[G.R. No. 106763. May 9, 2001.

]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MARCELA FRANCISCO,
NAMELY: ROSARIO BERNARDO and PACIFICO BERNARDO; HEIRS OF JUANA FRANCISCO NAMELY: BUENAVENTURA
CRISOSTOMO, ANDRES CRISOSTOMO, FELICITAS CRISOSTOMO; HEIRS OF BRIGIDA FRANCISCO, NAMELY: LIWANAG
JAVIER, EUDOSIA JAVIER, ANAPURA JAVIER, AURORA JAVIER, DOMINADOR JAVIER and FRANKLIN JAVIER; and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition to annul the decision of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite, Branch III, 2 in Reg. Case No. N-440, LRC Rec. No. 26961. This case stems from
proceedings to annul a 1965 decision of the said land registration court which adjudicated to private respondents certain
parcels of land.
The antecedents are as follows: On April 22, 1964, the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, represented by its Mayor, Pablo G.
Sarino, sold Lot Nos. 317, 318, 330 and 356, Psu-164199, with an approximate combined area of 3.1437 hectares, located
at Barrio Salinas, 3 in the said municipality, to private respondents' predecessors-in-interest for P188.20 pursuant to Act
No. 3312 4 and Municipal Resolution No. 89 as amended by Resolution No. 289. Prior to the sale, private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Brigida Francisco, had been in possession of the subject lot and paid the real estate taxes thereon
as early as 1907. On October 27, 1964, private respondents filed an application for land registration before the above-
mentioned CFI of Cavite, covering the aforesaid lots, docketed as LRC Case No. N-440, LRC Record No. N-26961. On August
4, 1965, a decision was rendered adjudicating to the applicants, herein private respondents, the subject parcels of land,
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming its previous order of general default, hereby adjudges and decrees lots
356, 318, 319 and 330 of plain AP-1377, AP-1378, AP-1379 and AP-1380, respectively, situated in the barrio of
Salinas, municipality of Bacoor, province of Cavite, free from any liens and encumbrances to applicants, jointly
and equally in undivided shares, in the following manners: TDESCa

1. to MARCELA FRANCISCO, widow 1/3 undivided share.

2. to the HEIRS OF JUANA FRANCISCO, namely:
BUENAVENTURA CRISOSTOMO, married to Librada Crisostomo;
ANDRES CRISOSTOMO, married to Esperanza Legaspi;
FELICITAS CRISOSTOMO, married to Gregorio Javier;
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, single (these four own 1/3 undivided share.)
3. to the HEIRS OF BRIGIDA FRANCISCO, namely:
LIWANAG JAVIER, married to Anastacio Dominguez;
EUDOSIA JAVIER, married to Ernesto de la Cruz;
AMAPURA JAVIER, married to Angel Sebastian;
AURORA JAVIER, single;
DOMINADOR JAVIER, married to Luz Manalili;
FRANKLIN JAVIER, married to Elina Jose (These six own 1/3 undivided share.)
All applicants are Filipinos, of legal ages, and residents of Mabolo, Bacoor, Cavite.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED." 5
Pursuant to said judgment, Decree No. N-105464 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. O-468 were issued
on October 7, 1965.
Twenty-five years later, or on October 15, 1990, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to annul the decision of the CFI of Cavite, Decree No. N-105464 and OCT No. O-468 issued pursuant thereto; and
to order the restoration or reversion of the subject parcels of land to the mass of the public domain. The OSG alleged that
the registration proceedings were null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the parcels of land subject thereof were
still classified as forest land, having been released therefrom only on February 21, 1972; that the OSG was not furnished
with a copy of the application for registration and other records as mandated by Section 51, of the Public Land Act; and

1
that the applicants have not shown possession and occupation of the lands in the manner and for the length of time
required by section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. On August 13, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, dismissing for lack of merit as aforesaid, the petition to annul the Decision dated August 4, 1965 of the CFI of
Cavite, Br. III in Reg. Case No. N-440, LRC Rec. No. 26961. 6 The Court of Appeals ruled that "by virtue of Act 3312 enacted
by the Philippine Legislature on December 2, 1926, the subject lots were previously classified as communal in character;
that the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents were able to purchase subject lots as authorized by said Act; that
there is no question about the validity of Act 3312 especially the power of the Philippine Legislature at that time to
authorize the sale of land then classified as communal land; and that the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents
acquired the subject lots pursuant to this law and their right has acquired the sanctity of a vested right which cannot be
adversely affected by the subsequent passage of C.A. 141."
Hence, the instant petition questioning whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) relying solely on Act No. 3312 as
basis for its conclusion that subject lots are alienable and disposable, in total disregard of the Public Land Act; (2) in holding
that the registration court had jurisdiction to adjudicate subject lots as private property of private respondents'
predecessors-in-interest despite their being "communal lands" and, hence, not agricultural lands subject to disposition;
(3) in holding that a vested right had been acquired by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent over the subject
lots which could no longer be affected by the Public Land Act; (4) in not finding that the Office of the Solicitor General was
never furnished with a copy of the application and other records in the registration proceedings as mandated by Section
51 of the Public Land Act; (5) in considering as non-issue the lack of approval of the provincial board of Cavite and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the sale of subject lots to private respondents' predecessors-in-interest;
(6) in not declaring that the subject lots were only classified and released as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain in February, 1972, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the registration court; (7) in not holding that the applicants'
predecessors-in-interest had no registrable title over the subject lots at the time the same were adjudicated to them by
the registration court; (8) in not declaring the sale of the subject lots by the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, a mere trustee
thereof, as void ab initio for lack of approval or consent of the provincial board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources as required by law.
As the Court sees it, the assigned errors cognizable by this Court may be reduced into the following, to wit:
1. Whether the sale of communal lands of the Municipality of Bacoor to private respondents' predecessors-in-interest was
authorized by law; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the parcels of land covered by the decree issued on
October 7, 1965 pursuant to the decision of said court of August 4, 1965.
The petition is not impressed with merit. ScAaHE

First of all, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Act No. 3312, known as the "Act Authorizing the Sale of the Communal
Lands in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, and for other purposes," which was enacted into law on December
2, 1926, was the law governing the sale and acquisition by private respondents of the subject parcels of land. It provided:
"SECTION 1. The sale to private parties of the communal lands situated in the municipality of Bacoor, Province
of Cavite, Philippine Islands, and held in trust by the municipal council thereof for the benefit of the inhabitants
of said municipality, is hereby authorized: Provided, That the present tenants and lessees of the different parcels
composing said lands shall have the right to buy their respective leaseholds subject to such rules and regulations
which shall be adopted by the municipal council of Bacoor subject to the approval of the Provincial Board of
Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources: Provided, further, That if any parcel of land is
the subject of litigation in court the sale thereof shall be suspended until after the litigation is finally terminated.
xxx xxx xxx."
ACT 3312 authorized and recognized the sale of communal lands in the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, to qualified
applicants. By express declaration of Section 1 of Act 3312 quoted above, lands designated as communal lands of the
municipality of Bacoor were open to disposition to private parties. Pursuant thereto, the Municipality of Bacoor issued
Resolution No. 289, Series of 1962, entitled, "A Resolution to Amend Resolution No. 89, Series of 1956 Authorizing the Sale
of Communal Lands in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, and Prescribing Rules and Regulations for the Purpose
of Implementing the Provisions of Philippine Legislature Act No. 3312 as approved on December 2, 1926." Among others,
Resolution No. 289 imposed as conditions, the following: 1. Buyers should be tenants and lessees as of December 2, 1926
of the different parcels composing said lands as recorded in the communal lands register in the Office of the Mayor; and

2
2. they must pay the corresponding rental in arrears and other obligations due to the municipality. Presumably, with no
proof to the contrary shown, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents have met all the requirements of the
law and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto for the execution of the sale.
Notably, petitioner's petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals contended that the decree in favor of
the private respondents was issued at the time when the subject land was still forest land, based primarily on the Final
Report of Investigation of Senior Land Management Officer Romeo B. Manicat dated December 28, 1989. According to his
report, the subject parcels of land were found, among others, to be within the forest zone at the time they were
adjudicated to the applicants by the land registration court in 1965, as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 2376
under Project No. 6-A. However, a scrutiny of the foregoing documents fails to conclusively establish the actual
classification of the land prior to its release as alienable and disposable in February 21, 1972. The aforesaid Land
Classification Map drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1965 merely shows that the subject lots were
part of Project 6-A, a big tract of land in Bacoor, Cavite which was certified and declared as alienable or disposable land
on February 21, 1972 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1253. Contrary to petitioner's posture, the Report of
Senior Land Management Officer Romeo B. Manicat who conducted an investigation of the parcels of land does not prove
the real nature and character of the subject lots at the time of their sale and registration. In fact, he indicated in said report
that the lands were cleared, converted into a modern community, with permanent improvements. More important, the
subject lots were previously classified as communal lands, which were then held in trust by the Municipal Council of
Bacoor, Cavite, for the benefit of the inhabitants of said municipality. The private respondents were able to purchase the
same pursuant to Act No. 3312 and Resolution No. 289 of the Municipal Council of Bacoor prescribing the Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of Act 3112.
Secondly, it is error to say that private respondents, as qualified applicants, could no longer avail of the benefits of Act
3312, due to the subsequent passage of C.A. 141. True, the sale was perfected and consummated only on April 22, 1964
and the application for registration was filed only on October 27, 1964. But we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
right of private respondents had already acquired the sanctity of "vested or acquired rights" which cannot be defeated or
adversely affected by the passage of C.A. 141. The right was vested by the fact that their predecessors-in-interest have
been occupying the said communal lands embraced by the law since 1907, as found by the registration court. While
petitioner contests this finding of fact, we cannot depart from the well-entrenched rule that uniformly holds that findings
of facts of the trial court particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding upon the Supreme
Court. 7 Further, review by the Supreme Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited only to
questions of law. 8
Thirdly, we are not persuaded by petitioner's argument that Act 3312 was repealed by C.A. 141. According to petitioner,
as between Act No. 3312, an earlier enactment passed by the Philippine Legislature on December 2, 1926, on one hand,
and C.A. 141, enacted on November 7, 1936 on the other, the latter should prevail over the former because the assailed
disposition of the subject lots took place in 1964-65, or at a time when C.A. 141 had long been in force and effect.
Petitioner adds that while the sale of communal lands situated in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, was authorized
under Act No. 3312, the same should now bow to C.A. 141 limiting the disposition of the lands of the public domain only
to agricultural lands. There can be no implied repeal of Act 3312 by the subsequent enactment of C.A. 141 as it is a well-
settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 9 If repeal of particular or
specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it. 10 The Public Land Act is a general law governing the
administration and disposition of the lands of the public domain; while Act 3312 is a special law on the sale of lands
designated as communal situated in the Municipality of Bacoor in Cavite. The presumption against implied repeal is
stronger when of two laws, one is special and the other general; and this rule applies even though the terms of the general
act are broad enough to include the matter covered by the special statute. 11 Therefore, we apply the rule that unless
otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, a law will always be
presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. 12 The other issues raised by petitioner
pertaining to the non-transmittal of the records in the registration proceedings to the Solicitor General and that the sale
did not bear the approval of the Provincial Board of Cavite and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources deserve
scant consideration as these are not jurisdictional prerequisites for the valid exercise of jurisdiction by a court in a land
registration case. It must be stated that a petition to annul judgment which is void, is anchored on want of jurisdiction or
that it has been obtained by extrinsic fraud. 13 Conformably with this rule, the issues raised must be limited to a discussion
of lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
3
Finally, the Republic as petitioner, does not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the said parcels of land had already
been declared alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion in favor of the Republic, the land recovered would
not be for public use, but for eventual disposition to other private persons. It would be grave injustice and would not serve
any declared national land policy to dispossess private respondents of the said parcels of land at this point, where
possession has been found to date as far back as 1907, only to enable the government to dispose anew the lands covered
thereby to subsequent applicants. 14 Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in 1972. In a
few more months, the possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess through acquisitive
prescription, without need of title or good faith, pursuant to the Civil Code. 15
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. aIEDAC

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

(Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106763, [May 9, 2001], 409 PHIL 695-706)
|||

[G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO
BERNABE, JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE, and ELISA BERNABE, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated
February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R, entitled "EMILIO BERNABE, SR., et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES," affirming
the order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record
No. 1097, which dismissed petitioner Republic's petition for review of the decrees of registration issued pursuant to the
decision rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in favor of the private Respondents herein, the lots applied for by
them, and the Resolution of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975 denying herein Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before the last war in Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act 2061, concerning a portion of Lot
No. 622 Lot Nos. 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 and a portion of Lot No. 324 Lot Nos. 791 and 799 more
particularly identified and delineated in the segregation plans of Sgs-3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342 and
Sgs-3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession
of the same including that of the herein Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active, exclusive, public, adverse,
and in the concept of owners thereof for more than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5 and 11).
On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and directing that the Republic of the
Philippines be notified thereof by furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, a
copy of said Order together with Respondents' petition by registered mail (Record on Appeal, p. 6).
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the petition once
the area involved is found to be within the timberland and therefore inalienable under the Constitution (Record on Appeal,
p. 7). Upon verification, however, the Director of Forestry found the area to be the portion of the timberland already
released by the government from the mass of public forests and promptly withdrew his Opposition (Record on Appeal, p.
8).
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his opposition
to the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be the subject of a land
registration proceeding under Act 496.
The lower court found that the petitioners have complied with all the terms and conditions which would entitle them to
a grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19), reads:

4
"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342, Sgs-3343 and Sgs-3340 and their
technical descriptions are hereby APPROVED, and pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259, the court hereby adjudicates
in favor of petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr., married; Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz Bernabe, single; Amparo
Bernabe, single and Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos and residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein applied
for as follows:
Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.
3339
Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.
3341
Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.
3342 795 100,439 sq. m.
Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.
3343 797 75,100 sq. m.
Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.
Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.
and upon this decision having become final, the Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby directed to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration therefor."
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. N-124813-124818, all
dated May 7, 1969 (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-25).
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, through the Solicitor-General, filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration under Section
38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds that the entire
proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the petition for re-opening
of the cadastral proceedings; that the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open cadastral proceedings are
portions of the public domain, admittedly within the unclassified public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition
only on or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do not have a registerable title to the land subject matter
of the proceedings; and the lower court, without jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of registerable title to
respondents over portions of the public domain, as respondents do not qualify under the provisions of Section 48(b) of CA
141, as amended, and that under the circumstances, respondents employed actual fraud in procuring title over the parcels
of land (Record on Appeal, p. 25).
On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the Petition for Review on the grounds that: (1) The trial court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit as there is no fraud to justify the setting aside on review of a decree of
registration. If the Solicitor General was not notified of the subsequent hearings, it was because he delegated his
appearance to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. Besides the setting aside or review was filed out of time. (2) The petition
states no cause of action, the parcels of land involved in the actions having been already transferred to innocent
purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-General even filed the petition for review (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-40).
Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until the hearing of the merits of the case which was set for August
16, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer, respondents
reiterated their grounds in their motion to dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 40-44).
On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that after having
fraudulently secured title over the parcels of land involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale purporting
to convey various lots composing portions of the parcels involved to third parties for fictitious considerations in an obvious
attempt to remove the parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section 38 of Act 496, but in truth, the
aforementioned third parties are not innocent purchasers for value, being mere dummies of the petitioners, holding the
parcels of land involved only in trust for the petitioners. On November 23, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the
Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order denying petitioner's Amended Petition for Review (Record on Appeal,
p. 56).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1971, the questioned Order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).

5
On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of
merit, in the Resolution of a special Division of Five, promulgated on March 19, 1975.
Hence this petition.
Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court, through its First Division, resolved on May 5, 1975 to require the
respondents to comment thereon. On May 30, 1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the decision of
respondent Court and the questioned resolution were not rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Neither was
the discretion exercised by respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.
In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and denied the urgent motion
of respondents for leave to file a supplemental and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on November 29,
1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976. Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March 25, 1976 and on May 5, 1976, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BECAME AGRICULTURAL ONLY
ON JULY 6, 1965 WHEN THE SAME WERE RELEASED FROM THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THEY
LACK THE REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS POSSESSION TO ENTITLE THEM TO A GRANT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDING FOR REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL CASE OVER THE LOTS IN QUESTION WAS VITIATED BY LACK
OF NOTICE TO THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THIRD PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR
PERIOD OF REVIEW CONSTITUTES FRAUD SCHEMED BY THE TRANSFERORS AS A MEANS OF FRUSTRATING ANY
ACTION AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES THERETO.

The government's cause is meritorious.

I
It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles
Cadastre and in fact a decision was rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097,
declaring the lot in question as public land. It must be stressed that said lot was declared public land by virtue of a court
decision which has become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata. (Republic v. Estenzo,
120 SCRA 222 [1983]). It is therefore beyond question that the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral
proceeding under R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and the decision therein rendered is null and void ab initio.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622 was released as an agricultural land for disposition under Public
Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The lower court ordered the issuance of the corresponding decrees of registration for the
lots, pursuant to Sec. 48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
providing for the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter."
As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject
of a judicial confirmation of title under the aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered
with forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued
during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v.
Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of
6
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA
5 [1975]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979];
Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984].
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a
grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1
year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the
land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267, which includes the lots
claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above
mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots
for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.
II
Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the
Solicitor-General, should have been furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions, as in ordinary cases, in
order to bind the government. Failure to give such notice deprives the State of its day in Court, and renders the decision
void. (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).
The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen Cadastral
Case No. 19 but thereafter, notice of subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the decision itself promulgated by the lower
court on December 19, 1968 was sent instead to the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized
representative of the Solicitor-General in the cadastral proceeding as shown in a telegram dated January 19, 1968. (Record
on Appeal, p. 47).
In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426 [1976], the Supreme Court, applying the time-honored principle
of agency ruled that the service of the questioned decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be service on the
Solicitor-General, and added that technical transgressions relative to the filing and service may be brushed aside when
the adverse party (this time the Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the Solicitor-General) is aware of the
matter which his adversary would want the court to act upon. Once it appears that the party is already informed by one
means or another of what he is to be notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict observance
thereof is considered waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]).
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the Solicitor General was so apprised of the decision of the lower court in
question as there is no proof that the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan ever sent the Solicitor-General a copy thereof.
Furthermore, after the 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court, the
Provincial Fiscal on March 21, 1969 manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal upon the intervention of the District
Forester. (Respondent's Brief, p. 44).
It will be observed however that later decisions of the Supreme Court tend to be more strict in the matter of giving notice
to the Solicitor General. In a more recent case, Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161 [1985], it was established that
the Solicitor-General is the only legal counsel of the government in land registration cases and as such, he alone may
withdraw the Government's appeal with binding effect on the latter. He is entitled to be furnished copies of all court
orders, notices and decisions and as held the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time
the Solicitor-General's Office is apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal
was served with that order. Thus, representatives of the Solicitor General in the case at bar, had no power to decide
whether or not an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor-General and without
copies of court orders, notices and decisions, having been provided by either the trial court or the Provincial Fiscal of
Bataan to the Solicitor-General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the government.
III
The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 as amended was filed by the
Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, in the same Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, exactly a year after the issuance of aforesaid decrees of registration, on the ground of
actual fraud. (Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or
dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year from the

7
issuance of the decree and (4) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. (Libudan v. Gil,
45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, et al. v. Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however that the action to annul a
judgment, upon the ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. (Libudan v. Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands a showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual
malice. (Rublico v. Orellana, supra).
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over parcels of land
of the public domain as it is a matter of record that the land in question was opened for disposition and alienation only
on July 6, 1965. The matter was threshed out in the lower court and the decision of the latter was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Actual malice is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled
within one (1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same is true if entered in compliance
with a decision suffering from a fatal infirmity, such as want of due process, (Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo,
110 Phil. 118 [1960] or lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral case. (Republic v. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA
720 [1969]). Thus, on both counts, the case at bar can properly be the subject of review, it having been shown that the
Solicitor-General was not properly furnished the requisite notices and copy of the assailed decision but more importantly,
the lower court as previously stated had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931 as
amended by R.A. No. 2061.

IV
As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule that
a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted
in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machiner Co.,
et al., 37 Phil. 651[1918]. Without the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value in
contemplation of law.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void, when it covers property of public domain classified as forest
or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser
for value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540 [1979] underscoring
supplied). In the case at bar, it will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the lower court counted the
period of possession of private respondents before the same were released as forest lands for disposition, which release
is tantamount to qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they were still non-disposable. Thus, under the
foregoing rulings, even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived
from the titles of private respondents which were not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain,
may be cancelled.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First Instance are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED, because the lots in question still form part of the public domain. The certificates of title
issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40402, [March 16, 1987], 232 PHIL 444-458)
|||

[G.R. Nos. L-30263-5. October 30, 1987.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. ANDRES REYES,
Presiding Judge, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, GODOFREDO R. EUSEBIO, URBANO C. LARA, GIL VENZUELA,
RODOLFO CENIDOZA, RAMON OROSA, AND JOSEFINA OROSA (Spouses), THE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J :
p

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal dated December 16, 1968 in Civil Case No. 10047 entitled Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara vs. Director of Lands.
The dispositive portion of the questioned order reads:

8
"Wherefore, the orders of this court dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and August 27, 1968 are hereby set aside
and the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings is hereby denied."
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands their
Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land designated as Free Patent Applications Nos. 7-207 and 7-208 for Lot No. 1
(10.3629 hectares) and Lot No. 2 (15.2892 hectares), Psu-152606, respectively, situated in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal. After
the posting of notices and upon favorable recommendation of a representative of the Bureau of Lands, said free patent
applications were approved on June 14, 1956 as shown by the order of approval of applications and issuance of patents.
Thus, on June 16, 1956, Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 were issued to respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and
Urbano C. Lara, which patents were transcribed and registered on June 21, 1956 by the respondent Register of Deeds of
Rizal in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended, as
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139, respectively. cdll

In a subsequent investigation conducted by the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered
that the parcels of land patented and titled in the names of respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara were
actually under water and form part of the Laguna de Bay. Neither were private respondents able to occupy or possess said
lots. Evidence clearly showed that there were no signs of cultivation or of any improvement thereon.
On March 16 and March 22, 1960, respondents Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio executed separate affidavits,
admitting that they have not complied with certain requirements of the Public Land Act and expressly agreed to have their
patents and certificates of title cancelled (Rollo, pp.
13-14).prLL

By virtue of the findings of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, the affidavits and the surrender
of the owner's copy of the certificate of title, the herein petitioner, represented by the Director of Lands, as plaintiff, filed
separate complaints against herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara and the respondent Register
of Deeds of Rizal as defendants, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in
said court, for the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 140 and
139 (Rollo, pp. 15-20).
Accordingly, summons together with copies of the complaints were duly served upon all the defendants in Civil Cases Nos.
6747 and 6748 as shown by the returns (Rollo, pp. 21-22) dated August 16, 1961 submitted by the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, notwithstanding their receipt of the summons and copies of the
complaint, the defendants, herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, failed to file their answers to
the complaint. As a result thereof and upon proper motion of the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, 7th Judicial Region, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal, entered an order on November 25, 1961 (Rollo, p. 23) declaring
defendants (herein respondents) in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 in default. On October 6, 1962, on the basis of evidence
submitted by the plaintiff (herein petitioner) the Court of First Instance of Rizal, rendered separate decisions * declaring
null and void Free Patent Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 and their corresponding Certificates of Title Nos. 140 and 139 and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel said patents and titles (Rollo, pp. 24-29) and for failure of defendants to
move for reconsideration or appeal, said decisions became final and executory (Rollo, p. 5).
On December 12, 1962, respondent Register of Deeds addressed separate and identical letters to respondents Godofredo
R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, informing them of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Cases Nos.
6747 and 6748 and advising them to surrender their owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and
140 for cancellation pursuant to the directive of the Court (Rollo, pp. 30-31). On December 27, 1962, said respondents
wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds stating that the owner's duplicate of title called for had long been surrendered to
Atty. Eduardo Javier of the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 32).
On June 3, 1967, after the lapse of almost five (5) years, respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara, this time,
as plaintiffs, instituted Civil Case No. 10047 against the Director of Lands, as defendant (herein petitioner) for the
annulment of the aforementioned decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748, alleging as grounds therefor that the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over their persons and that the decision
was procured through fraud (Rollo, pp. 33-36).
Although, the records show that the Director of Lands had not been properly served with summons in Civil Case No. 10047,
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, acting upon an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant
in Default filed by herein respondents Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara declared defendant (herein petitioner)
9
Director of Lands in default and allowed the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to adduce their evidence before the Special
Clerk of Court (Rollo, p. 38).
LLjur

On July 6, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 7th Judicial District, Branch VI, rendered a decision declaring the
decision dated October 6, 1962 of the Court of First Instance, 7th Judicial District, Branch II in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and
6748 null and void. The decretal portion of said decision reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the decision rendered in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 is hereby declared null and void and the
Director of Lands is hereby ordered to reinstate Free Patents Nos. V-45853 and V-45854 issued in the names of
Urbano C. Lara and Godofredo R. Eusebio respectively, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal is likewise ordered to
reinstate OCT No. 139 and 140 issued in the names of the patentees pursuant to the aforesaid patents.
"SO ORDERED."
On March 14, 1968, a Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings with Additional Parties was filed by defendant
(herein petitioner) Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, wherein it alleged that the said court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (petitioner) among other things (Rollo, pp. 43-44). On the
same day, the Director of Lands filed A Petition to Reopen Proceedings in the same court (Rollo, pp. 45-48). The aforestated
petition averred that on July 3, 1967, even before the promulgation of the aforementioned decision and notwithstanding
the fact that their patents and certificates of title had long been declared null and void in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748,
respondents Eusebio and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 for their respective parcels of land, executed separate deeds
of absolute sale involving the alleged lands in question in favor of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon
Orosa (Rollo, p. 46). Subsequently, on August 9, 1967, immediately upon securing the certification of the Clerk of Court
that the decision in the instant case had become final and executory, respondents caused the cancellation of Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 139 and 140 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196349 and
196348, respectively, in the names of respondents Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa. Accordingly, on
August 22, 1967, in consideration of P25,000.00 for each alleged parcel, respondents Gil Venzuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza
executed separate deeds of transfer of rights in favor of respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, as a
consequence of which Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 196348 and 196349 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958 to respondents spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa. Respondents
spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P800,000.00 executed a deed of
mortgage of the aforestated on December 27, 1967 in favor of respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(Rollo, pp. 46-47).
On March 28, 1968, intervenors spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their motion for leave to intervene in
opposition to the Motion to Admit Petition to reopen proceedings with additional parties filed by the Director of Lands on
March 16, 1968 (Rollo, p. 178) and the Intervenors' Opposition on the aforesaid petition to reopen proceedings of the
petitioner (Rollo, p. 181). Respondent Gil, Venzuela filed his opposition on April 17, 1968 (Rollo, p. 104) and his
Supplemental Opposition while respondent Rodolfo Cenidoza filed his separate opposition to the petition to reopen
proceedings on June 3, 1968 (Rollo, p. 239). LLphil

The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, after consideration of the motion to admit petition to reopen proceedings
with additional parties as well as the oppositions interposed thereto granted the motion on May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 49).
Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order by the court was filed by the intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and
Josefina Orosa on May 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 190) while respondent Gil Venzuela filed his urgent manifestation and motion
for reconsideration on June 6, 1968 (Rollo, p. 114). On June 8, 1968, the Director of Lands (petitioner herein) filed his
opposition to the intervenors' and Gil Venzuela's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated May 8, 1968 (Rollo, p.
195). Consequently on June 12, 1968 the intervenors spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their Intervenors'
Reply to the Defendants' Opposition (Rollo, p. 203).
On June 29, 1986, the Court of First Instance of Rizal denied, in an order, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
intervenors and set the hearing on July 29, 1968 (Rollo, p. 50). A motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the
Order of June 29, 1968 and Motion for Second Reconsideration of the Order of May 8, 1960 was filed by the intervenors
on July 22, 1968 (Rollo, p. 205). However this was denied by the court in an order dated August 27, 1968 (Rollo, p. 51).
Meanwhile, the intervenors filed their third motion for reconsideration of the order of May 8, 1968 and/or Clarification
and Reconsideration of the Order of August 27, 1968 on November 2, 1968 (Rollo, p. 217), which was opposed by herein
petitioner in its Opposition to Intervenors' Third Motion for Reconsideration on November 23, 1968 (Rollo, p. 228).

10
On December 16, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the said third motion for reconsideration, set aside its
Orders dated May 8, 1968, June 29, 1968 and August 27, 1968 and denied the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen
Proceedings. The court ruled that the petition is not the proper course of action available to the Director of Lands, who
has not availed of the remedies provided by the Rules of Court or the Land Registration Court such as relief from the order
of default or appeal from judgment or review thereof, and has consequently lost his personality when he was declared in
default, and the Court, its jurisdiction to entertain the afore-mentioned Petition to Reopen (Rollo, pp. 52-53).
Hence, this petition.
Notice of lis pendens was given to the Register of Deeds on March 10, 1969 (Rollo, p. 57). On March 11, 1969, in a
resolution promulgated by this Court, the respondents were required to file their answers and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued without bond (Rollo, p. 60). Respondents except the Register of Deeds of Rizal were restrained from
entering into any transaction in connection with Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-211957 and T-211958 and specifically
prohibited the respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal to accept, record, transcribe and register any transaction concerning
the free patents and certificates of title subject matter of Civil Cases Nos. 6747-48 (Rollo, pp. 60-61).
On March 26, 1969, respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa manifested that they be furnished with a copy
of the petition for certiorari so that they may file their answer thereto (Rollo, pp. 65-66). Respondent Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank filed its answer on April 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 71-73) while respondent Gil Venzuela and
respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their answers on April 24, 1969 and April 16, 1969, respectively
(Rollo, pp. 95-103; 120-137). Respondent Rodolfo A. Cenidoza filed his answer on May 2, 1969 (Rollo, pp. 236-238), but
respondents patentees Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara did not file their answers.
In the Resolution of May 12, 1969, the hearing of these cases was set for June 18, 1969 (Rollo, p. 235). At said hearing,
counsel for petitioner was given twenty (20) days within which to submit its memorandum in lieu of oral argument while
counsel for respondents was granted leave to submit a reply thereto and petitioner was allowed to submit a rejoinder
(Rollo, p. 242). The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands filed its memorandum on August 16,
1969 (Rollo, p. 253). Respondent spouses, Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed their reply memorandum on October 21,
1971 (Rollo, p. 315) while a supplemental reply was filed by Gil Venzuela on October 30, 1971 (Rollo, p. 394). On June 26,
1987, respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa filed an urgent motion to resolve (Rollo, p. 409). LLjur

In his memorandum the Director of Lands assails the following acts of respondent Judge as constituting grave abuse of
discretion:
"A. Taking cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint of Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara
against the Director of Lands instead of dismissing the complaint outright.
"B. Declaring the Director of Lands in default notwithstanding non-service of summons and a copy of the
complaint upon said defendant.
"C. Setting aside and declaring null and void the two (2) previous, valid, final and fully implemented decisions of
the same Court in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748.
"D. Granting, after two (2) previous denials thereof, the third pro forma motion for reconsideration of
respondents Orosa spouses.
"E. Denying the Motion to Admit Petition to Reopen Proceedings of the Director of Lands after having previously
granted said motion." (Rollo, p. 262).
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not a decision which has long become final and executed, can be annulled
on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant and that the decision was procured
through fraud.
The petition is impressed with merit.
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, respondents herein,
Godofredo R. Eusebio and Urbano C. Lara in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748, respectively, as clearly adduced from the
evidence presented that personal service was made on them. As shown by the Sheriff's returns, in Civil Cases Nos. 6747
and 6748, respondent Godofredo R. Eusebio was duly served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No.
6747, while Urbano C. Lara was personally served with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 6748. Both
services were made on August 16, 1961 upon the respondents at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal their recorded address (Rollo,
pp. 265-266).

11
Apart from the fact that Deputy Sheriff Maximo de Silva enjoys the presumption that he had regularly performed his duty,
the records amply show that, contrary to respondents Eusebio's and Lara's claim that they were completely unaware of
the proceedings, they were duly summoned in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 on August 16, 1961; that copies of the
decisions in these cases were furnished them by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that the Register
of Deeds in separate letters informed them of the decisions in these cases and in reply to the request of the Register of
Deeds to surrender their owners' duplicate certificates of OCT Nos. 140 and 139, they alleged in a joint letter that they
had long surrendered their owner's duplicates certificates to the Bureau of Lands (Rollo, p. 267). Jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant is acquired when he actually receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista, 53 SCRA 420 [1979]). prcd

Thus, it is beyond dispute that all the proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 are regular and that the trial court
rendered valid judgment on the aforestated cases which have become final and executory and are res adjudicata. This
Court ruled in the case of (Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Municipality of Makati, 135 SCRA 235 [1985]), that once
judgment has become final, the issue therein should be laid at rest. Final judgment was promulgated and a writ of
execution was issued. Respondents herein did not avail of any remedies available to them until after five (5) long years
when they filed Civil Case No. 10047 in another court.
As held by this Court in Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, 63 SCRA 355 [1975], "Once a court renders a final judgment, all
the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter
related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of
adjudication. Indeed the nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the
properties of the loser is generally ministerial." A judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff did
not appeal said judgment (Malia vs. IAC, 138 SCRA 116 [1985]) and courts are without jurisdiction over the case once
judgment has become final (Vda. de Emmas vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1979]). The doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgment of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Arciaga,
148 SCRA 433 [1987]).
Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 10047 is improper and there can be no justification for respondent Judge's taking
cognizance of and giving due course to the complaint filed therein by respondents Eusebio and Lara against the Director
of Lands; much less his setting aside of final, executory and fully implemented judgments resulting in the cancellation of
original certificates of titles issued by respondent Register of Deeds of Rizal. Where judgment had long become final and
executory and absent a showing that respondents were deprived of due process or that said judgment was procured by
extrinsic or collateral fraud, the judgment can no longer be set aside (Gaba vs. Castro, 120 SCRA 505 [1983]).

