
in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible
within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service. However, what
was reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While the Rules
are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, the court cannot cling to
such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead.
Hence, the Sheriff was justified when he concluded that further attempts to serve
summons in person within reasonable time would be futile. The information given by the
Secretary that their President and Managing Director were always out of the office
and not available by reason of the nature of their work, justified the Sheriff to cause
substituted service of summons.
FACTS:
Respondent Co sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its

President/Publisher (Macasaet); its Managing Director (Quijano); its Circulation
Manager; its Editors; and its Columnist/Reporter (herein referred to as the PETITIONERS),
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the
June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The case was raffled to RTC Manila-Branch 51
which in due course issued summons to be served on each PETITIONER, including
Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd
Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros,
Manila.
In the morning of September 18, 2000, Sheriff Medina proceeded to the stated
office address to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his
efforts to personally serve each party in the address were futile because the
PETITIONERS were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon
of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed by
the Secretary, Lu-Ann Quijano that petitioners were still out of the office. Thus, he
decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained in his sheriffs
return dated September 22, 2005 why personal service could not be made. According
to the sheriffs return, Sheriff Medina caused the service of summons and its annexes
attached thereto at the PETITIONERS BUSINESS ADDRESS: 1.) for Publisher/ President
Macasaet: thru his secretary Lu-Ann Quijano ; 2.) for Quijano: thru his wife Lu-Ann
Quijano; 3. For the other remaining staffs and officers: thru Esleta, Editorial Assistant of
the Abante Tonite. As per the return, the sheriff stated that efforts to serve the said
summons personally upon said parties were made, but the same were ineffectual and

unavailing on the ground that per information of Lu-Ann Quijano said persons were, by
reason of the nature of their work, always out of the office to gather news and not
available, thus, substituted service was applied.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss through counsels special appearance in their

behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and
ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made
no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in accordance with
Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In their answer, they further
prayed to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor
a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil action.
RTC: Denied the motion to dismiss filed by THE PETITIONERS.
CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners thru the
substituted service of summons effected by the Sheriff?
RULING:
YES. The court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners thru
the substituted service of summons effected by the Sheriff. There is no question that
Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in
person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the
second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet
and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were
"always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in
the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of
petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he
concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time
would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected
or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times,
considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he
be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what
was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While the Rules
are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, the Courts do not cling to
such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead.
Ultimately, petitioners insistence on personal service by the serving officer was
demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through
their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an
answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam.
They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules
of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

CASE TITLE HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE PALICTE

PROMULGATION
June 13, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Rule 39 Section 47 (b) CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Res judicata.A final judgment or decree on the merits

rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the
previous suit. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared
identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity
of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent
cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient.
FACTS:
Don Filemon had 4 children, namely: Marcelo, Pascuala, Miguel and Matilde.
Marcelo was the administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners. Levy on execution was effected against 6 parcels
of land and 2 residential houses belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were
sold at a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed 4 of the parcels of land in her own
name, while her sister Pascuala redeemed 1 of the two houses. Consequently, the
Deputy Sheriff executed a deed of redemption in favor of Matilde, which the Clerk of
Court approved. Matilde, thus, filed a motion to transfer to her name the title to the 4
properties. CA, however, allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-
redemptioners for a period of 6 months before the probate court would grant her
motion to transfer the title to her name. The 3 others failed to exercise their option to join
Matilde as co-redemptions Accordingly, CFI approved Matildes motion to transfer the
title of the 4 lots to her name. Register of deeds registered the deed of redemption and
issue new certificates of title covering the 4 properties in Matildes name. Later, the 3
other heirs: Pascuala, Miguel, and the Heirs of Marcelo (the petitioners), sought again to
be joined as co-redemptioners.
Petitioners (Heirs of Marcelo) filed this present action for partition against
Matilde, alleging that despite the redemption of 4 properties having been made in the
sole name of Matilde, the 4 properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for
having furnished the funds used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the RTC
declare the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct
their partition among the heirs of Filemon. While, Matilde filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, stating that: xxx (b) the claim was already barred by prior judgment,
estoppel and laches; xxx (d) a similar case entitled Pahang v. Palicte (Civil Case No.
19338) had been dismissed with finality by Branch 8 of the RTC in Cebu City. xxx
RTC: Granted the motion to dismiss. CA: Affirmed.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the present action for partition was already barred by prior
judgment.
RULING:
Yes. Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and
the other action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be
final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of
subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Former judgment must be final: Since 1987 when the first case was filed until the fourth
case, all of which dealt with Matildes right to the 4 properties the courts had upheld
Matildes right to the 4 properties and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered
in the exercise of the respective courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were
adjudications on the merits of the cases.
Identity of parties Identity of parties: The parties were the same, or there was privity
among them, or some of the parties were successors-in-interest litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the
parties was not necessary, because a shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata
to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, or even community of interests
between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not
impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact that a previous case
was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.
Identity of the subject matter: the subject matter of all the actions (1st case up until this
5th suit), was the same, that is, Matildes right to the 4 properties. On the one hand,
Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive right to them, while, on the other hand, the
other declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners predecessors-in-interest, maintained
that the properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto.

CASE TITLE SIMPLICIA ABRIGO AND DEMETRIO ABRIGO vs. JIMMY FLORES, ET AL.
PROMULGATION
June 17, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Rule 39 & Rule 51 CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE:
A. Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment. Once a judgment becomes immutable and
unalterable by virtue of its finality, its execution should follow as a matter of course. A
supervening event, to be sufficient to stay or stop the execution, must alter or modify
the situation of the parties under the decision as to render the execution inequitable,
impossible, or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest on unproved or uncertain
facts.
B. When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or

planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or
remove said improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion
of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent
has failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
FACTS:
This case emanated from the judicial partition involving a parcel of residential
land situated in Laguna that siblings Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona had
inherited from their parents. After Franciscos death, his widow and Gaudencia entered
into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was assigned to
Franciscos heirs while the eastern half to Gaudencia. However, there was no actual
ground partition of the land. Thus, both the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in
common the land in dispute, which co-ownership was recognized by Gaudencia
herself during her lifetime, whose heirs, being in actual possession of the entire area,
encroached and built improvements on portions of the western half. In the case of the
petitioners Abrigo, a small portion of their residence, their garage and poultry pens
extended to the western half. In 1988, the heirs of Francisco filed a suit for judicial
partition before the RTC- San Pablo, Laguna to demand the termination of the co-
ownership. Hence, under the immutable and unalterable judgment rendered on
November 20, 1989, the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, the respondents,
would have the western portion of the disputed land, while the heirs and successors-in-
interest of Gaudencia its eastern half. Heirs of Gaudencia appealed.
Consequently, an Entry of Judgment was issued on June 3, 1996. Soon thereafter,

the heirs of Francisco filed a motion for execution to enforce the November 20, 1989
decision. Petitioners were given 2 months within which to remove their garage, a small
portion of their residence which was extended to a portion of the property of the
respondents as well as the chicken pens thereon and to show proof of compliance
herewith. To forestall compliance, petitioners, prayed the respondent court for a final

extension of 60 days to comply with the order. However, the extension was denied.
Several demands were made upon the heirs of Gaudencia but to no avail.
Consequently, private respondents filed a motion for issuance of special order of
demolition. In turn, petitioners filed a motion to defer demolition and alleged that
Simplicia Abrigo bought the share of such western portion from Jimmy Flores, one of
the heirs of Francisco. Hence, she became a co-owner of the share owned by
Jimmy. Per the petitioners, after the finality of the decision and on the stage of
execution thereof, there was a supervening event and circumstance which took place
between the parties which would render the enforcement of the execution unjust and
inequitable as the sale took effect after the finality.
RTC: Ruled in favour of the private respondents. MR was likewise denied. Petitioners,
then, filed a petition for certiorari.
CA: Upheld the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the petition. RTC was directed to issue
a special order of demolition to implement its final and executory decision of
November 20, 1989. MR was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the sale of the share of Jimmy Flores constituted a supervening event that
would justify material change in the situation of the parties, thus, rendered the
execution of final judgment against the petitioners inequitable or unjust?
2. Whether the issuance of the special order of demolition was proper under the
circumstances?
RULING:
1. No. The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4
share in the western portion of the lot was a supervening event that rendered the
execution inequitable is devoid of merit. Although it is true that there are recognized
exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment,
one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To
accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order
to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-
in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the portion supposedly
subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible,
considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no
longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land,
rendered it. A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of
a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein
as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. It consists of facts that
transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that
develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not
aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at
that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or
the quashal of the writ of execution,or he may move the court to modify or alter the
judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who
alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts
by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the
conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.
Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the western
portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the
judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with
suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction
in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and
due execution of the deed of sale itself.
This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be

relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain
circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.
Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in
their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct
course of action was to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the
western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.
2. Yes. The issuance of the special order of demolition was proper. Such issuance would
certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and
immutable decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the
property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has
failed to remove the improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With
the special order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the
delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective owners, the CA's
dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be upheld.

CASE TITLE RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA FABIANA AGAINST JUSTICE REYES
ET AL.
CITATION A.M. No. CA-13-51-J
PROMULGATION
July 2, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Andrade, Ricardo II, R.
DOCTRINE: In the appellate stage, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all
cases and proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or
interests or parties mandatory.
FACTS:
Merlita Fabiana, surviving spouse of Marlon Fabiana, filed a labor case for death
benefits against Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. The Labor Arbiter granted the
following claims in favor of the wife: US $82,500 for death benefits, US $16,500 to the
complainant and others. The NLRC affirmed the LAs decision but it modified the award
with respect to moral and exemplary damages.
The parties then brought their respective petitions with the CA. There were 2 petitions
brought to CA: 1) one assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the award of moral and
exemplary damages, and 2) second, a case assailing the monetary awards granted to
the heirs.
When the heirs of Fabiana filed their comment in the second petition, they sought the
consolidation of the 2 cases but this was not acted upon by the CA, and was rendered
moot when the first division rendered a decision on the first petition. Magsasay
Maritime filed a motion for reconsideration; The heirs likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the heirs went to the SC, but the latters third
division denied the petition for review on certiorari (Jan. 13, 2010 resolution).
The heirs moved for the dismissal of the second petition on the ground that the
intervening promulgation by the First Division has rendered the second petition moot
and academic.
The First division of the CA comprising of the respondent justices denied the heirs
motion to dismiss. The division opined that the decision rendered by the court passed
upon the issues of NLRCs jurisdiction and the reduction of award of damages. The
court has yet to pass upon the propriety of the award of the damages given.
The heirs accuse Justice Reyes et. Al. of willfully disobeying the resolution of Jan. 13,
2010.
ISSUE:
WON the Respondent judges should have consolidated the 2 cases.

RULING:
Yes, under the Rules of Court, the consolidation of cases for trial is permissive and a
matter of judicial discretion. This is because trials held in the first instance require the
attendance of the parties, their respective counsel and their witnesses, a task that
surely entails an expense that can multiply if there are several proceedings upon the
same issues involving the same parties. At the trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary
expenses and undue vexation to the parties is the primary objective of consolidation of
cases. But the permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to the appellate
stage where the primary objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and
undue vexation than it is the ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate
adjudications. Therefore, in the appellate stage, the rigid policy is to make the
consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving
identical claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation should be made
regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory policy
eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between the same parties
or interests even as it enhances the administration of justice.

CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION

(POTC) vs. AFRICA
PROMULGATION
July 3, 2013
DATE
DOCTRINE: An intra-corporate dispute involving a corporation under sequestration of

the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts (RTC), not the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS:
Three Corporations namely POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC are involved in this case. The
ownership structure of these Corporations implies that whoever had control of POTC
necessarily has 100% control of PHILCOMSAT and in turn whoever controls PHILCOMSAT
wields to 81% majority control over PHC.
Atty. Ilusorio owned the shares of stocks of POTC. He claimed that the Marcoses
grabbed from him these shares through threats and intimidation without valuable
consideration, and placed the shares to their (Marcos)alter ego corporations
Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development (MPLD).
Upon the creation of the PCGG, Jose Campos, a crony of Marcos, voluntarily
surrendered to the PCGG the properties, assets and corporations he had held in trust of
the deposed president. With this, PCGG obtained control of 3-7 seats in the POTC Board
of Directors.
PCGG filed in the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, restitution etc.

against Africa, Nieto, Marcoses and Ilusorio that they acted in collaboration with each
other as dummies and appropriated a substantial portion of the shares of POTC. This
case, however, ended with President Ramos approval of the proposed compromise
agreement. So the result was the redistribution of the POTC shareholdings.
Later on, Mid Pasig filed in the Sangiganbayan a motion to vacate the order approving
the compromise agreement. Atty. Ilusorio opposed the said motion.
PHILCOMSAT stockholders held an informal gathering at the Manila Golf Club for the
purpose of introducing the PCGG nominees to the stockholders. It was announced that
it was a SPECIAL PHILCOMSAT STOCKHOLDERS MEETING. Directors such as Nieto, Africa
and rest were elected.
As a consequence, PHILCOMSAT stockholders (Ilusorio) instituted a complaint with

application for issuance of TRO with the SEC assailing the election of the Directors and
Officers.

Meanwhile, the Securities Regulation Code was enacted. It effectively transferred the
SEC case to the RTC.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying the motion to vacate the

approval of the compromise.
Thereafter, various suits were filed against each other by the two factions to gain
legitimacy of their election as respective officers of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. The Africa
group sought the invalidation of the proxy issued in favor of Nieto, Jr. and/or Locsin and
consequent nullification of the elections held during the annual stockholders meeting
of PHC. (Nieto Group)
The Africa group wanted to inspect the corporate books of PHC. This was disallowed by
Nieto. Victor Africa, in his capacity as president/CEO of PHILCOMSAT and as a
stockholder, filed with the RTC a Complaint for Inspection of Books against the
incumbent PHC Board to enforce its rights under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation
Code of the Philippines.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It held that it is the Sandiganbayan,
not the RTC, which has jurisdiction since plaintiff is a sequestered corporation of the
Republic through the PCGG alleging a right of inspection over PHC but which right or
authority was being raised as a defense by the defendants.
PHILCOMSAT appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the RTC order. Hence, the PCGG-Nieto Group appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
1) Which court has jurisdiction over Intra-corporate dispute?
2) What is the proper mode of appeal in case of an adverse decision over an intra-
corporate dispute?
RULING:
1) RTC (Branch 138) had jurisdiction over the election contest between the Ilusorio-
Africa Groups and Nieto-Locsin Groups. Upon the enactment of Republic Act
No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code), effective on August 8, 2000, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and the other cases
enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A was transferred to the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 5.2 of the law, which provides:
5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5 of

Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court; Provided, That
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases
involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which
should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code.
The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of

payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally
disposed.
2) The Proper mode of appeal in intra-corporate cases is by petition for review

under Rule 43. In Dee Ping Wee vs. Lee Hiong Wee, the Court has expounded
that the appropriate mode of appeal for an aggrieved party in an intra-
corporate dispute is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Verily, the first part of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules is categorical.
Save for the exceptions clearly stated therein, the provision enunciates
that a decision and order issued under the Interim Rules shall be
enforceable immediately after the rendition thereof. In order to assail the
decision or order, however, the second part of the provision speaks of an
appeal or petition that needs to be filed by the party concerned. In this
appeal or petition, a restraining order must be sought from the appellate
court to enjoin the enforcement or implementation of the decision or
order. Unless a restraining order is so issued, the decision or order rendered
under the Interim Rules shall remain to be immediately executory.

CASE TITLE GILFREDO BACOLOD, a.k.a. GILARDO BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
PROMULGATION
July 15, 2013
DATE
DIGEST BY Santos, Shannon Alyssa L.
DOCTRINE: Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the
absence of direct evidence.
FACTS:
As narrated by the prosecution witness Ruben Gonzales, he heard the loud voices of
petitioner Gilardo Bacolod and his sister coming from the Cogtas house that the
Bacolod family had been renting. The petitioner was demanding money from his sister
Daisy Mae but the latter not acceding to the demand. Not soon after, Gonzales heard
a commotion inside the Cogtas house, and then immediately saw Daisy Mae and three
other persons running out of the house asking for help. Gonzales himself going towards
the house to see what was happening, saw the petitioner in the kitchen waving a
flaming blanket that he had lit from the burner stove. The petitioner then came out of
the house, daring anyone to arrest him. Gonzales turned off the burner stove in the
kitchen, even as he saw the ceiling of the kitchen already in flames and the fire
immediately spread to the other parts of the house which eventually burned down the
house completely. Gonzales account about the commotion inside the house was
corroborated by Alexander Cernal, a barangay tanod who happened to be on board
his tricycle at the same subdivision where the Cogtas house was located.
The RTC Cebu City convicted Gilardo Bacolod of arson and was subsequently affirmed
by the CA.
Bacolod submits that both the RTC and the CA erred in their appreciation of the
evidence. He insists that no witness had actually seen him set the house on fire; that the
State did not show that he had the motive to commit the arson; and that only
circumstantial evidence was presented against him, but such evidence, not being
incompatible with the hypothesis favoring his innocence, was insufficient to support a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
No, the lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of
the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct

evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because
circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence.
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series
of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to
establish a fact in issue."
The RTCs reliance on circumstantial evidence was sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court, which requires for circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction
of an accused that, firstly, there are more than one circumstance; secondly, the facts
from which the circumstances arose are duly established in court; and, thirdly, the
circumstances form and unbroken chain of events leading to the fair conclusion of the
culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is convicted.
Ostensibly, our rules "make no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it
is direct, for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused."
The States witnesses credibly and reliably described a chain of circumstances that
absolutely incriminated the petitioner in the criminal burning of the house of
complainants Spouses Ceferino and Gemma Cogtas. The CA did not err in holding that
the States circumstantial evidence sufficed for the conviction of the petitioner. Indeed,
the unbroken chain of circumstances established from the recollections of witnesses
whose motives had not been impugned at all by the petitioner warranted no
conclusion but that the petitioner had deliberately caused the burning of the house.

CASE TITLE RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROMULGATION
July 15, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure
DOCTRINE: An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded

party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending
criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification.
FACTS:
Rafael Jose-Consing, Jr. obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling P18 Million from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) in Cavite
registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of P21 Million. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital and paying an additional amount of around P3 Million. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of
Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the
title to the property was really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng.
Unicapital demanded the return of P41.38 Million received by de la Cruz and Consing,
but the latter ignored the demands.
Consing filed in the RTC Pasig (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the P41.38 Million on the
ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public

document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutors Office. It
further sued Consing in the RTC Makati (Makati civil case) for the recovery of a sum of
money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Later
on, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz
an information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC Makati City
(Makati criminal case). Consing eventually moved to defer his arraignment in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the
pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases.
RTC Makati issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
The Prosecution assailed in the CA the order of the RTC in the Makati criminal case, but
CA dismissed the petition.

In the meanwhile, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing in
the RTC Manila (Manila civil case).
Another information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed
against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite (Cavite criminal case).
Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. However,
the RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consings motion. Thereafter,
Consing commenced appeal in the CA and sought to enjoin his arraignment and trial
in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted Consings appeal and set aside the order
of the RTC Imus, Cavite. Not satisfied, the Prosecution assailed the decision of the CA
before the SC. The SC granted the petition for review, and reversed and set aside the
decision of the CA. Eventually, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. Hence,
Consing appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether a prejudicial question existed that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings.
RULING:
No. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud when Consing and de la Cruz offered as security and later object
of sale, a property which they do not own. As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of the Makati criminal case pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code. It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical
injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and
does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal
case. Although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants, the
civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were
undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered
by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Also, there was no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, the determination of the issue involved in Pasig
civil case is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the Cavite criminal
case.

CASE TITLE SPOUSES CELSO DICO, SR. AND ANGELES DICO vs. VIZCAYA
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
PROMULGATION
July 17, 2013
DATE
DOCTRINE: The defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia,
res judicata, and prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal.
FACTS:
Celso Dico was the registered owner of Lot No. 486, adjacent to Lot No. 29-B and Lot
No. 1412, all belonging to the Cadiz Cadastre. Celso and his wife Angeles resided on
Lot No. 486 since 1958. In 1964, Celso and Angeles filed in the District Office of the
Bureau of Lands in Bacolod City, their free patent application covering Lot No. 29-B and
Lot No. 1412. It does not appear, however, that the Bureau of Lands acted on their
applications.
Respondent Vizcaya Management Corporation (VMC) was the registered owner of Lot
No. 29-B. VMC likewise claimed to be the owner of Lot No. 1412.
In 1967, VMC caused the consolidation and subdivision of Lot No. 29-B, Lot No. 1412
and other lots and subsequently filed in the Land Registration Commission. LRC
approved the consolidation-subdivision plan, resulting in the total landholding of VMC
of 481,583 square meters.
In 1981, VMC filed against the Dicos a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court
of Cadiz. The City Court of Cadiz rendered its decision in favor of VMC. Dicos did not
appeal, and the decision became final.
In 1986, the Dicos commenced an action for the annulment and cancellation of the
titles of VMC. They averred that they were the registered owners of Lot No. 486 and the
possessors-by-succession of Lot No. 1412 and Lot No. 29-B; and that they had filed free
patent applications in the Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 1412 and Lot No. 29-B. The RTC
ruled in favor of the Dicos.
On appeal, VMC averred that the RTC erred in not dismissing plaintiffs complaint for
being barred by prescription and/or laches. The CA thus reversed the RTC. The Dicos
appealed before the SC and contended that prescription could not be appreciated
against them since it was not pleaded, therefore deemed waived.
ISSUE:
Whether the Dicos were already barred from asserting their right by reason of
prescription and/or laches.

RULING:
Yes, prescription could be used by the CA to bar their claim for reconveyance
notwithstanding VMCs failure to aver them in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. This is
pursuant to Section l, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which states that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by
a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis
pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal, except that the objection to the lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be barred by laches.

CASE TITLE ZUELLIG FREIGHT AND CARGO SYSTEMS vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND RONALDO V. SAN MIGUEL
PROMULGATION
July 22, 2013
DATE
DOCTRINE: In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner has the burden to prove
that the abuse of discretion by the court was grave, and not a merely reversible error
was committed.
FACTS:
Ronaldo San Miguel brought a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-
payment of salaries and moral damages against petitioner, formerly known as Zeta
Brokerage Corporation. He had been a checker/customs representative of Zeta since
1985. In January 1994, he was informed that Zeta would cease operations, and that all
affected employees, including him, would be separated. By letter dated February 28,
1994, Zeta informed him of his termination effective March 31, 1994. He reluctantly
accepted his separation pay subject to the standing offer to be hired to his former
position by petitioner. However, on April 15, 1994, he was summarily terminated, without
any valid cause and due process.
San Miguel contended that the amendments of the articles of incorporation of Zeta
were for the purpose of changing the corporate name, broadening the primary
functions, and increasing the capital stock. Such amendments, according to him, could
not mean that Zeta had been thereby dissolved.
On November 15, 1999, the Labor Arbiter held that San Miguel had been illegally
dismissed. There was merely a change of business name and primary purpose and
upgrading of stocks of the corporation.
Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Zeta then filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA, imputing to the NLRC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the closure of the
business operation of Zeta had not been bona fide.
RULING:
No, the outcome reached by the CA was borne out by the records of the case.
Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually

refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Indeed, in a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court or quasi-judicial
body with jurisdiction over a case, petitioner carries the burden of proving that the
court or quasi-judicial body committed not a merely reversible error but a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.
Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for it is necessary to demonstrate that
the abuse of discretion was grave.
Under the circumstances, the CA committed no abuse of discretion, least of all grave,
because its justifications were supported by the records and by the applicable laws
and jurisprudence.

CASE TITLE DONGON vs. RAPID MOVERS

PROMULGATION
August 28, 2013
DATE
DOCTRINE: Parties seeking the review of the decisions of the NLRC should file a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC. Further. Certiorari
under Rule 45 and 65 are mutually exclusive of each other. The recourse to the latter will
bar the availment of the former.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rapid is engaged in the trucking business, while Private respondent Dongon is
a former truck helper leadman. Respondents area of assignment is the Tanduay Otis
Warehouse. Respondent was likewise with his driver, Vicente Villaruz at the time of the
incident.
Tanduays security guard called the attention of the private respondent as to the fact
that Villaruz was not wearing an ID. Respondent assured that to the guard that he will
secure a special permission from the management to warrant the release of goods.
Instead of doing this, Respondent lent his ID to Villaruz, and a clearance was then issued
for the release of goods. But the Security guard accosted them and reported the
matter to the management of Tanduay.
After conducting administrative investigation, private respondent was dismissed from

the Company.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that it was a valid exercise of Management Prerogative,
and declared that the dismissal was lawful. The NLRC reversed LAs ruling. But the Court
of Appeals reinstated the ruling of the LA. Unsatisfied, Petitioner took the matter to the
SC via Certiorari under Rule 45.
Respondent argued that Certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy, and that
they apparently resorted to a lost appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the Petition should be dismissed.
RULING:
No. In St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, the court has clarified that parties seeking the
review of the decisions of the NLRC should file a petition for certiorari in the CA on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of the NLRC. Thereafter, the remedy of the aggrieved party from the CA decision
is an appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Ordinarily, an original action for certiorari will not prosper if the remedy of appeal is
available, for an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
mutually exclusive, not alternative nor successive, remedies.
On several occasions, however, the Court has treated a petition for certiorari as a
petition for review on certiorari when: (a) the petition has been filed within the 15-day
reglementary period; (b) public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate
such treatment; (c) the broader interests of justice require such treatment; (d) the writs
issued were null and void; or (e) the questioned decision or order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
The Court deems it proper to allow due course to the petition as one for certiorari under
Rule 65 in the broader interest of substantial justice, particularly because the NLRCs
appellate adjudication was set aside by the CA, and in order to put at rest the doubt
that the CA, in so doing, exercised its judicial authority oppressively. Whether the
petition was proper or not should be of less importance than whether the CA gravely
erred in undoing and setting aside the determination of the NLRC as a reviewing forum
vis--vis the Labor Arbiter. We note in this regard that the NLRC had declared the
dismissal of petitioner to be harsh and not commensurate to the infraction committed.
Given the spirit and intention underlying our labor laws of resolving a doubtful situation
in favor of the working man, we will have to review the judgment of the CA to ascertain
whether the NLRC had really committed grave abuse of its discretion. This will settle the
doubts on the propriety of terminating petitioner, and at the same time ensure that
justice is served to the parties.

