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Article 16

SEC. 3. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

74. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG),petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.


FACTS:
Petitioner Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank charged with two counts of oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal before MeTC of Mandaluyong City.
The MeTC dismissed the criminal information against him., acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that petitioner enjoyed
immunity from legal processes.

The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTCs dismissal. Hence, Liang filed a petition for review before the SC
which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts
performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present Motion for Reconsideration. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Liang is immune from suit.

RULING:
No. The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity
granted to ADB officers and personnel. The issue of whether ornot Liangs utterances constituted oral defamation is still for
the trial court to determine.
The Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by
any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts. In receivingex-partethe DFAs advice and inmotu propriodismissing the two criminal cases without notice to
the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as
much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that
the mere invocation of the immunity clause does notipso factoresult in the dropping of the charges.
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: "Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of
this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities: a.).immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity." The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was
done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a).
Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.

Facts:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two motor vehicles. Both loaded with illegal clumbers, these were driven
by Abuganda and Babalcon. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but
the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed
before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda for violation of the Revised Forestry
Code. On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the
DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda.
The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor. The vehicle driven by Constancio Abuganda was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan, it was again loaded with illegal forest products. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John for violation of the Revised
Forestry Code. Although Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable, It appeared that it was Pagarao
who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.

Issue:
W/N the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, a suit against the State

Ruling:
Yes. Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public
officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the
protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in
good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called
to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In
implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was neither
malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the States consent.

AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondents GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND were allegedly awarded a "verbal contract of lease" in 1970
by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of
national parks, Whoever in NPDC gave such "verbal" accommodation to private respondents was unclear, for indeed no
document appears on record to show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents. Private respondents were
allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. With the change of government after the
EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the
so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within
the public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the Regional Trial
Court against petitioner, Villanueva, and "all persons acting on their behalf". GABI's action for damages and injunction was
subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued
without its consent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
W/N the suit against the petitioner (Public Official) is a suit against the state

Ruling:
No. The rule on suit against a public official being a suit against the state does not apply where the public official is
charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in
their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is
clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may he have been
committed while he occupied a public position.

EDGARDO MANCENIDO FOR HIMSELF AND OTHER TEACHERS OF CAMARINES NORTE HIGH SCHOOL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, PROVINCIAL SCHOOL BOARD, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, PROVINCIAL
TREASURER AND PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, ALL OF THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.

Facts:
"On September 6, 1990 private respondent [herein petitioner] Eduardo Mancenido filed an action for mandamus and
damages with the Regional Trial of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, Daet (docketed as Civil Case No. 5864), against the petitioners
provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board, provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay
the teacher's claim for unpaid salary increases. Petitioners [herein co-respondents] filed their answer to the complaint. The
lower court rendered a decision ordering the Provincial School Board to appropriate and satisfy plaintiffs claim in the amount
of P268,800.00, as unpaid salary increases. Petitioners [herein co-respondents] filed a notice of appeal. Respondent judge
issued an order giving due course to petitioners appeal.
Private respondents filed a notice of appeal. Private respondents filed an opposition to petitioners notice of appeal and a
motion for partial execution of judgment. Respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23, 1994,
granting the appeal of petitioners; (2) approving the appeal of private respondents; and (3) granting their motion for partial
execution. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April 8, 1994 respondent judge denied the motion for
reconsideration."

Issue:
Whether or not a private counsel can represent a municipal official sued in their official capacities

Ruling:

Yes. If the suit is filed against a local official which could result in personal liability of the said public official, the latter
may engage the services of private counsel. The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC
of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, for mandamus and damages. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court granted mandamus,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not award damages. In view of the damages sought which,
if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to have been improperly represented by private
counsel. No error may thus be attributed to the appellate court when it recognized the right of respondents to be represented
by private counsel.

SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V., Petitioner:


V
EFREN JALOS, et al. Respondent

Facts:
Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract
38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan and development of Malampaya gas reserves. On
May 19, 2003, respondents (Jalos, et al) filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Oriental Mindoro. Jalos, et al claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shells natural gas
pipeline. Shell in answer, claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the States
consent. Shell said that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the
development of the Malampaya gas reserves. On March 24, 2004 the RTC dismissed the complaint.

Issue:
W/N Shells service contract with the state give it immunity from suit
Ruling:
No. Shell is not an agent of the republic of the Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the exploration and
development of one of the countrys natural gas reserves. An agent is person who binds himself to render some services or to
do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. Shells obligation under the
contract is not to represent Phil. Government for the purpose of transaction with third persons. Rather its contractual
commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the state.

China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Group vs. Hon. Cesar D. Santamaria
665 SCRA 189, G.R. No. 185572
February 7, 2012

FACTS: China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Group (CNMEG) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to
San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project). The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance
of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project.
The desire of CNMEG to secure the Northrail Project was in the ordinary or regular course of its business as a global
construction company. The implementation of the Northrail Project was intended to generate profit for CNMEG with the
Contract Agreement. The use of the term state corporation to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a GOCC,
and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the
latters sovereign functions.
Respondents prayed for the annulment of contracts entered into by CNMEG and Northrail before the RTC Makati.
Petitioner claims that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the
Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing
provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.
CNMEG prays for the dismissal of the suit, contending that it is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a
local court, and that the contract agreement is an executive agreement, such that it cannot be questioned by or before a local
court.
ISSUE: W/N CNMEG is entitled to immunity from suit
RULING: NO. A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary
activity. Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was
conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government, but was
plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental
functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a GOCC without an original charter. As a result, it has
the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.

Teodora Santos vs. Leoncio Santos

FACTS: An undivided parcel of land was owned by the petitioners and the respondent in the proportion of 1/7 undivided
share for Teodora and 1/14 undivided share each for Josefina and Emiliana Santos (nieces of Teodora) and 5/7
undivided share for Leoncio. Leoncio collected from the Army of the United States of America rentals for the use and
occupation of said parcel of land.
They made a demand upon Leoncio for the accounting of which and payment of their respective shares therein but the latter
failed and refused to do so. They also complain that they made a demand upon Leoncio to have the lot partitioned among them
but the latter again refused. Instead, he sold the lot to the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Upon these allegations they pray that Leoncio be ordered to render an accounting of the rentals and to pay and deliver their
shares in the land; that the parcel of land be partitioned among them in the proportion above stated; that the purported sale
by Leoncio to the National Airports Corporation (the predecessor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration) insofar as their
shares are concerned be declared null and void; that the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration be directed to
vacate the portions of the lot belonging to them, to pay them a reasonable rental until after possession of their shares in the lot
shall have been restored to them and to pay damages and costs.
The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
insufficiency of the complaint against him, and invoking immunity from suit.
ISSUE: W/N the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued
RULING: YES. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally prevent a party or parties
from enforcing their proprietary rights for lack of juridical personality, because it took over all the powers and assumed all the
obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the contract in question.
Where the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and
purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and
obligations arise therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the
officer against whom such action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof the state itself may be sued even without its
consent, because by entering into a contract the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be
sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO


148 SCRA 424, No. L-70853
March 12, 1987

FACTS: Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of 4
lots. He bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale, followed by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property
was evidenced by an informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff 's purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the
same, introduced various improvements therein.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property
reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial court by 86
settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court
ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them to present their
evidence.
Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and
hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
ISSUE: W/N the State is immune from suit
RULING: YES. The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon
a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too
plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence
of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.

Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vinzon


405 SCRA 126, G.R. No. 154705
June 26, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement
with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement was to take effect in
a period of 4 years, unless cancelled by either party by giving 30 days prior written notice from the date of expiry.
Petitioners claim that prior to the agreements expiration, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall
be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim. When Kasim assumed
the said position, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards
set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim, moreover,
that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.
However, the respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent filed a complaint
against petitioners in RTC Makati, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign
sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.
In turn, respondent filed an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its
immunity from suit.
ISSUE: W/N the Republic of Indonesia can be sued
RULING: NO. The SC ruled that the Republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The mere
entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is
an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii.
The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy.
The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot
be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be
settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of
sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local
courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to
include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may
have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it.
NOTA BENE: Jure imperii are activities of a governmental or public nature carried out by a foreign State or one of its
subdivisions
Jure gestionis generally means a nations acts that are essentially commercial or private, in contrast to its public acts.
83. Metran v. Paredes

Facts: A petition was filed before the Court of Industrial Relations entitled "National Labor Union, versus Metropolitan Service
(Metran)," wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate labor organization, thirty of whose affiliated members were
working and under the employ of the respondent; that the respondent is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly
known as 'Metran,' and after several other allegations concluded with the prayer that its nine demands in said petition be
granted. In behalf of the respondent, an oral petition for dismissal of the case was made before the court on the ground that
the respondent belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as such, it can not be sued.

Issue: W/N Metran can be able to invoke the Doctrine of State Immunity.

Ruling: Yes.
The Court held that Metran was a mere office or agency of the government, unincorporated and possessing no juridical
personality under the law, incapable of suing or being sued and that a claim against it would in effect be a suit against the
Government, which suit may not prosper without the Governments consent.

Bernass explanation in the book:


In a republican state, like the Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the will of the
people themselves in freely creating a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" a representative
government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the
common good and general welfare. In so agreeing, the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender some of their private
rights and interest which were calculated to conflict with the higher rights and larger interests of the people as a whole,
represented by the government thus established by them all. One of those "higher rights," based upon those "larger interests"
is that government immunity. The members of the respondent Labor Union themselves are part of the people who have freely
formed that government and participated in that solemn undertaking. In this sense and a very real one it is they are in effect
attempting to sue themselves along with the rest of the people represented by their common government an anomalous and
absurd situation indeed.

84. NAC vs. Teodoro

Facts: The National Airports Corporation (NAC) was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the
provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation.

Before NAC was abolished (by EO 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created), the Philippine
Airlines, Inc. paid to NAC fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land, and the owner commenced an action against the Philippine Airlines, Inc. to
recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against NAC, which by that
time had been dissolved. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to NAC the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision,
Inc. on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that
the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod and, further,
that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals
for the use of their lands.

The Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that because the National Airports Corporation is an agency of
the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, it is incapable of suing
and being sued.

Issue: W/N NAC can be sued.

Ruling: Yes.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to suits. Immunity from suits is determined by
the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.

Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental
capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such a corporation,
for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation.

85. Mobil Philippines vs Customs Arrastre

Facts: This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to
recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The shipment was
discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations
therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the
Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be
sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as
operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private
individuals.

Issue: W/N both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state immunity.

Rulings: Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and damages involving arrastre
services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of the primary
and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity
performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is
undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit
extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the
General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under
which money claims against the Government may be filed.

86. Del Mar vs PVA

Facts: In his petition for mandamus against the Philippines Veterans Administration (PVA), Quirico del Mar averred that he
served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command with the rank of major; that he subsequently
obtained an honorable discharge from the service on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper
claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board granted him a monthly life pension; that the
said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the
United States Government, through the United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the
United States Army, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government.

The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively
barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the
monthly allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. The PVA also
asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. In addition, it alleged that
that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA a
mere agency of the Philippine Government and, in effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable without its
consent.

Issue: W/N PVA may invoke state immunity.

Ruling: No.
Suit against the Philippine Veterans Administration not a suit against the Government. As a general proposition, the rule on the
immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the
public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property." In such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits
against the Government, the Court has no option but to dismiss them.

Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary
who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by
statute for the benefit of the said claimant.

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA


G.R. L-51806
FACTS:
Private respondent Ernest E. Simke at the time of the case was the Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He,
with several other persons went to the Manila International Airport(MIA) to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a
better view of the passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck of the airport. While walking on the
terrace, Simke slipped over an elevation which made him fall on his back and break his thigh bone. The CAA was held liable for
negligence and was ordered to pay for damages aside from the medical and hospital bills. CAA alleged that it cannot be sued
considering that it is an agency of the government, and that there was no basis for a finding of negligence.
ISSUE: WON the CAA is an unincorporated government agency, therefore, is immune from suit.
RULING: No. The immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. It was
settled in National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro that the CAA is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions
pertaining to a private entity. It was created not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially
a business.

NOTES: (Not really necessary to the provision assigned, but the teacher might ask about this.)
Negligence was found considering the design of the lines of the tiles in the viewing deck are continuous, which makes it
difficult to notice the inclination. There was no warning sign indicating the change in elevation too. CAA was expected to
properly and safely maintain the facility considering one had to pay first in order to gain access in the viewing deck.

Hon. Ramon J. Farolan, Jr. (Commissioner of Customs) v. Court of Tax Appeals


217 SCRA 298 (1993)
FACTS:
The vessel S/S Pacific Hawk arrived at the Port of Manila carrying 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading.
The value of the importation was valued at $3,750 and classified under the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem.
Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11, 350. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-
examination of the shipment, acting on the strength of the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito nets. The
shipment was re-appraised upon discovery that it consisted of 80 bales of screen net. Bagong Buhay was assessed P272, 600
as duties and taxes. The Office of the Collector of Customs also forfeited the shipment in favor of the government since its
quantity and value was misdeclared. Bagong Buhay filed a petition with the Farolan to appeal the decision of the Collector of
Customs. Farolan affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs; Bagong Buhay moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Bagong Buhay elevated the matter to the CTA, which reversed the decision of Farolan on the ground that the forfeiture of the
shipment was not in accordance with the law. Farolan moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the CTA.
Bagong Buhay filed a petition to release the shipment and later demands that the Bureau of Customs pay for damages for the
shipment that were in bad condition.
ISSUE: WON the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the shipment actually lost by Bagong Buhay.
RULING: No. The Bureau of Customs is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own. It has an inherent power of taxation and performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is not a
proprietary function. Thus, Bagong Buhays claim for damages must fail.

NOTES:
Ad valorem according to the value.

Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court


FACTS:
A passenger express train of defendant collided with a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc., which led to the death of 18 of
the latters passengers and physical injuries to 53 others. BTI alleged that the cause of the collision was the negligence of PNR
and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, for operating its passenger train without any signal lights or switchman to warn
the public of the approaching train. BTI filed the instant action for Damages against PNR. PNR alleged that the collision was
caused by the negligence of BTIs bus driver, Romeo Hughes. It was determined that Cirbado is guilty of negligence as the train
was speeding. There was no contributory negligence on the part of Hughes considering the fact that he asked the conductor to
make a Look and Listen before traversing the tracks. PNR is liable for damages.
ISSUE: WON PNR enjoys immunity from suit, thus, not liable for damages.
RULING: No. Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suit. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objects which the entity was organized. In this case, PNR is subject to the obligations of
persons engaged in private enterprise, it is not performing a governmental function. Therefore, PNR is not immune from suit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. EMILIANO R. NOLASCO,Respondent.


FACTS:
The root of the dispute is a public works project, the Agno River Flood Control Project, the undertaking of which has
been unfortunately delayed due to the present petition. Funding for the project was to be derived primarily through a loan
from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). A Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) was constituted by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the purpose of conducting international competitive bidding for the
procurement of the contract for Package IIthe Guide Channel to Bayambang under Phase II of the Project. Six (6) pre-
qualified contractors submitted their bids for the project, among them the present intervenors Daewoo Engineering and
Construction Co., Ltd. (Daewoo), and China International Water and Electric Corp. (China International).

However, even before the BAC could come out with its recommendations, a legal challenge had already been posed to
preempt the awarding of the contract to Daewoo. On 19 February 2002, Emiliano R. Nolasco filed aPetition, seeking a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, with the RTC of Manila, naming the DPWH and the members of
the BAC as respondents. He alleged having obtained copies of "Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH Consultant,"
which he attached to his petition. Nolasco argued that based on the confidential reports it was apparent that Daewoos bid was
unacceptable and the putative award to Daewoo, illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the Filipino
taxpayers. Nolasco prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and Daewoo
disqualified as a bidder.