Moreover, the doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of higher importance in the
administration of justice that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated
by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (30-A Am Jur 605). As this Court ruled in the case of Mas vs. Dumara-og, 12 SCRA
34 [1964], a Judge of a branch of one should not annul the order of a judge of another branch of the same court. Any
branch even if it be in the same judicial district that attempts to annul a judgment of a branch of the CFI either exceeds its
jurisdiction (Cabigo vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 84 [1949]) or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction (PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525 [1952]). Thus, in the case of Parco vs. CA, 111 SCRA 262, this Court held that
the various branches of the Court of First Instance being co-equal cannot interfere with the respective cases of each
branch, much less a branch's order or judgment. llcd

Pertinent thereto is Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as
the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of the inferior courts as herein provided."
(Emphasis supplied).
Respondent spouses Ramon Orosa and Josefina Orosa, Gil Venzuela and Rodolfo Cenidoza contend that they are buyers
in good faith. Besides the fact that such contention is belied by the records which show that on July 3, 1967, even before
the promulgation of the decision in Civil Case No. 10047, and while their patents and titles remained cancelled,
respondents Eusebio and Lara, in consideration of P10,000.00 paid to them for their respective parcels, executed separate
deeds of absolute sale over the lands in question in favor of Gil Venzuela, Rodolfo Cenidoza and Ramon Orosa (Rollo, p.
259). The Court ruled in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 [1987]). That it is well settled that any
title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. In the
12
case at bar, the free patents and certificates of title issued to Eusebio and Lara cover areas which form parts of Laguna de
Bay. These are neither agricultural nor disposable. Subject patents and titles were erroneously issued due to
misrepresentations and false reports and must therefore be cancelled. Any false statement in an application for public
land shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the title granted. This rule applies even after the issuance of the certificate
of title (Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784 [1983]). A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to
perpetuate fraud, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud
(De Leon vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358). Likewise, the Court ruled in Cuevas vs. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1986], that mere
possession of land does not itself divest the land of its public character.
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its ownership of the land nor operate to change the
public character of the land to private (Director of Lands vs. Gonzales, 120 SCRA 375 [1983]).
Under the same principle, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, although an innocent mortgagee for value,
acquires no protection under the Land Registration Law. LibLex

While it is true that a bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to make an investigation of the title of the
property being given as security (Philippine National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and
that where the torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later given as security for a bank loan, the
subsequent declaration of said Title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage rights of the bank which
has acted in good faith (Philippine National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang-Villalon, supra; Penullar vs. PNB, 120 SCRA
171 [1983]), it is apparent that the law on innocent purchasers for value does not apply insofar as non-disposable public
lands are concerned.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby rule that: (1) the decision dated July 6, 1967 and order dated December 16, 1968 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (2) the decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 6747 and 6748 dated October 6, 1962 are reinstated; (3) the
Register of Deeds of Rizal is directed to cancel all Certificates of Titles issued in connection with the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 10047; and (4) the real estate mortgage executed by the respondent spouses Orosa in favor of the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank is SET ASIDE, but their indebtedness must be paid to the Bank.
SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-30263-5, [October 30, 1987], 239 PHIL 304-319)
|||

[G.R. No. 104296. March 29, 1996.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF IRENE BULLUNGAN, represented by her husband DOMINGO PAGGAO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ISABELA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; FREE PATENT; THE STATE MAY BRING AN ACTION UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT
FOR REVERSION TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF LANDS WHICH HAVE BEEN FRAUDULENTLY GRANTED TO PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS. It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the
Director of Lands will no longer have either control or jurisdiction. The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent or
homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date
of issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529, 32 (formerly Act No. 496, 38). However, as held in Director of Lands
v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under 101 of the Public Land Act for the
reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has been the
consistent ruling of this Court.
2. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS IN THE APPLICATION CONSTITUTES FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
AND IS A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE. The failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was
in possession of the portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a ground for annulling her
title. Under 91 of the Public Land Act where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation,
as in the case at bar, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of the one-year period.
3. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT ONE WHO OBTAINS TITLE TO A PUBLIC LAND THROUGH FRAUD SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO BENEFIT THEREFROM. Nor is there merit in the claim of private respondents that the action taken by
the Republic in this case is "not in keeping with the policy of State to foster families as the factors of society, to give them

13
a sense of protection and permanency in their homes." Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land
through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even
before Irene Bullungan bought the possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in
her application for a free patent that she had been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that Carabbacan
had been there ahead of her.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XIX, 2 Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 in the name
of Irene Bullungan null and void so far as the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 involved in this case is concerned.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On September 10, 1955, Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a free patent covering lots situated in Fugaru (now
San Guillermo), Angadanan, Isabela. The lots included a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, between Lot No. 763 and Lot
No. 764, consisting of 1.04 hectares, which Vicente Carabbacan claimed. In her application, Irene Bullungan stated that
the land applied for by her was not claimed or occupied by any other person and that it was public land which had been
continuously occupied and cultivated by her since 1925. 3
Upon certification of Assistant Public Land Inspector Jose M. Telmo at Ilagan, Isabela that Irene Bullungan had been in
actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse possession of the land since 1925, the Director of Lands
approved Bullungan's application on June 4, 1957. On December 26, 1957, Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 was
issued in the name of Irene Bullungan.
Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 covered by the free patent issued to Irene Bullungan overlapped the lot
between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, which he was occupying, Vicente Carrabacan filed a protest on September 7, 1961.
The District Land Officer at Ilagan, Isabela recommended the dismissal of the protest on the ground that the Bureau of
Lands no longer had jurisdiction over the matter as a result of the grant of a free patent to Irene Bullungan. But the Director
of Lands on March 23, 1982 ordered an investigation of the protest.
Vicente Carabbacan also brought an action for the reconveyance of the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 and the
cancellation of free patent against Irene Bullungan on September 5, 1961, although this was dismissed by the court
without prejudice.
The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to recover possession of the land in an action which they brought in the Court
of First Instance of Isabela on April 13, 1972. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Br. II-1102. On the other hand,
refusing to give up his claim, Vicente Carabbacan filed a case for reconveyance on August 15, 1972, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1108. The cases were thereafter tried jointly.
On November 22, 1972 the court rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint of Vicente Carabbacan and ordering him
to vacate the land, even as it upheld the ownership of Irene Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been in possession of the
land in question, was finally ousted on December 10, 1981.
As already stated, the Director of Lands ordered on March 23, 1982 an investigation of Carabbacan's protest. The
investigation was undertaken by Senior Special Investigator Napoleon R. Dulay, who found that Vicente Carabbacan had
been in actual cultivation of the land identified as Lot No. 763, Pls-594 since 1947, having acquired the same from Tomas
Tarayao on May 4, 1947. In his report dated September 17, 1985, the land investigator stated that due to a big flood which
occurred in December 1947, the Cagayan River changed its course by moving north-east, resulting in the emergence of a
piece of land, which is the subject of this dispute. Carrabacan took possession of the land and cultivated it. He was in the
continuous, peaceful, open and adverse occupation and cultivation of the land from December 1947 until 1981 when he
was ejected by virtue of the decision in Civil Cases No. 1088 and 1102. 4
Based on these findings, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands recommended on March 10, 1986 that
steps be taken to seek the amendment of Free Patent No. V-79740 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 of the late
Irene Bullungan so as to exclude the disputed portion and for the reversion of the same to the State.
On November 28, 1986, the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a complaint for the
cancellation of Free Patent No. V-79740 and OCT No. P-8817 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining
the free patent. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela which, on September 25, 1989, rendered
a decision declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and OCT No. P-8817 null and void insofar as the portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-
150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, is concerned. The lower court found that Irene Bullungan made

14
misrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free patent that she was in possession of the disputed portion of
Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, when in fact Vicente Carabbacan was occupying and cultivating the land. The court justified the
reversion of the land in question as an assertion of "a governmental right."
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling on the ground that, after the lapse of one year
from the date of issuance of the patent, the State could no longer bring an action for reversion. The appellate court held
that the certificate of title issued in the name of Irene Bullungan became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse
of one year from the issuance of the free patent.
The Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It contends that the doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Titles
does not bar the filing of an action for cancellation of title and reversion of land even if more than one year has elapsed
from the issuance of the free patent in case of fraud in obtaining patents.
We agree with petitioner. To begin with, there is no question that Free Patent No. 79740 and Original Certificate of Title
P-8817 were obtained through fraud. The trial court found that Irene Bullungan falsely stated in her application for a free
patent that Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 was not claimed or occupied by any other person. The trial court found that a portion
of the lot in question had been in the possession and cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan since December 1947. 5Indeed
private respondents admit that before Irene Bullungan filed her application for a free patent, she had filed a complaint for
forcible entry against Vicente Carrabacan. The complaint, which was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Angadanan,
Isabela, was dismissed precisely because the court found that Carabbacan had been in possession of the land long before
it was sold to Irene Bullungan by Leonida Tarayao. 6
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding in this case that Irene Bullungan committed fraud and
misrepresentation. Its decision rests solely on the ground that after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of a
free patent an action for the cancellation of patent and title on ground of fraud and misrepresentation can no longer be
maintained.
We think that this is error. It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act No. 496 (now P.D. No. 1529) and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property
over which the Director of Lands will no longer have either control or jurisdiction. 7 The Torrens Title issued on the basis
of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of
one year from date of issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529, 32 (formerly Act No. 496, 38). However, as held
in Director of Lands v. De Luna, 8 even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under 101 9 of the
Public Land Act for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals.
This has been the consistent ruling of this Court. 10

The failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was in possession of the portion of land in dispute
constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a ground for annulling her title. 11 Thus 91 of the Public Land Act provides:
91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission
of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any
subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso
facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of
Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue
to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director
of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain
compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence
of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if
the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully
issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and
specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may
issue out further proceedings.
The appellate court said in its decision:

15
We are not, of course, unaware of cases where the patent and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto
were declared null and void notwithstanding the expiration of the aforementioned period of one (1) year simply
because of false statement of material and essential facts made in the application therefor. Be it noted,
however, that in these cases the lots patented or granted were no longer part of the public domain but private
ones segregated from the mass thereof. Consequently, no right whatsoever was awarded in said cases for it is
already settled that a free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not have any title
at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner (Suva v. Ventura, 40
O.G. 8, 4th sup. August 23, 1941; Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil. 855; Director of Lands v. Abanilla, G.R. No. L-26324,
August 31, 1983). This does not obtain in the present case for it is beyond dispute that the subject land was still
a part of the public domain when the same was patented by the Government in favor of appellants' predecessor
in interest. Accordingly, there was indeed a title awarded such that when the same was brought under operation
of Land Registration Act in 1957, it became incontrovertible in 1958. 12
This is not so. Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation, as in the case at bar,
the State may institute reversion proceedings even after the lapse of the one-year period.
Nor is there merit in the claim of private respondents that the action taken by the Republic in this case is "not in keeping
with the policy of State to foster families as the factors of society, to give them a sense of protection and permanency in
their homes." 13 Public policy demands that one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to
benefit therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even before Irene Bullungan bought the
possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in her application for a free patent that
she had been in possession of the lot in question when the fact is that Carabbacan had been there ahead of her.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the decision dated September 25, 1989 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch XIX is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104296, [March 29, 1996], 325 PHIL 636-645)
|||

[G.R. No. 128531. October 26, 1999.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE L. YUPANGCO, JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Solicitor General,
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in an action
for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of the lost copy. The issue in this case is whether in a
proceeding for the issuance of an owner's duplicate copy of title, the Solicitor General is required to be notified, such that
failure to give such notice would render the proceedings void.
The petition was devoid of merit. The Court ruled that considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement
in proceedings for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General
was at most a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. Moreover, nothing in Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires that the
Office of the Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of
title. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); SOLICITOR GENERAL NOT REQUIRED TO BE
NOTIFIED IN PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. Nothing in the law,
however, requires that the Office of the Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the issuance of an
owner's duplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of the same law, involving original registration proceedings,
specifically mentions the Solicitor General as among those who must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides
that the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director
of Lands.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF NOTICE TO SOLICITOR GENERAL IN PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW OWNER'S
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT. Considering that the law does not impose such notice
requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor
16
General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. This case should
be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral registration cases and original land registration proceedings which require
that the Solicitor General be notified of decisions and hold as decisive, for the purpose of determining the timeliness of
the appeal filed by the government, the date of his receipt of the decisions therein and not that of the Director of Lands
or of his other representatives. The issue and the applicable laws in those cases are different.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p

The question for decision in this case is whether in a proceeding for the issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of
title, the Solicitor General is required to be notified, such that failure to give such notice would render the proceedings
void. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari. dctai

The facts are as follows:

Private respondent Vicente Yupangco is the owner of a unit in a condominium building in Legaspi Street, Makati City, as
evidenced by Certificate of Title No. 7648. Because his aforesaid certificate could not be located, he filed, on January 28,
1994, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati, a petition for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in
lieu of his lost copy, pursuant to 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). The trial court ordered the Registrar
of Deeds of Makati to comment on the petition and thereafter set the case for initial hearing.
On February 11, 1994, the Registrar of Deeds of Makati filed a manifestation that she had no objection to the petition.
After hearing private respondent's evidence, the trial court rendered, on December 15, 1995, its decision granting the
petition, declaring as invalid the missing copy of the certificate of title, and ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to
issue a new owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of private respondent. A copy of this decision was furnished
the Solicitor General.
On February 5, 1996, the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the trial court's decision on the ground that no
copy of private respondent's petition or notice thereof had been given to him. His motion was, however, denied. The
Office of the Solicitor General then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in a decision 1 dated March 5, 1997,
affirmed the order of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Private respondent's petition before the trial court was anchored on 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
which provides:
SECTION 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a
duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new
certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the facts of such loss or
destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due
hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that
it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as
the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree. 2 (Emphasis
added) LibLex

Nothing in the law, however, requires that the Office of the Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the
issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of the same law, involving original registration
proceedings, specifically mentions the Solicitor General as among those who must be notified of the petition.
Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Director of Lands.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, invokes 35(5), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
which provides:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
17
General shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. . .
He contends that, in view of this provision, it was mandatory for the trial court to notify him of private respondent's
petition and that its failure to do so rendered the proceedings before it null and void. 3
The contention has no merit. The provision of the Administrative Code relied upon by the Solicitor General is not new. It
is simply a codification of 1(e) of P.D. No. 478 (Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General)
which similarly provided:
SECTION 1. Powers and Functions. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the
Office concerned, it shall also represent government owned and controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring
the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: LexLib

xxx xxx xxx

e. Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. . . .
It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owner's
duplicate certificate of title. Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the
government in land registration and related proceedings. Even so, however, the request for representation should have
come from the Registrar of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case. Here, there is no dispute that the
Registrar of Deeds of Makati was notified of private respondent's petition, but she manifested that her office had no
objection thereto. The Solicitor General does not question the propriety of the action and manifestation of the Registrar
of Deeds, nor does he give any reason why private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title should be denied. Instead, he claims that the fact that he was given a copy of the decision is an admission
that he is entitled to be notified of all incidents relating to the proceedings.
This is not correct. Considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of
a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds,
was at most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect.

This case should be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral registration cases 4 and original land registration
proceedings 5 which require that the Solicitor General be notified of decisions and hold as decisive, for the purpose of
determining the timeliness of the appeal filed by the government, the date of his receipt of the decisions therein and not
that of the Director of Lands or of his other representatives. 6 The issue and the applicable laws in those cases are
different.cdrep

The important role of the Office of the Solicitor General as the government's law office cannot be overemphasized. Its
powers and functions, however, should not be rigidly applied in such a manner that innocuous omissions, as in the case
at bar, should be visited with so grave a consequence as the nullification of proceedings. After all, no prejudice to the
government has been shown.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128531, [October 26, 1999], 375 PHIL 950-956)
|||

[G.R. No. 158449. October 22, 2004.]

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO
MEDINA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68546, 1 which set aside the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite in LRC Case
No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) 2 and dismissed petitioners' application for registration of a parcel of land.

18
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an
area of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay Malabag, Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442,
Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as the Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that they
acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of
owner for more that 30 years. 3
No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners proceeded with the presentation of their evidence. The
State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose M. Velasco, Jr. 4
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial court traced the history of possession of the
Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina Hintog. 5
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In the same year, the Subject Property was
transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property
from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand, Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and
other fruit bearing trees. After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of Alfredo and his
children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.6
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. 7
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was supported by tax declarations in the name of
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998. 8
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners' application for registration of the Subject
Property. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the
trial court to the Court of Appeals. EACIcH

In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving the application for registration despite petitioners'
failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12
June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners also failed to produce muniments of title to tack their possession
to those of their predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the prescriptive period required by law. 9
On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding the appeal meritorious, setting aside the decision
of the trial court, and dismissing the application for registration of petitioners. 10 The Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated 22 May 2003. 11
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the trial court, approving petitioners' application for registration of
the Subject Property, be reinstated. 12
In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial court, they claim that they are entitled to confirmation and
registration of their title to the Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
although they had not identified under which specific paragraph of the said Section. 13
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, for

19
a given period of time, it can be logically presumed that their claim to the right to register the Subject Property was based
on Section 14, paragraph (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent Republic before the Court of Appeals and this
Court, discuss mainly the Public Land Act, thus, establishing that the application for registration filed by petitioners before
the trial court is essentially an application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject
Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public Land Act. TCaADS

Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act are the same in that both are against the
whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and
final. They differ mainly in that under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the court only
needs to confirm. On the other hand, under the Public Land Act, there exists a presumption that the land applied for still
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at the
same goal, namely, a Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of rights adverse to the record
title. 14
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title under the Public Land Act must be
able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land; and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. 15
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable public land is undisputed. What is to be
determined herein is whether petitioners have complied with the period of possession and occupation required by the
Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to petitioners' application is Section 48(b). Through the
years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times. The case of Republic v. Doldol 16 provides a
summary of these amendments, as follows
. . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have failed to comply with the period of possession
and occupation of the Subject Property, as required by both the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. In
its decision, the Court of Appeals held that

Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the property is in 1958, which is the
earliest date Justina Hintog, the previous owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation purposes. This is
far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the applicants' possession under claim of ownership
should have begun at the latest. 17
Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March 1990, has repealed by implication Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and has effectively reduced the required period of possession and
occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing of the application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
20
Petitioners' arguments are without merit. This Court has already laid down the standard for repeals by implication, as
follows
It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so
declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States
v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist, that it be shown that the
statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the
former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the
latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency
that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative
purpose to repeal. 18
In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 do not even address the same
subject matter. DISTcH

In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may dispose of agricultural lands is enumerated, to wit
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act since the specific
requirements and application procedure differ for every mode. More particularly, the confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a) administrative legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the
Public Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII of
the same Act. Having filed their application before the courts, petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.
Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No. 6940 of Section 44 of the Public Land Act, to read
as follows
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12) hectares and
who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public land
subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such
tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and cultivation of the land, Section 44
of the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title to which
Section 48(b) applies.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 19 in which he discussed the development
of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under
the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44
of the Public Land Acton administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section
48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. DCISAE

The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the Public Land Act by extending the periods for
filing of applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, respectively, to 31
December 2000. Except for extending the period for filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on the other provisions under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, such as
Section 48(b) and the prescriptive period provided therein.
21
Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court on repeal by implication, there can be no conflict or
inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 that would give rise to a
repeal of the former by the latter.
The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January 2001 does not affect the position of this Court on the issues
discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only provision under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act amended by RA
No. 9176 by further extending the period for filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles to 31 December 2020. The other provisions of the Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and
45, already refer to free patents under Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and
the prescriptive period provided therein still remain unchanged.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which provides for a prescriptive period of thirty (30)
years possession, applies only to applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property
covered by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the continuous
possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546, which reversed the decision of the lower court in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No.
N-69787) and dismissed the application for land title of petitioners. No cost.
(Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No. 158449, [October 22, 2004], 484 PHIL 145-159)
|||

[G.R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002.]

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA
T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands,respondents.
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES, respondents/intervenors.
Britanico Law Office for petitioners.
J.P. Villanueva & Associates for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On April 25, 1985, petitioners filed with the Land Registration Court an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. At the time petitioners filed their
application, the lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioner's application.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application. Thereafter, the Land Registration Court held that petitioners had
adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the lot. Accordingly, it rendered a decision confirming
the imperfect title of petitioners. The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the case, specifically over the lot, which he claimed to be not alienable and disposable. The Court of
Appeals granted the petition and declared the decision of the Land Registration Court null and void ruling that the Director
of Lands has jurisdiction over the subject property inasmuch as the subject lot is part of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. The Court held that the Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction
over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly
adjudged the registration of title in favor of private applicant. In this case, the Court found that the subject lot, being a
watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. It held that once a parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, a presumption arises that the land continues to be a
part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent reclassification is shown. The evidence of the
petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, any title to the lot is void ab

22
initio. The Land Registration Court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject lot. Thus, all proceedings of the Land
Registration Court involving the subject lot were, therefore, null and void.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; REGISTRATION OF PUBLIC LANDS; JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE;
APPLICANT MUST OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND HE IS APPLYING FOR IS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain
and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An
imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, aconcession especial or
special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. Or, that he
has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48
(b) CA 141.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however, has
already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners' application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads: . . . "(b) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." Interpreting Section
48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following: "(a) that
the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over
the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902. Clearly, petitioners
were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of
possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment
by RA 1942 and PD 1073. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership
or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive
prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed
the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF FOREST LANDS OR OTHER INALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS CANNOT RIPEN INTO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP; LOT RESERVED AS WATERSHED IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO OCCUPANCY, DISPOSITION, CONVEYANCE OR
ALIENATION. Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO
33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years
prior to the filing of petitioners' application. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer
be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance
or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land.
Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other
inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court declared that inalienable public lands ". . . cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. 'The possession of public land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.''

23
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES WITH RESPECT THERETO DO NOT APPLY UNLESS AND UNTIL THE LAND CLASSIFIED AS WATERSHED
RESERVATION IS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION SO THAT IT MAY FORM PART OF THE DISPOSABLE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No.
1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of the proposed townsite. According
to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners
is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage. A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the
Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as such
is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONCE A PARCEL OF LAND IS INCLUDED WITHIN A WATERSHED RESERVATION DULY ESTABLISHED BY
EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION, A PRESUMPTION ARISES THAT THE LAND CONTINUES TO BE PART OF SUCH RESERVATION
UNTIL CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT DECLASSIFICATION IS SHOWN. The principal document
presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The certification on which petitioners
rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by several
documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court. The Solicitor General submitted to the
land registration court a Report dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the
MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. Likewise, in a letter dated November 11,
1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal,
similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner
Edna T. Collado's [as original applicant] application is the technical description of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan,
Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot
"is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly
and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues
to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT MUST BE IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION
OF THE LOT FOR AT LEAST THIRTY YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION. It is obvious,
based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the
MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners' possession as of the filing of their
application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974.
The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until
the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners' case falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on
April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite
reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; A FORESTED AREA CLASSIFIED AS FOREST LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN DOES NOT LOSE SUCH CLASSIFICATION
SIMPLY BECAUSE LOGGERS OR SETTLERS MAY HAVE STRIPPED IT OF ITS FOREST COVER. It is of no moment if the areas
of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be
applied to this case by analogy: "A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forest lands' do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified

24
as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply."
8. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; LAND REGISTRATION COURT; NO JURISDICTION OVER NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES. It
is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The evidence
of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion
of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this,
the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the
land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the
Lot are therefore null and void. We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, as follows: "The Land Registration
Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be
attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided
for by the Statute of Limitations."
9. ID.; ACTIONS; DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AND ESTOPPEL; DOES NOT APPLY TO SILENCE THE STATE'S CLAIM OVER
PUBLIC LANDS; RIGHT OF REVERSION OR RECONVEYANCE TO THE STATE OF PUBLIC PROPERTIES REGISTERED AND WHICH
ARE NOT CAPABLE OF PRIVATE APPROPRIATION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. We also hold that environmental consequences
in this case override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure. In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which involved the
registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to
silence the Republic's claim over public lands. The Court said: "It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or
laches does not apply when the. Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or
laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application
would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality." The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance
to the State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition
does not prescribe."
10. ID.; INTERVENTION; RULE; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of
judgment by the trial court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to
this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the case had already reached this Court.
Thus, in Mago the Court held that: "It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at
this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded . . . and on appeal . . . the same affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under . . . Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose
and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
was. created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."
DECISION
CARPIO, J :p

The Case
This Petition 1 seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 2 dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597,
which declared null and void the Decision 3 dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel
of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated
in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached
to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-
Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." On

25
March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-
applicants. 4 Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity). 5
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal
Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners' application. In due course, the land registration
court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-
in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding
real estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each.
During the hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them
and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
"1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in actual, open,
notorious and continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in
his name on22 March 1902 (Exhibit "W" and "W-1" testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano
Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had the property
resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit "X" and "X-1"; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of
Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the
Philippines during World War II. He owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for
tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit "I" and
testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3
February 1958 (Exhibit "H"). During the ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the
grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958,
under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and
under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.

5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982through a Deed of
Sale (Exhibit "G").
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit "P-1"
to "P-3").
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit "Q" to "Q-3").
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES,
LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD
bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit "S" to "S-3").
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold
their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO
ECO through aDeed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit "T" to "T-9")." 6
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General.
For failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing
to January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to

26
appear again despite due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the
evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Court's Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that petitioners had adduced
sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming
the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of the court's decision, as follows:
"From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and
their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses
Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by
Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said
property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said
property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all
Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to "private
rights."
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 "private rights" is proof of
acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private rights" means that applicant should
show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means
for the acquisition of public lands . . ." (Italics supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights
to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private
rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification issued by
the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area
excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904
per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site
Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation. (Exhibit "K")." 7
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision
dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision
on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue
the necessary decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court
had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the
Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration court's decision dated
January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to
issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant
to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously
classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private appropriation.

27
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry
Program ("ISF" for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-
Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992.
During the preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue
for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain. 8
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated
January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987
Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private
respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for
as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent
authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of
private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.""
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the
National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case
No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collado's
application that "said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public
land application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Italics supplied). The
respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts
inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should
have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
". . . inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director
of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources and Environment), and not the courts. . . . Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties
surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that
it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands
are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. And
courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of
Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Italics supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary
to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339)." 9
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
28
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE INTERVENORS' PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 ("EO 33" for brevity) dated July 26, 1904 10 established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation ("MWR" for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that
the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of
petitioners' claim over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights." They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the
reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there be." Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes
all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the
Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926
was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding
the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners' arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. 11 The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 12 which laid
the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain." 13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 14
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the
"Maura Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land
law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the
lands would revert to the state. 15
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as
follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government's title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term
"public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are

29
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands." 16
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141" for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains
to this day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands. 17
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on
February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. 18 The Torrens system
requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. 19 PD
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978, 20 amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King,
as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. 21 Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 22 explained thus:
"One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention
in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State
ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced
by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To
remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine."
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII 23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources" barred the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could
alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV 24 on the "National Economy and
the Patrimony of the Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII25 "National
Economy and Patrimony."
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also,
features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential
to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes." 26
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed
areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for brevity). 28 The Court defined watershed as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries
and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also recognized
that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a
watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed
ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage
property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs
to be answered now."
30
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may
be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof
within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water
or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters."
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering
the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with
proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the
land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would
mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that
the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldn't care less
even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious
resource water. . . .
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the
introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless
the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before
these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of
thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed
development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage
finally happens."
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and
determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed reservations
which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment.
Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future
generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights over the
parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements
of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the
public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect
title. An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, aconcession
especial or special grant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through
purchase. 29 "Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as
provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential

31
Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners' application for registration was
filed on April 25, 1985. 30 As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter."
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the
following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." 31
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon
continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the
required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under
the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either
by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904,
Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in
the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved
the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners
filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the
filing of petitioners' application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed
reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed
reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen
into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the Court declared that inalienable
public lands
". . . cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run
against the State.
'The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon
the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State,
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.'"
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals 33 is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They
admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified
as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights
of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. The Court
ruled:
"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that
petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573.
He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of

32
Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve,
was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation No. 573, should not be
interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the
property for so many number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real
estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open
and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the
25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession
required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the
"private rights" recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the
protection of "private rights" to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show ". . . by clear
and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] . . . means for the acquisition of
public lands."
In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for
acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year
period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or
possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious
possession."
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of
the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable
when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly
excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation.
Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town
sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED
RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A
CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE
ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the
operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both
series of 1915, which established the Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province
of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the
adjacent parcel of land, of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the
Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with
the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community
Development, which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)

33
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Man's Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2),
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked "1" on
sketch plan, being N-74'-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33' 28 W
1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40' 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30' 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence
N 75' 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14' 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43' 25 W 477.04 m. to point
7; thence N 71' 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31' 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38
m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due
East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m.
to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point
23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of
beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Man's Baguio, being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of
public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point
marked "1" on sketch plan being N 74' 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due
West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4;
thence Due West 1000.00. m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m.
to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12;
thence S. 31' 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71' 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43' 25 E 477.04 m.
to point 15; thence S 14' 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75' 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30' 50
E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40' 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33' 23 e 1575.00 m to point of
beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No.
1637 revised the area and location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O.
Ramos,Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and
reverted it to MWR coverage. 34 Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE
RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON
BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND
REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS
RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated
June 21, 1974 which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land
34
embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly described
as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762
establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-
13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-
25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San
Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked "1" on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the
identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan
Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines"
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been
earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. 35 Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 36
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau
of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The
Certification reads:
"Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV

EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of
1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of
Marikina Watershed Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904
per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite
Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the
sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies.

35
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum
dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section"
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the
reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report 37 dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator
Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot
described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration.
The Report states:
"COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this
Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described
as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record
No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al.,
pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984,
respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12 Marikina Watershed. . . .
"WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information and guidance
with the recommendation that the application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Italics
supplied)."
Likewise, in a letter 38 dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
"That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-
162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904
which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) . . . .
"xxx xxx xxx
"That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant but part of the
public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry
Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection (Italics supplied)." Copy of the letter is attached
herewith as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof."
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collado's [as original applicant] application is
the technical description 39 of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the
Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot "is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been
officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive

36
Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear
and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded
from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners' possession as of the filing of
their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in
1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902
until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners' case falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No.
1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by
petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until
the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply." 40
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republic's petition for annulment of judgment which
was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on
April 23, 1991. 41 Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment
of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 42 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become
final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment
after the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land registration court had no
jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the principle
of res judicata. They insist that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They
also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land registration court's jurisdiction considering that the
Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The evidence
of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion
of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this,
the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the
land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the
Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 43 as follows:
"The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate
of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the
State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations."

37
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, 44 which involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court
rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the Republic's claim over public lands. The Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues
as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law
or public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice
to technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and
which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe."
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR
under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the
parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition
with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to
them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the
aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the DENR's ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed
the same under the DENR's Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED
THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation
of Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the
public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry
Program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
"A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, beginning at point "1" on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation;
thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (9,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this
Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF; I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines"
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
(Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents
of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were
intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of
38
parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25)
years. 45 The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the
other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted. 46
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land registration court had already
rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners' imperfect title. Intervenors' counsel received a copy of
the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before the land registration court.
According to intervenors, the land registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by
the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by
the Solicitor General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a petition for
intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 47 provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or, an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides.
However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of
Appeals 48 reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for
intervention even when the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
"It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the
proceedings where trial had already been concluded . . . and on appeal . . . the same affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the
Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under . . . Section 2, Rule 12
of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in
issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired
into considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration
that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing
the intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already
claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and those of
the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups including
malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.

39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the
Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-
59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
(Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, [October 4, 2002], 439 PHIL 149-191)
|||

[G.R. No. 132963. September 10, 1998.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical School), petitioner, vs. NICANOR
DOLDOL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Amado Y. Mabulay for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pantacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental in 1959. He filed an
application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development on October 23, 1963, but it
was rejected on April 1, 1968. However, in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving
lot 4932, Cad-237 Opol Cadastre which included the area occupied by Doldol as a school site. Accordingly, in 1970, the
Opol High School, now called as Opol National Secondary Technical School, transferred to the said area. And on November
2, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the said area for the said school. The school,
then, made several demands to Doldol to vacate the portion occupied by him but he refused to do so. As a consequence,
an accion possessoria was filed by the school against him, and the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro ruled in the
school's favor and ordered him to vacate the land. cdasia

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
The petition is meritorious.
The original Section 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July
16, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. AaIDCS

The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the portion reserved for the
school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be
from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of the same
started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot
be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot,
therefore, assert a right superior to the school. In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the
land in dispute.aHESCT

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1073 IS NOW THE PREVAILING LAW. The original Section
48 (b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977.
2. ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT GRANT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN; REQUISITES. We stated that Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION; MUST BE FROM JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER. The law, as presently phrased, requires
that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
DHITSc

DECISION
ROMERO, J : p

40
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioner's complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. prcd

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis
Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest
Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of
Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved
lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on
November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion
in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National
School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate
said portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for accion possessoria with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he
occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in
1991.
Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred
on a question of law when it held, contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous,
notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years. Cdpr

The petition is meritorious.

