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    221 views28 pages

    Hall, The Bakuhan System in Cambridge History of Japan

    Uploaded by

    Aaron Christopher
    HAll BakuHan

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    CHAPTER 4 * THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM ‘The political structure established by the Tokugawa house in the early years of the seventeenth century is now commonly referred to as the bakuhan system (bakuken ‘aise. This term, coined by mocern Japa- nese historians, recognizes the fact that under the Edo bakufu, oz shogunate, government organization was the result ofthe final matura- don of the institutions of shogunal rule a: the national level and of daimyo rule at the loci! level." Although Tokugawa Ieyasu. became shogun in 1603, it was 20t until the years of the dynasty’s third sho- gun, Iemitsu, that the Edo bakufu reached its stable form, taat is, not until the 1630 and 1640s. And it took enother several decades before the han, or daimyo domains, completed their evolution as units of local governance.” Scholars now agree, however, that most of the insti- tutional components of the bakukan system had made their initial appearance under the first two of the “three great unifies,” Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi ‘This chapter will trice the formation and the evolution of the bakuhan structure of government from the middle of the sixteenth centuzy to the end of the eighteenth century. Because the following chapters will treat separately the daimyo doma.ns as units of local administration, the primary emphasis of this chapter will be the Edo shogunate and the nationwide aspects of the bakukan system. As noted in the introduction to this volume, historians increasingly icentify the brocder dimessions of shogunal rule by using the concept of kokka (nation or state) to replace fase (system), thus coining the expression 1 The msc ofthe uz Bohuhan is essentially a post-Worll War IT phenomenon hough te ‘loon inthis Bek had bean fo conctve of Edo givernmeat ast dyarly by the ie foros, See [6 Tastburs, "akuhen tae ony in Shir Nilowls aay (Toyo CASS ‘econ, 1947), snd Nakamra Richy Niko hme sathowsah (Tokyo: Nikasa sobs, 2‘The new interes: in the daimyo domain wa also Jl by the owo scholars cited in footnote: [Aferste war the Bel wat svodsced by Pino Tamot, nhs Batahon tach no Re (ekgo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1961); and by Kanai Madoka, Hime Cokye: Sinbundh, ge Aaold Blithe descies in greater deal tbe energence of the han suis eld Chip in this lume THE BAKUHAN SYSTEN 129 pukuhansei-hokka (the bakwhan state)’ Though not explicitly adopting this usage, this chapter will treat the Edo shoguiate as a ‘otal national policy, not simply as 2 narrowly defined political system. “The political and social institutions that underlay the bekuhan polity bad their origins in the “unification movement” of the last half of the sixteenth century, especially in the greet feats of military consolidation and social engineering achieved by Toyotomi Hideyoshi during the last two decades of the century.* Although neithe: Nobunaga nor Hide- yoshi became shogun, they sueceeded in advancing to absolute propor- tions the capacity to rule over the daimyo and oter political bodies thet comprised the Japanese nation. In the parlance of the day they succeeded in winning the tenka (the realm) and serving es its kogi (its ruling authority).* At the same time hewever, the daimyo enhanced their own powers of private control over thes lecal domains (their Johto in a limited local sense}, borrowing support from the very cen- tual cuthoriy that sought to constrain them. The most significant featuze of the resulting national polity was that unification was carried oxy 50 far. The daimyo domains, though giving up a portion of their hard-won autonomy, managed to survive as part of the srstem.* “Tosugawa Ieyasu and his immediate successors brought to its fullest development the bakufu system of rule under a military hegemon, But spite the preponderance of military power that the Tokugawa sho- sgaasheld, ther legal status was not qualitatively differen: fom that of the ffteenth-century Muromachi shoguns. Or the other hand, the powers exercised by the daimyo within their domains had exparded tremendously since txe time of the Muscmachi miktary governors, the shugo daimyo. In fact it was probably in the haz that the machinery of centralized bureaucratic administration proceeded the farthest, In meny instances the Edo shogunate based its governing practices on 3 See the creatment ofthis approach 0 Japanese pial story by Suki Junnosuke in ahha! tok von” in Araki Moriah ea, comps., Taker Nikon hike ss: 3) (obo: Tokys dig stuppanks, 1973). 4 Foe recent seerview in English of Hideynh’s sil polis, sce Bereard Susser, “The ‘Dyctom: Regime andthe Daimyo,” in Jties F Mase tnd Wiliam B, Houser, eds The vu i Jopanse Hist (Stanford, Cali: Sanfrd University Pres, 18s), pp 128-33. For eater daily see Mary Eliabeth Berry, Hider (Cari, Mass. Harvard Uaver- 9 Fre, 1983), 152 penetrating enment ofthese terns appears in Chapter + in his volume. For the ety tue of these terms by Me Inge seslonal daimyo of ibe svteeh entry, see Shu ‘Katoaca wih Marta Colla, “The Development of Saal Lavin John Whitey all, Kei Negara an Kozo Yomantra, eds, “upon Beir Tokuaa:Polical Covel ‘mind Eaowomic Grout, 1500-1630 (Prince, NJ: Princeton Uniesty Press 981, Fp.t9-24 6 The prevauty cited sympoi suas the elution of i by Mass and Hieron but role is pionee fir to prementnbeseial-strtur terms 130 ‘THE BAKUMAN SYSTEM technicuss adopted from times when the head of the Tokugawa fine twas simply one of many daimyo competing for .ecal supremacy in central Japan. In analyzing the creation of the Edo bakufu, then, we must deal with two seperate but interrelated strands of institutional development. And it is this that is suggested by the term bakuhan THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE AND :TS RISE TO POWER “The story of the rise of the Tokugawa family to become the foremost military house of Japan follows a pattern ccrimon among a whole class Of active regional military families who competed for local dominion uring the fifteenth ane sixteenth centuries.’ The stages o! growth, from focal estate manager (itd) to small independent military lord (Geumsitt), to minor regional overlord (dairayo), anc then to the status fof ma-or regional hegemon were typical of the day. As of the 1550s, there were daimyo leaders in almost every region of Japan poised to contest the national zenka, Why Teyasu rather than enother of his peers fnanaged to gain the prize, restec, no doubt, on his native ability and on such unpredictable factors as the lengzh of his life (he lived to be Seventy-three), his ability to father capable sons (he kad eleven), and the location of his origimal power base. The Mikawa~Cwari region was Clearly one of “ae more favorable ocations from waich to take and hold the imperial capital. It was the starting point for all three of the uniliers. “The Tokugawa house genealogy as offically adopted by Ieyasu in 1600 chimed descent from the most prestigious cf military lineages, the Seiwa Geaii, through the branch Ine begun by Nitta Yoshishige (1135-1202). The originator of the Nitta line rook his name from the Tocality in the province of Kézuke to which he was first assigned 2s estate manager. In the generations ‘hat followed, the Nitta line branched, giving rise to numerous sublines, cack of which followed the custom of adopting the name of its residential base as is idemtify- ing surname. One such branch took the name Tokugawa from the village of that name in the Nitta district of Kozuke. Eight generations later the head of this Tokygawa fanily is presumed to have left Kocuke and established himself as the adoptive head of che Matsa- + Ama he agente of arriehstieson re of he Twa hone, have ed aa ees ha vl ao Mon ees Tokye oni» Kon 968) 8 ath Mn: Boo bay sl 1 of Nr mo rb Tyo: Shaka, 079). 0 Kec Maeda the essen Tokupeva hegemony an be and. Sev ou Mey Ene nt A: Ee THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 131 hair family, chiefs ofa village bearing the sams name in neighberin Mews vince, According ote offal genealogy, fey we the ninth head of this Matsudaira line, and it was he who in 1566 peti tioned the Kyoto court to recegnize « change of suzname to Tokugawa See Figure 4. There are numerous questions about the auchenticity ofthe oficial SS ramodra society podlgret played an ereual tole te ceabishs ment of a family’s political status. Descent fiom noble lineage wtbether or not supported by authentic documentation, was commonly Cairzed by local members of :he provinsal warrior aristocracy. When such families reached nationalimportance, the neec to prove ena. ogi- eal correctness became critical. In Ieyasu's own case, nct only dit he change his surname, he also for atime kept two descent chars, thus kespng open a choice of two pedigrees, one tied to the Fujiwara (the foremost ccurt family) and the other to the Minamoto (one of the primary military lineages). His decision fo sete forthe Minamoto was taken in the wake of his victory at Sekigahara in 1600, when the possibilty of becoming shogun seemed within his grasp. ‘Whether the Kozuke years recorded in the oifcial genealogy are to be taken seriously isnot of great consequence. Infact, most recent studies of the Tokugavea house begin with the Mikawa years, starting roughly from the middle of the fifteenth century. Only then do the ‘sources permit a reasonably reliable account. We begin, tuen, aa time in Jaganese history when the old order that had been maintained by the Muromcchi shoguns and their proviccial agents, the shugo daimyo, was being challenged. A new generation of provincial military lords vas en the rise. These Sengoku daimyc, as they have beea called, built up tightly knit housebands of increasing size and miliary effective ness. The strength of these crganizations lay in the closeness of the lord-vassal relationships that held the housebands together. Other thn the sted ices in he sie ofthese xgniteg, he ost sible index ofthe gcowth ofthese new organizations cou the mature oftheir military estbishmentse oe seen i8 «qiilaesemurai wore dings from semmon cuvators by cr possession of proprietary lordsaizs and residences protected by ridimentary moats and earthen embankments. As fighting, became more technologically advanced, these local wartiot families took to ‘building small fortifications, usually on he ridges of nearby ills, in Yihich the local chief and his band of Followers could take shelter and tsi off predators. During the sixteen:h century taese litle “hill cas- ‘THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 133 ths” proliferated throughout the country. In Mikawa we can trace the establishment of the Matsudaira branch families by noting the appear- ance of nurierous hilltop foris above the valleys of the Yahagi River and its upper tributaries. The village of Matsudaira was itself on the Asuke River some distance above its confluence with the Yahagi. The first two Matsudaira generations were confined to this mountainous eavitonment, but the third chief, Nobumits: (?