CASE TITLE REPUBIC vs. BAKUNAWA

PROMULGATION
August 28, 2013
DATE
DOCTRINE: Only a preponderance of evidence was needed to prove its demand for
reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
FACTS:
Civil case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, restitution and damages
brought by the Republic against Respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa et. al, President
Marcos and his First Lady for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten
wealth.
The complaint alleged that Respondent had served as Imelda Marcos social secretary
during the Marcos administration, that it was during that period of her incumbency in
that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband had acquired assets and other
properties grossly disproportionate to her salaries and other lawful income.
Respondent alleged that they never served as Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos but
only an employee in the office of the Social Secretary, and that the properties they
acquired were purchased with honestly earned money.
PCGG offered the negotiated contracts which have been entered into when Luz
Bakunawa was a member of the Presidential Staff during the Marcos administration. But
this was done only to prove that the Bakunawas had been incorporators or owners or
had held key positiosn in the corporations that entered into the contracts.
The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of respondents for PCGGs failure to prove a

connection which would justify the action of the latter.
ISSUE:
1) What is the quantum of proof required in ill-gotten wealth cases.
2) WON the negotiated contracts were proven to be irregular.
RULING:
1) As what can be gleaned on Sec. 1 of E.O. 14-A, only a preponderance of
evidence was needed to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-
gotten wealth.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one

side is, as a whole, superior to that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance
of evidence refers to the comparative weight of the evidence presented by the
opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as "the weight, credit, and value

of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is usually considered to be

synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of
the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically

demurred to the evidence adduced against them. A demurrer to evidence is an
objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence that
his adversary produced, whether true or not, is insufficient in point of law to make
out a case or to sustain the issue. The demurring party thereby challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a judgment. The court, in passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to
support a verdict of guilt or liability.
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for
and to dismiss the case against the defendant should the scales hang in
equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence that tilts the scales to one or the
other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of proof has failed to establish its
case, and the parties are no better off than before they proceeded upon their
litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they are.
Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of
the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its
evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action. Similarly, when only
one side is able to present its evidence, and the other side demurs to the
evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the plaintiffs
evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the sheer
volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in its favor.
Quality, not quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.
2) No. the Sandiganbayan could not consider any evidence that was not formally
offered; and could consider evidence only for the purposes it was specifically
offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.
The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be
overemphasized. This need is designed to meet the demand for due process by
apprising the adverse party as well as the trial court on what evidence the court would
soon be called upon to decide the litigation. The offer and purpose will also put the trial
court in the position to determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or
denying admission to the evidence being offered.

CASE TITLE UCPB vs CHRISTOPHER and MILAGROS LUMBO

PROMULGATION
December 11, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 58 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, SEC 3
DOCTRINE: It was of no consequence at all that an ex parte application for the writ of
possession when Civil Case for the annulment of the foreclosure was already pending
in the RTC, for the settled jurisprudence is to the effect that the pendency of an action
for the annulment of the mortgage or of the foreclosure sale does not constitute a
legal ground to prevent the implementation of a writ of possession.
A right is in esse if it exists in fact. In the case of injunction, the right sought to be
protected should at least be shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made,
the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief.
FACTS:
The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB.

To secure the performance of their obligation, they constituted a real estate mortgage
on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklan and all the improvements thereon.
On November 11, 1998, UCPB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage upon
failure of the respondents to settle their obligation.
On January 12, 1999, during the foreclosure sale, UCPB emerged as the highest
bidder.
On February 18, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued and UCPB registered the
sale in its name. Then, the title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the
name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period.
On January 7, 2000, the respondents brought against UCPB in the RTC an action
for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the
consolidation of title, and damages (Civil Case No. 5920). During the pendency of the
latter, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover
possession of the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884) which the RTC granted the
same and issued the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to
place UCPB in the actual possession of the property.
On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed in the RTC handling Special
Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the
foreclosure sale and application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession. Thereafter,
both cases were consolidated.
On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter granted
the respondents petition. UCPB sought the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA
denied the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly granted the injunctive writ to enjoin the implementation of
the writ of possession the RTC had issued to place UCPB in the possession of the
mortgaged property.
RULING:
NO. The CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ,
and disregarded the patent fact that the respondents held no right in esse that the
injunctive writ they were seeking would protect.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency,
or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to
refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past. Under Section 3, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction may be justified
under any of the following circumstances enumerated therein.
In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,
the Court has stressed the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a
right in esse to be protected, stating: It is proper only when the applicant appears to be
entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the
right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a
prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for
the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima
facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a
cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed,
a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by
law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
However, the respondents made no such showing of their holding a right in esse.
They could not do so simply because their non-redemption within the period of
redemption had lost for them any right in the property, including its possession. The
absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compelling reason to undo the CA's
reversal of the RTC's denial of their application for injunction as well as to strike down
the injunctive relief the CA afforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they
had no "right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law".

CASE TITLE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MERALCO and NPC

PROMULGATION
December 11, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 65 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, SEC 7; RULE 18 CIVPRO, SEC 5
DOCTRINE: The intervening rendition by the trial court of a decision on the merits of the
case renders moot and academic the resolution of any issue raised on certiorari
against interlocutory orders setting the pre-trial and declaring the petitioner to have
waived its right to present its evidence. The resolution of the issue, having been pre-
empted by the decision in the main action, ceased to have any practical value.
FACTS:
On November 21, 1994, MERALCO and NAPOCOR had entered into the
Contract of Sale of Electricity (CSE) for 10 years. A provision of the CSE required
MERALCO to pay minimum monthly charges even if the actual volume of the power
and energy drawn from NAPOCOR fell below the stated minimum quantities. In the
years 2002, 2003 and 2004, due to circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the
parties, MERALCO drew from NAPOCOR electric power and energy less than the
minimum quantities stipulated in the CSE for those years. MERALCO did pay only the
charges for the electric power and energy actually taken. Thus, NAPOCOR served on
MERALCO a claim for undrawn electric power and energy. MERALCO objected to the
claim of NAPOCOR, and both agreed to submit their dispute to mediation.
On July 15, 2003, a Settlement Agreement was executed as a result of the
mediation which was duly approved by the respective Boards of MERALCO and
NAPOCOR. It contained a pass-through provision that allowed MERALCO to pay
NAPOCOR the net settlement amount from collections recovered from MERALCOs
consumers once the ERC approved the pass-through. Hence, NAPOCOR and
MERALCO filed on April 15, 2004 their joint application thereto. The joint application was
set for initial hearing and NAPOCOR was represented by OSG.
On July 10, 2006, MERALCO submitted its memorandum, and the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. Almost two years after the case was submitted for
resolution, the OSG, representing herein petitioner, filed in the ERC a motion for leave to
intervene with motion to admit its attached opposition. Then, ERC suspended the
proceedings and deferred the approval of the joint application. In this, MERALCO filed
an action for declaratory relief (Special Civil Action No. 3392) on November 23, 2009 in
the RTC in Pasig.
On September 16, 2010, the representative from the OSG appeared in the RTC
and moved to suspend the proceedings, but the RTC denied the motion. Subsequently,
the OSG filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings, and to refer the parties to
arbitration. However, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings
and to refer the parties to arbitration.
On November 4, 2010, the pre-trial was held; but, it was reset due to the non-
appearance of the representative of the OSG. Thereafter, OSG filed a motion to cancel

the pre- trial on its schedule date. On November 22, 2010, the petitioner brought in the
CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116863) a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction
(WPI), alleging that respondent RTC Judge had committed grave abuse of discretion.
During the reset date of the hearing, the OSG appeared in the RTC to argue for
the cancellation of the pre-trial. However, the RTC denied the motion to cancel the
pre-trial and instead declared the petitioner to have waived the right to participate in
the pre-trial and to present evidence. On December 1, 2010 and on February 3, 2011,
the CA granted TRO and WPI, repectively, enjoining the RTC Judge from conducting
further proceedings in Special Civil Action No. 3392 and from issuing orders and
performing other acts that would render the case moot and academic effective during
the pendency of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116863.
On October 14, 2011, the CA decided against petitioner and ordering the RTC to
proceed to trial. The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed an error in ignoring fundamental issues at the heart of the
controversy between petitioner and respondents, and thereby improvidently allowing
the trial court to proceed with s.c.a. case no. 3392.22
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for declaring the petitioners to have waived its right to present evidence
RULING:
NO. The CA directed the RTC to proceed to the trial on the merits in Special Civil Action
No. 3392, and to resolve the case with dispatch. It is worth mentioning at this juncture,
the RTC complied and ultimately rendered its decision on the merits in Special Civil
Action No. 3392 granting MERALCOs petition for declaratory relief and declaring the
Settlement Agreement between NAPOCOR and MERALCO as valid and binding, save
for the pass-through provision that was reserved for the consideration and approval of
the ERC. With the intervening rendition of the decision on the merits, the challenge
against the interlocutory orders of the RTC designed to prevent the RTC from
proceeding with the pre-trial and the trial on the merits was rendered moot and
academic. In other words, any determination of the issue on the interlocutory orders
was left without any practical value. A case that is moot and academic because of
supervening events ceases to present any justiciable controversy. The courts of law will
not determine moot and academic questions, for they should not engage in academic
declarations and determine moot questions.
Nonetheless, the Court considers it necessary to still deal with the contentions of the
petitioner in the interest of upholding the observations of the CA on the propriety of the
interlocutory orders of the RTC. Doing so will be instructive for the Bench and the
practicing Bar who may find themselves in similar situations.

The RTCs proceeding with the pre-trial set on November 24, 2010 was entirely in accord
with the Rules of Court. While it is true that the OSG had filed on November 22, 2010 the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the CA did not restrain the RTC from
thus proceeding. Absent any TRO or WPI stopping the RTC from proceeding, the mere
filing or pendency of the special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
did not interrupt the due course of the proceedings in the main case. This is quite clear
from the revised Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which mandated that the
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case. If the RTC not to proceed
with the pre-trial on its scheduled date despite the absence of any TRO or WPI enjoining
it from doing so could have subjected its Presiding Judge to an administrative charge.
Furthermore, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in deeming the petitioners right to participate in the pre-trial
and its right to present evidence as waived. The waiver appears to have been caused
by the deliberate refusal of the petitioners counsel to participate in the proceedings.

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, etc.

CITATION G.R. No. 88165/189063
PROMULGATION
December 11, 2013
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 65 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, SEC 1; ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS
CONSTITUTION, SEC 16
DOCTRINE: The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of
the writ. It must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in
a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On November 12, 2002, Congressman Villarama delivered privilege speech in
the House of Representative denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high
ranking government official whom he then called the 2 million dollar man.
On November 25, 2002, the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti-
Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the expose of the said
Congressman. Then, Cong. Villarama responded that it was Secretary of Justice whom
had knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose. However, the
latter denied the same. Thereafter, Congressman Jimenez delivered a speech in House
of Representatives contending the expose of Cong. Villarama and accusing Sec. Perez
of Extorting US$2M from him in February 2001.
On December 23, 2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his complaint-affidavit to the
Office of the Ombudsman. On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel created to
investigate Cong. Jimenezs criminal complaint which issued the Joint Resolution
recommending that the criminal informations be filed against respondents Secretary
Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernesto L. Escaler, Ramon C. Arceo and John Does.
On January 5, 2007, Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution. The
Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the respondents motion for
reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez approved this
resolution only on April 15, 2008. Ultimately, the informations charging the respondents
with four different crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez were all filed on
April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the commencement of Criminal Case No. SB-08-
CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding investigation
and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years
and five months.
In Criminal Case No. SB-08- CRM-0265, respondents moved to quash the
information for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The
Sandiganbayan 1st Division denied the motions to quash. Respondents separately

sought for reconsideration which was granted relying on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan. The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the
information. Thereafter, the Criminal Case was re-raffled to the 3rd Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The latter denied the Ombudsmans motion for reconsideration.
In Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266, Respondents filed motion to quash the
information charging robbery. However, the 2nd Division of Sandiganbayan denied the
same. Upon reconsideration, the motion was granted. The State moved to reconsider,
however, it was denied on June 19, 2009.
The State moved to reconsider the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court through petition for certiorari. Then, petitions were consolidated. The
State argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the
term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be
construed more liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the
Court, citing for that purpose the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran, Peligrino v.
People, and Chang v. People
ISSUES:
I. Whether the State, resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan dismissing the criminal charges against the respondents
through petitions for certiorari instead of petitions for review on certiorari.
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information by
applying the definition of transaction in Soriano, Jr. v Sandiganbayan
RULING:
I. YES. A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the
specific grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and can
prosper only the jurisdictional error, or the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the inferior court or
judge is alleged and proved to exist. In this jurisdiction, the exercise of the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the
instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue
the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose.
Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that; one, the tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Considering that the requisites must
concurrently be attendant, the herein petitioners stance that a writ
of certiorari should have been issued even if the CA found no showing of
grave abuse of discretion is absurd. The commission of grave abuse of
discretion was a fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to issue against
the RTC. Without their strong showing either of the RTCs lack or excess of

jurisdiction, or of grave abuse of discretion by the RTC amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction, the writ of certiorari would not issue for being bereft of
legal and factual bases. We need to emphasize, too, that
with certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, they must strictly observe the
rules laid down by law for granting the relief sought.
II. NO. In the instant case, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the
term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 has not
been overturned by the Court. The three cases the State has cited here did
not overturn the interpretation made in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as
used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 because the proper
interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases. And,
secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both
restrictively and liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing
crimes and laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly
against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them, and liberally
against the party sought to be charged. Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not
arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for failing to
properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019.

2014 CASES
CASE TITLE DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. vs. HANZ CALAPIZ,

REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA
CALAPIZ
PROMULGATION
January 15, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Tresvalles, Kris
TOPIC COVERED Remedial Law
DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
FACTS:
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-
year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital,
Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no
added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents consent, the petitioner performed
the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles were
swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner
forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents
protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess formation
between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought
about by Hanzs appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist,
who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent
cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanzs
parents brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the information was filed in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC.
RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence.
Court renders judgment acquitting the accused of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries, but ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioners civil liability despite his acquittal of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
259 Tresvalles, Tuason, Uy, Vizcarra, Yatco REMEDIAL LAW

RULING:
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be RULING liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must
be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist."
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not
prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the
criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of

conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in
determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on
mere preponderance of evidence.12 In this connection, the Court reminds that the
acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainants
recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a separate civil action for
that purpose.
The petitioners contention that he could not be RULING civilly liable because there was
no proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution
to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against
him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable.

CASE TITLE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUARIA

AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PROMULGATION
January 15, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: The foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor's default on the

principal obligation is premature, and should be undone for being void and ineffectual.
The mortgagee who has been meanwhile given possession of the mortgaged property
by virtue of a writ of possession issued to it as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may
be required to restore the possession of the property to the mortgagor and to pay
reasonable rent for the use of the property during the intervening period.
FACTS:
In July 1976, Guaria Corporation applied for a loan from DBP to finance the
development of its resort complex situated in Trapiche, Oton, Iloilo. The loan, in the
amount of P3,387,000.00, was approved on August 5, 1976.3Guaria Corporation
executed a promissory note that would be due on November 3, 1988.4 On October 5,
1976, Guaria Corporation executed a real estate mortgage over several real
properties in favor of DBP as security for the repayment of the loan. On May 17, 1977,
Guaria Corporation executed a chattel mortgage over the personal properties
existing at the resort complex and those yet to be acquired out of the proceeds of the
loan, also to secure the performance of the obligation. Prior to the release of the loan,
DBP required Guaria Corporation to put up a cash equity of P1,470,951.00 for the
construction of the buildings and other improvements on the resort complex.
The loan was released in several instalments, and Guaria Corporation used the
proceeds to defray the cost of additional improvements in the resort complex. In all, the
amount released totalled P3,003,617.49, from which DBP withRULING P148,102.98 as
interest.
Guaria Corporation demanded the release of the balance of the loan, but DBP
refused. Instead, DBP directly paid some suppliers of Guaria Corporation over the
latter's objection. DBP found upon inspection of the resort project, its developments and
improvements that Guaria Corporation had not completed the construction works.7In
a letter dated February 27, 1978,8 and a telegram dated June 9, 1978,9 DBP thus
demanded that Guaria Corporation expedite the completion of the project, and
warned that it would initiate foreclosure proceedings should Guaria Corporation not
do so.
Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guaria Corporation, DBP initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A notice of foreclosure sale was sent to Guaria
Corporation. The notice was eventually published, leading the clients and patrons of

Guaria Corporation to think that its business operation had slowed down, and that its
resort had already closed.
On January 6, 1979, Guaria Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific
performance of the latter's obligations under the loan agreement, and to stop the
foreclosure of the mortgages (Civil Case No. 12707).12However, DBP moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, stating that the mortgaged properties had already been
sold to satisfy the obligation of Guaria Corporation at a public auction RULING on
January 15, 1979 at the Costa Mario Resort Beach Resort in Oton, Iloilo.13 Due to this,
Guaria Corporation amended the complaint on February 6, 197914 to seek the
nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation of the certificate of
sale.
In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ADHERED TO THE USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN DECIDING C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 59491 AND THEREFORE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE "LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE.
RULING:
The doctrine of law of the case did not apply herein.
DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP already constituted the
law of the case. Hence, the CA could not decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491
differently.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and
means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court
has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that
case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may
have been reversed in other casesBut the law of the case, as the name implies,
concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's
insistence to be unwarranted.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of the writ of
possession was entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific performance
herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal concerning the
issuance of the writ of possession while the main case was pending, was not at all
intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491,
which was the appeal to determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was valid and
effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question
of law involved herein because this case for specific performance was not a
continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.

CASE TITLE HERMINIA ACBANG, Petitioner, vs.HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR.
CITATION G.R. No. G.R. No. 164246
PROMULGATION
January 15, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, the
defendant must perfect an appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically deposit
the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of
execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Spouses Lopez) commenced an
ejectment suit against the petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean
(Acbangs) in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64).
The defendants did not file their answer. Thus, the MTC rendered its decision on January
12, 2004 in favor of the Spouses Lopez. In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for
the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants
had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the
motion for execution pending appeal, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to
move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate
execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the
supersedeas bond unnecessary.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Luczon committed grave error in granting the motion for immediate
execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond as prayed for
by the Acbangs.
RULING:
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless
an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits
with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the
Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which
the action is appealed.

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession
of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while
the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must
concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3)
he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the
appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground
for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being
"ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal
but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the
supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an
appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming
due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that
the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court
may issue an order for the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez
are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the immediate execution
of the judgment in view of the Ac bangs failure to comply with all of the three
abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice
of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate
execution without the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond and the deposit of the
accruing rentals.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R TC favored the petitioner because
it declared the judgment of the MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of
jurisdiction over her person. The RTC thus directed the MTC to cause the service of the
summons on her and to conduct further proceedings without any delay. In effect, the
supervening declaration of the nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed
against her has rendered moot and academic the issue in this special civil action as far
as she was concerned.

CASE TITLE PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC vs. FAR
EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY
PROMULGATION
January 20, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for
annulment. Worthy to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification
and submission of the affidavits of witnesses is to bring all the relevant facts that will
enable the CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has substantial
merit.
FACTS:
On various dates in 1993, Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of petitioner
corporation (Pinausukan, for short), executed four real estate mortgages involving the
petitioners 517 square meter parcel of land situated in Pasay City3 in favor of Far East
Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of Philippine Islands). The parcel of land was
registered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126636 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay
City under the name of Pinausukan.4 When the unpaid obligation secured by the
mortgages had ballooned to P15,129,303.67 as of June 2001, the Bank commenced
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages on August 13, 2001 in the
Office of the Ex Officio Sheriff, Regional Trial Court (RTC), in Pasay City.5 Two weeks
thereafter, the sheriff issued the notice of sheriffs sale, setting the public auction on
October 8, 2001.
Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the
mortgages, Pinausukan brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the
annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC on October 4, 2001 (Civil Case No. 01-
0300), averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and
had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without Pinausukans consent
through a board resolution. Pinausukan applied for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Bank and the sheriff from
proceeding with the extrajudicial foreclosure and the public auction. On October 31,
2002, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 01-0300 for failure to prosecute. On June 24,
2003, the sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the property of
Pinausukan.
Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the
order of October 31, 2002 dismissing Civil Case No. 01-0300. Its petition stated that its
counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of
the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments on
the case.

The CA dismissed the petition for annulment citing the failure to attach the affidavits of
witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of
action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; and observing that the
verified petition related only to the correctness of its allegations, a requirement entirely
different and separate from the affidavits of witnesses required under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for attaching the affidavits of witnesses to the petition for
annulment should be relaxed
RULING:
Pinausukans petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective
The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukans disregard of the fourth requirement

mentioned earlier consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the
affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action. It is true that the
petition, which narrated the facts relied upon, was verified under oath by Roxanne.
However, the submission of the affidavits of witnesses together with the petition was not
dispensable for that reason. We reiterate with approval the CAs emphatic observation
in the resolution of July 31, 2003 dismissing the petition for annulment to the effect that
Roxannes verification related only "to the correctness of the allegations in the petition"
and was "not the same or equivalent to the affidavit of witnesses that the above-cited
Rule requires." To us, indeed, the true office of the verification is merely to secure an
assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct and not the product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith.52
Pinausukans failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for
annulment. Worthy to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification
and submission of the affidavits of witnesses is to bring all the relevant facts that will
enable the CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has substantial
merit. In that regard, however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only
by the affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances
constituting the extrinsic fraud can the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied
upon as the ground for its petition for annulment. This is because extrinsic fraud cannot
be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be particularized as
to the facts constitutive of it. The distinction between the verification and the affidavits
is made more pronounced when an issue is based on facts not appearing of record. In
that instance, the issue may be heard on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, subject to the court directing that the matter be heard wholly or
partly on oral testimony or depositions.

CASE TITLE HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE

PROMULGATION
February 17, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court."
FACTS:
this case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don
Filemon Y. Sotto (Filemon) respecting four real properties that had belonged to
Filemons estate (Estate of Sotto). It seems that the disposition by the Court of the
previous cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the successors-in-
interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the previous
cases either directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision
promulgated on November 29, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared their
action for the partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments
previously rendered, and the resolution promulgated on August 5, 2003 denying their
motion for reconsideration. On July 22, 2013, Atty. Mahinay submitted a so-called
Compliance (With Humble Motion for Reconsideration) containing his explanations,
praying that he not be sanctioned for violating the rule against forum shopping, as
follows:
1. The first three cases did not resolve the issues raised in Civil Case No. CEB-24393;
2. Marcelo Sottos cause of action arose only when respondent Palicte violated her
"hypothetically admitted" agreement with Marcelo Sotto;
3. He (Atty. Mahinay) was not the one who had prepared and signed the
complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24393, although he assumed the responsibility as
to its filing;
4. He (Atty. Mahinay) had filed a motion for referral or consolidation of Civil Case
No. CEB-24293 with the intestate proceedings of the Estate of Filemon Y. Sotto,
and
5. He (Atty. Mahinay) had acted in good faith in assisting the administrator of the
Estate of Filemon Y. Sotto in filing the Motion to Require Matilde Palicte To Turn
Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners' counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay, committed forum
shopping.

RULING:
There is no question that the ultimate objective of each of the actions was the return of
the properties to the Estate in order that such properties would be partitioned among
the heirs. In the other cases, the petitioners failed to attain the objective because
Palictes right in the properties had been declared exclusive. There was between Civil
Case No. CEB-24293 and the other cases a clear identity of the parties, of subject
matter, of evidence, and of the factual and legal issues raised. The Court saw through
the petitioners "ploy to countermand the previous decisions sustaining Palictes rights
over the properties."
Secondly, Atty. Mahinay asserts good faith in the filing Civil Case No. CEB-
24293.1wphi1 He points out that an associate lawyer in his law office prepared and
filed the complaint without his law firm being yet familiar with the incidents in the
intestate proceedings involving the Estate, or with those of the previous three cases
mentioned in the decision of June 13, 2013.11 He posits that such lack of knowledge of
the previous cases shows his good faith, and rules out deliberate forum shopping on his
part and on the part of his law firm.
Rather than prove good faith, the filing of the complaint, "simply guided by the facts as
narrated and the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners," smacked of
professional irresponsibility. It is axiomatic that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. As such, his claim of good faith was utterly
baseless and unfounded.
Even assuming that Atty. Mahinay did not himself prepare the complaint, it remains that
he subsequently personally handled the case.
The insistence cannot command belief. The disclosure alone of the pendency of a
similar case does not negate actual forum shopping. Had Atty. Mahinay been sincere,
the least he could have done was to cause the dismissal of the action that replicated
those already ruled against his clients. The records show otherwise. The filing of the
Motion to Require Matilde Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by
the Estate in Her Possession on June 7, 2000, a day after the trial court denied his motion
for reconsideration in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, was undeniably another attempt of the
petitioners and Atty. Mahinay to obtain a different resolution of the same claim.
Needless to observe, the motion reiterated the allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-24293,
and was the subject of the petition in The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto vs. Palicte.19
The acts of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forum
shopping shall be ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as be a cause for administrative sanctions against
the lawyer.20 Forum shopping can be committed in either of three ways, namely: (1)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having
been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not willful
and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of
the two grounds mentioned above. But if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate,
both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.21
If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. But if the
forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
In view of the foregoing, Atty. Mahinay was guilty of forum shopping.

CASE TITLE BJDC CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER/PROPRIETOR

JANET S. DELA CRUZ, vs. NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO,
JANET E. LANUZO, JOAN BERNABE E. LANUZO, RYAN JOSEE LANUZO
PROMULGATION
March 24, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Tuason, Jannelle
DOCTRINE: The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the
burden to establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on
negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.
FACTS:
Nena filed a complaint for damages against BJDC Construction. Nena alleged that she
was the surviving spouse Balbino Lanuzo who figured in the accident that transpired at
the site of the re-blocking work of BJDC; that Balbinos Honda motorcycle sideswiped
the road barricade placed by BJDC in the right lane portion of the road, causing him to
lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in his
instant death; and that BJDCs failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of
the project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the death of
Balbino. She prayed that the company be held liable for damages.
In its answer, BJDC denied Nenas allegations of negligence, insisting that it had
installed warning signs and lights along the highway and on the barricades of the
project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were working and switched on; that
its project was duly inspected by the DPWH, Office of the Mayor of Pili, and Pili
Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures to
ensure the safety of motorists. BJDC further alleged that since the start of the project, it
installed several warning signs. BJDC insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident
brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police investigation report
that stated, among others, that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and
the accident occurred while Balbino was overtaking another motorcycle; and that the
police report also stated that the road sign/barricade installed on the road had a light.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of BJDC. On appeal to the CA, it reversed the ruling of
RTC and ruled in favor of Balbinos heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not who among the parties were able to prove their case by the required
preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
RULING:
BJDC Construction. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it

because a mere allegation is not evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no
burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if
the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required
by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or
impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if
proved, will exculpate him from liability.
Based on the evidence adduced, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to BJDC

considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in
the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any
instrumentality within the exclusive control of BJDC. In contrast, Balbino had the
exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records
disclose that he did not take the necessary precautions. Balbino overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting a barricade
at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road.
This causation of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by Balbinos heirs.
Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project had been going on for more than a
month and was already in the completion stage. Balbino, who had passed there on a
daily basis in going to and from his residence and the school where he then worked as
the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could Balbinos
heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that
Balbinos motorcycle was equipped with headlights that would have enabled him at
dusk or night time to see the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still
occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of care expected
of him as a prudent motorist.
According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal depressed fracture
at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head
landing on the cemented road after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that
it was shown that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet at the
time of the accident, he was guilty of negligence in that respect. Had he worn the
protective head gear or helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.
The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the company was not
negligent in ensuring safety at the project site. All the established circumstances
showed that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own
negligence. Hence, Balbinos heirs could not recover damages.