In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides ac follows:
"Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the Philippines may acquire alienable
land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot
for thirty-two years, it ruled that the former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School's
claim over the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs. CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands
vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
cdasia

"The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private properly."
xxx xxx xxx
. . . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public land.
41
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. cdtai

The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to possess the lot through
the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos
of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still
good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, 2 which provided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a)
that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
LLphil

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the District
Forester's Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an alienable and disposable
tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first
requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the portion reserved for the
school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be
from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of the same
started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot
be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot,
therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol
National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General: LibLex

"(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even
though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry,
and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired." 3
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and Resolution dated
March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992,
is hereby REINSTATED.
(Republic v. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, [September 10, 1998], 356 PHIL 671-678)
|||

[G.R. No. 157466. June 21, 2007.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHERYL B. BIBONIA and JOSELITO G. MANAHAN, respondents.
42
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J : p

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeking to reverse the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
dated February 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54874 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
39, Daet, Camarines Norte dated September 17, 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-775 (LRA Record No. N-61762).
The facts are:
On September 1, 1994, Cheryl B. Bibonia, respondent, and Ricardo L. Fernandez, substituted by Joselito G. Manahan, also
a respondent, filed with the RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, an application for registration of two parcels of land,
docketed as LRA Record No. N-61762.
Respondent Bibonia's application covers Lot 1, while that of respondent Manahan covers Lot 2. Both lots, included in Plan
Psu-05-006012, are located in Vinzons, Camarines Norte.
Respondent Bibonia alleged in her application that she bought Lot 1 from Marita King as shown by a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated September 29, 1992. Marita, in turn, received the property from her father, Mariano Morales, by virtue of a
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos dated November 23, 1987. Morales, on the other hand, purchased the same lot from
Sisenando Barco who, in turn, bought it from Restituto Paraon on September 10, 1955. cAISTC

For his part, Ricardo L. Fernandez, substituted by respondent Manahan, alleged in the same application that he bought
Lot 2 on September 29, 1992 from Remedios Cribe. It was donated to the latter by her father, Mariano Morales, on
December 18, 1987, who purchased the same lot from Basilia Barco and the heirs of Liberato Salome on July 31, 1968.
In the course of the proceedings, or on August 3, 1995, the trial court ordered the substitution of Fernandez by respondent
Manahan, the former having transferred his rights and interest over Lot 2 in favor of the latter by virtue of a Deed of
Assignment dated May 25, 1995.
In its Decision, 3 dated September 17, 1996, the trial court granted respondents' application for registration, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the applicants, Cheryl B. Bibonia, of legal age, single, Filipino [C]itizen, with address at 84
Esteban Abada cor. Gonzales Street, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, and Joselito G. Manahan, of legal age, single,
Filipino citizen with address at 2501 CM Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila to have registrable titles over Lot 1 and Lot
2, respectively, of Plan PSU-05-006012 with their corresponding technical descriptions, judgment is hereby
rendered confirming their respective titles thereto and ordering the registration thereof in their respective
names.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision 4 dated February 28,
2003, affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner Republic contends, among others, that the Court of Appeals erred when it departed from settled jurisprudence
by ruling that respondents have occupied the lots for thirty (30) years; and that they could not have maintained abona
fide claim of ownership because at the time of the filing of their application on September 1, 1994, the lots had been
alienable for only eight (8) years, per Certification from the Community and Environment Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
For their part, respondents maintain that the petition should be denied for lack of merit.
In sum, the issues presented before us are: (a) whether respondents were able to prove that the lots subject of their
application were then disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (b) whether they were able to show that
they have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession of the lots in the concept of owners. aACHDS

Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Accordingly, applicants for registration of land must prove: (a) that it forms part of the alienable lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 5
43
Relative to the first requisite, it is undisputed that the subject lots have been declared as alienable and disposable by a
positive government act. The evidence on record shows that a Certification 6 was issued by the CENRO, DENR to the effect
that the lots are "within Camarines Norte Project No. 4-E, alienable and disposable area, certified as such on January 17,
1986."
Petitioner Republic argues, however, that since the lots were declared alienable only on January 17, 1986, respondents
could not have occupied and possessed the same in the concept of owners since June 12, 1945.
We disagree.
Adopting petitioner's view would lead to an absurd situation wherein all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, notwithstanding
the occupant's length of unchallenged possession. This could not have been the intent of the law since it is anathema to
the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth. AScTaD

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 7 a case with similar factual antecedents, we held:

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation
or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property. (Emphasis ours)
Here, when respondents filed their application in 1994, the lots were already declared alienable and disposable by the
DENR 49 years ago, or in 1945.
As to the second requisite, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondents were able to prove,
through testimonial and documentary evidence, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession of the lots for the period required by law. The basis of such conclusion is primarily
factual. It is basic that matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review except in some
meritorious circumstances. We find one such circumstance in this case.
In granting respondents' application for registration, the trial court concluded:
The foregoing facts contain all the essential requirements for the acquisition and confirmation of an imperfect
title to an agricultural land in favor of the applicants whose possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest
is more than thirty (30) years, hence sufficient to confer a registrable title to the applicants.
However, the trial court overlooked the fact that the required thirty-year period of occupation by an applicant for
registration has already been amended by P.D. No. 1073, 8 that took effect on January 25, 1977. Thus, instead of the thirty-
year requirement, applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, must prove that they have been in
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Unfortunately, evidence on record shows that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous
possession of the disputed property only since 1955. On this point, the Court of Appeals held: TEcAHI

In the present case, applicants-appellees' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
possession of the disputed land as early as 1955 (Commissioner's Report, p. 2; Record, p. 123), thus, they only
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what would otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. 9
Although respondents' possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest was more than 39 years when they filed their
application for registration in 1994, that period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of title. What is
required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under
a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 10 Much as we want to conform to the State's policy of
encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the
ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. 11

44
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
54874 affirming in toto the Decision dated September 17, 1996 of the RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte in Land
Registration Case No. N-775 (LRA Record No. N-61762) is REVERSED. Respondents' application for registration of title is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
|||(Republic v. Bibonia, G.R. No. 157466, [June 21, 2007], 552 PHIL 345-354)
[G.R. No. 177797. December 4, 2008.]
SPS. PEDRO TAN and NENA ACERO TAN, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision 1 dated 28 February 2006 and Resolution 2 dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71534. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated 9 May 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRC Case No.
N-2000-055, and ordered herein petitioners, spouses Pedro and Nena Tan (spouses Tan), to return the parcel of land
known as Lot 1794, Ap-10-002707, Pls-923, with an area of 215,698 square meters, located in Calingagan, Villanueva,
Misamis Oriental (subject property) to herein respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic). In its assailed Resolution,
the appellate court denied the spouses Tan's Motion for Reconsideration. aEcHCD

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian citizens on 9 February 1984. 4 They seek to
have the subject property registered in their names.
The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, as established by a
Certification 5 dated 14 August 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City.
Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property was in the possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses.
Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names under Tax Declarations No.
8035 (1952), 6 No. 1524 7 and No. 1523 (1955). 8
The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized
Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property 9 dated 26 June 1970. The spouses Tan took immediate possession of
the subject property on which they planted rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in their names, as evidenced by Tax Declarations No. 5012 10 (1971); No. 11155, 11 No.
10599, 12 No. 10598 13 (1974); No. 11704 14 (1976); No. 01224 15 (1980); No. 06316 16 (1983); and No. 943000 17 (2000);
and paid realty taxes thereon.
However, a certain Patermateo Casio (Casio) claimed a portion of the subject property, prompting the spouses Tan to
file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 88-204. On 29 August 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring the spouses
Tan and declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted". Casio appealed the said RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 26225. In a Resolution 19 dated 15 November 1990, the appellate court
dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 26225 for lack of interest to prosecute. Casio elevated his case to this Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, docketed as UDK-10332. In a Resolution 20 dated 13 March 1991 in UDK-10332, the Court denied
Casio's Petition for being insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final and executory on 3 June
1991. 21
Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property before the Bureau of Lands. 22 On
8 December 1999, Casio's application was ordered cancelled 23 by Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de
Oro City, upon the request of herein petitioner Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the subject property pursuant to the 29
August 1989 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 88-204. Similarly, survey plan Csd-10-002779 prepared in the name of
Casio was also ordered cancelled 24 by the Office of the Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region X, Macabalan,
Cagayan de Oro City. IcTaAH

In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title 25 to the subject property before the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39, where it was docketed as LRC Case No. N-2000-055. The application of the spouses Tan
invoked the provisions of Act No. 496 26 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 27 as amended. In compliance

45
with the request 28 of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000, the spouses Tan filed on 5 October
2000 an Amended Application for Registration of Title 29 to the subject property.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in LRC Case No. N-2000-055 on behalf of the Republic,
but failed to submit a written opposition to the application of the spouses Tan.
When no opposition to the application of the spouses Tan was filed by the time of the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-
2000-055, the RTC issued on 23 April 2001 an order of general default, except as against the Republic. Thereafter, the
spouses Tan were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
After the establishment of the jurisdictional facts, the RTC heard the testimony of John B. Acero (Acero), nephew and lone
witness of the spouses Tan. Acero recounted the facts already presented above and affirmed that the spouses Tan's
possession of the subject property had been open, public, adverse and continuous. 30
After Acero's testimony, the spouses Tan already made a formal offer of evidence, which was admitted by the court a
quo. 31
On 9 May 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in LRC Case No. N-2000-055 granting the application of the spouses Tan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, [Spouses Tan] having conclusively established to the satisfaction of this Court their ownership of
the [subject property], Lot 1794, Pls-923, situated in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, should be as it is hereby
adjudicated to the [Spouses Tan] with address at #166 Capistrano Street, Cagayan de Oro City.
Once this judgment becomes final, let the Order for the issuance of decree and corresponding Certificate of Title
issue in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended. 32
In its appeal of the afore-mentioned RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71534, the Republic
made the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in ruling that [herein petitioners Spouses Tan] and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and notorious possession of subject property for the period required by law. aSHAIC

II. The trial court erred in granting the application for land registration despite the fact that there is a disparity
between the area as stated in [the Spouses Tan's] application and the tax declarations of Juanito Neri, Lucio
Neri, and [herein petitioner Pedro Tan].
III. The trial court erred in granting the application for land registration despite the fact that [the Spouses Tan]
failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.
IV. The trial court erred in relying on the Decision dated [29 August 1989] by the RTC-Branch 24, Cagayan de Oro
City which declared [the Spouses Tan's] "title" on the subject [property] "quieted."
V. The trial court erred in not finding that [the Spouses Tan] failed to overcome the presumption that all lands
form part of the public domain. 33
On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 granting the appeal of the
Republic, and reversing and setting aside the 9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed
to comply with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June
1945. 34 Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.
The spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision of the Court of Appeals. To refute the finding
of the appellate court that they and their predecessors-in-interest did not possess the subject property by 12 June 1945
or earlier, the spouses Tan attached to their Motion a copy of Tax Declaration No. 4627 covering the subject property
issued in 1948 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Lucio Neri. They called attention to the statement in Tax
Declaration No. 4627 that it cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948. Unfortunately, no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was
available even in the Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis Oriental. The spouses Tan asserted that judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that land assessment is revised by the government every four years; and since Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was issued in the year 1948, it can be presupposed that Tax Declaration No. 2948 was issued in the
year 1944. cDTCIA

The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses Tan in a Resolution dated 12 April 2007.
The spouses Tan now come before this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not [the Spouses Tan] have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject [property], under a bona fide claim of

46
acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title. 35
The Court rules in the negative and, thus, finds the present Petition devoid of merit.
To recall, the spouses Tan filed before the RTC their Application for Registration of Title to the subject property in the year
2000 generally invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
The Public Land Act, 36 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, 37 governs lands of the public domain, except timber
and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. 38 It explicitly enumerates the means
by which public lands may be disposed of, to wit:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization.
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). 39
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific
requirements and application procedure for every mode. 40 Since the spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC,
then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title over the subject property. ADCEaH

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed
of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, 41 which
reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall
be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
The Court notes that Presidential Decree No. 1073, amending the Public Land Act, clarified Section 48, paragraph "b"
thereof, by specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, based
on the said provision of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply
with for the grant of their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and disposable; and
(2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945. 42 HTScEI

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order or administrative
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 43

47
In the case at bar, the spouses Tan presented a Certification from the DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, dated 14 August
2000, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property. The said Certification stated that the subject
property became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and
disposable is sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoys a presumption of regularity
in the absence of contradictory evidence. 44 Considering that no evidence was presented to disprove the contents of the
aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this Court is duty-bound to uphold the same.
Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to sufficiently prove that the subject property is part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain as early as 31 December 1925, they still failed to satisfactorily establish
compliance with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Through the years, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times. Republic v. Doldol 45 provides a
summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive periodof occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however,
has already been amended by Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section
48(b) now reads: ACTESI

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation
of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicants, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited. (Emphasis ours.)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too,
that possession and occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. 46
It is worth mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan do not dispute that the true reckoning period for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title is on or before 12 June 1945. They also admit that based on the previous
evidence on record, their possession and occupation of the subject property fall short of the period prescribed by law. The
earliest evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in
the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now asking the kind indulgence of
this Court to take into account Tax Declaration No. 4627 issued in 1948, which they had attached to their Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate court refused to consider. Just as they had argued
before the Court of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 2948; and should the Court take judicial notice of the fact that tax assessments are revised every four
years, then Tax Declaration No. 2948 covering the subject property was issued as early as 1944. ECTIcS

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
On the basis thereof, it is clear that evidence should have been presented during trial before the RTC; evidence not
formally offered should not be considered. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only submitted
by the Spouses Tan together with their Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The reason given by the Spouses Tan why they belatedly procured such evidence was because at the time of trial
the only evidence available at hand was the 1952 tax declaration. More so, they also believed in good faith that they had
met the 30-year period required by law. They failed to realize that under Section 48 (b) ofCommonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient because what the law requires is
possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945. This Court, however, finds the reason given by the spouses Tan
48
unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed their application for registration of title to the subject property under the provisions
of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. It is incumbent upon them as applicants to carefully know
the requirements of the said law.
Thus, following the rule enunciated in Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, this Court cannot take into consideration
Tax Declaration No. 4627 as it was only submitted by the Spouses Tan when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration
of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the appellate court.
And even if this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness and equity, admits and take into consideration Tax
Declaration No. 4627, issued in 1948, it would still be insufficient to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property by the Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since 12 June
1945 or earlier. Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three years after 12 June 1945, the cut-off date under
ADHcTE

the law for acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to public land. For the Court to conclude from the face of Tax
Declaration No. 4627 alone that the subject property had been declared for tax purposes before 12 June 1945 would
already be too much of a stretch and would require it to rely on mere presuppositions and conjectures. The Court cannot
simply take judicial notice that the government revises tax assessments every four years. Section 129 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence provides particular rules on which matters are subject to judicial notice and when it is mandatory 47 or
discretionary 48 upon the courts or when a hearing is necessary. 49 It is unclear under which context this Court must take
judicial notice of the supposed four-year revision of tax assessments on real properties. Moreover, the power to impose
realty taxes, pursuant to which the assessment of real property is made, has long been devolved to the local government
units (LGU) having jurisdiction over the said property. Hence, the rules pertaining to the same may vary from one LGU to
another; and regular revision of the tax assessments of real property every four years may not be true for all LGUs, as the
spouses Tan would have this Court believe. Given the foregoing, Tax Declaration No. 4627 is far from the clear, positive,
and convincing evidence required 50 to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property by the Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima
facie proofs of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 51 They may be good supporting or
collaborating evidence together with other acts of possession and ownership; but by themselves, tax declarations are
inadequate to establish possession of the property in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring
imperfect or incomplete title to the land.
As a final observation, the spouses Tan purchased the subject property and came into possession of the same only in 1970.
To justify their application for registration of title, they had to tack their possession of the subject property to that of their
predecessors-in-interest. While the spouses Tan undoubtedly possessed and occupied the subject property openly,
continuously, exclusively and notoriously, by immediately introducing improvements on the said property, in addition to
declaring the same and paying realty tax thereon; in contrast, there was a dearth of evidence that their predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject property in the same manner. The possession and occupation of the subject
property by the predecessors-in-interest of the spouses Tan were evidenced only by the tax declarations in the names of
the former, the earliest of which, Tax Declaration No. 4627, having been issued only in 1948. No other evidence was
presented by the spouses Tan to show specific acts of ownership exercised by their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject property which may date back to 12 June 1945 or earlier. TCADEc

For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
this Court has no other option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to the
subject property. Much as this Court wants to conform to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution
of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the
law's stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. 52
The Court emphasizes, however, that our ruling herein is without prejudice to the spouses Tan availing themselves of the
other modes for acquiring title to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for which they may be qualified
under the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 28 February 2006 and
Resolution dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
(Spouses Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, [December 4, 2008], 593 PHIL 493-508)
|||

[G.R. No. 146527. January 31, 2005.]

49
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA PROPERTIES, INC., Represented by its President, JOSE
TANYAO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Office for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, SECTION 23 THEREOF; DUTY AND POWER TO SET THE
HEARING DATE LIES WITH THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT. The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529reads: Sec.
23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order
setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from
the date of the order. . . . . The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. After an
applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice
of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed
by the clerk of court to the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND REGISTRATION CASES MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH;
AN APPLICANT SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR ACT OR OMISSION OVER WHICH HE HAS NEITHER RESPONSIBILITY NOR
CONTROL, ESPECIALLY IF HE HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW. Petitioner is correct that in
land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant
complied with the jurisdictional requirements. The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing
date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly
requested the trial court to reset the initial hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing Office,
which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records
indicates that Manna Properties failed to perform the acts required of it by law. We have held that "a party to an action
has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with
the business of such official in the performance of his duties". A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive
power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is
unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT COMPLIED WITH WHERE THE NOTICE OF HEARING WAS PUBLISHED BOTH
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE AND A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION WELL AHEAD OF THE DATE OF HEARING.
Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order setting the date of initial hearing
and the date of the initial hearing itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the
application. Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing.
Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases compliance
with the publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of hearing was published both in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the legal
requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; SECTION 48 THEREOF; OPEN, EXCLUSIVE AND UNDISPUTED POSSESSION OF ALIENABLE
PUBLIC LAND FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW IPSO JURE CONVERTS SUCH LAND INTO PRIVATE LAND. Lands that
fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We
have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed byCA 141 ipso
jure converts such land into private land. Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the
earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECKONING POINT. Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-
interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties
may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC, Manna Properties,
a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding
for its predecessors-in-interest first. We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and remains
part of the public domain.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT FOR CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT HE IS
QUALIFIED TO HAVE THE LAND TITLED IN HIS NAME. Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted

50
right to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden
of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name. Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that
is only subject to formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse
possession for the requisite period of time. It is only when the applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke
the rights given by CA 141. TAIaHE

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE A TAX DECLARATION BY ITSELF IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE OWNERSHIP, IT MAY SERVE
AS SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR INFERRING POSSESSION; CASE AT BAR. The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove
the required length of possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepea
("Manuel"), transferee's affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the land in question. We have ruled that while a
tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
However, the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna
Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945, a
scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q-16 was
in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration
indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material to this case. CA
141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax
declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued
on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may
have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED LENGTH OF POSSESSION NOT PROVED IN CASE AT BAR. Other than the mentioned
pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove
possession since 1952. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and substitute
tax declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such secondary evidence in cases involving the
confirmation of an imperfect title over public land. Manna Properties' evidence hardly constitutes the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEALS; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI; LIMITED TO THE REVIEW AND
REVISION OF ERRORS OF LAW; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ARE BINDING ABSENT ANY OF
THE ESTABLISHED GROUNDS FOR EXCEPTION. The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law. This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence
already considered in prior proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this Court is bound by the
findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts. The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of
the required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question of fact. It invites an evaluation of the
evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re-evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial and
appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court
to review under a Rule 45 petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. We find one such
circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals.
DECISION
CARPIO, J :
p

The Case
This is a petition for review 1 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 dated 20 December 2000. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union ("trial court") dated 21
February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352 ("LRC No. N-2352") approving the application of respondent Manna
Properties, Inc. ("Manna Properties") for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan,
San Fernando, La Union.
Antecedent Facts
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case are as follows:

51
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title of two (2) parcels of
land, specifically:
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union
measuring around 1,480 square meters.
Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo.
Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and record were forwarded to the Land
Registration Authority by the Court a quo on October 7, 1994. TCHcAE

However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration Authority, the full names and complete
postal addresses of all adjoining lot owners were not stated for notification purposes. As a result thereto, per
Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to submit the names and complete postal addresses
of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514 and 9516. On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which
was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority on December 22, 1994 together with the notice of the Initial
Hearing, which was reset to April 13, 1995.
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting of the initial hearing since April
13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a non-working day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety (90)
days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail delays and to enable them to cause the
timely publication of the notice in the Official Gazette.
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a quo.
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995 from the LRA with the information
that the notice can no longer be published in the Official Gazette for lack of material time since the National
Printing Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days before the date of the hearing. It was again
requested that the initial hearing be moved to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18, 1995.
The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified
under the new Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public domain. cAEaSC

Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing Office, the Notice of Initial Hearing was
published in the June 12, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette officially released on June 19, 1995. The same notice
was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.
Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on the acquisition of the subject
property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-owner of the subject property, who testified on the possession of the
applicant-appellee's predecessors-in-interest.
The [documentary] evidence presented were:
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;
2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor's Certificate;
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA;
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National Printing Office;
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald;
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995; DASEac

13. Sheriff's Return of Posting;

14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.
52
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996 granting the application. (sic) 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), promptly
appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. On 20 December 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Regional Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and competent evidence all its allegations in the
application for original land registration. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA") did not present any evidence in
opposition to the application. The trial court ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the application, and orders that the parcels of
land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One Thousand
Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and
embraced in Plan AS-1331434 (Exh. "A" and the technical description described in Exhibit "B" and "B-1") shall
be registered in accordance withPresidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree in the name of the applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose [Tanyao], Filipino
citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises,
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529. 4
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling and dismissed petitioner's argument that the applicant failed to comply
with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529 5 ("PD 1529"). The Court of Appeals pointed out that
the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the
publication of the notice of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case
reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepea was not the sole basis for the trial court's finding that Manna Properties'
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added that
while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they are "the best indicia" of possession.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; and
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE
REQUISITE PERIOD.
The Ruling of the Court
On Whether Manna Properties Failed
to Comply with the Jurisdictional
Requirements for Original Registration
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between the court order setting the initial hearing date
and the hearing itself. Petitioner points out that in this case, the trial court issued the order setting the date of the initial
hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial court set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125
days in between the two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529. Thus,
petitioner concludes "the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original
registration."ADECcI

The petitioner is mistaken.

The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order.
xxx xxx xxx
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. After an applicant has filed his
application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a

53
court document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court
to the LRA. This involves a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with the jurisdictional requirements.
In this case, the applicant complied with the jurisdictional requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period.
The records show that the Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the initial hearing date
because of printing problems with the National Printing Office, which could affect the timely publication of the notice of
hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties failed to perform the acts
required of it by law.
We have held that "a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court;
he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties." 6 A party cannot
intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court
errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant
has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law. EHCDSI

Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order setting the date of initial hearing
and the date of the initial hearing itself. Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the
application. Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing.
Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases compliance
with the publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of hearing was published both in the
Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the legal
requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.
On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently
Established Possession of the Land
For the Period Required by Law
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of the land for the period of time required by
law. Petitioner alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their evaluation of the
tax declarations presented by Manna Properties.
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the review and revision of
errors of law. 7 This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in prior proceedings. Absent
any of the established grounds for exception, this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the required possession, under a bona fide claim
of ownership, raises a question of fact. 8 It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re-
evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not
allow this. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 petition, except
in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. 9 We find one such circumstance in this case. The evidence on record
does not support the conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. aAHISE

Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties
is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional
prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part
of the public domain.
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the land in question has been in the open and
exclusive possession of its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already private land when Manna
Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest.
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141") otherwise known as the "Public Land Act." Section 48(b) of
the said law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
54
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive
prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land. 10 Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality
that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete. 11
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in
possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of
title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC, 12 Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for
judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest
first.
DASCIc

We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and remains part of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is premised on the
basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. 13 Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land
titled in his name. 14 Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject to formal recognition, it is still
incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of time. 15 It
is only when the applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of possession consists of the testimony of one
of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepea ("Manuel"), 16 transferee's affidavits, and several tax declarations
covering the land in question.
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for
inferring possession. 17 However, the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause.
Although Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12
June 1945, 18 a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to
be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back
of this tax declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A
substitute is not enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material to this case. CA
141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax
declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued
on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may
have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established. CTSAaH

There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Properties must fail. The tax declaration allegedly
executed in 1950 and marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small annotation found at the bottom of the
back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration
was issued in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will enable this Court or any
interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed. 19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render
any attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is
only a substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax
declaration.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was "FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A.
7160." Republic Act No. 7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991.The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who
allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads, "Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950. . ." This
means that the tax declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. Manna
Properties gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance
of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated
for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties' predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land in question since 12 June 1945.
The earliest of the "un-cancelled" tax declarations presented by Manna Properties is dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient
to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the transferee's affidavit, which was dated

55
1955. Manna Properties' reliance on Manuel's testimony is similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and
self-serving on its own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents or predecessors-in-interest were
in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that
his family used to plant rice on that piece of land. 20
Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna
Properties can only prove possession since 1952. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony
of Manuel and substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such secondary evidence
in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title over public land. 21 Manna Properties' evidence hardly constitutes
the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141. 22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of
Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, is DENIED. cACTaI

(Republic v. Manna Properties Inc., G.R. No. 146527, [January 31, 2005], 490 PHIL 654-670)
|||

[G.R. No. 160421. October 4, 2004.]

SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GENEROSO R.
GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the January 16, 2003 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65407 which reversed the September 7, 1998 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in
Land Registration Case No. T-320. Likewise assailed is the appellate court's October 17, 2003 resolution 3 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. TcDHSI

On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6, an application for registration of title over a 23,209 square meter lot, 4 designated as Lot 806, Cad-
424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485, situated in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
Batangas, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. They also
prayed in the alternative that their petition for registration be granted pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,
or the Public Land Act. 5
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806 from sisters Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana
Torres for the amount of P6,943,534.40. 6 The two, in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased parents, Vicente and
Eufemia Medrana. Maria, born on October 22, 1917, declared that since 1945, her father was already the owner of Lot
806. She became aware of her father's possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner in 1930 when she was 13
years of age. The possession of the subject lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita, 7 who
testified that in 1935 when she was 13 years of age, she first came to know that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The
sisters added that during the lifetime of Vicente, he planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their tenant. After
his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through hired farmers. 8
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidences
(1) Blue Print Copy of the Plan 9 and Technical Description 10 of Lot 806, both certified by Land Management
Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands), of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
(2) Tax Declarations 11 of the lot for the years 1948, 1955, 1968, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1994 (in the name
of Vicente Medrana); 1996 (in the name of Rosita Guevarra and Maria Torres); and 1998 (in the name of Philip
and Ester Recto).
(3) Certification of Non-Delinquency for the year 1998 from the Municipal Treasurer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas; 12
(4) Report 13 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) stating, among others, that
(a) the entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 30 L.C. Map No. 582
and released and certified as such on December 31, 1925; (Emphasis, supplied)
(b) the lot is not within a reservation area nor within the forest zone;
56
(c) the lot is not within a previously issued patent, decree or title.
(d) there is no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or any other person;
(e) the land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 021-02166-A in the name of the predecessor-in-interest and that
there is no difference in area;
(f) the lot is agricultural in nature; and
(g) the lot does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed and river bank protection.
(5) Report from the Land Management Bureau that the land involved is not covered by any land patent or by
land application pending issuance of patent. 14
(6) Report from the Forest Management Service, DENR that the subject lot falls within Alienable and Disposable
lands, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, per BFD LC Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925. 15
(7) Report from the Land Management Sector, DENR that Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a
portion of nor identical to any previously approved isolated survey. 16
There being no opposition to the petition from any private individual, an Order of General Default was issued by the trial
court. 17
On September 7, 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision granting the petition for registration. The dispositive portion
thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, this Court hereby adjudicates
and decrees Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre on plan Ap-04-010485, situated in San Rafael, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, with an area of 23,209 square meters, in favor of and in the names of Spouses Philip Recto and Ester
C. Recto, Filipino citizens and residents of 1322 Palm Avenue, Dasmarias Village, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED. 18
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that petitioners failed to
(1) offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the period required
by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption that subject property forms part of the public domain. 19
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court on the sole ground of failure to offer in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land. 20
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that in view of their compliance with all the substantive and
procedural requirements for registration, save for the submission of the tracing cloth plan, the case be remanded to the
trial court for the presentation of the said tracing cloth plan. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, interposed no
objection to petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 21
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 22 Hence, the instant petition
praying for the remand of the case before the trial court.ASIDTa

In its Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that in the interest of justice, he will not oppose the petition. 23
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now the
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

57
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 24
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners, categorically testified that they, and prior
to them their father, had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of owners. Maria, having been born on
October 22, 1917, and Rosita on October 29, 1922, were 13 years of age when they became aware of their family's
possession of Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly capable and competent to perceive
their father's possession of Lot 806 in the concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be worthy
of belief and credence. Considering that the judge below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue, having
personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, her findings deserve the
highest respect. 25
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the subject lot was for the year 1948 will not militate against petitioners. Note
that said 1948 Tax Declaration cancels a previous Tax Declaration (No. 26472), 26 thus substantiating petitioners'
possession of Lot 806 through their predecessor-in-interest even prior to said date. At any rate, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 27 it was held that the belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not necessarily mean that possession
by the previous owners thereof did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony supporting possession for
the required period is credible, the court will grant the petition for registration. Pertinent portion of the decision, reads

Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the possession of Marcial Listana for
the period required by law. The issue of credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better
position to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's
appreciation of the witness' testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [A] person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the
fact and (b) he can make his perception known. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was
four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and
Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was
only a child at the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to testify on the matter.
It is well-established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which
he is examined. The requirements of a child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b)
capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not
possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness' knowledge of the fact to which he testifies
was obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at the
age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is
reason to reject petitioner's claim that Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession since
it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana
possessing the land.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of the property for tax purposes does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the predecessors were not in possession of the land as required by
law since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration presented took effect only in
1980 while the certificate of tax payment is dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that tax
declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow
that belated declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant
case where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.

58
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public domain having been released and certified as such
on December 31, 1925. As further certified by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR,
the entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area
nor within a forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed, and riverbank
protection. 28 Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet the requisite for original registration of title, to wit: open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable land under a bona fideclaim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. EIaDHS

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court granting the petition for registration on the
ground of petitioners' failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806. Indeed, the submission of
the tracing cloth is a mandatory requirement for registration. 29 However, it was held that while the best evidence to
identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blue print
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. 30 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 31 the Court ruled
that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lot's technical description duly certified as to their correctness
by the Bureau of Lands (Now the Land Management Bureau of the DENR) 32 are sufficient to identify the land applied for
registration, thus
On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, where it was held that "the
original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a
statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the identification of the land sought to be registered. As
what was submitted in the case at bar to identify the subject property was not the tracing cloth plan but only
the blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court should have rejected the same as insufficient.
We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it observed that in that case the
applicant in effect "had not submitted anything at all to identify the subject property" because the blueprint
presented lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast
In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement of the law as the subject property
was sufficiently identified with the presentation of blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director
of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this connection that the Bureau of Lands has
certified to the correctness of the blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go with
it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant has provided ample evidence to
establish the identity of the subject property. (Emphasis supplied)
Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where we
held that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original tracing
cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient
identification. This rule was bolstered only recently in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, where
the Court declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:
We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that Exhibit "O," the true certified
copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was
found by the appellate court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of the
Land Registration Commission, and was re-verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974
pursuant to the provisions ofP.D. No. 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration Commission the authority to
approve original survey plans. It contained the following material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality
(Amadeo) and province (Cavite) where the subject land is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as
plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical
Descriptions signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In fine, Exhibit
"O" contained all the details and information necessary for a proper and definite identification of the land sought
to be registered, thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is required. The fact
therefore that the original survey plan was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract
from the probative value thereof. . . ..

59
In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit "R") 33 and the technical
description (Exhibit "S") 34 thereof both approved by Land Management Services, DENR. Also, per report of the Land
Management Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael,
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously approved isolated
survey. 35 Petitioners also submitted before the Court of Appeals a certified true copy 36 of the original tracing cloth plan
as well as a certification 37 from the Land Registration Authority attesting to the fact that the original plan of Plan-Ap-04-
010485 in Diazo Polyester film is on file with their office. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the decision of the trial court solely on the ground that petitioners failed to present the original tracing cloth
plan.
Having met all the requirements for registration of title including the presentation of sufficient evidence to identify the
land sought to be registered, there is no more need to remand the case before the trial court for the presentation of the
tracing cloth plan.
WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65407 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September 7, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
(Spouses Recto v. Republic, G.R. No. 160421, [October 4, 2004], 483 PHIL 81-93)
|||

[G.R. No. 157683. February 11, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPS. NAPOLEON & EMILIA HUBILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J : p

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67929 dated March 21, 2003.
The facts are as follows.
On March 5, 1999, respondents filed an application for registration of title for Lot No. 6218-B in Subdivision Plan Csd-04-
004665-D situated in Alaminos, Laguna (the Property). 1 Respondents alleged that they have been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful and notorious possession and occupation of the Property, by themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, prior to June 12, 1945. Among others, the respondents presented the following documents to support their
application: 1) a blue print copy of the subdivision plan 2 Csd-04-004665-D approved by the Director of Lands through
Assistant Regional Director Ernesto Viquiera; 2) a technical description 3 approved by the Land Management Bureau of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); 3) a certification from the DENR Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) which states that the Property is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone
as of December 31, 1925 and has not been previously titled; 4 4) a report of the Land Management Bureau stating that
the Property is not covered by any previous land registration case; 5 and 5) tax declarations dating from 1999 back to 1945
in the names of Mateo Abrigo and Rodrigo Abrigo after the former's death. 6
The trial court rendered its decision on May 8, 2000, approving the respondents' application for registration. 7 On May
30, 2000, the petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. 8 The petitioner, through the Solicitor
General, argued that the trial court erred when it granted the application despite the failure of respondents to submit the
original tracing cloth plan and prove that they complied with the period of possession and occupation required by law. 9
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on March 21, 2003, dismissing the petitioner's appeal. The appellate court
deemed the submission of the blueprint of the subdivision plan as sufficient to support respondents' claim of ownership
as it contained material data such as the technical description and location of the Property. 10 Moreover, the appellate
court observed that the blueprint of the subdivision plan was identical to the original tracing cloth plan which respondents
submitted to them on June 19, 2001. 11 As to the petitioner's contention that respondents failed to prove possession of
the land as required by law, the appellate court ruled that they were bound by the findings of the trial court. 12 The
appellate court also noted that the land in question was declared for taxation purposes by respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest as early as 1945. 13 Hence, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. ACETIa

The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it deemed the submission of a blueprint copy of the survey
plan as sufficient compliance with the requirements under the Property Registration Decree. 14 In this regard, petitioner

60
avers that submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory
requirement in cases of application for original registration of land. Since respondents failed to offer the original tracing
cloth plan or the diazo polyester film duly approved and certified by the Bureau of Lands, petitioner concludes that
respondents failed to comply with a jurisdictional requirement and the trial court's decision is null and void. The petitioner
also maintains that even if the blueprint was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court, the respondents failed to
prove that the property was alienable and disposable land.
We rule in favor of the respondents.
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this
rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands
and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. 15 The
Court concluded that the subject property was sufficiently identified by: 1) the blueprint copy of the plan and technical
description which were both approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR; and 2) the report of the Land
Management Sector stating that the subject property is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously approved isolated
survey. The applicants in that case also submitted a certified true copy of the original tracing cloth plan to the Court of
Appeals as well as a certification from the Land Registration Authority attesting that the original plan in diazo polyester
film was on file.
Similarly, the respondents in this case offered as evidence before the trial court: 1) a blueprint copy of the subdivision
plan 16 approved by the Director of Lands; 2) a technical description 17 approved by the Land Management Bureau of the
DENR; 3) a certification from the DENR CENRO which states that the Property has not been forfeited for non-payment of
real estate taxes, is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as of December 31, 1925, has not been previously
titled and is not covered by any previous public land application; 18 and 4) a report of the Land Management Bureau
stating that the Property is not recorded in their lot and plan index cards as being subject of a previous public land
application. 19 The respondents also filed a motion to admit original tracing cloth plan with the Court of Appeals during
the pendency of the appeal and attached thereto the original plan. 20 We likewise note that the original tracing cloth plan
submitted to the Court of Appeals is the same as the blueprint subdivision plan offered as evidence before the trial
court. 21
The petitioner's contention that the Property's status as alienable and disposable land was unsubstantiated is likewise
unavailing. As stated earlier, the respondents offered as evidence before the trial court a certification from the DENR
CENRO stating that the Property is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone classified under Project No. 8, Land
Classification Map No. 582 and certified on December 31, 1925. 22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2003 is
hereby AFFIRMED. ICT

|||(Republic v. Spouses Hubilla, G.R. No. 157683, [February 11, 2005], 491 PHIL 370-374)
[G.R. No. 103727. December 18, 1996.]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO
OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996.]
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD
SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Emerito M. Salva & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 103727.
Romeo R. Bringas for petitioners in G.R. No. 106496.
Rodolfo G. Dimaisip for A. D. Ocampo.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dilag Blanes Alvarado Sillano Jurado Cudiamat Riollo and Basar for T. C. dela Cruz.
Benjamin C. Sebastian for D. D. Buhain.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE COURT; JURISDICTION; THE PROBATE COURT'S JURISDICTION IS NOT
LIMITED TO THE DETERMINATION OF WHO THE HEIRS ARE AND WHAT SHARES ARE DUE THEM AS REGARDS THE ESTATE

61
OF A DECEASED PERSON. Before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court,
acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no
jurisdiction as an "intestate court", to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban. The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that
petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad
4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be
mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging
to the estate of the deceased. A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and
what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of
wills. We held in the case of Maningat v. Castillo, that "the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the
estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily
includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory
of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the
lawful heirs. In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus: ". . . questions of title to any property apparently
still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties,
without prejudice to third persons . . ." Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of
whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a
petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
maybe resolved by the probate court. In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not
commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision
dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered
by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. ETISAc

2. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; SPANISH TITLES; P.D. NO. 892 HAS ABOLISHED THE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION UNDER
THE SPANISH MORTGAGE LAW; SPANISH TITLES CAN NO LONGER BE COUNTENANCED AS INDUBITABLE EVIDENCE OF
LAND OWNERSHIP. It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976,
the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act within six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification
of their lands. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. In the case
of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and
care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that
have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II. In both cases, petitioners-heirs did
not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their
allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and
the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of
Title covering the land registered. Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we
categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative
value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a
related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final
judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations
by this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise.
In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the TItulo's nullification was definitive.
In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. The
issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by
the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory

62
submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate"
to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro. cCaDSA

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J : p

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases.
The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third
persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quinones," 1 on the
basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San
Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro
Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands
extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and
Tayabas Bay in the south. 2
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets proliferated
resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, 3 in connection
therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et
al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy
as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of
the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
"It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been
exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may
be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein
embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the
court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality." 5 [Cited cases omitted]

It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein writing finis to
these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's claim of ownership over this vast
expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R. No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession and/or damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion 8 of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo,
Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit."
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for
preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the "Intestate
Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio
Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D.
Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development
Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447
in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants
were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer

63
Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-
17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124,
both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive
ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and
executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April
23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner
estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to
a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita
G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of
summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered
owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel
Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo,
Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be
defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under
the Torrens System by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with the Court
of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower court's decision was
affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens System hence, it
cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of
private individuals:
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the
lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated
was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present
petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978
declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.
The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and that therefore no
rights could be derived therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving the lands covered
by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.

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4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in
any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the
same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty days their final
accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession
or knowledge under oath.
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the presentation of their
evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and inventory of the presentation of
movants-intervenors' evidence as well as the consideration of all other incident are hereby set on December
22, 1978 at 8:30 a m."
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV,
Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito
who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was received by the
lower court without any opposition. 21
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator
of the subject estate. 22
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in
the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of administration and
other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in
which properties of the estate are located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and
Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by various persons who
had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its
properties by virtue thereof.