—1488) greatly ex- panded the family’s reach, pushing ito the midcle plain of Mikawa and occupying the castle of Anjo in ¢47t. For roughly fifty years the Matsudaira based themselves at Anjo. Rect its location to the west and south of Matcudaira village made it hard to hold, particularly in the face of the growing power of the Oda ablishment to the west in Owari Province. In 1524 the family chief iyoyasu (1511-35) consolidated his position oy pulling back to the east of the Yahagi river, adoptng the cesile of Okazaki as his headquar- ters. This castle was to serve the Metsudaira on and off until Teyasu’s time, Okazaki was well placed for purposes of military defense and economic growth, and by the 1550s the family had asserted itself over several districts covering roughly the interior one-third of Mikawa Province.’ The Matsudaira were not yet in a position to stand on their own. Historically they existed, as did others in this area, within a regional power structure built around the Imagawa hcuse, whose heads were military governors (shugo) of Suruga, and at times of Mikawa and ‘Totdmni as well. As a vassal of the Imagawa, the Matsudaira aspired to the vice-governorship of Mikawa, But they were hard pressed by the head of the Oda house who, as vice-governor of Owari, was actvely pushing beyond its provincial borders. During the 1550s the Matsu- daira household split over waether te realign themselves towarc the ‘Oda. The move to Okazaki Castle was an implcit decision to continue to look toward the east and the Imagawa. But Kivoyasu was killed in 1535 by one of his own men over this issue, and when his successor Hiirotada (1526~49) (Ieyasu’s father) acknowledged the Imagawa over- lordship, a faction of the Matsudaira leadership troke off and joined the Oda. As a child Ieyasu was a victim of these unsettled circum stences. From age six to fourteen he was kept as a hostaze first by the Oda and then by the Imagaws. Technically he had inherited the family headship following Hirotada’s death in 1549. But Okazaki was cccu- ‘The fifteen shogun are in diamonds. Fathers are the three successor houses (gosanke), in to adopted sons by dashed lines. ran, and Encyclopedia of Japan.) of the Tokugawa tamuly. three lords lines (gosamky6), ran, Nihonsh sr 8 The Okazaki yeus are oughly cotered in the dccuments hoy pulsed by Ocseaki Gig. Shibata Akins, ey Tokugace Zeynu va ma thy 5 us. (ORaKL sh Olazabh sbuyakuth, 1926) sed in rectangles; heads of re 4.1 Genealogy 134 ‘THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM pied by Imagawa officers. It was only in 1356 that Teyasu was able to return to Okazaki as heed of the Matsudaira main line. leyesu found the Matsudaira houseband in disarray. On top of this, between 1556 and 1559 he was constantly in the field fighting at the behest of his overlord, Imagawa Yoshimoto (1515-60). Nevertheless, he. did what he could to repair the damage done to the housebanc during the years of internal dissensioa, thereby strengthening the bonds betweex himself and the numerous cadet houses and several classes of house vassals, The Tokai years By the middle of the sixteenth century, the temptation to contest for natioral overlordship wis becoming increasingly seductive to some of the more powerful daimyo. Imagawa Yeshimoto was one of the first to ‘make the attempt. But when in 1560 he led an army of some 25,000 ‘men cross Mikawa on his way to the capital to gain legitimacy from the emperor, his army was decisively defeated, and he himself was killed ty a greatly inferior force under the command of Oda Nobu- naga. Yoshimoro’s deat: released Teyasu from his bond to the Imagawa house. As a sign, he adopted the given name Ieyasu at this time. (It had been Mo:oyasu, the “Moto.” of couse, having come from Ima- zgawa Yoshimero.) Nobunaga was now clecrly the coming power in the area, and Teyasu lost litle time in entering into a formal alliance with him. ‘Thus began a new chapter in the evolution of the Matsudaira house.? Using Okazaki as his central castle and p-otected on his west- em flank by Nobunaga, Ieyasu began to press eastward at the expense of the now-weakened Imagawe of Totimi and the still-powerfel ‘Takeda in Surnga. By 1565 he had succeeded in placing his men in the key castles of Mikawa. In other words, Mikawa was safely his. Sym- bolic of his new sense of confidence, in 1566 he petiticned the court to have his surname changed to Tokugawe, Iraving the name Matsudaira attached to the principal cadet families ane also available for use as an honorary “gift name” with which Ieyasu could reward daimyo who became his allies. Aloag with official recognition of his change of surname, Ieyasu received appointment to the now largely honorary title of governor of Mikawa and to the fourth cour: rank junior grade. 