CASE TITLE LEONORA PASCUAL vs. JOSEFINO DAQUIOAG

PROMULGATION
March 31, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: The writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the
ownership of land to a party may authorize putting her in possession although the
judgment does not specifically direct such act.
FACTS:
Pascual filed a Free Patent Application over the lots located at Brgy. No. 7, Alejo
Malasig (Pait), Vintar, Ilocos Norte. Villamor presented a protest, claiming that petitioner
had no right to apply for title over the properties. The Executive Director of Region I of
the DENR rejected the free patent application of Petitioner.
Pascual appealed to the Secretary of the DENR, who affirmed the decision of the
Regional Executive Director. Pascual thereafter appealed to the Office of the President
(OP), which affirmed the decision of the Secretary of the DENR. Still dissatisfied with the
result, Pascual elevated the decision of the OP to the CA by petition for review, but the
CA outrightly denied due course to her petition for review because of procedural
lapses. The decision of the OP attained finality.
On July 3, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued the writ of execution
directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte to execute the decision. Accordingly, respondent Daquioag issued
a memorandum directing respondents to implement the writ of execution against
Pascual. The execution proceedings were carried out on July 27, 2000.
Assailing the issuance of the memorandum and the execution proceedings, Pascual
brought a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of writ of injunction in
the RTC. She claimed in her petition that Daquioag had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the memorandum to
execute the decision "by placing Villamor in possession of the premises in question"
because the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR did not authorize
or direct such action; that placing Villamor in possession of the properties would be
tantamount to her being ejected without due process of law. Respondents filed their
answer with counter-claim and with motion to dismiss, maintaining that the writ of
execution conformed to the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 and
the phrase "placing the winning party" found in the memorandum was but the logical
interpretation of the decision of said Regional Executive Director. RTC dismissed
Pascual's petition. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of execution issued was in accordance with the judgment to be
executed.
RULING:
Yes. Admittedly, the phrase "placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in
the premises of the land in question" was not expressly stated in the dispositive portion
of the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the absence of that
phrase did not render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full
consonance with the decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to
what appears on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Under the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, as upheld by the
Secretary of the DENR and the OP, the three lots subject of Pascual's free patent
application were covered by the Titulo Propiedad of Marcos Baria, the predecessor-in-
interest of Villamor. The appellee, derives her claim from the title 'Titulo de Propiedad of
her late [great] grandfather issued on June 14, 1895 which she inherited by operation of
law, whereas, the appellant anchors his claim on the alleged deeds of sale executed in
1983 by third persons not related nor privy to appellee, covering the lots in question
which are portions of the titled property one of which deeds of sale is even inexistent.
The denial of Pascual's free patent application was based on the recognition of
Villamor's ownership of the subject properties. The consequence of the denial was the
directive for Pascual to refrain from entering the property, and from possessing the
subject property declared to be owned by Villamor. Upon the final finding of the
ownership in the judgment in favor of Villamor, the delivery of the possession of the
property was deemed included in the decision, considering that the claim itself of
Pascual to the possession had been based also on ownership.
Accordingly, Respondent's memorandum placing Villamor in possession of the

properties was not inconsistent with the decision of the Regional Executive Director of
the DENR, as affirmed by the OP. With the clear recognition of Villamor's ownership, and
in default of any credible showing by Pascual of any valid justification for her to
continue in possession of the properties despite the denial of her free patent
application, possession must be restored to Villamor as the rightful owner and possessor
of the properties.
Hence, Respondent's assailed memorandum could not be disparaged as having been

issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The
RTC correctly held that placing Villamor in possession of the properties was necessary to
give effect to the order requiring Pascual to refrain from entering the premises.

CASE TITLE AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND
MAGDALENA YBAEZ
PROMULGATION
April 21, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: Any factual issue not included in the pre-trial order will not be heard and
considered at the trial, much less, on appeal.
FACTS:
Aznar Brothers filed in the RTC a complaint against Jose R. Ybaez claiming absolute
ownership of Lot No. 18563 by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor
by Casimiro Ybanez. Alleging that the free patent issued in favor of Jose R. Ybaez
covered the same property already adjudicated as private property, Jose R. Ybaez
moved to dismiss the complaint of Aznar Brothers. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss. Thereafter, Jose R. Ybaez filed his answer to the complaint.
In its reply, Aznar Brothers averred that Jose R. Ybaez did not present records or
certification as to the ownership of the land at the time of the application for free
patent xxx to prove that the land xxx is not a private land. In the course of the case,
Aznar Brothers amended its complaint to allege the sale executed. Aznar Brothers
amended its complaint a second time to implead Jose R. Ybaezs wife Magdalena
Marcos-Ybaez as defendant and sought a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the Spouses Ybaez from disposing of the land. It further sought
the cancellation of OCT No. 2150; an order directing the Register of Deeds to issue
another title in its name; the ouster of the Spouses Ybaez from the property; the
permanent injunction to prevent Spouses Ybaez from interfering with or disturbing its
possession and ownership of Lot No. 18563; and judgment ordering the Spouses Ybaez
to pay damages and the cost of the suit.
The Ybaez Spouses opposed the admission of the second amended complaint
however, RTC admitted the second amended complaint, emphasizing that the original
cause of action of accion publiciana would not be changed because the second
amended complaint would incorporate additional but related causes of action, a
change permitted only during the pre-trial stage.
The RTC rendered judgment after trial, declaring that the identity of the land sold to
Aznar Brothers by Casimiro and the land sold by the heirs of Casimiro to Ybaez was
not an issue anymore because it was not raised as an issue during the pre-trial
conference. Aznar Brothers appealed to the CA but the same affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not matters not raised as issue during the pre-trial can still be belatedly
raised during trial.
RULING:
No. The holding by both lower courts was proper and correct. The non-inclusion in the
pre-trial order barred the identity of the property in litis as an issue, for it is basic that any
factual issue not included in the pre-trial order will not be heard and considered at the
trial, much less, on appeal. The parties had the obligation to disclose during the pre-trial
all the issues they intended to raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or
impeaching matters, for the rule is that the definition of issues during the pre-trial
conference will bar the consideration of others, whether during trial or on appeal. The
basis of the exclusion is that the parties are concluded by the delimitation of the issues
in the pre-trial order because they themselves agreed to it.
The waiver of the identity of the property in litis as an issue did not violate the right of
any of the parties herein due to the Rules of Court having forewarned them in Section
7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court that should the action proceed to trial, the pre-trial order
would explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried, and its contents would control the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest
injustice.
In reality, the parties could still have reversed the waiver had they so wanted. Towards
that end, they had three opportunities after the issuance of the pre-trial order to submit
the identity of the property in litis as an issue for trial and decision. The first was for either
of them to seek the modification of the pre-trial order prior to the trial in order to
prevent manifest injustice, but neither did so. The second was for either of them to have
the trial court consider the identity of the property in litis as an issue proper for the trial,
but such party must give a special reason to justify the trial court in doing so. This would
have been authorized under Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. Again, neither of
them seized such opportunity. And the third was for the Spouses Ybaez to adduce
evidence on Lot No. 18563 being different from the land claimed by Aznar Brothers.
Had they done so, Aznar Brothers could have either allowed such evidence without
objection, or objected to such evidence on the ground of its not being relevant to any
issue raised in the pleadings or in the pre-trial order. The RTC could then have
proceeded as it deemed fit, including allowing such evidence. This procedure would
have been authorized by Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
Moreover, for the Spouses Ybaez to call upon the Court now to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again upon such a factual matter would be impermissible
considering that the Court is not a trier of facts. Accordingly, the Court, just as the lower
courts have been bound, shall proceed upon the assumption that the property in
litis and Lot No. 18563 were one and the same realty.

CASE TITLE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R.

TANTOCO, JR., DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
IMELDA MARCOS, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA R.
TANTOCO, AND MARIA LOURDES TANTOCO-PINEDA
PROMULGATION
April 21, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in
issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts
known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by
clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from
also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.
FACTS:
The Republic, through the PCGG, commenced a complaint for "reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages" against the respondents. Instead of
filing an Answer, respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion To Strike Out Some
Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars," which were both denied for lack of
bases.
Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated

"Interrogatories to Plaintiff." A month later, they filed both an "Amended Interrogatories
to Plaintiff" and a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. This time, the
Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. When the PCGG elevated the issue to the
Supreme Court, this Court affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan.
Pre-trial commenced, the PCGG produced documents before Atty. Renato T. Bocar
and respondents counsel. Thereafter, pre-trial was declared closed. The temporary
markings of Exhibits together with their sub-markings, were adopted. However, over the
objections of respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and caused the
pre-marking of additional documents.
Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court," claiming that
the additional documents were never produced at the discovery proceedings and
praying that petitioner be sanctioned for contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion. Trial proceeded; however, new documents not shown at discovery were still
being marked. Tantoco and Santiago again filed a "Motion to Ban Plaintiff From
Offering Exhibits Not Earlier Marked During the Discovery Proceedings," which the graft
court denied.
Petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. Sandiganbayan ruled that with the
exception of some documents, "all Exhibits... are denied admission. The due execution

and authenticity of these documents remain challenged since the prosecution failed to
show otherwise." On petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan partly
relented and admitted the documents. Respondents, in turn, filed their Motion for
Reconsideration, to which the graft court issued the assailed Resolution stating that the
plaintiff must be prevented from offering in evidence all the documents that were not
produced and exhibited at the time the plaintiff was under a directive to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding
the documents due to petitioners own failure to produce them at the pre-trial.
RULING:
No. Aside from lack of authentication and failure to present the originals of these
documents, what ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner in the view of the graft
court was the formers lack of forthrightness in complying with the Supreme Court
directive. Petitioner failed to obey the mandate of G.R. No. 90478, which remains an
important case on pre-trial and discovery measures to this day. It is the duty of each
contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present
to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing
nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the
technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his
knowledge.
After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it was clearly
ordered by both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to do so, petitioner also
repeatedly failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the documents.
Having failed in its belated attempts to assuage the Sandiganbayan through the
submission of secondary evidence, petitioner may not use the present forum to gain
relief under the guise of Rule 65.
Dissenting:
To conclude that the Republic lacked forthrightness in complying with the order for the
production of documents from the fact that, as stated in the Sandiganbayans
Resolution, the Republic had "fail[ed] to offer a plausible explanation for its
concealment of the main bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a directive to
produce them xxx giv[ing] rise to a reasonable inference that the plaintiff, at the very
outset, had no intention whatsoever of complying with the directive of the Court" is
unwarranted. Bad faith or willfulness should not be inferred from the mere failure of the
Republic to render a plausible explanation. Good faith should be presumed in favor of
the Republic. The respondents still carried the burden to show that the failure to
produce the documents during the discovery proceeding had been in bad faith or
willful. Absent such showing, the Republic should not be sanctioned with exclusion of its
evidence.

CASE TITLE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. JUDGE HONTANOSAS , RTC Br. 16,
CEBU CITY
PROMULGATION
June 25, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Uy, Alexander Charles L.
TOPIC COVERED Rule 4 (Section 2); Rule 58 (Section 3)
DOCTRINE: Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the party
applying for the same has a right to be protected, and that the acts complained of
are in violation of such right. It should not decide the merits of the case or decide
controverted facts for it is a preventive remedy, and it only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injury until the rights of the parties can be
settled.
Well-settled is the rule that personal actions are filed in the place of residence of the
plaintiff or the residence of the defendant at the election of the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Private respondents (Spouses Silverio, Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes, Erlinda Facultad,
and XM Facultad Development Corporation) commenced a civil case against herein
petitioner (BPI) for the declaration of nullity of several promissory notes, chattel and real
estate mortgages, and surety agreements. The private respondents also sought for a
writ of preliminary injunction. From the complaint of the private respondents, it became
clear that they had entered into all of the contracts mentioned above, but because of
the financial turmoil as a result of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, they could no longer
pay their obligations, thus, they sought the writ of injunction in order to prevent herein
petitioner from foreclosing on the agreements.
In their opposition to the complaint, BPI sought to dismiss the action on the ground, inter
alia, that the venue was improperly laid. On June 5, 2011, respondent (Judge
Hontanosas) granted the relief prayed for at the same time that he denied the motion
to dismiss filed by petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA to question the
issuance of the writ. The CA, however, did not dissolve the writ, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not the venue was improperly laid?
b. Whether or not there was a mistake in the issuance of the questioned writ?
RULING:
a. The Court ruled in the negative and that the venue was not improperly laid. XM
Facultad Development Corporation, one of the principal plaintiffs in this case,
had its address in Cebu City. It is a well-settled rule that the plaintiff has the
choice in regards as to where to file the action, provided that the action was
filed in a place where he or if there be multiple plaintiffs, where one of them

resides, or at the place of the residence of the defendant, at the election of the
plaintiff.
b. The Court ruled in the affirmative and said that there was a mistake in the
issuance of the writ. Under the Rules of Court, a writ of preliminary injunction
would issue only when the applicant could show that he has a right and that the
action subject of the writ threatens to violate such right. In the instant case,
private respondents could not prove that they have a right to prevent the
foreclosure, indeed, they had already admitted that the foreclosure was regular
and that as a part of the contract, petitioner had the right to foreclose the same.

CASE TITLE MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS, INC. V MARGARET DEFENSOR

PROMULGATION
June 16, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Uy, Alexander Charles L.
TOPIC COVERED Rule 128 (Section 2) vis-a-vis Rule 133
DOCTRINE: In labor cases, the rules on the degree of proof are enforced not as
stringently as in other cases to better serve the higher ends of justice. This leniency is
intended to afford the employee every opportunity to level the playing field.
FACTS:
Respondent (Margaret Defensor) was employed by petitioner corporation as Associate
and later as Group Publisher. As Group Publisher, respondent wrote and proposed to
petitioner Sarita Yap, Executive Vice President of the company, on February, 1999, a
commission and incentive plan which Yap modified before accepting, crossing out two
items and proposing instead that outright commissions be given and that, if
acceptable, respondents should draft something for Yap to sign and also for
respondent to announce the possibility of a 14th month pay.
In December, 1999, respondent left the company, but because she had not been
given her commissions and bonus, she filed a case before the LA asking for the same.
Yap replied that because respondent had not communicated anything in regards to
her February 1999 proposal, Yap assumed that respondent was amenable to the same.
The LA dismissed her complaint for failure to present evidence in regards to the
February 1999 schedule, as did the NLRC. At the NLRC, however, respondent sought to
introduce additional evidence, which, however, was denied by the NLRC. The CA
initially dismissed her appeal, but upon motion for reconsideration, the CA remanded
the case to the NLRC for reception of evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner went before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can introduce evidence for the first time on appeal?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative and allowed the reception of the evidence. The
Court, however, held that the remand of the CA was in error. The evidence in question
had already been attached to the pleadings filed before the NLRC, hence, there was
no need to remand the same. As a rule, the NLRC can accept evidence for the first
time on appeal. The Court noted that the stringent rules on degree of proof are not
enforced as stringently in labor cases in order to level the playing field between the
employee and the employers.

CASE TITLE ARAULLO vs. AQUINO

PROMULGATION
July 1, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Vizcarra, WIlliam
TOPIC COVERED RULE 65 CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL REVIEW
DOCTRINE: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered
moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character
and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
Transcendental importance is a ground to waive locus standi.
FACTS:
Nine petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP. All the
petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the
issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders.
The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in
the absence of adverse claims between the parties; that the petitioners lacked legal
standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered
any injury as a result of the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their
being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to
sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of
NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending power of Congress; and
that even if the petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of law available to them, like assailing the regularity of
the DAP and related issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA) or in the trial
courts
The respondents further aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition
are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP,
NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances implementing the DAP.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing the DAP;
2. Whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination
3. Whether the petitioner have a legal standing.
RULING:
1. Yes
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
Prohibition, on the other hand, is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings
when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or
are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
2. Yes
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The

incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and
its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The
issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged
executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments
by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and
expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been
allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive
acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the
Court.
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a
supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court
had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the cases being rendered
moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when there was a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional character
and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the DAP were ultimately
sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely come under all the
exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising its power of judicial
review.
3. Yes
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient
interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them.
Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the Supreme Court ruled that the assertion
of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional
executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the
public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the
action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates
in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of
a public right. The Court likewise cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc., to explain that standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because
in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the
controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the
issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate
public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that
are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad
and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

CASE TITLE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. OILINK INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION
PROMULGATION
July 2, 2014
DATE
TOPIC COVERED JURISDICTION OF CTA; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
DOCTRINE: Exhaustion of administrative remedy would be unavailing if it was the

Commissioner of Customs himself who was demanding from the taxpayer payment of
tax liability.
FACTS:
On July 8, 1999, Oilink formally protested the assessment on the ground that it was not
the party liable for the assessed deficiency taxes.
On July 12, 1999, Commissioner Tan communicated in writing the detailed computation
of the tax liability, stressing that the Bureau of Customs (BoC) would not issue any
clearance to Oilink unless the amount demanded as Oilinks tax liability be first paid.
On July 30, 1999, Oilink appealed to the CTA, seeking the nullification of the assessment
for having been issued without authority and with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction because the Government was thereby shifting the
imposition from URC to Oilink.
The CTA rendered its decision declaring as null and void the assessment of the
Commissioner of Customs.
Aggrieved, the Commissioner of Customs brought a petition for review in the CA upon
the following issues, namely: (a) the CTA gravely erred in holding that it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter; and (b) the CTA gravely erred in holding that Oilink had a
cause of action.
The Commissioner of Customs posits that the final demand letter from which Oilink
appealed was not the final "action" or "ruling" from which an appeal could be taken;
that what Section 7 of RA No. 1125 referred to as a decision that was appealable to the
CTA was a judgment or order of the Commissioner of Customs that was final in nature,
not merely an interlocutory one; that Oilink did not exhaust its administrative remedies
under Section 2308 of the Tariff and Customs Code by paying the assessment under
protest; that only when the ensuing decision of the Collector and then the adverse
decision of the Commissioner of Customs would it be proper for Oilink to seek judicial
relief from the CTA; and that, accordingly, the CTA should have dismissed the petition
for lack of cause of action.
CA, in both issues, ruled in favor of Oilink.

ISSUE:
1. Whether CTA had jurisdiction over the subject matter; and
2. Whether Oilink had a cause of action.
RULING:
1. Yes.
There is no question that the CTA had the jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No.
1125, the law creating the CTA, defined the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA as follows:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive

appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxxx
2. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for

Customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of
property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto;
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs;
2. Yes.
The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was not an iron-clad rule

because there were instances in which the immediate resort to judicial action was
proper. This was one such exceptional instance when the principle does not apply. As
the records indicate, the Commissioner of Customs already decided to deny the
protest by Oilink on July 12, 1999, and stressed then that the demand to pay was final. In
that instance, the exhaustion of administrative remedies would have been an exercise
in futility because it was already the Commissioner of Customs demanding the
payment of the deficiency taxes and duties.

CASE TITLE ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE

PROMULGATION
July 23, 2014
DATE
DOCTRINE: The prescription of the wrong penalties is invalid and ineffectual for being
done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Note: The doctrine related to Remedial Law has no connection to the facts and issue.
FACTS:
On February 17, 2004, the Regional Trial Court found Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue
Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) guilty of 18 counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction
of the petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC.
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several
counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents on the
basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as
Revenue District Officer; that the acts imputed to him did not constitute negligence;
and that he could not be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation
through negligence at the same time.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA and RTC failed to promulgate the proper judgment?
RULING:
Yes.
The CA and the RTC failed to decree in favor of the Government the return of the
amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to
pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which
the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. The Court emphasized in
Bacolod v. People, it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a
waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if

it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted
by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the
fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard
compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant
of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction
of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court,
as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination
of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering
justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done
without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.

CASE TITLE NURSERY CARE CORPORATION vs. ACEVEDO

PROMULGATION
July 30, 2014
DATE
TOPIC COVERED APPEAL CIVIL POCEDURE
DOCTRINE: An appeal from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed, and that an appeal erroneously taken to the CA shall be out rightly
dismissed.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed their respective petitions for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court
questioning the act of the City Treasurer of Manila of assessing and collecting business
taxes under Section 21of Ordinance 7807, on top of other business taxes also assessed
and collected under the previous sections of the same ordinance is a violation of the
provisions of Section 143 of the Local Government Code.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the petitioners appealed to the
CA.
The CA denied the petitioners appeal, it held that the present appeal in these
consolidated cases does not necessitate the calibration of the whole evidence as
there is no question or doubt as to the truth or the falsehood of the facts obtaining
herein, as both parties agree thereon. The present case involves a question of law that
would not lend itself to an examination or evaluation by this Court of the probative
value of the evidence presented.
Thus the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant petition for lack of jurisdiction under
Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure which states:
"Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. An appeal under

Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by
said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for
review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA properly denied due course to the appeal for raising pure
questions of law.

RULING:
The CA did not err in dismissing the appeal, but the rules should be liberally applied for
the sake of justice and equity
The Rules of Court provides three modes of appeal from the decisions and final orders
of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where
the decisions and final orders were rendered in civil or criminal actions by the RTC in the
exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review under Rule 42, where the decisions
and final orders were rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of
appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court
only on questions of law.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is well established. On
the one hand, a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; on the other, there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellants
notice of appeal filed in the trial court, and from the appellants brief submitted to the
appellate court. In this case, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal in which they
contended that the April 26, 2002 decision and the order of July 17, 2002 issued by the
RTC denying their consolidated motion for reconsideration were contrary to the facts
and law obtaining in the consolidated cases. In their consolidated memorandum filed
in the CA, they essentially assailed the RTCs ruling that the taxes imposed on and
collected from the petitioners under Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila
constituted double taxation in the strict, narrow or obnoxious sense. Considered
together, therefore, the notice of appeal and consolidated memorandum evidently
did not raise issues that required the reevaluation of evidence or the relevance of
surrounding circumstances.
The CA rightly concluded that the petitioners thereby raised only a question of law. The
dismissal of their appeal was proper, strictly speaking, because Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court provides that an appeal from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of
law shall be dismissed, and that an appeal erroneously taken to the CA shall be out
rightly dismissed.

CASE TITLE VINUYA vs. ROMULO

PROMULGATION
August 13,2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Vizcarra, William
TOPIC COVERED RULE 65 CERTIORARI; RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
DOCTRINE: There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received.
Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, the court cannot direct the
Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner.
FACTS:
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1)
that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the
waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (2) that
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (3) that
petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents.
The petition for certiorari contains the following averments, viz:
82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women system,"
approached the Executive Department through the Department of Justice in
order to request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations
in the Philippines;
83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file
a claim against the said Japanese officials and military officers;
84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turn approached the Department of Foreign

Affairs, Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file
their claim against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but
their efforts were similarly and carelessly disregarded.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari was timely

2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the injunction
RULING:
1.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing of the special civil action for certiorari was
timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives
the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To
establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed
judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be
dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates
determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has
emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge Development Corporation:
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in
a matter involving strict observance with the Rules.
The petition mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached the
Department of Justice for assistance, but does not specifically state when they
received the denial of their request for assistance by the Executive Department of the
Government. This alone warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for
assistance in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way beyond
the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify the Courts acts of
disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is
neither a natural right nor an essential element of due process; a writ of certiorari is a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in
the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for

it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the
Rules.
2.
The Court cannot grant petitioners prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the
main case, and is subject to the latters outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. It is
provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency
of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action. Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is
no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal
action.
In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act.

Hence, it is an extreme remedy, to be granted only if the following requisites are
attendant, namely:
(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;
(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of
the applicant which should be protected. Moreover, extreme caution must be
observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is
fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against
the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the
Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot
direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our
foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

CASE TITLE MAGSINO vs. DE OCAMPO

PROMULGATION
August 18, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Vizcarra, William
TOPIC COVERED RULE 42 APPEAL; RULE 1 SEC. 6 LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but
merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. Being the
party who sought to appeal, he must comply with the requirements of the relevant
rules; otherwise, he would lose the statutory right to appeal.
The insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled with the unjustified refusal of the
petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement
justified the dismissal of his petition.
The liberal construction of the Rules in exceptional situations should rest on a showing of
justifiable reasons and of at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with them.
FACTS:
Magsino filed against the respondent, De Ocampo and Guico, a complaint for forcible
entry in MTC. In his complaint, he alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of
agricultural land and that he had been in physical possession of the land for more than
30 years; and that the respondents, through force, intimidation, threats and strategy
and with the aid of armed men, had illegally depriving him of the possession of the
land.
The Magsino filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction but the MTC issued only
a writ of preliminary injunction. De Ocampo countered that she had held a registered
title in the land; and that Magsino was a squatter on the land with no possessory rights.
Her co-respondent Ramon Guico, Jr., had allegedly owned the titled land being
occupied and possessed by De Ocampo.
The MTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondents. The same was affirmed by
the RTC.
The CA dismissed the petition. It held that it is not accompanied by copies of the
pleadings and other material portions as would support the allegations of the petition.
The dismissal was pursuant to Section 2 and 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by
the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on

time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised,
the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the
Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance
of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by
the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies
thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition.
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that the
petitioner did not attach to his petition the complaint, the answer, and the motion to
dismiss, all filed in the MTC and the copies of the parties memoranda on appeal
presented in the RTC.
RULING:
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but merely a
statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. Being the party
who sought to appeal, he must comply with the requirements of the relevant rules;
otherwise, he would lose the statutory right to appeal.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, a case that involved the dismissal of a petition for
certiorari to assail an unfavorable ruling brought about by the failure to attach copies
of all pleadings submitted and other material portions of the record in the trial court
(like the complaint, answer and position paper) as would support the allegations of the
petition the Court recognized three guideposts for the CA to consider in determining
whether or not the rules of procedures should be relaxed, as follows:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to
the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it.
The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the
material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give
due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not
be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also (sic) found in
another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material
allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will
suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still
be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that
petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher
interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule
42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached
documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the
petition.
Is this case, the petitioner entirely bypassed the first guidepost. Petitioner failed to
attach the complaint, answer, motion to dismiss, and the memoranda on appeal the
parties respectively filed in the RTC.
The second guidepost refers to a process whereby the CA derives the contents of the
omitted relevant document from another attached to the petition for review filed in the
CA. A perusal of the records indicates that the documents actually attached to the
petition for review were limited to the following, namely: (1) illegible certified xerox copy
of the May 5, 2003 judgment of the MTC; (2) duplicate original copy of the September
17, 2003 order issued by the RTC affirming the judgment of the MTC; (3) certified xerox
copy of the November 6, 2003 order of the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration
of the petitioner; and (4) original copy of the September 30, 2003 motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner in the RTC.
The Magsino posited in his motion for reconsideration that the copy of the MTC decision
was a sufficient basis to resolve the issues he was raising in his petition for review. Even
with the copy of the MTC judgment being actually attached to the petition for review,
however, the second guidepost could not be complied with because the copy was
hopelessly illegible and it did not contain the statement of the issues relied upon by the
petitioner in his appeal in the CA.
It is worth mentioning that pursuant to the third guidepost recognized in Galvez case
the petitioner could still have submitted the omitted documents at the time he filed his
motion for reconsideration vis--vis the first assailed resolution of the CA. Yet, he did not
do so. Instead, he boldly proposed in his motion for reconsideration vis--vis the first
assailed resolution that the CA should have bowed to the "greater imperative of doing
substantial justice" by not hampering the appeal "sticking unflaggingly to such rules.
The petitioner is further reminded that any resort to a liberal application or suspension of
the application of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.