65
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines
alleging, inter alia:
"4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely
inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies
for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever
rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or
prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of inventory, settlement or
distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands
within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the petition considering
that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in
accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership." 25
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. 26
On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed by means of
the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
"WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the
'Opposition' dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the
office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof." 27
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic. 28
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of
Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio
Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful
heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the
said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said above-
mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands
which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons, or the Republic
of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government as
reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions
thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved
by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case
to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales, quitclaims,
and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect immediately,
to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to
the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-

66
administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the
Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take
possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and
credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper
Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the
estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition of
the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the
concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of
the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the New Society, the above intestate
estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by
the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED." 29
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly
appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition,
Judge Fernandez denied the said petition. 31
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated
Order 32 dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower
court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma,
thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs. 34 In affirming the assailed Order
dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court
erred in declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed
to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production
of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of
the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892
(Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by invoking certain cases wherein the
validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 35
Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G.R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both
cases on September 15, 1994. 37
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we denied on
different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
"I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of
law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not
remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower court's null and void judgment." 38
In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:

67
"First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question of title or ownership
over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated
objections of the petitioners. 39
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order
and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing,
revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges of equal rank. 40
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez who without
jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already
final. 41

Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was appointed by
President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were
denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. 42
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before Judges Echiverri,
Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of
evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner
stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the
Supreme Court upholding the Guido title " 43
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners' Spanish title in these
cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the
special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the
lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad
No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no
jurisdiction as an "intestate court", 44 to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban. 45
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that petitioners'
contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which
purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing
with properties that are proven to be part of the State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of
the deceased. 46
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as
regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case
of Maningat v. Castillo, 47 that "the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased
persons either summarily or through the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes theexamination
of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate properly
included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:
". . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon
in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . ."
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to be
included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as
in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court.
In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia 49 that:

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". . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it
is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance
with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the
deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits
have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations, with power to
determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein
belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership
of the said properties." 50 [Emphasis Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error when it issued
the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is
the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic
since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By
setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge
Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded
without authority and/or jurisdiction. 51
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly
appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence are all available to
him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument of the
petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a
certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record
was available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978
of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting
aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez' disposition of the case, i.e.,
the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether
or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that
the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the
appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as
evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered
thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said
Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their
lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
"SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded
under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish
titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded
under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344."
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:
69
"WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and private
lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between
legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of,
or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and
instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected;

WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system,
being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;"
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that
caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous
fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the
operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we have held that a
mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. 59 Proof of compliance
with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered the
reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892.
Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D.
892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the
following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence
of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had
inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions
of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and religious organizations,
including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood
wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims." 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial administrator
Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R.
No.103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo's validity
notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of
November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts' holding in G.R. No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that
since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior
to the registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of
the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the
possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not
been proven. In both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite
a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the
subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to

70
prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish
term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor
presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the
petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo
was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms.
Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
"SEC. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of
which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;"
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
"SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability,
its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses."
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. If the writing be in the custody of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of
its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But
the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully
obtained or withheld by the adverse party."
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as
the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any
probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 61
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due execution of the
Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged
contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:
"Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be
changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 63
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on:
(1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated
as "Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the
then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978 decision correctly clarified that
the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano
Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-
heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the government whether
he admits that there is actually a titulo propiedad 4136.
COURT:
71
 Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is already answered by witness. The
parties have not yet established the due existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness is a witness for the
government, so with the testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually in
existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question candidly to the government counsel whether he is
prepared to state that there is really in existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this court that there was such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the
signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic." 64
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of
dubious validity:
". . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit 'O-RP') concluded
that the document contained material alterations as follows:

a) On line 15 of 'p. 1, Title' and on line 5 of 'p. 2, Title,' the word 'Pinagcamaligan' was written after 'Pulo;'
b) On line 16, 'p. 1, Title,' 'un' was converted to 'mil;'
c) On Line 18, 'p. 1, Title,' 'mil' was written at the end of 'tres' in 'tres mil;'
d) On line 19 of 'p. 1, Title,' a semblance of 'mil' was written after 'setentay tres;'
e) On line 6, 'p. 2, Title,' 'un' was formed to a semblance of 'uni;' and
f) On line 8, 'p. 2, Title,' 'un' was formed to 'mil.'
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of
the NBI, there are still "pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of burnings.
The burnings were made on the very portions where there were previous erasures, alterations and
intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act." 65
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. 66 Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating
the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
". . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of Mariano San Pedro
shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the location
of the land described in the original title . . ."
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court's analysis, as affirmed
by the appellate court, viz:
"To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon request of the
Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP'") was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136. But no one produced the Titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the Court cannot take
cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea
but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs
were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to
determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are unknown or that there are not enough
funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if produced." 67

72
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners-
heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there
exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value. 68
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan
Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in
the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban,
province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly
opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
"But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The Title
embraces land 'located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City.' Second. The title was signed
only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation,
indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved
not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17
Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil.
202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving
a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not
in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August
31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be
measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's 'Rejoinder to Opposition' dated
April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000
hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its 'Opposition' of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as
containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's
land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his
rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-
24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment
showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for were to be filed with the Direccion General
de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the
interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from
the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another
year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed,
as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of
October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and
100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil.
935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase
to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should
be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta
de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for
adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the
publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands
established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which
boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal

73
Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession
(Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated April 29 or April
25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo.
The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation not
its evidence(Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged
the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This
transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his
daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco
was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27,
1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land
to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco
shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian
Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit
of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was
paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend
on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de
Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most
conspicuously over Piadeco's title."

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 we categorically enunciated that the
alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land
ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito
and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting
G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue of the validity
of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the
Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
". . . conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot
be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court
of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive
as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue
be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in
the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by
merely identity of issues."
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied
upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the
inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net
estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
74
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela
Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2"
Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from its final decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the
vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to
prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross
negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs'
claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle
that the negligence of counsel binds the client. 76 The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced
by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership itself of the
lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 77 we held:
"It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This negligence
ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the
herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel (Que v. Court of Appeals,
101 SCRA 13 [1980]. Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the
petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner
had been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect."
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied due process on
account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without
recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from
the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used
as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling land registration
cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the
Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully
belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13,
1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter
not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for
review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for leave to reopen and/or new
trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then
administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed
and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole
or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate
the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.
75
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
(Intestate Estate of San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103727, 106496, [December 18, 1996], 333 PHIL
|||

597-637)
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J :
p

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of
the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences. STHDAc

xxx xxx xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have
wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving
property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of
which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field in each
field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one
who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law"
which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine
government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide
definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land
Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the
problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws
are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to
decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law,
though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot
9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years. HaSEcA

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the
State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at
the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban the fourth being
Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from
their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he
"also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic of the Philippines
likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
76
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation
of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos'
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of
the Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision
of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, 11 which was handed down
just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is
actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had
no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural
land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title underthe Public Land Act and
the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The
Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable
and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

77
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of
the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter
dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court
applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was
patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to apply, the land should have been classified
as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings
in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation, 17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18ACTEHI

With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing
it under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property
had already been "converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite
extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article
1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property", while Section
14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a
ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits
that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the
time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject
property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference
has to be made to the Public Land Act. HSEIAT

A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public
and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
78
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. DEHcTI

Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073.
Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain". The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the
lands that may be registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands"
are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest
the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision
reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. SDTIaE

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14 (1) therein, the Public
Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed
or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor
than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than
establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with
the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa

79
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and
given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of
the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period
within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several
times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to
the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any
said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only
until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration
Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable
and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14 (1) of theProperty Registration Decree or
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of
ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation
nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation
or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. EIcSTD

80
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary
pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual
inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under abona fide claim of ownership
long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land
registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of
initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that the
particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period
of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. . ." That statement, in the context of Section
14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not
establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not
even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for
over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. aCHDST

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section
14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved situation wherein
the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's
interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the latter, the application
for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a claim of possession that
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration inCeniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M.
Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980".
This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents' application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is
true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the
ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question
are forestal land. . . .IDASHa

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by
law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private

81
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were
able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under
Section 48 (b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June
1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land
had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) yearsbefore the land was
declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it
from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14 (2), which we did even then recognize, and still
do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only
after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws." DEcSaI

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. [ 30 ] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [ 31 ] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession
of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their registration
bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back
as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original
registration under Section 14 (2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral
lands.caTESD

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription.
Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or through extraordinary
82
prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, 34 as well as just
title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid
basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs
affirmation is whether Section 14 (2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the
State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section
14 (2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by granting
the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least
thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning
point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under
the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the
Civil Code ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is
completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present,
the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under
Section 14 (2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No.
1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil
Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the
application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at
the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty (30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding with
respect to the present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration became
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is
derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14 (2)
puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to
Section 14 (1).
B.

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Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we
are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14
(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription". The identification what consists of patrimonial property
is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object
of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable
and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government
officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and
disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all,
by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides
that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. IEcDCa

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when * it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and
reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of
the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable,
remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in
accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch.
Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. aATEDS

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An
Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is more commonly known as
the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in
Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the

84
law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. 41 The President is authorized to sell portions
of the military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject
thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and disposable. However,
said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be
sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such purpose can be
tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable.
It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property
and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly
promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in
counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain
land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public
dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code,
there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted
to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.EHTSCD

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration
on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by theProperty
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14 (1).
Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor
inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to
interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to
Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures
correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man
are susceptible to prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article

85
1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from
acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to
impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites good faith and just title. The ascertainment of
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, 45 provisions that
more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains: ITCcAD

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have actually
transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription.
Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive
prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession". 47 It is evident
that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from
whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation,
succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession
preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing
prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso
jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal
next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent
that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under
the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion
of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June
1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still, the gap was lamentable,
considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of theProperty
Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as
of now. AcDaEH

V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes
and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act. 51

86
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription
is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property
by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan
or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree. EaCDAT

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared
as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for
the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless,
discomfiture over the implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in
the country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit
and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes
the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap.
Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven
unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. 52 Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on which they have
lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They
have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be
said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive
law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth
a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are
lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites
for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

87
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the
person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches
to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem. caHIAS

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated
2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents see Opinion.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late
Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant Petition, being
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, may not be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil
Code, nor registered pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. CTIEac

At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree governs registration of land under the Torrens
system. It can only identify which titles, already existing or vested, may be registered under the Torrens system; but it
cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the land they are seeking to register is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, a fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and explicitly refers to "private lands", without mention at
all of public lands. There is no other way to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree except that the land was already private when the applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by
prescription. The prescription therein was not the means by which the public land was converted to private land; rather,
it was the way the applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from another person previously holding title to
the same. 2 The provision in question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to what are already private
lands, then, there is no question that the same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code,
because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights to private lands. ECcTaS

Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be disposed of by the State, and at the same
time, mandates that the latter can only do so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the intent of the
legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the modes by which agricultural public land may be disposed of by the
State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only readily apparent, but explicit. And, undeniably, the
enumeration of the modes for acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include prescription, in the
concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
88
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome the express restriction placed by the Public
Land Act, as amended, on the modes by which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to lands of the public domain, except timber and
mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case,
the one designed therefor specially should prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same cannot confer title to land and can only confirm
title that already exists or has vested. As has already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural public land vests
or is acquired only by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended. TcADCI

And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times, changing the period of possession required
for acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de
dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained.
However, on June 22, 1957,Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment
required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President
enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of
Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-
in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the public domain could be acquired by adverse
possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act by requiring possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945
or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for
acquiring imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no longer determined according to a fixed
term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession
should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain by prescription under the Civil
Code, and registration of title to land thus acquired under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, it would be
sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of the amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain by possession would again
be made to depend on a fixed term (i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription),
rather than being reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48 (b) ofthe Public Land Act, as
amended. DCcIaE

There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public agricultural land in question, accordingly, the
same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion concerning the contradictory
pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals 6 and Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, need only prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of filing of the
application for judicial confirmation and/or registration of title. On the other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a
person must establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land was likewise already declared alienable and disposable since 12
June 1945 or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in Naguit, and declares the pronouncements on the matter
in Herbieto as mere obiter dictum.

89
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my elucidation in said case on the acquisition
of imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary
to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause,
"by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such
are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of certain parcels of land of the public
domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the other
procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to prove that they possessed the subject parcels of land for the
period required by law; and (2) the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that the alleged infirmity in the application
constituted a misjoinder of causes of action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of the
misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by the court separately. The Court though took note of the belated
publication of the notice of hearing on the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto, the hearing was
already held before the notice of the same was published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and was
fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue in Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and
David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land they wish to register in their names for the period required by law. The Court
ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requires
possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land sought
to be registered was declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period of possession prior to such
declaration should not be counted in favor of the applicants for registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not
be deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite period as to acquire imperfect title to the
same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
which could be the subject of judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said case. It wasnot a mere
remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, "by the way", or only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon
a question before the Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; or introduced by
way of illustration, or analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI

It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition inHerbieto and
discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already
be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the
Court from resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the application
for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court
over the application, in light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit
of the application given that the applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to
expeditiously and completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and issues between the
parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could
have easily believed that they could re-file their respective applications for registration, just taking care to comply with
the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more
appropriately, what does not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered
as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are
presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion,
and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided
does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some
90
other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the
same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have
turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was
necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the
case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more
points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such
points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be
regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make
statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. IcHTCS

An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum; and this rule applies
as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course
of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter
on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because
the disposition of the case is or might have been made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points
in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it
did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and established jurisprudence on the matter, and is
binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially reiterating Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the applicant for registration prior to the
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable cannot be credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a
Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and disposable also
by 12 June 1945 or earlier.

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There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree, which would not run afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws
or binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person from
acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which could be
judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the intention of the law is to dispose of agricultural public
land to qualified individuals and not simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation and
application of both law and jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, is well justified
by the significant consequences arising from a finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the public
domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect title. An imperfect
title can only be acquired by occupation and possession of the land by a person and his predecessors-in-interest for the
period required and considered by law sufficient as to have segregated the land from the mass of public land. When a
person is said to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant to the land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the land ceased to be part of the
public domain and goes beyond the authority of the State to dispose of. An application for confirmation of title,
therefore, is but a mere formality. 12 EIAHcC

In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, has identified several ways by
which agricultural lands of the public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of agricultural public land has
its own specific requirements which must be complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title, because the land in question was declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not
totally without recourse for he could still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated in the afore-quoted
provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of the ruling in Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the majority, toDENY the Petition
at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing, for absolute lack of basis, petitioners' application for registration of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the application of prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree (PRD), and on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable can be
made after June 12, 1945, in accordance with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit(Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a new law, crafted by this Court, going beyond what the
Constitution ordains and beyond the law that the Legislature passed. Because the majority has not used the standards set
by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA), 2 its conclusions are based on a determination on what the law ought
to be an exercise in policy formulation that is beyond the Court's authority to make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the order these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI

Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy of laws that govern public lands to fully
understand and appreciate the grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled National
Economy and Patrimony) establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding principle. 3 This
doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the State, 4 and that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and, other than the Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter. Section 7 of the PLA delegates
to the President the authority to administer and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open
to disposition or concession, and the requirement that they should be officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant section, states that
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Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of title to the qualified occupant or possessor of
an alienable public land. This section provides:cHAIES

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs
have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various laws relating to property registration. It governs
the registration of lands under the Torrens System, as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. Section 14
of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. SEDIaH

Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from, Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The two
provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based on the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a
substantive law that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the
other hand, specifically refers to the manner of bringing registerable lands, among them alienable public lands, within
the coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the first is a substantive law, while the other is essentially procedural, so that
in terms of substantive content, the PLA should prevail. 7

93
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and its provisions on Property 8 and
Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes importance because land, whether public or private, is property. Prescription,
on the other hand, is a mode of acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of the modes of disposition mentioned
in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs". On this
basis, Article 419 classifies property to be property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 proceeds to
further classify property of public dominion into those intended for public use, for public service, and for the development
of the national wealth. Article 421 states that all other properties of the State not falling under Article 420 are patrimonial
property of the State, and Article 422 adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425, property of private ownership, besides
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons,
either individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring alienable public land
under the PLA, (Significantly, the PLA under its Section 48 provides for its system of how possession can ripen into
ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of title.) Section 14 (2)
of the PRD, however, specifies that "[t]hose who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws" as among those who may apply for land registration. Thus, prescription was introduced into
the land registration scheme (the PRD), but not into the special law governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that
prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides that "all things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided; property of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The provisions of Articles
1128 to 1131 may also come into play in the application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration
of lands of the public domain should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong to the State,
and he who claims ownership carries the burden of proving his claim. 10 Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes
of the terms of the grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the PRD for the registration
of lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the Constitution.
The Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on property and prescription and should be accorded respect as such. In
more concrete terms, where alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the PLA is the primary
law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on property and prescription must yield in case of conflict. 11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a reiteration of the first principle that under the regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 12 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 13 We
should never lose sight of the impact of this first principle where a private ownership claim is being asserted against the
State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, starting from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public
land law that followed, Act No. 2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was described in the
following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands", for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government's title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The

94
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to the present PLA and its amendments. Another
basic feature, the requirement for open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the alienable
and disposable public land under a bona fide claim of ownership also never changed. Still another consistent public land
feature is the concept that once a person has complied with the requisite possession and occupation in the manner
provided by law, he is automatically given a State grant that may be asserted against State ownership; the land, in other
words, ipso jure becomes private land. 15 The application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,
based on the procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner that the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the required occupation or possession. In the first
PLA, the required occupation/possession to qualify for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10 years preceding the
effectivity of Act No. 926 July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141, until this law
was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957), 17 which provided for a simple 30-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. This period did not last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential
Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073) 18 changed the required 30-year possession and occupation period provision, to possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. PD 1073 likewise changed the lands subject of
imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. PD
1073 also extended the period for applications for free patents and judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to December
31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to history. A major concern raised against this date
is that the country was at this time under Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the
uncertainties and instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on how one could possibly comply with
the June 12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation did not
legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a Presidential Decree) was solely through the
President's lawmaking powers under a regime that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is the
possible impact of the interplay between the old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was enacted, the utmost
concern, in all probability, was how the law would affect the application of the old law which provided for a thirty-year
possession period. Counting 30 years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should
have provided for a January 24, 1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons, the date June
12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired under the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA
1942) providing for a 30-year possession period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We recognized this
legal dilemma in Abejaron v. Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does
not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation
of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title
over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated,
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity
of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete
title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet
the latter date is the express legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that where an
applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity of PD
95
1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date back to June 12,
1945. For purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to highlight that it is a date
whose significance and import cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social
policy concerns; the full legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees
were complemented by Presidential Decree No. 892 (PD 892) 20 issued on February 16, 1976 which limited to six
months the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected
Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for filing applications for free patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect
title to December 31, 2000. The law now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12 hectares to
any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years
prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to
December 31, 2020. 23

Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the administrative grant of title to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain through homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940and RA 9176 signify that
despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 that the Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist under the law for
the grant of alienable lands of the public domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978 to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property. Its Section 14 describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree, among
them
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately discussed below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June 12, 1945 and which, under the conditions
discussed above, may be read to be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section 14 (1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that
"under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until
December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in 2002, 24 limiting the filing of an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently refers only to the use of Section 14
(1) of the PRD as a mode of registration. Where ownership right or title has already vested in the possessor-occupant of
the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by operation of law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for
purposes of registration of a "private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the PLA vests title to the
occupant/possessor and renders the land private in character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Office of the Solicitor General that the public land to be registered
must have been classified as alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in Section 48 (b) June
12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of
96
ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation
or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court noted that while the
claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as
alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable.
Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable
and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It does the same with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that
came after Naguit and should have therefore overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites with approval
the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 27 penned by the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however completely misses the point from the perspective of
whether possession of public lands classified as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited for
purposes of a grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA, and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases, as
analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied registration on the basis of whether the public land has been classified
as alienable and disposable at the time the petition for registration was filed. Thus, except for Naguit, these cases can be
cited only as instances when registration was denied or granted despite the classification of the land as alienable after
June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above, this is one case that explained why possession
prior to the classification of public land as alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who filed his or her
application for registration after the classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but where such classification
occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its statutory construction interpretation of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral, and
timber. Of these, only agricultural lands can be alienated. 28 Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis to
determine which lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not; hence, classification is a constitutionally-
required step whose importance should be given full legal recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without
classification into disposable agricultural land, the land forms part of the mass of the public domain that, not being
agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that are completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed with legal
effects. To allow effective possession is to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership and control that the doctrine
97
denotes will be less than full if the possession that should be with the State as owner, but is elsewhere without any
authority, can anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed under its Section 48 (b), it is very important to note
that this law does not apply until a classification into alienable and disposable land of the public domain is made. If the
PLA does not apply prior to a public land's classification as alienable and disposable, how can possession under its Section
48 (b) be claimed prior such classification? There can simply be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public
land that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141. 29 If the land is either
mineral or timber and can never be the subject of administration and disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the
possession of these unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of public land as alienable and
disposable is inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into a claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term that can best be understood in terms of the Civil
Code in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of possession. 30Article 530 of the
Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This perspective fully complements what has been said above under the
constitutional and PLA reasons. It confirms, too, that the critical difference the ponenciasaw in
the Bracewell and Naguit situations does not really exist. Whether an application for registration is filed before or after
the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can be recognized
prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date June 12, 1945. The ponencia assumes, based on its statutory
construction reasoning and its reading of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from June
12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been classified as alienable at the time of application for registration. As
heretofore discussed, this cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and should be given full significance. Its full import
appears from PD 1073 that amended Section 48 (b), whose exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly state what Section 48 (b) should provide under the
amendment PD 1073 introduced in terms of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b). But under the PD
1073 formulation, the intent to count the alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain that is described in terms of the character of the possession required
since June 12, 1945. This intent seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording of the Decree is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the PLA. Naguit's absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively
adopted is more apparent than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration of alienability will
not render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach. The acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by
other modes under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above, now allows the use of free patents. 31 It was
approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts may qualify
a possessor to apply for a free patent. The administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are also open,
particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom the absurdity of the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the constitutionally-
mandated separation of powers in giving Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain
wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is to avoid an absurd
situation. If we feel that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role under the principle of
separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity.
We thereby dip into the realm of policy a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason,
we should avoid expanding through Naguit and the present ponencia the plain meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA,
as amended by PD 1073.

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In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling in Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or
an obiter dictum. As to legal correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated above; hence, it cannot be
dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling. Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective legal possession prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable cannot strictly be obiter because it responded to an issue directly
raised by the parties. Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the case, but it cannot be
faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the ponencia passes off as the established and definitive
rule on possession under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no definitive ruling touching
on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have been established in the present case since the applicant Heirs could only prove
possession up to 1948. For this reason, the ponencia falls back on and examines Section 14 (2) of the PRD. In short, if
there is a perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary ruling is
the ponencia's ruling that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus, on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference between Sections 14 (1) and
14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the coverage of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly
applying civil law provisions on prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To quote the obiter
dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14
(2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered in the interpretation of Section 14 (2).
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully applies to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore
"private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these properties are within the commerce of
men and can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above assumptions and its direct application of prescription
under Section 14 (2) to alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once the
ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests in the occupant or possessor pursuant to the
terms of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with or without judicial confirmation of title, so that the land has become a private
land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes fully operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There
are matters that the Constitution itself provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under Section
3, the Constitution took it upon itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to state that only agricultural lands may
be alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid down the terms under which lands of the public domain may be leased

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by corporations and individuals. At the same time, it delegated to Congress the authority to classify agricultural lands of
the public domain according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law, the size of
the lands of the public domain that may be acquired, developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act, specifically, whether it will pass a general or a
special law. On alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Congress has, from the very beginning,acted through
the medium of a special law, specifically, through the Public Land Act that by its terms "shall apply to the lands of the
public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws." Notably, the Act goes on to provide that
nothing in it "shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands
commonly called 'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by laws at present in force or
which may hereafter be enacted." 33 Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage
extends only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the effect and application of laws and human
relations; persons and family relations; property and property relations; the different modes of acquiring ownership; and
obligations and contracts. 34 Its general nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides that: "In matters
which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this
Code."

The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the latter's special focus land registration and
fully applies civil law provisions in so far only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is
expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section 14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of prescription under
existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specific purposes and are supreme within their own
spheres, subject only to what the higher Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides when
the matter to be registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including State property. It classifies property as either of
public dominion or of private ownership, 35 and property for public use, public service and those for the development of
the national wealth as property of the public dominion. 36 All property not so characterized are patrimonial property of
the State 37 which are susceptible to private ownership, 38 against which prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer to the properties of the State in general, i.e., to
both movable and immovable properties. 40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land alone, much
less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the
special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case of deficiency. 41
This conclusion gives rise to the question can alienable and disposable lands of the public domain at the same time be
patrimonial property of the State because they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the development of national
wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction discussed above between the PLA and PRD,
on the one hand, and the Civil Code, on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or disposition of an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain has been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only suppletorily. The
possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the requirements of this Section
are satisfied, the alienable and disposable land of the public domain remains a State property that can be disposed only
under the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether for purposes of
prescription an alienable and disposable land of the public domain is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public
land, even if alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription does not run against the State. 42 In other words,
there is no room for any hairsplitting that would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil Code to
be directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of the public domain before this land satisfies the terms of a
grant under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of alienable and disposable public lands under
the norms of the Civil Code is rendered moot and academic.

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From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, an applicant
for land registration invoking Section 14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly show that the land has been
withdrawn from the public domain through an express and positive act of the government. 43
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land from the mass of the public domain is provided
both in the old and the prevailing Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the required
possession of agricultural public land (under the first and second PLAs) or alienable and disposable land of the public
domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration provided by law is equivalent to a government grant. Thus,
the land ipso jure becomes private land. It is only at that point that the "private land" requirement of Section 14 (2)
materializes. 44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic
exercise to leave no stone unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription directly applies to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I am happy to note that the
present ponencia has adopted, albeit without any attribution, part of my original academic discussion on the application
of the Civil Code, particularly on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State and prescription.
Specifically, I posited assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies that the classification of a public land as alienable
and disposable does not per se signify that the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to be patrimonial,
must not be for public use, for public purpose or for the development of national wealth. Something more must be done
or shown beyond the fact of classification. The ponencia now concedes that "[T]here must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use or the development of the
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has become private by the government's own
declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between
this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies
as a special and primary law when a public land is classified as alienable and disposable, and remains fully and
exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the land now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At
that point, the application of the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The application of Section 14 (2)
of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in considering lands of the public domain. Top
consideration should be accorded to the Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the consideration
of applicable special laws the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to lands of the public domain. The Civil
Code and other general laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the primary laws or to supply any of the latter's
deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classification of public lands as alienable and disposable does not need
to date back to June 12, 1945 at the latest, is wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classification is a required step whose full import should be given full effect
and recognition; giving legal effect to possession prior to classification runs counter to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is classified as alienable and disposable; thus, Section 48
(b) of this law and the possession it requires cannot be recognized prior to any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under the Public Land Act; this
legal reality renders the ponencia's absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court,
to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises and for being an
aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on

101
the effective possession prior to classification since this ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for the
resolution of the present case.

|||(Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 244-326)
[G.R. No. 148338. June 6, 2002.]
ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Ramel A. Aguinaldo for petitioner.
Solicitor General for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon
Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting of 772,329 square meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite. On the day he
filed his application, petitioner submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891.
Sometime thereafter, the clerk of court transmitted to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of
petitioner's application, the original tracing cloth plan, and other documents submitted by petitioner in support of his
application. After trial and submission of evidence, the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite rendered its decision granting
the application of petitioner. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its decision reversing the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied. EAHcCT

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the application of petitioner. The submission in
evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original
registration of land, is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and
to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure to
comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application. The Court further ruled that petitioner failed to establish
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had met the legal requirements as to the nature and length of possession leading
to a registrable title over the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted the bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact
would hardly suffice to prove possession as it would constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. The
Court stressed that possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the
State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LANDS; SUBMISSION OF ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN
IS A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF MANDATORY CHARACTER. The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory
requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel
of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to
petitioner's application for registration. Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth
plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty
bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. The Court of Appeals
appropriately quoted from our decision in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, in which it was similarly
claimed that applicant failed to present the tracing cloth plan of the land applied for because it had been forwarded to
the Land Registration Authority. Rejecting the contention, this Court, through Justice Nocon, held: . . . It is undisputed that
the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by respondent, which omission is fatal
to his application. The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. . .
. Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to petitioner's application and marked in evidence, suffice to
comply with the requirement of the law. Although in one case it was ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan,
together with the lot's technical description, was sufficient to identify the land applied for registration, both the blueprint
copy and the technical description were certified as to their correctness by the Director of Lands. In this case, what was
marked in evidence, the advance survey plan and the technical description, lacked the necessary certification from the
Bureau of Lands.

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2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AS TO THE NATURE AND LENGTH OF THE POSSESSION LEADING TO A REGISTERABLE
TITLE OVER LAND; MERE CASUAL CULTIVATION OF SOME PORTIONS OF THE LAND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE POSSESSION
UNDER A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had met the
legal requirements as to the nature and length of possession leading to a registrable title over the land. Petitioner claims
that he and his family cultivated the subject land, without the help of tenants, in order to plant bamboo and mango trees
thereon. His witness also testified that the land was for a time planted with coconut trees andpalay. However, from the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appears that petitioner is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon,
Cavite, has actually been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from childhood until the present. Moreover, it appears
that the land was only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much tending to. There is also doubt as to how
many mango trees, if any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from these trees, since there was no
testimony to that effect and the tax declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements found on the land were
only bamboo trees. Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on the land some coconut trees, but these
were no longer there at the time of his testimony. He also testified that the land was planted with palay, but not by
petitioner or his predecessors or his family but by kaingeros, including himself, who only asked permission from petitioner
to use the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted the bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact would hardly suffice
to prove possession as it would constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. A mere casual cultivation
of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is
not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however
long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years. DEcITS

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP BUT ARE MERE INDICIA
OF A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. It is noteworthy that
the land subject of the application was declared for taxation purposes only on September 8, 1997 and the taxes due
thereon covered only a period of 10 years beginning 1988 and was paid only on September 9, 1997, or a little more than
a month prior to the filing of the application. There is no other tax declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership. TcHCDI

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY STILL UNCLASSIFIED AT THE TIME PETITIONER AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ALLEGEDLY
BEGAN POSSESSION OF THE LAND. It is also noteworthy that the certification submitted by petitioner shows that the
land became alienable and disposable only on certain dates. Thus, one portion of the land was certified on November
12, 1971, while the remaining portion was certified on June 21, 1983. As petitioner's application was filed only on October
13, 1997, almost 26 years from the time one portion was certified as alienable and disposable and 14 years from the time
the remaining portion was certified, the property was still unclassified at the time petitioner and his predecessors-in-
interest allegedly began their possession of the same. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: A person
cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards the eventual
confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NO BASIS REOPENING OF THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE. For evidence to be admitted under Rule 53, 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same must comply
with the following requisites: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. In the present
case, the original tracing cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already available
upon the filing of the application for registration. Although it could not be produced during the trial because it was still in
the custody of the LRA at that time, it was petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing the same that
accounts for its non-presentation in evidence. With regard to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, it is apparent that the
prayer to allow its presentation is a mere afterthought because it was never offered in evidence during the trial and
petitioner had already turned over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission to the LRA.