19 The mip of the Matsa tous’ caste holdings in ikawa Pevince printed io Kitajima, ‘Kem hid, 39, revs he soe elasonship ofthe Matsula ra House tothe province ‘lca coaBigurioa~ hillsand ever, THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 135 By such means Ieyasu began to acquire recognition as a member of the military aristocracy. During the next few years Teyasi beat into shape the kind of houseband and enfeoffment pattern required of a successful daimyo. ‘Whereas the Matsudaira chieftains up to this point had relied heavily on Kinsmen as their main supports in battle ané administration, Ieyasu ecopted the practice of converting even heads of collateral houses into dependent hereditary vassals (fudat), thus gaining firmer grip over his senior military commanders. At the same time he enlarged his vassal bend, particularly at the lower levels, by incorporating into his fighting forces large numbers of rurai samurai. These he assigned to the com- mand of his enfeoffed vassalsto form new and expanded military units. Az yet anotaer level he worked to stabslize the ralationsh:p between his samurai retainers and the land-cultivating peasantry. As other daimyo were doing at this time, Ieyasu began a systematic survey of the land of his domain, He also confronted the troublesome issue posed in Mikawa by the militant and politically independent Ikké religious communities, eventually bringing them around to his support. Nobunaga and Ieyasu worked closely togetner during the next few years. Teyasu’s hold on Mikawa prctected Nobsnaga’s advance on Kyoto in 1568, whereas the Oda presence in Owari gave Ieyasu the freedom to concent-ate on his eastera front. By 1570 the Tokugawa ctie! had taken all of Totémi from the Imagawa and had moved his castle headquarters to Hamamatsu, a pert town in Totomi. Ieyasu now ‘began with Nobunaga’s help an all-out effort to destroy the Takeda of Suruga and Kai. It turned out to be é lengtxy operation. Not until 1482 were the Takeca finally defeated and Ieyasu could receive investi- ture of Suraga from Nobunaga. By this ume Ieyasu had acquired control over all or parts ofthe five provinces of Mikawa, Suruga, Tétémi, Kai, end Shinano. These all being in the Tokaidd circuit, Teyasu was commonly referred tos “lord of five Tokai provinces.” He stood among che dozen or so largest deimyo of the land, and he was alresdy gaining a rsputaton for having ‘one of the most effective administrative and military organizations in the country. Nobunaga’s assassination in 1582 by Akecti Mitsuhide threw the ‘existing power structure into momentary confusion. Ieyasu himself, a kely figuie to come to the defense of the Nobunaga legacy, was caught without his following in the port city of Sakai. He thus was forced to make his way to Okazaki in secret. Before he could gain full scmmand of his forces for 2 possible military move, Hideyosh: had 136 THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM already killed Akechi and was in the process of winning over the Oda coalition. Ieyasu had been outmaneuvered., and he realized i:. But he also knew that it was not politically wise to give in too precipitously to Hideyoshi’s takeover. ‘Over the neat several years Ieyasu worked off the formal obligations of his oath of allegiance to Nobunaga by taking up the cause of Nobunaga's second son Nobukatsu (1558-1630) against Hideyoshi, This involved him in some actual tests of stength with Hideyoshi. In 1589, Ieyasu invaded Teyotomi territory in Owari, winning a limited engagement at Nagakute. But his forces fought to a stalzmate at Komaki, Although theseat the time seemed to be mino: engazements, in retrospect itis clear that they constituted something of a turning point. Militariy they instilled in each man a respect for the other. Modern historians have suggested that this was leyasu’s first “political war,” one that he shrewcly ended by agreeing, for political effect, to a formal compact of submission with Hideyoshi. Obviously Hideyoshi also found it expedient aot to push to the imit. The agreement was consuramated in 1586 by Ieyasu’s formal visit of submission to Hide- yoshi at Osaka Castle. leyasu’s second son was given to Hideyoshi for adoption; one cf Hideyeshi’s sisters was given in marriage to Ieyasu and for 2 period Hideyoshi’s mother was kept as @ hostage in Ieyasu’s household. At the time these exchanges wer: being negotiated, Ieyasu moved his castle headquarters farther to the east at Sumpu. From 1586 to Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, Ieyasu served as a willing ally. Having stood his own in battle agaiast Hideyoshi, he was treated with respect and caution by the latter. As a consequence he was able to avoid depleting his own military resources by fighting Hideyoshi’s battles. While Hideyoshi was sending gigantic armies into Shikoku and Kyushu to carry his conquest into western and southern Japan, Teyasu managed to stay in the east exparding his heldings, improving his military capacity, and perfectiag his adzministrative machinery. He also greatly enlarged his castle at Sumpu, t0 which he gathered large bodies of retainers and merchant and serviz2 personnel. It was during these same years that he carried forward the systematic survey of cultivated land, now definitely adopting she method preferred by Hideyoshi that stressed paymént of the annual land tax in rice. The survey became the base cn which en effective system of material extrac- tion was built and the secruitmeat of military manpower from both samurai and peasants wes standardized. 10 Toi Edohaf, pp. 43-50 ‘THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 137 By 1589, after the subjugetion of Kyushu, she only major daimyo oldouts requiring Hideyoshi’s attention were the Hj6 of the Kanto and the Date, Gamé, Tsugara, and others in the far north, Hideyoshi attempted to win over the Hojo by using Ieyasu as a go-between, Ieyasu had previously given his dacghter in marriage to Hojo Ujinao (1562-92). But unlike the daimyo of Shikoku and Kyushu, Ujinao refused to capitulate. Hideyoshi prepared for tattle. This time Teyasu was obliged to assis: Hideyoshi in the attack cn Odawara Castle, the eadquarters of the great H5j6 domain that included the six Kanto provinces of Iau, Sagami, Musashi, Skimdsa, Kazusa, and Awa. In the iavestment, Ieyasu took the initiative, leading an army of some thirty thousand men in six divisions. The Hoj6 held out for some :hree months, but