CASE TITLE EMERITU C. BARUT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROMULGATION
September 24, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Yatco, Nathaniel
TOPIC COVERED SEC 34, RULE 132 EVIDENCE; OFFER OF EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE: A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply
marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given
an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or
identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of
fact and judgment only and strictlyupon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial.
FACTS:
SPO4 Vicente Ucag and his family were cruising along South Superhighway in 2
separate vehicles. Barut and Ancheta, Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC for brevity) guards, apprehended one of those vehicles, an owner type jeep
driven by Villas, with passengers Vincent Ucag and his mother, due to a traffic violation
(busted headlights.) Barut asked for ViIlas drivers license. It took a while before Villas
surrendered his license and he was apparently waiting for his companions who were
riding in a passenger jeepney namely SPO4 Vicente Ucag (father of Vincent Ucag,)
Rolando Ucag (brother of Vicente) and a certain Danilo Fabiano to confront the said
PNCC guards. The PNCC guards confiscated Villas license and issued him a ticket.
Upon arrival of SPO4 Vicente Ucag at the scene, he inquired and argued about Villas
violation and demanded the return of the latters license. An altercation ensued
between PNCC guard Ancheta and SPO4 Ucag. They exchanged gunshots thereafter.
Both were wounded. Vincent Ucag, the son of SPO4 Vincente Ucag, came to aid his
wounded father, but unfortunately, PNCC guard Barut shot Vincent in the chest.
Vincent died.
PNCC guard Barut was tried and found guilty of Homicide in the RTC. The CA affirmed.
Factual findings of the lower court concluded that Villas and Fabiano had consistently
and clearly testified that Barut had indeed shot Vincent.
ISSUE:
WON the extrajudicial sworn statement of Villas in which he declared not having seen
Barut fired a gun be admitted in evidence in favour of the accused.
RULING:
No. In Candido vs CA, It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which
has been formally offered. A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence
when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing
counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to
prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their

findings of fact and judgment only and strictlyupon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then
expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The
opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to
its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not
previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records
cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the
hearing of the case.
Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could
consider only the evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end, the
offering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered. The
rule would ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise,
the adverse party would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as
well as to properly counter the impact of evidence not formally offered.
In this case, The CAs negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas extra-
judicial sworn statement was in accord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence.

CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOBBY BELGAR

PROMULGATION
September 8, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY Yatco, Nathaniel
TOPIC COVERED SEC. 4, RULE 133 EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE: Conviction for rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the
victim cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape as she was rendered
unconscious when the act was committed, provided that more than one circumstance
is duly proved and that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven
lead to no other logical conclusion than the appellants guilt of the crime charged.
FACTS:
At about 8pm, AAA, a 15 year old female was sleeping with her sisters in their house.
Suddenly, she was awakened for someone touched her feet. She saw Bobby Belgar, as
the room was illuminated by a kerosene lamp, who poked her with a knife and
threatened her that if she squeels, he will kill her family. AAA was then dragged from her
house onto a nearby tree. Bobby injected a substance in her stomach which made her
feel dizzy and was held unconscious. Upon waking up, AAA was naked and saw
reddish and whitish substance on her vagina. AAA was examined by Dr. Villanueva and
observed multiple lacerations in her genital area. Bobby Belgar interposed the defense
of alibi and contends that rape was not proven by direct evidence as AAA was
unconscious and the red and white substance was not submitted for laboratory
examination to determine presence of spermatozoa and to determine that it was
indeed a man who raped the victim.
ISSUE: WON Bobby Belgar may be convicted of the crime of rape by circumstantial
evidence
RULING: YES. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient and competent, may warrant the
conviction of the accused of rape.
In this connection, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions

set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are shown to exist, to wit:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In People v. Perez, the court affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape based on
circumstantial evidence, there being no direct proof of the sexual intercourse. The
accused was charged with having carnal knowledge of the 16-year old victim through
force, intimidation and against her will. The Prosecution established that he had

entered the victims room and had covered her nose and mouth with a chemically-
laced cloth, causing her to lose consciousness. Upon waking up, she felt pain in her
vagina, and she then saw blood and a white substance in her vagina. Her clothes were
in disarray and her underwear was in the corner of the room. He was no longer around.
Nonetheless, the Court held:
Conviction for rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the victim cannot
testify on the actual commission of the rape as she was rendered unconscious when
the act was committed, provided that more than one circumstance is duly proved and
that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other
logical conclusion than the appellants guilt of the crime charged.

CASE TITLE ROLANDO ROBLES vs. FERNANDO FIDEL YAPCINCO, PATROCINIO B.

YAPCINCO, MARIA CORAZON B. YAPCINCO, and MARIA ASUNCION
B. YAPCINCO-FRONDA
PROMULGATION
October 22, 2014
DATE
DIGEST BY YATCO, NATHANIEL
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE 68, SEC 3; FORECLOSURE OF REM
DOCTRINE: The registration of the sale is required only in extrajudicial foreclosure sale
because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right
of redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial
foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except
in mortgages with banking institutions.
FACTS:
In 1944, Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on his property to Marcelo. Marcelo
assigned his rights as a mortgagee to Apolinario Cruz. Yapcinco defaulted payment on
his obligation. An action for judicial foreclosure was instituted by Cruz to the CFI of
Tarlac. Yapcinco died during the pendency of the case. In 1956, The CFI rendered in
favour of Cruz and gave the estate of Yapcinco/heirs of Yapcinco a 90 day period to
redeem the property. The equity redemption was not exercised. Cruz emerged as the
highest bidder and a certificate of absolute sale was issued to him in 1959. He did not,
however, registered such certificate of sale as he intends to donate it. In 1972 Cruz
donated the property to his four grandchildren Carlos de la Rosa, Apolinario Bernabe,
Ferdinand Cruz and petitioner Rolando Robles. In 1991, Bernabe, however, made it
appear via a falsified deed of sale that Yapcinco sold the property to him, Ma. Teresita
Escopete, Orlando Santos and Oliver Puzon. TCT 20458 was cancelled and TCT 243719
was issued in favor of Bernabe and the co-vendees. Carlos dela Rosa and Ferdinand
Cruz, the other donees, filed a complaint for the nullification of the contract of sale
against Bernabe, etal. But such case was not pursued, they being first cousins. In 2000,
Respondents, heirs of Yapcinco, instituted an action against Bernabe and his
covendees in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tarlac City for the annulment of TCT No.
243719. Heirs of Yapcinco averred that such sale was void and ineffectual because the
Spouses Yapcinco had already been dead as of the date of the sale (falsified deed of
sale.) In 2001, RTC Tarlac rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Yapcinco, TCT No.
20458 in the name of Yapcinco was restored (TCT No. 354061.)
In 2002, Petitioner Rolando Robles filed an action for the nullification of document,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages against the the heirs of Yapcinco. He
averred that they acted in bad faith in causing the issuance of TCT No. 354061 because
they had known fully well that the property had long been excluded from the estate of
Yapcinco by virtue of the CFI decision in 1956, a certificate of absolute sale was issued
in the name of Apolinario Cruz as early as 1959; and that he had a vested right in the
property pursuant to the deed of donation in 1972. The RTC rendered in favor of Robles.
The CA reversed, and held that due to the non-registration of the certificate of sale in
the judicial foreclosure, the period of redemption did not commence to run. Also,

Apolinario Cruz never acquired title to the property and could not have conveyed and
transferred ownership over the same to his grandchildren through the deed of
donation. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON as a consequence of the non-registration of the certificate of sale, the
period of equity redemption did not commence to run.
2. WON Petitioner has better right over the property.
RULING:
1. NO. The failure of Apolinario Cruz to register the certificate of sale was of no
consequence in this adjudication. The registration of the sale is required only in
extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the
reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption. In contrast, the
registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure because only the
equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages with
banking institutions. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes
final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation of the sale.
2. YES. The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the foreclosure sale, was
Section 3, Rule 70 (Now Rule 68, sec3) of the Rules of Court, which relevantly
provided that: "Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior
encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an
order of the court, it shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by law."
Under the applicable rule cited, the judicial confirmation operated only "to
divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
Consequently, the late Yapcinco and the respondents as his successors-in-

interest were divested of their right in the property, for they did not duly exercise
the equity of redemption decreed in the decision of the trial court. With
Yapcinco having thereby effectively ceased to be the owner of the property
sold, the property was taken out of the mass of the assets of Yapcinco upon the
expiration of the equity of redemption.

CASE TITLE SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI
FAMILY BANK, INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO
PROMULGATION
October 22, 2014
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE; FORECLOSURE OF REM
DOCTRINE: The foreclosure of a mortgage is but the necessary consequence of the

non-payment of an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where the parties have
stipulated in their agreement, mortgage contract and promissory note that the
mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgage upon the mortgagor's default, the
mortgagee has a clear right to the foreclosure in case of the mortgagor's default
FACTS:
Jaime is the branch manager of respondent BPI, while Evangeline was a bank teller.
They availed of a housing loan for P273k and executed a real estate mortgage of a
property in Bulacan. Such obligation was to be paid in monthly instalments to be
deducted in his salary. Subsequently, the Jaime was terminated by the employer BPI
due to loss of trust and confidence. Jaime filed a case for Illegal Dismissal against BPI.
Several months later BPI asked for the remaining balance of the total obligation but the
spouses defaulted. A foreclosure proceeding was instituted by BPI. A complaint for
injunction and damages with petition for preliminary injunction was filed by the spouses
and they contend that the obligation has not yet become due and demandable as
the case for Illegality of his dismissal was still pending for resolution. BPI countered that
the loan given to employees were coterminous to their termination and the foreclosure
was based on their prior default of monthly payments.
ISSUE:
WON the foreclosure proceedings is premature.
RULING:
NO. The CA correctly found that there was basis to declare the petitioners entire
outstanding loan obligation mature as to warrant the foreclosure of their mortgage. It is
settled that foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his
obligation.
The foreclosure of a mortgage is but the necessary consequence of the non-payment

of an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where the parties have stipulated in their
agreement, mortgage contract and promissory note that the mortgagee is authorized
to foreclose the mortgage upon the mortgagor's default, the mortgagee has a clear
right to the foreclosure in case of the mortgagor's default.

Thus, having signed a deed of mortgage in favor of BPI, the spouses Sebastian should
have foreseen that when their principal obligation was not paid when due, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized
and sold with a view to applying the proceeds to the payment of the principal
obligation.
Assuming, arguendo, that BPI indeed refused to accept the subsequent payment from
appellants, they could have consigned the same before the Court. They failed to do so.
Also, The protection of Republic Act No. 6552 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act)
does not cover a loan extended by the employer to enable its employee to finance
the purchase of a house and lot. The law protects only a buyer acquiring the property
by installment, not a borrower whose rights are governed by the terms of the loan from
the employer.

CASE TITLE GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE vs. HON. DANILO A.
MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN, BR.1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROMULGATION
October 22, 2014
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE 65; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO
QUASH
DOCTRINE: The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant
accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on
appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash.
The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject
of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary
course of law.
FACTS:
The mauling incident involving neighbors outside the house of petitioners Enrile ended
up with the filing of criminal cases in the MTC for frustrated homicide and less serious
physical injuries by the alleged victims, the Moranos. The MTC issued a joint resolution
finding probable cause. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint resolution,
arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their having been given
medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of less
serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical
injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The MTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration because the
grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution
sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the
petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the
deferment of the arraignment. The MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the
cases for less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure;
and reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
order of the MTC in the RTC. RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari.
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion.
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify
the orders issued by the RTC, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same
grounds they advanced in the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition for being the wrong remedy.

ISSUE:
1. WON the Motion to Quash may prosper.
2. WON the Petition for Certiorari is the appropriate remedy.
RULING:
1. NO. The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his
plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point
of law, or for defects apparent on its face.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal
of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a

complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints
sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the
complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not
the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury
or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial.
Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
2. NO. The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of
appeal, taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC
through petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by
notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and impermissible,
because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address
jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress
is that the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners motion to quash. In
its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion to quash correct, for it
would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases
against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants to prove
the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance for them. Indeed,

the time and the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.

2015 CASES
CASE TITLE SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN

FOUNDATION,INC., vs. HON. TEODORO T. RIEL
PROMULGATION
January 12, 2015
DATE
DIGEST BY Tresvalles, Kris G.
TOPIC COVERED RULE 65 Section 1 CIVPRO
DOCTRINE: That the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an

available remedy in the ordinary course of law is clear from Section 1 of Rule 65, which
requires that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court will be corrected
by certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors.
FACTS:
On October 28, 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that
the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the
Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due
course to the petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for
reconstitution. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, however, the
RTC denied the same for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to reconsider.
Hence, on February 22, 2007, the petitioner came directly to Supreme Court
alleging petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and Respondent Judge submitted their comment on the petition for certiorari and
mandamus. The University of the Philippines (UP) sought leave to intervene, attaching to
its motion the intended comment/opposition-in-intervention which was granted. In turn,
the petitioner presented its consolidated reply. Respondent Judge justified the dismissal
of the petition for reconstitution by citing the opposition by the OSG and the UP, as well
as the recommendation of the Land Registration Authority (LRA). The OSG and the UP
argued that by directly coming to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and
mandamus, the petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its
lost appeal; that the correct recourse for the petitioner was an appeal considering that
the two assailed orders already finally disposed of the case; that the petitioner intended
its petition for certiorari and mandamus to reverse the final orders; that the petitioner
further failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, despite the Court of
Appeals (CA) having concurrent jurisdiction with the Court over special civil actions
under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction in dismissing its petition for reconstitution on the basis of the
recommendation of the LRA and the opposition of the Republic and the UP despite
having initially given due course to the petition for reconstitution.
309 Dizon, Espino, Katigbak, Legado, Rodriguez, Superable, Tresvalles REMEDIAL LAW
RULING: NO.
The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge
could have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely
abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Firstly, Under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial
reconstitution of a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of
First Instance) had the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting
on and dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for reconstitution
involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA.
Instead, it would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and
granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
Secondly, the petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of OCT
No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the
provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an
existing Torrens title.
Thirdly, the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the
application for judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the
case.
As of then, therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the
Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its
motion for reconsideration. By allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking
action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible,
for an extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Fourthly, the filing of the instant special civil action directly to the Supreme Court
is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is
allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the
same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself
from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned
to it. There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby
violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari.
Finally, the land covered by the petition for judicial reconstitution related to the same
area that formed the UP campus. The UPs registered ownership of the land comprising
its campus has long been settled under the law. Accordingly, the dismissal of the
petition for judicial reconstitution by respondent Judge only safeguarded the UPs
registered ownership.
CASE TITLE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF
APPEALS
PROMULGATION
January 12, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 67 Section 4 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
DOCTRINE: The exercise of right of eminent domain is not unlimited, for two mandatory
requirements should underlie the Governments exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation is paid to the property owner. These requirements partake the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable to condemn or to keep the
property expropriated.
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a government-owned and -
controlled corporation vested with authority under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended.
The former entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan
Power Transmission Project. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the
property with TCT registered under Registry of Deeds of Batangas. Thereafter,
NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC Batangas City, and prayed for
the issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to enable it to enter and take
possession and control of the affected portion of the property.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss averred that NAPOCOR had not
negotiated with them before entering the property and that the entry was done
without their consent in the process, nonetheless, they tendered no objection to
NAPOCORs entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion
sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
In the pre-trial conference conducted on December 20, 1995, the RTC directed
the parties to submit the names of their nominees to sit in the panel of commissioners
within 10 days from the date of the pre-trial. The RTC constituted the panel of three
commissioners. Thereafter, submitted their joint report on April 8, 1999.
The parties then submitted their respective objections to the reports. The RTC
adopted the recommendation contained in the joint report and ordered NAPOCOR to
pay the respondents just compensation for the whole area. The CA AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that NAPOCOR shall pay only for the occupied 6,326 square meters of
the subject real property at the rate of P550.00 per square meter and to pay legal
interest therefrom until fully paid. Hence, appeal by NAPOCOR to the SC. During the
pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings stating that
negotiations between the parties were going on with a view to the amicable
settlement of the case. However, On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed
to reach an amicable agreement and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the
expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed
pending appeal.
RULING: YES.
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is
proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just
and equitable.
The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate,
not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial
sovereignty, to public purpose." To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The
meaning of the term "public use" has evolved over time in response to changing public
needs and exigencies. "Public use" has now been RULING to be synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," and "public convenience."
Therefore, it is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires
to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw,
as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted.
Indeed, public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence,
NAPOCORs motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and should be
granted. NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground
that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents property had already been
retired. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the
expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the
expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator
due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
CASE TITLE YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION vs. TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PROMULGATION
January 12, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Remedial Law, CIV PRO
DOCTRINE: Section 1,27 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment
rendered by the OP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA.
Section 428 of the Rule states that the appeal must be taken within 15 days "from
notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
lastpublication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration.
FACTS:
This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and mined by
Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial
losses. PIMI's portion (known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a foreclosure sale to
the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BD0).
In 1976, the Gold Mining Development Project Team, Mining Technology Division, The
Mining Group of the Bureau of Mines prepared a so-called Technical Feasibility Study
on the Possible Re-Opening of the CPMI Project of PIM (Mining Aspect) and the
Exploration Program (Uranium Project) at Larap, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
discussed an evaluation of the ore reserve and a plan of operation to restore the mine
to normal commercial mining production and budgetary estimate should the Bureau of
Mines take over and run the PIMI Larap Mines. The Government then opened the area
for exploration. In November 1978, the Benguet Corporation-Getty Oil Consortium
began exploration for uranium under an Exploration Permit of the area, but withdrew in
1982 after four years of sustained and earnest exploration.2
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the
area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with Philex
Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly registered by the Mining
Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)3 over the area in that Regional Office of
the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The
application, which was amended in 1999, was granted on July28, 2007 under MPSA No.
252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to explore, develop and
utilize the mineral deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter
that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of
absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas
of Trans-Asias MPSA. Based on the documents submitted by Yinlu, four of the six transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) it RULING covered four mining claims under Patent Nos. 15, 16,
17 and 18 respectively named as Busser, Superior, Bussamer and Rescue Placer Claims,
with an aggregate area of 192 hectares. The areas covered occupied more than half
of the MPSA area of Trans-Asia.
On September 14, 2007, Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would commence
exploration works in Yinlus areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu to allow its
personnel to access the areas for the works to be undertaken. On September 23, 2007,
Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration works on its own private
property in the Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining
patents.6 This response of Yinlu compelled Trans-Asia to seek the assistance of the MGB
Regional Office V in resolving the issues between the parties. It was at that point that
Trans-Asia learned that the registration of its MPSA had been put on hold because of
Yinlus request to register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.
The matter was ultimately referred to the DENR Secretary, who directed the MGB
Regional Office V toverify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu. On November 29,
2007, the MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that there
was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu. Accordingly,
the parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
Consequently, DENR Secretary Atienza, Jr. ordered the amendment of Trans-Asias

MPSA by excluding there from the mineral lands covered by Yinlus mining patents.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal was taken beyond the required period.
RULING:
Tardiness of Trans-Asias Appeal
Yinlu contends that the CA should have outrightly dismissed TransAsias appeal for
being taken beyond the required period for appealing; and that Trans-Asias filing of
the second motion for reconsideration was improper inasmuch as the motion did not
cite any exceptional circumstances or reasons as required by Section 7 of the OPs
Administrative Order No. 18 Series of 1987.26
The contention of Yinlu is correct.
Section 1,27 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by the OP
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA. Section 428 of the
Rule states that the appeal must be taken within 15 days "from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its lastpublication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
reconsideration x x x."
Trans-Asia received a copy of the OP resolution dated June 29, 2010 denying the first
motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2010.29 Hence, it had until July 29, 2010 to appeal
to the CA by petition for review. However, it filed the petition for review only on May 11,
2011,30 or nearly 10 months from its receipt of the denial. Under the circumstances, its
petition for review was filed way beyond the prescribed 15-day period.
CASE TITLE RUBEN MANALANG, ET,AL. vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI
PROMULGATION
January 12, 2015
DATE
DOCTRINE: The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate

Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional
Trial Court.
FACTS:
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M.
Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236
with an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey
plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents Lot No. 4235 covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the
relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result
showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405
square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands Management
Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) confirmed the
result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached
portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners
commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua
(Civil Case No. 3309), and the casewas assigned to Branch 2 of that court.
On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of
jurisdiction based on its finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute
that should be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for
further proceedings,5holding that because there was an apparent withholding of
possession of the property and the action was brought within one year from such
withholding of possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately dismissed the
complaint and counterclaim for lack of merit through the decision rendered on August
31, 2000.
Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.
At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to
determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the
surveyor. On September 19, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed
and set aside the MTCs decision of August 31, 2000.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in an
ejectment case
RULING: To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall
not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides:
Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership. x x x.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony
of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The
violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
on the survey and the surveyors testimony instead of the record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin. Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an
ejectment case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the
allegations of the complaint.
CASE TITLE FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA)
CITATION GR. NO. 213525
PROMULGATION
January 27, 2015
DATE
DOCTRINE: Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of
service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service.
x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and
the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.
FACTS:
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a
memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified
barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the
premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement
voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter office disallowed the payment for
lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent
LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.5 On
November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition,6 holding that
under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or
city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance
coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGUs failure to comply with the
requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the
COA denied the motion.
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition
for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on
August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof
of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period
RULING:
The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari
complied with the requirement on proof of service.
The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the
registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered
mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the
service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the
person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended
to the paper being served. A compliance withthe rule is mandatory, such that there is
no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one
Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by
registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524
attached tothe appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The
petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry
receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule
requires to be appended the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions.
Fresh Period Ruleunder Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court
The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five
days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.20
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31
days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its
motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of
the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it
filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
CASE TITLE MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG

ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP.
LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. TERRY
L. RIDON, KABATAAN PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS
ISAGANI ZARATE, BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO
M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT,
CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR,
YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners, v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.
PROMULGATION
FEBRUARY 03, 2015
DATE
DIGEST BY Superable, Ethel C.
TOPIC COVERED Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund
Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program -Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
Remedial Law Certiorari and prohibition Locus Standi
Administrative law; Budget process Operative Fact Doctrine
DOCTRINE:
Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may
be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Thus, petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the Supreme
Court ruled that the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may
not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is
enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection
or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The Court likewise cited
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to explain that [s]tanding is a
peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue
in the public interest.

Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the petitioners
has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus
standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of
the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds,
whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are
of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such,
the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and
wise discretion to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement
Allocation Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process,
specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution;
and (4) Accountability.
The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming
from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling
unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2)
releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the savings and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support
other priority PAPs.
Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy
designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of
the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive
as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate
to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to
adopt or to implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene
Section 29(1), Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the
laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget
to changes in the countrys economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for
the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the
DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to
be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through
the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The
transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the
Constitution], must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from
the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose
for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such
funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized.
This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress power of
the purse.
Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer
to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any
obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which
the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies
to meet and deliver the required or planned targets.
The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation
of savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending.
Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in
effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations under the GAAs.
The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to revert
to the General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end
of the fiscal year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by
declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to
the end of the fiscal year.
Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013
set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be
augmented must be deficient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this
Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon
implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to
be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by
augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this
Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held that the
savings pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any
appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the Solicitor General]
rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate
to faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did not
translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for
that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs,
given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the
Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would
threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers.
Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices, Section 25(5)
has delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one
office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-
border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the
plain text of Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-
border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under Section
25(5).
No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated
against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others
could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The
denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties
who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators
claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The
reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully
bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain
why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the
law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative
fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It
provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces
no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it
cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted
to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances
have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To declare the
implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real
as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and
unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices
under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they
had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
FACTS:
On September 25, 2013, in a privilege speech delivered by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada delivered in the Senate of the Philippines he divulged that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
According to Secretary Jinggoy Estrada the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. He said that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to
name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
As an answer to Sen. Estrada's revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM

issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending
Acceleration Program explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part
of the Disbursement Acceleration Program, a program designed by the Department of
Budget and Management to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
DBM Secretary said that such releases were made as their response to the letters of
request for funding given by the Senators; and that it was not the first time that releases
from the DAP had been made. According to the DBM Secretary, DAP had already
been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused
the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
This revelation prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong

Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions
with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. They contended that DAP is
unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
DBM Secretary refuted her statement and argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the General Appropriations Act (GAA) (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President
to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
DBM Secretary also explained that when he assumed office in the middle of
2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a
significant focus of his Administration. Such focus unfortunately decelerated
government project implementation and payment schedules even if it resulted in an
improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to July
of 2011. Based on the observations of the World Bank, the Philippines' economic growth
could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened should the Government
continue with its under spending and fail to address the large deficiencies in
infrastructure.
The DBM Secretary contended that the DAP was to be implemented and
funded by declaring savings coming from the various departments and agencies
derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased
appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the savings and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing P APs or to support other priority PAPs. The
Government, by spending on public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of
ensuring profitability for prospective investors. The PAPs funded under the DAP were
chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the economy and
infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into
disbursements.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
5. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
RULING:
1. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely
a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
2. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to
the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because
whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
3. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-
border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment
of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA
is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although
some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project
once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
4. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification
from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.
5. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP
has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on
the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted
in good faith.
CASE TITLE JOSE PEPE SANICO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER
SON-TENIO
PROMULGATION
March 25, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Rule 122 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE & Rule 40 Section 7 CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to
dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases,
because Section 9(c), Rule 122, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal on
the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may
have been filed upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon
the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioners
appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on
appeal.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanican and Batiquin were convicted for Violation of Section 103 of
Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The two
were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of minerals before the MTC-Carmen-
Sogod- Cebu. However, the accused were declared not guilty for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, Sanicos
counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. Then, RTC ordered Sanico to file his
memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC dismissed the appeal
on the ground of failure to file a memorandum on appeal with prejudice. Atty. Caete,
another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a MR vis--vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating
that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset
with problems due to his wifes debilitating illness, as well as his first counsel, Atty.
Barings own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and
whom to contact as principal counsel hereof. RTC denied the MR. CA: Affirmed.
In the meantime, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Judgment,

which the RTC authorized the issuance. Sanico filed an omnibus motion to recall the
order and to quash the entry of judgment, but the RTC denied. The entry of judgment
was issued; the writ of execution; and that execution sales covering several personal
properties of the petitioner were made, and the certificates of sale were issued in favor
of Tenio.
ISSUES:
Whether CA committed reversible error in not nullifying the RTCs order dismissing the
appeal for failure to file a memorandum?
RULING:
Yes. Both RTC and CA were guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules
of Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the
appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC
wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal
of the appeal once the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal. While, CA
erroneously upheld the RTC.
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss
the appeal ONLY in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases,
because Section 9(c) Rule 122, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal on
the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may
have been filed upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon
the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioners
appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the
petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course,
whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the
appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner
that occasioned severe prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his
first-time appeal being a matter of right, and because his conviction was then declared
to have attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. RUDY NUYOK