103
Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original
tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not now as he belatedly offers it on appeal.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XV, Naic, Cavite and denying the application of petitioner Angel del Rosario for registration of title over
a large tract of land in Maragondon, Cavite.
On October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application 3 for registration of a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad-
457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting of 772,329 square meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon,
Cavite. In his application, petitioner stated that he is a Filipino, married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion,
Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his family.
Petitioner further alleged that there was no mortgage or encumbrance on the land; that the same was not bound by any
public or private road or by any river or creek; and that there was no person having any interest therein, legal or equitable,
or having possession thereof other than himself. Petitioner indicated the owners/claimants/occupants of the adjoining
properties [(a) the Municipal Engineer (northern boundary), Ternate, Cavite; (b) Juan Angeles (or his heirs/successors; for
Lot 1890), Brgy. Sapang, Ternate, Cavite; (c) Madiano Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; for Lots 1286 & 1291), Brgy.
Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (d) Agripino Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1290), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon,
Cavite; (e) Lucas Arcival (or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1482), Maragondon, Cavite; (f) Danilo Sisayan (for Lot 1287), Brgy.
Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; and (g) the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the Republic of the
Philippines (Lot 1692), Plaza Cervantes, Binondo, Manila], and annexed to his application the following documents: (a) an
advance survey plan of the land applied for with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601; 4 (b) Technical
Description of Lot No. 1891; 5 (c) Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes,
attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; 6 (d) Certification, dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable
and disposable; 7 (e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the property is not covered by any public land application
or patent; 8 (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the parcel of land; 9 and (g) Official Receipt No.
1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997. 10
On the same day he filed his application, petitioner also submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell M. Resus,
the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891. 11 On October 15, 1997, the clerk of court transmitted to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner's application for registration of title of Lot No. 1891, the
original tracing cloth plan, and the other documents submitted by petitioner in support of his application. 12
During the initial hearing on February 24, 1998, no oppositor appeared except for the provincial prosecutor of
Maragondon, Cavite, who appeared on behalf of the Solicitor General in representation of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Bureau of Lands. Accordingly, the trial court issued an order of general default against the whole world, with
the exception of the Bureau of Lands, after which petitioner submitted documentary evidence to establish the
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, the case was referred to a trial commissioner for the reception of further evidence. 13
Aside from himself, petitioner presented Raymundo Telia before the trial commissioner to prove his claim of ownership
and title over the parcel of land applied for registration. Both of them were subjected to cross-examination by the
provincial prosecutor.
In his testimony, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his application and identified the annexed documents. He claimed
he and his family planted in the subject lot mango and bamboo trees and raised animals on it. Petitioner testified that he
inherited the land from his grandfather, who caused the survey of the said lot to be made in his name as the original
claimant. He said that he possessed the subject property from 1984, the time the cadastral survey was made thereon, but
also claimed that the first survey on the land was made in 1930. Petitioner also stated that his predecessors-in-interest
started cultivating the property in 1940, planting kakawati trees along its boundaries. He claimed that he and his family
alone were the ones who gathered the fruits and forest products of the land and that no one had ever disturbed his
possession over the lot or questioned his ownership of the same. 14
To corroborate petitioner's testimony, Raymundo Telia, then 59 years old, testified that he personally knew the real
property subject of the application since he went there with petitioner, whom he recognized as the owner of the lot. Telia
stated that when he was still young, the property was already planted with kakawati trees along its boundaries. According
104
to him, when he came of age, he already knew that petitioner owned the property and that anybody who needed to get
bamboo, gather firewood, or do kaingin farming could do so only upon petitioner's permission. Furthermore, Telia stated
that he and his parents stayed in the property during the Japanese occupation and settled there until the 1950s with leave
from petitioner. Telia said he stayed on the land for about three years more engaging in kaingin farming. He further
claimed that, although he did not personally know Madiano Villanueva, Lucas Arcival, and Danilo Sisayan, who allegedly
were the owners of the adjoining lots, it was public knowledge that they were indeed such. 15
On August 25, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting the application of petitioner. The dispositive portion
thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of General Default hereby
decrees and adjudge[s] that certain parcel of land as herein above identified, described, and bounded, consisting
of 772,329 square meters, described as Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601
situated in Barangay Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite and its technical description, pursuant to the provisions
of Republic Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, in the name of the applicant, Angel del Rosario, Filipino,
married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
SO ORDERED. 16
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, putting in issue the failure of petitioner to submit in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891 and to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
and notorious possession of the land applied for registration for the period required by law. 17
On January 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision 18 reversing the decision of the trial court on the ground
that petitioner indeed failed to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for registration.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. 19
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
1. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION WAS UNJUSTIFIED.
2. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN REOPENED TO ADMIT THE ORIGINAL TRACING
CLOTH PLAN IN EVIDENCE, TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE SAME PROCEEDINGS ALREADY HAD IN THIS APPLICATION. 20
The petition is without merit.
First. Petitioner argues that the denial of his application because of his failure to submit in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of Lot No. 1891 was unjustified. He claims that he should not be faulted for such failure since he turned over
the same to the trial court on the day he filed his application, but it was submitted to the LRA by the branch clerk of court
and could not be produced during the trial.
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application
of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. 21 The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of
the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining
land. 22 The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the
latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan
from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. 23 The Court of Appeals appropriately quoted from our
decision in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 24 in which it was similarly claimed that applicant failed to
present the tracing cloth plan of the land applied for because it had been forwarded to the Land Registration Authority.
Rejecting the contention, this Court, through Justice Nocon, held:

It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by
respondent, which omission is fatal to his application. The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character.
Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that he submitted the original tracing cloth plan, together
with other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he filed the application. The application and supporting
documents were then elevated to the Land Registration Commission (now the National Land Titles and Deeds
105
Registration Administration) for approval of the survey plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent argues the
fact that the Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing would indicate that respondent
had submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his application.
This argument had already been disposed of in Director of Lands vs. Reyes [68 SCRA 177, 189 (1975)], wherein
this Court held
Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan by claiming that
the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or verified the survey plan and the
technical description thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no
authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there,
the applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done.
Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when the
same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the objection to said evidence.
We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. 25
Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to petitioner's application and marked in evidence, suffice to
comply with the requirement of the law. Although in one case 26 it was ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan,
together with the lot's technical description, was sufficient to identify the land applied for registration, both the blueprint
copy and the technical description were certified as to their correctness by the Director of Lands. In this case, what was
marked in evidence, the advance survey plan and the technical description, lacked the necessary certification from the
Bureau of Lands.
Second. Petitioner prays that the trial court proceedings be reopened in order for him to be able to present in evidence
either the original tracing cloth plan 27 or the "sepia copy" (Diazo Polyester Film) in lieu thereof 28 pursuant to
theNALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66 dated May 2, 1985. 29 Petitioner contends that the original tracing cloth plan or the
"sepia copy" thereof may be considered as newly discovered evidence which, when admitted in evidence, may alter the
result of the case.
The argument is without merit. For evidence to be admitted under Rule 53, 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
same must comply with the following requisites: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. 30 In
the present case, the original tracing cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already
available upon the filing of the application for registration. Although it could not be produced during the trial because it
was still in the custody of the LRA at that time, it was petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing the
same that accounts for its non-presentation in evidence. 31 With regard to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, it is apparent
that the prayer to allow its presentation is a mere afterthought because it was never offered in evidence during the trial
and petitioner had already turned over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission to the
LRA. 32 Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the
original tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not now as he belatedly offers it on appeal.
Third. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had met the legal requirements as to the
nature and length of possession leading to a registrable title over the land. Petitioner claims that he and his family
cultivated the subject land, without the help of tenants, in order to plant bamboo and mango trees thereon. His witness
also testified that the land was for a time planted with coconut trees and palay. However, from the testimonies of
petitioner and his witness, it appears that petitioner is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, has actually
been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from childhood until the present. Moreover, it appears that the land was
only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much tending to. There is also doubt as to how many mango trees,
if any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from these trees, since there was no testimony to that
effect and the tax declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements found on the land were only bamboo
trees. 33

106
Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on the land some coconut trees, but these were no longer
there at the time of his testimony. He also testified that the land was planted with palay, but not by petitioner or his
predecessors or his family but by kaingeros, including himself, who only asked permission from petitioner to use the land.
Assuming that petitioner had planted the bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact would hardly suffice to prove
possession as it would constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however
long the period thereof may have, extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years. 34
Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since the
1930s, his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. It is noteworthy that the land subject of the application
was declared for taxation purposes only on September 8, 1997 and the taxes due thereon covered only a period of 10
years beginning 1988 and was paid only on September 9, 1997, or a little more than a month prior to the filing of the
application. There is no other tax declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's predecessors-in-interest.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership. 35
It is also noteworthy that the certification submitted by petitioner shows that the land became alienable and disposable
only on certain dates
. . . the area shaded in orange color is within the Alienable or Disposable (sic), Project No. 15 of Maragondon,
Cavite per Lc Map No. 2720; cert. on November 12, 1971.
2. the remaining portion of the area is within the Alienable or Disposable (sic), Block-1, Project No. 15-A, of
Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No. 3091; cert. on June 21, 1983. 36
Thus, one portion of the land was certified on November 12, 1971, while the remaining portion was certified on June 21,
1983. As petitioner's application was filed only on October 13, 1997, almost 26 years from the time one portion was
certified as alienable and disposable and 14 years from the time the remaining portion was certified, the property was still
unclassified at the time petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest allegedly began their possession of the same. As held
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 37
A person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be
alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the 30-year open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept
of an owner, as required by C.A. No. 141, 48 (b), as amended, petitioner's application for original registration of Lot No.
1891 cannot be granted. 38
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the application of petitioner Angel del Rosario for original
registration of Lot No. 1891, Cadastral 457-D, Maragondon, Cavite, Ap-04-0011601, is AFFIRMED. AECIaD

SO ORDERED.
(Del Rosario v. Republic, G.R. No. 148338, [June 6, 2002], 432 PHIL 824-839)
|||

[G.R. No. 154953. June 26, 2008.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J :
p

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.AcISTE

The Antecedent Facts

107
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-
B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre.
The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial
Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, 4 and in
the 18 October 1999 issue of People's Journal Taliba, 5 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice
of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land. 6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices
concerned were notified of the initial hearing. 7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the
Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On
15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order 8 of General Default against the whole world except as against
petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave
Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition. 9 Carandang failed to file his written
opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order 10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated
the Order of General Default. CDISAc

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres),respondent's Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista),a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records
Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse,
open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering
the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another
piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated
to one of Antonio's children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and
its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which
possession converted the land to private property. cEaCAH

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates
and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated
in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square
meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application
for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general
in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to
corroborate Evangelista's testimony. IESDCH

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only
from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors.
On Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals
108
ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals
also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato's relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not
affect Evangelista's statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy's
death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became
public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness' testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he
had caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum: IATHaS

The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. 13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and SAHIaD

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the
public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State. 14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 15AHDacC

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas
City, 16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas
with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land
Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification 17 in the form of a memorandum
to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-
DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas
certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates
of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, 19dated 19 April
1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. 20 In this case, respondent applied for
registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO
certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990,
is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. AcISTE

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
109
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan; EcSCAD

2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects. ASIDTa

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed
to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications
are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
and disposable. DSATCI

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19 (a),when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy . . . . The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication 21 of
the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. cASTED

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer", such as entries made by the Civil Registrar 22 in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. 23 The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records
of public documents. 24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative
value. 25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. 26 Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents

110
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. EHIcaT

The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute
proof of the facts stated therein. 27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's representative, identified the
certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications.
As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value. 28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres
was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications. 29 Torres did not prepare the certifications,
he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within
the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR
Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification
Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the
precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein . . . and does not in any way certify the nature
and classification of the land involved." 30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan
that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's
classification. 31 However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the
dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of
the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's
certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in
the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan
was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent. DAcaIE

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner
alleges that Evangelista's statement that the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-interest was open, public,
continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of
possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land
openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked
on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy's land. The Court of
Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of Kabesang Puroy's possession of the land stemmed
"not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors." 32The Court of
Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that
people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news
or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire,
thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them. 33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the
exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community.
He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista's testimony is contrary to the
factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of
Antonio's children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony. EHcaDT

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration.
However, in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent's
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot
consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent's

111
acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land
was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. 34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why
the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the
land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed
ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in
this case.cHDEaC

We agree with petitioner.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. aCSHDI

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain.
Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land.
The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 36 The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease....
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size
of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed
the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a
corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in
the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead
of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller
and smaller plots from one generation to the next. ISCaTE

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring
more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals
who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations
to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow
him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of
the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

112
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area
of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the
provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in
the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would
seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban. 37
In Director of Lands v. IAC, 38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
(Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from
members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when
the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court
ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a
registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding
1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares. 39 HAISEa

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the
period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period,ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is
of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than
the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "...shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ...." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete.
. . . [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.Following
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property
at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. .... 40 (Emphasis supplied) HTCIcE

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land ...was already private property at
the time it was acquired ...by Acme". In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who,
along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land
was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the
corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title
to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30
years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been
converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when
the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners
or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against
corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973
113
Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private
property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation
cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such
acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the
public domain. EASCDH

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of
Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 42 (R.A. 9176) further amended the Public Land Act 43 and extended the period for the filing
of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods
of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as having been
filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. HacADE

Under R.A. 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and
disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for
registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess
area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio.In applying for land registration, a private corporation
cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that
the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by
operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land
when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16
December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635.
We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.HcSCED

(Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, [June 26, 2008], 578 PHIL 441-464)
|||

[G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005.]

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE
OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF
SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA
AYING, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 7, 2000 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City,
Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 2930-L; and the Resolution dated August 2, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta
Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930,
the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-on's eight children,

114
namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate
of title was, however, lost during the war.
Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale dated March 3, 1964, conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Said
deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing
registration for unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had been religiously paying real property taxes on said
property.
In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title as the original title over the subject
property had been lost during the war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the abovementioned Aying siblings. Thus, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2856 was issued.
In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to
persons occupying the property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City. DIETHS

On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. The case eventually reached this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 128102, entitled Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, Luis Aying, Demetrio Sida,
Felomino Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo Augusto. 2 On March 7, 2000, a Decision was promulgated in favor of herein
petitioner, declaring it as the rightful possessor of the parcel of land in question.
Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of the eight Aying siblings, all in all
numbering around 220 persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale,
recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint was dismissed twice
without prejudice. Said complaint was re-filed on August 19, 1993, docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
In their amended complaint, herein respondents (plaintiffs before the RTC) alleged that: they are co-owners of subject
property, being descendants of the registered owners thereof under OCT No. RO-2856; they had been in actual, peaceful,
physical, open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of owner of subject parcel of land since time
immemorial; their possession was disturbed only in the last quarter of 1991 when some of them received notices to vacate
from petitioner and several weeks thereafter, earthmoving equipment entered the disputed land, bulldozing the same
and destroying plants, trees and concrete monuments ("mohon"); respondents discovered that such activities were being
undertaken by petitioner together with Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.; petitioner claimed to be the owner of
subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale executed in petitioner's
favor by the alleged heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on; the aforementioned extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of
absolute sale is a fraud and is null and void ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject property affixed their
signature on said document and some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time
of the execution thereof; petitioner entered subject land in bad faith, knowing fully well that it did not have any right to
the land and used force, threat and intimidation against respondents; and they suffered moral damages. 3
Petitioner (defendant before the RTC) filed its Answer, denying that respondents are the lawful owners of subject parcel
of land by virtue of their being descendants or heirs of the registered owners of subject property. Instead, petitioner
alleged that it had been in actual possession of subject land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of
real property and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been paying taxes thereon religiously; that
it tolerated about 6 persons to live on said land but said persons were eventually ejected by court order. Petitioner then
raised the affirmative defenses of failure to state cause of action and prescription, as it took respondents 27 years, 10
months and 27 days to file the action to recover subject property, when an action to recover property based on an implied
trust should be instituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. 4
In the Pre-Trial Order dated January 30, 1995 of the RTC, the issues were narrowed down to the following:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the heirs of the registered owners of Lot No. 4399.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 4399.
3. Whether or not the defendant Aznar [herein petitioner] is estopped to make any claim on Lot No. 4399.
4. Whether or not the defendant Aznar is a builder in bad faith.
5. Whether or not the defendants are liable for damages and attorney's fees in favor of the plaintiffs.
6. Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and had, in effect,
validly conveyed to defendant Aznar Lot No. 4399.
115
7. Whether or not the plaintiffs' action has prescribed. 5
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated July 4, 1997, ruling that respondents' evidence failed to prove that the extra-
judicial partition with deed of absolute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and concluded that said document
is valid, thus, effectively conveying to petitioner the property in question. It further held that respondents' action had
prescribed in that the action is considered as one for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, it prescribed
in 10 years from the registration of the deed on March 6, 1964; and if the action is considered as one for annulment of
contract on the ground of fraud, it should have been filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. The trial court also
ruled that respondents failed to present any admissible proof of filiation, hence, they were not able to prove that they are
indeed heirs of the eight Aying siblings who appear as the registered owners under OCT No. RO-2856. TaDSHC

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the amended complaint on the ground of prescription,
and declaring the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964 as valid
and binding, adjudging that Lot 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Mactan, Lapu-
Lapu City had been validly conveyed to and in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty Company, and directing the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to register the above-mentioned deed in accordance with law and to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2856, and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of Aznar Brothers Realty
Company upon payment of the necessary registration fees pursuant thereto.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in this case is hereby ordered dissolved.
The Motion for Contempt filed by the plaintiffs against defendants is dismissed for want of factual and legal
basis.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Herein respondents appealed the foregoing decision to the CA and on March 7, 2000, said court promulgated its Decision,
the dispositive portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision while AFFIRMED is hereby MODIFIED. The heirs of
Emiliano Aying, Simeon Aying and Roberta Aying are hereby declared as the lawful owners of the contested
property but equivalent only to 3/8.
SO ORDERED.
In modifying the RTC judgment, the CA ratiocinated that "an action for recovery of possession of registered land never
prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44, Act No. 496 (now Sec. 47, PD 1520), to the effect that no title to registered
land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription." The CA further ruled that even if the
action is deemed to be based on implied trust, prescription did not begin to run since there is no evidence that positive
acts of repudiation were made known to the heirs who did not participate in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, striking down the RTC's ruling that the respondents' complaint is
dismissible on the ground of prescription, the CA held instead that herein respondents' action had not prescribed but
upheld the validity of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, except as to the shares of the
heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta, who did not participate in the execution of said document.

Herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was denied per Resolution dated August 2, 2000.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT AN HEIR OF THE ORIGINAL REGISTERED
OWNER MAY LOSE HIS RIGHT TO RECOVER A TITLED PROPERTY BY REASON OF LACHES;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT THE ACT OF REGISTRATION OF THE DEED
OF PARTITION WITH SALE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN UNEQUIVOCAL REPUDIATION OF THE TRUST GIVING RISE
TO PRESCRIPTION; SaICcT

III

116
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1104 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO
THE EFFECT THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FRAUD, THE PARTITION WITH PRETERITION OF ANY
COMPULSORY HEIR SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED. 7
In their Comment, respondents argue that this case is an action to declare as null and void the Extra-Judicial Partition of
Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, hence, under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action for declaration of an
inexistent contract does not prescribe. Respondents further posit that the principle of laches should be applied against
petitioner and not against them, as they (respondents) had been in actual possession of the subject property, while
petitioner merely brought action to eject them more than 29 years after the alleged execution of the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. They also refuted petitioner's arguments regarding the application of
the principles of implied and constructive trusts in this case.
At the outset, it should be stressed that not all the plaintiffs who filed the amended complaint before the trial court had
been impleaded as respondents in the present petition. The only parties impleaded are the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and
Roberta Aying, whom the CA adjudged as owners of a 3/8 portion of the land in dispute for not having participated in the
execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.
It is significant to note that herein petitioner does not question the CA conclusion that respondents are heirs of the
aforementioned three Aying siblings. Hence, the trial court and appellate court's findings that the Extra-Judicial Partition
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was not forged nor simulated and that the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta
Aying did not participate in the execution thereof, are now beyond cavil.
The issues raised by petitioner for the Court's resolution are (1) whether or not respondents' cause of action is
imprescriptible; and (2) if their right to bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the principle of laches apply.
Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that not all the co-owners of the land in question signed or executed the
document conveying ownership thereof to petitioner and made the conclusion that said document is null and void. We
agree with the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is
valid and binding only as to the heirs who participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and
Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate therein, cannot be bound by said document.
However, the facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all the
heirs have executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law applicable to this case
is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
In Vda. De Esconde vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court expounded thus:
Construing this provision of the Civil Code, in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated:
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust,
confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui
que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A constructive
trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust,
a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is
neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor
intends holding the property for the beneficiary. 9
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as follows:
. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction
as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or
constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines
the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise
from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On
the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
117
justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or
abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold. 10 (Emphasis supplied) DTAHSI

Based on such concept of constructive trusts, the Court ruled in said case that:
The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless
he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied
trusts, prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily,
repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. 11
The next question is, what is the applicable prescriptive period?
In Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 12 the Court expounded on the prescriptive period within which to bring an action for
reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust, to wit:
. . . under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law
(Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor
of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and
not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 13
It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does
not prescribe. 14
In the present case, respondents Wenceslao Sumalinog, an heir of Roberta Aying; Laurencio Aying, an heir of Emiliano
Aying; and Paulino Aying, an heir of Simeon Aying, all testified that they had never occupied or been in possession of the
land in dispute. 15 Hence, the prescriptive period of ten years would apply to herein respondents.
The question then arises as to the date from which the ten-year period should be reckoned, considering that the Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No.
496 (Land Registration Act), despite the fact the land in dispute was already titled under Act No. 496 in the names of the
Aying siblings at the time the subject document was executed.
In Spouses Abrigo vs. De Vera, 16 it was held that registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry, in order
to affect and bind the land and, thus, operate as constructive notice to the world. 17 Therein, the Court ruled:
. . . If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but
the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such
sale is not considered REGISTERED . . . 18
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No.
3344 and not under Act No. 496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year prescriptive period
cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The
prescriptive period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. IaAHCE

The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao
Sumalinog's (heir of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they already learned of the existence of
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale; 19 and Laurencio Aying's (heir of Emiliano Aying)
admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time ago and can only estimate that it must be
after martial law. 20 Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the children of Simeon
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Aying actually learned of the existence of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any other
evidence to prove the date when respondents were notified of the execution of the subject document.
In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the
existence of the document of sale, it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact.
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no
evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. 21 Moreover, one alleging a
fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the
burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed. 22 Thus, the defendant bears
the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff's claim or cause of action; he
being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which
that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor. 23
In the case at bar, it was petitioner, as the defendant before the RTC, which set up in its Answer the affirmative defense
of prescription. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the prescriptive period began
to run. Evidence as to the date when the ten-year prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying,
as Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of sale in the year 1967. As to the
heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document
conveying the subject land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying
and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the
admission in the amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when
petitioner sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive
period should be reckoned.
Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993. 24 Thus, with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta
Aying who had knowledge of the conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is already barred by prescription
when said amended complaint was filed as they only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent
heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action for reconveyance of property based on implied
or constructive trust well within the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they were sent by petitioner
a notice to vacate the subject property.
Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect
their interest well within the period accorded them by law.
With regard to petitioner's argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a partition made with
preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as
to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was
ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of
the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano
and Simeon Aying who, having brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance
of their share in the land in dispute.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
7, 2000 is MODIFIED, as follows: The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, having instituted the action for reconveyance within
the prescriptive period, are hereby DECLARED as the LAWFUL OWNERS of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856.caCTHI

(Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Aying, G.R. No. 144773, [May 16, 2005], 497 PHIL 788-805)
|||

[G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J :
p

This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining
order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-
going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of

119
Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP' for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No.
1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, . . . lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands." 1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay " 2 under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so
that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP . . . shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed
upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work
to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx xxx xxx
(iii) . . . CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all
of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP
as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three
(99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three
Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed
areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First
Neighborhood Unit." 3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA
"the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land
area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or
157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On April 28, 1995,
the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. 5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V.
Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. 6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced
the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997. 7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3)
the JVA itself is illegal.
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On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal
Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the
Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, 8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, 9 and the Government Corporate
Counsel. 10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees. 11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations
between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director
Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The
Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case
before the proper court." 12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner
prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts
that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, 13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25,
1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit
the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the
case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which
the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May
28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended
JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA 15 and AMARI 16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE
HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI
OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT
VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events.

121
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a new agreement."
The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new
agreement with AMARI.
"PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a
copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has
satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing
of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999.
Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and
approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to
moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal
basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits
the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed
violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the
effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5
hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more
compelling for the Court to resolve the issue too insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the
Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar, and the public. 17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could
claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141"
for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged
areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain
undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA
can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still
to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.Besides, the deadline for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987. 20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer
at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is
obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation
progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for
the reclamation project. 21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of
hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. 22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

122
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without
first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera 23 where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even if
the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential decrees.
PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil
Code 24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 25 to publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need
for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it
has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that
the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of
petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79 of
the Government Auditing Code, 26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was
under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA
make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure
because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding.
Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal
duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone, is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in the instant case is the
capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the
public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit.
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA
also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation
of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA
to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to
comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG, 28 the Court upheld
the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of
'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral
well-being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have
set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx xxx xxx

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In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in
interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the
laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case,
the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized
in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the
petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when
a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied
by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under
the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container
Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . .
in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records,
documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by
decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a
Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this
manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or, decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information
on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Italics supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These
twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative
and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times . . . accountable to the
people," 29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of
any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. 30

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 "An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG, 31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite
propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage.'"
Also AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the
transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or
treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract and already consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you." 32 (Italics supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government
officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government
agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate
public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information
the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract,
PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its
property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms
and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must
prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this
disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,
there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes
its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the
public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG, 33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and
its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public informations on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are
still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe
the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information." (Italics supplied)

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
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consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose
its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended.
Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional
right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in
formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing,
confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials.
The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations,
legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or
minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents
and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how
to conduct the inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation
of powers. 36 The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the
accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that
Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation
of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondence, or discussions during closed-door
Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions
of either house of Congress, 38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal
branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial Power. 39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government
and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order. 40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information
in several legislations. 41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed,
violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds
that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership
of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as the sovereign
ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he
disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King,
as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored

126
principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain." 43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950,
incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands
in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but
not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the
Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly
passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the
Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. 44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation,
provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public
service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense
of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public
service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but
employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private property,
to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must
declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate
the property to private parties. 45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore
lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all Government
or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the
Philippine Islands,shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice
to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.

Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and
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alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the
Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that such parts
of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and
business purposes, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such
regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Italics supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also
vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the
government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandate public bidding in the
lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to
private parties.
Act No. 1654, however did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private
parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by
private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act. 46 The salient provisions of
Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, . . .
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-
General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited
or classified. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions
of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
xxx xxx xxx.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties
by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are
open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under
the provisions of this Act." (Italics supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into . . . alienable or
disposable" 47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition
128
or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be classified" as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power
to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also
empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into government
reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The
Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were
"not necessary for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-
agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands
for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other non-
agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes
the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in
adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant."
(Italics supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only
natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became
inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government
could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell
under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although
subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because
of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935
Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the

129
public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the1935
Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess
of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of
one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by
homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares,
may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association." (Italics supplied)

Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for
sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature
continued the long established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day
the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or
disposable" 52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands
that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, 53 for the purpose of their
administration and disposition.
"Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare
what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited
and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. . . . ."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must first officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be
no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, are as
follows:"
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be
used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural,
and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not
otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
130
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person,
corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . .
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties
by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under
this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this
Act." (Italics supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting
the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are
intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only
the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59
(d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935
Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter
and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter
IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54 unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 55 Justice Reynato
S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the
government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the
foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of
reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by
the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing,
however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must have
been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to
be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land
remained property of the State."(Italics supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution,
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified
as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed
lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain
continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. 56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands
under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes that the government could sell to private parties.

131
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the
government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No.
141 declares that
"Sec. 60. . . . The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and
shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to
grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for
the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or
transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: . . . ."
(Italics supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section 56
of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from
the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not
just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise,
the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent
constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such
transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on
these lands. 57

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67
require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the
Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources)
for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by
public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, . . .
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. .
. . ." (Italics supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. 58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could
become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No.
141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code of
1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
xxx xxx xxx.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or
public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of government

132
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their
disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those properties of the State
which, without being for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth."Thus,
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed
to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant." (Italics supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in
the 1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If
the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land
of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of
the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development requirements
of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may be developed,
held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions
therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not
to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation
or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest
resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the Batasang
Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority." (Italics supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely
barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of
alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly
government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the
following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire
reclaimed land;

133
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands,
buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient, economical and
beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is
created, have the following powers and functions:
(a) To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume . .
..
xxx xxx xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the purposes
and objectives herein specified." (Italics supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas are
those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water
regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public
domain 63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no
longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply
to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as
it still applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands
of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title
to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be
legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA
No. 141, which states
"Sec. 60. . . . ; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; . . . ." (Italics supplied)

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987
Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. . . . .
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations
or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
134
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Italics supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations
to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law
governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is
still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the
public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners
probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
'No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973
Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been
very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was
indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo
was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court
said it would be in violation of this." (Italics supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi, 64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private
corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations
or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size
of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under
the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would
be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon
the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland.
This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than
the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired
the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide
his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-

135
growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paraaque and Las
Pias, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the configuration of the
reclaimed area." 65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about
250 hectares . . . ," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares . . . ." 66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation
project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands.
AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed.
AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is
defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's
share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended
JVA provides that
". . . , PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title
pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI,
shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the
name of AMARI, . . . ; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time
pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI,
until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled."
(Italics supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which
will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority,
rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states
that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and
Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and
exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development
Plan."

The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental
agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares
of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State.With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. . . . Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, . . . ." (Italics supplied)
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Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, In its Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
xxx xxx xxx.'" (Italics supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force 68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and
Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain." 69 The Legal Task Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of ownership and
disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly
convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3,
Art. XVII, 70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by
statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
"lands of the public domain, waters . . . and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such,
foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use. 71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified." 72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs.
Garcia, 73 the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the
Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to
another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 74 of the Civil Code, a property of public
dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on
the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]."
(Italics supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from
the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and
7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
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At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands
although subsequently there were partial erosion on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural
lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and
are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the islands
under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing
the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate." 75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Italics supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with "proper
permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of
the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the
reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private
person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land
which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public
lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable
before the government can alienate them. These land must not be reserved for public or quasi-public
purposes. 78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under water
and revested solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether
foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper
contract. (Italics supplied)

xxx xxx xxx."

PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could now
be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties
may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as
provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's implementing arm
to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for
reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or
disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.

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The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged
and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present
state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are,
under the Constitution, "waters . . . owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable.
Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which
under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into
public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to disposition
is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public
domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads,
tramways and other kinds of land transportation, . . . ; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary
sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is
empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the
highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus,
part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service
since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that
"[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon the recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; . . . ." Thus, underEO No.
525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No. 1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government
to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the entity "to undertake
the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests." 79 Since large
portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration
segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not
automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise,
reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domains would automatically become alienable once reclaimed
by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources
and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such
resources;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease
agreements and such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's
marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the
conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;

139
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve
as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies." 80 (Italics supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises "supervision and control over
alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of
all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake
reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides
whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 7 82 of CA No. 141. Once DENR
decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a
proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the
power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR
is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the
President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83 of CA No. 141and
other applicable laws. 84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall
be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that
reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: . . . ." 85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia, 86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that

"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized
by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
. . . ."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. The Court
declared that
"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence." (Italics supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the
reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Project between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other
contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership
and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That

140
the rights and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the
aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic of
the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares
of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute such
contacts or agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be
necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estates
Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis
of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title." (Italics
supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its
administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be
used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No.
525declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA
should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of
PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Italics
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charterfree
from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the legislative
authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations
since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including
government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor
or his assignees" (Italics supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands.
PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law
exempting PEA from holding a public auction. 88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by
authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an
acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and

141
manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public
auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does
not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is
required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it
shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable,
it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of the auditor
concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the
Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where
the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like period in at
least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails,
the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned
and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must
approve the selling price. 90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Codethrough
Circular No. 89-296 91 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only
through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that
the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom
Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one, however,
submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands
through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on December
10, 1991. 93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still
to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. 94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving
only 407.84 hectares, 95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the
signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the
intervening period.

Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations
or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, . . . ." EvenRepublic Act No. 6957
("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties,
recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any infrastructure
projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to
the provisions of this Act, the project proponent . . . may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue
of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage
of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: . . .
." (Italics supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
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Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land
reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects by
the Private Sector. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant of
a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the
constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local
Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only
be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the
reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares 96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of
the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA
transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the
"issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public
domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the
issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings
of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato, 97 where the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part
of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David, 98 where the Court declared
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all
the safeguards provided therein."
3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, 99 where the Court ruled
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land
remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is
registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued covering
the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore,
the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 101 where the Court stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the
Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient
for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the
registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated,
granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands."
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The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued to
private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that
upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited
involves the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to
Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National Government transferred the
12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center,
which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of
Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered
under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to
any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of
the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates,
being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the
land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any
of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by
itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer
of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No.
3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing
a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters;
the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Italics supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a
"statutory lien affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104 Alienable lands of
the public domain held by government entitles under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot
be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot
authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional
ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically
convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain
must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before
these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress
can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas
of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.

Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and
submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in
various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with national programs;

144
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to provide
for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall ensure a
coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government corporation to
undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests;
and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to reorganize the
national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects
shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any
national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the
PEA upon approval of the President.
xxx xxx xxx."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed
lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it
disposes of other alienable lands does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency
tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not
private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds
of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the
public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name
does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of
these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will
effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire .
. . any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands.
This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country creating the very evil that
the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional
development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares
of public lands. 105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and
the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically
become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under
the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No.
496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:

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Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the . . . Government of the Philippine
Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or
conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Italics
supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances
of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision
of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to
Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No.
141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain
that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed
of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered under the
Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48 Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the government is authorized
by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) . . .
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political subdivision or
of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Italics
supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the name
of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National
Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer
the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled
in the name of the municipality. 106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered
under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the
de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its own power of eminent domain become unquestionably
part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name
of the National government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85 Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or
taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the
judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or interest
expropriated, the number of certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or
interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is
taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city, municipality, or any
other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the
memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority
taking the land or interest therein." (Italics supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands
of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.

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AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be
reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture
with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction
works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint
venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of
title conveying AMARI's Land Share on the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations
"shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." the transfer of title and ownership to AMARI
clearly means that AMARI will "hold' the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a
"disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, 108 theGovernment
Auditing Code, 109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public
domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable
lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our
ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable
natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the conditional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to
private corporations, do so at their own risks.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows;
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then
can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares 110 of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares 111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI
will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. under Article 1409 112 of
the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men,"
are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. EcICDT

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the
Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

147
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and
VOID ab initio.HSIaAT

(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, [July 9, 2002], 433 PHIL 506-592)
|||

[G.R. No. L-54094. August 30, 1982.]

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAMON D. BAGATSING, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA,
(Presiding Judge, CFI, Rizal, Pasay City, Branch XXIX), and NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F PASCUAL, ANSELMO F.
PASCUAL, MAMERTO F PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL, CATALINA S. PASCUAL
and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, MAKATI BRANCH, respondents.
R.D. Bagatsing & Associates for petitioners.
Ramon S. Nieves for respondent.
Dennis E. Angeles and Oscar Herrera, Jr. for intervenor Greenfield Dev. Corp.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners filed this petition against the decision of the CFI of Pasay City, Branch XXIX granting the reconstitution of the
certificate of title, original land owner's duplicate copy in the name of Manuela Aquial supposedly covering Lots 2 and 4
of Survey Plan 11-4374 on the ground that the said decision suffers from jurisdictional infirmity fatal to the petition for
reconstitution since said petition-and the notice thereof lacked essential data mandatorily required by law (Secs. 12-13 R.
A. 26) and, that the said decision was invalidly issued without actual and personal notice having been served upon
possessors, actual occupants and adjoining owners of the property involved who are indispensable parties in interest and
without whom a valid judgment cannot be rendered. Aside from alleging ownership over the lands in question
subsequently sold to innocent purchasers in good faith and for valuable consideration as part of the Alabang Hills Village,
a subdivision which it owned, petitioners claimed that on the basis of the technical descriptions contained in their titles
and as appear in the alleged title sought to be reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels owned and registered in their
names. A temporary restraining order was issued to restrain respondents from enforcing the challenged decision and
specifically the Register of Deeds of Rizal from issuing a reconstituted title in their name.
Respondents, among others, aver that the petition is barred by laches due to the failure of petitioners to appeal from the
trial court's orders denying their belated intervention and motion for new trial; that the question for ownership over the
alleged overlappings cannot be sweepingly adjudicated in a certiorari proceeding or a reconstitution case; and that the
existence of their title is established by government documents.
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court noted that some essential data required in Sections
12 and 13, R. A. 26 have been omitted. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no adjoining
owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. Following the ruling in the
Bernal case, (L-45168, 93 SCRA 238) the Supreme Court ruled that "said defects have not invested the Court with authority
or jurisdiction to proceed with the ease because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute
which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
The Court likewise observed that the lots involved in the reconstitution case are covered by the same survey plan in the
Bernal case and they are contiguous. Thus the finding as to the non-veracity and falsity of the survey plan submitted in
support of reconstitution in the Bernal case is likewise warranted to reject the evidence presented by respondents in
support of their petition for reconstitution.
The argument that petitioners are guilty of laches is unavailing for here, there is no finality of any decision to speak of
since the decision under question is pronounced null and void far having been rendered without jurisdiction and the
judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective'' against the owners of the land covered thereby who were not joined as parties
in the proceedings.
The judgment ordering the Register of Deeds, Metro Manila, Makati, Branch IV to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170
and the plan and technical descriptions submitted, the alleged certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy in
the name of Manuela Aquial was annulled and set aside; the petition for reconstitution was ordered dismissed; the
temporary restraining order made permanent and a copy of the decision at bar was ordered to be furnished the Minister
of Justice for the institution of appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents and all others who have
assisted or conspired with them as may be warranted by the evidence of record.
SYLLABUS

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1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES; REQUIREMENTS OF; JURISDICTION
NOT CONFERRED ON THE COURT WHEN SAME NOT COMPLIED WITH; CASE AT BAR. Upon examination of the subject
petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data required in Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26,
have been omitted; the nature and description of the buildings or improvement, which do not belong to the owner of the
land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings, and improvements, and the names and addresses of
the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who
may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing, such that no adjoining
owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. Following the
pronouncement in the Bernal case, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction
to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction at prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceeding utterly null and void.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S INACTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LACHES WHEN QUESTIONED DECISION WAS RENDERED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION. Respondents cannot attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order of
the lower court denying their motion to intervene and motion for new trial for there is no laches nor finality of any decision
to speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LANDS COVERED BY DULY ISSUED SUBSISTING TITLES, NOT PROPER SUBJECT FOR A PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION FILED BY THIRD PARTIES. The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued
existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section
38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing tides (and as the Court
reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. Nos. L-32694 and L-33119, July 16, 1982, "in cases of
annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence
but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction
over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already
covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and
indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two
certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori; such proceedings for "reconstitution"
without actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Tides to the land are null and void. Applicants,
land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duty accountable therefor.
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J : p

On the authority of relevant and controlling pronouncements in the related case of "Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court
of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents; Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor;
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors," * the Court declares as null and void the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case
No. 9368 granting the reconstitution of the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela
Aquial supposedly covering Lots 2 and 4 of Survey Plan II-4374. As in the authoritative case above mentioned, the said
decision suffers from jurisdictional infirmity, fatal to the petition for reconstitution since said petition and the notice
thereof lacked essential data mandatorily required by the law, 1 and just as importantly, the decision was invalidly issued
without actual and personal notice having been served upon possessors, actual occupants and adjoining owners of the
property involved who are indispensable parties in interest and without whom a valid judgment cannot be rendered. LexLib

The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution alleges that the petitioners are
registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of Title 2 all issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal
covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that TCT Nos. 175223 to 175235 were the
subject of petition for Consolidation-Subdivision Plan PCS-5878, LRC Record No. 6137 after approval by the Bureau of
Lands and the Land Registration Commission on petition of Alabang Development Corporation with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII; that after hearing the Court issued an order dated April 19, 1969, by virtue of which the
Register of Deeds of Rizal issued among others sixty-seven (67) Transfer Certificates of Title 3 ; that said parcels of land
surrounded by a high perimeter wall on their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable
consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang Development Corporation, many
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of whom were already issued in turn the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor; and that these innocent
purchasers for value have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted possession of their
respective lands since 1969.