the end was inevitable, Odawara Castle surrendered in the summer of 1590. Before this the Date and other daimyo to the north sought out Hideyoshi’s camp and quickly pledged their alle- siance. Hideyoshi tad pacified the realm. All daimyo were now his, xassals, and he could claim to be the chief of the military estate (buke 10 tryd). The early Kanté years Following the Hj6 surrender, Hideyashi ordere¢ Ieyasi to move out of his home Tokai provinces and to occupy the demain vacated by the Hojo." The assignment was on the surface ar. advancement. Posses- sion of six of eight Kant provinces made Ieyasu’s holdings the largest in the land, larger in fact than Hideyoshi’s. But the transfer moved Jeyasu farther from the center of political affaiss, and it uprootec him ard his followers from the areas where their histeric roots were deep- est and most secure. The move thus came as a shock to leyasu’s senior vassals, who saw it as tantamount to exile Tae rapidity with which Ieyasu accomplished the Kant transfer is ‘mazing. Literally chousands of families had to pick up their entire households and equipment and find new houses in urfamiliar teri- tary, And this had :o be done with great expedition, Ieyasu received Hideyoshi’s formal commard on the thirteenth day of the seventh month. He had had some prior warning dating back to the fourth month and hence kad been able to make some advance plans. * He entered the small castle of Edo, his rew headquarters, by the first of 1 Kuali, Kempo Ais, pp. 8 ': Kama, Kemyota hs, ps (90; an Kitajia, Bd bata, pp. taf, 138 THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM the eighth month. This was the official cempletion of his move, al- though it took nearly a year longer to settle in. Just as rapidly, Hideyeshi fillec the castles given up by Ieyasu in tae Tokai provinces with his own rested vassals. ‘The transfer into the Kant6 was a major turning point in the Toku- gaia forunes, with results that were in many ways unanticipated, at least by Hideyoshi. ‘The move out of the ancestral Mikawa homeland was bound to >reak the long-esiablished ties of command among Teyasn’s vassal band, the lower village samurai, and the peasantry, thereby forcing Ieyasu © establish a network of command over an unfamiliar base. “There is some evidence that Hideyoshi expected the village samurai of the Kanto to give Ieyasu a difficalt time, But Teyasu’s earlier experi- cence ir handlirg territories obtained by conquest ~ Kai Prov:nce won from Takeda was a good example — proved critical in the Kanté. Rather than displace the rural samurai and even some enfeoffed vassals, left tenind by the Hoj6, Teyasu used them es best he could, -ecogniz~ ing the status they had held under the HajS and using them as rural intendants or recruiting them into his and his retainers? vassal bonds. For all the difficulties that attended the transfer, pessession of the Kanto ~ the historic homeland of the bushi class ~ provided Ieyasu ‘with what was to prove the ideal ase from which to win the national hegemony. Moreover, from the point of view of institutional develop- ment, the major difference between the domain structure of the daimyo of the Sengoku era and those of the Edo ere was visible in the greater degree to which the latter had redaced the independence of their vassals. During the Sengoku era mest bushi remained in the countryside living off their hereditary landholdings. This was true even for the high-ranking military offices with personal fiefs and even castles. Although independent enfeoffimert mean: that the daimye overlord was less burdened by the need to provide sheer and mainte- hance for thesz members of his vassal band, he was at a disedvantage wwhea it came to asserting his authority over them. The so-called Sengoku daimyo was lord of a decentralized domain. made up of ¢ patchwork of daimyo cemesge and vassel fiefs. The daimyo of the sevenceenth ceatury had drawn their housemen, down to a fairly low level, away from their fiefs, thereby making them dependent on sti- pends paid out of the daimyo's granaries." This condition is seen by 13 This practice dtinguibes the posession of a land fe (higyc) fom the ree aipend (orl, See Kia Home 39-98-43 THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 139 seme scholars as indicative of the degree to which daimyo achieved the ultimate Edo period norm in sociopolitical evolution. Moreover it is apparent that in those parts of Japan where either the daimyo cr the rural samurai, or both, had remained ia place for several generations, daimyo authority over houseband vessals as harder to achieve. “Daimyo ebsolutism,” as the capacity to exact domainwide compli- ance with directives from the castle headquarters has been called, flourished best whece the private tie berween the daimyo’s houseband and the peasantry ~ in other words, -he jizamurai system — had been completely destroyed.' The resulting structure was one in which the samurai had been drawn into the daimyo’s castie headquarters and the peasantry had been placed under sn impersonal field administration controlled from the central castle. ‘There was thus a hidden advantage for leyasu in the forced transfer te the Kanto, for it obliged him to reorganize from scratch the relationship of his vassal band to the peasantry. The domain transfer was an experience that nearly all the daimyo who made the transition into th: Edo period were to encounter at least onze. One could say that it was almest a precondition for a successful transition into the bakuhare era Possession of the Kanto made Ieyasu lord cf te largest domain in tke country, well over twice the size of his Tokai holdings. There is no accurate record of the total productive >ase of leyasu’s Tokai domain, buc it is pessible to get a gereral idea by extrapolation irom the hold ings of the daimyo who were placed in the territory vacated by Ieyasu in 1590. Taese add up to just over r million koku.'