PROMULGATION
JUNE 15, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence Circumstantial Evidence
DOCTRINE: All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. In other words, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the perpetrator.
FACTS:
At 9:00 oclock in the evening of June 25, 2005, as AAA was about to sleep, the
accused laid down beside her. Sensing fear, she tried to escape, but he pulled her by
the hair, slapped her, and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious.
Upon regaining consciousness, she noticed that her sando was already raised up to her
neck, and her panties had blood. She felt pain in her vagina. She saw the accused
putting oh his pants. He warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to
kill her and her family if she did so. Despite her fear she related the incident to BBB and
her elder sister, CCC, but her report fell on deaf ears. He raped her again in July 2005.
On that occasion, she was sleeping in BBBs house when he crept up to her side, pulled
her hair, took off her panties, laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her. She
resisted, and tried to kick him away but missed. He overpowered her and succeeded in
gratifying his lust. A third and fourth rape had occurred.
The accused asserts that the State did not establish the carnal knowledge on June 25,
2005; and that the trial court simply assumed its occurrence. He bases his assertion on
AAA testifying that she was rendered unconscious at the time of that rape, and that all
that she noticed upon regaining consciousness was that her sando was already on her
neck and her panties had blood.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the first rape.
RULING:
Despite the lack of testimony on how the accused had carnal knowledge of his victim
on June 25, 2005, his guilt was nonetheless shown beyond reasonable doubt. A
conviction for rape may rest on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Thus, an
accused like him can be declared guilty of rape even if the sole witness against him
was the victim who had been rendered unconscious at the time of the consummation
of carnal knowledge provided sufficient circumstantial evidence existed showing that
the victim was violated, and that it was the accused and no other who had committed
the violation. To disallow such showing is to obstruct the successful prosecution of a

rapist who renders his victim unconscious before the consummation.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, onsists of

proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is sufficient to sustain
a conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; ( b) the facts from which the
inferences were derived have been established; and ( c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. In other words, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
The Prosecution successfully established the following facts and circumstances that,
when taken together, very well constituted evidence of the accused's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit: (a) he and AAA lived in the same house; (b) while AAA was
sleeping at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of June 25, 2005 in the same house, he crawled
up and laid down beside her; (c) AAA tried to escape; (d) he then pulled AAA's hair,
slapped her and punched her in the stomach; (e) AAA was rendered unconscious; (j)
when AAA regained consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and her sando was
already raised up to her neck; (g) AAA felt pain in her vagina; (h) AAA saw him in the
act of putting on his pants; (i) he threatened to kill AAA if she would reveal the incident
to anyone else; and (j) AAA sustained hymenal laceration. These circumstances,
coupled with AAA' s positive testimony that was corroborated by the examining
physician's physical findings on her, lead to the inescapable conclusion that he raped
AAA against her will on that occasion.
CASE TITLE METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP. vs. REYNALDO CUEVAS AND JUNNEL
CUEVAS
PROMULGATION
JUNE 15, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure Cross Claims
DOCTRINE: The registered owner of a motor vehicle whose operation causes injury to
another is legally liable to the latter. But it is error not to allow the registered owner to
recover reimbursement from the actual and present owner by way of its cross-claim.
Although the registered-owner rule might seem to be unjust towards the registered
owner who sold his motor vehicle to the actual owner whose employee caused the
accident, the law did not leave it without any remedy or recourse. MMTC could
recover from Minas Transit, the actual employer of the negligent driver, under the
principle of unjust enrichment, by means of a cross-claim seeking reimbursement of all
the amounts that it could be required to pay as damages arising from the drivers
negligence.
FACTS:
Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and Mina's Transit Corporation (Mina's Transit)
entered into an agreement to sell dated August 31, 1990, whereby the latter bought
several bus units from the former at a stipulated price. They agreed that MMTC would
retain the ownership of the buses until certain conditions were met, but in the meantime
Mina's Transit could operate the buses within Metro Manila.
On October 14, 1994, one of the buses subject of the agreement to sell, bearing plate
number NXM-449-TB-pil 94, hit and damaged a Honda Motorcycle owned by Reynaldo
and driven by Junnel. Reynaldo and Junnel sued MMTC and Minas Transit for damages
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cavite.
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim, MMTC denied liability, and
averred that although it retained the ownership of the bus, the actual operator and
employer of the bus driver was Minas Transit; and that, in support of its cross-claim
against Minas Transit, a provision in the agreement to sell mandated Mina s Transport
to hold it free from liability arising from the use and operation of the bus units.
On its part, Minas Transit contended that it was not liable because: (a) it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; (b) its bus driver exercised
due diligence; and (c) Junnels negligence was the cause of the accident.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents on September 17,
19999 ordering petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and its co-
defendant Minas Transit Corporation (Minas Transit) to pay damages in favor of
respondents Reynaldo Cuevas and Junnel Cuevas. The RTC, however, did not rule on
the propriety of the cross-claim. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MMTC was liable for the injuries sustained by the respondents despite
the provision in the agreement to sell that shielded it from liability.
RULING:
Petition is partly meritorious. In view of MMTCs admission in its pleadings that it had
remained the registered owner of the bus at the time of the incident, it could not
escape liability for the personal injuries and property damage suffered by the
Cuevases. This is because of the registered-owner rule, whereby the registered owner of
the motor vehicle involved in a vehicular accident could be held liable for the
consequences. The registered-owner rule has remained good law in this jurisdiction
considering its impeccable and timeless rationale.
Indeed, MMTC could not evade liability by passing the buck to Minas Transit. The
stipulation in the agreement to sell did not bind third parties like the Cuevases, who
were expected to simply rely on the data contained in the registration certificate of the
erring bus.
Although the registered-owner rule might seem to be unjust towards MMTC, the law did
not leave it without any remedy or recourse.1wphi1 According to Filcar Transport
Services v. Espinas ,14 MMTC could recover from Minas Transit, the actual employer of
the negligent driver, under the principle of unjust enrichment, by means of a cross-claim
seeking reimbursement of all the amounts that it could be required to pay as damages
arising from the drivers negligence. A cross-claim is a claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein, and may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a
claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
MMTC set up its cross-claim against Mina's Transit precisely to ensure that Mina's Transit
would reimburse whatever liability would be adjudged against MMTC. Yet, it is a cause
of concern for the Court that the RTC ignored to rule on the propriety of MMTC's cross-
claim. Such omission was unwarranted, inasmuch as Mina's Transit did not dispute the
cross-claim, or did not specifically deny the agreement to sell with MMTC, the
actionable document on which the cross-claim was based. Even more telling was the
fact that Mina's Transit did not present controverting evidence to disprove the cross-
claim as a matter of course if it was warranted for it to do so. Under the circumstances,
the RTC should have granted the cross-claim to prevent the possibility of a multiplicity of
suits, and to spare not only the MMTC but also the other parties in the case from further
expense and bother. Compounding the RTC's uncharacteristic omission was the CA's
oversight in similarly ignoring the cross-claim. The trial and the appellate courts should
not forget that a cross-claim is like the complaint and the counterclaim that the court
must rule upon.
CASE TITLE BERNARDO MESINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROMULGATION
JUNE 17, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure Judgement
DOCTRINE: All trial and appellate courts must avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will
not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations
of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and
obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity
for all.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1998, after the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed
charging him instead with malversation of public funds in the amount of P167,876.90.
On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of malversation, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused BERNARDO MESINA Y
UMALI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation as defined and
penalized under Article 217 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Court further imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office
and a fine of P167,876.90 upon the accused.
SO ORDERED.
On July 24, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, with modification as to the amount
of fine imposed,decreeing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated November 8, 2001 of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-54217 is
affirmed with modification in the sense that the fine is reduced from P167,876.98
to P37,876.98. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both RTC and CA is correct in not making the accused liable for the
restitution of the misappropriated amount.
RULING:
Both RTC and CA is incorrect. Although correct in finding the accused guilty of
malversation the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the petitioner to
pay the amount of P37,876.98 subject of the malversation. That omission was plain error
that we should now likewise correct as a matter of course, for there is no denying that
pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and unrevised, would permanently
deprive the City of Caloocan of the misappropriated amount. Such prejudice to the
public coffers should be avoided.
In Zafra v. People:
One more omission by the CA and the R TC concerned a matter of law. This refers to
their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally
misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in
each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code,
and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and
the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in
Bacolod v. People, it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a
waiver of its recovery.
It is not amiss to stress that both the R TC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of
conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination
of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering
justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done
without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.
Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. Given that his
obligation requires the payment of the amount misappropriated to the City of
Caloocan, the indemnification for damages is through legal interest of 6% per annum
on the amount malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.21
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003 finding
petitioner BERNARDO U. MESINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of
public funds subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and pay a fine of P37,876.98;
and (b) he shall further pay to the City of Caloocan the amount of P37,876.98, plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision
until the amount is fully paid.
CASE TITLE GILDA JARDELEZA (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, ERNESTO

JR.,TEODORO MARIA, ROLANDO, MA. GLENDA AND MELECIO, ALL
SURNAMED JARDELEZA vs. SPS. MELENCIO & ELIZABETH JARDELEZA,
JMB TRADERS, AND TEODORO JARDELEZA
PROMULGATION
JUNE 17, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Special Proceedings Probate
DOCTRINE: Probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not extend to the
determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings. If in some
instances it is allowed, the determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
On March 7, 1997, the Spouses Gilda Jardeleza and Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. (Ernesto)
commenced Civil Case No. 23499 against respondents Spouses Melecio and Elizabeth
Jardeleza, JMB Traders, Inc., and Teodoro Jardeleza (Teodoro) respecting several
parcels of their conjugal lands. Civil Case No. 23499 was raffle d to Branch 33 of the
RTC. On January 13, 2004, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 23499, Ernesto died.
Hence, administration proceedings (Special Proceedings No. 04-7705) were
commenced in the RTC (assigned to Branch 38), and Teodoro was appointed as the
administrator of the estate. The other heirs questioned the appointment in the Court of
Appeals (CA).
Meanwhile, Teodoro, in his capacity as the administrator, filed a motion to dismiss in

Civil Case No. 23499 on the ground that because Melecio, one of the defendants, was
also an heir of Ernesto, the properties subject of the action for reconveyance should be
considered as "advances in the inheritance," and, accordingly, the claim for
reconveyance should be heard in Special Proceedings No. 04-7705 by Branch 38.
Branch 33 issued the first assailed order dated January 31, 2005 granting the motion to
dismiss, viz.:
Considering that the Motion to Dismiss dated December 15, 2004 carries with it the
signature of all parties and their respective counsels in the above-entitled case, the
prayer for the dismissal of the complaint and the counterclaims in this case are hereby
granted.
SO ORDERED.
Gilda sought reconsideration, arguing that she had a personal cause of action of her
own distinct from that of Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented to the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 23499; and that Teodoro should have first sought the approval of
Branch 38 as the intestate court considering that the estate could potentially recover
properties belonging to it.
On April 7, 2005, Branch 33 issued the second assailed order denying Gildas motion for
reconsideration. Hence, Gilda has directly appealed the adverse rulings of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Did Branch 33 err in dismissing Civil Case No. 23499?
RULING:
Yes. Gilda correctly posits that the action for reconveyance, which survived the
intervening death of Ernesto as co-plaintiff, should be maintained independently of
Special Proceedings No. 04-7705. Indeed, whether an action survives or not depends
on its nature. In a cause of action that survives, the wrong complained of primarily and
principally affects property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental; in a cause of action that does not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. This rule is
applicable regardless of whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who dies, or whether
the case is in the trial or in the appellate courts. Verily, Civil Case No. 23499 survived the
death of Ernesto.
The jurisdiction of the RT C as a probate court relates only to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not
extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the
proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate, unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they
agree to submit the question for determination by the probate or administration court
and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced; or unless the purpose is to
determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory, in
which case the probate or administration court may decide prima facie the ownership
of the property, but such de termination is not final and is without prejudice to the right
of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action. Otherwise
put, the determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction.
In this regard, it bears mentioning that Civil Case No. 23499 had been instituted in 1997
and was pending trial before Branch 33 prior to the bringing of the probate
proceedings in 2004. In dismissing Civil Case No. 23499, Branch 33 shirked from its
responsibility to decide the issue of ownership and to let the probate court decide the
same. Branch 33 thereby did not consider that any decision that Branch 38 as a
probate court would render on the title and on whether or not property should be
included or excluded from the inventory of the assets of the estate would at best be
merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate
action.
CASE TITLE SPOUSES FRANCISICO AND MERCED RABAT vs. PNB

PROMULGATION
JUNE 18, 2012
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure Doctrine of immutability of judgement
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-
fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end
to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist. Indeed, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely; the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, the
doctrine of immutability is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a
matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.
FACTS:
On 25 August 1979, respondent spouses Francisco and Merced Rabat (hereafter
RABATs) applied for a loan with PNB. Subsequently, the RABATs were granted on 14
January 1980 a medium-term loan of P4.0 Million to mature three years from the date of
implementation.
On 28 January 1980, the RABATs signed a Credit Agreement and executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over twelve (12) parcels of land which stipulated that the loan would
be subject to interest at the rate of 17% per annum, plus the appropriate service
charge and penalty charge of 3% per annum on any amount remaining unpaid or not
renewed when due.
On 25 September 1980, the RABATs executed another document denominated as

"Amendment to the Credit Agreement.
Thereafter, there are several availments of the loan accommodation on various dates
by the RABATs reached the aggregate amount of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P3,517,380). For failure of the RABATs to
pay their obligation, the PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by the RABATs. After due notice and publication, the
mortgaged parcels of land were sold at a public auction held on 20 February 1987 and
14 April 1987. The PNB was the lone and highest bidder with a bid of P3,874,800.00. PNB
eventually filed on 5 May 1992 a complaint for a sum of money on the deficiency
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint
finding that the auction sale is already enough to satisfy for the loan. The CA affirmed,
then the case was brought to the SC since the CAs decision is not based on the
arguments presented by the parties. The SC then ordered the CA to make the correct
decision. The CA then decide still favouring the RABATs but upon motion for
reconsideration by PNB, the CA reversed.
The RABATs contend that the case already attained finality when the RTC ruled in their
favour.
ISSUE:
W/N the case before the RTC already attained finality.
RULING:
The SC uphold the CAs promulgation of the second amended decision. Verily, all
courts of law have the unquestioned power to alter, modify, or set aside their decisions
before they become final and unalterable. A judgment that has attained finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may thereafter no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land. The reason for the rule of immutability is that if, on the application of one
party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, the court
could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and
continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the
overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. The
doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Indeed,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely; the rights and obligations of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, the doctrine of
immutability is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public
policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.
It is no different herein. The amended decision that favored the Spouses Rabat would
have attained finality only after the lapse of 15 days from notice thereof to the parties
without a motion for reconsideration being timely filed or an appeal being seasonably
taken. Had that happened, the amended decision might have become final and
immutable. However, considering that PNB timely filed its motion for reconsideration vis-
-vis the amended decision, the CAs reversal of the amended decision and its
promulgation of the second amended decision were valid and proper.
CASE TITLE PEOPLE vs. ALVIN ENSUGON

PROMULGATION
JUNE 22, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence Qualification of Witness
DOCTRINE: Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the
child's competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge. Being a
child witness cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with
which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption,
the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the childs competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child.
FACTS:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident,
he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground
floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and
stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there
was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed,
his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mothers lower chest.
His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a
neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-
examination, he related that the assailant took money from his fathers pocket. He
likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetra tor because there was no
light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light
when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their
second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the stairway.
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that after the incident she took Carl and had
him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone
but she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the
police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes
and demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who
stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said "
siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay namin.
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl
pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl
questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house
and stabbed his mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter
denied having committed the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that
their basis in arresting appellant was the information relayed by Carl.
The RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the
appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a
5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.
However, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his
inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of
the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that
unlike him, his sisters, who were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused
from sleep; that contrary to Carls recollection, the place was not even dark when the
stabbing attack on the victim occurred because his father said that he had turned the
light on upon hearing somebody shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had
then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was
Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the
appellant as the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his
mother.
RULING:
SC affirmed both lower courts. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability
to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings,
to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following

persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully. (19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident,
and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are
not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of
the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court
allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a
case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for
disqualification.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently

not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred
in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the
composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such,
their effect on his testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did
not negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl
did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother
to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and
to react to what happened like an adult. Although children have different levels of
intelligence and different degrees of perception, the determination of their capacity to
perceive and of their ability to communicate their perception to the courts still
pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation
on the part of the trial court.
CASE TITLE ROMEO T. CALUZOR vs. DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE LORENZO LLANILLO, and MOLD EX REALTY CORPORTATION
PROMULGATION
July 1, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Rule 65 Section 1
DOCTRINE: The remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the
special civil action for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if
there is no appeal, or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
Facts:
Lorenzo Llanillo owned the parcel of land in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan.
Romeo Caluzor averred that Lorenzo took him into the land as a tenant in 1970 and to
effectively till the land, the petitioner and his family were allowed to build a makeshift
shanty thereon. The petitioner continued giving a share of his produce to the family of
Lorenzo even after Lorenzos death through Ricardo, Lorenzos overseer. In 1990,
respondent Deogracias Lanillo, the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner of the
cultivated land in exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias but in the end,
Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead, respondent forcibly ejected the
petitioner and his family by levelling their shanty and plantation with the use of a
bulldozer.
The petitioner then instituted a case against Deogracias in PARAD demanding

payment of disturbance compensation. The PARAD dismissed the complaint of the
petitioner ruling that not all the requisites of a tenency relationship exists. The petitioner
appealed to the DARAB, which reversed the earlier decision of PARAD and ruled that
Calusor is a de jure tenant of a portion of the subject land. Clearly, the institution of
Complainant-Appellant as a tenant in the subject land by Deogracias Llanillo and the
sharing of the produce between the parties sufficiently established tenancy relation
between the parties. The CA reversed the ruling of the DARAB and reinstated the
PARADs decision.
Hence, he filed a special civil action fo certiorari on the ground that the CA had
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it
heavily relied on documents that had not been presented in the PARAD proceedings;
and, secondly, it disregarded altogether the evidence on record proving his tenancy
and entitlement to disturbance compensation. Respondents, in their comment, insists
that petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy arguing that the assailed decision of the
CA, being one determining the merits of the case, was subject to appeal by petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy of a special civil
action for certiorari and should be dismissed?
Ruling:
Yes. It is clear that the CA promulgated the assailed decision in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction to review and pass upon the DARABs adjudication by of the
petitioners appeal of the PARADs ruling. As such, his only proper recourse from such
decision of the CA was to further appeal to the Court by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Despite his allegation of grave abuse of discretion
against the CA, he could not come to the Court by special civil action for certiorari. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari were mutually exclusive, for the special civil action
for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal, or
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In certiorari,
only errors of jurisdiction are to be addressed by the higher court, such that a review of
the facts and evidence is not done; but, in appeal, the superior court corrects errors of
judgment, and in so doing reviews issues of fact and law to cure errors in the
appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. Based on such distinctions, certiorari
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
It is obvious that all that the petitioner wants the Court to do is to revisit and
review the facts and records supposedly substantiating his claim of tenancy and his
demand for consequential disturbance compensation. He has not thereby raised any
jurisdictional error by the CA, and has not shown how the CA capriciously or whimsically
exercised its judgment as to be guilty of gravely abusing its discretion.
CASE TITLE SPOUSES BENITO BAYSA and VICTORIA BAYSA vs. SPOUSES FIDEL
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO ALCORIZA,
PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE
ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA,
JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, and NILA ARADO, PEDRO
ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO vs. ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTE
SUNJACO
PROMULGATION
July 8, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence, Rule 131, Section 1
Doctrine: The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by

preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs.
Facts:
Raymundo Alcoran and Joaquina Arado were married and had a son named
Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan, but their union had no
offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with
Francisca Sarita who gave birth to Anacleto who married Elenette.
Upon death, Joaquinas siblings filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of
property and damages against Anacleto and Elenette.Eight of the subjects properties
belonged to Raymundo and the last two had been the paraphemal properties of
Joaquina. It was contended by the petitioners that Anacleto was not entitled to be
Nicholas heir and Joaquinas heir as the will was void for not having been executed
according to the formalities of the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention
of Joaquina and that they were the rightful heirs to the properties. The defendants
countered that Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact
evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto.
RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that he was really the acknowledged
illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of Anacleto, which proved that
Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto' s birth. It observed that the
name of Nicolas appeared under the column "Remarks" in the register of births, which
was the space provided for the name of the informant. They failed to refute such entry
and became conclusive with respect to the facts contained therein. Further, baptismal
certificate, a picture taken during the wake of Nicolas showing the young Anacleto
being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas' wife, Florencia, his school records, and
Joaquinas consent to marriage, and Joaquinas will bequeathing the subject
properties to Anacleto were sufficient basis. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners were able prove that Anacleto was not an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Nicolas?
Ruling:
No. The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by
preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs.
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of
the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof. The plaintiffs did not rebut
the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence.
The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the

Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas
appearing in the column "Remarks", the space provided for the name of the informant
of the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a
direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of
Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.
However, Anacleto's baptismal certificate was of no consequence in

determining his filiation. As it was ruled that "while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to
the child's paternity." Further, he weight accorded by the R TC and the CA to the
picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the
coffin of the departed Nicolas was also undeserved. At best, the picture merely
manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto.
The school records of Anacleto, which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of
Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and
Elenette, which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did
not have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent
recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for the recognition "must be made personally by
the parent himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept
of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses,
by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside
wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative

evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto 's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child
remained beyond question in view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and
directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
CASE TITLE SPOUSES BENITO BAYSA and VICTORIA BAYSA vs. SPOUSES FIDEL
PLANTILLA and SUSAN PLANTILLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY
PROMULGATION
July 13, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Rule 68; Act No. 3135
DOCTRINE: In extrajudicial foreclosure of property subject of a real estate mortgage,

Act No. 3135 requires that special power of attorney to sell the property be either
inserted or attached to the deed of mortgage.
Facts:
Plaintiffs-spouses executed a real estate mortgage involving their parcel of land
in Cubao, Quezon City in favor of the defendants-spouses to secure the payment of
their of their indebtedness in the principal sum of Php2,300,000. Based on the terms of
the REM, the plaintiffs agreed to pay interest on the principal amount at the rate of
2.5%/month, or P57,500.00/month. This parcel of land including the improvements is
worth P15 million. They suffered business reverses and difficulty in collection so they
became irregular in the monthly payment of the agreed interest and for late payment
they were charged 8% interest per month. Upon the default of the petitioners, the
respondent spouses commenced the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM to recover
from the petitioners the total liability of P3,579, 100.00 (inclusive of the principal and the
unpaid interest).
The plaintiffs sued the respondent spouses in RTC Quezon City to annul the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and the public auction conducted pursuant to the
extrajudicial foredosure. They alleged that all the proceedings relevant to the
extrajudicial foreclosure were null and void, pointing out that there had been no power
or authority to sell inserted in the REM or attached thereto as required by Section 1 Act
No. 3135.
The RTC dismissed the case. It explained that the deed of real estate mortgage
expressly states the consent of the mortgagors to the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged property in the event of non-payment.
Aggrieved, the plaintiffs appealed. The CA promulgated the assailed

judgment, affirming the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. It was explained that
the extrajudicial foreclosure was not visited with vice for failure of the mortgagor in the
mortgage deed to grant special power to sell the property in favor of the mortgagee. It
suffices that the mortgage document empowers the mortgagee to extrajudicially
foreclose the property. Such authority carries with it the grant of power to sell the
property at a public auction.
Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure was valid despite the lack of provision in
the mortgage deed granting special power to sell to the mortgagee?
Ruling:
No. The CA is in error when it affirms the decision of the RTC that the extra judicial
foreclosure as valid. Section 1 of Act No. 3135 provides:
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or

attached to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions
of the following section shall govern as to the manner in which the sale
and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is
made in the power.
Accordingly, to enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM of the

petitioners, the special power to sell should have been either inserted in the REM itself or
embodied in a separate instrument attached to the REM. But it is not disputed that no
special power to sell was either inserted in the REM or attached to the REM. Hence, the
respondent spouses must resort to judicial foreclosure pursuant to the procedure set
forth in Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.
CAs decision was based on paragraph 13 of REM, in the event of non-payment

of the entire principal and accrued interest due under the conditions described in this
paragraph, the mortgagors expressly and specifically agree to the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged property.
The petitioners evidently agreed only to the holding of the extrajudicial

foreclosure should they default in their obligations. Their agreement was a mere
expression of their amenability to extrajudicial foreclosure as the means of foreclosing
the mortgage, and did not constitute the special power or authority to sell the
mortgaged property to enable the mortgagees to recover the unpaid obligations.
What was necessary was the special power or authority to sell that authorized the
respondent spouses to sell in the public auction their mortgaged property.
Since the sale of the property by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure would be
made through the sheriff, there must be a written authority, otherwise, the sale would
be void. And pursuant to Article 1878, (5), of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney
was necessary for entering "into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable
is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration," the written
authority must be a special power of attorney to sell.
Note: The Court deems it unnecessary to consider and determine the final issue on
whether or not the petitioners had lost their right to redeem. In other words, there is no
right of redemption to speak of if the foreclosure was void.
CASE TITLE HORACIO SALVADOR vs. LISA CHUA

PROMULGATION
July 15, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure, Rule 120 Section 6
Doctrine: The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of judgment of

conviction loses the remedies available under the law, specifically: 1)filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, and 2)an appeal from the judgment of conviction. But,
the Rules permits him to regain his standing in Court to avail such remedies if within 15
days from the date of promulgation, he surrenders or files a motion for leave of court to
avail the remedies stating his reason.
Facts:
The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estaf.
On the date scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for
the deferment of the promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from
hypertension. Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its
decision pronouncing the spouses gulty as charged.
The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest and thereafter
apprehended.
The petitioner then filed a Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal and
attached thereto the medical certificate purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A.
David. In an order, Judge Cruz initially denied the said motion on the ground of non-
compliance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.The petitioner
moved for the reconsideration which was eventually granted, thereby giving due
course to his notice of appeal.
Motion for Reconsideration against the order giving due course to the notice of
appeal of petitioners was filed, attaching the affidavit executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A.
David affirming that he had not examined the petitioner and that he had not issued
any medical certificate.
The petitioner opposed it and prayed that he be allowed to post bail pending
appeal. Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Judge Francisco G. Mendiola, In his
order, Judge Mendiola denied the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed
bail of F80,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the petitioner. Consequently, the
respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to nullify the order
giving due course to the petitioner's which was granted.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his failure to appear at
the promulgation of his conviction?
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction. Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction may be done in absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of
15 days from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal;
otherwise, the decision becomes final. The accused who fails to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under the
Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial
or for reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction
(Rule 122). However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in
order to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of
the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave
of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence.
Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he should .be
allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the order finding
his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the judgment of
conviction.
Under Section 6, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of

the was mandatory because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light
felony or offense. He was charged with and actually found guilty of estafa. The
petitioner had only until April 14, 2011 within which to meet the mandatory requirements
under Section 6 (the promulgation of judgment was March 30, 2011).
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies,the petitioner
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached thereto the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David but he failed to establish that his absence
had been for a justifiable cause because the purported issuer, Dr. Paolo Miguel A.
David, directly impugned the credibility of this certificate.
Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly
excused his absence from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other
requirement of Section 6, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender used
in the rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court to suffer any consequences of the verdict against him.
CASE TITLE HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS OF MELECIO