Petitioners further alleged that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein respondents as petitioners
therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy (allegedly lost or destroyed
over 30 years earlier in the last World War II) and issued allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in
the name of their predecessor-in-interest, deceased Manuela Aquial, covering two lots, 2 and 4, indicated in Plan II-4374,
situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal; that on the basis of the technical
descriptions contained in petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be reconstituted, the latter overlap
the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly registered in their names; that petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, actual, continuous, adverse, notorious possession since time immemorial of these parcels of
land and that they have been paying religiously the real estate taxes thereon up to the present time; that petitioners being
actual possessors and registered owners were not served with notice of the hearing of the petition for reconstitution in
violation of Republic Act 26 such that the court a quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the
reconstitution and that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As prayed for, the Court issued on June 27, 1980 a temporary restraining order upon the filing of the petition and
restrained the respondents from enforcing the challenged decision, and specifically the Register of Deeds of Rizal from
issuing a reconstituted title based on Decree No. 15170 in the name of the respondents-members of the Aquial-Pascual
family.
Respondents on the other hand alleged that the petitioners filed in the court below a belated intervention and motion for
new trial which were denied by respondent judge, and since neither appealed therefrom nor did they question such
denials by way of certiorari, the petition is barred by laches; that the petition is not accompanied by copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto as required by Rule 65, section 1 and 2, Rules of Court; that certiorari being
a remedy against jurisdictional infirmity, the absence of any allegation of ultimate facts tending to show such infirmity is
fatal to the petition; that there is no allegation that private respondents knew of such alleged facts and the addresses of
petitioners' vendees and/or that they have better rights than the alleged boundary owners who were notified, that
petitioner Alabang Development Corporation is an intangible juridical person incapable of physical possession of the
property and petitioner Bagatsing who is publicly known to be residing in Manila is not in physical possession or occupation
of any property adjacent to the property in question; that the question of boundary owners not having been notified is a
factual question not determinable a priori but in a proper action for ownership of any overlapping; that if there is any
"sensible question" (sic) raised in the petition, the same is ownership over the alleged overlappings which cannot be
sweepingly adjudicated in a certiorari proceeding or a reconstitution case "especially if a good issue is on the validity of
petitioners' titles;" "that non-joinder of some alleged owners would render ineffective any judgment petitioners may get
in these proceedings;" that the existence of respondents' title is indubitably established with the existence of the
corresponding decree in the Land Registration Commission which was examined and found authentic and genuine by NBI
and PC handwriting experts, approved plans reproduced from the microfilm (the plans dub approved by the Director of
Lands on July 25, 1911), survey plan, and relocation and verification plans in the Bureau of Lands all government
document; and that private respondents have been in continuous possession of the land and have been up to date in the
payment of land taxes thereof.
After both parties had submitted their respective memoranda, Greenfield Development Corporation moved to intervene
in the proceedings stating, in brief, that upon comparison of the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 43 hectares designated as Lots 2 and 4 of Plan II-4374, as set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No.
15170, Land Registration Case 9368, relied upon by respondents in their petition for reconstitution, with those technical
descriptions set forth in the certificates of title in the name of said intervenor 4 , it appears that the lots supposedly
covered by the title sought to be reconstituted overlap and include a substantial portion of intervenor's land covered by
its titles. As in the Bernal case, supra, 5 the Court is called upon to allow such intervention of an indispensable party "in
view of the higher and greater interest of the public and in order to administer justice consistent with a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of the respective claims of the parties and their numerous successors-in-interest," in view of
the overlapping titles that respondent judge would authorize in his questioned decision in derogation of the underlying
indefeasibility and stability of the Torrens System of registration. As the Court therein stressed, "the sprawling area of the
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property in question where various subdivisions, residential houses and homes and infrastructures have mushroomed and
the great number of people living or having proprietary rights and interests in such a vast property would certainly bring
about the swamping of the courts and the clogging of their dockets with cases involving not only the original parties and
the movants but also their successors-in-interest. This litigation will have no end, which this Court will not allow nor
tolerate." 6
Unlike in the Bernal case, however, the Director of Lands need not be directed to conduct anew a relocation-verification
survey of the properties involved in this case, as the petition before us is simply a special civil action attacking the
jurisdiction of the lower court, and not a petition for review where the court would need to delve deep into the issues on
the merits. But even if the Court found some need to do so, the land involved insofar as herein petitioners and intervenor
are concerned refers to one and same area involved in the Bernal case, and the report of the Bureau of Lands in that sister
case would suffice to enlighten us on the question of surrounding improvements, boundaries and overlappings.
The basic issue in the case at bar is the jurisdiction of the lower court to act upon the petition for reconstitution.
Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens
Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed," read
"Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(e), and/or
3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following:
(a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or
destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings
or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the
owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any
interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a
statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or,
if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same; Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified
copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
"Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal
building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things,
the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having
any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."

Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data required in section
12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or improvements,
which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of
the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in
the Notice of Hearing. 7 such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered
151
mail or otherwise. On these glaringly conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its pronouncement in the Bernal case, to
wit.
"And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the same data do not also appear in the
Notice of Hearing of the petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which
enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require
the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute
non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court
with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction
as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings
utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and
show cause if any they have why said petition should not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must be
interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the
trial court granting the motion to amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and
posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We
pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for
publication and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court. (Emphasis supplied).
"The rule on notification to the possessor or one having interest in the property whose title is sought to be
reconstituted is laid down explicitly in Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June 22,
1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
'Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and
technical descriptions of the lots involved, which sources may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic
Act No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in the property should be sent a
copy of the notice of the petition at the expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.
'If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the
property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
'Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not sufficient but such notice must be actually
sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution.'
"The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya et al., supra, is
rightly so because one who seeks the reconstitution of his title to the property is duty-bound to know who are
the occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property involved, specially where the
property is so vast and situated in a suitable residential and commercial location, where buildings and
improvements have been or are being constructed openly and publicly. As stated earlier, indispensable parties
have appeared, claiming ownership, possession, and valuable interests in the property, which are not only
numerous but also patently conspicuous that private respondent cannot feign ignorance, much less
unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence of her or within her claimed property." (Emphasis supplied)
After passing upon the jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot just let go unmentioned its observation that the lots 8 involved
in this reconstitution case are part of the survey plan (Plan II-4373) allegedly covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are involved
in the Bernal case. In other words, these lots are covered by the same survey plan and they are contiguous. As a matter
of fact, "Annex 6-A" 9 of respondents' memorandum which they claim to be a survey plan for their mother Manuela Aquial
is actually entitled "Plan of Property of Olimpia D. Sta. Maria." Olimpia Sta. Maria is supposed to be the predecessor-in-
interest of petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the petitioner in the Bernal reconstitution case involving Lots 1
and 3. Also, in each of the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 embodied in the petition for reconstitution
filed by Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal 10 , Manuela Aquial consistently appears to be an adjoining owner. This
remarkable coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the Court's findings as to the non-veracity and falsity of the
survey plan II-4374 submitted in support of reconstitution in the Bernal case.
It is to be remembered that per resolution of this Court dated September 25, 1979 in the Bernal case, the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands was directed to conduct a relocation survey of the property involved therein.
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Pursuant to such directive, a "Final Report" on the matter was submitted by Amante R. Dumag, Officer-in-Charge, National
Capital Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands, based upon a memorandum addressed to him by the Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plan and Standards of said Bureau. Excerpts from both the report and the memorandum as reproduced in the
decision in the Bernal case are hereunder quoted.
I. From the Final Report:
"3. That while making a research on the survey data of the lands involved in this case the surveyors of the Bureau
of Lands found out that the properties claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
consisting of lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, does not have an original copy of a plan in the Records Division of the
Bureau of Lands. Attached with this Report is a certified photocopy of a letter dated January 30, 1978 marked
as Annex 'A' to form an integral part of this Report sent by the Staff Supervisor for Technical Plan and Standards,
Bureau of Lands, Manila, addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Region IV, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila,
informing the latter of the non-existence of the original copy of plan II-4374. However, he further informed that
there exists a microfilm copy of plan 11-4374 with Accession No. 385637, but he expressed his doubts as to its
source and authenticity, and gave his reasons for his apprehension in his aforementioned letter dated January
30, 1978 to the Officer-in-Charge of Region IV, Metro Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
"6. That it was ascertained during the verification survey that the lands known as Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374
claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal does not actually exist on the ground;
"7. That the properties claimed by private respondent Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting of Lots 1 and 3, plan
II-4374, were platted on the plan Vs-04-000153 using the xerox copies of uncertified technical descriptions
furnished by the Office of the Solicitor General;
"8. That as directed by this Honorable Court, the location of industries, factories, warehouses, plants and other
commercial infrastructures, residential buildings, public or private roads and other landmarks found inside the
areas concerned are properly indicated on the white print copies of plan Vs-04-000153 (Annex 'D')."
II. From the Memorandum:
"1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world war and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged.
Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section records were recently turned over
to the Records Division. A perusal of the folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17,
1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the Records Division certified that his division (Survey Records
Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).
"2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired
surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record
was submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns
out to be Plan 11-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of the Municipality of Liloan,
Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
"3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo Almazan, then Chief of
Reconstruction Section upon request of the interested party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-
4374. (This document was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution of title [pp. 1 and 2
of folio]). As to how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of
the original copy of the plan is not known. This not our standard operating procedure since we always issue
technical descriptions based on available approved survey records.
"4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section,
certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the
survey number II-4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war not microfilmed is a mystery.
Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the locator card indeed confounds us. We are not now
privy to the testimonies made in Court regarding this microfilm.
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"5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For this reason, we caused the preparation
of an enlargement of said microfilm for further examination and evaluation.
"6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following significant discrepancies and
deviations from similar survey plans on record . . .
"7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm enlargement of the frame that purports to be
that of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and
does not and has never represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau."
(Emphasis supplied)
As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the above final report on the relocation-verification survey of the
regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and admitted it as evidence of the falsity of the survey plan in question, there is no
reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis for reaching the conclusion that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by
the same Survey Plan II-4374 are purely imaginary and "do not actually exist on the ground."
There are a number of other observations in the Bernal case that would warrant rejection of the totality of the evidence
presented by respondents in support of their petition for reconstitution 11 but a discussion thereon would be superfluous
since the weight of all such other evidence is anchored upon the veracity or falsity of Survey Plan II-4374 as determined
by the office of the Bureau of Lands commissioned by the Court for that purpose, and also considering, as stated earlier,
that this is a special civil action wherein a ruling on jurisdiction is sufficient to adjudicate the matter in controversy.
cdphil

The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order of the lower court denying
their motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence allowing the said order/decision to become final. There is no
laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in their comment, the
judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of lands covered thereby who were not joined as parties in
the proceeding. As the Court ruled in the Bernal case on the matter of intervention 12 "a valid judgment cannot even be
rendered where there is want of indispensable parties" such as petitioners who hold subsisting Torrens Titles to the
properties in question and "this aspect of the case commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold
their interests based upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of late intervention." Petitioners have
precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy of the present special civil action of certiorari and prohibition
to annul and set aside for want of jurisdiction the decision and all proceedings of respondent judge.
If there is any laches at all to speak about, it is the respondents who should be held culpable thereof. For they appear to
have slept on their supposed rights to the property claimed by them. It is of record that the petition for reconstitution was
prepared and filed in September 1977, more than thirty years after the alleged loss or destruction of the alleged certificate
of title in the last World War II. During this long span of time, herein respondents never protested the development and
building of residential subdivisions as well as factories, roads and infrastructures in the area which unexplained inaction
taken together with the falsity of their basic survey plan, supra, impress upon their petition a most dubious character to
say the least.
To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion in the Bernal Case, "The first lesson to be drawn here is
that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates
of title, particularly where the petitions are filed, as in this case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged
loss. Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure that indispensable parties, i.e. the actual owners and possessors of
the lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition (not by mere general publication),
particularly where the lands involved constitute prime developed commercial land including a part of the South
Superhighway. The stability and indefeasibility of the Torrens System would have been greatly imperiled had the appellate
court's judgment granting reconstitution prevailed, resulting in two holders of Torrens certificates over the same lands.
We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and hasty
grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been
victimized only to find that the 'lands' purchased by them were covered by forged or fake titles or their areas simply
'expanded' through 'table surveys' with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials." (Emphasis copied).
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot

154
be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing
by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs.
Court of Appeals, 13 "in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by
a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The
courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very
concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema
the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. Afortiori, such proceedings for
"reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and
void. Applicants, land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly
accountable therefor. prcd

WHEREFORE, the subject judgment of the lower court ordering the register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV
to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical descriptions submitted, the alleged certificate of title,
original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, is hereby annulled and set aside, and the petition for
reconstitution is ordered dismissed.
The temporary restraining order of June 27, 1980 issued against respondents is hereby made and declared permanent.
With costs jointly and severally against private respondents.
The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish the Honorable Minister of Justice a copy of the decision at bar (as
well as a copy, for ready reference, of the decision of January 27, 1981 in the related Bernal case, G.R. No. L-45168,
previously ordered furnished to him) for the institution of appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents
and all others who have assisted or conspired with them as may be warranted by the evidence of record.
SO ORDERED.
|||(Alabang Development Corp. v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-54094, [August 30, 1982], 201 PHIL 727-745)
[G.R. No. 55771. November 15, 1982.]
TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F. PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F. PASCUAL,
PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL, and CATALINA S. PASCUAL, respondents.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner.
Ramo S. Nievo for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE; RECONSTITUTION OF LOST TITLE; NOTICE OF HEARING; PETITIONER
NOT NOTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing,
it is at once apparent that Tahanan has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner, occupant or possessor
of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state or
mention that Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a portion of said Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure is that
Tahanan was never notified of the petition for reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSTING REQUIREMENT IS MANDATORY UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
COMPLY; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the notice of hearing issued by the trial court directed that copies thereof
be posted only in the bulletin board of the CFI of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law (R.A No. 26) specifically requires
that the notice of the petition shall be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land is situated,
at the provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing. The failure or
omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person
having an interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or
omission to post copies of the notice of hearing on the main entrance of the municipality on which the land is situated, at
the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the
trial court as ruled in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438 and stressed in Alabang Development
Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; INTERVENTION; ALLOWED DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE, AS EXCEPTION TO THE RULE; CASE AT BAR. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA
238, the Supreme Court allowed the intervention of adjacent owners even during the pendency of the appeal in the
Supreme Court from the decision granting reconstitution in the paramount interest of justice and as an exception to

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Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court below and alleging
material and substantial interest in the property to which title is sought to be reconstituted in its Motion to Set Aside
Decision and Re-Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its adjoining transfer certificates
of title of its properties adjoining and even overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area,
the trial court ought to have admitted said motion. There was reversible error in refusing to do so.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERVENTION IN LOWER COURT IS MORE EXPEDIENT THAN IF FILED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
The holding of the respondent Court of Appeals that our resolution in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, allowing
intervention is not applicable to the case at bar because there was no motion to intervene filed before the Supreme Court
by Tahanan is without merit. Such holding fails to see that the intervention of Tahanan while the reconstitution was still
in the trial court below was more expedient for the trial court is in better and more suitable position to hear and decide
the question of encroachment and overlapping raised by Tahanan in its Motion to Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings and where the witnesses may be examined and cross-examined by the parties and the court, whereas the
Supreme Court is not trier of facts.
5. ID .; ID.; ID.; ID.; INFERIOR COURTS SHOULD NOT IGNORE OR CIRCUMVENT THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the end of the proceedings, there should and there ought
to be no quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to abide and
conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well-becoming sense of modesty and a respectful awareness of
its inferior position in the judicial hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the appellate court to the end that a well-
ordered and disciplined administration of justice may be preserved and maintained. We cannot allow, permit or tolerate
inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express rulings of this Court.
6. ID.; ID.; PARTIES TO ACTION; INDISPENSABLE PARTY; JOINDER OF PETITIONER INDISPENSABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering Tahanan as an indispensable party to the
proceedings, it having been shown positively that it has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in its absence, without injuring or affecting such interest. In Director of Lands vs. CA,supra,
and Alabang Development Corporation vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982, the Supreme
Court ruled that "The joinder must be ordered in order to prevent multiplicity of suits so that the whole matter in dispute
may be determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of
indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be
rendered where there is want of indispensable parties."
7. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE; INTEGRITY AND INVIOLABILITY MUST BE UPHELD BY COURTS; DUTY
TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES. Time and again, the integrity
and inviolability of Torrens titles issued pursuant to the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and Presidential Decree No.
1529 have been shaken by the very courts whose unwavering duty should be to protect the rights and interests of title
holders but instead have favored claimants under the guise of reconstitution filed after a long lapse of time after the
Japanese occupation, alleging the existence of original and duplicate certificates of title issued pursuant to a court decree
but have subsequently been lost or destroyed including the records of the land registration case on account of the war
and lay claim and title to valuable parcels of land previously titled and registered under the Torrens registration system
and are even able to dispose these properties to unsuspecting homelot buyers and speculating land developers. The courts
must be cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title, both original and duplicate
owner's, based on documents and decrees made to appear authentic from mere xerox copies and certifications of officials
supposedly signed with the seals of their office affixed thereon, considering the case and facility with which documents
are made to appear as official and authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and verify carefully all supporting
documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact, circumstance or incident which corroborates or relates to the
existence and loss of the title should be examined.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT THEREOF; NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF TORRENS TITLE
SOUGHT TO BE RECONSTITUTED IN CASE AT BAR. The claim of the Pascuals that their predecessor-in-interest, Manuela
Aquial, had an original certificate of title to Lots 2 and 4 of Plan II-4374 is extremely difficult to believe and sustain. There
are too many omissions and blanks, too many failures and unanswered questions that belie such a claim. Thus, it is at once
noted that the number of the certificate of title issued to and registered in the name of respondents' mother and
predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, is unknown. Nowhere in the voluminous records do the Pascuals cite, state, or

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mention the number of said certificate of title. Not even in the tax declaration of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh.
"S" and Tax Declaration No. 10187, Exh. "S-1") and Lot No. 4 (Tax Declaration No. 15424, Exh. "T" and Tax Declaration No.
10188, Exh. "T-1") is the number of the certificate of title indicated. And there is absolutely no document, private or
official, presented by the Pascuals mentioning the number of the certificate of title. There is also no proof as to when the
certificate of title was issued.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PROOF AS TO HOW RESPONDENTS ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION; CASE AT BAR. In the
instant petition at bar, We find no claim of Aquial nor her successors, the Pascuals, as to how they acquired title in fee
simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales patent, composicion con el estado, or informacion possesoria. The only
allegation of the basis of their ownership is paragraph 3 of the petition for reconstitution which alleges "That the
petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and still are in the actual,
public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as owners in fee simple since
time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO PRESENT ANY COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN CASE AT BAR RENDERS CLAIM TO TITLE
SUSPICIOUS. Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued Certificate of Title No. 724 pursuant to Decree No. 15170
Issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree number and the same land
registration case number, cannot present her owner's duplicate copy nor the original certificate which she claims were
lost or destroyed, including the records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the Notice of Hearing
therein was shown and exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette), We find and so hold that it is the Aquial certificate of
title that is suspicious, if not non-existent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate No. 724.

11. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE; PETITIONER'S TITLE MUST BE RESPECTED. The
Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous transfers therefrom to innocent purchasers for value must be
respected and protected in order to achieve the "real purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land . .
. and once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or
sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land." (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84; Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).
AQUINO, J., concurring:
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS TITLE; CASE AT BAR, A LANDGRABBING CASE; HOW IT IS PERPETRATED.
The case at bar is a landgrabbing case and it may be perpetrated by (1) actual and physical usurpation, (2) expanded
survey, (3) fake Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution of fake Torrens titles, registration decrees or judgments in land
registration cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR RELATED TO BERNAL CASE. The Bernal case (Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal and CA, L-45168, January 27, 1981, where the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for reconstitution) to which
the instant case is related involves the reconstitution) to which the instant case is related involves the reconstitution of a
fictitious Torrens title over parcels of land existing only on paper and which, when verified on the ground, covers land
already titled in the name of other persons.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BERNAL CASE RULING APPLIED IN BAGATSING AND ALABANG CASE; DECISION IN THE LATTER CASE
RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE CASE AT BAR. The Supreme Court in its decision of August 30, 1982, in G.R. No.
54094, entitled "Alabang Development Corporation, et al. vs. Judge Valenzuela, et al." using findings and rulings in
the Bernal case, reversed Judge Valenzuela's decision and dismissed the petition for reconstitution. Said decision rendered
the instant case moot and academic.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J : p

There are three cases recently decided by the Supreme Court that are directly related to and squarely identified with the
petition at bar, namely, (1) Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents, Greenfield Development
Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, No. L-45168,
September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238, (2) The Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria
Vda. de Bernal, respondents, Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370, and (3) Alabang Development Corp. and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982.

157
In the first case, Our Resolution admitted the intervention of the intervenors filed before the Supreme Court at the stage
of the proceedings where trial of the petition for judicial reconstitution had already been concluded, the judgment thereon
granting the reconstitution had been promulgated and on appeal by the losing party, the same was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and the petition for certiorari to review said judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme
Court. The second case is Our decision on the merits of the certiorari petition wherein We ruled, among others, that the
judgment of the lower court granting the petition for judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in the name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal covering two parcels of land located in
Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Rizal (now Barrio Cupang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal) denominated
as Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 based on a survey approved July 25, 1911 with an area of 717,523 square meters and
717,539 square meters, respectively, was null and void for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Republic
Act No. 26. We further held that TCT No. 42449 was fake and spurious.
In the third case, the Supreme Court directly ruled that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City,
Branch XXIX, in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P Land Registration Case No. 9368, Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding,
ordering the reconstitution from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical descriptions, the alleged certificate of title,
original and owner's duplicate copy over Lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, in the name of Manuela Aquial, was null and void.
The instant petition for review similarly assails the validity of the same judgment ordering the reconstitution of the
Certificate of Title, original and owner's duplicate copy, over the same lots, Lots 2 and 4, of the same plan, Plan II-4374, in
the name of the said Manuela Aquial, promulgated in the same Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No.
9368, Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding. The said case at bar was
brought by petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation while the third case was instituted by Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioners.
Whereas the third case categorically ruled and decided the questions of law raised therein, the proceedings being the
special civil action of certiorari attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, the petition at bar being a petition for review,
a more extended discussion of the issues on the merits is necessary and more appropriate. Thus, We start by noting that
herein petition for review seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated April 30, 1980 reversing
an earlier decision of the same Court dated November 16, 1979 in CA-G.R. No. SP-08680-R entitled "Tahanan Development
Corporation, petitioner, versus Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents," as well as the subsequent resolution dated
December 8, 1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation,
hereinafter referred to as TAHANAN, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge, further seeks
the setting aside of the decision rendered by the latter in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368,
dated October 5, 1978 in favor of herein private respondents Nicolas A. Pascual and his co-heirs, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV, is hereby
ordered to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit X, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the
Court the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single,
Filipino, with residence at 307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number
which will not conflict with other titles already issued upon payment of the prescribed fees. The Branch Clerk of
Court is directed to forward a certified copy of this decision and all documents necessary for the reconstitution."
(Rollo, p. 66).
The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondents hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals, claiming
as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of lost
certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, presided by respondent Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, alleging
that:
"xxx xxx xxx
2. That Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, while yet single and up to the time she got
married, was the registered owner of those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan II-4374, situated in
Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, and more particularly bounded as follows:

158
1). A parcel of land (Lot 2 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. No. _______), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality
of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now BO. CUPANG, Muntinlupa, Rizal) ( . . . containing an area of Three Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty-Two (375,622) Square Meters. Bounded on the NE., NW., and
W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 by Pedro L. Flores who is in occupation of the same and of which notice maybe
served at his office address at No. 959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila or at his residence at No. 707 A.
Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and on the SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by
Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B.
Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board at No. 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision,
Mandaluyong, Rizal;
2) A parcel of land (Lot 4 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. Record No.______), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio,
Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal) ( . . . containing an area of
Fifty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Five (56,295) Square Meters. Bounded on the NW., and SW., along lines
1-2-3 (portion of Lot I, Plan II-4374) and on the SE., NE., and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1 (Portion of Lot 3, Plan II-
4374), all by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private corporation existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of which notice may be served to it C/O
Constancio B. Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board, at No. 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills
Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal. The above lots are more particularly described in herein attached Decree No.
15170 issued on March 4, 1914 with the same boundaries and description contained in the corresponding
original certificate of title (original and owner's duplicate copy) issued therefor in Land Registration Case No.
9368 on file with the Land Registration Commission; that said lands have not been included in any cadastral
survey;

3. That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and
still are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described
lands as owners in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture;
4. That the said original certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copies, covering said lands have been
lost or destroyed in the last World War II and diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said
title was subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances of any
kind and nature up to the present; that the records of the land registration case of the same lots have likewise
been lost and destroyed except such records as hereinafter set forth;
5. That there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any land grant over said lands to any person or
entity; that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any lien holder's copy of said Original Certificate of Title
have ever been issued; that Manuela Aquial as well as her first and second husbands, Esteban Pascual and
Cornelio Mejia and petitioners herein have not at any time delivered the Owner's Duplicate copy of subject
certificate of title to any person or entity to secure the payment of or performance of any obligation whatsoever
nor any transaction entered into by them by which certain deed or other instruments related to or affecting the
subject lands presented for or pending registration in the office of the Register of Deeds for Makati, Metro
Manila;
6. That said Manuela Aquial died intestate in Cubao, Quezon City on January 26, 1967 leaving the
aforementioned estate to the herein petitioners as her heirs, without debts;
7. That for purposes of said inheritance, the petitioners desire in this petition to reconstitute the lost original
certificate of title, Original and Owner's duplicate copies, covering said Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 herein above
described, on the basis of: (1) Said Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1914 (Annex "A") and the certification
thereof by the Chief, Docket Division, Land Registration Commission (Annex "A-1"); (2) Survey Plan II-4374 from
microfilm Reel 560 under Accession No. 385657 on file with the Bureau of Lands (Annex "B"); and certification
thereof (Annex "B-1"), and the corresponding affidavit of the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands,
159
attesting to such fact (Annex "B-2"); (3) Certified Technical Description of Lots 2 and 4 under said Plan II-4374,
by the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands (Annexes "C" and "C-1"); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief,
Records Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record of any Sales Patent, Sales Certificates or any land grant
affecting or embracing the subject lands to any person (Annex "D"); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes "E", "E-1", "E-
2" and "E-3"); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes "F" and "F-1 "); (7) Affidavit of adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed
before Notary Public Atty. F.S. Guanco for Quezon City (Annex "G"); (8) White print copy of Relocation Plan
dated July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic Engineer Restituto L. Beltran who conducted said
relocation survey of Lots Nos. 7 and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the adjoining owners (Annex "H"). All of
which are xerox copies and made integral parts of this petition but the originals thereof shall be presented at
the hearing."
On October 5, 1977, the Notice of Hearing was issued by the Court and likewise, for its materiality in resolving the issue
of jurisdiction, We quote the material portions thereof below:
"NOTICE OF HEARING
A verified petition dated September 2, 1977 has been filed by petitioners, thru counsel, alleging, among others,
that:
(Paragraphs 1 to 7 are omitted, being the same allegations in the Petition for Reconstitution hereinbefore
quoted.)
Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that this petition will be heard before this Court, sitting on the 2nd floor,
New City Hall Building, F.B. Harrison, Pasay City, Metro Manila, on the 18th day of November, 1977, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning, at which date, time and place, all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show
cause, if any why said petition should not be granted.
Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official Gazette and in the Newspaper of general circulation in the
Greater Manila Area, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and likewise
posted in the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City.
Let the Office of the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands be furnished this Notice and copies
of the petition, together with its annexes.
WITNESS the HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, presiding Judge of this Court, this 5th day of October, 1977.
(SGD.) BASILIO B. BOLANTE
Branch Clerk of Court"
The above notice was published in the Official Gazette in the issues of November 14, 21 and 28, 1977 (Exhibits "A", "B",
"B-1", "C", "C-1", "D", "D-1" "E" and "E-1"). Copies of the same notice were also posted by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio de
Guzman of Pasay City in the Bulletin Board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of
Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City on October 5, 1977 (Exhibit "F"). On the same date, copies of the notice were served
to the Office of the Solicitor General and on November 9, 1977, to the Commissioner of Land Registration by Deputy
Sheriff De Guzman (Exhibit "F"), together with copies of the petition and its annexes. The proofs submitted of notice to
the adjacent owners indicated in the Petition and Notice of Hearing, namely, Pedro L. Flores with address at 959 C. Lerma
Street, Sampaloc, Manila and Constancio B. Maglana as President and Chairman of the Board of Maglana & Sons
Management Corporation with office and postal address at 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong,
Rizal, are their respective affidavits dated July 17, 1974 and August 6, 1974 (Exhibits "H" and "I").
The Director of Lands thru counsel, Atty. Daniel C. Florida, Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed on
April 14, 1978 an Opposition to the petition on the following grounds:
"1. That the same petitioners in this Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Nicolas A. Pascual, et al., claiming to be the
heirs of the late Manuel Aquial, had previously filed a similar petition for reconstitution of the alleged lost
original certificate of title supposed to have been issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 under Decree No.
15170 in the name of Manuela Aquial over the same parcels of land, Lots 2 and 4, Plant II-4374 situated at Bo.
San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, which previous petition, docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, appears to have been dismissed. Oppositor Director of Lands
hereby reserves his right to present later a certified copy of the order of dismissal, as he has not yet received a
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reply of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXVI, to our letter to him dated March 14,
1978, duplicate copy hereto attached as Annex "A", requesting for a certified copy of the order or decision
resolving said Reconstitution Case No. 77, which order or decision may be a dismissal with prejudice and may
thus be a bar to the filing of the instant Reconstitution Case No. 504-P based on the principle of res judicata;
2. That contrary to the claim of petitioners that the aforementioned Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo.
San Dionisio. Paraaque, Rizal were issued Decree No. 15170 on March 4, 1914 in the name of Manuela Aquial
in Land Registration Case No. 9368 and that the corresponding original certificate of title for said Decree were
registered and issued under the said Decree, the truth is that said Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case
No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eugenio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, covering a parcel of land with an area of 422 square meters situated at Bambang,
Pasig, Rizal, and not for Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 with a total area of 431,917 square meters situated at Bo. San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. These facts are evidenced by the letter dated February 28, 1978 of the Acting Register
of Deeds of Rizal, the letter dated March 9, 1978 of the same Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, and the Report
dated November 11, 1974 of the then Register of Deeds of Rizal submitted to him as required by the court in
the previous Reconstitution Case No. 77 filed with Branch XXXVI of this Honorable Court at Makati, Rizal, xerox
copies of said letters and report are hereto attached as ANNEX "B", ANNEX "C" and ANNEX "D", respectively;
3. That from the documents ANNEXES "B", "C" and "D", it is very clear that no original certificate of title had or
has been issued to Manuela Aquial covering Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374, situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal; that consequently, no original certificate of title in the name of Manuela Aquial has been lost; and that
therefore, this instant petition for reconstitution of an alleged lost original certificate of title has no basis in fact
and in law, there being no title to be reconstituted under Republic Act No. 26;
4. That the applicants for land registration in Land Registration Case No. 9368, Decree No. 15170, of the then
Court of Land Registration were Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, and not Manuela Aquial; and that the land subject thereof was a parcel of land
in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, and not a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal;
5. That the same Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368 issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, et al.
for a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal could not have been also issued in the name of Manuela Aquial for
a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal;

6. That the genuineness or authenticity of ANNEX "A" of the petition in this case which is alleged to be a copy
of Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial is very questionable on the following grounds and
points:
(a) ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy not of the original of Decree No. 15170 or of an authenticated copy thereof but
only of an unauthenticated true copy of said decree as indicated by the typewritten words 'A true copy:' at the
bottom of the left hand corner of page (2) of said document;
(b) The said typewritten words 'A true copy': is not signed or even initialed by any competent officer of the court
of the Land Registration Commission to give it authenticity;
(c) That ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy of the original of Decree No. 15170 of an authenticated copy thereof but only
of a true copy is also seen from the first line on top of the document on page 1 which reads: 'Copy of Decree
No. 15170.' An original of a Decree is issued without the words 'Copy of' prefixed before the Decree Number;
(d) ANNEX "A" being a mere xerox copy of an authenticated 'true copy,' it is very questionable why the true copy
which was reproduced by the xerox copy marked ANNEX "A" bears the written signature of the Clerk of Court,
Enrique Altavas by way of attestation of the decree. It is well known that a mere true copy of any document,
public or private, does not bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the document.
Only the original or duplicate of the document may bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or
issuing the document;.