* The extent of the Kanto domain taken over from the Hojo is also not precisely kaown beccuse of the complexity of the t-aasfer and the fact that different metaods of calculation were used at the time. [a gross terms, however, ike total was in the neighboshood of 2.5 million to 3.0 million koku. ‘The task of administering and defending this greatly expanded terri- tery meant that Ieyesu had either to dalegate more authority to officers of his field administration or to expand his military and administrative personnel. He chose the latter method, relying or. the services of both old and newly enrolled vassals. He, of course, took with him as many 2 possible of his own housemen. But he was sill shorthanded and had tc adopt into his service numerous samurai who had been left behind 44 Facan aatsie ofthe evolution ofthe “marae” fa in ere of te peogresive witha of th samura fo their un es, se Junmonuke Soak, wits RonaléP. Toby, “The Cranging Rival af Dalnyo Contra inthe Emergence ofthe Batabas, Stat,” Hal, Nagas, sd Yaramur, edt Jopan Before Tuga, Pp. 27-96 ‘5 Nikamura Richly Tekno, p11 140 BAKUHAN SYSTEM by the Hoja or who had been cast adrift n other provinces by the fortunes of war.* "As a master plan for Eis new domain, Ieyasu adopted Edo as his capital and distributed his retainers arouné Edo according to certain guidelines. Lands directly held by the head of the Tokugawa house as granary linds (eurair-chi or gory, later texzy6) were located close to Edo; small fief holders were placed not more thar: a single night’s stopover away from Edo; and holders of large domains were placed at a greater distance from tke center. These las: were, for the most part, set out ab castlz holders and were situated with an eye to strategic location, Teyast put the actual task of fief assignment into the hands ofa team of officers with experience in land-tax administration. The team was under the supervision of Sakakibara Yasamasa (15431606), the first among his daimyo-class retainers and shortly to occupy the castle of Tatebayashi, The transition team worked quickly and effectively It set aside lands with a total assessed value of roughly one million koku (che new standard unit of land assessment based on assessed rice produc- tion) or leyasu’s private granary land. This, being about 39 percent of the total, was consideratly more chan the Hojo chief had held, Gra- nary land was placed under the administration of Ina Tadatsugu (1350-1610) and a group of subordinace land stewards, The latter were drawn in large part from personnel who remained in their ances- tral villages and who hac previously served the Takeda, Imagawa, or Hojo. They were selected for their familiarity with the area. “The remaining territory was divided among eyasu’s enfeolfed vas- sals, Of these, thirty-eight were assigned Boldings of from 10,000 to 120,000 kolku. This meant that they were of daimyo size and function, but they were rot considered daimyo because they were rear vassals in the eyes of the national overlord. All together, this group held about t million koku. Thirty-two retainers holding from 2,00 to 5,000 koku accoumted for another 142,000 Roku, and several hundred lesser hhousemen each enfeoffed at less than 2,000 koku took up the remain- ing 426,000 koku. The intial fief distribution was carried out on the basis of the cadastral records objained from the Hoj>. Because the Hojo bad retained the old monetary payment system of celculation (kandake), the Tokugawa soon initiated a round of new surveys using 16 Fos more limited example of vasal band organation by acreton, se my “The Theta Howse an cg Reinert in Sen," John W. Halland Marius Bunsen, ed. Sus inthe Thsutnimal Husny of Eary Modem Japon (Priston, NJ. Pesce Unies Pres {968} pp 19-88 Asa see Tau Edo a PD. St THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 141 the ricetax system.” It would take the next several decades for the Tokugawa to convert their Kant6 holdings to the specifications of Hideyoshi’s survey system (Taik® Aenchi). Aside from the assignment of his military followers, Ieyesu was occupied with a mass of logistical problems. Hfe faced the construction of a suitable castle, the draining of swampy land for urban construction, the drawing of fresh water into the city, and the improvement of port facilities. Hideyoshi’s last years In the cight years from the fell of Odawara to the time of his death in 1598, Hideyoshi worked energetically, though rather erratically, to instizutionalize his military power into.a natioral government. Despite his domestic military successes, Hideyoshi still felt the need to demon- stratz his powers of command over kis vassal daimyo, even by compel ling them to engage in foreign invasions. This would appear to be his, main reason for the conquest of Chine that he attempted in 1390." ‘When the invasion ended in failure, many of the participating daimyo had deen measurably weakened. And because the invasion was still in progress when Hideyoshi died, the fact that several important daimyo ‘were out of the country at the time contributed to the political confu- son that followed tke hegemon’s death, ‘Meanwhile Ieyasu, and a aumber of daimyo whose domains were located at great distances from the takeoff point for the invasicn of Korea, had been spared a cebilitating involvement