The petition was raffled to the sala of Judge Nabong. Anex-parte hearing was conducted on the prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO), with Nolasco alone in attendance. Petitioner issued anOrderdated 4 March 2002 directing the
issuance of a TRO, enjoining the DPWH and the BAC from awarding the contract to Daewoo "and that [Daewoo] be disqualified
as bidder and its bidders be rejected" from carrying out the Project.4The term of the TRO was for a period of twenty (20)
days. Upon learning of the TRO, the DPWH and the BAC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to
Dismiss Petition with Motion for Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order Dated March 4, 2002.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in regarding Nolascos petition as a petition against the State without its consent?
HELD:
No. The SC finds no error on the part of the RTC in regarding Nolascos petition as a suit against the State without the
latters consent. An unincorporated government agency such as the DPWH is without any separate juridical
personality of its own and hence enjoys immunity from suit. Even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental
to its primarily governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still cannot be sued without its consent. Moreover,
it cannot be said that the DPWH was deemed to have given its consent to be sued by entering into a contract, for at the time the
petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had not yet entered into a contract with respect to the Project. (MAIN POINT IS VERY
BAYUT BASED ON THE COLOR HEHE)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,Petitioner,vs. UNIMEX MICRO-


ELECTRONICS GmBH,Respondent.
FACTS:
Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer
cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote controllers, parts and accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. (Handyware). After the
shipment arrived in the Port of Manila the Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the description
appearing on the cargo manifest. As a result, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware and later issued a warrant
of seizure and detention against the shipment.

The Collector of Customs issued a default order against Handyware for failing to appear in the seizure proceedings.
After anex partehearing, the Collector of Customs forfeited the goods in favor of the government. Unimex (as shipper and
owner of the goods) filed a motion to intervene in the seizure proceedings. The Collector of Customs granted the motion but
later on declared the default order against Handyware as final and executory, thus affirming the goods forfeiture in favor of
the government. Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs (BOC Commissioner) in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). In a decision, the CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the subject
shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs duties. The CTA decision became final and executor.

Unfortunately, however, respondents counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA
decision. Respondent filed in the CTA a petition for the revival of its decision. It prayed for the immediate release by BOC of its
shipment or, in the alternative, payment of the shipments value plus damages. The BOC Commissioner failed to file his
answer, hence, he was declared in default. BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its
warehouses.

The CTA declared that its previous decision could no longer be executed due to the loss of respondents shipment so it
ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods based on the prevailing exchange rate at
the time of their importation. The RP, represented by the BOC Commissioner, assailed the decision of the CTA on the ground
that government funds cant be charged with respondents claim without a corresponding appropriation and cannot be
decreed by mere judicial order.
ISSUE: WON the government can be held for actual damages?
HELD:
Yes. Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately fall on the
government, and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for governmental acts
(jus imperii),we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its
exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine. (Main Point mga ateng)

As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOCs ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping
of respondents goods. We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in failing to provide a cogent explanation on
the goods disappearance, considering that they were in its custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation. The
situation does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly,
the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties
that may have legitimate claims against it.

Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts directive that, upon payment of the necessary customs duties by
respondent, petitioners "payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of goods or properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau
of Customs."

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC.,Petitioner,vs. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT


AUTHORITY,Respondent.
FACTS:
PROVI is an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment, information technology products and broadcast
devices, including the supply of plastic card printing and security facilities. TESDA is an instrumentality of the
government; To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards
to trainees who have passed the certification process.

TESDAs Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public biddings on for the printing and encoding
of PVC cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both instances since only two (2) bidders PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp.
submitted proposals. Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with
PROVI. TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their "Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance" (the Contract
Agreement) for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards.TESDA and PROVI executed an
"Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance" (Addendum),whose terms bound PROVI to deliver one
hundred percent (100%) of the enumerated supplies to TESDA.

TESDA in turn undertook to pay PROVI thirty percent (30%) of the total cost of the supplies within thirty (30) days
after receipt and acceptance of the contracted supplies, with the balance payable within thirty (30) days after the initial
payment. PROVI alleged that TESDA paid PROVI only 3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of
35,735,500.00; Despite the two demand letters dated March 8 and April 27, 2001 that PROVI sent TESDA, the outstanding
balance remained unpaid. PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. The RTC ruled
in favor of PROVI. TESDA filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA and the CA set aside the RTCs orders after finding that: (a)
TESDAs funds are public in nature and, therefore, exempt from garnishment; and (b) TESDAs purchase of the PVC cards was a
necessary incident of its governmental function; consequently, it ruled that there was no legal basis for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment/garnishment.The CA subsequently denied PROVIs motion for reconsideration;hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON TESDA is covered by the State immunity from suit?
HELD:
Yes. TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without
its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates
this Constitution.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against
the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency
covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is
against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ
of attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA
performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and
establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this
function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the
performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and
disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions. (MAIN POINT Sizzums)

ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA,petitioners,vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch,
Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C. BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR
GENERAL,respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, sought the payment of just
compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government
through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of
the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written
or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged the appraisal
committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00
per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended in the sense that the remedy prayed
for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.

In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice,
Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and
therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown.
ISSUE: WON the defendants are immune from suit?
HELD:
No. The SC reversed the decision of the lower court. The government is immune from suit without its consent.Nor is it
indispensable that it be the party proceeded against. If it appears that the action would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls
for application. It follows then that even if the defendants named were public officials, such a principle could still be an
effective bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial responsibility for the government, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is not personal. The
party that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability may be interposed.

So it has been categorically set forth inSyquia v. Almeda Lopez:5"However, and this is important, where the judgment
in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge
against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of said Government."

SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL.


G.R. No. L-1648
August 17, 1949

Facts:
Petitioners, Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings
situated in Manila. They executed three lease contracts one for each of the three apartments. The period for the three
leases was to be for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US. Six months
after when Japan surrendered petitioners approached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and
requested the return of the apartment buildings. Moore and Tillman expressed to plaintiffs that the US Army wanted
to continue occupying the premises. Petitioners requested to execute a lease contract but respondent refused but
advised that the US Army will vacate the apartments. Not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs
formally requested Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the apartments. Tillman refused to comply with the request.
Because of the assurance that the US Government would vacate the premises, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure
possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by respondents.
Petitioners served a formal notice to the occupants demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in
rentals to P300 a month; (c) execution of new leases (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in
the event of failure to comply with said demands.
The 30-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with the demand. Plaintiffs commenced
an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against
respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the real party in interest was the US Government and
not the individual defendants. Furthermore, the respondent argued that the war between the US and her allies on one side
and Germany and Japan on the other had not yet been terminated and consequently the period of the three leases has not yet
expired. Also, a foreign government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent. That even
though the US Government was not named as the defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless the real defendant as the
parties named are officers of the US Government.
The Municipal Court dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower court.

Issue:
W/N the court has jurisdiction to hear and try the case

Held:
No. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the present case for Unlawful Detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The US Government has not
given its consent to the filing of the suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case
of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a
foreign government without said governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
this country.

A/N: Napahaba ata facts ko so nag bold na lang ako ng important facts :D

Festejo vs Fernando
G.R no. L- 5156

Facts:
Petitioner, Carmen Festejo, owner of sugar lands filed a suit against the defendant Isaiah Fernando, the Director of
Public works for taking possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be constructed
thereon without obtaining first a right of way, without her consent and knowledge, andagainst her express
objection. Festejo demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition.

Issue:
W/N the suit filed is against the state
Ruling:
No. The evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiffs land defendant committed acts
outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiffs land and damaged
it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on
him by law.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act.
It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope
of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If
he exceeded the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under
the color of his office, and not personally. In the eyes of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

Shotgun ruling: No. The motion against Isaiah Fernando, Director of Public Works in charge and responsible for the
construction of irrigation systems in the Philippines is a directed personally against him, for acts which he assumed to run on
his official concept. The law does not excuse him from responsibility for the abuses to commit or have committed in the
performance of his official duties.