BUENO) vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES
PROMULGATION
July 22, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Rule 41, Section 2
Doctrine: The correct remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision rendered by the RTC
in the special civil action for certiorari should be by ordinary appeal as the Court is
exercising its original jurisdiction.
Facts:
The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural
land located in Poblacion, Iba, and Zambales. He brought an ejectment suit in the MTC
of Iba against the Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales, claiming that in 1983, the
Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a substantial portion of his
land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to
vacate the property had remained unheeded.
The MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of
appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality
of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the R TC in Iba, Zambales to assail the denial of
due course by the MTC which was granted. The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted
Bueno upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court but the CA dismissed it for not being the proper mode of
appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal is proper for being not the proper mode of appeal, despite
substantial compliance with the requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41?
Ruling:
Yes. An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a court
with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any
error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing
more than an error of judgment. It is very crucial to be cognizant of the different modes
of appeal. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which states that xxx the
appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal xxxin
conjunction with Section 3 and Section 4 of Rule 41, the petitioners should have filed a
notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the
judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the
RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the
notice of appeal within the period allowed by the Rules sets in motion the remedy of
ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected. It is upon the perfection of
the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case.
On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within
the reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
the non compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the
appeal under Section 1, ( c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these
requirements was the only way by which they could have perfected their appeal from
the adverse judgment of the RTC.
In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the

petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC
shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to appeal
of the other parties.
The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the
appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. The procedure
taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from that
taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is
burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the
correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to the CA
must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. This requirement of
transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA
when deemed necessary.
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the petition for review
under Rule 42 was wrong. Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the
petition for review.
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. As the parties
invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the
requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their privilege to
appeal.
CASE TITLE BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA
YUJUICO
PROMULGATION
July 22, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Civil Procedure, Rule 1 Section 4; Rule 9 Section 1
Doctrine: 1)An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
property mortgage is a personal action because it does not affect title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein.
2) Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived.
Facts:
The City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the
expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the
name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land were previously
mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest,
under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Manila RTC rendered its judgment
declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The petitioner
subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to
Defendant's Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been "filed
out of time." Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage
constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents' loan. After holding
the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest
bidder.
Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18, 522155.42, the petitioner sued the

respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint which was denied. The respondents moved for reconsideration
and in their reply, they raised for the first time their objection on the ground of improper
venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a
supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action
that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where
the properties were located. Makati RTC denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration and held on the issue of improper venue that it would be improper for
the Court to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the ground of improper venue, assuming
that the venue is indeed improperly laid, since the said ground was not raised in the
defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The CA granted the petition for certiorari of the
respondents ruling that a suit for recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a
mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to
enforce the mortgage contract. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of
deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred when it ruled the case filed by BPI should be dismissed on
the ground of improper venue, being an action emanating from the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage contract which is a real action?
Ruling:
Yes. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a
personal action. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. The real
action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. In contrast, the
Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the
deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal
action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought the case in the Makati RTC
because Makati was the place where the main office of the petitioner was located.
Moreover the Court agreed with the RTC that it would be improper to dismiss the
case on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been improperly
laid, considering that the respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to
Dismiss. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional,
and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates
that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived.
CASE TITLE GRACE BORGONA INSIGNE, DIOSDADO BORGONA, OSBOURNE

BORGONA, IMELDA BORGONA RIVERA, AND ARISTOTLE BORGONA
vs. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGES, INC. AND FRANCIS BORGONA
PROMULGATION
July 29, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence, Rule 131, Section 1; Civil Procedure, Rule 7, Section3
Doctrine: 1) From the plaintiff the burden to prove his positive assertions never parts. Yet,
for the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not a denial of an essential
ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but rather one that, if established, will be a
good defense.
2) Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court expressly empowers the trial court to dismiss
the complaint motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant if, for no justifiable cause,
the plaintiff fails to comply with any order of the court-- the non-compliance constitutes
a willful violation of an order of consequence to the action.
Facts:
Petitioners are siblings of the full blood while respondent Francis is their older half-
blood brother. Pedro (the father) was the founder, president and majority stockholder
of respondent Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. (Abra Valley), a stock corporation. After
Pedros death, Francis succeeded him as the president of Abra Valley.
Petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC against Abra Valley praying that the RTC
direct Abra Valley to allow them to inspect its corporate books and records, and the
minutes of meetings, and to provide them with its financial statements. Abra Valley
failed to answer, hence the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. RTC
denied Abra Valleys motion for reconsideration. When it appealed before the CA, the
court ordered the RTC to admit Abra Valleys answer despite its belated filing.
Subsequently, petitioners amended their complaint to implead Francis as an additional
defendant, both in his personal capacity and as the president of Abra Valley. The
amended complaint also alleged that they were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley,
attaching copies of stock certificates indorsed in their favor on the dorsal portion by the
original holders.
The respondents then filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and
Affirmative Defenses. At the hearing set, the RTC ordered the petitioners to present the
stock certificates issued by Abra Valley under their names. Petitioners submitted
their Compliance and Manifestation,attaching several documents to establish their
claim that they were bona fide stockholders of the corporation.
The RTC issued the order dismissing the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court holding that the documents presented were not stock certificates,
hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with the order of the Court. The CA affirmed the
decision.
Issue:
1. Whether the Court is correct when it ruled that the burden of proving the stock
ownership lies with the petitioners?
2. Whether the lower court properly dismissed the case on the ground of the
petitioners failure to comply with the order issued by the RTC to produce stock
certificates?
Ruling:
1. No. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. Thus, the party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant,
who asserts the affirmative of an issue bears the onus to prove his assertion in order
to obtain a favorable judgment. From the plaintiff the burden to prove his positive
assertions never parts. Yet, for the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is
not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but rather
one that, if established, will be a good defense i.e., an "avoidance" of the claim.
Being the parties who filed the Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and
Affirmative Defenses, the respondents bore the burden of proof to establish that the
petitioners were not stockholders of Abra Valley. The respondents assertion therein,
albeit negative, partook of a good defense that, if established, would result to their
avoidance of the claim.
2. No. To establish their stock ownership, the petitioners actually turned over to the trial
court through their Compliance and Manifestation submitted various documents
showing their ownership of Abra Valleys shares, specifically: the official receipts of
their payments for their subscriptions of the shares of Abra Valley; and the copies
duly certified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stating that Abra
Valley had issued shares in favor of the petitioners, such as the issuance of part of
authorized and unissued capital stock; the secretarys certificate; and the general
information sheet. They were able to show that the respondents had allowed the
petitioners to become members of the Board of Directors according to the Minutes
of the Annual Meeting of Directors and Stockholders of the Abra Valley College of
January 29, 1989. Section 23 of the Corporation Code requires every director to be
the holder of at least one share of capital stock of the corporation of which he is a
director, the respondents would not have then allowed any of the petitioners to be
elected to sit in the Board of Directors as members unless they believed that the
petitioners so elected were not disqualified for lack of stock ownership.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the case on the basis that "the
documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly announced by the
plaintiffs counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with the order of the Court
dated March 8, 2010" was unwarranted and unreasonable. Although Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court expressly empowers the trial court to dismiss the complaint
motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff
fails to comply with any order of the court, the power to dismiss is not to wielded
indiscriminately, but only when the non-compliance constitutes a willful violation of
an order of consequence to the action. As we have seen, however, the dismissal of

the case by virtue of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court should be undone
because the petitioners production of the stock certificates was rendered
superfluous by their submission of other competent means of establishing their
shareholdings in Abra Valley.
CASE TITLE BERLINDA ORIBELLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH
DIVISION), AND REMEDIOS ORIBELLO
PROMULGATION
August 5, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED JURISDICTION, B.P. BLG. 129; RULE 69 CIVIL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Any attack in the action for partition against the validity of the adoption
decree issued by the lower court cannot be permitted because such would constitute
a collateral attack against the judgment in the adoption case.
The plaintiff had the burden of proof, as the party demanding the partition of property,
to establish her right to a share in the property by preponderance of evidence.
FACTS:
An action for partition and damages was filed by private respondent Remedios Oribello
against petitioner Berlinda Oribello, involving twelve parcels of land owned by
deceased Toribio Oribello. Remedios alleged that she is an adopted daughter of Toribio
based on a decision granting the petition of Toribio and his former wife Emilia Oribello
for adoption. Petitioner Berlinda, widow and co-owner of deceased Toribio in one of
the parcels of land in question, denied that Remedios is an adopted daughter of
Toribio. She averred that the first and second adoption proceedings and the decree of
adoption were void ab initio. Also, she stated that the Toribio referred to in the first
adoption case and petitioners husband, Toribio, are two different persons. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment dismissing the case. RTC held that Remedios
is not a co-owner of the properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC
decision and remanded the case to the lower court for the second phase of the
partition suit without prejudice to the filing, if still available, of either a petition for relief
from the decree of adoption rendered by the then Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro (Branch II) or an action for annulment thereof. The CA pointed out that even if
the adoption proceedings had suffered from infirmities, the RTC did not have the
authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss the complaint for partition for
that reason; and that at any rate the petitioner still had the option either to file a
petition for relief or an action for the annulment of the adoption decree in the
appropriate court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the established rule that the
counterclaim in the answer of the petition is a direct attack on the nullity of the alleged
petition and judgment of adoption, and that the RTC has the authority to set aside the
said null and void judgment and to dismiss the complaint
(2) Whether or not Remedios had the right to the partition as the adopted daughter
of Toribio Oribello
RULING:
(1) First, the CA erred when it ruled that the RTC had no authority to interfere with
the CFIs decree of adoption. Section 56, paragraph 1, of Act No. 136 (An Act providing
for the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands), effective on June 11, 1901,
vested original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all civil actions in which the subject of
litigations is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The CFI retained its jurisdiction under
Section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948), effective on June 17,
1948, which contained a similar provision vesting original jurisdiction in the CFI over "all
civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation." As a result, the jurisdiction over the action for the annulment of judgment
had been lodged in the CFI as a court of general jurisdiction on the basis that the
subject matter of the action was not capable of pecuniary estimation. In 1981, the
Legislature enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
Among several innovations of this legislative enactment was the formal establishment of
the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic
classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary
estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in
the CA (Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 129). The action in which the subject of the litigation was
incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since
then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the
RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. In the case at bar, however, the
RTC did not interfere with the jurisdiction of the CFI as a court of equal rank and
category, and did not negate the adoption decree, but simply determined whether or
not the claim of Remedios Oribello to the partition of the property of Tomas Oribello
was competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence. What the RTC thereby
settled was only whether Remedios Oribello was a co-owner of the property with
Berlinda Oribello, the widow of Tomas Oribello. The RTC, being the trial court with
jurisdiction over the action for partition, undeniably possessed the fullest authority to
hear and settle the conflicting claims of the parties.
(2) Second, the CA correctly held that the validity of the adoption decree in favor
of the respondent should not be assailed in an action for partition. The judgment or final
order of a court of law can be set aside only through a direct attack commenced in
the court of competent jurisdiction. In the instant case, the petitioner insists that her
attack against the adoption decree was akin to the counterclaim allowed in Heirs of
Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, an action for the nullification of a
certificate of title, because the counterclaim constituted a direct attack on the title.
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that any attack in the action for partition against the
validity of the adoption decree issued by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro cannot be
permitted because such would constitute a collateral attack against the judgment in
the adoption case.
No. The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the plaintiff to show that
she was entitled to the partition. Partition, a proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, is a judicial controversy between persons who, being co-owners or coparceners
of common property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof among themselves,
giving to each one of them the part corresponding to him. As stated in the case
of Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, a judicial partition has two phases. The first phase is
an inquiry as to whether there exists co-ownership of properties by several persons. The
second phase is on the actual partition and accounting, if applicable. In this case, with
regard to the first phase, the fact Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted Remedios
Oribello under the CFI's decree of adoption was not the same person as the Tomas
Oribello whose property was the subject of her demand for judicial partition, was
supported by the records. Toribio Oribello did not know about the first adoption case
just like the second one. The Court finds that no-co-ownership exists between plaintiff
and defendant. Hence, we cannot proceed to the second phase.
CASE TITLE CHARLIE TE VS. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL
REGION, BRANCH 10, DAVAO CITY, ET. AL.
PROMULGATION
August 5, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 46 CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE 126 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not
depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in
court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question
had been issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered
the People of the Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil action
for certiorari.
FACTS:
Respondent Presiding Judge Hon. Augusto V. Breva issued a search warrant against the
petitioner, Charlie Te, on the basis of his finding of probable cause for hoarding large
quantities of liquefied petroleum gas in steel cylinders belonging to respondent Pryce
Gases, Inc. in violation of Section 2(b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1865. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant
and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return of Seized Items. Respondent Presiding
Judge issued an order denying the said motion. The petitioner, thereafter, assailed the
order on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA promulgated an
order dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that a copy of the petition had
been served on the OSG. The petitioner argued that the People of the Philippines as
respondents was premature because no criminal case had yet been filed against him
with only the application for the issuance of the search warrant having been made;
and that serving the copy of the petition on the OSG pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court was not indispensable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as respondents
RULING:
Yes. As provided under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents
and the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Also, under Section 1, Rule 126, a
search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines,
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property described therein and bring it before the court.
In this case, it is admitted that the application for the search warrant was not a criminal
action and the application for the search warrant was not of the same form as that of a
criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is rather
a legal process that may be likened to a writ of discovery employed by no less than the
State to procure relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool,
issued under the State's police power and this is the reason why it must issue in the
name of the People of the Philippines. Impleading the People of the Philippines in
the petition for certiorari did not depend on whether or not an actual criminal action
had already been commenced in court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied
that the search warrant in question had been issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the Philippines indispensable parties in
the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the questioned orders of
respondent Presiding Judge. Therefore, the CA did not abuse its discretion when it
denied petitioners petition for certiorari.
CASE TITLE JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROMULGATION
August 18, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 114, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DOCTRINE: Unless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness
of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge
and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit
the prisoner to bail.
FACTS:
Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner herein, and several others were charged with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their alleged involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile
filed an Omnibus Motion for him to be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
found against him. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the said motion on the
ground of its prematurity and ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the same day that the
warrant for arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to CIDG and was later on
confined at the PNP General Hospital. Enrile, thereafter, filed a Motion to Fix Bail. He
argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must
further be seriously considered. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the said
motion and wherein they stated that admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition
and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, it is premature to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong since the
latter has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. Enrile then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not bail may be granted in favor of Enrile
RULING:
Yes, bail may be granted in favor of Enrile. In resolving bail applications of the accused
who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit: (1) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court); (2) Where
bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, Rule 114); (3) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (4) If the guilt of the accused is
not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, Rule
114) Otherwise petition should be denied.
Nonetheless, unless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the
illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and
the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the
charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail.
In the case at bar, the currently fragile state of Enriles health presents a compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
There is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance, was not even recommended because of the limitations in the medical
support at that hospital.
Hence, granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in
the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his
defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
Further, Enriles social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. Also, at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and
was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
Accordingly, therefore, the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile.
CASE TITLE NILO V. CHIPONGIAN VS. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ

AGUILAR, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
PROMULGATION
August 26, 2015
DATE
TOPIC COVERED RULE 41, CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE 109 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
DOCTRINE: When the petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings, his complaint-in-
intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any
final disposition thereof subject to the rules specifically applicable to special
proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Petitioner Nilo Chipongian and deceased Vicente Benitez executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel Chipongian, sister of petitioner
and wife of Vicente. In the said deed, petitioner waived all his rights to the estate of
Isabel in favor of Vicente. Upon the death of Vicente, the respondents initiated
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente. Petitioner intervened in the said
special proceeding and sought the partial revocation of the order appointing one of
the respondents as administrator in order to exclude the paraphernal properties of
Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente. Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention, which the RTC granted. Thereafter,
on August 21, 1998, the RTC dismissed the complaint-in-intervention. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on March 8, 1999. A notice of appeal,
thus, was filed on March 19, 1999 but was denied due course by the RTC on March 30,
1999 for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. On April 19, 1999,
the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration vis-a-vis the order denying due course
to his notice of appeal. On July 5, 1999, the RTC issued an order whereby it conceded
that the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that he had not perfected his appeal because of his
failure to pay the appellate court docket fees. On July 26, 1999, the petitioner brought
his Motion to Set Aside the July 5, 1999 order denying his Motion for Reconsideration. On
August 13, 1999, the RTC denied the Motion to Set Aside. On October 26, 1999, the
petitioner instituted his petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed
the petition stating that petitioner paid the appeal fees only on March 31, 1999, but as
admitted by him in his Motion for Reconsideration, the last day to perfect
his appeal was on August 21, 1998. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held
that failure to comply with the requirement for payment on time of the appeal fees
renders the decision final.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner timely filed his appeal
RULING:
No. First, Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that
an appeal "may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable." In the context of the final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not
limit the appealable orders and judgments in special proceedings to the final order or
judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders
or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the case, such as when
it allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
and when it constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination
in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be
allowed from the appointment of a special administrator. In the case at bar, when
the petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings, his complaint-in-intervention, once
admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition
thereof subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing," that is, his
right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell under Section 1
or Rule 109, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of
Vicente, and because it was a final determination in the trial court of his intervention.
Conformably, the dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue
of its nature of completely disposing of his intervention.
Further, pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41, the proper mode of appealing a judgment or
final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. Under
Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to
perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a
record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the
adverse party. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. In this case, for the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting
the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing
the intervention. The start of the period of 30 days happened on September 18, 1998,
the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing his intervention. However,
the entire time from the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 1998 until
his receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on March 18, 1999 should be
deducted from the reckoning of the period to perfect his appeal. Considering that
the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule
41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result,
the dismissal became final and immutable.
CASE TITLE ROGELIO BARONDA v HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HIDECO

SUGAR MILLING CO., INC.
PROMULGATION
October 14, 2015
DATE
DOCTRINE: The general rule provides that certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, was
available only when there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary, course of law. However, petition for certiorari is available in exceptional
situations, such as: (1) when the remedy of certiorari is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (2) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment; (3) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (4) where
appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient; (5) where the issue raised is one
purely of law; (6) where public interest is involved; and (7) in case of urgency.
FACTS:
Respondent HIDECO employed the petitioner as a mud press truck driver. On May 01,
1998, he hit HIDECOs transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total
factory blackout. Power was eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO
damages totaling P26, 481.11.
After requiring Baronda to explain and on the incident and complying thereafter, the
management conducted its investigation and finding him guilty of negligence,
recommending his dismissal. The resident manager served a termination letter and
informed him of the decision to terminate his employment effective at the close of
office hours of that day.
Petitioner filed in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board a complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO. The Voluntary
Arbitrator Lopez, Jr. found petitioners dismissal illegal.
Petitioner filed a manifestation with motion for the issuance of the writ of execution in
the Office of the Voluntary Arbitration, praying for the execution of the decision, and
insisting on being entitled to backwages and other benefits based on Article 279 of the
Labor Code.
HIDECO opposed the petitioners motion for execution and simultaneously presented its
own motion for execution to enforce the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator directing
the petitioner to pay the actual damages amounting to P26, 484.41. The Voluntary
Arbitrator dismissed petitioners motion and granted HIDECOs motion for execution.
Petitioner filed another motion for execution praying that a writ of execution requiring
HIDECO to pay to him unpaid waged, 13th month pay and bonuses; which was granted
by the Voluntary Arbitrator.
HIDECO instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals averring
that the Voluntary Arbitrator had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner countered that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed considering that
HIDECO should have appealed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court because certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari was the proper remedy.
RULING:
NO. HIDECOs proper recourse was to appeal by petition for review and not petition for
certiorari.
Even if the error sought to be reviewed concerned grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the remedy was an appeal in due course by filing the
petition for review within 10 days from notice of the award or decision. This is because
certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, was available only when there was no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary, course of law.
The justification for HIDECOs resort to the extraordinary equitable remedy of certiorari
did not exist due to the availability of appeal, or other ordinary remedies in law to which
HIDECO as the aggrieved party could resort.
Although it is true that certiorari cannot be substitute for a lost appeal, and that either
remedy was not an alternative of the other, we have at times permitted the resort to
certiorari despite availability of appeal or of any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law in exceptional situations, such as:
1. When the remedy of certiorari is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and
injury to a party;
2. Where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;
3. Where there may be danger of a failure of justice;
4. Where appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient;
5. Where the issue raised is one purely of law;
6. Where public interest is involved; and
7. In case of urgency.
In this case, HIDECO did not establish that its case came within any of the aforestated
exceptional situations.
CASE TITLE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v ERNESTO ROXAS

PROMULGATION
October 21, 2015
DATE
DOCTRINE: Government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to writs of
execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy judgments of the court. The disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
FACTS:
The NHA is charged, among others, with the development of the Dagat-dagatan
Development Project in Navotas, Manila. Roxas applied for commercial lots in the said
project with an area of 176 sq. m. for the use of his business of buying and selling gravel,
sand and cement products.
The NHA approved his application and issued the order or payment respecting the lots.
Later on, NHA issued the notice of award for the lots in favor of Roxas. The latter
completed his payment for the subject lots on December 20, 1991.
NHA conducted a final subdivision project survey, causing the increase in the area of
the subject lots from 176 to 320 sq. m. The NHA informed Roxas about the increase in
the area of the subject lots, and approved the award of additional area of 144 sq. m.
to him at P3,500.00/sq. m. Although Roxas desired to purchase the increased area, the
purchase must be in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the order
of payment and notice of award issued to him.
After NHA rejected his appeal, Roxas commenced an action for specific performance
and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. He
amended the complaint to compel the NHA to comply with the terms and conditions
of the order of payment and the notice of award.
NHA countered that Roxas prayer to include in the original contract the increase in lot
measurement of 144 sq. m. was contrary to its existing rules and regulation and at the
very least, his right in the additional area was limited only to first refusal.
The RTC ruled against NHA. Roxas filed his motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution which was granted by the RTC.
NHA filed its petition for certiorari. It contends that the money judgment awarded to
Roxas could not be covered by motion for execution but should have been first filed in
the COA.The CA dismissed NHAs petition and ruled that NHA was a government-
owned and controlled corporation whose funds were not exempt from garnishment or
execution; and ruled that Roxas did not need to first file his claim in the COA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the money judgment awarded in favor of Roxas should be first filed
before the COA.
RULING:
YES.
The audit jurisdiction of the CIA extends to all government-owned or controlled

corporations, their subsidiaries and other self-governing boards, commission or agencies
of the Government, as well as to all non-governmental entities subsidized by the
Government, or funded by donations through the Government, or required to pay
levies or government share, or for which the Government has put up a counterpart
fund, or those of partly funded by the Government.
There is no question that the NHA could sue and be sued, and thus could be held liable
under the judgment rendered against it. But the universal rule remains to be that the
State, although it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law, may limit
the claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution.
Government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to writs of execution or
writs of garnishment to satisfy judgments of the court. The functions and public services
of the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
fund from their legitimate and specific objects, and as appropriated by law. The
disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law.
2016 CASES
CASE TITLE PEDRO LADINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE
RAMON
PROMULGATION
JAN 11, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED EVIDENCE - RES GESTAE AND AND CRIM PRO - RULE 124 NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
DOCTRINE:
Newly-discovered evidence refers only to such evidence that can satisfy the following
requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.
FACTS:
Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin), were
watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the
Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, when the petitioner and Licup appeared and
passed by them. Petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed
Erwin below the navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow.
At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the
blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and wielded it
against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with
Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where
he died. In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial.
RTC: pronounced the petitioner guilty of homicide and acquitted Licup for insufficiency
of evidence.
CA: Affirmed RTC's decision.
MAIN ARGUMENT OF ACCUSED: insisting that the CA committed reversible error in

affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident
that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted
newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners
guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether the res gestae statement of co-accused Licup constituted a newly
discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners guilt.
RULING:
No. The res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly- discovered evidence
372 Alvarez, Azarcon, Borja, Castillo, Castillo,, De Guzman, Dimaliwat, Doran REMEDIAL LAW
Espinas
that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners guilt. The concept of newly-
discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-
opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal,
particularly one before the Court. The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of
newly-discovered evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason.
The Court would be compelled, despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and
consider the evidence for purposes of its appellate adjudication.
But the propriety of remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court to receive
the newly-discovered evidence would inflict some degree of inefficiency on the
administration of justice, because doing so would effectively undo or reopen the
decision that is already on appeal. That is a result that is not desirable.
The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such
evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is
of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
In the present case, the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered
because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the
proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter
that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant
documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal
responsibility.
Espinas
CASE TITLE FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

PHILIPPINES INC.
PROMULGATION
January 20, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED CIVIL PROCEDURE - RULE 34 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
DOCTRINE:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming
party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the
pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny
the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in
another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies,
delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondents hospital
under several contracts. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67M of
its total obligation of P123M, leaving unpaid the sum of P54M.
On February 11, 2009 ("February Agreement"), the petitioner and the respondent,
respectively represented by Fernando and Maglaya, Sr., entered into an agreement,
whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50M, and allowed the latter to
pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.
However, respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had reviewed
their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic
prejudice; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the "February
Agreement" because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having
been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired. Due to the respondents
failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the
RTC of Manila.
The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis
pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated
that it had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the
February agreement in the RTC Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case
would be determinative of the petitioners action for collection
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss. Thus, respondent filed its answer which states:
2. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint are
ADMITTED subject to the special and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;
3. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint are DENIED for
Espinas
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity

thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of
office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines. At any rate,
these allegations are subject to the special and affirmative defenses hereafter
pleaded; xxx
Petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the
respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not
tender any issue as to such allegations on its answer.
RTC: DENIED THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT BASED ON THE PLEADINGS
CA: AFFIRMED RTC'S DECISION AND ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be
improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an
issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the
RTC in Cabanatuan City.
MAIN ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER: CA erred in going outside of the respondents answer

by relying on the allegations contained in the latters complaint for rescission; Insists that
the CA should have confined itself to the respondents answer in the action in order to
resolve the petitioners motion for judgment based on the pleadings
ISSUE:
Whether a judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer is composed only of
general denials and disavowal of knowledge?
RULING:
Yes. The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether
or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in
a case or not depends on how the defending partys answer has dealt with the
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint.
The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse partys
pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also
when it omits to deal with them at all.
In the present case, the respondent expressly admitted the various agreements,
especially the February 11, 2009 agreement, and thus significantly admitted the
petitioners complaint. To recall, the petitioners cause of action was based on the
February 11, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable document in the case.
The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February agreement, and
contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the genuineness
and due execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings
became proper.
Espinas
Further, the denial of the respondent of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were
undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan
University- Philippines is not an effective denial. Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7
and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to know or could
have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such material averments. It is
settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known
to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it are
insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.
That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its
special and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue,
litis pendentia and forum shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative
defenses, by their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioners
claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the complaint.
Lastly, the Supreme Court emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioners Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could must rely only on the answer of
the respondent filed in the RTC Manila. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court,
the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaints material
allegations were admitted or properly denied.
As such, the respondents averment of payment of the total of P78M to the petitioner
made in its complaint for rescission in RTC Cabanatuan had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings filed in RTC Manila.
Espinas
CASE TITLE ANDREW D. FYFE, RICHARD T. NUTTALL, AND RICHARD J. WALD

vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
PROMULGATION
June 06, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Verification/certification
Sec 2, Rule 41
Rule 43
Rule 45
Rule 65
DOCTRINE:
We ought not to exact a literal compliance with Section 4, Rule 45, in relation to Section
2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, that only the party himself should execute the
certification especially if there is not showing that it was done to circumvent the
requirement for the verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
Arbitration Law has limited the ground of review to "questions of law." Accordingly, the
CA correctly dismissed the appeal of the petitioners because pursuant to Section
2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court an appeal of questions of law arising in the courts in the
first instance is by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Under Section 22 of the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding, by

virtue of which any application should be made in the manner provided for the making
and hearing of motions, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Arbitration Law.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent entered into Technical Service Agreement (TSA)
wherein under its terms, penalties shall be payable by the terminating party.
Respondent sent notice to petitioner terminating the TSA for lack of confidence and
wants to offset the penalty from its advance payment. Petitioner denied the refund and
claim for offset and proposed to submit the issue to arbitration pursuant to their TSA. The
Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc. rendered judgment in favor to the petitioner.
Respondent filed an Application to Vacate Arbitral Award in RTC Makati in view of the
SEC Order that respondent is under a state of suspension of payment. The petitioner
filed MTD on the ground that (a) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners
due to the improper service of summons; (b) the application did not state a cause of
action; and (c) the application was an improper remedy because the respondent
should have filed an appeal in the CA pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. RTC
granted the application to vacate arbitral award. Petitioner appealed to CA by notice
of appeal. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Section 29 of
arbitration law limited appeals to a review on certiorari upon questions of law. CA
rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Hence this appeal by the petitioners.
Espinas
On the merits, the respondent maintains that: (a) the term certiorari used in Section 29
of the Arbitration Law refers to a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court; (b) XXX; (c) the petitioners' claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC
should fail because an application to vacate an arbitral award under Sections 22 and
26 of the Arbitration Law is only required to be in the form of a motion; and (d) the
complete record of the arbitration proceedings submitted to the RTC sufficiently proved
the manifest partiality and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the panel of
arbitrators.
ISSUE:
(a) whether or not the petition for review should be dismissed for containing a
defective verification/certification; and
(b) whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for
being an inappropriate remedy.
RULING:
(a) There was sufficient compliance with the rule on verification and certification
against forum shopping. The purpose of the verification is to ensure that the
allegations contained in the verified pleading are true and correct, and are not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; and that the pleading is filed
in good faith. This purpose was met by the verification/certification made by Atty.
Chao-Kho in behalf of the petitioners. We ought not to exact a literal compliance
with Section 4, Rule 45, in relation to Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, that only
the party himself should execute the certification. After all, we have not been shown
by the respondent any intention on the part of the petitioners and their counsel to
circumvent the requirement for the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping.
(b) The assailed resolution of the CA did not expressly declare that the petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 was the sole remedy from the RTC's order
vacating the arbitral award. The CA rather emphasized that the petitioners should
have filed the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 considering that Section
29 of the Arbitration Law has limited the ground of review to "questions of law."
Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal of the petitioners because
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court an appeal of questions of law
arising in the courts in the first instance is by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
Although the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution provides

that the appropriate remedy from an order of the RTC vacating a domestic arbitral
award is an appeal by petition for review in the CA, not an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the Court cannot set aside and reverse the assailed
decision on that basis because the decision was in full accord with the law or rule in
force at the time of its promulgation. We remind that the petitioners cannot insist on
their chosen remedy despite its not being sanctioned by the Arbitration Law. Appeal
Espinas
as a remedy is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised

only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law.
The petitioners' challenge against the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of
the absence of the service of the summons on them also fails. Under Section 22 of
the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding, by virtue of which
any application should be made in the manner provided for the making and
hearing of motions, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Arbitration Law.
The RTC observed that the respondent's Application to Vacate Arbitral Award was
duly served personally on the petitioners, who then appeared by counsel and filed
pleadings.
Espinas
CASE TITLE SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. AND MR. BEN YAPJOCO vs. VICTOR
ALBINA, VICENTE UY AND ALEX VELASQUEZ
PROMULGATION
June 06, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Rule 65
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion that amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and
narrow in character. As such, the judicial inquiry in a special civil action
for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only whether or not the NLRC acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Respondents Victor Albina, Vicente Uy and Alex Velasquez charged the
petitioners in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in Cebu City with having illegally dismissed them as kettleman,
assistant kettleman, and inspector, respectively. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that
although the dismissal of the respondents was justified because of their being guilty
of gross negligence, the petitioners should pay them separation pay.
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the LAs decision and dismissed the appeal for
failure of the appellants to comply with Article 223 of the Labor Code. Aggrieved,
the respondents assailed the result through their petition for certiorari in the CA. CA
granted the petition for certiorari. Hence this appeal.
The crux of this appeal is the extent of the authority of the Court of Appeals
(CA) to review in a special civil action for certiorari the findings of fact contained in
the rulings of the NLRC. The petitioners insist that the CA's review is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; hence, it cannot disregard the findings of
fact of the NLRC to resolve the issue of illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA depart from well-settled rules on what findings the CA could review
on certiorari?
RULING:
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. The CA acted in accordance
with the pertinent law and jurisprudence. As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being
confined to the correction of acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that amounts to lack or excess of
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jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character. As such, the judicial inquiry in
a special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only whether or not
the NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
We find that the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence
and deciding the case on the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already
being final. We have frequently expounded on the competence of the CA in a
special civil action for certiorari to review the factual findings of the NLRC.
Espinas
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDISON C.