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(e) In ANNEX "A-1" of the petition in the instant case, alleged to be a certification of Decree No. 15170, what
appears to have been certified by the Chief, Docket Division of the Land Registration Commission is that the
document (Decree No. 15170) 'is a true and correct reproduction of a true copy of Decree No. 15170.' Where is
the original or an authentic signed duplicate of Decree No. 15170?
(f) ANNEX "F", either the xerox copy of a true copy, or the true copy reproduced by the xerox copy, is an
UNAUTHENTICATED copy of the alleged decree, and therefore, it cannot be the valid basis for reconstitution
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26;
7. That contrary to the allegation in paragraph 3 of the petition, petitioners by themselves and thru their
predecessor-in-interest Manuela Aquial have not been in the actual, exclusive and continuous occupation of the
lands subject of their petitions since time immemorial, the truth of the matter being that their alleged
occupation is only of recent vintage, having declared the lots for taxation only in 1973, beginning with the year
1970 (ANNEXES "E", "E-1", "E-2", and "E-3"), and paid the taxes for 1970 to 1973 in lump sum on September 6,
1973 (ANNEXES "F" and "F-1");
8. That Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 have never been applied for and registered under the Land Registration
Law, Act No. 496, the same being lands of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and
are portions of the adjoining public land as indicated in Plan II-4374, subject to disposition only under the
pertinent and applicable provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;
9. That not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case have been established and therefore, this Honorable
Court has not acquired jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case under Republic Act No. 26, for the reason that
petitioners thru counsel have failed to serve notice of the petition in this case to the owners of the adjoining
properties. The affidavits of the alleged adjoining owners, Constancio B. Maglana and Pedro L. Flores submitted
by petitioners as Exhibits "H" and "I" respectively, and which were executed in 1974 before the petition in the
instant case was filed on November 15, 1977, cannot be validly admitted as substitute for service of notice of
the petition to the adjoining owners as required under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26; and
10. That the instant petition for reconstitution should be dismissed outright for lack of factual and legal basis,
the Decree No. 15170 involved by petitioners having been issued in favor of other persons named Eugenio
Tuason, et al. for a different parcel of land located in another barrio and municipality."
On November 18, 1977, the date scheduled for the hearing as indicated in the Notices, the Court re-set the hearing of the
case to February 27, 1978, it appearing that the Notice of Hearing had not been published in the Official Gazette as per
information relayed to the Court by the petitioners. Again, the hearing set on February 27, 1978 was re-scheduled to April
14, 1978 in view of the manifestation of the representative of the Bureau of Lands that they have not received copy of the
petition. Once more, the latter setting was cancelled and re-set to June 2, 1978 on the ground that the counsel for
petitioner informed the Court that they have just received the Opposition dated April 11, 1978 filed by Solicitor Daniel
Florida.
Meanwhile, the Pascuals filed their Reply to the Opposition alleging, among others, that they had filed a previous petition
docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal which was
voluntarily withdrawn by them on grounds stated by their counsel in his Motion to Withdraw without prejudice and
granted by the Court in its Order dated May 30, 1975; that the report of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal mentioning
that Decree No. 15170 appears in the name of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco in Original Certificate of Title No.
724 does not preclude the existence of Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land Registration Case
No. 9368 since, assuming the report of the Register of Pasig to be accurate, it could have been a clerical error or mistake
of the clerk in the office of the Register of Deeds in typing on the Original Certificate of Title No. 724 the same Decree No.
and the same Registration No. as that issued in favor of Manuela Aquial; and that there may be two decrees bearing the
same number but involving different parcels of land is nothing unusual or surprising, in the same manner that there may
be two or three certificates of titles bearing the same number but in the names of different owners covering properties in
different places and issued at different periods of time.
The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution in its decision dated October 5, 1978. The court said:
"The documents presented by the petitioners to establish the existence of the prerequisites to reconstitution
of the title in the name of their predecessor-in-interests were either admitted or not objected to by Atty. Rodolfo
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J. Flores in representation of the Director of Lands, except Exhibits O and P on Plan II-4374 on the alleged ground
that they were reproduced from a microfilm reel and not from available approved records, as well as Exhibits X,
X-1 and X-2 (Decree No. 15170), on the ground that they were mere xerox copies not of the original of the
Decree or an authenticated copy thereof.
Counsel for oppositor overlooks the realities that forced the petitioners to seek reconstitution of the title of
their predecessor-in-interests. The original of the Decree was sent to the register of deeds for the issuance of
the certificate of title. It was in the latter office that it was lost. The copy left in the Land Registration Commission
is authenticated by the signature of the Clerk of Court of the Land Registration Court, Enrique Altavas. To limit
the bases of reconstitution to originals of the official documents is to defeat the purpose of the law. Reason and
the law would not justify private properties to remain forever with their titles unreconstituted.
The grounds for the objection disregards the destruction of many government records during the last world war
and defeats the purpose of the law on reconstitution. If those records were not destroyed, there would be no
need for reconstitution. The loss and destruction underscore the need for reconstitution. Reconstitution or
reconstruction relates to lost original records in the government offices. Any data available may suffice if the
Court is convinced of the existence of the title being reconstituted. This is in accord with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Villa vs. Fabricante, L-5531, June 30, 1953. If the law allows reconstitution from
testimony a fortiori it must allow reconstitution upon xerox copies of documents microfilmed in anticipation of
possible loss thereof. The microfilm underscores the existence of the documents, for without them there would
be nothing to microfilm. The Government has enjoined by Decree the microfilming of important documents.
By and large, the presence of the signature of the Clerk of Court of the land registration court on the Decree
attests to its genuineness and authenticity. He is too dead to falsify the Decree Exhibit X.
Except Exhibit 5 which is a xerox copy of a cancelled owner's duplicate copy of Certificate of Title No. 724 and
which mentions Decree No. 15170, the oppositor's documentary evidence are letters of inquiry and replies
thereto. By their very nature, they are too weak a basis to establish any fact. The writers thereof were not
presented as witnesses to be cross-examined on their contents. The witness who was presented to identify the
exhibits was not the receiver nor custodian of said communications. He admittedly does not know the contents
thereof.
Exhibit 5, a supposed cancelled owner's duplicate of the title of Eugenio Tuason which mentions Decree No.
15170 refers to a 422-square meter lot in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, which is different from the Decree Exhibit X for
the two lots inCupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, having a total area of 431,917 square meters. The existence of the
owner's duplicate copy in the office of the register of deeds without the original is a suspicious circumstance
never explained by anybody. The mystery goes deeper if we consider that no other document, private or public,
was presented to support the existence of the original title or the decree upon which the title was based.
Nobody even testified on the existence of this Exhibit 5 in the office of the register of deeds.

The Decree Exhibit X enjoys the probative value of an official document existing in the proper depositary
unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion. The law reposes probative force upon the official documents
as it presumes fidelity in the discharge of duties of public officers. The authenticity of the Decree issued in favor
of petitioners' predecessor having been established, the Decree Exhibit X 'shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto' and 'shall be conclusive upon all persons, including the Insular Government and all branches thereof,'
and 'incontrovertible' after one year from the issuance of the Decree (Sec. 30, Act 496).
Reconstitution of destroyed certificates of title is mandatory (Director vs. Gan Tan, L-2664, May 30, 1951). The
bases for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title are numerous (Secs. 2 and 3, Rep. Act 26). Among them
are:
'(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration . . . (Sec 2, Rep. Act 26).
'(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the
lost or destroyed certificate of title' (Secs. 2, 3, Rep. Act 26).
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In the light of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of their petition
for the reconstitution of the title in the name of Manuela Aquial, the court has no alternative to granting the
petition. Republic Act 26 provides:
'SEC. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence, or
otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title,
and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate
of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of
reconstitution shall be issued.'
The requirements of Sections 5, 12, and 13 of Republic Act 26 have been complied with. The Court has no reason
to doubt the credibility of the witnesses for the petitioners, particularly the government officials subpoenaed
who had occasion and reason to know the facts they testified to, being parts of their functions and duties in
their respective offices.
The Court discerns nothing from the opposition which Atty. Florida filed for the Director of Lands except his seal
to protect possible interests of the Government. From the sparks created by his opposition, the Court saw the
crystal truth."
Copy of the above decision was served the Land Registration Commission on October 16, 1978.
On November 15, 1978, herein petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation filed with the Court a quo a verified Petition
To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings, alleging that:
"xxx xxx xxx
"2. Sometime in 1971, in the course of its operations, Oppositor acquired and became the registered owner of
six (6) parcels of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and aggregating some
sixty (60) hectares in area; xerox copies of the certificates of title, all of the Registry of Deeds for the Province
of Rizal, covering said parcels of land and issued in Oppositor's name are attached to and made an integral part
of this Petition as follows:
Annex "A" T.C.T. No. 324558
Annex "B" T.C.T. No. 324559
Annex "C" T.C.T. No. 324560
Annex "D" T.C.T. No. 324561
Annex "E" T.C.T. No. 324562
Annex "F" T.C.T. No. 351775.
All of said certificates of title originated from the 'mother title' Original Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal, issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888 issued in Land Registration Case No. 776, a
copy of said O.C.T. No. 6567 is attached to and made an integral part of this Petition as Annex "A";
3. The aforementioned certificates of title, Annexes "A" to "F", were later wholly or partly superseded by
individual certificates of title, about one thousand four hundred (1,400) in all, and also in Oppositor's name,
covering the individual home lots, street lots and other spaces into which the lands above referred to were
subdivided in the course of the development of what are now known as Phase I and Phase II of Oppositor's
'Tahanan Village'; and while ownership, of and registered title to, some of the home lots have since passed to
individual buyers by virtue of final sales, a considerable number of said certificates of title still remain in the
name of Oppositor;
4. Under date of October 5, 1978, this Honorable Court rendered a Decision in the above-entitled proceedings,
granting the Petitioners' petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate,
allegedly issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in Case No. 9368 of the Land Registration
Court, and directing the register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV:
' . . . to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit K, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the court
the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with

164
residence at 307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number which will not
conflict with other titles already issued upon payment of the prescribed fees. . . . '
5. The land supposedly covered by the certificate of title thus ordered reconstituted appears to consist of two
(2) parcels located in Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, with an aggregate area of forty three (43) hectares,
more or less, the technical descriptions of which are set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land
Registration Case No. 9368 relied upon by Petitioners;
6. Upon a comparison of said technical descriptions with those set forth in the certificates of title, Annexes "A"
to "F" of the present Petition, it would appear that the land supposedly covered by the certificate of title ordered
reconstituted overlap and include substantial portions of Oppositor's lands covered by the titles, Annexes "A"
to "F"; the location and extent of the overlapping, as plotted on the basis of the respective technical descriptions
referred to, is shown on the sketch plan, marked Annex "H", which is attached to and made an integral part of
this Petition;
7. Oppositor, therefore, has a substantial, material and proprietary interest in the subject matter of these
proceedings which is directly and adversely affected by the Decision already referred to;
8. Oppositor, as the owner of lands not only adjacent to, but in fact overlapped by, the land supposedly covered
by the title sought to be reconstituted, was entitled to personal notice of the petition for reconstitution; such
requirement of notice is jurisdictional, being mandated by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, and the
consequence of failure to comply therewith is that the court never acquires jurisdiction to entertain and hear
the petition or render valid judgment thereon.
The salient feature of this method (of judicial reconstitution under Republic Act No. 26) is a petition and a
hearing after two successive insertions in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing. It partakes of the nature
of an original registration proceedings, personal service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and
occupants being essential, as well as posting of the notice in main entrances of the Provincial and Municipal
Buildings where the land lies at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. (Ponce, The Philippine Torrens
System, p. 272).
9. Oppositor, as such adjoining owner, was not given notice of the petition for reconstitution; these proceedings
were instituted, set for hearing, were heard and went to judgment without Oppositor's knowledge; indeed, it
was only on or about November 9, 1978, more than one month after the date of the Decision allowing and
ordering reconstitution, and only because another adjoining owner similarly affected saw fit to so inform it, that
Oppositor first learned of the existence of the present proceedings;
10. Oppositor was denied due process and deprived its day in court through fraud, accident or mistake,
consisting in that Petitioners, knowing or being chargeable with knowledge that the 'Tahanan Village' is a
privately-owned and operated residential subdivision and that Oppositor is the owner/developer thereof, failed
and to all indications by deliberate design to name Oppositor as adjoining owner or occupant in their
petition for reconstitution; and Petitioners did more than fail to name Oppositor as an adjoining owner and to
serve it notice of these proceedings, it would appear that they actively concealed or sought to conceal such fact;
in the survey plan, Exhibit "V", submitted by them to the Court which, by its terms, is based on a survey made
as late as July 7-12, 1974, the area where Oppositor's 'Tahanan Village' would lie is described as public land; and
these circumstances directly led to and produced the results already stated, namely, that Oppositor, never
having been notified of the petition for reconstitution, was not able to oppose the same or to be heard thereon;
11. The gravity and inexcusable character of Petitioners' conduct above complained of is made manifest by the
fact that for several years now, the existence of 'Tahanan Village' as a privately-owned and occupied residential
subdivision has been made apparent to all and sundry by such prominent features as the perimeter fence or
wall separating it from adjacent estates, the roads, streets and constantly increasing volume of home
construction within the subdivision itself, the very visible electrical lighting and water supply installations, the
presence of private security guards guarding the premises, to mention only a few; moreover, it has a number of
signs of conspicuous size and location identifying and advertising it as a housing development owned and/or
165
managed by Oppositor; all of said circumstances render it hardly conceivable that Petitioners, who hold
themselves out as actual possessors of the property involved in these proceedings (p. 3 Decision), could even
innocently misapprehend the adjoining development ('Tahanan Village') as ownerless and untenanted;

12. Oppositor has good and meritorious grounds to oppose the petition for reconstitution; one of such grounds
and a principal one is that Land Registration Case No. 9368 and Decree No. 15170 issued therein, which
Petitioners invoke and rely upon, in actual fact refer, not to the lands claimed by said Petitioners, but to another
parcel of land only some 422 square meters in area and located in Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, that by virtue
of said Decree, Original Certificate of Title No. 724 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued in the names of
Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and that said land eventually passed to its present owners, Pedro
Tuason, et al., under the current Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77516 (Rizal) and Agripino Changco, et al., under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77515 (Rizal) which was later superseded by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
150102 and 150103;
13. Oppositor is ready, if its present Petition is granted, to produce persuasive evidence of the facts above
averred, evidence which perforce will also show the proofs, both oral and documentary, adduced by Petitioners
in support of the petition for reconstitution to be untrustworthy and wanting in requisite integrity, hence
inadequate and insufficient to warrant grant of the reconstitution sought;
14. The Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution is not yet final, the Land Registration Commission having
been served with copy thereof on October 16, 1978; the thirty-day period for finality prescribed in Section 110,
2nd paragraph, of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has not yet expired;
xxx xxx xxx"
On the same day, November 15, 1978, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a Petition To Set
Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978, claiming that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the petition for reconstitution
since they have not been personally notified of the pendency of the reconstitution case to which they are entitled
under Republic Act No. 26 not only as adjoining owners but as actual possessors thereof; that grantingarguendo that the
title subject to be reconstituted is valid, which it is not, the same cannot prevail over the earlier titles of Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing under TCT No. 45397 and TCT No. 45398 which are transfers from the
Original Certificate of Title No. 684 in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands issued on September 20, 1913
pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued August 27, 1910; and that the overlapping of the area of the title sought to be
reconstituted on the area of the parcels of land evidenced by the titles of Alabang Development Corporation and Bagatsing
would result in a case of the same land registered in the name of two different persons.
The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Extension to File Record on
Appeal on November 16, 1978. Respondent Judge in his Order of November 23, 1978 granted the Solicitor General's
motion, extending the period for appeal for another thirty days from date of its issuance but did not pass upon nor resolve
the petitions to set aside and re-open proceedings filed by Tahanan, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D.
Bagatsing, the Court ruling that:
"The oppositor Director of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, was a party in the
proceedings before this Court. Said oppositor had adopted to resort to appeal as the appropriate remedy. The
Court finds it, therefore, unnecessary to resolve the Petition To Set Aside Decision and To Re-Open Proceedings
filed by Tahanan Development Corporation and the Petition to Set Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978 filed
by the Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing."
Copy of the above Order was served on Tahanan thru counsel on December 12, 1978. On December 14, 1978, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order of November 23, 1978 alleging that the "shelving" of its Petition To Set
Aside Decision was equivalent to a denial thereof; that the effect of such "shelving" if maintained up to the perfection of
the appeal of the Director of lands would be to deny petitioner recourse both in the court of the respondent Judge and in
the appellate court, because the respondent Judge would then lose jurisdiction over the proceedings and petitioner, not
yet actually a party to the proceedings but only seeking to be admitted as such, could not intervene in the appeal to
protect its interest; that the Petition To Set Aside, the purpose of which was precisely to effect the admission of petitioner
as a party and to allow it an opportunity to present evidence opposing the reconstitution, was sufficient in form and
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substance to merit resolution and approval; and that considerations of justice, fairness, due process and correct procedure
dictated that the Petition To Set-Aside be first resolved before allowing the appeal of the Director of Lands to proceed to
perfection.
The Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing and submitted on December 19, 1978. As of December 21, 1978,
when the period for appeal extended in favor of oppositor Director of Lands was about to expire on December 23, 1978
and said Director of Lands had not yet filed a record on appeal, the possibility that once the record on appeal is filed, the
approval thereof with the consequent perfection of appeal and transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court can come at
any moment. Since the Petition to Set Aside and the Motion for Reconsideration were still pending or awaiting resolution,
the same would be rendered moot and academic and petitioner left without remedy in both the trial court and the
appellate court. To forestall that eventuality and to preserve recourse in the matter, petitioner opted to file a Petition for
Certiorari with the appellate court without further awaiting resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, the petition
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08680.
The Director of Lands failed to perfect its appeal with the Court of Appeals. Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon
D. Bagatsing did not interpose any appeal.
Petitioner in its Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-08680) claiming arbitrariness and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge for by-passing its Petition To Set Aside, and for not acting on its Motion for Reconsideration after
hearing and submission despite awareness of the fact that the period of appeal extended by the Court was about to lapse
and raising the issue of whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution case despite absence of personal
notice to it as adjoining owner, prayed for preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order for the preservation of
the status quo in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P by prohibiting and restraining the respondent Judge, and his successors
in office, from scheduling, conducting or otherwise entertaining, setting in motion, or continuing, all and any further
proceedings and incidents in said case, particularly, but not limited to, proceedings relative or leading to the perfection of
the final judgment on the Petition for Certiorari or until further orders from the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to Tahanan's petition in the Resolution of December 29, 1978. Respondent
Judge was likewise ordered to resolve petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. A bond was filed by petitioner on January
9, 1979 and thereupon a restraining order was issued "enjoining the respondent Judge from taking any action in
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P which will make him lose jurisdiction over said case such that he can no longer act on
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, dated December 14, 1978. If any such action has already been taken, the same
shall be set aside by respondent Judge."
Under legal compulsion, respondent Judge resolved Tahanan's Motion for Reconsideration on January 4, 1979. He denied
it.
On November 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the petitioner, ruling that respondent Judge did not
exercise sound discretion in refusing to re-open the case below so that Tahanan could protect its property rights which
could possibly be impaired by the reconstitution. The appellate court granted the Petition for Certiorari on the basis of
the following considerations:
"1. The PROPERTY must now be of substantial value because, even at P100.00 per square meter, its more than
43 hectares could be worth some P43 million.
According to TAHANAN (Annex H of its Motion to Reopen), Lot No. 2 of the PROPERTY overlaps a substantial
part of its own land. Although the exact area of the overlap has been given, it can be estimated at about 10
hectares, which can he worth P10 million. The value of the land which TAHANAN seeks to protect is such as
should have induced the lower court to reopen the CASE BELOW to give an opportunity to TAHANAN to prove
its contentions. Denial of reopening, even if technically possible as a matter of law, would not be equitable.
2. It is more or less of public knowledge that the Land Registration Commission has been charged with
anomalies. The lower court should have reopened the CASE BELOW if only to assure itself that Exh. X is not an
anomaly committed by the Commission, a possibility which TAHANAN might he able to show.
The lower court had already shoved aside the proposition advanced by the Director of Lands that Exh. X issued
in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco covering a
parcel of 422 sq.m. situated in the Municipality of Pasig. Respondent Judge conclude that the title allegedly
issued (Exh. 5) was a result of that Decree was only a photostat and was weak evidence, as the supposed original
could not be found in the office of the Register of Deeds. But TAHANAN could prove through the Official Gazette
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of December 13, 1913 (pp. 198, 200, Rollo) that in Land Registration Case No. 9368, the applicants were Eugenio
Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and not MANUELA Aquial. While Exh. X could be a forgery, the Official Gazette
cannot be spurious. Accidentally, if respondent Judge found that Exhibit 5 was weak as it was only a copy, under
the same token he should neither have given credence to Exh. X, which was also merely a xerox copy.

3. It has been noted that the certification made by the deceased Enrique Altavas of Exh. X bears no date. That
is an important factor to ascertain; not only for the determination of the genuineness of his signature, but also
for the determination of the plausible reason why the certification was made. As a rule, signatures can be
established as genuine by comparison with accepted true signatures executed around the same date.
4. It has also been further noted that there is no record that a Torrens title had been issued in the name of
MANUELA as no mention of the number thereof is in the record. It certainly would be strange if no title had
been issued since 1914. If a title had been issued, the number thereof should have been mentioned in one
document or other, executed after 1914. For example, in the tax declarations submitted by MANUELA before
and after the war, the number of her title (or the fact that it had been lost) would have been mentioned.
5. Exh. X was supposed to have been issued to MANUELA on March 4, 1914 when she was still single. However,
her son, Nicolas A. Pascual, testified in 1977 or 1978 that he was then 67 years old. He must have been born in
1910 which would belie that MANUELA was still single in 1914.
6. In a re-opening, TAHANAN may ask for a relocation survey to be actually made of the PROPERTY by placing
new monuments. It should be advisable that such a relocation survey in the presence of the parties be made so
that possible occupants and adjoining owners will have direct and personal knowledge of the reconstitution
proceedings.
7. The appeal by the government will not adequately protect the rights of TAHANAN and other land owners who
may be affected by the reconstitution. For one thing, the Government did not introduce its own handwriting
expert, which TAHANAN might do, in order to assail the authenticity of Exh. X. Ordinarily, whether a signature
in a xerox copy is genuine or forged is difficult to determine."
The Court of Appeals further sustained the right of Tahanan to be heard in the case below on the basis of and in accordance
with the Resolution of the Supreme Court of September 25, 1979 in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-45168,
the first case mentioned at the beginning hereof as one of the three cases recently decided by Us that are directly related
to and squarely identified with the petition at bar wherein We admitted the intervention of the intervenors filed before
Us even as of the time that the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals granting reconstitution of the lost
and/or destroyed certificate of title was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. "We are duty-bound to
abide with the rulings of the Supreme Court," said the appellate court, and it concludes with the dispositive part, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court of November 23, 1978 and January 4, 1979, as well as the Decision
of October 5, 1978, are hereby set aside and respondent Judge is hereby directed to reopen the CASE BELOW
so that TAHANAN can present its evidence and cross-examine the witnesses of private respondents.
SO ORDERED."
Private respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated December 4, 1979 of the CA Decision penned by Justice
Corazon Juliano Agrava, arguing that the decision being set aside by the appellate court had long become final and
executory; that the lower court had proper jurisdiction over the reconstitution case; that petitioner's remedy should not
be a petition for certiorari but an ordinary action for determination of the alleged overlapping of land areas; and that the
Court of Appeals erroneously applied the Supreme Court resolution in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
45168, September 25, 1979.
Through a Special Division of Five, respondent Court of Appeals granted the Pascual's Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed its previous decision of November 16, 1979, through its Resolution promulgated April 30, 1980. The petition for
certiorari filed by Tahanan was thereby dismissed and the restraining order issued on January 9, 1979 was ordered
dissolved.
With obvious vehemence, Justice Agrava dissented from the findings of the majority, unequivocally observing that "the
alleged difference between that case (Director of Lands vs. CA) and the present case (is) pure casuistry and a failure to
abide by decisions of the Supreme Court."
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In the instant appeal before Us, petitioner Tahanan assigns numerous errors committed by the appellate court but the
principal and fundamental issues to be resolved is whether or not the trial court properly acquired and was invested with
jurisdiction to hear and decide Reconstitution Case No. 504-P in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of Republic
Act No. 26. Upon resolving this pivotal issue, the corollary issue as to respondent Judge's grave abuse of discretion in
denying Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside Decision and To Re-Open the Proceedings of Reconstitution Case No. 504-P as
well as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the decision of respondent Judge, will find the correct and
appropriate answers.
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title
lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to hear
and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of
procedure that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the
petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for
Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the Official
Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act
provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed. These sections state as follows:
"Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitutions from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e),
and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns,
or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the
following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-
owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost
or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the
buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses
of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any
interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a
statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or,
if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified
copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property."
"Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal
building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things,
the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having
any interest therein must appear and file their claim of objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."
As We have earlier quoted in full the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P and substantially the
Notice of Hearing issued by the court published in the Official Gazette together with the Certification of Posting by the
Deputy Sheriff, it would not be a difficult task to check and verify whether the strict and mandatory requirements of
Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 have been faithfully complied with by therein petitioners Pascuals, now the
private respondents here.

169
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at once apparent that Tahanan
has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner, occupant or possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to
which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state or mention that Tahanan is the occupant
or possessor of a portion of said Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was never notified of the
petition for reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.

According to petitioner Tahanan, this omission was deliberate on the part of the Pascuals who actively concealed or sought
to conceal the fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and possessor of properly adjacent to the alleged properties of
the Pascuals as well as the fact that Tahanan is in possession or occupancy of portions of the land claimed by the Pascuals.
Indeed, as pointed out by petitioner Tahanan, to which We agree, the Pascuals made it appear in the survey plan, Exhibit
"Y" submitted by them to the Court based on a survey made as of July 7-12, 1974, that the area where "Tahanan Village"
would lie is described as public land.
That the Pascuals deliberately omitted, concealed or sought to conceal the fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and
possessor of property adjacent to the former's alleged property may be deduced by their failure to comply with the order
of Judge Leo Medialdea issued in the original petition for reconstitution, Case No. 77, dated July 10, 1974 (the records of
which We ordered forwarded to the Court) wherein "the petitioners are hereby required to amend their petition, within
ten days from receipt hereof, by indicating therein the names and addresses of all boundary owners of the parcels of land
in question as well as the names and addresses of all persons occupying the same."
In complying with the above order, the Pascuals simply filed an Amended Petition and although they allegedly undertook
relocation survey on the subject land by which the supposed adjoining owners and claimants may be definitely ascertained
as well as their actual occupation and respected addresses, they only included Pedro L. Flores as the occupant on the NE.,
NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 with address at 959 C. Lerma St., Sampaloc, Manila; and on the SE., along lines 7-
8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, c/o Constancio B. Maglana,
President and Chairman of the Board, with address at No. 513, Lafayette St., Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
And as far as Lot 4 is concerned, the Amended Petition then mentioned the boundary owner on the NW., SW., along lines
1-2-3 (portions of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) and on the SE., NE. and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1, the same Maglana & Sons
Management Corporation as boundary owners.
The amended Petition notwithstanding, the omission of Tahanan as adjoining owner and even as occupant of portions of
the supposed Pascual property is palpable and conspicuous.
It is all too evident that the Pascuals in refiling their Petition for Reconstitution in October, 1977 docketed as Case No.
504-P, had no intention to notify nor give cause for notification and knowledge to all adjacent or boundary owners,
particularly Tahanan.
The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual adjacent boundary owners on all sides and directions of their
property. They are charged with the obligation to inquire who their neighbors are in actual possession and occupancy not
only of portions of their own property but also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation cannot be ignored or
simply brushed aside where the location or the properties involved is a prime site for land development, expansion,
suitable for residential, commercial and industrial purposes and where every square inch of real estate becomes a valuable
and profitable investment. It is of public knowledge in the community of Paraaque that "Tahanan Village" is a privately-
owned and occupied residential subdivision, plainly visible to the general public by reason of the perimeter fence or wall
separating it from adjacent estates the roads and streets therein and leading thereto, the numerous home constructions
and buildings going on, the visible electrical, lighting and water supply installations, the presence of private security guards
thereat and the numerous signs and billboards advertising the estate as a housing development owned and/or managed
by petitioner Tahanan. It is preposterous to claim that the area is public land.
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin board of the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law specifically require that the notice of the petition shall be posted
on the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the
municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio
C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the
Main entrance of the provincial building in Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main entrance of the municipal building

170
of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in the municipal building of Paraaque where
Barrio San Dionisio was then embraced. LLjur

Adverting again to the original records of the Petition for Reconstitution No. 77, We find and note that Judge Leo
Medialdea correctly directed in his order of September 27, 1974 the service of process, thus:
"Service of process in this proceedings shall be made as follows: (a) by publication of a copy of this Order in two
(2) successive issues of the Official Gazette, (b) by posting of copies of this Order at the entrance of the Provincial
Capitol of Rizal and the Municipal Buildings of Muntinlupa and Paraaque, Rizal, (c) by furnishing every person
named in the amended petition with copies of this Order by registered mail, (d) by furnishing Pedro L. Flores
and the Maglana & Sons Management Corporation with copies of this Order personally, and (e) by furnishing
the Director of Lands, the Commission of the Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Rizal
with copies of this Order personally, the publication, posting and notices shall be made at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of the hearing, at the expense of the petitioners.
The Deputy Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to implement the directives herein set forth."
Further proceedings in this original petition show that the above directives were faithfully and strictly followed.
Nevertheless, this Reconstitution Case No. 77 was withdrawn by the Pascuals, apparently for the reason that there having
been filed conflicting reports by the Director of Lands and the Land Registration Commission favorable to the Pascuals and
another submitted by the Register of Deeds which was adverse to them and the reports could not be reconciled, the case
"would only clog the calendar of the court" pending continued research by the government offices concerned and
availability of certain documentary evidence of the Pascuals. The Court granted the Motion to Withdraw in its Order of
May 30, 1975.
It is necessary that We quote hereunder the Report of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal submitted in the
original Reconstitution Case No. 77 as follows;
"R E P O R T
COMES NOW, the undersigned Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal and unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully manifests;
1. That on June 4, 1974, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal has been furnished a copy of the petition in
the above entitled reconstitution case;
2. That on October 8, 1974, the Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of the Order of the Court dated
September 27, 1974, by way of service of process in the proceedings;
3. That the property subject of the petition for reconstitution, known as Lot 2 and Lot 4 of Plan II-4374 are
situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now as Bo. Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal) containing an area of 375,622 sq. meters, and 56,295 sq. meters, respectively, was allegedly
covered by Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1911;
4. That a verification of the records of this office, show that Decree No. 15170 of the Court of Land Registration
in Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, under Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B, and covers a property
situated at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, with an area of 422 sq. meters."
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant
or person having an interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the
failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality on which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court. This was Our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438. It was also
stressed in Alabang Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982. And
We reiterate it herein, to wit:
"In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act,
We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case
because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not
been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice
that 'all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should
171
not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with
exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to amend the original
petition provided all the requisites for publication and posting of notices be complied with, it appearing that the
amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We have pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal failed to comply with all the requirements for publication and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to
the jurisdiction of the Court."

The above rule is a reiteration of the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-
17913, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
"Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and
technical descriptions of the lots involved, which sources may fall properly under Section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic
Act No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in the property should be sent a
copy of the notice of the petition at the expense of the petitioner, pursuant to Section 13 of the said Act.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the
property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and executory.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not sufficient but such notice must be actually
sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution."
Having resolved the fundamental issue that the trial court had not properly acquired nor was it duly invested with
jurisdiction to hear, determine and decide the petition for reconstitution and accordingly all proceedings conducted
thereon were rendered null and void including the judgment issued granting the reconstitution, the resolution of the
corollary issues need no extended discussion but considering the obvious intent to circumvent the ruling of the Supreme
Court laid down in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, We find it imperative to make a
reiteration of the pertinent doctrines applicable to the case at bar.
LLpr

In the above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of adjacent owners even during the pendency of the appeal from
the decision granting reconstitution, the appeal then in the Supreme Court, in the paramount interest of justice and as an
exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court below
and alleging material and substantial interest in the property to which title is sought to be reconstituted, in its Motion To
Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its transfer certificates
of title of its properties adjoining and even overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area,
the trial court ought to have admitted said motion. There was reversible error in refusing to do so. Once more, We must
emphasize the reasons in relaxing the strict application of the Rule above-cited as We did in Director of Lands vs. CA, et
al., 93 SCRA 238, in this wise:
"But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein promulgated is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice.
The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of
notice, or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to
the movants, to their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open
the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claims be proven to be true. For it
cannot be gainsaid that if the petition for reconstitution is finally granted, the chaos and confusion arising from
a situation where the certificates of title of the movants covering large areas of land overlap or encroach on
properties the title to which is being sought to be reconstituted by private respondent, who herself indicates in
her Opposition that, according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping embraces some 87 hectares only, is
certain and inevitable. The aggregate area of the property claimed by respondent covering Lot 1 and Lot 2 is

172
1,435,062 sq. meters which is situated in a fast-growing, highly residential sector of Metro Manila where growth
and development are in rapid progress to meet the demands of an urbanized, exploding population. Industries,
factories, warehouses, plants, and other commercial infrastructures are rising and spreading within the area
and the owners of these lands and the valuable improvements thereon will not simply fold their hands but
certainly will seek judicial protection of their property rights or may even take the law into their own hands,
resulting to multiplicity of suits."
The holding of respondent Court of Appeals that Our resolution in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, allowing
intervention is not applicable to the case at bar because there was no motion to intervene filed before the Supreme Court
by Tahanan is without merit. Such holding fails to see that the intervention of Tahanan while the reconstitution case was
still in the trial court below was more expedient for the trial court is in a better and more suitable position to hear and
decide the question of encroachment and overlapping raised by Tahanan in its Motion to Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings, and where the witnesses may be examined and cross-examined by the parties and the court, whereas the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. LibLex

Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the end of the proceedings, there should and there ought
to be no quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to abide and
conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well-becoming sense of modesty and a respectful awareness of
its inferior position in the judicial hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the appellate court to the end that a well-
ordered and disciplined administration of justice may be preserved and maintained. We cannot allow, permit or tolerate
inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express rulings of this Court.
There is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court when it denied Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside Decision
and Re-Open Proceedings. While said petition is not captioned "Motion for Intervention" the allegations of the petition
clearly and succinctly aver Tahanan's legal interest in the matter in litigation, which interest is substantial and material,
involving as it does the boundaries, possession and ownership of about 9 hectares of land covered by certificates of title
registered under the Torrens System in Tahanan's name and issued from the mother title "Original Certificate of Title No.
6567 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888, Land Registration Case No. 776 dated
September 18, 1930."
Aside from arbitrarily refusing to admit Tahanan's intervention sought in the trial court below, We find also grave abuse
of discretion committed by respondent Judge in not considering Tahanan as an indispensable party to the proceedings, it
having been shown positively that it has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in its absence, without injuring or affecting such interest. Again, We refer to Our ruling in Director of
Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, and more recently in Alabang Development Corp. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G.R. No.
54094, Aug. 30, 1982, that: "The joinder must be ordered in order to prevent multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter
in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the
joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the
parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot
even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties."
Time and again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens titles issued pursuant to the Land Registration Act (Act 496)
and Presidential Decree No. 1529 have been shaken by the very courts whose unwavering duty should be to protect the
rights and interests of title holders but instead have favored claimants under the guise of reconstitution filed after a long
lapse of time after the Japanese occupation, alleging the existence of original and duplicate certificates of title issued
pursuant to a court decree but have subsequently been lost or destroyed including the records of the land registration
case on account of the war and lay claim and title to valuable parcels of land previously titled and registered under the
Torrens registration system and are even able to dispose these properties to unsuspecting homelot buyers and speculating
land developers. The courts must be cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of
title, both original and duplicate owner's, based on documents and decrees made to appear authentic from mere xerox
copies and certifications of officials supposedly signed with the seals of their office affixed thereon, considering the ease
and facility with which documents are made to appear as official and authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and
verify carefully all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact, circumstance or incident which
corroborates or relates to the existence and loss of the title should be examined.
The claim of the Pascuals that their predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, had an original certificate of title to Lots 2
and 4 of Plan II-4374 is extremely difficult to believe and sustain. There are too many omissions and blanks, too many
173
failures and unanswered questions that belie such a claim. Thus, it is at once noted that the number of the certificate of
title issued to and registered in the name of respondents' mother and predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, is
unknown. Nowhere in the voluminous records do the Pascuals cite, state, or mention the number of said certificate of
title. Not even in the tax declaration of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. "S" and Tax Declaration No. 10187, Exh. "S-
1") and Lot No. 4 (Tax Declaration No. 15424, Exh. "T" and Tax Declaration No. 10188, Exh. "T-1") is the number of the
certificate of title indicated. And there is absolutely no document, private or official, presented by the Pascuals mentioning
the number of the certificate of title.

There is also no proof as to when the certificate of title was issued. Assuming that the certificate of title was issued
pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914, the date of issue of the certificate of title must be subsequent thereto.
Assuming further that her duplicate copy was lost in 1944 during the Japanese occupation, why did she wait until 1974
[when the first petition for reconstitution was filed which was after thirty (30) years] to seek reconstitution of her owner's
copy.
The survey plan allegedly conducted January 9-29, 1911 and approved July 25, 1911 as shown in Exhibit "O" is titled "Plan
of Property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al., Case No. ______, Court of Land Registration. Unperfected Title No. _______,
Bureau of Lands." In the case of Director of Lands vs. CA and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, et al., 102 SCRA 370
which involved the reconstitution of the certificate of title to Lots 1 and 3 Plan II-4374, Bernal, petitioner therein, claimed
ownership to Lots 1 and 3 by virtue of a sales patent issued to her by the Government, which patent, however, We ruled
as fictitious. In the instant petition at bar, We find no claim of Aquial nor her successors, the Pascuals, as to how they
acquired title in fee simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales patent, composicion con el estado, or informacion
possesoria. The only allegation of the basis of their ownership is paragraph 3 of the petition for reconstitution which
alleges "That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and still
are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as owners
in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture."
Decree No. 15170 which supposedly decreed Lots 2 and 4 to Manuela Aquial is claimed by the Pascuals to have been
issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368. On its face, the attestation clause of the decree reads:
"Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of Land Registration, the 10th day of
January, A.D. nineteen hundred and fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914, at 8:38 A.M.
Attest:
Seal of the Court (SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Clerk of the Court
(SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
A true copy." Clerk of the Court
In the official report submitted to the court by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal in the original petition for
reconstitution, No. 77, CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, marked Exhibit "2", Decree No. 15170 was issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 in the name of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, in whose names the Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal covering a property situated at Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal with an area of 422 sq. meters was likewise
issued.
The Tuason-Changco decree is dated January 10, 1914 and entered on March 4, 1914 at 8:38 A.M. and the Certificate of
Title No. 724 was issued January 10, 1914. The attestation clause of the certificate of title reads:
"Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of Land Registration, the 10th day of
January, A.D. nineteen hundred and fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914 at 8:38 A.M.
Attest: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Clerk of the Court
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, this
7th day of March, nineteen hundred and fourteen, at 9:15 o'clock in the A.M.