Aberca v. Ver 160 SCRA 590 [1988]

Shauf vs CA
G.R no. 90314

Facts:
Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was
rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. Shauf was offered a temporary
position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will
be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to
vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was extended. Thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She
claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she
filed against Persi (private respondent). Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it
was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint
against private respondents for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin
(Filipino by birth) RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to
be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for
acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. CA reversed RTCs decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Issue:
W/N private respondents are immune suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

Ruling:
No. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner Shauf. While the doctrine of immunity is also
applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not
cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official act in a manner that invades or violates the
personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will not be a suit against the state.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as
an ordinary citizen.
Main point: Doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in
his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen; It is a well-settle principle of law that a public official may be liable for
his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malic and in bad faith or beyond the scope
or his authority.

VIDAD v RTC

Facts:

A group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held for 3 days, a must action, or a strike from their school
classes, to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget. The teachers also assailed alleged corruption in
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).

A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional Director Teofilo Gomez with a warning that if the
"striking" school teachers were not to resume their classes within twenty-four hours, administrative charges will be filed. The
order not having been heeded, administrative complaints against the teachers concerned were thereupon filed. The teachers
were each given five days from receipt of said complaints within which to submit their respective answers and supporting
documents. Constituted to look into the cases was an investigation panel composed of three DECS lawyers.

On 13 November 1990, a group of school teachers, who were administratively charged, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete a complaint against the aforenamed DECS officials. A temporary restraining order, prohibiting the
defendants from continuing with the administrative investigation, was forthwith granted by the court. The defendants filed
their answer, later followed by a motion to dismiss. The school teachers, on their part, moved to strike out the appearance of
the Office of the Solicitor General and to accordingly declare the defendants in default. Both motions of the plaintiffs and the
defendants were denied by the court in its Order of 10 April 1991.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General may properly represent the defendants in the Regional Trial Court
cases.

Held:

Yes. Presidential Decree 478, in part, provides: The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President of head of office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:

a. ) Represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party (stress supplied).

REGIONAL DIRECTOR v CA

229 SCRA 557 [1994]

Facts:

The private respondents,together with other Negros Oriental public school teachers, held, starting 19 September 1990
and lasting until 21 September 1990, a mass action, or a strike from their school classes, to demand the release of their salaries
by the Department of Budget.

A return-to-work order was promptly issued by one of the petitioners, Regional Director Teofilo Gomez of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"), with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to
resume their classes within twenty-four hours, administrative charges would be filed. Since the order was not heeded,
administrative complaints against the teachers concerned were thereupon filed. The teachers were each given five days from
receipt of said complaints within which to submit their respective answers and supporting documents. An investigation panel,
composed of three DECS lawyers (the other petitioners herein) was constituted to look into the case.
Prior to the start of the hearings by the DECS Investigating Team, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 42, Dumaguete City, a complaint for injunction, prohibition and damages with prayer for
preliminary injunction. On 26 March 1991, the court a quo issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

The petitioners filed their answer, later followed by a motion to dismiss. On 24 June 1991, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and set the case for pre-trial hearing, holding that the complaint stated a cause of action and that the court
had jurisdiction thereover.3

The pre-trail, however, was pre-empted by the petitioners when they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus on 25 July 1991 and so docketed as G.R. No. 100781.4 In a resolution, dated 5 August 1991, the
Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.

On 6 May 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed


decision,5 denying the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not public officials are immune from damages

Held:

No. Public officials are not necessarily immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from acts done in
bad faith, for if malice is indeed established, public officials can no longer be said to have acted within the scope of official
authority so as to still find protection under the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Africa v. PCGG/Villanueva v Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Victor Africa (petitioner) who claims to be an employee of Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc (ETPI)
holding the positions of vice-president, general counsel(on official leave without pay), corporate secretary and special
assistant to the chairman (and president), filed a petition for injunction, seeking to enjoin the PCGG and its
nominees/designees to the board of directors and the newly-installed officers of ETPI from implementing their alleged illegal
act of ousting him from his offices and positions at the ETPI pending the determination of whether they have validly, legally
and morally assumed their supposed positions and offices as "directors" and/or "officers" of ETPI.

The petitioner was also allegedly forcibly taken out of his office on the basis of a PCGG order, petitioner Africa sought
to have the Commissioner declared in contempt of court for having committed "improper conduct tending directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

He likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering respondents to open his office
and allow him access to and use of the same.

PCGG sequestered ETPI on March 14, 1986. Eduardo Villanueva was elected as the president and general manager.
Petitioner contended that the assumption of Villanueva to said positions was effected without due process of law through the
PCGG using and voting the sequestered shares without legal justification.

Villanueva filed a motion to dismiss the issuance of a restraining order on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, because
the complaint partakes of the nature of a suit against the State without its consent; that plaintiffs are not the real parties in
interest in the action, which is actually a quo warranto proceeding; that the complaint is premature for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and that the issues raised have already been passed upon by the Supreme Court In G.R. No. 85621,
petitioner Villanueva imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan in proceeding with the deferred hearing of Civil
Case No. 0048.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it restrained the PCGG, its nominated officials
at ETPI from voting the sequestered shares.

Held:

No. The Court upheld the restraining order issued by the Sandiganbayan insofar as it restrained the stockholders
meeting specifically for the purpose of ratifying the proposed amendment to delete from ETPIs articles of incorporation and
by-laws the right to refusal clause.
Recognizing that the exercise of the right of refusal is an act of strict ownership, the Court ruled that that while there
may be instances when only through an act of strict ownership can the PCGG be able to prevent the dissipation of assets of a
sequestered corporation of business, the situation then presented was nevertheless not one of such instances.

DOH v Phil Pharmawealth

518 SCRA 240 [2007]

Facts:

Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and
supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines. Then Secretary of Health Alberto G.
Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27 outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of
government suppliers for pharmaceutical products.

A.O. No. 27 was later amended by providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at
ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner.
Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug
products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine."

DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units of vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite
the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding pharmawealths request for inclusion of additional items in its list of
accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin GBenzathine contract and gave the lowest bid. However, the
contract was awarded to the other company. Hence, respondent filed a complaint injunction, mandamus and damages against
DOH.

Issue:

Whether or not DOH can invoke immunity from suit.

Held:

NO. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or
jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in charge or financial
liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the
official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity
from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action
directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.

Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court,
agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to
impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Baer v. Tizon 57 SCRA 1 [1974]

Foreign Government
103 US v Ruiz
Brief Fact Summary.When Ruizs sentence was vacated because she refused to waive her rights to impeachment evidence,
the government brought appeal on the grounds that its plea bargaining process was not unconstitutional.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a defendant receive exculpatory evidence at
trial, a defendant may waive their right to this information in a plea agreement.

Facts.Federal prosecutors offered respondent, Angela Ruiz, a fast track plea bargain, after 30kg of marijuana was found in her
luggage by immigration agents. Per the terms of the bargain, the respondent would have gotten a reduced sentence
recommendation, in exchange for waiving the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other
witnesses, as well as to information supporting any affirmative defense she may raise if she were to go to trial. Ruiz rejected
the waiver of her rights, the offer was withdrawn and she was indicted for unlawful drug possession. At sentencing, Ruiz asked
the judge to grant her the sentence she would have gotten, had she taken the plea bargain, on the grounds that it was in
violation of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial. The Court of Appeals ruled for the respondent, and vacated the
sentence, and the government brought appeal.

Issue.Whether, before entering into a plea agreement, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors to disclose
impeachment information relating to informants or other witnesses.
Held.Justice Breyer, for the Court, held that although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do provide that a defendant be given
exculpatory impeachment evidence from prosecutors, a guilty plea under a plea agreement, with a waiver of rights, can be
accepted as knowing and voluntary.
Concurrence. Justice Thomas concurs, noting that the purpose of requiring exculpatory evidence is so there be no unfair trial
to the accused, which does not apply at the plea bargaining stage.

