BLAS ET AL. VS.

SANTOS ET AL

Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children.
He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In
1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former
wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the
other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu
of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of
her husband; that she promises that shell be giving, upon her death, one-half of the
properties shell be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that
she can select or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment
accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix
of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage,
together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that
Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-
tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas property precisely
because Maxima promised that theyll be receiving properties upon her death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.
HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it
lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually
executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas estate) hence it is a compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the
reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an
obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal
properties in the will of the husband.
Justice Bautista Angelo, dissenting:
It should be noted that Maxima Santos promise to transmit is predicated on the condition that
she can freely choose and select from among the heirs and legatees of her husband those to
whom she would like to give and bequeath depending on the respect, service and
companionship that they may render to her. Her commitment is not an absolute promise to
give to all but only to whom she may choose and select. And here this promise has been
substantially complied with when she disposed one-tenth of the property to some legatees
named in Simeons will.
GR No. 165300 Ferrer vs Diaz

FACTS: Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazs represented the latter to obtain a loan to Ferrer. The
loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner claims that prior to said loan,
Comandante executed an instrument in his favor entitled Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over
a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diaz, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by
Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to
settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate
Mortgage Contract against the Diaz and Comandante.

ISSUE: Whether or not waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another by an heir for a future inheritance
valid?

HELD: No the waiver is not valid. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that no contract may be entered
into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be
considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract
may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of
Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1)That the succession has not yet been opened; 2)
That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) That the promissor has, with
respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. In this case, there is
no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been
opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise
present considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of
the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a
right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear
that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the formers future inheritance as
embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided)
executed by her in petitioners favor.
US VS. CARLOS

FACTS:

The accused had been a consumer of electricity furnished by the Manila Electric Railroad and Light
Company for a building containing the residence of the accused and three other residences. The
representatives of the company, believing that more light was being used than their meter showed,
installed an additional meter (Exhibit A) on a pole outside of defendants house, and both it and the
meter (Exhibit B) which had been previously installed in the house were read. Exhibit A read 218
kilowatt hours; Exhibit B, 745 kilowatt hours. On March 3, 1910 each was read again, Exhibit A showing
2,718 kilowatt hours and Exhibit B, 968.

In other words the actual consumption, according to the outside meter, was more than ten times as
great as that registered by the one inside. Obviously this difference could not be due to normal causes.

The city electrician testified that the electric current could have been deflected from the inside meter by
placing thereon a device known as a jumper.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to one year eight
months and twenty-one days presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party, The Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company, in the sum of P865.26, to the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to the payment of the costs.

Ignacio Carlos was accused of the crime of theft for taking away two thousand two hundred and
seventy-three (2,273) kilowatts of electric current, of the value of nine hundred and nine (909) pesos
and twenty (20) cents Philippine currency.

Counsel for the appellant insists that the only corporeal property can be the subject of the crime of
larceny, and in the support of this proposition cites several authorities for the purpose of showing that
the only subjects of larceny are tangible, movable, chattels, something which could be taken in
possession and carried away, and which had some, although trifling, intrinsic value, and also to show
that electricity is an unknown force and cannot be a subject of larceny.

And article 518 of the revised penal code fixes the penalty for larceny in proportion to the value of the
personal property stolen.

ISSUE: Can electricity be a subject of theft?

RULING: It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded by electricians as a fluid, but its
manifestation and effects, like those of gas, may be seen and felt. The true test of what is a proper
subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal, but whether it is capable of
appropriation by another than the owner.

Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property and is capable of appropriation by another. So no error was committed by the trial court in
holding that electricity is a subject of larceny. The value of the electricity taken by the defendant was
found by the trial court to be P865.26. This finding is fully in accordance with the evidence presented. So
no error was committed in sentencing the defendant to indemnify the company in this amount, or to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The judgment being strictly in accordance with the law and the merits of the case and was affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

FORT BONIFACIO DEVT. CORP. VS. CIR ET AL.

Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs. CIRGR No. 158885/ 17068002 October 2009

Facts:

The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CIRs Decision which granted the
consolidatedpetitions of Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation restraining the respondents from
collecting frompetitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00 representing the transitional input tax credit
due it for the fourthquarter of 1996 and directed to refund to petitioner the amount of P347,741,695.74
paid as output VAT forthe third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input tax credit
available to petitioner for thesaid quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to such amount. The
respondents invoke Section 100of the old NIRC as amended by RA 7716 and Section 4.105.1 and
paragraph (A) (III) of the RevenueRegulation No. 7-95 limiting the 8% transitional input tax to the
improvements on real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration is meritorious.

Held:

No. The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit. The first VAT law, found in The term
goods or properties by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes real properties held primarily for
sale to costumers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business. Having been defined in Section100
of the NIRC, the term goods