MAGBITANG, Accused-Appellant.
PROMULGATION
June 14, 2016
DATE
DIGEST BY ALVAREZ, MELISSA P.
TOPIC COVERED EVIDENCE Sec. 21(b), Rule 130 Rules of Court;
Circumstantial evidence
DOCTRINE: Every child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known
his perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive
to testify.
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence,
no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than
when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
FACTS:
At around 5 p.m. of December 25, 1998, 7-year old AAA asked permission from her
mother, BBB, to go to a nearby store. BBB allowed her daughter to leave the house, but
the child did not return home. Later that evening, the child's lifeless body was found by
the riverbank. The post-mortem examination of her cadaver revealed that she had
succumbed to asphyxiation, and that there were "incidental findings compatible to
rape." The lone witness to what had befallen AAA was 6-year old CCC, who recalled in
court that he and AAA had been playing when Magbitang approached AAA; and
that Magbitang brought AAA to his house. CCC testified on re-direct examination that
he had witnessed Magbitang raping AAA (inasawa), as well as burning her face with a
cigarette (sininit-sinit).
Magbitang, denying the accusation, claimed that he had attended a baptismal party
on December 25, 1998, and had been in the party from 4:00 p.m.to 5:00 p.m.; that from
the party he had gone looking for his nephew to have the latter tend to his watermelon
farm; that he had returned home by around 6 p.m.; that at around 7:30 p.m., he had
gone to his farm to check on his nephew; and that he and his wife had remained in the
farm until 4 a.m. of the following day.
The trial court convicted Magbitang. The CA affirmmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
1. WON CCC, being a child of tender age, is a competent witness.
2. WON the lower court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of rape with
homicide based on circumstantial evidence.
Espinas
RULING:
1. YES. Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to
render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined
and of relating the facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of sound mind with the
capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the
absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify. Once it is established that the
child fully understands the character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full
credence. In the case of CCC, the Defense did not persuasively discredit his worthiness
and competence as a witness. As such, the Court considers the reliance by the trial
court on his recollection fully justified.
2. No. Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker in persuasive quality than

direct evidence. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or
inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial
evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an
inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court makes no
distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is
required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the
trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
In this case, the evidence of guilt against Magbitang consisted in both direct and
circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence was supplied by CCC's testimony, while
the circumstantial evidence corroborated CCC's testimony. Such evidence, combined,
unerringly pointed to Magbitang, and to no other, as the culprit.
Espinas
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANO

OANDASAN, JR., Accused-Appellant.
PROMULGATION
June 14, 2016
DATE
DIGEST BY ALVAREZ, MELISSA P.
TOPIC COVERED Evidence, Crim Pro
DOCTRINE: : In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, first, he was in another place at the time of the offense; and,
second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites

must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, these
requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present.
The rule is that the allegations of the information on the nature of the offense charged,
not the nomenclature given to it by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, are controlling
in the determination of the offense charged.
FACTS:
Ferdinand Cutaran and his companions Jose Ifurung, Arthur Cutaran and victim Danny
Montegrico were having a drinking spree outside the bunkhouse of Navarro
Construction on July 29, 2003 between 8:00 to 9:00 in the evening when suddenly,
appellant appeared from back of a dump truck, aimed and fired his gun at
Montegrico. Cutaran ran away after seeing the appellant shoot Mentegrico. However,
he did not witness the shooting of the other two victims Edgar Tamanu and Mario
Paleg. When Cutaran returned to the crime scene, he saw the bodies of Montegrico,
Tamanu and Paleg lying on the ground. Cutaran and his companions rushed the
victims to Lyceum of Aparri Hospital. As a result of the shooting incident, Danilo
Montegrico, and Edgardo Tamanu, died while Mario Paleg survived. Prudencio Bueno,
a checker at Navarro Construction, stated that after having dinner with Cutaran and
the others on the date and time in question, he went inside the bunkhouse to drink
water. Suddenly, he heard successive gun reports. When he peeped through a
window, he saw the accused approaching from the back of a dump truck holding
something, and going to the table where they were eating. He confessed that he did
not actually see the appellant fire his gun at the victims.
The accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that from July
up to October 2003, he was staying at his sister's house in Imus, Cavite. He was hired by
SERG Construction, Inc. as a mason to work on a subdivision project in Rosario, Cavite.
That on of July 29, 2003, he reported for work from 7:00 a.m. up to 5:00 p.m. To bolster
his claim, he presented an Employment Certificate dated January 20, 2007 and a time
record sheet dated July 29, 2003. He went back to Aparri in October 2003 after the
Espinas
completion of his project in Cavite. Fred Escobar, testified that on July 29, 2003, when
he was about to go home at around 8:00 p.m., after having a drink with Montegrieo
and three other men whom he did not know, a stranger appeared and fired his gun at
Montegrieo. The assailant whom he did not know fired his gun several times. He
asserted that appellant was not the assailant since the latter was shorter in stature.
The Trial Court finds the accused Mariano Oandasan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal: for Murder for killing Danilo Montegrieo; for Homicide for killing
Edgardo Tamanu and for Frustrated Homicide for wounding Mario Paleg. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant was properly identified.
2. Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused appellant.
3. Whether or not the accused appellant cannot be convicted of the crime of
frustrated murder based on the information filed.
RULING:
1. Yes. There is no doubt that Prosecution witness Ferdinand Cutaran positively identified
the accused as the person who had shot Montegrico. Considering that Cutaran's
credibility as an eyewitness was unassailable in the absence of any showing or hint of ill
motive on his part to falsely incriminate the accused, such identification of the accused
as the assailant of Montegrico prevailed over the accused's weak denial and alibi.
As for the defense of alibi, for it to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and
satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was
somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it was committed,
as well as the facility of the access between the two places.
In the case at bar, appellant failed to prove the element of physical impossibility for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time it took place. His alibi that he was in Cavite
and the employment certificate and time record sheet which he presented cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Alibi
is the weakest defense not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it is easy to fabricate. It is generally rejected when the accused is positively
identified by a witness.
2. No. Although no witness positively identified the accused as the person who had also
shot Tamanu and Paleg, the record contained sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish that the accused was also criminally responsible for the fatal shooting of
Tamanu and the near-fatal shooting of Paleg. The circumstantial evidence available
was enough to convict accused-appellant. Circumstantial evidence is competent to
establish guilt as long as it is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused, and not someone else, was responsible for the killing. For circumstantial
Espinas
evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, these requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are
present. First, the witnesses unanimously said that they saw appellant coming from the
back of a dump truck and shoot Montegrico pointblank. Second, appellant fired his
gun several times. Third, immediately after the shooting incident, three victims were
found lying on the ground and rushed to the hospital. Fourth, the Certificates of Death
of Montegrico and Tamanu and the Medical Certificate of Paleg revealed that they all
sustained gun shot wounds. Thus, it can be said with certitude that appellant was the
lone assailant. The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no
reason to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses.
3. No. The averment in the second paragraph of the information filed in relation to the
shooting of Paleg that homicide was the consequence of the acts of execution by the
appellant does not prevent finding the accused guilty of frustrated murder. The rule is
that the allegations of the information on the nature of the offense charged, not the
nomenclature given to it by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, are controlling in the
determination of the offense charged. Accordingly, considering that the information
stated in its first paragraph that the accused, "armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and with treacher[y], conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot
one Engr. Mario Paleg y Ballad, inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound," the
accused can be properly found guilty of frustrated murder, a crime sufficiently averred
in the information.
Espinas
CASE TITLE TRIDHARMA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF

TAX APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
PROMULGATION
June 20, 2016
DATE
DIGEST BY ALVAREZ, MELISSA
TOPIC Special Civil Action- certiorari
DOCTRINE: the CTA may order the suspension of the collection of taxes provided that
the taxpayer either: (1) deposits the amount claimed; or (2) files a surety bond for not
more than double the amount.
FACTS:
On August 16, 2013, the petitioner received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) from
the BIR assessing it with various deficiency taxes - income tax (IT), value-added tax
(VAT), withholding tax on compensation (WTC), expanded withholding tax (EWT) and
documentary stamp tax (DST), inclusive of surcharge and interest. A substantial portion
of the deficiency income tax and VAT arose from the complete disallowanceby the BIR
of the petitioner's purchases from Etheria Trading in 2010 The petitioner replied to the
PAN through its letter dated August 30, 2013. On September 23, 2013, the petitioner
received from the BIR a Formal Letter of Demand assessing it with deficiency taxes for
the taxable year ending December 31, 2010, inclusive of surcharge and interest. It filed
a protest against the formal letter of demand. Respondent CIR required the petitioner
to submit additional documents in support of its protest, and the petitioner complied.
On February 28, 2014, the petitioner received a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment.
The petitioner filed with the CIR a protest through a Request for Reconsideration.
However, the CIR denied the request for reconsideration. Prior to the CIR's decision, the
petitioner paid the assessments corresponding to the WTC, DST and EWT deficiency
assessments, inclusive of interest. It likewise reiterated its offer to compromise the
alleged deficiency assessments on IT and VAT. The petitioner appealed the CIR's
decision to the CTA via its so-called Petition for Review with Motion to Suspend
Collection of Tax.
The CTA in Division granted petitioner's Motion for Suspension of Collection of Tax
representing its deficiency Income Tax and Value Added Tax for taxable year 2010.
They further ordered the petitioner to deposit with the Court a continuing surety bond
equivalent to 150% of the assessment. The petitioner filed its Motion for Partial
Reconsideration praying, among others, for the reduction of the bond to an amount it
could obtain. The CTA in Division issued its second assailed resolution reducing the
amount of the petitioner's surety bond, which was the equivalent of the BIR's deficiency
assessment for IT and VAT. Hence, the petitioner has commenced this special civil
action for certiorari.
Espinas
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA in Division committed grave abuse of discretion in requiring the
petitioner to file a surety bond.
RULING:
Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 (R.A. No. 1125), as amended by Republic Act
No. 9282 (RA 9282) it is stated that: Sec. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. x x x
xxxx
No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the Collector of
Internal Revenue or the Collector of Customs shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint,
and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as
provided by existing law: Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the Court the
collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs may
jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of
the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to
deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the
amount with the Court. (bold Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the CTA may order the suspension of the collection of taxes provided that the
taxpayer either: (1) deposits the amount claimed; or (2) files a surety bond for not more
than double the amount.
The CTA in Division gravely abused its discretion under Section 11 because it fixed the
amount of the bond at nearly five times the net worth of the petitioner without
conducting a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether there were grounds to suspend
the collection of the deficiency assessment on the ground that such collection would
jeopardize the interests of the taxpayer. Although the amount was itself the amount of
the assessment, it behoved the CTA in Division to consider other factors recognized by
the law itself towards suspending the collection of the assessment, like whether or not
the assessment would jeopardize the interest of the taxpayer, or whether the means
adopted by the CIR in determining the liability of the taxpayer was legal and valid.
Simply prescribing such high amount of the bond like the initial 150% of the deficiency
assessment or later on even reducing the amount of the bond to equal the deficiency
assessment would practically deny to the petitioner the meaningful opportunity to
contest the validity of the assessments, and would likely even impoverish it as to force it
out of business.
Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. 1125, as amended, indicates that the requirement of the
bond as a condition precedent to suspension of the collection applies only in cases
where the processes by which the collection sought to be made by means thereof are
carried out in consonance with the law, not when the processes are in plain violation of
the law that they have to be suspended for jeopardizing the interests of the taxpayer.
Espinas
CASE TITLE JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

PROMULGATION
July 12, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure
DOCTRINE: The principal factor considered in bail fixing, to the determination of which
most factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his
flight to avoid punishment.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court,
granting the petition for bail filed by Juan Ponce Enrile
The People rely on the following grounds for the reversal of the decision of
August 18, 2015, to wit:
The decision granting bail to petitioner was premised on a factual finding that he
is not a flight risk, on a determination that he suffers from a fragile state of health
and on other unsupported grounds unique and personal to him. In granting bail
to petitioner on the foregoing grounds, the decision unduly and radically
modified constitutional and procedural principles governing bail without
sufficient constitutional, legal and juris prudential basis.
The decision openly ignored and abandoned the constitutionally-mandated

procedure for determining whether a person accused of a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment such as plunder can be granted bail.
The decision also disregarded constitutional principles and relevant court

procedures when it granted petitioner's request for bail on the ground that he is
not a flight risk, premised on a loose finding that the principal purpose of bail is
merely to secure the appearance of an accused during trial.
Contrary to the strict requirements of the 1987 constitution on the matter of

granting bail to persons accused of crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the decision erroneously held that petitioner should be granted
bail because of his fragile state of health, and because of other unsupported
and debatable grounds and circumstances purely personal and peculiar to him,
without reference to the strength of the prosecution's evidence against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of bail is proper.
Espinas
RULING:
Yes, the grant of bail is just proper.
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the
conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before the proper court whenever
required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing supports this purpose.
Thus, in Villaseor v. Abao, the Court has pronounced that "the principal factor
considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of which most factors are directed, is
the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment."
The Court has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting bail,
which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear during his trial and would
continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges
levelled against him.
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal
prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the
accused's right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of
preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to
punish a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the
practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere
accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of the procedure is
rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards has found
and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the individuals
wrongly accused could be punished by the period of imprisonment they undergo while
awaiting trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel, searching for evidence
and witnesses, and preparing a defense. Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism
to accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in
assuring his presence at trial.
Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is
the reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important
factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases.
The exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused's official
and social standing and his other personal circumstances are considered and
appreciated as tending to render his flight improbable.
Espinas
CASE TITLE MACAPAGAL-ARROYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROMULGATION
July 19, 2016
DATE
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that the special civil action for certiorari is not proper to
assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. An exception to this is when there is
grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
The Ombudsman charged former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo with
plunder as regards the diversion and appropriation and misappropriation of the
operating budget of PCSO.
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisdiction over most of the accused,

including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted
except those of the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA
assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this
remains unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers
to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the
accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was
sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the
Supreme Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial
of the demurrers to evidence.
RULING:
Yes, it the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
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remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides, the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment. However, In the exercise of our superintending control over
other courts, the Supreme Court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case as the ends of justice may require. So it is that the writ will be granted
where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice
the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of apnc10us, arbitrary, whimsical and
despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side.
Espinas
CASE TITLE SULPICIO LINES INC vs. NAPOLEON SESANTE

PROMULGATION
July 27, 2016
DATE
DOCTRINE: An action to recover damages for personal injury brought by breach of

contract survives the death of the party.
FACTS:
On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V Princess of the Orient, a
passenger vessel owned and operated by the petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in
Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the
passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner for breach of contract and
damages.
When the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, Sesante died. He was
substituted by his heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint for breach of contract and damages a personal action
that does not survive the death of the plaintiff.
WON the complaint for breach of contract
RULING: survives the death of a party? yes
The present case survived the death of the plaintiff.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in the
event of the death of a litigant, viz.:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel
to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action
survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
following actions that survive the death of a party, namely: (1) recovery of real or
personal property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate;
and (3) recovery of damages for an injury to person or property. On the one hand,
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Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including:
(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2)
judgments for money; and (3) all claims for money against the deceased, arising from
contract, express or implied.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect

or malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages.
Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach
of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his
death, and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.
Section 1, Rule 87 Section 5, Rule 86

Actions that survive the death Actions abated by death:
of a party, namely: (1) claims for funeral expenses
(1) recovery of real or personal and those for the last sickness
property, or an interest from the of the decedent;
estate; (2) judgments for money; and
(2) enforcement of liens on the (3) all claims for money
estate; and against the deceased, arising
(3) recovery of damages for from contract, express or
an injury to person or property implied
Espinas
CASE TITLE MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY vs. FELICIDAD VILLAMINA

PROMULGATION
July 27, 2016
DATE
DOCTRINE: Although the defendant had already filed an answer prior to the order of
default, his answer may still be stricken off if the plaintiff had already filed a motion for
declaration of default prior to the filing of the answer, and all the requisites for properly
declaring the defendant in default then existed.
FACTS:
On September 23, 1997, plaintiff filed against defendant a complaint for

"Nullification of Deed of Sale and of the Title Issued" pursuant thereto alleging that she is
the owner of a parcel of land with improvements located in Caloocan City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 204755.
On August 19, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendant corporation in

default for failure of aforesaid defendant to file its answer as of said date despite the
filing of an Entry of Appearance by its counsel dated May 4, 1998.
On September 10, 1998 defendant corporation filed its Answer with

Counterclaim which denied the allegations in the complaint.
Under the order dated October 15, 1998, the petitioner was declared in default,
and its answer was ordered stricken from the records. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the
respondent to present her evidence ex parte.
On August 23, 1999, the RTC rendered the default judgment nullifying the
assailed deed of absolute sale and the transfer certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order and judgement by default is proper.
RULING:
Yes, the order of default and the consequent judgment is proper.
The filing of the formal entry of appearance on May 5, 1998 indicated that it
already became aware of the complaint filed against it on September 23, 1997. Such
act of counsel, because it was not for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, constituted the petitioner's voluntary appearance in the action, which was
the equivalent of the service of summons.
Espinas
Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the three requirements to be

complied with by the claiming party before the defending party can be declared in
default are: (1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare
the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion
to declare it in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party
failed to answer the complaint within the period provided by the rule. It is plain,
therefore, that the default of the defending party cannot be declared motu proprio.
Although the respondent filed her motion to declare the petitioner in default with
notice to the petitioner only on August 19, 1998, all the requisites for properly declaring
the latter in default then existed. The defendant filed its answer only on September 10,
1998. Hence, on October 15, 1998, the RTC appropriately directed the answer filed to
be stricken from the records and declared the petitioner in default.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that the RTC and the CA acted in
accordance with the Rules of Court and the pertinent jurisprudence. The petitioner was
insincere in assailing the default judgment, and its insincerity became manifest from its
failure to move for the lifting of the order of default prior to the rendition of the default
judgment. The CA rightly observed that the petitioner had apparently forsaken its
"expeditious remedy" of moving soonest for the lifting of the order of default in favor of
"wager[ing]" on obtaining a favorable judgment. The petitioner would not do so unless it
intended to unduly cause delay to the detriment and prejudice of the respondent.
Espinas
CASE TITLE MARY JANE G. DY CHIAO vs SEBASTIAN BOLIVAR, SHERIFF IV

PROMULGATION
AUGUST 17, 2016
DATE
TOPIC
DOCTRINE: A losing party cannot seek relief from the execution of a final judgment by
bringing a separate action to prevent the execution of the judgment against her by the
enforcing sheriff. Such action contravenes the policy on judicial stability. She should
seek the relief in the same court that issued the writ of execution.
FACTS:
On June 12, 2008, the RTC (Branch 19) issued the writ of execution and directed
the respondent to levy as much properties of the petitioner as would be sufficient to
satisfy the amount of PS, 711, 164. 00, and to sell the properties at public auction.
On November 21, 2008, the respondent proceeded with the public auction of
the petitioner's levied properties, and sold two parcels of her realty with areas of 69
square meters and 85 square meters, both located in Naga City, to the highest bidders
for P8,000,000.00, namely: Jose R. Rivero, Jessie Rivero, Jr. and Amalia Rivero Rafiosa. In
due course, the respondent issued a provisional certificate of sale dated November 24,
2008.
The respondent, allegedly without any order from the Presiding Judge of the RTC
(Branch 19), or without an alias writ of execution being issued by the court, and without
notice to the petitioner, pursued further execution proceedings against the petitioner.
She learned of such proceedings only from Atty. Greta Paraiso, the Registrar of Deeds
ofNaga City.
The notice of levy dated March 10, 2009 issued by the respondent, addressed to
the petitioner, identified the two parcels of land located in Naga City registered in her
name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8933 of the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur. The first property had an area of 386 square meters, while the second
an area of 387 square meters. Although the notice stated that it was being issued by
virtue of a writ of execution, it did not bear the date of its issuance.
On May 8, 2009, the petitioner received a notice of sale of real property on

execution dated April 15, 2009 stating that the two real properties of the petitioner were
being levied to satisfy the sum of P5,711,164.00; and that the public auction was set
from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on May 15, 2009.
After the RTC (Branch 23) denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, she
filed in the CA her Motion for Extension of Time to File Verified Petition for Review on
Certiorari indicating therein that she would be raising a question of law. The CA also
denied the petition.
Espinas
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for the appellate court to Deny petitioner's motion for
extension, which indicated that it would be raising a question of law, on the ground
that it should have been filed before the Supreme Court despite the recognized
principle of hierarchy of courts.
RULING:
We deny the petition for review on certiorari for its lack of merit.
The CA properly denied the petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Verified
Petition for Review on Certiorari and justifiably considered the case closed and
terminated. The petitioner was patently guilty of taking an erroneous appeal in view of
her manifest intention to limit her appeal to questions of law. Such an appeal would
only be by petition for review on certiorari, to be filed in this Court pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.-A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Pursuant to Section 2, 14 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal raising only questions
of law brought to the CA instead of to this Court shall be dismissed. The same rule
expressly forbids the erroneous appeal to be transferred to the Court.
The petitioner, as the party appealing, had only a limited period of 15 days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from within which to perfect her appeal to the
Court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension
of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.
The petitioner obviously failed to perfect her appeal from the dismissal by the
RTC (Branch 23) of the case commenced through her so called Petition with
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
consequence of such failure to perfect the appeal was to render the dismissal final and
Espinas
immutable. This meant that no court, including this Court, could thereafter alter, modify
or reverse the result. As such, her present appeal to this Court cannot but be viewed
and condemned as a futile attempt to resurrect the lost appeal.
On the other hand, to allow the petitioner's action in the RTC (Branch 23) would
disregard the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, under which no court has
the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Courts and tribunals with the same or equal
authority - even those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction - are not
permitted to interfere with each other's respective cases, much less their orders or
judgments therein. 16 This is an elementary principle of the highest importance essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Its observance is not required on the grounds of
judicial comity and courtesy alone; it is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of processes. A contrary rule would dangerously
lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
That the respondent was the sole party sought to be prevented from further
acting in the execution proceedings, or that the RTC (Branch 23) was not impleaded by
the petitioner did not matter. The effect is still an undue interference that disregarded
the doctrine of judicial stability or non interference.
Espinas
CASE TITLE LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES-LURA, AND FE V. FLORES,