Discussion.While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are designed to protect the right to a fair trial, a defendant can knowingly
and voluntarily waive those rights in a valid plea agreement.

104 Sanders vs Veridiano


FACTS:
PetitionerSanderswas thespecial servicesdirector oftheU.S. NavalStation.Petitioner Moreau wasthe commanding officer
ofthe Subic NavalBase. Private respondent Rossi is anAmerican citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyerwere both employed asgame room attendants inthe special services department of the
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-timetopermanentpart-time. Theyinstitutedgrievanceproceedingstothe rulesand
regulationsoftheU.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-
time status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The
letter contained the statements that:
a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;"
b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;"
and
c) "even though the grievant were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public
places where others not involved in the case could hear. "Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner
Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So,
private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letterscontained libelous imputations andthat the prejudgment of
thegrievance proceedings was aninvasion oftheir personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners argued that the acts
complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no
jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the
petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel,
including the private respondents. Given the official character of theletters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the
United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope oftheir authority. Thus,
it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that the
mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from
the protection ofthe law ofpublic officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere
invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the
officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of aforeign state, as in the
present case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages,
such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government
as theirprincipal.This willrequirethat government toperform anaffirmative acttosatisfy thejudgment,
The appropriation ofthe necessary amount tocover thedamages awarded,thus makingthe action asuit
againstthat government without its consent.
Understanding on the law:
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that
par in parem non habetimperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our
previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

US v. Reyes
Facts:
Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG
headquarters as the activity exchange manager.

Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed. After shopping & while she was already at the
parking lot, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Her
fellow ID checker then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing
irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such
search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store
unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a
wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in
excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue
embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial
discrimination in our own land which is a blow to our national pride & dignity. Summons & complaint were served on
Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a
suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts
done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use &
operation & defense thereof.

Issue:
WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity for the acts done by her is in performance of her functions as NEX Manager of
JUSMAG pursuant to the Philippine-US Military Assistance Agreement.

Ruling:
NO.
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement
creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official
functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

HOLY SEE VS.ROSARIO


Facts:
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines
by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the
name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold
to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale
of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and
three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.

The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to SC. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Issue:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

Ruling:
YES. The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was
acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the
property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the
lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

Jusmag vs. NLRC

Facts:

Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at the
JointUnited States Military Assistance Group to the Philippines (JUSMAG-Phils.). He had been with JUSMAG from 1969-1992.
When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAGPhils.- Filipino Civilian Employees Assoc.,
a labor organization duly registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due tothe abolition of his position.
Sacramento filed complaint with DOLE on the ground that hewas illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG.
Heasked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed Motion to Dismiss invokingimmunity from suit. Labor arbiter Cueto in an Order
dismissed the complaint "for want of jurisdiction". Sacramento appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor
arbiter and held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued because: (1) the principleof estoppel-that JUSMAG failed to
refute the existence of employer-employee relationship;(2)JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired
the services of private respondent. Hence, thispetition.
Issue:
WON JUSMAG is immune from suit.
Held:
JUSMAG has immunity from suit. When JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental
function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between the Philippines and America. A
suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to
the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

T/SGT Aldora Larkins vs National Labor Relations Commission


Fact:
PetitionerwasamemberofUnitedStateAirForceassignedtooversee dormitoriesofThird AircraftGenerationSquadron(3
AGS)atClark AirBase Pampanga. 3 AGS terminated the contract for maintenance of dormitories with De Guzman Custodial
Services. It was left to new contractor JAC Maintenance Service owned by Joselito Cunanan and decides whether it would
retain services. Cunanan decided to bring in his own workers. Complaint was filed against Larkins, Lt. Cor Frankhauser for
illegal dismissal and underpaymentofwagesandaddedclaimsforemergency,costofliving allowance, etc. Petitioner failed to
answer the complaint and appear to hearings, thus the
LaborArbiterrenderedthedecisiongrantingallclaimsofprivaterespondentsand found both the Petitioner and Lt.
Col. Frankhauster guilty of illegal dismissal.PetitionerappealedbutNLRCaffirmedthedecisionortheLaborArbiter,but
declaredthat: In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced and considering our finding that the real party
respondent is the United States Government through its Armed Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made
subjecttoexistinginternational agreementanddiplomatic protocol.
Issue:
WON Lt. Cor Frankhauser is immune from suit.
Ruling:
YES, because he acted for and in behalf of the US government which, by right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the
dormitories of at the Clark Air Base for USAF members. The doctrine of state immunity also applies to complaints filed
against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties within the scope of their
authority.

Minucher vs CA

Facts
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, was filed against Minucher following a buy-bust operation conducted by
Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said
to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency,
however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the buy-bust operation conducted at the residence
of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the diplomatic status of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained
the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Carabao v. Agricultural product Com. 35 SCRA 224 [1970]

Arcega vs CA
FACT:
The petitionerAlicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name Fairmont Ice Cream Company, filed a complaint
before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from
allegedly unauthorized payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange.
TheCentral Bankmoved todismiss the complainton the grounds, among others, that thetrial court has no
jurisdictionover the subject-matter of the action, because the judgment sought willconstitute a financial charge against
the Government, and therefore thesuit is one against the Government, whichcannot prosper without its consent, and
inthis case no such consent has been given. The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set
forth in the Central Banks motion to dismiss. The petitioner Arcega filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution to
which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted
a certification that the balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was turned over to the Treasurer
of the Philippines. Then the court denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration as a result Arcega appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether asuit against the Central Bank for refund asuit against the State?
Held:
It is not a suit against the state. The charted of the Central Bank of the Philippines authorizethat it canto sue and be sued. The
consent of the State to be sued, therefore, has been given.

Rayo vs CFI

FACTS:
At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of
the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns
in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation.

Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents from dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent corporation
is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE:
W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and operation of
the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

HELD:
The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any
court under its charter.

As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.

Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died. The heirs of Bania filed a complaint for
damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and
its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After
trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of Bania.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality could be held liable.

HELD: No. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load
of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS:
In December of 1978, the full ownership of PNEI was transferred to its creditor, the National Investment Development
Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank (PNB),following the latters foreclosure of PNEI assets.PNEI
was one among several companies placed under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
shortly after the historic 1986 events in EDSA.Some time in January, 1988, the sequestration order was lifted to give way to
the sale of PNEI by the APT which, in the meanwhile, had taken over the management of the company [The continuing
deterioration of its financial condition prompted PNEI to lodge, on07 May 1992, a Petition for Suspension of Payments with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a move calculated to prevent further dissipation of PNEIs assets and to make
PNEI a viable source of income for the government.The management committee, which was created to handle the business
operations of PNEI, presented a report to the SEC that recommended, in a move to best serve the interest of all parties
concerned (creditors, employees of PNEI and the government), the sale of the company through privatization in accordance
with the rules of the APT.As a cost saving measure, the management committee also recommended to the SEC the
retrenchment of some 500 employees of PNEI.The retrenchment was carried out during the months of November and
December of 1992 and January of 1993.
The filing of various labor complaints against PNEI was the immediate result.
The Solicitor-General initially points out that APT, being an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of thePhilippines, is
immune from suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not APT, being an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of thePhilippines, is immune from suit.
RULING: No. The Court is not persuaded even as it is cognizant of the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent.
The doctrine is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance.On the contrary,
as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; its clear import then is that the
State may at times be sued.The States consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law.In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found
in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.Implied consent,
on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counter-claim, or when it
enters into a contract.