174
(SGD.) (unintelligible)
Register of Deeds"
Comparing the Aquial decree and the Tuason-Changco title, both appears to have been entered at Manila on the same
day, that is March 4, 1914, and at the same hour, 8:38 A.M. That the Tuason property and that of Aquial would bear the
same decree number (15170), the same land registration case number (9368), the same land registration court (Pasig,
Rizal), the same presiding judge (The Honorable Dionisio Chanco) is indeed incredible, if not incomprehensible.
But contrary to the claim of the Pascuals that the records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 have been lost, destroyed or
missing, there was presented copies of the Official Gazette of December 10 and 17, 1913, Volume 11, Nos. 50 and 51, duly
certified by the Librarian of the Ministry of Justice wherein the Notice of Hearing in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was
published, the applicants for the registration and confirmation of their title to a parcel of land situated in Barrio Bambang,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal being Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Tuason (sic). The Notice of Hearing set the
date on December 22, 1913 and "Witness the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of the Court this 14th day of
November, in the year 1913."
Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued Certificate of Title No. 724 pursuant to Decree No. 15170 Issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree number and the same land registration case
number, cannot present her owner's duplicate copy nor the original certificate which she claims were lost or destroyed,
including the records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the Notice of Hearing therein was shown
and exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette), We find and so hold that it is the Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious,
if not non-existent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate No. 724.
At the back of Certificate of Title No. 724, We find annotated therein a number of documents registered by the heirs of
Tuason and also the heirs of co-owner Changco. The deeds or transactions executed on different dates and registered
thereon appear normal and there is no reason to doubt their authenticity. On the other hand, no deed, document or
transaction had been shown by the Pascuals relating to or affecting their land from which We can infer or deduce the
existence of the original certificate of title if one was in truth and in fact issued to Aquial. LibLex

The Pascuals claim that they have paid taxes on the land but they can only present Exhibits "U", "U-1", "V" and "V-1" to
prove their payment in lump sum of the taxes thereon for four (4) years only, from 1970 to 1973. They have not presented
proof of tax payment from 1914 to 1969, more than five (5) decades. All these omissions and failures cannot but show the
spuriousness and falsity of their claim that they were granted a decree by the Land Registration Court, that a certificate
of title was issued in their name and that said certificate of title was existing and subsisting at the time they filed the
petition for reconstitution.
We reject the trial court's finding that the absence in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal of the Original Certificate
of Title No. 724, although the owner's duplicate is on file therein, is suspicious, for it is satisfactorily explained in the letter
of the Acting Register of Deeds Guillermo San Pedro, Exhibit "4", that.
"Original Certificate of Title No. 724 was cancelled on June 24, 1960 and transferred to the heirs by virtue of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased registered owners. The original copy of OCT No. 724 is no longer
available but the cancelled owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 724 is still existing in our files.
xxx xxx xxx"
Likewise, We do not agree with the holding of the trial court that "in the light of the foregoing impressive and
overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of their petition for reconstitution of the title in the name
of Manuela Aquial, the Court has no alternative to granting the petition," the Court having "no reason to doubt the
credibility of the witnesses for the petitioner, particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had occasion and
reason to know the facts they testified to, being parts of their functions and duties in their respective offices."
It is to be noted that the supposedly impressive and overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners centered on
showing the alleged authenticity and genuineness of the survey plan denominated Plan II-4374. The list of petitioner's
exhibits is indeed long but the basic, specific and relevant piece of evidence is Exhibit "O" with the certification of Roman
Mataverde, Chief, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands dated October 27, 1972 that "Exhibit "O" is a photographic copy of the
original plan as reproduced from the microfilm negative which is on file in the Bureau of Lands, Manila."
This is the crucial question on which hinges the veracity of respondents' claim of title and ownership to 431,917 sq. meters
of prime land (Lots 2 and 4) in Paraaque, Rizal - is there such an original survey plan known as Plan II-4374?
The oppositor Director of Lands strongly and stoutly maintains that there is no such plan and in support thereof Exhibit
"7" is submitted to the Court, the same being the official communication of Amante R. Dumag, Officer-In-Charge, Metro
175
Manila Region, Bureau of Lands, stating "that Plan II-4374 could not be the basis for any verification because the original
plan thereof is not subsisting in the files and records of this Bureau." Enclosed with said communication is the xerox copy
of the letter dated 30 January 1978 of Staff Supervisor Privadi JG. Dalire. Said Exhibit "7" further states: "However,
assuming that Plan II-4374 exists and using its technical description, the same overlaps Muntinlupa Estate and Plan 61581,
Lot I, Decree No. N-515888, O.C.T.-6567 identical to Lot 4762, Cad-299, Paraaque Cadastre."
Exhibit "8" of the Director of Lands is the xerox copy of the letter referred to above, which for its materiality and relevance
to the vital question herein before stated and stressed, is reproduced in full below:
"Republic of the Philippines
Department of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF LANDS
Manila

SUBJECT: Plan II-4374

Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
Paraaque, Rizal
30 January 1978
Mr. Amante Dumag
Officer-in-charge
Region IV, Metro Manila
Anent your Memorandum of 17 January 1978 requesting for an authenticated plan of II-4374 Lot 1 and Lot 3
situated in Paraaque, Metro Manila, please be informed of the following:
1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world war and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged.
Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section which records were recently turned
over to the Records Division. A perusal of the folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July
17, 1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the records division certified that his division (Survey Records
Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).
2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired
surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record
was submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns
out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of Municipality of Liloan, Island
of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction
Section upon request of the interested party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This
document was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution of title (pp. 1 and 2 of folio). As
to how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original
copy of the plan is not known. This is not our standard operating procedure since we always issue technical
descriptions based on available approved survey records.
4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section,
certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the
survey number II-4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war got microfilmed is a mystery.
Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the locator card indeed confound us. We are not now
privy to the testimonies made in Court regarding this microfilm.
5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For this reason, we caused the preparation of
an enlargement of said microfilm for further examination and evaluation.
6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following significant discrepancies and
deviations from similar survey plans on record:

176
a) The date of approval appears to be July 25, 1911 and the signature appearing as the approving official
(Director of Lands) of the alleged plan II-4374 is not the same official approving plans during the period. Samples
of surveys and inventoried original survey plans on file in this Bureau clearly show that on July 25, 1911 or
thereabouts the Acting Director of Lands and therefore proper approving official for survey plans was John R.
Wilson. The following original plans (partial list) available in our records and approved within the month of July
1911 or thereabouts all bear the signature of Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson.
Survey No. Accession No. Date of
Approval
1. I-1817a 369826 July 25, 1911
2. II-4142 385736 July 25, 1911
3. II-4141 385735 July 25, 1911
4. II-4110g 385833 July 25, 1911
5. II-4110j 385832 July 25, 1911
6. II-4110e 385834 July 25, 1911
7. II-4110d 385830 July 25, 1911
8. II-4110c 385829 July 25, 1911
9. II-4110b 385828 July 25, 1911
10. II-4897 186222 July 25, 1911
11. I-41696 July 11, 1911
12. II-4172 July 5, 1911
13. I-1415 379513 July 25, 1911
14. II-1410 446936 Aug. 22, 1911
b) Authentic plans like that of II-4858 (original copy on file) approved on December 19, 1911 show the BL Form
No. 52 and the format then in use during the period. Likewise, this plan (marked O) shows the signature of the
Director of Lands at that time, Chas H. Sleeper. What is being represented as 'the signature of Chas H. Sleeper
as Director of Lands on the microfilm of II-4374 appears to be very far from the genuine signature of Chas H.
Sleeper appearing on original plans on file. Chas H. Sleeper was the incumbent Director of Lands from November
1, 1905 up to October 15, 1913. However, during his term of office, the then Assistant Director of Lands in the
person of John R. Wilson had occasion to assume duties as Acting Director of Lands as evidenced by the above-
listed survey plans mostly approved on July 25, 1911 by Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson. Considering the
fact that on various dates within the month of July 1911, specifically those of July 25, 1911, the original survey
plans available in the file show John R. Wilson as the approving official in his capacity as Acting Director of Lands,
and the observation that the signature appearing on microfilm II-4374 is very far from the genuine signature of
the incumbent Director of Lands Chas H. Sleeper, the appearance now of the microfilm of II-4374 purportedly
approved on July 25, 1911 showing Chas H. Sleeper as the approving official is highly questionable. For this
reason and the facts stated elsewhere in this memorandum, we cannot certify authenticity of the microfilm
copy of II-4374.
c) The form used for the questionable plan II-4374 differs from the standard survey plans approved during the
time (year 1911) in the following respects:
(1) Authentic plans during the time are prepared on B.L. Form No. 52 which is on upper left hand corner; the
questionable plan (II-4374) was prepared on B.L. Form No. 52-A which appears on upper left hand corner and
on upper center which is unusual.
(2) Authentic plans indicate the name of the surveyor immediately below the line that shows the date of survey,
followed by the designation (surveyor) and thereunder Bureau of Lands; the questionable plan, on the other
hand, does not conform with the said format.
(3) Authentic plans do not contain the paragraph "The original field notes, . . . " as in the case of the questioned
plan II-4374 but immediately "Bureau of Lands" below the surveyor's name is Approved:_____(date)_____
followed by the title and signature of the approving official.
177
7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm enlargement of the frame that purports to be
that of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and
does not and has never represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau.
8. Nevertheless, our investigation is still continuing purposely to find out how the frame of such microfilm got
inserted into microfilm Reel No. 560 of this Bureau.
9. Records of the Case show that this was handled by the late Atty. Pedro Flores in collaboration with Assistant
Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Trial Attorney Antonio G. Castro. This pertains to the petition of
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal for the reconstitution of T.C.T. No. (12/T-79) 42449 (Sales Patent) covering
area of 143.5062 hectares. The case is opposed in the sala of CFI, seventh Judicial District, Branch XIII of Rizal by
the Director of Lands and Aurora R. Favila, et al. In cases like this, we take action in close collaboration with the
Legal Division.
10. Enclosed for your ready reference are.
a) Enlargement copy of alleged II-4374 whose original copy was not inventoried as salvaged after the war;
b) Microfilm copies of Authentic Plans;
c) Xerox copies of relevant papers in the Folio:
1) Certification of Mr. Gabriel Sansano, dated 17 July 1972
2) Petition for Reconstitution of Title (Filed with the Court)
3) Opposition of the Director of Lands
4) Motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution of title filed by the other oppositors.
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI JG. DALIRE
Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plans & Standards"
From the evidence submitted by the Director of Lands, it is officially and clearly shown that Plan II-4374 was not among
those salvaged after the last World War and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy;
that Plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637 is not authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of
land properly surveyed and approved by the Director of Lands; that on July 17, 1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief
of the Survey Records Division, certified that his division has no copy of Plan II-4374 and that on May 15, 1970, Mr. Angel
Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the alleged source of data being
Accession No. 195551 which, however, turned out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land pertaining
thereto is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
Subsequent certifications issued by Anselmo Almazan, Chief, Survey Reconstruction Section, Bureau of Lands dated
November 24, 1971 marked Exhibits "M" and "N" indicating the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 with
Accession No. 385637 cannot be relied upon because said plan was not among those salvaged after the last World War.
Our ruling in the Bernal case, 102 SCRA 370, 447 that "the technical descriptions cannot have two accession numbers as
sources thereof" stands. LLphil

Incidentally, We must point out that the above official report (marked Exhibit "8") was submitted to the Supreme Court
in the Bernal case as Annex "A" to the Final Report of Amante R. Dumag, Officer In-Charge, NCR, Bureau of Lands, pp. 425-
428, in compliance with Our resolution of September 25, 1979, which was accepted and approved by Us and admitted as
evidence of this Court. In the case at bar, it is part of the evidence of the oppositor Director of Lands, admitted by the trial
court and hence, reviewable on appeal in the petition at bar, he being a respondent herein.

The Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous transfers therefrom to innocent purchasers for value must be
respected and protected in order to achieve the "real purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land . .
. and once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or
sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land." (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84; Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).
In summation, We find no factual and legal basis for the judgment granting the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution
Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City. Fundamentally,
178
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide said petition for reconstitution and for this jurisdictional infirmity, its
decision including all proceedings therefrom are null and void, including the assailed Resolutions of April 30, 1980 and
December 8, 1980 of the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City
in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of
April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the respondent Court of Appeals are likewise declared null and void. Costs against
private respondents.
Petition granted.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur with the recommendation that this case be referred to the NBI for investigation and possible prosecution.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., concurs.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. This is a landgrabbing case. Landgrabbing may be perpetrated by (1) actual and physical usurpation,
(2) expanded survey, (3) fake Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution of fake Torrens titles, registration decrees or judgments
in land registration cases.
The Bernal case, to which this Tahanan case is related, involves the reconstitution of a fictitious Torrens title over parcels
of land existing only on paper and which, when verified on the ground, covers land already titled in the names of other
persons.
The Bernal case. Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal of 102 Sixto Antonio Street, Barrio Rosario, Pasig, Rizal claimed
that her mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, bought in 1942 from the Government a tract of land with an area of 186
hectares located at Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal. Mrs. Sta. Maria allegedly obtained a sales patent dated
September 15, 1942 and Original Certificate of Title No. 42392 dated September 29, 1942.
The said land was allegedly surveyed in 1911 for Mrs. Sta. Maria as shown in Plan II-4374. It consisted of four lots, Lots
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Lots 1 and 3, with an area of 143 hectares, were supposedly sold by Mrs. Sta. Maria to her daughter,
Mrs. Bernal, for P10,000 in November, 1943. The register of deeds of Greater Manila issued to Mrs. Bernal Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42449 for Lots 1 and 3.
In 1970, or more than twenty-six years after the issuance of that title, Mrs. Bernal filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition for the reconstitution of the original thereof. She averred that her owner's duplicate of that title, which
she first identified as TCT No. 12 and later as TCT No. 42449, was not lost.
Judge Pedro A. Revilla denied the petition for reconstitution. Mrs. Bernal appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a
decision dated October 1, 1976 allowed the reconstitution (Per Crisolito Pascual, J., with Bautista and Santiago, JJ.,
concurring).
The case was brought to this Court on petition for review and by means of a special civil action for certiorari since the
Solicitor General's motion for an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was filed one day late in the Court
of Appeals and it was denied.
During the pendency of the case in this Court, or on December 7 and 28, 1978, Greenfield Development Corporation,
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed motions for intervention on the ground that the 143
hectares claimed by Mrs. Bernal included substantial portions of the lands already registered in their names.
As an exceptional case and in the interest of expeditious justice, the interventions were allowed in this Court's resolution
of September 25, 1979. Also in the interest of justice, although unprecedented, this Court ordered the chief of the survey
division of the Bureau of Lands to relocate the boundaries of the lots claimed by Mrs. Bernal and the intervenors and to
report on the overlapping and the improvements in the said areas (93 SCRA 238, 249 and 102 SCRA 421).
In his report of February 25, 1980, the officer-in-charge of the national capital region of the Bureau of lands categorically
stated that Lots I and 3, Plan II-4374, claimed by Mrs. Bernal, do "not actually exist on the ground" or, as found by the chief
of the technical services section of the same bureau, the said lots "could not be located in the locality by all technical
means" and that the original copy of Plan II-4374 does not exist.
Consequently, this court dismissed Mrs. Bernal's petition for reconstitution (Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
and CA, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370).
179
This case of the heirs of Manuela Aquial. As already stated, Mrs. Sta. Maria's alleged 186-hectare land in Barrio San
Dionisio supposedly consisted of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of which Lots 1 and 3, with a total area of 143 hectares, were claimed
by her daughter, Mrs. Bernal. That claim was found to be fictitious in the reconstitution case already discussed above.
Now, the other two lots, Lots 2 and 4, of Mrs. Sta. Maria's land were supposedly acquired by Manuela Aquial of 307 15th
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. She died on January 26, 1967.
On October 5, 1977, her legal heirs named Nicolas, Crisanto, Anselmo, Mamerto, Cirilo and Catalina, all surnamed Pascual,
and Pascuala A. Mejia and Damiana A. Mejia filed in the Pasay City branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the Bernal
case was filed in the Pasig branch) a petition for the reconstitution of Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 issued in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 and the original and owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title issued pursuant
to the said decree allegedly in the name of Manuela Aquial, covering the said Lots 2 and 4, with a total area of 43
hectares located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, formerly Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque and described inPlan II-4374, the
same non-existing plan involved in the 143-hectare land, Lots 1 and 3 claimed by Mrs. Bernal.
It should be noted that 43 hectares plus 143 hectares equal 186 hectares, the total area of the land allegedly surveyed for
Mrs. Sta. Maria in 1911 in the fictitious Plan II-4374. It should be further noted that in the description of Lots 1 and 3, as
set forth in the Bernal case, Manuela Aquial is cited as one of the boundary owners. cdphil

In the description of Lots 2 and 4 set forth in the petition for reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, Lots 1
and 3 and the names of Mrs. Sta. Maria and Mrs. Bernal are not mentioned at all.
The Director of Lands opposed the said petition for reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial. He alleged that a
prior reconstitution proceeding filed by the Pascuals was dismissed by the Makati branch of the lower court; that Decree
No. 15170, LRC Case No. 9368, was issued to Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco for a 422-square meter land in Barrio
Bambang, Pasig, Rizal and that the photostatic copy attached to the petition is a copy of a fake decree.
After hearing, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela in his decision of October 5, 1978 granted the petition. On November 15, 1978,
the Tahanan Development Corporation filed a petition to set aside the decision and for the reopening of the proceeding
on the ground that Lots 2 and 4, claimed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, include substantial portions of the subdivision
lots of the Tahanan Village covered by transfer certificates of title derived from OCT No. 6576, Decree No. 515888, LRC
Case No. 776.
Also on that same date, November 15, 1978, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a motion
to set aside the decision on the ground that the land claimed by the Aquial heirs overlaps the lots of Bagatsing and Alabang
Development Corporation covered by Torrens titles derived from OCT No. 684, Decree No. 4552 issued on August 27,
1910.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal but did not perfect his appeal to the Court of Appeals. As the trial court failed
to resolve the petition to set aside filed by the Tahanan Development Corporation, it filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals which later ordered Judge Valenzuela to resolve Tahanan's petition. He denied it in his order of January
4, 1979.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of November 16, 1979 ordered Judge Valenzuela to reopen the case and allow Tahanan
to present its evidence (Per Agrava, J.). The Pascuals filed a motion for reconsideration. In a resolution dated April 30,
1980, the Court of Appeals set aside its decision and dismissed Tahanan's petition for certiorari. The Tahanan Development
Corporation appealed to this Court.
On the other hand, Bagatsing and Alabang Development Corporation filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition wherein they assailed Judge Valenzuela's decision. llcd

This Court in its decision of August 30, 1982 in G.R. No. 54094, Alabang Development Corporation, et al. vs. Judge
Valenzuela, et al., using the findings and rulings in the Bernal case, reversed Judge Valenzuela's decision and dismissed
the petition for reconstitution.
That decision in the Bagatsing and Alabang case rendered this Tahanan case moot and academic. This case has to be
decided in the same manner as the Alabang and Bagatsing case because this Court had already set aside Judge
Valenzuela's decision and dismissed the petition for reconstitution. All that is necessary is to set aside the above-
mentioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1980.

As in the Bernal case, the decree and title sought to be reconstituted and the land claimed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial
are imaginary or pure fabrications. See J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano, L-33140, October 23, 1978, 85 SCRA 644,

180
where the sisters Manuela and Maria Aquial unsuccessfully assailed OCT No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman
Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., concurs.

(Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55771, [November 15, 1982], 203 PHIL 652-707)
|||

[G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); VIEW OF RESPONDENT COURT
THAT SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 26 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIEDLY AMENDED BY SAID DECREE, TOTALLY
UNFOUNDED. We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26
"appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D.
No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of
Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529reading as follows: ". . .
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court." Worse, it committed
a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26
by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF SAID VIEW. The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes
of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards
to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration
proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication
in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of
title to their land because scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title
thereto and sold the property to third parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLICATION IF NOTICE IS PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailingand
by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is
published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is
to accord primacy to the official publication. That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of
giving notice, which remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in
the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; FUNCTION; LAPSES ON THE PART OF COURTS OR THEIR PERSONNEL, NOT A REASON OR
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF LAWS. The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it
would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice
because it was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since
the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally
unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private
respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression
that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the
court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs
public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their
personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions,
they should be the first to obey the laws.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J :
p

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This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29 August 1988 1 of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October 1988 3 which, respectively, affirmed the Order of
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4 granting the petition
of private respondent for the reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of a transfer certificate of
title despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, and denied petitioner's
motion for the reconsideration of the Decision. 5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and
jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel
of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the
reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's
duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of' the petition but she, however,
did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official
Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were
given.
Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's evidence was made by the OIC-Branch Clerk of
Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order 7 which made the following findings of facts:
"From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a certain parcel of
land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, embraced in
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and registered in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B")
as evidenced by a document of sale executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title
which was usually kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the
fire which razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12,1977 (Exh. "C").
It appears further that there are no co-owner's, mortgagee's, lessee's duplicate copy of said certificate of title
which had been previously issued by the Register of Deeds of this province; that the petitioner is in actual
possession of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to her and that she is benefitting from the
produce of the improvements existing on the area belonging to her."
and disquisition:
"Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its approval, same
is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to reconstitute the original and the
owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of the registered owners (sic)
thirty days after receipt of this Order by the Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Commission, on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy thereof."
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals and made
the following assignment of errors:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION
OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062 WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SERVICE
OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION." 8
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA 394.
In its Decision of 29 August 1988 9 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner and held that:
1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and actual
occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No.
1529" because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides that in original registration cases
182
publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
Section 110 of said Decree provides:
"SEC. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of certificates of title
lost or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting such titles shall be
reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not
inconsistent with this Decree." (emphasis supplied)
2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original and the
owner's duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant case where the
duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the Register of Deeds was
destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found intact in the names of other
persons; and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily
Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.
3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court, not the party
filing the petition for reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard thereto should not
prejudice or injure the latter.
4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original copy of the
transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should not, therefore,
be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 18 October
1988, petitioner filed the instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging therein that:
"a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that the trial
court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original owners (sic) duplicate
copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual
occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;
b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for reconstitution
of the original and duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062."
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989, 10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition. Private respondent
filed her comment on 10 February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the questioned decision of respondent Court of
Appeals.
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July 1989 12 and private respondent on 10 June 1989. 13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals, as
well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987, must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein of service of notice
of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the
court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the Order of the trial court granting
the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section
110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978. prLL

In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13 of R.A. No.
26 reading as follows:
"SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (e)
and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns,
or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the
following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-
owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost
or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the

183
buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses
of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any
interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a
statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or,
if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified
copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petition, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance
of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated,
at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is
known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number
of the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the
occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest
therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit
proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void. We
reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where, in respect particularly to the
required notice to an adjoining owner, We categorically declared:
"The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or
as claimant or person having interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of
Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the
municipality (sic) on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat,
are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court."
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine: LibLex

"The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the notice of
hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the
main entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property lies at least 30 days prior to the
date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites."
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a sophistic distinction between
said case and the instant case and an implausible interpretation of the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have
been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which
intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either
misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:
". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court."
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section
13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
LLphil

Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter alia, that:
"The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting."
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
184
"Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means
is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette,
although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official
publication.LibLex

That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and
jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have
stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the
Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in
its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property.
It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the
reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could
read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice
of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and
registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties
had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the private respondent
the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it was not through her fault that the original copy
of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions;
besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the duty
of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so. It
suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed
with if the failure to comply with them is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe. We
should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or a justification for non-
observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they should be the first to obey the laws. cdrep

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition
No. 11,456.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
(Republic v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 85515, [June 6, 1991], 275 PHIL 243-254)
|||

[G.R. No. 111732. February 20, 1996.]

NEW DURAWOOD CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELIX S. CABALLES, as Judge, RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 71, WILSON M. GAW, ORLANDO S. BONGAT, DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY CO.,
INC., respondents.
Edgar A. Pacis and Belo Gozon Elma Parel Asuncion & Lucila for petitioner.
Andin & Andin for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLE AND DEEDS; TORRENS TITLE OF LAND REGISTRATION; RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES; APPLICABLE
LAWS. Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicatecertificates of
title which are lost or stolen or destroyed. On the other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is expressly provided for under Section 110 of P.D.
1529.

185
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONSTITUTED TITLE IS VOID WHERE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT LOST BUT POSSESSED BY THIRD
PERSON. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted
title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked
any time. (Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) Since we already concluded earlier that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction, necessarily its judgment must fall.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were in the possession
of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioner's chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said
certificates were not in fact "lost or destroyed," there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the
"Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title . . . ." In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order
the issuance of new certificates. Hence, the newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECONSTITUTION OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE TITLE; DUE NOTICE UNDER OATH BY OWNER OR BY SOMEONE
IN HIS BEHALF TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, REQUIRED. Section 109, P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496) provides that in
case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is
discovered. Private respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the procedure set forth in P.D. No. 1529 which, as
already stated, governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title. Section 109 of said law provides, inter
alia, that "due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate "shall be sent by the owner or by someone
in his behalf to the Register of Deeds." In this case, while an affidavit of loss was attached to the petition in the lower court,
no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PETITION TO COMPEL SURRENDER OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE TITLE TO REGISTER OF DEEDS,
PROPER REMEDY WHERE HOLDER REFUSES OR FAILS TO SURRENDER TITLE. Private respondents tried to convince the
Court that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution.
Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in case of the refusal or failure of the holder in this case, the
petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a "petition in court to compel surrender of the same
to the Register of Deeds," and not a petition for reconstitution.
6. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; ANNULMENT BASED ON FRAUD; FRAUD MUST BE EXTRINSIC AND HAVE PREVENTED PARTY FROM
EXHIBITING HIS SIDE; NOT PRESENT WHERE PARTY WAS DULY REPRESENTED. The respondent Court of Appeals, in its
own words, "confine(d) its discussion" in the assailed Decision only to the ground of fraud. It ruled that the RTC's decision
could be annulled only where extrinsic or collateral fraud is shown that is, when the fraudulent acts prevented a party
"from exhibiting fully his side of the case." Hence, petitioner could not claim extrinsic fraud inasmuch as it was duly
represented by Gaw in the reconstitution proceeding.
7. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; CORPORATION CANNOT CLAIM ALLEGED LACK OF QUORUM WHEN RESOLUTION WAS PASSED
WHERE IT HAD TAKEN BENEFITS FROM SAID RESOLUTION. The appellate court explained that while there may not have
been a quorum during the board meeting of petitioner-corporation on May 10, 1984 when a resolution authorizing Gaw
to sue on its behalf was allegedly passed, this did "not mean however, that New Durawood Co., Inc. cannot be bound by
Gaw's action" because "no howl of protest, complaint or denial came from (said corporation)," and that said corporation
in fact had taken advantage of the benefits therefrom. Hence, petitioner is estopped from questioning Gaw's acts.
8. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION CODE; CORPORATIONS; DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY; DOES NOT APPLY TO
A MERE BRANCH MANAGER. The doctrine of "apparent authority" cannot apply as to Gaw because, being a mere branch
manager, he could not be looked upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied or "apparent" power to file suit for
and in behalf of a corporation. In petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of Torrens titles, it is essential
as provided under Sec. 109 of P.D. 1529 as amended (supra) that the trial court take steps to assure itself that the
petitioner is the "registered owner or other person in interest." Otherwise, new owner's duplicate certificates might be
issued in favor of impostors who could fraudulently dispose, hypothecate or otherwise deal in and with real estate in
mockery of the Torrens system of titling properties.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p

The main issue here is: does a court have jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate of a Torrens certificate of title if it
is shown that the existing owner's copy has not, in fact and in truth, been lost or destroyed? The Court resolved this issue
in the negative in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 promulgated on May 31, 1993 and the subsequent Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The said

186
Rulings dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 25434 and in effect affirmed the "order" 3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal 4 dated April 16, 1991 in LRC Case No. 91-924, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 140486, 156454 and 140485 which
were lost, null and void and of no further force and effect and in lieu thereof.
(b) Hereby orders and directs that new copy of the said titles be issued to the petitioner giving them the same
faith and credit and carrying over the same terms and conditions appearing on the originals thereof, upon
payment of the required fees.
"SO ORDERED."
By Resolution of the First Division dated November 15, 1995, this case along with several others was transferred to the
Third Division. After due consultation and deliberation, the Court assigned the undersigned ponente to write this Decision.
The Facts
On February 14, 1990, a "Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Lost Owner's Duplicate Certificates of TCT Nos. 140486;
156454 and 140485" 5 was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal by petitioner-corporation,
"represented by its Branch Manager, Wilson M. Gaw . . . ." Attached to said petition was an "Affidavit of Loss" dated
December 31, 1990 6 of respondent Orlando S. Bongat, one of the stockholders of petitioner-corporation.
Finding the petition "to be sufficient in form and in substance," respondent Judge set the case for hearing on March 18,
1991. On April 16, 1991, respondent Judge issued the questioned order.
Sometime in May, 1991, petitioner discovered that the original TCT Nos. N-140485, N-140486 and 156454 on file with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 had been issued
in the name of respondent Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner
after investigation found out about the reconstitution proceeding in the respondent trial court. So, on July 17, 1991,
petitioner filed suit 7 in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 25434 praying for the annulment of the assailed order
in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by respondent Judge. It also prayed for the cancellation of the new certificates (TCT Nos.
200100, 200101 and 200102). On May 31, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision and on
August 30, 1993, the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse to the Supreme
Court.
The Issues
Petitioner brought up the following ground as basis for its petition:
"The Court of Appeals gravely abused its authority in not declaring the order of respondent Judge Caballes in
LRC Case No. 91-924 null and void for want of jurisdiction and in not declaring that the reconstitution of the
owner's duplicate transfer certificates of title Nos. N-140486, N-140485 and 156454 was obtained through
fraud."
Petitioner argues that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and thus jurisdiction can be acquired only through
publication and notice sent pursuant to Section 13, Republic Act No. 26. It also alleges that fraud is manifest (1) from the
insufficient allegations of the petition filed before the trial court, as it (the petition) does not mention the names of
adjoining land owners and interested persons, as well as (2) from the affidavit of loss attached to the petition.
In their Comment, private respondents aver that in 1990, these three lots were sold by petitioner to Durawood
Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. but the sale in their favor could not be registered because "the certificates of title .
. . were lost." They also allege that the applicable law is Section 109 of R.A. No. 496, as amended by P.D. 1529, and not
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26, and that fraud, in order to serve as basis for the annulment of a judgment "must be extrinsic or
collateral in character," which is not the case in the action before the court a quo. They also fault "(t)he deliberate failure
of Dy Quim Pong (petitioner's board chairman) and his family, who constitute the majority of the stockholders and
directors of (herein petitioner-corporation), to disclose the whereabouts (of) there (sic) son, the President and General
Manager Francis Dytiongsee . . ." who allegedly executed the deed of sale of the lots and who allegedly claimed that the
owner's copies of the TCTs were lost.

In its Reply, petitioner contends that "the very procedure provided under Sec. 109, P.D. 1529, which they (private
respondents) insist is the applicable provision of law in the matter, was not strictly followed . . . ." It also argues that the
owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs were all along in the custody of Dy Quim Pong, whom private respondents should

187
have sued to compel him to surrender the same in order that the alleged deed of sale in favor of private respondent could
be registered.
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent Wilson Gaw had no authority to institute the petition for reconstitution in the
trial court because "(t)he Court of Appeals itself, in its questioned resolution stated that said board resolution (authorizing
Gaw) was passed without the required quorum."
From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows:
(1) Which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title in lieu of lost ones?
(2) Did the respondent trial court have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the new owner's duplicate certificates?
(3) Was the reconstitution of the said owner's duplicate certificates of title obtained through fraud?
The First Issue:
Law Governing Issuance of
Lost Owner's Duplicate Titles
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to reexamine the following provisions referred to by the parties:
(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26: 8
"Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to
be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose
address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things,
the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having
any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court."
(2) Section 109, P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496):
"Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate
certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register
of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate
certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to
him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be
filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
"Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due
hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that
it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as
the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree."
A reading of both provisions clearly shows that Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of
new owner's duplicate certificates of title which are lost or stolen or destroyed. On the other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in
cases of reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is expressly provided
for under Section 110 of P.D. 1529 as follows:
"Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title. Original copies of certificates of title lost
or destroyed in the offices of Registers of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered
by such titlesshall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No.
26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost
or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of
land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent

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(10%) of the total number in the possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That in no
case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred (500).
"Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished by the Register of Deeds of
the place where the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No order or
judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of
such order or judgment without any appeal having been filed by any such officials." (As amended by R.A. 6732;
emphasis supplied)
The Second Issue: Jurisdiction
In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 9 , this Court ruled:
"In Serra Serra v. Court Appeals (195 SCRA 482 [1991]), on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this
Court already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person,
the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently
the decision may be attacked any time."
In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioner's
chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said certificates were not in fact "lost
or destroyed," there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the "Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate
Certificates of Title . . . ." In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Hence,
the newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.
It is obvious that this lapse happened because private respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the procedure
set forth in P.D. No. 1529 which, as already stated, governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title.
Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that "due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate "shall
be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ." (emphasis supplied). In this case, while an
affidavit of loss was attached to the petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.
Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other
recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in case of the
refusal or failure of the holder in this case, the petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a
"petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds," and not a petition for reconstitution.
The Third Issue: Fraud
The respondent Court of Appeals, in its own words, "confine(d) its discussion" 10 in the assailed Decision only to the ground
of fraud. It ruled that the RTC's decision could be annulled only where extrinsic or collateral fraud is shown that is, when
the fraudulent acts prevented a party "from exhibiting fully his side of the case . . . ." Hence, petitioner could not claim
extrinsic fraud inasmuch as it was duly represented by Gaw in the reconstitution proceeding.
The appellate court explained that while there may not have been a quorum during the board meeting of petitioner-
corporation on May 10, 1984 when a resolution authorizing Gaw to sue on its behalf was allegedly passed, this did "not
mean however, that New Durawood Co., Inc. cannot be bound by Gaw's action" because "no howl of protest, complaint
or denial came from (said corporation)," and that said corporation in fact had taken advantage of the benefits therefrom.
Hence, petitioner is estopped from questioning Gaw's acts. The appellate Court was of the belief that petitioner-
corporation ratified Gaw's "authority" by acquiescence to his acts. The respondent Court thus concluded that petitioner-
corporation's "claim of being a victim of extrinsic fraud is baseless."
We are appalled by this rather novel interpretation of corporate law. It is clear that, there having been no quorum present
during the meeting in question, the board of directors could not have validly given Gaw any express authority to file the
petition. Upon the other hand, the doctrine of "apparent authority" cannot apply as to Gaw because, being a mere branch
manager, he could not be looked upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied or "apparent" power to file suit for
and in behalf of a corporation. 11 Neither will estoppel prevent the corporation from questioning Gaw's acts. Precisely,
these acts were hidden from the company and its top officers. How then can estoppel attach? 2
Suffice it to say then, that by his surreptitious filing of the petition for reconstitution without authority express or
implied of his employer, Gaw enabled respondent corporation to acquire the certificates of title in a manner contrary
to law.

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In petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of Torrens titles, it is essential as provided under Sec. 109
of P.D. 1529 as amended (supra) that the trial court take steps to assure itself that the petitioner is the "registered
owner or other person in interest". Otherwise, new owner's duplicate certificates might be issued in favor of impostors
who could fraudulently dispose, hypothecate or otherwise deal in and with real estate in mockery of the Torrens system
of titling properties.
Be that as it may, in the case before us, whether Gaw was authorized to file the suit or not is of little significance in finally
resolving this case. Jurisdiction is and remains the main issue. Since we already concluded earlier that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction, necessarily its judgment must fall.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed decision SET ASIDE and REVERSED; the proceedings in LRC Case No.
91-924 ANNULLED; and the order issued therein dated April 15, 1991 as well as the reconstituted Transfer Certificates of
Title issued pursuant thereto, namely, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 in the name of private respondent declared
NULL and VOID. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
(New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111732, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 109-123)
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