Complainants -versus- ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA, JR.,
Respondent
CITATION A.C. No. 11099
PROMULGATION
September 27, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Disbarment; Evidence Rule 130, Section 3 (Best Evidence Rule) and
Rule132, Section 23
DOCTRINE:
1. Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents
should not be the occasion to establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases
should first be duly and competently established either in criminal or civil
proceedings appropriate for that purpose.
2. It is settled that notarization converts a private document into a public
document, whereby the document becomes entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. The notarized document then has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and to overcome the presumed regularity of its execution, whoever
alleges the contrary should present evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant.
Any questions pertaining to the qualifications of a lawyer to be appointed as a state
prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice who had administrative
supervision over him under the law, and not to the Court in the guise of the disbarment
complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and the proceeding thereon
should focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue
membership in the Bar.
FACTS:
Atty. Roman Villanueva was charged with gross dishonesty based on the falsification or
forgery of public documents. The complainants alleged that Atty. Roman falsified their
signatures in the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal executed in connection with a parcel
of land where they have an adverse claim. They further alleged that Atty. Roman
concealed his true age to secure his appointment as state prosecutor. They presented
as evidence:
(1) the residence certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom they
claimed was the respondent himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate;
(2) the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing
that the respondent was 14 years old when he signed the document as "Isabelo
Villanueva";
(3) the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Tupi, South
Cotabato12showing that he was 26 years old when he got married on December 24,
1961; and
(4) the affidavits respectively executed by his siblings, Francisca V. Flores and Tarcela V.
Sajulan.
Espinas
For his defense, Atty. Roman presented his birth certificate which indicated November
29, 1943 as his birthday. He also denied the allegations and claimed that the filing of
the disbarment case was driven by ill-motive.
ISSUE:
Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct
and gross dishonesty?
RULING:
No.
Allegations of falsification or forgery must be competently proved because falsification

or forgery cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations should first be established and
determined in appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by
such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a court
of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the
occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue
to be addressed and determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney is
still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed
the supposed falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the
prior determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.
Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the due execution and
authenticity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document. In view of this,
the complainants' mere denial of having signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal did
not suffice to overcome the positive value of it as a notarized document. It is settled
that notarization converts a private document into a public document, whereby the
document becomes entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. The notarized
document then has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the
presumed regularity of its execution, whoever alleges the contrary should present
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
As to the alleged concealment of his age, a birth certificate is treated as the prima
facie evidence of the fact of one's birth, and can be rebutted only by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. As such, the birth certificate submitted by the
respondent was decisive on the date of his birth in the absence of clearer and more
convincing contrary evidence.
Moreover, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate cannot be successfully

assailed on the basis alone of its being belatedly entered in the local civil registry. This is
because the State expressly allows the late registration of births not only at the instance
of the father, mother, or guardian in case the person whose birth is to be registered is
under 18 years of age, but also at the instance of the person himself when already of
age. To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late registration of the
Espinas
respondent's birth should not adversely affect the validity of the entries made in his birth
certificate.
Lastly, the Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a disbarment or
suspension complaint brought against a lawyer employed in the government service
whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or conduct unrelated to the
discharge of his official functions, the investigation should be carried out by the agency
or office having administrative supervision over him or her when the allegations of the
complaint relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed to the public
office.
Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent to be

appointed as a state prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice who
had administrative supervision over him under the law, and not to this Court in the guise
of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and the
proceeding thereon should focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent
lawyer to continue membership in the Bar.
Espinas
CASE TITLE AURORA A. SALES v. BENJAMIN D. ADAPON, OFELIA C. ADAPON

AND TEOFILO D. ADAPON
PROMULGATION
October 05, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Investigation
DOCTRINE: It is error to dismiss a criminal complaint for falsification if the records already
contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to charge the respondents
therewith on the basis alone that the complainant, already residing abroad, did not
herself submit to the clarificatory hearing, and the investigating prosecutor did not state
the matters that still required clarification.
FACTS:
In 2001, private respondent, a US immigrant who has resided in said country since 1980,
represented by her son Adelfo A. Sales, filed a complaint against her siblings, including
herein petitioners and other heirs of the late Spouses Pedro and Severina Adapon for
nullification of various certificates of title and recovery of properties covered by the
void certificates. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that during her absence
and without her knowledge and consent, she never agreed to an arrangement for the
subdivision of the subject property in the manner made by the defendants, neither did
she recall any extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her parents, much less a judicial
partition thereof. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint,
attaching thereto a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs. Private respondent
executed an affidavit subscribed and sworn to before Vice-Consul Legaspi in NY, USA,
claiming that the deed of extra-judicial settlement attached to the motion to dismiss,
which herein petitioners submitted, is a falsified document. She claims that she did not
sign the subject deed, thus, she disowns the purported signature appearing on top of
her name in said document, the same having been placed there without her
knowledge or consent. She was in the US when the document was supposedly
executed and could not have appeared before the notary public in Makati City.
Hence, the instant complaint charging herein petitioners with the crime of use of
falsified documents under Article 172, par. 3 of the RPC
Private respondent authorized Jerico B. Sales, her son-in-law, for the purpose of
instituting the criminal proceedings against petitioners.
Prosecutor Cuevas dismissed the instant complaint on the ground that it is impossible for
him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the appearance of private
respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory questions on certain matters.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied.
Espinas
Private respondent filed an Appeal or Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice. Public respondent reversed and set aside the decision of the Provincial
Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the corresponding information against herein
petitioners. The DOJ pointed out that the dismissal on the sole basis of the non
attendance of the petitioner at the clarificatory hearing was erroneous because: firstly,
the investigating prosecutor did not state the matters that still needed to be clarified to
justify the necessity for her to personally appear that her failure to do the same would
cause the dismissal of the complaint; and secondly, the totality of the evidence
presented already established probable cause to indict the respondents for the
violation of Article 172, par. 3, of the RPC.
The CA declared that the DOJ was guilty of grave abuse of discretion because the
investigating prosecutor was bound to personally examine the petitioner as the
complainant and her witnesses; and that the continuous absence of the complainant
from the clarificatory hearing had effectively prevented the investigating prosecutor
from determining the existence of probable cause against the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint because of the
petitioner's failure to appear at the clarificatory hearing set by the investigating
prosecutor
RULING:
Yes. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed; and that the respondent, who is probably guilty thereof, should be held for
trial.
Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the officer conducting the same
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the
end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the
accused.
In view of the foregoing, the investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the
petitioner's criminal complaint for falsification simply because of her non-appearance
at the clarificatory hearing. To start with, her personal presence was excusable because
of her advanced age and the distance of her place of residence at the time (New
York, United States of America) from the Province of Batangas, the venue of the
proceedings. Secondly, the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which
the investigating prosecutor could make a finding of probable cause. Thirdly, she was
represented in the proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had
constituted as her agent for purposes of pursuing the criminal case against the
respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized for that special purpose, Jerico
could competently respond to the investigating prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a
manner legally binding on her. Thirdly, had the investigating prosecutor sincerely
considered her personal presence as absolutely necessary in the determination of
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probable cause, he should have granted her request to have her deposition taken
instead. Such power was within his discretion as the investigating prosecutor. And, lastly,
the investigating prosecutor's requiring her personal presence at the clarificatory
hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of his failure to specify the
matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier mentioned, the documents submitted by
both parties in the proceedings were already sufficient for the determination of whether
or not probable cause existed against the respondents. If the clarificatory hearing was
geared towards the determination of the existence of probable cause, the non-
specification of the matters to be inquired into during the clarificatory hearing
indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the petitioner herself.
Espinas
CASE TITLE YOLANDA LUY Y GANUELAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROMULGATION October 12, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence, Chain of Custody
DOCTRINE: Accused immediate admission of the possession of the shabu following her
arrest in flagranti delicto bound her for, under the rules on evidence, the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact was admissible against her. Her
admission renders her insistence irrelevant and inconsequential.
FACTS:
JO3 Joaquin claimed that on 25 October 2004, she was doing her usual duty as female
guard at the gate of the Bureau of Jail Management Bureau Olongapo City. When she
searched the effects of accused-appellant for possible contrabands, her attention was
called on the strawberry juice placed in a white container full of cracked ice inside.
When she was asked what was unusual about the juice, JO3 Joaquin answered that
accused-appellant can make the juice inside if she wanted to. To quell her suspicion,
JO3 Joaquin asked accused-appellant if she could transfer it in another container but
accused-appellant refused. JO3 Joaquin insisted, nevertheless. They then went to the
guardhouse and transferred the juice into a bowl. As the ice inside scattered, the illegal
drugs were revealed. Accused-appellant allegedly pleaded for her not to report the
matter to the jail warden, but JO3 Joaquin ignored her plea. After bringing accused-
appellant to the jail warden, they brought the confiscated items to the laboratory for
examination. The examination revealed that the confiscated items were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
JO3 Joaquin also identified the accused-appellant in court and the confiscated items
and claimed that they can identify them to be the same items seized from accused-
appellant because of the markings she placed thereon.
On cross-examination, JO3 Joaquin explained that the heat-sealed plastic sachets

were wrapped with a plastic and two (2) -peso coins. She also admitted that she
placed accused-appellant on a close watch because even prior to the incident,
accused-appellant would bring with her ready-made juice, making her think that
accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs inside the prison. Finally, she claimed that
she never had a misunderstanding with accused-appellant prior to the date of the
incident.
Accused denied that the confiscated were hers but to certain Melda, who requested
that she give the juice to her husband, a certain Bong, who was also a prisoner at the
BJMP.
The RTC convicted petitioner as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
Espinas
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State have proved the chain of custody of the shabu
RULING:
Yes. In our view, however, her immediate admission of the possession of
the shabu following her arrest in flagranti delictobound her for, under the rules on
evidence, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact was
admissible against her.19 Her admission renders her insistence irrelevant and
inconsequential.
Sec 26 Rule 130 Admissions of a party
Espinas
CASE TITLE ANTONIO ESCOTO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING

CORPORATION
PROMULGATION
October 17, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Criminal Procedure, Appeal by Certiorari
DOCTRINE: An appeal of the decision of a trial court upon a question of law must be by
petition for review oncertiorari to be filed in this Court.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the late Edgar Laxamana were promoters/agents of Legend
International Resort Limited (LIRL). They organized a tourist-oriented cockfighting derby
to be held on May 8 and 10, 2003 within the premises of LIRL within the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone. For this purpose, they obtained a permit to conduct the event from the
SBMA). Learning of the event, the respondent immediately advised LIRL to desist
because cockfighting activity was outside its competence as a hotel casino resort.
This prompted the promoters to bring their suit for injunction with application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. They
argued that respondent should be enjoined from ordering LIRL to desist from holding
the cockfighting derby because the charter of the respondent did not include the
supervision, control and regulation of cockfighting activities in the premises of LIRL within
the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the authority to regulate such activities was within the
powers of the SBMA under RA 7227; and that there was nothing that should prevent LIRL
from holding the: cockfighting derby after the SBMA had issued the permit for such
purpose. Respondent, on the other hand, objected to the issuance of the TRO and
urged the dismissal of the case because: (a) the promoters were not the real parties in
interest to maintain the suit; (b) they had no clear legal right to be protected; and (c)
the conduct of the cockfighting derby was not a right but a mere privilege, and that,
as such, the compliance with the law was mandatory before anyone could exercise
the privilege. The respondent stated that one of the laws that the promoters had not
complied with was Presidential Decree No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974), which
required a license for the cockfighting event to be issued by the relevant city or
municipality.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs thereafter appealed, assigning as errors
the following: The issue raised on the merits of the case is already moot and
academic; alternatively, the Court a quo committed an error in declaring that the
permission or license to hold a one-time cockfight held (sic) at the Subic Bay Free Port
Zone does not full [sic] within the authority of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) under Republic Act No. 7227.
The CA dismissed the appeal for raising only pure questions of law that were outside the
competence of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Espinas
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in dismissing the appeal?
RULING:
No.
To start with, the determination of whether or not the appeal was upon a question of
law was within the discretion of the CA as the appellate court. In making its
determination thereon, the CA correctly relied on the assignment of errors expressly
made in the appellant's brief of the petitioner. Its determination that the issues were
purely legal questions deserved respect. The correctness of the determination should
be assumed unless there is a clear showing of the CA thereby committing error or
gravely abusing its discretion. Regrettably, the petitioner did not show so herein.
The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is not met by considering the
appellation given to such question by the party raising it; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
If no review or evaluation of the evidence is necessary, the question is one of law;
otherwise, it is a question of fact.
And, secondly, obviously decisive herein is the ascertainment of which law RA 7227 (The
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) or RA 7160 (The Local Government
Code) - would be controlling. This ascertainment involves a purely legal question. In
view of such nature of the question being sought to be presented for review, the
appeal to the CA was improper. The dismissal of the appeal by the CA was the only
proper and unavoidable outcome.
Indeed, Section 2, Rule 50 of theRules of Court mandates the dismissal, viz.:
Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.
An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable
by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review
from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
Espinas
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEHAR REYES

PROMULGATION
October 19, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED Evidence, Chain of Custody
DOCTRINE: Compliance with the guidelines on the preservation of the chain of custody
of the dangerous drugs subject of a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
must be clearly and convincingly established by the State. Any lapse in the chain of
custody must be affirmatively explained by the Prosecution; otherwise, the chain of
custody will be held to be broken and insufficient to support a conviction of the
accused. The presumption of regularity of the performance of official duty in favor of
the arr sting officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.
FACTS:
On 27 November 2002, at around 2:00 p.m., a buy-bust operation was conducted at
accused-appellant's residence in Cebu. The team was composed of Senior Police
Inspector Banzon, P02 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro (both poseur-buyers).
PO2 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro conducted a 2-week surveillance on accused-

appellant, a reported drug pusher, residing in Cebu. The surveillance confirmed
accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. A team to conduct a buy-
bust operation was formed. PO2 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro were designated as the
poseur-buyers, while Banzon, Senior Police Inspector Glenn Mayan, SPO2 Jesus Rojas,
SPO1 Eduardito Brigoli, P03 Danilo Lopez, PO2 Percival Charles, PO3Lumayag, and PO2
Aristocles, were designated as back up. The buy bust money consisting of ten bill 100.00
bills was marked with the initials "J.C.R." of SPO2 Rojas.
PO2 Villahermosa and PO1 Miro proceeded on foot to the target site, the house of the
accused-appellant, while the back-up team members positioned themselves about 5
meters away to observe the transaction.
PO2 Villahermosa approached the front of accused-appellant's house and called out
the latter's name. Accused-appellant went out of his house. PO2 Villahermosa told
accused-appellant he wanted to buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu. Accused-appellant
took one plastic pack from his pocket, and gave it to PO2 Villahermosa. PO2
Villahermosa in turn, handed the ten pieces of P100.00 bills to accused-appellant. Upon
receipt of the P1000.00 buy-bust money, PO2 Villahermosa immediately accosted
accused-appellant. PO1 Miro removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal to the backup
team, that the transaction had been completed. PO2 Villahermosa informed the
accused-appellant he was under arrest, and informed him of his constitutional rights. He
frisked accused-appellant, and recovered the following: two more plastic packs that
contained a white crystalline substance; and the buy-bust money of ten P100.00 bills.
Espinas
Accused-appellant was brought to the police office, and PO1 Miro marked the items
seized, as follows: "JR-B" (for the plastic pack of shabu subject of the buy-bust); "JR-1"
and "JR-2" (for the 2 plastic packs of shabu recovered from the frisking). PO1 Miro
prepared the letter-request tor laboratory examination.
On 27 November 2002, at 5:20 p.m., PO1 Miro delivered the letter-request for laboratory
examination, and the plastic packs marked "JR-B", "JR-1" and "JR-2", to PO1 Fiel, the
clerk on duty at the PNP Crime Laboratory. PO1 Fiel turned over the letter-request, and
the three plastic packs, to the Chemistry Branch for examination.
On 28 November 2002, Jude Daniel Mendoza, the forensic analyst, conducted the
laboratory examination on the contents of the three plastic packs. Per Chemistry Report
No. D-2390-2002, the contents of the three packets tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Accused-appellant was thereafter charged with violating Article 2, Section 5 of R.A.

9165, or the crime of illegal sale of drugs.
The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged which was affirmed by the CA.
Accused-appellant argues: since the police officers who arrested him did not make an
inventory report of the items they confiscated from him, and that the markings on said
items were not clearly established, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty no longer applies; the conduct of the police officers in the case at bar
grossly violated Sec. 21(1), Article 2 of R.A. 9165; these omissions on the part of the
police officers indicate that the operation they conducted was a sham, therefore
illegal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the corpus delicti was duly preserved and established by the
Prosecution
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, the identity of the plastic pack of shabu subject of the buy-bust
operation was sufficiently established by the Prosecution. PO1 Miro marked the plastic
packs of shabu seized from the accused appellant at the office. The plastic pack of
shabu subject of the buy-bust operation was marked "JR-B", while the two plastic packs
of shabu recovered from accused-appellant after he was frisked by P[O]2 Villahermosa
were marked "JR-1'' and "JR-2". Clearly, the identity of the corpus delicti was duly
preserved and established by the Prosecution. Hence there is no doubt as to whether
what was presented in Court, was the same plastic pack of shabu purchased from the
accused-appellant at the buy-bust operation.
In addition, the evidence the Prosecution presented is complete to establish the

necessary links in the handling of the shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, from the
Espinas
time of its seizure, until its presentation in Court. In other words, the Prosecution was able
to comply with the chain of custody rule.
It is clear that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were
preserved. No convincing proof was shown that the evidence submitted by the
Prosecution had been tampered, from the time they were recovered from accused-
appellant, until they were turned over for examination.
It has been ruled time and again that non-compliance vith Sec. 21 of the IRR does not
make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is ''the preservation of the
integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt of innocence ofthe accused." Given the Prosecution's
evidence, We rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties has not been overturned. The presumption remains because the Defense failed
to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly
perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary.
Espinas
CASE TITLE GUILLERMO SALVADOR, REMEDIOS CASTRO, REPRESENTED BY PAZ

"CHIT" CASTRO, LEONILA GUEVARRA, FELIPE MARIANO, RICARDO DE
GUZMAN, VIRGILIO JIMENEZ, REPRESENTED BY JOSIE JIMENEZ,
ASUNCION JUAMIZ, ROLANDO BATANG, CARMENCITA SAMSON,
AUGUSTO TORTOSA, REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO TORTOSA, SUSANA
MORANTE, LUZVIMINDA BULARAN, LUZ OROZCO, JOSE SAPICO,
LEONARDO PALAD, ABEL BAKING, REPRESENTED BY ABELINA BAKING,
GRACIANO ARNALDO, REPRESENTED BY LUDY ARNALDO, JUDITH
HIDALGO, AND IGMIDIO JUSTINIANO, CIRIACO MIJARES,
REPRESENTED BY FREDEZWINDA MIJARES, JENNIFER MORANTE,
TERESITA DIALA, AND ANITA P. SALAR vs. PATRICIA, INC.,
RESPONDENT. THE CITY OF MANILA AND CIRIACO C. MIJARES
PROMULGATION
November 09, 2016
DATE
DOCTRINE: The determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute. The
three essential elements of jurisdiction are: one, that the court must have cognizance of
the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; two, that the proper
parties must be present; and, three, that the point decided must be, in substance and
effect, within the issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the
case as made by the complaint and the relief sought; and the primary and essential
nature of the suit, not its incidental character, determines the jurisdiction of the court
relative to it.
FACTS:
This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property
occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.
The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts of Manila. A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner
of the land occupied by the plaintiffs.
Based on the allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is
whether the improvements of the plaintiffs stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or
the City of Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a Certificate of Title
Since the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are
admitted as genuine, the question now is: Where are the boundaries based on the
description in the respective titles?
To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and
respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three
geodetic engineers as commissioners, namely: Engr. Rosario Mercado, Engr. Ernesto
Pamular and Engr. Delfin Bumanlag.5 These commissioners ultimately submitted their
reports.
On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against
Patricia, Inc., permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the
Espinas
former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from them. The
RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had found that
the land belonged to the City of Manila.
On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735, reversed the RTC's judgment, and
dismissed the complaint. The CA declared that the petitioners were without the
necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title;
castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of the
commissioners; opined that the RTC should have conducted hearings on the reports of
the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the adjudication of the boundary dispute in
an action for quieting of title.
The petitioners maintain that the CA erred in dismissing the complaint, arguing that the
parties had openly raised and litigated the boundary issue in the RTC, and had thereby
amended the complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court; that they had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting of
title because they had built their improvements on the property; and that the RTC
correctly relied on the reports of the majority of the commissioners.
On its part, the City of Manila urges the Court to reinstate the decision of the RTC. It
reprises the grounds relied upon by the petitioners, particularly the application of
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
In response, Patricia, Inc. counters that the boundary dispute, which the allegations of
the complaint eventually boiled down to, was not proper in the action for quieting of
title under Rule 63, Rules of Court; and that Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court did
not apply to vest the authority to resolve the boundary dispute in the RTC.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err m dismissing the petitioners' complaint?
RULING:
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions
for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x
x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in
a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as

amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.
Espinas
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title
to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MTC, not the RTC.
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of
the property. Such failure left the trial court bereft of any basis to determine which court
could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC
could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although
neither the parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the
proceedings, the issue did not simply vanish because the Court can hereby motu
proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law,
and could not be vested by any act or omission of any party.
Espinas
CASE TITLE SAMSODEN PANGCATAN vs. ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP

AND BELINDO BANKIAO
PROMULGATION
November 16, 2016
DATE
DOCTRINE: Section 11, Article III of the Constitution has guaranteed free access to the
courts, to wit:
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This guarantee of free access to the courts is extended to litigants who may be indigent
by exempting them from the obligation to pay docket and filing fees. But not everyone
who claims to be indigent may demand free access to the courts.
FACTS:
Pangcatan commenced Civil Case No. 1888-02 in the RTC to recover various damages
he had suffered in April 2002 from the vehicular accident caused by the negligence of
the defendants. Defendants Alexandro "Dodong" Maghuyop and Belindo Bankiao, the
petitioners were respectively the owner and driver of the passenger van that
Pangcatan had hired to transport himself and the goods he had purchased in
Pagadian City to his store in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the police
report on the vehicular accident, Bankiao had stopped his vehicle in the middle of the
right lane of the highway in order to call for more passengers when the dump truck of
defendant Engr. Arnulfo Garcia then driven by defendant Eldefonso Densing suddenly
bumped the rear of the van, causing Pangcatan to lose consciousness. After
Pangcatan regained consciousness in the hospital, he discovered that his right leg had
been fractured, and that he had lost all the goods he had bought in Pagadian City.
When he filed his complaint in September 2002, Pangcatan also filed his Ex Parte Motion
for Leave to File Case as Pauper Litigant, which the RTC granted through its order of
September 4, 2002 under the condition that the filing fees would constitute a first lien on
any favorable monetary judgment that he would recover from the suit.
Instead of filing their answer, Maghuyop and Bankiao moved to dismiss the complaint
based on several grounds, namely: (1) that the venue was improperly laid; (2) that the
complaint stated no cause of action against them; (3) that the claim or demand had
been paid or otherwise extinguished; (4) that the plaintiff was estopped from filing the
case; (5) that the plaintiff did not comply with a condition precedent; and (6) that the
plaintiff, a well known businessman and resident of Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur,
was not an indigent litigant.
Espinas
On January 27, 2003, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss because the movants did
not substantiate the grounds of the motion on the day of the hearing thereof.
Maghuyop and Bakiao did not file their answer subsequently, and were declared in
default as a consequence. Pangcatan then presented ex parte his evidence against
them. Later on, they submitted their Comment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Formal Offer
of Evidence with Motion to Strike Out All Pleadings filed by the Plaintiff,10 whereby they
maintained that Pangcatan was not an indigent litigant based on his offer of
documentary evidence and his pleadings, and that, as such, he was not entitled to the
services and representation of any lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office; that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the non-payment of the
required docket fees; and that the complaint should be expunged from the records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pangcatan may litigate as Pauper Litigant.
RULING:
The procedure governing an application for authority to litigate as an indigent party as
provided under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court have
been synthesized in Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga.
Algura stipulates that when the application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the
trial court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the
applicant to determine if he complies with the income and property standards
prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141that his gross income and that of his
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee; and that he does not own real property with a fair market value of more
than P300,000.00; that if the trial court finds that he meets the income and property
requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted, and
the grant is a matter of right; that, however, if the trial court finds that one or both
requirements have not been met, it should then set a hearing to enable the applicant
to prove that he has "no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his family;" that in that hearing, the adverse party
may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the
applicant; that, afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application depending on the
evidence adduced; that, if the trial court determines after hearing that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court; and
that if payment is not made within the time fixed by the trial court, execution shall issue
or the payment of the prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to other
sanctions that the trial court may impose.
Section 19 clearly states that the litigant shall execute the required affidavits in order to
support by sufficient evidence his indigent status. It appears from the record that
plaintiff-appellee was exempted from payment of legal fees on account of his alleged
poverty. Yet there is scant evidence of that. Samsoden failed to meet the evidentiary
Espinas
requirements for prosecuting a motion to litigate as an indigent party. What he has

presented before the court a quo was only a Certification from the Office of the
Provincial Assessor's Office that he has no land holdings or real properties. Quite clearly,
the court a quo has erroneously allowed the suit in forma pauperis without following the
requirement of the Rules. But just because the court below has so erred does not mean
We should at once castigate plaintiff-appellee by outrightly dismissing his complaint
outright (sic) for non-payment of the docket fees.
Espinas
CASE TITLE ARSENIO TABASONDRA vs. SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO

CITATION G.R. No.196403
PROMULGATION
DECEMBER 7, 2016
DATE
TOPIC COVERED SEC. 11 RULE 69 OF THE RULES OF COURT
DOCTRINE: If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by
metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate
assigned to each party
FACTS:
The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two
marriages.Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra were siblings. They were
also the registered owners of the three parcels of land located in Tarlac City.
Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on
August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998, respectively. They all died intestate and without
partitioning the propertycovered by TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and
the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the
property.
The Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants-Appellant

claiming that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and the Defendants-
Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence, they
asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.
In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a

partition provided that the same should be made only with respect to Cornelio' s share.
They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the
subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their
favor on August 18, 1982.
The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Dissatisfied, the respondent
appealed before the CA. the latter granted the appeal. Hence, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to only
33,450.66 square meters of the property registered under TCT No. 10612.
RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by
Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana was 100,352 square meters; and that each of the co-
owners had the right to one-third of such total area. It was established that
Valentinaand Valeriana executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they specifically
Espinas
disposed of their shares in the property registered under TCT No. 10612 in favor of
Sebastian Tabasondra and TarcilaTabasondra.
However, even if the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not
segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the
several co-owners. According to sec. 11, Rule 69, If actual partition of property is
made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate
description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and the
effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the
portion of the real estate assigned to him.
Here, Both RTC and CA failed to describe definitely and adequately the particular
portion of the real estate assigned to the following; Tarcila and heirs of Sebastian.
Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose
of identifying and segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three
lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect the physical partition of the property.
Espinas

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FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

2009 Cases .................................................................................................................................... 1

2010 Cases .................................................................................................................................. 19

2011 Cases .................................................................................................................................. 67

2012 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 126

2014 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 258

2015 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 308

2016 Cases ................................................................................................................................ 371

CASE TITLE RICARDO C. DUCO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FIRST DIVISION;

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the notice of appeal must be

2 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee;

xxx the bare invocation of interest of substantial justice is not a magic

Court reiterates that rules of procedure especially those prescribing the

4 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM

Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his

5 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket

Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be

6 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

That foundation is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no

7 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE ROBERT P. GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR

The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own

8 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

9 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

10 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE JOWETT K. GOLANGCO VS. JONE B. FUNG

11 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE JOWETT K. GOLANGCO VS. JONE B. FUNG

DOCTRINE: An order by the trial court terminating the Prosecutions presentation of

12 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

13 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE vs. RADSTOCK SECURITIES

DOCTRINE: To be able to intervene in an action, therefore, the prospective intervenor

On January 25, 2007, the CA approved the compromise agreement.

STRADEC filed a motion for intervention in order to assail the compromise

14 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

Moreover, to be able to intervene in an action, the prospective intervenor must

(NOTE: This is a dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin. However in this issue of motion

2. Yes, the denial for annulment of judgment was proper.

The jurisdiction to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court is

However, as explained in the case of Grande v University of the Philippines, the

15 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

(NOTE: This is a dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin. In this particular issue, he dissents

16 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE JUNO BATISTIS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized to

17 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

18 Azarcon, Balanay, Borja REMEDIAL LAW

CASE TITLE ELIGIO P. MALLARI vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

SC: denied petitioner's petition for review

20 Castillo , Castillo, Danduan, De Guzman, De Guzman, Dimaliwat, Rodriguez REMEDIAL LAW

CA: CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because

23 Castillo , Castillo, Danduan, De Guzman, De Guzman, Dimaliwat, Rodriguez REMEDIAL LAW

In October 1998, Petitioner ( thru DAR Secretary) without acting on the

DAR regional director denied the application for exclusion. Respondents

24 Castillo , Castillo, Danduan, De Guzman, De Guzman, Dimaliwat, Rodriguez REMEDIAL LAW

Aggrived, petitioners insisted that CA committed 4 errors in ruling in favour of