DOH VS. CANCHELA, SECTION 3, IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

FACTS: The DOH entered into three owner consultant agreements with the private respondents covering infrastructure
projects for the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC), the Batangas Regional Hospital and the Corazon
L. Montelibano Memorial regional Hospital in Bacolod City. The agreements for the three (3) projects are almost identical. This
requires the private respondents to prepare: detailed architectural and engineering design plans; technical specifications and
detailed estimates of cost of construction of the hospital, including the preparation of bid documents and requirements; and
construction supervision until completion of hand-over and issuance of final certificate.
While the Agreements were witnessed by the respective Chief Accountants of the hospitals and were duly approved by the
Department of Health, the former did not issue corresponding certificates of availability of funds to cover the professional or
consultancy fees. The DOH through is authorized representative, wrote separate letters to the respective chiefs of hospitals
confirming the acceptance of private respondents complete Contract or Bid Documents for each project and RECOMMENDED
THE PAYMENT OF 7.5% OF THE PROJECT ALLOCATION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS CONSULTANCY FEES. During the
construction of the projects, various deficiencies in the performance of the agreed scope of private respondents work were
allegedly discovered which were not communicated to the private respondents.
Due to such alleged deficiencies, petitioner withheld payment of the consultancy fees due to private respondent. Neither did
petitioner return the documents, plans, specifications and estimates submitted by private respondents. Considering the refusal
of the DOH to pay said fees despite repeated demands, the private respondents submitted the dispute to the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). After the presentation of evidence by both parties, the Arbitrator issued his decision
dated March 30, 1999 sentencing the DOH to pay the private respondents to pay P3, 492,713.00 for services performed and
completed for and accepted by DOH. The said amount shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the award until the
decision becomes final. Thereafter, the principal and the interest accrued as of such time shall earn interest at 12% per annum.
The DOH filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for being filed out of time. As
such, on motion of the private respondents, the Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government can still be held liable to a private individual if the contract it entered into is void but
the other party had already complied with his obligations under said agreement.
RULING: Yes, because the government shall not enrich itself at the expense of its citizens. To sustain the argument that the
government cannot be held liable would not only perpetuate a grave injustice on private respondents who performed their
services in good faith and were given the run-around for over eight years, but would sanction as well unjust enrichment on the
part of the State.

U.S.A vs. Guinto


Feb. 26, 1990
G.R. No. 76607
FACTS: Private respondents sued several officers of the US Air Force regarding a bidding for barbering services contract. A bid
from Okinawa Area Exchange was solicited through James Shaw, a contracting officer. Private respondents and
concessionaires inside the Clark Air Base, Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao and Pablo C. del Pilar, were among the
bidders, however, Ramon Dizon won the bidding. The private respondents complained with the contention that Dizon also bid
for the Civil Engineering (CE) area which was not included in the bidding invitation.
PHAX or the Philippine Area Exchange, to whom the respondents complained to, represented by petitioners Yvonne Reeves
and Frederick Smouse clarified that the CE area is yet to be awarded to Dizon because of a previous solicitation. Dizon was
already operating the NCO club concession, however, and the contract expiry of the CE barbershop was extended only until the
end of June 1986. Hence, the respondents filed a petition, with a prayer to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to
revoke the award to Dizon, and conduct a rebidding to allow the private respondents to continue operating their concessions
by a writ of preliminary injunction pending litigation. To maintain status quo, Respondent court issued an ex parte order to the
petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion for dismissal and petition to oppose the preliminary injunction. They contended that the
action was in effect a suit against the US Force. Both were denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition for
preliminary injunction were filed before the Supreme Court and a TRO was issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can use State Immunity (Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution) as defense.

RULING: No. The barbershops, subject of the bidding awarded were commercial enterprises, operated by private persons,
therefore they are not agencies of the US Armed Forces nor part of their facilities. Although the barbershops provide service to
the military, they were for a fee. State Immunity cannot be invoked by the petitioners for the fact that they entered into
a contract with a private party, commercial in nature.
Under Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, The State may not be sued without its consent. However, this does not mean that at
all times, the State may not be sued. There needs to be a consideration on if they were indeed acting within the capacity of
their duties, or if they enter into a contract with a private party.

Agency Propriety
Fontanilla v. Maliaman 194 SCRA 486
[02-27-1991]

Petitioner: Sps Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla


Respondent: Hon. Inocencio D. Maliaman, and National Irrigation Administration

Facts:
In its Motion for Reconsiderationof the Court's Second Division decision the National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
through the Solicitor General, maintains that, on the strength of Presidential Decree No. 552 (which amended certain
provisions of Republic Act 3601, the law creating the NIA)"the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious
act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent."

Issue:
WON allowing the NIA to be liable for the act of its driver, would run contrary to the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent

Ruling:
No, the same purpose such as public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of certain enterprises
(those engaged in the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communication, or in the
production and distribution of prime necessities, etc.) yet it is certain that the functions performed by such enterprises are
basically proprietary in nature. Moreover, Sec 2(b) of PD 552 provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
Hence, the NIA is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

PRC v. CA 256 SCRA 667


[05-08-1996]

Petitioner: Philippine Refining Company (now Unilever Philippines)


Respondents: Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Refining Company (PRC) was assessed by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(Commissioner) to pay a deficiency tax for the year 1985 in the amount of P1,892,584.00. The assessment was timely
protested by petitioner Petitioner Philippine Refining Company (PRC)., on the ground that it was based on the erroneous
disallowances of bad debts and interest expense although the same are both allowable and legal deductions.
It appears that the only evidentiary support given by PRC for its aforesaid claimed deductions was the explanation or
justification posited by its financial adviser or accountant.
Out of the sixteen accounts alleged aas bad debts, only 3 complied with th requirements of worthlessness. To justify
one of the other accounts, particularly the account of AFPCES (Armed Forces of the Philippines Commisary and Exchange
Service) for unpaid supplies in the amount of P13,833.62, petitioner asserts that since the debtor is an agency of the
government, PRC did not file a collection suit therefor.

Issue:
WON the PRC may not file a suit against a government agency for the recovery of a debt.

Ruling:
No, the mere fact that AFPCES is a government agency does not preclude PRC from filing suit since said agency, while
discharging proprietary functions, does not enjoy immunity from suit. Such pretension of petitioner cannot pass judicial
muster.

Waiver
Republic v. Purisima 78 SCRA 470
[08-31-1977]

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines


Respondent: Hon Amante Purisima, presiding judge of CFI Manila

Facts:
Private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines filed a suit for collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach
of contract Rice and Corn Administration.
The Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding raise the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-
known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its
consent.
Respondent Judge said that the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and
defendant Rice and Corn Administration anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may
thereafter arise.

Issue:
Whether or not, the State, by virtue of the RCA contract with Yellow Ball, gave consent to sue

Ruling:
No, the consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute. Thus,
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to, had no binding force on the government. That was
clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

Santiago v. Republic 87 SCRA 294


[12-19-1978]
Petitioner: Ildefonso Santiago
Respondent: Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director, Bureau of Plant and Industry

Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City naming as defendant the
government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. His plea was for
the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as
the donee. As alleged in such complaint, the Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities
and water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974.
The CFI sustained a motion to dismiss on the part of the defendant on the premise that the State cannot be sued
without its consent.

Issue:
Whether the respondents may be exempt from liability due to immunity from suit

Ruling:
No, the constitutional provision itself snows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not be
express. It can be implied. "The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen. A donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental
postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way.

Traders Royal Bank v IAC


GR no. 68514

Facts: Petitioner Traders Royal Bank extended a loan to the National Media Production Center, an unincorporated government
instrumentality tasked with the function of disseminating government information. The money was for the purpose of
facilitating the broadcast of a basketball season. When the bank tried to collect, the National Media Production Center
(NMPC) pleaded immunity from suit.
Traders contends herein that although NMPC is a government instrumentality and hence, it may not be sued without its
consent, by entering into a loan agreement for the benefit of the PBA, it exercised a proprietary function thereby abandoning
its sovereign capacity and impliedly consented to be sued. It also asserts that NMPC's petition for Certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in the appellate court was improper.

Issue: W/N NMPC is immune from suit in the case at bar.

Ruling: No. Immunity from suit may be waived by implied consent to be sued as when the state enters into a contract that is
proprietary in character. The evidence is that such is the contract here. Hence, immunity was effectively waived.