in the ven:ure. Ieyasu sent only a token backup force to northem Kyushu in 1592, and this did not see action. Ieyasu cleverly tcok the opportuni:y to expand and strengthen his Edo Castle and carry out military and civil admunistrative programs. Thus at :he time of Hideyoshi’s death in 1598, Ieyasu enjoyed a much more secure and powerful position than ke had when he first acquired the Kantd provinces. Although remarkably successful as a military leader, Hideyoshi proved less capable as a political organizer. Having beaten the daimyo imo submission, he had difficulty ia devising a governmental frame- work that would institutionalize his ckarismtic overlordship. What hie eventually did was to graft his military power onto the social pres- 17 Tr ale nndak sytem of tx management, stdin terms of monetary use) is phd a Natrona “Te Sah Dumont ean "in Hal, Napa, nd Yaamrs st Japon Bf ogous, 9. 2-8 18 The thesis tht Hivos eed the evasion of Koen salegeardis eae devloped cern th volume 142 TEE BAKUHAN SYSTEM tige of the high nobility, legitimizing himself through the title of ‘hampau and by his close proximity to the tarone."” It was not util Hideyoshi realized that fe was near the end of his life and that-he was putting the fate of his succession on Hideyori (1593-1615), ahild of five, that he tried to devise a formal system for delegating polical authority. The task of saieguarding Toyotomi rule, he placed in the hands of a board of five regents (go-tair). They were selected from among the most powerful of Hideyosi’s allies: namely, ‘Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was to remain it: Fushimi Castle as chief pol- icymaker and head of the board; Maedz Teshiie (1538-99), who was assigned to Osaka Castle as guardian to Hideyor!; Méri Terumoto (1553-1625); Kobayakawa Takakage (1533-97) (later succeeded by Uesegi Kagekatsu); and Ukita Hideie (1573-1655). The moreadminis- trative aspects of government became the responsibility of a board of five commissioners (go-bugyd): Asano Nagamasa (1544-1611), Maeda Gen’i (1539-1602), Ishida Mitsunari (156¢-1600), Mashita Nagamori (1545-1515), aad Natsuka Masaie (?—160c). All five had served for many years as members of Hideyoshi’s house administration. ‘This arrangement did create « central authority of sorts, able te make and carry out national policy in the immediate aftermath of Hideyoshi’s death, as it did in calling off tie Korean campaign. But the structure was inherently unstable, and once Hideyoshi passed from the scene it began to fall apart. The rmembers of the two boards were toe involved in their own damestic problems, so that one by one they abendoned the capital area on grounds of urgent business. The death of Maeda Toshiie in 1599 made Ieyasu by far the most experi: enced and powerful among the regents, and when on his own initiative hhe moved into the position in Osaka Castle vacated by Maeda Toshiie, he was recognized as the obvious tenka-dono (lord of the realm). Winning the tenka Teyasu’s path from here to the acquisition of recognized national leadership was not easily traversed. There were a number of power- ful da:myo heads of large daimyo leagues, located meinly in western Japan. who were not ready t6 accept @ takeover by Ieyasu without a struggle. There were also a number of lesser daimyo whose entire careers had been spent in the service of Hideyoshi and whose for- tunes were thereby tied to a continuation of the Toyotomi polity. 19 Seefootnote 4 THE TOKUGAWA HOUSE 43 This group consisted of house daimyo, like the Sve magistrates, and ideyoshi's close field generals like Kato Kiyomasa, Kuroda Naga- masa, and Fukushima Mascnori. Ther center of activity was Osaka Castle. But their cause lacked a single charismatic leader who could. keep them united, and it soon became apparent that major differ- ences of opinion divided the so-called admiristzative (bugyd) group srom the generals. Ieyasu did not openly declare his ambition to succeed Hideyoshi to ational hegemony, but increasingly he began to act the part. For stance, he entered into marriage alliances with other daimyo on his ‘own authority. In early 1600, after Maeda Teshiie’s death, he moved from Fushimi into the western enclosare of Osaka Castle, The numer- ous letters he directed to his fellow daimyo at this time were couched in statesmanlike terms of concern for the maintenance of peace.” ‘When Uesagi Kagekatsu (1555-1623), who had joined the ranks of the regents after Maeda Toshiie’s death, was reported to be mobilizing troops in his domain centered on Aizu, @ location that threatened the Tokugawa rear, Ieyasu expressed alarm and called for a counter- mobilization, ordering nearby daimyo to prepare a move again Aizu. By now Ieyasu was issuing orders as though ae had full national, authority, and he was being courted by daimyo members of the ‘Toyotomi coalition who began to offer him pledges of support, even sending hostages as a safeguard for the futuze. Among these were members of the Toyoromi “generals” group and ethers like the Ikeda (of Bizen) and the Yamanouchi (of Tét3mi). By tae summer of 1600, the country divided increasingly between those who saw an advantage ‘o supporting the Osaka group based on Hideyori’s potential as a symbol of national unity and those who saw Leyssu as the inevitable hhegemon of the future. The Osaka faction had among its most power- ful sapporters the Ukita, Chosokabe, Mori, Kenishi, Nebeshima, and Shimazu, daimyo whose lands were mainly in provinces west of Osaka and out of Ieyasu’s immediate reach. The supporters who clustered around Ieyasu were mainly based in the east. Ishida