Republic vs Sandoval
220 SCRA 124 (1993)

Facts: The heirs of the deceased, together with those injured from the Mendiola massacre of 12 rallyists on Jan. 22, 1987,
instituted a petition seeking for damages. The massacre was the culmination of 8 days and 7 nights of encampment by
members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform
(MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City. The ones responsible
for the shooting of farmers at Mendiola were military personnel and policemen.
Hon. Edilberto Sandoval issued an Order dismissing the case, on the ground that the impleaded Military Officers, since they are
being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial
responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit cannot conveniently and correspondingly be applied to
them. Petitioners seek its reversal.

Issue: W/N the impleaded Military Officers can be held liable for the deaths that followed the incident.

Ruling: Yes. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although
the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident
occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings,
there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and
military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in
dispersing the marchers.
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official
action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and
as its agents and servants.
Delos Santos v IAC
223 SCRA 11 (1993)

Facts: Petitioners Delos Santos and Spouses Padilla are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal (area:
19,061 sq m). Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo Cadiente, a private
contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying
1,165 sq m of their parcel of land. Aside from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also
constructed, occupying more areas of their property. Petitioners filed two cases which were later consolidated.
Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases several grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against
the state which could not be maintained without the State's consent. The lower court dismissed the petition; petitioners
elevated the case to the SC on certiorari, which referred the cases back to the IAC. IAC ruled that the two actions cannot be
maintained because they are suits against the State without consent.

Issue: Whether or not the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained
Ruling: Yes.The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the State against an action for payment by the owner. The respondent government
officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use; no expropriation proceedings had been
undertaken prior to the construction of the projects. Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on
the price of the land to be reckoned from the time of the unlawful taking.
Petition granted. Republic of the Philippines shall have been impleaded as defendant in said cases.

DA v NLRC
227 SCRA 693 (1993)

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services to
be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by SSA in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment ofwages, non-payment of 13th
month pay, overtime pay, etc. as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly liable with the SSA for the payment of money claims of the
complainants. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA
and the SSA. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution, faulting the NLRC
for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the COA. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Ruling: No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The
general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government consents
and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private parties.
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the
complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.

EPG Construction v Vigilar

Facts: The Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a
government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig. The MHS entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) to develop the housing site and construct 145
housing units. By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing,
Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the
construction of the housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each
housing unit".Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units
despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas
that additional funds will be available and forthcoming. Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to
P5,918,315.63. Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined
that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be
forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA). In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December
20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of
Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303. In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to
the DPWH. In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money
claims. Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners
their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Ruling: No. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that
this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.
MP: The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
It is just as important , if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the ruleof law were to be
maintained.

Philrock v Board of Liquidators


Facts: PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against the Board of Liquidators, as liquidator of the defunct
REPACOM the replacement of the defective rock pulverizing machinery purchased from REPACOM or as alternative, to refund
the purchase at 31% of its contract price, reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining the plant
at Php5,000 a month and Php4,000 per day as unrealized profits and exemplary damages and Php50,000 attorney fees plus
expenses and costs of the suit.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State, filed a notice of appeal on the ground that
the payment for damages are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued
a Writ of Execution. Subsequently the Board of Liquidators filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition in the Court of
Appeals where the Court of Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators in the Philippine National Bank may
be garnished.
Ruling: No, The REPACOM, a government agency with no juridical personality, enjoyed the governments immunity from suit.
The sale contract it entered into with Philrock was merely incidental to the performance of its governmental function. Hence it
was not a waiver of Immunity. Without an act of congress appropriatin the amount due, there can be no disbursement of
public fund.
MP: Governments consent to be sued does not mean it concedes liability.
Note :Purchase of the said rock pulverizing plant from REPACOM in the total amount of P l02,837.66

Liang v People of the Phils


Facts: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank, was allegedly charged for uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, petitioner was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court(MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issed by the MeTC.
After fixing petitioners bail at P2400 per criminal charge, MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The
next day the MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity form legal
process under section 45 of the agreement between ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from the suit, the MeTC judge
dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside
the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest earlier issued. Petitioner elevated the case to
this court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
Issue: Whether or not Liang is covered with immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government?
Ruling: No.

Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:


"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the
Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.)....... immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank
waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity."

Republic v Hidalgo

FACTS:Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale,
reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession a property against the Republic of the Philippinesin the RTC of
Manila. It is also known as the Arlegui Residencewhich housed two Philippine presidents and which now holds the Office of the
Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau. The case was initially dismissed by the presiding Judge of the Manila RTC
(Branch 35) on the ground of state immunity. The case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC (Branch 37), with respondent Vicente
A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republic in default for failure of Solicitor Gabriel
Francisco Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required Answer within the period prayed for in his motion for
extension. It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the Constitution and the fundamental rule that government funds
are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance of the writ of execution against the Republic.

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke immunity from suit.

HELD: Yes, It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an
unrestrained execution against it. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law

129 Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. vs Josefina Trinidad Lichauco

FACTS:
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private telecommunications
carriers and the DOTC. They formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They
requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
When DOTC Sec confirmed the assignment of Phil. Orbital slots, PASI undertook preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its
business partners, and making an initial payment. When they requested the Land banks confirmation of its participation in a
club loan for the governments assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina
T. Lichauco sent a letter to the bank controverting the said assignment, clearly stating that orbital slot 153E can no longer be
assigned to PASI. She subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including 153E in December 1997.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn that another company whose
identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153E, filed a complaint before
the RTC of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot
153E, declare its nullity, and for damages.
PASI also filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de
Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of officers or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Because a prejudicial question was found by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was
dismissed and reconsideration was denied. Hence, PASI is in petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman
erred in dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint on the account of prejudicial question is in order.

RULING:
NO. While the evaluation of a complaint involves the discretion of the investigating officer, its exercise should not be abused or
wanting in legal basis. The proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition,
and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer (according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court).
It would sanction the extiguishment of the criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article
89 vis a vis Article 90 and 91 of the RPC.
The Order dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 dated July 17, 1998 against Lichauco was set aside. The Ombudsman
was Ordered to reinstate the case for further proceedings.

Doctrine of State Immunity:


When a public officer, in this case, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury caused by him is his own personal
liability and cannot be imputed to the State.

130 CURATA VS. PPA, 590 SCRA 215 (2009)

TOPIC: STATE IMMUNITY (RESULTING LIABILITY)

FACTS:
Executive Order No. (EO) 385 Series of 1989, and EO 431 Series of 1990, delineated the Batangas Port Zone BPZ and placed it
under the PPA for administrative jurisdiction of its proper zoning, planning, development, and utilization.Pursuant
thereto, the PPA instituted on October 14, 1999 a Complaintfor expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC
of Batangas City.Owned by some 231 individuals or entities, the 185 lots, with a total area of about 1,298,340 square
meters, were intended for the development of Phase II of the BPZ.
On July 10, 2000, the RTC issued the first compensation order, which pegged the just compensation at PhP 5,500 per
square meter in favor of the Dimayacyac Group.Alleging that almost all of the group members were of advanced age, the trial
court, upon motion, issued the July 24, 2000 Order that granted the execution pending appeal.On July 31, 2000, another order
ensued, directing the issuance of the writ of execution.On August 2 and 3, 2000, respondent Sheriff Rolando D. Quino served
Notices of Garnishment on LBP.
On August 10, 2000, PPA filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal and Pay
Appeal Fee.Within the period of extension requested, PPA filed its Record on Appeal on August 25, 2000.On the same day,
August 25, the RTC issued an Order denying PPAs Notice of Appeal from the July 10, 2000 Order (First Compensation Order)
on the ground of non-payment of appeal fee.In its August 28, 2000 Order, the RTC denied PPAs Record on Appeal.On
September 18, 2000, the RTC denied PPAs Motion for Reconsideration of the August 25, 2000 RTC order.
Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 60314, PPA challenged the execution pending appeal of the July 24, 2000 Order, the July 31,
2000 Order which issued the writ of execution and the August 2 and 3, 2000 Notices of Garnishment.In its supplemental
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 60314, PPA assailed the August 25, 2000 Order which denied PPAs motion for extension of time to
file Record on Appeal and pay the appeal fee, the August 28, 2000 Order which denied the PPAs record on appeal and the
September 18, 2000 Order which denied PPAs motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: W/N government funds may be seized to satisfy the writ of execution.

HELD: NO. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government
properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.

131. U.P. v. Dizon 679 SCRA 54 [2012]

FACTS:

The University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders
Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and
Sciences Building in the campus of the University of Los Baos (UPLB). In the course of the implementation of the contract,
Stern Builders submitted three progress billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the
billings. The third billing was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the
disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP and officials to collect the unpaid billing
and to recover various damages.

Meanwhile, the sheriff served notices of garnishment on the UPs depository banks namely Land Bank of the
Philippines (Buendia Branch) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (Commonwealth Branch). The UP assailed said
garnishment of funds. Stern Builders and dela Cruz, meanwhile, again sought the release of the garnished funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the funds of UP are subject to garnishment?

HELD: No

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a chartered institution performing a legitimate
government function. The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting
quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and
income enumerated under the Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to
achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the
possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a
special trust fund the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always
be subject to auditing by the COA.

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use
of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds
subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment
rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against
the UP, because suitability of the State does not necessarily mean its liability.

Section 6. Police Force

132 Patrolman Oscar Quilona vs. The General Court Martial


Facts:
Oscar Quilona, policeman, was charged before respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on 2 counts, under
Article 248 of the RPC.
The petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to Pres. Cory Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and
sought a waiver of a military jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National
Police Law creates his honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court.
Petitioner filed a motion to inhibit court martial from proceeding with his arraignment and his case be investigated and tried
by a civilian prosecutor or court. His motion was denied. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.
---------------------------------- Additional facts. But for section 6 purpose, the above facts is already sufficient---------------------------
---
At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner's counsel manifested to respondent General Court Martial his client's desire not to be
arraigned and to be tried by a civilian court, furnishing respondent court martial a copy of petitioner's letter to the President.
The petitioner's arraignment was reset.
On 28 December 1990, the petitioner filed a motion to inhibit respondent court martial from proceeding with his arraignment
and that his case be investigated by a civilian prosecutor or tried by a civilian court. Although the said motion was set by
petitioner-movant for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent court martial decided to have it argued on 28 December
1990 the very day it was filed. And after a closed-door deliberation among members thereof, it resumed session where
it denied the petitioner's motion. Thereafter, it proceeded to read the charges and specifications to petitioner.
Notwithstanding the petitioner's refusal to enter a plea, respondent court martial entered to him a "Plea of Not Guilty" and set
the trial of the case on 25 January 1991.
Petitioner has filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, alleging
that respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for inhibition and that there is no appeal, nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not PNP members shall be tried by a civilian court.
Ruling: Yes.
As prayed for by petitioner, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, directing the respondents to CEASE and DESIST
from trying and/or proceeding with the trial of the petitioner.
Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating the PNP, which took effect on 1 January 1991, provides:
"SEC. 46.Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving
PNPmembers shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts;Provided, That the courts-martial appointed
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include
appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the
Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial:Provided,further,
thatcriminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be
transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."
Section 46 should be read in the light of the policy of the State declared under Section 2 of the act, which says:
Sec. 2Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and order,
ensure public safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the effective delivery
of the basic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police
force that is national police force that is national in scopeand civilianin character.Towards this end, the State
shall bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement and public safety agencies created under this Act.
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions.
Itsnational scope and civilian character shall be paramount.No element of the police force shall be military
nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line therewith,
the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.

ANTONIO CARPIO (in his capacity as citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Philippine Bar)
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF DILG
206 SCRA 290 (1992)

Facts:

Petitioner Carpio assails the constitutionality of RA 6975 which established the Philippine National Police (PNP) and placed it
under the reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) pursuant to Sec 6 Art 16 and approved by
President Cory Aquino.

Carpio advances that the Act emasculated the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to
administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained with the Department Secretary; and by vesting the power to
choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors.

SC upheld its constitutionality and that there is no usurpation of the power of control as the local executives merely act as
representatives of the NAPOLCOM.

Issue: W/N the Act detracts from the Constitutional mandate that the PNP shall be administered and controlled by
NAPOLCOM.

Ruling:

NO.

Full control remains with the NAPOLCOM. The local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As
such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions. Thus, unless
countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM.

PNP as a civilian agency and NAPOLCOM not being an independent Constitutional Commission are subject to the
Presidents power of executive control, thru his or her alter ego, the DILG Secretary. ("Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency")

The circumstance is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under
the assailed Act.

Department of Budget, CSC, NAPOLCOM and PNP


vs Manilas Finest Retirees Association, Inc.[Text Wrapping Break]GR 169466 May 9 2007

Facts:
Petitioners DBM et all assail and seek to set aside RTCs decision, declaring herein respondents entitled to the same retirement
benefits accorded upon retirees of the Philippine National Police (PNP) under RA 6975, as amended by RA 8551 and ordering
herein petitioners to implement the proper adjustments on respondents retirement benefits.

Under the RA 6975 (or PNP Law), the PNP would initially consist of the members of the Integrated National Police (INP),
created under P.D. No. 765 (or INP Law), as well as the officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). It
was then amended to RA 8551 which reengineered the retirement scheme in the police organization. Relevantly, PNP
personnel, under the new law, stood to collect more retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had
retired under the INP Law, received.

INP retirees, spearheaded by the Manilas Finest Retirees Association, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory relief impleading
DBM et al in the RTC.

Respondents asserted that the petitioners could not claim the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6975 because at no time did
they become PNP members, having retired prior to the enactment of said law.

RTC held that R.A. No. 6975, as amended, did not abolish the INP but merely provided for the absorption of its police functions
by the PNP, and rendered judgement in favor of INP Retirees. Respondents et al motion for reconsideration was denied by CA
as well.

Issue: W/N INP retirees should not be excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees.

Ruling:

Yes.

By removing the police force from under the control and supervision of military officers, the bill seeks to restore and
underscore the civilian character of police work. The lawmakers were one in saying that there should never be two national
police agencies at the same time. INP was not in fact abolished but was merely transformed to become the PNP. Members of
the INP, therefore should receive the same retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees.

Most importantly, the perceived restriction could not plausibly preclude the respondents from asserting their entitlement to
retirement benefits adjusted to the level when RA 6975 took effect. Such adjustment hews with the constitutional warrant that
the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and other benefits due to retirees of both the government
and private sectors.

PO3 William Mendoza vs PNP[Text Wrapping Break]GR 139658 June 21, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Mendoza and another PNP officer were faced with an affidavit-complaint for illegal arrest, illegal detention, physical
injuries and robbery. Found guilty, PNP Regional Director ordered their dismissal from the service.

Claiming that they were denied due process, they filed an appeal to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB) of the NAPOLCOM.
RAB affirmed the decision of the PNP Regional Director and denied Mendozas motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Petitioner then filed with RTC a petition for certiorari. That he was denied due process and prayed and to annul RAB
Decision. The RAB, through the OSG, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, contending that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies; that before seeking judicial intervention, he should have first appealed the RAB Decision to the
Secretary of DILG, then to CSC. RTC denied.

RAB then filed with CA. CA affirmed dismissal. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner assails CA decision on
the ground that he failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

Issue: W/N petitioners failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is fatal to his cause.

Ruling:

Yes. The Decision of the PNP Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of dismissal from the
service is appealable to RAB. From RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. Here,
petitioner did not interpose an appeal to the DILG Secretary.

In the event the Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, petitioner may still elevate his case to the CSC. Section 6, Article
XVI provides that the State shall establish and maintain one police force which shall be civilian in character. Consequently, the
PNP falls under the civil service. Thus in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Civil
Service Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the Department and finally to the Commission.

It is elementary that where, as here, a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should first be resorted
to.