Mitsunari, the prime mover of the western faction, de- eunced Ieyasu’s move against Aizu asa usurpation of national author- ity aad called for punitive action. He assembled a large military force and began to march toward the Kanto. leyasu, having anticipated this ove, left the Aizu operation to others, notably Date Masamune and. 2» leyn's commespondenceis conveniently arrangec by KuwataTadachik ic Tog lea, sam gam rng (Tokyo: Shin buts osha 197 144 THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM ‘Yaki Hideyasu, and quicely prepared to meet the threat from: Osaka. As he led his army out of the Kant, all the dairayo along the way opened their castles to him, detaching fo:ces to join the mobilization. On the fifteefth day of the ninth month (October 21, 1690), the ‘combined armies of the two factioas met in battle at Sekigahara. It is estfinated that the eastera league committed some seventy thousand ‘men to the engegement, The western league fieldec some eighty thou- sand men, but they were poorly positioned and of uncertain reliability. Only about half of them went into action. The tattle was in doubt throughcut the morning, but the cefection of Kobayakawa turned the tide. Victory went to the eastern coalition. Teyasu used the victory at Sekigahara to assert his national authority over the military estate and to make drastic changes in the composition ‘and placement ef the daimyo and their holdings throughout Japan.” In the immediate aftermath of the battie, zighty-seven daimyo who had opposed Ieyasu were defeated and their lands ccnfiscated. The ands of three others were drastically reduced in size. All together, a total of 6,221,690 Roku were taken from [2yasu’s daimyo ofponents. Another 1.35 million kotu were taken from the Tayotomi house and made available for reallocation to other daimyo ar for inclusion in Teyasu’s personal holdings. Even greater changes were brought about by the transfer of forty-three daimyo from one location to another and the creation of new daimyo. The authority to invest new daimyo rested on Ieyasu’s claim to hegemony ever the ~rarrior estare. Prior to the battle Ieyasu counted among his cadet branch heads and Eeredicary housemen forty whose holdings were of 10,000 kcku or more. He was now able to set these men out as full-fledged daimyo under his own ppateat. All were given domain increases. Another twenty members of his houseband who, as of 1600, held fiefs of less tha 10,000 toku were raised to daimyo status. Finally, he granted daimyo status to eight rear vassals who hed distinguished themselves in Ieyasu’s eyes. 'All these confiscations, reassignments, and new creations added up to the greatest transfer of landholding in Japanese history. As a result, the balance of power was heavily :ilted ia Heyasu’s favor. Butit was not by any means secure or properly legitimized. In the immediate after- mata of Sekigchara, as the troops of the eastern ccalition poured into Osaka, Ieyasu undoubsedly had the miliary capacity to take over ‘Osaka Castle, at the time defended by Méri Teramoto on behalf of 21 The mun recect and detiled treatment the Skigatua seem found a the work of aja Tamowneapoilly Bataan Sh wo Ae, 150 FORMATION OF THE 2D0 BAKUFU 145 ‘Teyctomi Hideyori and his mother Lady Yodo. But leyasu was a stom trustee of the Toyotomi polity, and many of his most powerful supporters in the recent confrontation still had strong errotional ties to Hideyoshi. Ieyasu was also sobered by the fact that he had few trust- worthy allies in the western provinces. Hideyori, though suffering Joss of near.y two-thirds of the domain left by his father, was therefore allowed to retain Osaka Castle and a 650,000-koku domain in the surrounding provinces of Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi. Although re~ duced ro the status of daimyo in the world of the military hegemon, in the eyes of the court, Hideyori merited high raak as heir to Hideyoshi, who had retired with the high rank cf Taiko. It was clear to all that the ‘Tokugawa reality and the Toyotomi memory could not coexist for Jong, but Ieyasu, hoping to avoid a war that would reopen the question ‘of the ultimate loyalty of the military Kouses, felt constrained te put ‘off the final confrontation until 1614-15. FORMATION OF THE EDO BAKUFU In 1602, the Shimazu house of southern Kyushu ecknowledged Ieyasu’s overlordshia, thus completing the Sekigahara settlement. A year later Ieyasu was installed as sei- cai shogun by Emperor Go-Yozei 1h atticipation of ths appointment that would legitimize him as chief of the warrior estate (buke no t6ryd), Ieyasu had pet together a geneal- ‘gy that showed his descent from the Minamoto line. Concurrently with his new appointment he received the traditional designations Gen no chija (chief of the Minamoto lineage}. Funna, Shogaku rydin ‘beud (rector of the Junna and Shogaku collegss), second court rank, and udaijin (minister ofthe ght). These grandiloquent titles dic not in themselves add new politcal or military weight to Ieyasu, but as tokens of legitimacy, they all were smportant. And ther importance was underlined by the fact that Hiceyori, although only ten years of age, received the tile of inner minister (naidajin) at che same time. Osaka Castle, because of Hideyori’s high ccurt rank, held certain powers of appointment and recommendation t9 tae cotst that paral- leled those of Ieyasu, Obviously Hieyori was the darling of the court and was being used as a means of court involvement in warrior poiti- cal affairs. The closer the center of warror officers came to Kyoto, the

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